



**Thesis**  
**By**  
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**Arts**


**Cultural Humanism and the Challenge  
of Global Justice**

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**September, 2014**

**CULTURAL HUMANISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL  
JUSTICE**

**BY**



**CLEOPAS CHIKA MBA (B.A. HONS, M.A.)**

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## DEDICATION


To Rose and Linus

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## CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this Ph.D. thesis titled: “**Cultural Humanism and the Challenge of Global Justice**” is an original work carried out by Cleopas Chika MBA under my supervision in the Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan.

30/9/2014  
Date



Supervisor

Prof J. O. Irele  
Department of Philosophy,  
University of Ibadan.

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## ABSTRACT

Philosophers of culture assert that culture is at the root of injustice and subversion of the principles of international cooperation; such that a theory of global culture ought to precede any universally valid principle of justice. In political philosophy, major writers on global justice have attempted to develop principles of justice that would apply universally; but these attempts have been largely unsuccessful because they failed to pay sufficient attention to the significant role culture plays in determining the basis of international cooperation. This study, therefore, examined extant positions on global justice and global culture, and proposed Frantz Fanon's cultural humanism as a theory of global culture, with a view to evolving a universally valid principle of justice that will engender a flourishing global order.

This study adopted as framework, Fanon's cultural humanism, which states that a universal cultural mix has become a reality, such that a particular culture is neither the basis of any individual or group identity, nor the grounds for treating anyone unjustly. Eight texts in *Philosophy of Culture*, including three canonical texts by Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (TWE); *Black Skin, White Masks* (BSWM); *Toward the African Revolution* (TAR) and nine in *Political Philosophy*, were purposively selected because they dealt extensively with global culture, cultural humanism and global justice. Critical analysis was deployed to interrogate the dominant standpoints on global justice, while the method of reconstruction was used to develop the idea of inter-cultural equality, a principle of global justice that derives from cultural humanism.

Texts in *Political Philosophy* (including *Global Justice: Seminal Essays*), established that major writers on global justice: the exponents of the political conception, who regard the state as the basis of international cooperation and the cosmopolitans, who take the individual as the basic unit of consideration in thinking about global justice, do not take full cognisance of the overriding role cultural beliefs play in determining acceptable principles of international justice. Texts in *Philosophy of Culture* generally espouse the view that cultural prejudices are at the root of global injustice and that a theory of global justice ought to take cognisance of cultural pluralism. Fanon asserted that universality resides in the decision to recognise and accept the reciprocal relativism of different cultures (TWE, TAR), while setting aside the false claim that any particular culture is the source of the truth (BSWM). Critical reflections revealed that Fanon's cultural humanism advocates the principle of inter-cultural equality which values human well-being and cooperation above cultural differences, while showing that there are no superior or unblemished national cultures. Inter-cultural

equality, thus, recognises and overcomes cultural sentiments and prejudices which constitute serious obstacles in the way of realising global justice; and this consequently offers the requisite conditions for inter-cultural equality to engender a flourishing global order.

Fanon's cultural humanism generates inter-cultural equality, a universally valid principle of justice that values human cooperation and well-being above cultural differences. This implies that recognising and respecting cultural pluralism is capable of engendering an egalitarian and flourishing global order.

**Key words:** Fanon's cultural humanism, Global justice, International cooperation, Global culture, Inter-cultural equality

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## INTRODUCTION

*They consider us as animals; they target us with unconventional weapons; they think we are animals.<sup>1</sup>*

*[T]he Arab['s]... inflamed power of imagination presents things to him in unnatural and distorted images, and even the spread of his religion was a great adventure. The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. [T]he Negro is lazy, soft and trifling. [B]ut the Germans, the English, and the Spaniards [are] those who are most distinguished from all others in the feeling of the sublime.<sup>2</sup>*

The problem of justice is an old one in philosophy. It has received attention from the most adept minds in the history of the discipline, including the likes of Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Indeed, the problem of how to maintain a just social arrangement arises whenever there is more than one person. Notably, many traditional philosophers of justice were concerned, to different degrees, with how their conception of justice would apply to other societies and possibly affect the world as a whole. These earlier discussions concerning how to universalise certain aspects of domestic or state-centric notions of justice have been carried on under different nomenclatures, viz.. “international ethics”, “international justice” or “the law of nations”. However, the recent question of global justice (in political philosophy) or the problem of developing consistent principles of justice that would apply globally marks a watershed in the Universalists’ conception of justice in political theory.<sup>3</sup> At all events, discussions on global justice have risen to become what some consider the most important discourse in contemporary political philosophy. Two factors account for the rise in prominence. The first is the theoretical

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<sup>1</sup> An unknown Bahraini teenage boy wounded and traumatised during the series of protests staged by the youth and people of Bahrain; aimed at toppling the oppressive regime of King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa in February, 2011. A brutal crackdown on the protesting opposition was organised by the al-Khalifa regime forces in conjunction with invited troops from three other Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and much later a South Asian country, Pakistan. The al-Khalifa family has been ruling the oil rich Persian Gulf sheikhdom since mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, over 200 years ago. The al-Khalifa Dynasty has been effectively backed and sustained for decades by the United States of America and UK governments, up to the present. The sheikhdom is also home to the strategic American Fifth Fleet (comprising about 4,500 troops) or what Hillary Rodham Clinton calls “our Central Command Naval Forces” in the Persian Gulf (from 1947 to the present). No attempt was made by the American government under President Barack Obama or the Fifth Fleet to stop or curtail the enforced disappearances, torture, rapes and killings of protesters by regime and invited forces.

<sup>2</sup> Kant, I. 2007a [1764], *Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime*, P. Guyer, Trans., p. 2:243 – 254; also see Kant, I. 2007b [1775], *Of the different races of human beings*, H. Wilson and G. Zoller, Trans., p. 2: 438.

<sup>3</sup> Universalists here refer to philosophers who believe that justice is a thing that can be conceived and applied universally, as mentioned in the first couple of sentences.

trajectory of political philosophy since the publication of John Rawls' very influential book, *A Theory of Justice* in 1971. The second reason is globalisation; or the growing interdependence of all human societies as a result of major developments in technology.

In the field of Philosophy of Culture, some notable scholars and politicians have been insisting that cultural beliefs and practices constitute the primary factors why some societies and peoples are poor in the first place. They further argue that the poor should not be helped or allowed to migrate to other countries where they might be able to live fulfilled lives; so that they would not come to inconvenience the citizens of "culturally superior" and affluent societies. Lawrence Harrison, Samuel P. Huntington, David S. Landes, Mitt Romney and Representative Curry Todd are some of the influential scholars and politicians who have in recent times voiced and or tried to sustain certain aspects of this view. History reveals even more strident supporters of cultural essentialism or the view that somehow a people's putative culture imbues every single individual of that society with an immutable, irrevocable identity. Examples here include David Hume, Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel and Adolf Hitler.<sup>4</sup>

We find that people have been allowed or even forced to die or to suffer grave harm based on the rather weighty accusation that they are inferior humans because they allegedly belong to an inferior culture, a culture of laziness or a culture of weak rational capacity, or that they belong to a culture of savagery or to no culture at all. Enslavements, colonialism, apartheid, xenophobia, ethnic and religious bigotry, *cultural racism* and nativism are some historical and existing examples wherein cultural prejudices have at least constituted a major rationalising factor for entrenched denial of justice and the subversion of human rights. Cultural prejudice is defined here as any view that at first assumes that culture is an insular analytic and teleological category that interpretes the action and behaviour as well as the progress or the lack of it of human groups. In addition, a view is culturally prejudiced if it purports to deny that any human being has a culture; or if it casts or has the tendency to cast a particular putative culture in a bad light based on insufficient evidence or stereotyping. It would also amount to cultural prejudice to imply that we can predict *a priori* how each member of a human group would act in any given situation; or that we can predetermine the extent of their abilities in all circumstances based on the putative culture they were presumably born into or necessarily belong.

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<sup>4</sup> Hume, Kant and Hegel may have had intentions quite different from that of Hitler when they inscribed racist views, but in the end, one central argument runs through the writings of the quartet in this area: culture accounts for the sharp distinction between different "breeds" of human beings.

Relying on Frantz Fanon's anti-colonial and cultural theory, the research develops a theory of global culture it calls *cultural humanism*. Cultural humanism states that a universal cultural mix has become a reality, such that a particular culture is neither the basis of any individual or group identity, nor the grounds for treating anyone unjustly. It further holds that in our world of interdependencies, cultural differences, pluralisms and multi-formed identities, we ought to recognise the very fact that even though we all have a culture, no one belongs to a particular putative culture.<sup>5</sup> We must also keep in mind the very fact that no particular culture is the source of *the* truth. In clear terms, cultural humanism denies that it is possible to describe or identify an individual in terms of a particular putative culture. It further denies that the world is made up of human beings – peoples and groups – that can be calibrated into quantised cultures. In addition, the essay contends that humanity, understood in Fanonian-Patočkan terms as free beings “living in problematicity” of truth is more important than culture.<sup>6</sup> It then follows that human interest trumps culture in our general consideration of justice. The sum total of this argumentation is that the idea of global justice is possible, but it ought to be based on the principle of justice we call *intercultural equality*: in a world of cultural humanism. A major contribution of the thesis is that it demonstrates that philosophers, theorists and creators of global justice ought to, as a matter of necessity; precede future theories of the millennium with a theory of global culture.

To properly understand the point of entry of this essay into the debate on global justice, it might prove useful to consider the following Hilary Putnam's distinction carefully:

It is possible to distinguish two species of moral philosophers. One species, the legislators, provide detailed moral and political rules. If one is a philosopher of this sort, then one is likely to think that the whole problem of political philosophy (for example) would be solved by devising a constitution for the Ideal State. But, as Stanley Cavell has emphasized, there are philosophers of another kind, the philosophers whom he calls ‘moral perfectionists’. It is not, he hastens to tell us, that the perfectionists deny the value of what the legislative philosophers are attempting to do; it is that they believe there is a need for something *prior* to principles or a constitution, without which the best principles and the best constitution would be worthless.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In the whole of this analysis, we use “belong” and “have” deliberately.

<sup>6</sup> See Patočka, J. 2007, *Living in problematicity*; Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth* and Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*.

<sup>7</sup> Putnam H. 2004, *Levinas and Judaism*, p. 36.



The general motive of this research is in keeping with the pursuits of philosophers of the latter sort, the “perfectionists”. Thus, the essay does not deny the value of the important work already done by moral and political philosophers in the area of legislating rules and principles of justice that would apply globally, helping to eradicate world poverty and entrench the fulfillment of human rights; rather it argues that there are fundamental prior considerations that address what it means to be human, to have a culture or an identity, or to live in the same shared world. The essay’s contention is that if considerations of the latter sort are not addressed to any agreeable extent, then the quest for a globally just world will remain fruitless. This work is mainly a contribution in this regard.

This work begins with an **Introduction** which offers a bird’s eye view of the general concerns of the essay. It is then followed by five consecutive chapters.

**Chapter One** titled “**Evolution of the Idea of Global Justice**” relies on the classical writings of four major philosophers, one for each major epoch in philosophy, viz., Plato, St. Augustine, Kant and Rawls to seek both a background to the idea of global justice as well as define our approach to the discourse. The critical finding of this chapter is that philosophers have since begun to seek a universal account of the morality of justice. However, it was not until Rawls that major philosophers began to attempt to develop consistent ideas and principles of justice that could apply to the world as a whole.

**Chapter Two** titled “**Problematising Global Justice: Political and Cosmopolitan Perspectives**” consequently examines the extant output of the raging controversy between those who agree with Rawls (i.e. the advocates of the *political conception*) that state sovereignty is the basis of international cooperation and since we do not have a world state, it must follow that global justice is an unachievable utopia, on the one hand and the cosmopolitans on the other. The cosmopolitans argue that the individual, not the nation-state ought to be regarded as the ultimate unit of moral consideration in thinking about (global) justice. In the end, the study criticises the positions of both camps for not taking cognisance of the overriding role attitudes towards culture could play in determining the bases of international cooperation. The chapter argues that if this fact is recognised, then an acceptable theory of global justice would be preceded by a theory of global culture.

**Chapter Three** titled “**Fanon’s Cultural Humanism**” relies on three canonical texts by Frantz Fanon viz., *The Wretched of the Earth* (TWE); *Black Skin, White Masks* (BSWM); *Toward the African Revolution* (TAR) to begin to trace the contours of Fanon’s notion of “cultural humanism” which provides the framework for evolving a universally valid principle of justice. Fanon’s cultural humanism states that a universal cultural mix has become a

reality, such that a particular culture is neither the basis of any individual or group identity, nor the grounds for treating anyone unjustly. Fanon asserted that universality resides in the decision to recognise and accept the reciprocal relativism of different cultures (TAR and TWE), while setting aside the false claim that any particular culture is the source of the truth (BSWM). This further implies that a global culture need not emerge in the form of a mono-cultural world.

Thus, **Chapter Four** titled “**The Idea of Inter-Cultural Equality**” interrogates cultural humanism with a view to evolving a universally valid principle of justice that would guarantee a humane and flourishing global order. To do this, however, the work reviews and criticises some extant theories of global culture including those of Kant, J. S. Mill, Samuel P. Huntington, Lawrence Harrison, David S. Landes and Charles Taylor. Relying on texts by Fanon, Amartya Sen, Edward Said, Emmanuel Levinas, Diana Wylie, Nigel Gibson and Amilcar Cabral, the chapter propounds a theory of global culture which allows for cultural freedom and recognises the dynamics of cultural mutation. Ultimately, the chapter denies that it is possible to categorise human beings under quantised cultures. Here the study establishes that cultural sentiments and cultural prejudices constitute serious obstacles in the way of reforming the current global order. It then concludes that the utopian vanishing point on the horizon of the global discourses on justice and culture is a world of inter-cultural equality, galvanised effectively by the vivifying wellspring of cultural humanism. Inter-cultural equality values human well-being and cooperation above cultural differences, while showing that there are no superior or unblemished national cultures. Inter-cultural equality thus recognises and overcomes cultural sentiments and prejudices which constitute serious obstacles in the way of realising global justice; and this consequently offers the requisite conditions for inter-cultural equality to engender a flourishing global order.

**Chapter Five** titled “**Justice and the Imperatives of a New Global Order**” examines the findings of the previous chapters with a view to launching sustained criticisms on the drivers of the presently unjust global order such as neoliberalism and capitalism. It arrives at the conclusion that unless the shibboleths of these “isms” are reformed on the basis of cultural humanism, then global justice will remain an unachievable utopia. Critical reflections reveal that the principle of inter-cultural equality provides a viable pathway for reforming the current global order and engendering human well-being and flourishing. Inter-cultural equality thus overcomes the inadequacies that characterised earlier studies on global justice that did not take full cognisance of the fact that cultural differences and sentiments are serious obstacles in the way of realising global justice.

The work ends with a **Conclusion** which reviews the main claims and findings of the research and points to new directions for further research.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF GLOBAL JUSTICE

*Man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all.*

— Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC)<sup>1</sup>

This chapter does two things: (a) it enunciates the approach to (political) philosophy deployed in this work, and (b) examines various classical commitments to the *idea* of justice; the main aim being to rely on some of the most adept minds in the discipline to mark the trajectory of the discourse on justice and the Universalist hope in several of such theories.<sup>2</sup>

#### 1.1: (Political) Philosophy, Universalism and Inter-disciplinarity<sup>3</sup>

It appears that each time a political philosopher attempts to make a “clear” distinction between political philosophy and political theory, the chief aim has never really been to make any such clear distinction between the two disciplines. The pre-occupation of these philosophers — always seems to be — a self-conscious effort to attempt to justify the existence of political philosophy or philosophy itself as an autonomous discipline rather than an overarching commitment to say clearly what political philosophy is all about.<sup>4</sup> This has the consequences of occluding such distinctions and occulting the task of the political philosopher. In reality, understanding the proper meaning, scope and limits of political philosophy requires that we do three simple things:

- (1) say what political philosophy is all about, and what it is not;
- (2) identify the central problems tackled by political philosophers, and;

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, 1993, *Politics*, quoted in *Microsoft Encarta® 2009* [DVD].

<sup>2</sup> I leave the clarification for what it might mean to talk about the *idea* of justice as different from *conceptions* of justice until much later in Chapter Four.

<sup>3</sup> I have relied largely on a similar notion of (political) philosophy to be found in my unpublished M.A. dissertation: 2008, *Political parties and civic republicanism*, p. 2 – 5.

<sup>4</sup> See for example, Raphael, D. D. 1976: *Problems of political philosophy*, Revised Ed.. (esp. p. 1 – 26); Okolo, M. S. C. 2007: *African literature as political philosophy* (esp. p. 22 – 27). See also Grant R.W. 2002, *Political Theory, Political Science, and Politics*, p. 577 – 595; White, A. K. 1950, *The Nature and Study of Politics*, p. 291 – 300.

- (3) attempt to alert us as to at what point political philosophy might become an interdisciplinary venture, and then, perhaps, coalesce in certain respects with the commitments of the historian or the political scientist, for example.

We attempt to do these three things here bearing in mind the overall concerns of this work.

Over the ages, the central problems of political philosophy have been a rigorous, self-conscious attempt to proffer solutions to seemingly intractable problems of human societies. To this end, philosophers attempt to answer deep, difficult and slippery questions about what it means to maintain justice in a political community; how can we justify the existence of a particular model of the state, understood as the fabric of human society? Can we offer morally defensible justification for the existence of the state and the instruments and values that undergird its institutions and functions? What are the criteria upon which we may confer legitimacy on a particular government or regime? What are the scope and limits of political authority? On what grounds, if any, can we justify political obligation?<sup>5</sup>

In attempting to answer the above questions, John Rawls tells us, it has come to the notice of philosophers that the basis of (sometimes long periods of) “deep and sharp conflicts” regarding what acceptable answers to these questions could be has in turn been a quarrel over what the meaning, contents, and application of such political concepts should be. To overcome this challenge, the political philosopher wields the philosophical tool of conceptual clarification or the clarification of ideas. The clarification of ideas helps us to critically evaluate our beliefs and ideas concerning what it means to have a just society, for example.<sup>6</sup> To be sure, the ultimate aim of clarifying our ideas is to make lighter the onerous task of reconstructing our existing political beliefs and ideas, including those that have to do with justice and society. But, then again, the philosopher does not do this with the aim of offering “final” answers to these questions, rather, the aim, usually, is to (re)present political issues “in such a way as to provoke

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<sup>5</sup> Dudley Knowles has cast the difficult questions tackled by political philosophers in a slightly different wording: “does the state have a legitimate claim to authority or do citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law, or a duty of allegiance?; how should the state be constituted?; how far should the coercive activity of the state be constrained by the freedom or right of the citizen?; [and finally] what principles determine the just allocation of goods and services?” Whichever way the problems of political philosophy are cast, they remain questions that any answer(s) proffered is/are bound to be controversial. For the views of Knowles just cited, see Knowles, D. 2003, *Political philosophy*, p. 329 -- 347.

<sup>6</sup> The point here is that when concepts like “justice” or “state” are clarified, certain ambiguities surrounding them that could generate misunderstanding and discord simply disappear.

critical reflection,” on the seemingly “difficult, if not impossible” social and political conflicts.<sup>7</sup> And this is capable of helping us “to find reasoned common ground for political agreement.”<sup>8</sup> Thus, “one task of political philosophy,” Rawls argues — “its practical role... is to focus on deeply disputed questions to see whether despite appearances, some underlying basis of philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered.” Even when this fails, Rawls, adds, political philosophy can still attempt to narrow down diverging philosophical and moral persuasions — which underlie the root of political differences — to a point where social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect among citizens can still be maintained.<sup>9</sup>

Rawls identifies a second role of political philosophy, which is that it attempts to perform the function of orientating or re-orientating a people into a deeper understanding and appreciation of how their political and social institutions as a whole function. This in turn enables the people to understand and appreciate how they stand with these institutions as different from their standing in families and voluntary organisations.<sup>10</sup> A final role of political philosophy which Rawls identifies is that it provides us with the tools and dispositions that allow us to continually revise our political beliefs and convictions. For this reason, “we regard political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as probing the limits of practicable political possibility.”<sup>11</sup> It is precisely in its critical posture that political philosophy parts ways with political ideology. This is because ideologies tend to offer final answers to the problem(s) of organising human society. Final answers that are in many cases poorly defended with rationally indefensible arguments that may be based on biases and sentiments; or worst still, an uncanny willingness to tell the people exactly what they may want to hear; especially if the ideologue could find a way to twist the people’s nascent or even misguided beliefs to achieve certain selfish ends.

Now, it has been said by political philosophers like D. D. Raphael, that while political philosophy aims at developing normative political theories or theories about what ought to be the

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<sup>7</sup>This is because if indeed the philosopher as a result of any ulterior reason endorses a certain political theory with ‘finality’, his effort can only then pass as an ideology and no longer a part of political philosophy. See Okolo, M. S. C. 2007. *African literature*, p. 27; Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness: a restatement*, p. 2

<sup>8</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 2 – 3.

<sup>11</sup> Here, we ignore Rawls’ third role of political philosophy for lack of relevance to our present concerns; see Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 3 .

case in the political space universally, political theory or political science attempts to offer explanatory theories (based on empirical evidence) about particular states or existing political orders.<sup>12</sup> This seems to me a very dubious distinction between political science and political philosophy. To be sure, the political scientist, political sociologist and even the historian have to depend on an overwhelming collection of facts and evidence to propound their theories or explanations – but the truth is that – even the political philosopher has to depend on facts about extant political situations in order to postulate a political theory, attempt to revise existing theories, or as a matter of necessity, offer an alternative theory even at that normative (dis-empirical) order. Following Dewey’s claim that there is a sense in which every philosophy is a “national” project, it becomes easy to see the dubiousness of Raphael’s claims. To take just one example, Hobbes’ *Leviathan* is precisely an attempt to create a vision of an ideal state, governed by an absolute ruler that could prevent the kind of war, chaos and disorder that characterised the England of his time. His philosophical commitments led him to attempt to “provide a metaphysical foundation for political institutions, and to rise above the contingencies of history so as to view human community as it must be, in every age.”<sup>13</sup> But his inspiration was clearly drawn from his immediate factual *English* experiences. In like manner, in spite of his invocations of “*a priori* principles”, Kant’s political treatises were directly motivated by the epoch-making events of the French revolution. As a matter of fact, in his *To Eternal Peace*, he steadily cited historical, anthropological and statistical facts as bases for his utopian consideration of a possible World Community.

The distinction, therefore, that ought to be made between political philosophy and other disciplines that grapple with deep and troubling questions about human society and its organisation is that these other disciplines rely more on fieldwork, raw facts and evidence to explain human behaviour in politics and attempt to offer acceptable theories that explain and are likely to explain such human conducts in the future, in particular societies. The special commitments of the political philosopher on the other hand leads him to attempt to discover alternative principles and ideas – based on human nature for instance – that explain and would help him come up with a political theory that is likely to explain in an abstract and general way, human behaviour in politics. Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Marx

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<sup>12</sup> Raphael, D. D., 1976, *Political philosophy*, esp. Chapter One.

<sup>13</sup> Scruton, R. 1995, *A short history of modern philosophy: from Descartes to Wittgenstein*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 194.

are all examples of political philosophers who attempted to explain human conduct in politics by first attempting to construct a philosophically elaborate theory of human nature.

The political philosopher need not stop at the level of explanation. In many cases, they indeed move beyond explanatory theories to attempt to build (via intellectual flight) an alternative, morally acceptable political theory based on abstract and general ideas generated by human reason. At all events, the point being contested here is the claim that philosophical ideas and/or theories in politics are not empirically derived and merely state the ought. Even Plato, the most idealistic of (political) philosophers, wrote the *Republic* in response to the existing political situation in Athens of his time.<sup>14</sup> So he was responding to a practical situation in an abstract manner – by rejecting the existing order, and modelling an alternative, if utopian political construct.

Perhaps, it could further be argued, and I believe, correctly, that philosophy has always aimed at universalism or developing universal concepts; something that is not just true of political science.<sup>15</sup> Universalism or the idea of propounding theories that would be valid for all persons in every epoch and every human society is quintessentially philosophical. One need only take a look at the kind of questions raised in the major branches of philosophy like epistemology and ethics to realise this. Philosophers hope to develop universally valid theories by attempting to state the ideals of every concept, for every person and every society at all times.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, we do not see that political theory or political science merely explain existing (particular) political orders. Many political scientists in explaining the existing order often attempt to offer alternative theories about “what should have been the case” if a particular crisis situation were to be averted. They do this by making comparisons between two or more (dis)similar (historical) political situations, or even by returning to the ideals of an acceptable model of political

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<sup>14</sup> Indeed, Plato's political theory, like Hobbes' was affected by the unfavourable political climate of his time. See Russell, B. 1961, *History of Western philosophy*, p. 131.

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle famously suggested that “poetry is something more philosophical and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature of universals, whereas those of history are singular.” The lesson to be drawn here is that philosophical problems/statements are couched in universal language, and a field of inquiry maintains closer affinity to philosophy if it aims, even though unsuccessfully, at universals. See Danto, A. C. 1985. *Philosophy as/and/of literature*, p. 77; also cf. *ibid.*, p. 75

<sup>16</sup> At any rate, some (post)-modern philosophers in trying to rebut the position of the idealists and liberal theorists would argue that this aim of philosophy is not a realistic one. Concepts and their meanings keep changing and may apply differently to different societies and epochs. Even philosophy itself would not admit of any definition whose validity would be absolute and timeless. See for example, Iribadjakov, N. 1973, *Philosophy as a science*, p. 68.



arrangement – democracy for example. To do this effectively, requires that such a political scientist engages in the clarification of the idea of democracy or postulates what he conceives as what democracy ought to be! Here, finally, the political scientist is hand in glove with the political philosopher.<sup>17</sup>

In the end, let us note that in the contemporary period, political philosophers are increasingly depending on the works of scientists, social scientists and historians in their attempt to proffer credible political theories that would indeed endear political philosophy to not only the curious reader, but to policy makers as well.<sup>18</sup> This, of course, is in keeping with the now widely accepted cross-disciplinary approach to important discourses in the human sciences that seeks critical pathways, not only for theoretical, but even methodological convergences. This work on global justice attempts to follow the above sketched approach to political philosophy.<sup>19</sup>

## 1.2: Universal Justice in the History of Philosophy

It can plausibly be assumed that philosophers beginning from Plato to Rawls have been attempting to solve the problem of justice as a moral and political question within the state boundary. In this respect, Plato's idea of justice for example, would be seen as applicable to the Greek city-states and any others like it. Similarly, Locke's idea of the social contract would apply to Britain and other states that share similar ideals with it. Not only is this view

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<sup>17</sup> Joseph Losco and Leonard Williams have expressed in passing, views broadly similar to the ones expatiated in this section: "Though the term *theory* frequently has been applied to both normative and empirical studies, some political scientists reserve the term *philosophy* for studies of the former sort (e.g., what is the best regime?) and apply the term *theory* to the latter sort (e.g., what models best explain voter turnout?). Nonetheless, empirical theorists must make normative assumptions in generating explanatory model, and normative philosophers clearly must take empirical data into account in formulating defensible views." Also, Dipo Irele recognises the truism that "social facts... impinge on the normative perspective," but ends up arguing that political philosophy is to be studied from the "conceptual prism of the normative perspective." See Losco, J. and Williams, L. Eds., 2003, Introduction, *Political theory: classic and contemporary readings, volume II: Machiavelli to Rawls*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 6, n2; Irele, D. 1998, *Introduction to political philosophy*, p. 12 & 13; and Irele, D. 1993a, *Introduction to contemporary social and political thinkers*, p. 9.

<sup>18</sup> Indeed, the ethical and economics writings of many major older philosophers including Aristotle, Hume, Mill (especially) and Marx suggest that this is not really a new development in philosophy, or in the world of scholarly writing in general.

<sup>19</sup> My convictions here are further given credence by most of the seminal essays on global justice. Charles Beitz for example, was explicit in stating that the social science of international relations is less advanced than that of the domestic society; such that "empirical considerations are, if anything, more important in international than in domestic political theory..." See Beitz, C. R. 1999, [1979], *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 6.

inconsistent with the general view of philosophy enunciated above – that of the (sometimes implicit and at other times explicit) Universalist aims of the subject of philosophy – there are evidences, as this essay demonstrates, that philosophers have indeed (consciously or unconsciously) attempted to develop conceptions of justice that would be valid for all human societies. Philosophers have seemed anxious to think of justice as something we can conceive of a consistent pathway for its workability and applicability to individuals and societies the world over.<sup>20</sup> To illustrate this view, we choose four representative writers, one for each of the major epochs in philosophy in the Global North. These are Plato, Augustine, Kant and Rawls.<sup>21</sup> We shall begin with Plato.

### 1.2.1: Plato's Idea of Justice

Plato (427 – 347 BC) is regarded by many as the greatest philosopher of all time. He set out the finer points of his theory of justice in his celebrated *Republic*, which is considered “one of the world’s greatest works of philosophy and literature.”<sup>22</sup> But Plato began to prefigure his overall conception of justice in three earlier dialogues; *Protagoras*, *Gorgias* and *Meno*. In *Protagoras*, Plato installs justice as an embodiment of human nature, arguing that, “a man cannot be without some share in justice, or he would not be human.”<sup>23</sup> And if humans are naturally better fulfilled and freest in a political state, it stands to natural reason that (political) wisdom involves justice and moderation.<sup>24</sup> It must then follow that there could be no greater political

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<sup>20</sup> Whether or not they have been successful in doing so, and whether such intentions have always been noble is a different matter entirely, an issue that will concern us much later in this essay.

<sup>21</sup> St Augustine is an African writer but is chosen here to represent the medieval period, not just because his writings usually appear in the history of “Western” philosophy of that epoch, but for the greater reason that our effort is also to represent differing conceptions of justice from as many different civilisations as possible.

<sup>22</sup> See Jackson, R. 2004, Plato, *Great thinkers: a – z*, p. 185.

<sup>23</sup> Plato, 1956, *Protagoras*, p. 323C.

<sup>24</sup> A view like this is also held by Aristotle when he says that humans are by nature, *zoon politicos*; and therefore can only find fulfillment in life at the political space. But many modern thinkers would reject this notion about humanity and the nature of its freedom and fulfillment. Benjamin Constant’s oft cited distinction between the ‘liberties of the ancients’ and the ‘liberties of the moderns’ serve to illustrate this tension. Plato and Aristotle espouse the view (backed in the modern period by the writings of Rousseau, for example) that taking part in (democratic) politics is seen as the privileged locus of the good life, so much so that the liberty of the ancients was their active participation in the exercise of political power. As a matter of fact, failure to participate in politics makes someone a ‘radically incomplete and stunted being.’ On the other hand, Constant tells us, the liberties of the moderns (which traces to the democratic writings of Locke), consists in the unfettered freedom of thought and conscience, the recognition and entrenchment of certain basic rights of the person and of property, and of the rule of law. This liberty grants the moderns ‘unimpeded pursuit of happiness in their personal occupation and attachment, which requires freedom from

wisdom than “justice as equal shares”.<sup>25</sup> When justice is conceived as fair shares, for Plato, then, there would be no difficulty in recognising the ethical truism that “justice is holy and holiness just... [or that] justice is either the same thing as holiness or very much like it...”<sup>26</sup> That being the case, for the Platonic-Socrates, it is impossible to successfully rule or direct a city or household or anything else without temperance and justice.<sup>27</sup> In this way, Plato is led inexorably to conclude that a healthy and happy city is one that is by its very nature just, irrespective of whether or not anyone concerns themselves with the issue of justice.<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless, Plato encourages us to inquire into the true meaning of justice.<sup>29</sup> The question is: what exactly is justice?

In the *Republic*, Plato showed dissatisfaction with the welfare conditions in the Athens of his time, and looked to philosophy for a radical theory of the state and a new idea of justice.<sup>30</sup> He proposed to uncover a theory of justice that would simultaneously account for the private and public elements of justice in both the individual and the state. If the metaphysical principle(s) of justice is/are discovered, then, we need only look to the just state, in order to inscribe the elements of justice that must be recognisable in a just person. The dialectical argumentation in the *Republic* that proceeded in the form of conjectures and refutations culminates in a conception of justice that says that the ends of justice are served when everyone performs roles – the social roles they are best suited for. A kind of division of labour where each one is expected to mind their businesses, in fields and areas they are the most competent. The outcome of this scenario is that justice becomes the efficacious bond that binds disparate individuals “each of whom has found his life-work in accordance with his natural fitness and his training.”<sup>31</sup> “Justice”, in short, for Plato, is that “each one man must perform one social service in the state for which his nature

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the exercise of political power, or what Habermas describes as the right to retreat to the private domains of family and friends, or ‘the syndrome of civil privatism’, or what Kymlicka in citing Habermas mistakenly transcribes as ‘the syndrome of civic privatism’. For the relevant references, See Constant, B. 1988, *The liberties of the ancients compared with that of the moderns*; Rawls, J. 1996, *Political liberalism*, p. 206, Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 295; Oldfield, A. 1990, *Citizenship: an unnatural practice?*, p. 177 – 87; and Habermas, J. 1998, *Between facts and norms: contributions to discourse theory of law and democracy*, p.78. See Plato, 1956, *Protagoras*, p. 323A.

<sup>25</sup> Plato, 1953, *Gorgias*, p. 488D

<sup>26</sup> Plato, 1953, *Gorgias*, p. 331B

<sup>27</sup> Plato, 1956, *Meno*, p. 73D.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Strauss, L. 1987, *Plato, History of political philosophy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed., L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, Eds. p.43

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Annas, J. 2003, *Plato: a very short introduction*, p. 19.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Jackson, R. 2004, *Plato, Great thinkers: a – z*, p184 & 185; Russell, B. 1961, *History of Western philosophy*, p.125; and Ryan, A. 1998, *Political philosophy*, p. 367.

<sup>31</sup> See Sabine, G. H. and Thorson, T. L. 1973, *A history of political theory*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., p. 64.

was best adapted for,” or in another wording, “rendering to each what befits him,” ensuring that everyone, including the society itself, does what they are best fitted.<sup>32</sup> In simple terms, one could say that for Plato,

Social justice ... may be defined as the principle of a society, consisting of different types of men ... who have combined under the impulse of their need for one another, and by their combination in one society, and their concentration on their separate functions, have made a whole which is perfect because it is the product and the image of the human mind.<sup>33</sup>

Early on, Plato wondered whether justice may not be equated with truth-telling and returning what one has received or in some sense, reciprocity. Under this view, truth-telling or justice is required both in war time and peace time as well. This is as well, because justice helps to secure engagements and dealings (including peace treaties, for example).<sup>34</sup> But Plato is disturbed by the very fact that in some cases, the person to whom one owes a service of truth (a promise) and or some property especially weapons may in the meantime, become mentally deranged, making it difficult for us to honour our contracts and pledges with them when in their right senses.<sup>35</sup> In our view, this raises the practical question as to whether we should ever supply weapons or manpower to anyone involved in an unjust or senseless war, irrespective of our past agreements and commitments.<sup>36</sup>

In another line of reflection, the Platonic-Socrates tackles Polemarchus when the latter suggests that justice is “getting the better” of our opponents; benefitting our friends and harming our enemies.<sup>37</sup> Plato, speaking through the mouth of Socrates, soon began to wangle this

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<sup>32</sup> See Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book IV, p.432A; Book V, p. 453B. Also, Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 332C.

<sup>33</sup> Barker, E. 1925, *Greek political theory, Plato and his predecessors*; cited in Sabine, G. H. and Thorson, T. L. 1973, *A history of political theory*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., p. 64.

<sup>34</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 333A.

<sup>35</sup> See Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 331B – 332B.

<sup>36</sup> This question is an important one for global justice following the many cases of governments who continue to back their allies even when it is obvious their ally was the wrong party in a war.

<sup>37</sup> Plato, 1930, op cit., Book I, 332 A – 336A; also cf. Book II, 362B – C.

definition of justice. To the consternation of Polemarchus, Socrates suggests that under this definition of justice, a person, to take just one hypothetical example, would be considered just, were he to engage in stealing “with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends, and the harm of enemies.”<sup>38</sup> This possible implication of his own view, by the instant admission of Polemarchus, is to say the least, frightful. As Plato suggests, the founding of the city is predicated on the mutual recognition of every members’ needs. “Every human being, just or unjust, is in need of many things, and at least for this reason in need of other human beings.”<sup>39</sup> The key word here seems to be interdependence. Interdependence, in this reading of Plato, is a major consideration in determining who we treat unjustly by harming them, or justly by benefitting them. With this realisation at hand, it becomes difficult to determine who one’s ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’ are at any point in time.<sup>40</sup> For the harmony of the state clearly depends on the recognition of the intrinsic worth of all persons as co-existing and cooperating to mould the city into a symbiotic bond. Without further need for arguments, Plato rebuts the harm principle by asserting that: “men who are harmed become more unjust.”<sup>41</sup> It is therefore unwise to harm one’s enemies and benefit one’s friends as their dues, for “in no case is it just to harm anyone.”<sup>42</sup>

Plato further acknowledges the temptation to be unjust as it seems profitable in some cases to be so; in that injustice seems to bring wealth and power. Injustice, a person may then believe, is far more profitable for his personal good, than the pursuit of justice which may result in the common good.<sup>43</sup> But Plato iterates that such a person will be vicious, licentious and disgraceful.<sup>44</sup> To be sure, he continues, no one will do the right thing – will do the bidding of justice – without some constraint. However, a person can only be unjust because the fellow knows no better.<sup>45</sup> Notably, Plato and Socrates are not the only important philosophers or scholars to hold a view like this. Only recently, Amartya Sen in his book, *The Idea of Justice*, has insinuated that Wittgenstein had correctly held the view (that is if Sen by his own admission is interpreting Wittgenstein correctly), that it takes smartness to be better or to be good. Or that it

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<sup>38</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 334A – B.

<sup>39</sup> Strauss, L. 1987, op cit., p. 43.

<sup>40</sup> More on this in later chapters.

<sup>41</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 335C.

<sup>42</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 335E.

<sup>43</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book II, p. 360E – 362A.

<sup>44</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book I, p. 348E; also *ibid*, Book IX, p. 589A – C.

<sup>45</sup> Presumably, education is the ‘constraint’ people will require in order to abide by the ideals of justice. The allegory of the cave points to this line of reasoning.

takes smartness to make the right deliberations and choices.<sup>46</sup> If “right choice” or being “better” is equated to justice, then, it would take smartness to be just, even were we to identify what is just with what serves our self-interest.<sup>47</sup> For it would also take smartness to identify what *is* in our self-interest. If that much could be granted, then, Plato should experience no difficulty in confiding that justice is virtue and wisdom, while injustice is vice and ignorance.

Virtue and Wisdom purifies a person and puts him/her in a state of perpetual goodness, transcending the present corporeal existence. In the *Apology*, Socrates makes this view very clear. According to him, no harm can ever come to a good man either during his life or after his death. Similarly, in the *Gorgias*, Plato or Socrates argues at length that injustice harms the doer, and justice benefits the just person.<sup>48</sup> However, Plato was certain that “the height of injustice is to seem just without being so.”<sup>49</sup> At every point in time, the nobleman must then pursue justice for its own sake, and not because he is compelled, otherwise, if he ascends to a position of power where no one can compel him anymore, he will work injustice to the extent of his ability.

Following the above line of argument, Plato rejects Thrasymachus’ attempt to define justice as the rule of the stronger for their own advantage, and that as a result, rulers rule in their own interest. Indeed, Plato is later to acknowledge that leaders often rule in their own interests, practising nepotism in the first instance, but that is because such leaders lack the smartness to decipher what really is in their own interest or advantage. To be sure, for Plato, justice is about interest of some sort, but is clearly not of the stronger, for “there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and alone he considers in everything he says and does.”<sup>50</sup> This simply means that for Plato, justice requires, perhaps in a social sense, that rulers and the institutions they govern eschew two things:

1. an abuse of their professional calling or the reason(s) for which they were established in the first instance, and

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<sup>46</sup> Sen, A. 2010, *The idea of justice*, p. 31 – 34.

<sup>47</sup> To be sure, for Plato, justice is the residual virtue that proceeds from soberness, courage and intelligence. See Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book IV, p. 432B.

<sup>48</sup> Burnyeat, M. 1987, Plato: Dialogue with Bryan Magee, *The great philosophers: an introduction to Western philosophy*, p. 17.

<sup>49</sup> Plato, 1930, op cit., Book I, p. 361A.

<sup>50</sup> Plato, 2004. Does might make right?, p. 749 – 52.

2. carrying out unjustified harmful acts on their subjects.

When this is done, then the leaders at every point in time would consider an action or speech worthy of performing if such would promote the wellbeing of the members of the society in some way, and help to achieve peace and harmony. Thus,

in the case of the definition suggested by Thrasymachus, the analogy used can be turned right round and made to refute the view of justice which it was intended to support. The arts of the shepherd, of the medical man, of the pilot, are shown to imply that persons fulfilling these functions, and hence persons fulfilling the function of government, seek not [or ought not to seek] their own advantage but the advantage of those on whom their skill is directed.<sup>51</sup>

In precise language, if the stronger (the rulers) were to be smart enough, for Plato, they would use their powers only in ways that benefit the weak (their subjects), for the art of governance demands no less. Only in this way can the strong, the rulers hope to preserve what they have.<sup>52</sup> In precise terms, what is in “the advantage of the stronger,” is to ensure that the wellbeing of the seemingly weak and disadvantaged is protected and preserved.<sup>53</sup>

### 1.2.2: Plato's Universal Justice

Plato preferred to view things in their large forms; the nature of justice is more readily perceived on a large scale than on a small scale.<sup>54</sup> Rather than search for justice in particular individuals, Plato felt that creating a vision of the ideal state where its basic components work

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<sup>51</sup> The underlying argument here is that it is erroneous to equate the idea of justice with instances of justice, via analogies. See Laing, B. M. Oct., 1933, *The problem of justice in Plato's Republic*, p. 414 – 15.

<sup>52</sup> Hobbes has speculated that left in a state of nature or self-help where the weak is oppressed by the stronger; we soon discover that with enough patience, the weakest person will someday have his revenge on even the strongest persons in the land.

<sup>53</sup> For further elaboration on this line of reasoning, see for example, Johnson, C. 1985, *Thrasymachan justice: the advantage of the stronger*, Lxxviii, 1: p. 37 – 49.

<sup>54</sup> Ryan, A. 1998, *Political philosophy*, p. 367.

harmoniously to produce a flourishing society provides us with a unique capability for identifying just human beings and helping them to remain just. For according to Plato, the state is “man writ large”. A state is just if all three classes that complete its population perform their natural duties leading up to the happy fulfillment of the common good. In the same way, a human being is just if the three aspects of his psyche are trained to perform their natural roles which would ultimately midwife a happy person. But it is important for Plato that we search first for justice in the state, in order to progressively search for and identify the elements of justice in particular individuals.<sup>55</sup>

It seems natural to wonder at this point what Plato might contemplate if he were to live in an age and time where people from different states and societies increasingly interact with each other, and even depend on each other to actualise certain basic ends which the state is traditionally thought to be able to fulfill. Would he have asked us to look first for justice at the world level, whereupon we gradually search out instances of just states, down to the individual person? The immediate and obvious objection to this seems to be that the notion of an ideal city imagined by Plato is a miniature society, far too small to be compared with the vast and complex modern state. So, it could be argued that in the first instance, Plato would not have postulated his political utopia if he had the complexity of the modern state in mind. But this argument would be sliding through the question raised. For the question is a logical one, requiring a logical reply. Plato preferred neither to look for the definition of justice in a particular individual nor in particular instances of justice in particular arts. Rather, for him, justice is a *Form*. A Form that once apprehended, if we understand Plato properly, is better applied at a large scale and universally.

A thoughtful reading of Plato reveals an even more subtle consideration of deep and unlimited justice in Plato’s writings. According to him, “a judge ... rules soul with soul.”<sup>56</sup> Here Plato’s justice universalism is even more pronounced. In this rendition, justice is a harmony pursued; a balance between a soul and another soul. It is suggestive of Plato’s concern to demonstrate the metaphysical dependence of justice on the essence of humanity – not a thing to be tied to contingent or artificial appellations like state boundaries, colour of skin

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<sup>55</sup> Somehow, the further implication of this, which Plato did not explicitly state, is that it might prove impossible to find a just person in an unjust state or unjust political arrangement.

<sup>56</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book III, p. 409A.



or gender. Indeed, Plato felt confident that he had successfully repudiated the relativistic tendencies of the Sophists by grounding justice in the proper functioning of the various parts of the soul.<sup>57</sup> Justice being the residual virtue of the harmonious interaction of the various aspects of the soul (and since every human person possesses a soul) cannot possibly be the product of personal, cultural or political opinion, nor can it be a question of might. Since we know what exactly to expect from a properly functioning soul; we can move to delineate the features of intrinsic qualities of justice. In the same way, presumably, for Plato, we can come to know when the World Soul is in harmony with itself and thus is able to exude the contents of Universal Justice.

Plato was ahead of his time in that he looked beyond the ultra-male-dominated Athens of his time to canvass for gender equality or genderised justice.<sup>58</sup> He saw that justice is a universal requirement of the state, and the entirety of the human race.<sup>59</sup> Everyone must then come to the aid of justice and be guided by justice.<sup>60</sup> For this higher reason, Plato was sure that education ought to be the same for both male and female guardians.<sup>61</sup> Justice is simply a thing without restrictions of any kind, so much so that any correct and therefore praiseworthy philosophy

*affords in all cases what is just for communities and for individuals; and that accordingly the human race will not see better days until either the stock of those who rightly and genuinely follow philosophy acquire political authority, or else the class who have political control be led by some dispensation to become real philosophers.*<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Cf. Jackson, R. 2004, Plato, *Great thinkers: a – z*, p. 185.

<sup>58</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book V, p. 453B – 457A.

<sup>59</sup> See Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book IV, p. 432A.

<sup>60</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book IV, p. 427D – E.

<sup>61</sup> Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book V, p. 456C – D; also cf. *Ibid*, Book V, p. 466C – D.

<sup>62</sup> Italics added. Note here, Plato's concerns for justice ultimately transcend individuals and communities to encompass the entire human race. The passage further highlights Plato's belief that philosophy – a good philosophy – ought to serve a universal purpose. Plato had further suggested that justice bestows blessings from both the gods and humans. Who would reasonably want to be left out from the blessings of gods and men? See Plato, 1930, *Republic*, Book X, p. 614A. Also, Plato, 353 B.C., Letter VII, cited in Sabine G. H. and Thorson, T. L. 1973, *A history of political theory*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., p. 49 – 50.

The simple idea here is that philosophy ought to pursue justice for all human societies. And if philosophy genuinely pursues this aim, then, there is no reason why only philosophers or those who have imbibed the virtue of philosophy (that is justice) may not be the only persons suitably qualified and duty bound to have political control everywhere; a situation that will necessarily engender universal justice.

### 1.3.1: St Augustine's Notion of Justice

Aurelius Augustinus was born in Thagaste (modern day Souk Ahras in Algeria) in Roman North Africa in AD 354. He died as bishop of Hippo, (now Annaba, Algeria) in AD 430, and was later to be canonised Saint Augustine. Scholars are agreed as to his inestimable and enduring influence on both Catholic and Protestant theology after him. His great influence on philosophical thought and political action even up to the contemporary period is unquestionable.<sup>63</sup> St Augustine is credited with being the first philosopher of history, and with giving "birth to many of the themes of modern philosophy, and was thereby twelve centuries ahead of his time." In addition, "his use of the introspective examination of the self as a philosophical starting point is a technique we will not see again until the Renaissance."<sup>64</sup> The single most important influence on Augustine's thought is Plato who he regarded as the greatest pagan philosopher "whose thought most closely approximated that of Christianity."<sup>65</sup> Other major influences include Cicero (who at any rate merely copied, Romanised and Stoicised Plato's writings), Aristotle, the Manichees and the Neoplatonists.

Augustine saw the importance of gregarious life and the desire for a commonwealth among human beings. But there is a problem with realising these universal human desiderata: how to maintain peace, order and balance, pursuant to the common good in any such association, if and when created. Augustine seemingly had a simple solution to this worry. Citizens are to inculcate the supreme virtue of justice. The importance of the virtue of justice, for Augustine,

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<sup>63</sup> In October 2011, in the United States, during the series of protests and rallies targeted at forcing the Obama administration to reform the Wall Street and generally restrict America's capitalism, as well as initiate sundry other social and political reforms, an American youth held a placard conspicuously. It read: "Without justice, what is sovereignty, if not organized robbery on a large scale? – St. Augustine."

<sup>64</sup> For both citations, see Lawhead, W.F. 2002, *The voyage of discovery: a historical introduction to philosophy*, p. 137.

<sup>65</sup> Fortin, E. L. 1987. St. Augustine, p. 180.

could not be over-stressed; for no society can thrive nor subsist without peace and order; and sustainable peace and social order could not be maintained without a vigorous pursuit of justice. It then follows that justice is the basic and indispensable ingredient of civil society and is to be pursued for the sake of peace. In the last analysis, a city without justice has forfeited its very existence. To put things in their proper light,

[P]eace which is the highest good is also the proper aim of human societies. They should aspire to practise justice, to be stable, to be equitable in their dealings. In practice, this is often only realized by coercion, punitive measures, and harsh exercise of authority: Augustine finds this appropriate to our fallen human nature, vitiated as it is by original sin. Controlling humans driven by greed, pride, ambition, and lust calls for a rule of law that, at best, contains vestiges or traces of authentic justice.<sup>66</sup>

But how do we define “authentic” justice? Augustine would prefer to say that it is the justice that comes from the heavenly City of God. In the meantime, Augustine interprets justice as “right”, rather than as “law”. Furthermore, following Cicero, Augustine defines civil society or the commonwealth as “an assemblage (of men) associated by a common acknowledgement of rights and by a community of interests.”<sup>67</sup> It would be a mistake to imagine here that justice is what is advantageous to the one in power or the privileged few.<sup>68</sup> The minimum demand of justice, in this light, is that “where there is an offence [irrespective of the status of the offender or the offended], there must be satisfaction: the offender must offer a recompense that is equal and opposite to the offence.”<sup>69</sup> Without doubt, no one can administer a city without the preservation of right and or justice in the manner stated. For “remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale?”<sup>70</sup> Yet for Augustine, “existing cities are assemblages of rational beings bound together not by a common acknowledgement of right, but by ‘a common

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<sup>66</sup> Furley, D., Ed. 1999, *Routledge history of philosophy Vol. II: from Aristotle to Augustine*, p. 401 – 402.

<sup>67</sup> St Augustine, *City of God*, cited in Fortin, E. L. 1987, *St. Augustine, History of political philosophy*, p.181.

<sup>68</sup> Saint Augustine, 1958, *City of God*, V. J. Bourke, ed., p. 469.

<sup>69</sup> Augustine is cited in Kenny, A. 2005, *A new history of western philosophy, vol. II: medieval philosophy*, p. 43.

<sup>70</sup> Saint Augustine is cited here by Anthony Kenny. See Kenny, A. 2006, *An illustrated brief history of western philosophy*, p.118.

agreement as to the objects of their love', regardless of the quality of that love or the goodness or badness of its objects."<sup>71</sup>

The enthronement of "perfect" human justice, Augustine is aware, is a lofty aim of philosophy; a pursuit which he himself has now joined. But the age-long failure of philosophy to actualise this aim is precisely the reason why Augustine must look elsewhere for genuine justice. Genuine justice here is in a Platonic sense, idealised justice, divinely articulated in heaven. and then unfurled to envelop humans who must now conform to its dictates by grace. For it is only in this New City of God that a just person may conceivably always perform just acts for the right reasons, and an innocent person who suffers unjustly could be recompensed adequately, while there is no chance an evil-doer can, if he escapes punishment here on earth, escape eternal punishment.

In further building and deepening his conception of justice, Augustine strove to locate justice in the realm of the traditional cardinal virtues. Virtue, properly understood would be seen, first, as love of God which then finds further expression in the love of fellow humans.<sup>72</sup> Justice would begin from "giving God his dues", and as persons existing in social and political contexts, recognise the wider need to love our neighbours as well. In this way, love becomes the basis of justice. In addition, Augustine anchors his notion of justice in a celebration of the Natural Law theory.

Our awareness of the natural law derives from self-love, or the instinct for self-preservation, and it extends (as does the Stoic concept from which it derives) to a realization of the need for justly regulated relations with others ... Primarily, this realization is a form of the Golden Rule in its negative version 'Do not do to others what you would not have others do to you.'<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Fortin, E. L. 1987. St. Augustine, *History of political philosophy*, p. 181.

<sup>72</sup> "Augustine's favorite definition of virtue is "rightly ordered love," which consists in setting things in their right order of priority, valuing them according to their true worth, and in following this right order of value in one's inclinations and actions." See Markus, R.A. 1999, Augustine, St., *Philosophy and ethics*, p. 77.

<sup>73</sup> Furley, D., Ed. 1999, *Aristotle to Augustine*, op cit., p. 401.

But it was perhaps too early in the history of philosophy for a philosopher to be convinced that each person ought to be free to decide for herself whether a particular law is just or unjust, even when that law may not conform to the dictates of Natural Law, or flows from an unjust lawgiver.<sup>74</sup> Nonetheless, Augustine argues that justice is identical with the single indivisible and immutable truth which traverses all things;<sup>75</sup> truth that we do not have to rely on experience to unravel; since our knowledge of what is just is introspective. This in turn, is because such knowledge does not depend on sense perception, but based on the totality of our experiences. Our interior “higher perception” aids us to be able to make the right judgment about what is intuitively just or otherwise.<sup>76</sup>

### 1.3.2: St Augustine: Universal Justice is the Divine Plan

According to Augustine, the autonomy of the state in making laws can only be retained if such laws are dictated by the requirements of justice which is eternal. Like Plato, Augustine sought to repudiate relativism. But like one historian of philosophy put it, the uniqueness of Augustine’s arguments lies in his novel interpretation of the meaning of justice.<sup>77</sup> Augustine endorses the dictum which flows from Plato that “justice is a virtue distributing to everyone his due.” But the tough question is what is “due” to anyone? Augustine’s commitment to universalism leads him to repudiate the view that justice is conventional, and is therefore relative to particular societies. Justice, he argues is to be discovered in the structure of human nature with its relation to God. Thus, for Augustine, justice is “the habit of the soul which imparts to every man the dignity due him.... Its origin proceeds from nature... and this notion of justice... is not the product of man’s personal opinion, but something implanted by a certain innate power,” which is eternal.<sup>78</sup> Consequently, Augustine argues that it is according to the Divine Plan that all be united under one universal-humanity. This is eloquently demonstrated by the very fact that

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<sup>74</sup> However, given the diversity in human societies and the attendant differences in customs, Augustine gave room for variations in certain kinds of laws, the law of monogamy or polygamy, for example. Cf. Furley, D., Ed. 1999, *Aristotle to Augustine*. p. 401.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Kenny, A. 2005, *Medieval philosophy*, op cit., p. 41.

<sup>76</sup> See Saint Augustine, 1958, *City of God*, op cit., p. 238.

<sup>77</sup> Stumpf, S. E. 1994, *Philosophy: history and problems*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., p. 148.

<sup>78</sup> Stumpf, S. E. 1994, *Philosophy: history and problems*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., p. 148.

rather than create several men at the beginning of time, God saw the wisdom in creating just one man from whom the rest of humanity would spring.

But even if the former scenario was not what obtained, Augustine argued, the unification of all men regardless of race, colour or appearance will remain a desirable outcome. For besides being physically brothers in Adam, didn't men become supernaturally brothers in Christ? This view immediately brings to the fore what one may regard as Augustine's anti-racism and spiritual humanism. The more reason for this claim is that for Augustine, any rational and mortal being – Pygmies, Sciopodes and Cynocephali alike – qualify as descendants of Adam.<sup>79</sup> At any rate, Augustine's notion of a universal society is dualistic in nature. On the one hand, a Universal City of the just is possible where the love of God unites all humanity to aspire to organise our world to resemble the Heavenly City, a universal city of the wicked is also possible in a situation where people loved the world, on the other hand. But Augustine's City of God is not to be likened to that of the Stoics. The Stoics thought of the City of Zeus as comprising the entirety of the cosmos, but for Augustine, the City of God is restricted to a veritable society of rational persons.<sup>80</sup>

In essence, it could be said that Augustine either as a philosopher of history or a theologian of history, proposed to treat all human beings as a single humanity “whose history would be unfolded without interruption from the beginning till the end of time.”<sup>81</sup> If Augustine is right, then it would be for this reason that the human desire for a global community (which Augustine thinks is a worthy cause) lives on. Indeed, for Gilson, Augustine takes it for granted that “generation after generation has honestly attempted to gather all men within the walls of an earthly city modelled upon the heavenly Jerusalem.”<sup>82</sup> But this quest has remained elusive; precisely because, in Augustine's view, no one can hope to achieve a Christian end by non-Christian means. “The most serious mistake” of these questrists, in Augustine's view, lies in their “imagining that a universal and purely natural society of men is possible without a universal religious society,” which would necessarily foster a society of peoples that would accept and

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<sup>79</sup> Gilson, E. 1958. Preface to St Augustine's *City of God*, V. J. Bourke, Ed., p. 25.

<sup>80</sup> Gilson, E. 1958, St Augustine's *City of God*, p. 30.

<sup>81</sup> Gilson, E. 1958, St Augustine's *City of God*, p. 30.

<sup>82</sup> Gilson, E. 1958, St Augustine's *City of God*, p. 34.

pursue the same universal/supernatural good.<sup>83</sup> But the immediate objection to Augustine's vision is to point to the enormous, if not insurmountable obstacles in the way of establishing a "World Religion". However, Augustine is quick to point out that the dominant ingredient of even the pagans' social and political organisations, especially the city, is justice. Cicero was therefore right in asserting that

every society should resemble a symphonic concert, in which the different notes of the instruments and voices blend into a final harmony. What the musicians call harmony, the politician calls concord. Without concord, there is no city; but without justice, there is no concord.<sup>84</sup>

It then follows that for Augustine, a city without justice has forfeited its very existence. But then, a state cannot realise justice unless it is also Christian. In this way, for Augustine, a just state becomes synonymous with a Christian state.<sup>85</sup> If, again, the unifying force of all human societies is justice and the elevation of the commonweal, then, while Philosophy may be right in attempting to achieve world justice/unity through philosophical unity, the question must arise validly for Augustine, as to how anyone can hope to achieve a Divine Plan/Christian end by non-religious/non-Christian means? If many of us are uncomfortable with the rather narrow/religious strategy deployed by the Church Father in resolving what he clearly saw as a globally public problem, we must then turn to the modern period to seek alternate constructs.

#### 1.4.1: Understanding the Kantian Idea of Justice

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), is widely regarded as the greatest modern philosopher, as well as the father of modern liberalism. Some think the choice is between him and Plato, who to designate the greatest philosopher of all time. His greatness is accounted for by what one philosopher calls his "quite exceptionally *penetrating*" ability to see

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<sup>83</sup> Gilson, E. 1958, *St Augustine's City of God*, p. 13.

<sup>84</sup> Gilson, E. 1958, *St Augustine's City of God*, p. 22 – 23.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Sabine, G. H. and Thorson, T. L. 1973, *A history of political theory*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., p. 186.

an intellectual problem where others overlooked; as well as his professionally methodic wisdom in seeing “how the whole compass of his arguments fitted together.”<sup>86</sup> Kant made original and invaluable contributions in the major areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and the philosophy of science, as well as political philosophy.

Kant held like Plato and Augustine before him that justice is a *Form*, a good recognisable *a priori* by the human reason. But he, more than Plato and Augustine, emphasized on the rights, autonomy, equality and dignity of the human person, as critical conceptual correlates for consistently maintaining justice at any realm of human relations. It is precisely this commitment that for Kant, calls for a lawful system of coercion which is simultaneously a condition *sine qua non* for exiting the state of nature (a state of nature which need not be conceived as unjust because of its attendant unequal power relations, but is all the same devoid of justice) and serving as the mechanical device for propelling the civil society. The civil state/society, for Kant, regarded purely as a lawful state, is based on the following *a priori* principles:

1. The freedom of every member of society as a *human being*.
2. The *equality* of each with all others as a *subject*.
3. The *independence* of each member of a commonwealth as a *citizen*.<sup>87</sup>

To be precise, the social contract is imperative because there is an acute need to secure the freedom, dignity and rights of every individual from all forms of aggressions and violations, in perpetuity. Thus,

By this contract, all members of the people (*omnes et singuli*) give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once as members of a commonwealth, i.e. of the people regarded as a state (*universi*). And we cannot say that men within a state have sacrificed a *part* of their inborn external freedom for a specific purpose; they have in fact abandoned their wild and lawless freedom, in order to find again their entire and undiminished freedom

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<sup>86</sup> Warnock, G. 1987, Kant: dialogue with Bryan Magee, *The great philosophers: an introduction to Western Philosophy*, p. 187.

<sup>87</sup> Italics is in original. See Kant, I. 1990, Social contract as an idea of reason, p. 128; cf. Kant, I. 2001a, Concerning the common saying: this may be true in theory but does not apply to practice, p. 420.



in a state of lawful dependence (i.e. in a state of right), for this dependence is created by their own legislative will...<sup>88</sup>

The main purpose of this social pact as Kant has already intimated is the untrammelled elevation of the rights and dignity of all persons and reciprocal respect for persons. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, he makes a strong case for the inviolability of human dignity, insisting that not even the depraved person could justifiably be denied respect nor moral worth, for “man... can never lose every inclination toward what is good.”<sup>89</sup> The ontological basis of this Kantian conviction is that “humanity itself is dignity”, no one has a right to deny anyone, including himself, dignity and self-respect.<sup>90</sup> Realistically, human beings are not equal in dignity, but the inalienable duty to treat persons equally demands that we treat all human beings as though they are equal in dignity and self-respect. Without equivocation, Kant states: “There is nothing in the wide world than the right of others. They are inviolable. Woe to him who trespasses upon the right of another and tramples it underfoot! His right should be his security; it should be stronger than any shield or fortress....”<sup>91</sup> Clearly, for Kant, following the Categorical Imperative, we are not only to respect the rights of others, but as autonomous individuals, must endeavour to protect our own rights by all means. Social cooperation is possible eventually only because we carry out the minimum required for it, namely the respect for persons.<sup>92</sup>

Kant’s views further rest on the conviction which he shares with all variants of the natural right theory “that there is an objective, timelessly valid and universally binding principle of right, which is accessible to human knowledge,” and always assisting people to determine correctly what may be considered right or wrong, just or unjust.<sup>93</sup> This principle of right, for

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<sup>88</sup> Kant, I. 1990, *Social contract as an idea of reason*, p. 126 – 27.

<sup>89</sup> Hassner, P. 1987, *Immanuel Kant, History of political philosophy*, p. 589.

<sup>90</sup> Hassner, P. 1987, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 589.

<sup>91</sup> In the *Metaphysics of morals*, “Kant claims that there are two types of rights: innate rights and acquired rights. Innate rights belong to people by nature, independently of any act of law. Acquired rights, on the other hand, only come to exist through an act of law;” see Don Becker, 1993, *Kant’s moral and political philosophy*, p. 71. For the in-text citation, see Norman, R. 1992, *The moral philosophers: an introduction to ethics*, p. 22.

<sup>92</sup> But it doesn’t seem to follow from here, that for Kant, as long as I do what is necessary for social cooperation and don’t violate the rights of others, then, for the rest, I can decide what the good life shall be for me at all times. This is because there is the constraint for necessity in which for Keith Graham, “I cannot simply snatch any considerations I wish out of the air and then treat them as an input into the rational deliberation.” See Graham, K. 1996, *Coping with the many coloured dome: pluralism and practical reason*, p. 132.

<sup>93</sup> Kersting, W. 1992, *Politics, freedom and order: Kant’s political philosophy*, p. 344.

Kant, accommodates only the sphere of external human actions. “*Duties of justice* are constraints on a person’s actions that are necessary to secure the *external* freedom of others...” Thus, “force may (and should) be used for the sake of justice only.” In consonance, “persons should be coerced insofar as is necessary to meet reasons [sic] demand for the compatibility of our domains of external freedom.”<sup>94</sup> In short, “the concept of justice...applies only to the external and what is more – practical relationship of one person to another.”<sup>95</sup> Kant’s comments above further rest on a basic distinction he draws between “strict duty” and “imperfect duty”. An imperfect duty cannot be fully discharged or demanded by right by the next person, and for this reason one has considerable latitude in deciding when and how far it is to be honoured. Imperfect duty includes duties of humanitarian assistance and the duty to improve oneself. On the other hand, “duties of justice, of respecting in action the rights of others, or the duty not to violate the dignity of persons as rational agents, are strict because they allow no exception for one’s inclination.”<sup>96</sup> Again, even though our duties of justice must in essence arise from our inner motive of justice – the virtue of justice – only outward compliance with the duties of justice is required. “Inner intentions and convictions are excluded from the sphere of justice just like interests and needs.”<sup>97</sup> This further implies that neediness cannot ordinarily serve as grounds for making claims to rights. “For Kant, a community is not a community of solidarity among the needy, but a community for self-protection among those who have power to act.”<sup>98</sup> The reason for Kant’s assumptions here is obviously tied to the fact that the form of political justice that human reason reveals under the social contract is procedural. Careful deliberations and consensus are required to inscribe every right and establish justness.

In addition, Kant relies on certain residual implications of the social contract and pure practical reason, to argue that “a law is an objective principle valid for every rational being; and is a principle on which he *ought to act* – that is – an imperative.”<sup>99</sup> Thus “if duty is a concept which is to have any meaning and real legislative authority for our actions, this can be expressed only in categorical imperatives and by no means in hypothetical ones.”<sup>100</sup> This is why (as

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<sup>94</sup> See Pogge, T. W. 2010, *Kant’s Theory of Justice*, p. 410 & 411.

<sup>95</sup> Kant, I., *The metaphysics of morals*, cited in Don Becker, 1993, *Kant’s moral and political philosophy*, p. 84.

<sup>96</sup> Also, a perfect duty is “one that requires a specific action (e.g. keeping a promise)...” See Ameriks, K. 1999, *Kant, Immanuel*, p. 466.

<sup>97</sup> Kersting, W. 1992, *Kant’s political philosophy*, p. 345.

<sup>98</sup> Kersting, W. 1992, *Kant’s political philosophy*, p. 345.

<sup>99</sup> Kant, I. 1953, *Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals*, H.J. Patton (trans.) p. 88, n51.

<sup>100</sup> Kant, I. 1953, *Groundwork*, p. 92.

rational beings), Kant enjoins us to: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”<sup>101</sup> The point here is that morality and law proceed from our capacity for rational thinking. In Kant’s view, the significant connection, the symphonic harmony in civil society lies in the realisation that “without justice presupposing effective judicial laws, there would be no morality at all, and human life on earth would lose its value.”<sup>102</sup> But then, reason – human reason – guided by self-autonomy is an ever vigilant platform for “constraining what rights and duties a just social order is to stipulate.”<sup>103</sup> Rationality serves both as the source of the law and as the metaphysical basis of obedience to the law. A law should be enacted bearing in mind that no one could be above it. In fact no one ought to find any difficulty in obeying the law, since, as it were; the law is merely a codification of our individual wills as “the general will”.<sup>104</sup> In addition, the “universal imperative of duty” decrees: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”<sup>105</sup> Thus, finally, the groundwork for Kant to inscribe his conception of justice having been laid, he could now define justice as “the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”<sup>106</sup>

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant consciously elevates justice to the status of ‘goodwill’. If three of the four classical cardinal virtues viz., courage, temperance and intelligence can sometimes generate harmful consequences, if unaccompanied by goodwill; justice, the fourth virtue is beyond reproach of this kind, precisely because justice and goodwill are quite simply, identical concepts.<sup>107</sup> However, in a famous argument, Kant denies that a non-harm principle (or a principle that says that rightness of action demands that we owe no one a duty of assistance, provided we do no harm to them via a direct consequence of our actions) is enough to guarantee (universal) justice. He writes:

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<sup>101</sup> Kant, I. 1953, *Groundwork*, p. 91.

<sup>102</sup> Pogge, T. W. 2010. Kant’s theory of justice, p. 413.

<sup>103</sup> Pogge, T. W. 2010. Kant’s theory of justice, p. 413.

<sup>104</sup> Notably, “Rousseau’s notion of the general will was taken up, in different ways, by Kant and Hegel. Kant sought to give it a non-mythical form as a universal consensus of moral agents each legislating universal laws for themselves and for all others. Hegel transformed it into the freedom of the world-spirit expressing itself in the history of mankind.” See Kenny, A. 2006. *A new history of western philosophy, vol. III: the rise of modern philosophy*, p. 300.

<sup>105</sup> Kant, I. 1953, *Groundwork*, p. 89.

<sup>106</sup> Kant, I, *The metaphysics of morals*, cited in Don Becker, 1993, Kant’s moral and political philosophy, p. 88.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Hassner, P. 1987, Immanuel Kant, p. 592.

As regards meritorious duties to others, the natural end which all men seek is their own happiness. Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with *humanity as an end in itself* unless everyone endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have *full* effect in me, be also, as far as possible, *my* ends.<sup>108</sup>

The idea behind Kant's argument here is that a just and sustainable human society is more likely to survive on a principle of reciprocity rather than on a principle of harm as stated above. The more reason for Kant's deductions is that he denies Hobbes' view that political freedom is an absence of external constraints which may hinder a person from doing "what he has a will [and strength] to." On the contrary, in upholding the principle of reciprocity, Kant urged that in preserving our autonomy and freedom, in the way Hobbes has stipulated, we also "have to see beyond our own needs and desires to the equally legitimate needs and desires of other human beings."<sup>109</sup>

#### 1.4.2: The Kantian Cosmopolitan Intent

Kant viewed as necessary the need to have in place an international social contract or civil constitution, because, as Thomas Pogge has recently argued, he saw that once people come in contact, and become interdependent, they ought to form a common civil constitution to pilot their affairs.<sup>110</sup> According to Kant,

The very same unsociability which compelled man to do this [enter into a social contract at the state

<sup>108</sup> Italics are Kant's. See Kant, I. 1953, *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals*, H.J. Patton (trans.) p. 98.

<sup>109</sup> Williams, H. 2006. Liberty, equality, and independence: core concepts in Kant's political philosophy. *A companion to Kant*, p. 366.

<sup>110</sup> See Pogge, T. W. 2010. Kant's Theory of Justice, p. 427.

level] is again the cause of the fact that each commonwealth in its external relations, that is to say, as a state in relations to other states, is in a condition of unrestricted freedom... One commonwealth must expect from the others the very same evils which oppress individual human beings and which compelled them to enter into a lawful civil state.<sup>111</sup>

The above scenario compels our species, in Kantian terms, “to introduce a cosmopolitical state of public security.”<sup>112</sup> But Kant foresees the danger that human vitality might be dimmed in the face of the comfort that may arise from a peaceful world union; or it might turn out that these states might decimate each other if there is no balance of equal power to regulate their affairs.<sup>113</sup> Kant then sought a constitutional means of maintaining justice among nations. To this end, he ascertained that there are three kinds of constitutions:

1. The constitution according to the law of national citizenship of all men belonging to a nation (*ius civitatis*);
2. The constitution according to international law regulating the relation of states with each other (*ius gentium*);
3. The constitution according to the law of world citizenship which prevails insofar as men and states standing in a relationship of mutual influence may be viewed as citizens of a universal state of all mankind (*ius cosmopolitanum*).<sup>114</sup>

Kant avers that obedience to law in any of the constitutions is hinged on what he calls “external lawful *freedom*,” or the view that no one is obligated to obey any external law, unless he has fully consented to such laws beforehand. Also, “external (lawful) *equality* in a state is the relationship of the citizens according to which no one can obligate another legally without at the

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<sup>111</sup> Kant, I. 2001b, *Idea of a universal history with cosmopolitan intent*, p. 126.

<sup>112</sup> Kant, I. 2001b, *Idea of a universal history with cosmopolitan intent*, p. 128.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Nielsen, K. 1988, *Global justice, power and the logic of capitalism*, p. 30.

<sup>114</sup> Kant, I. 2001c, *To eternal peace*, p. 440 – 41, n.2.

same time subjecting himself to the law of being obligated by the other in the same manner.”<sup>115</sup> Kant could be understood as saying that an external action cannot be right if it could not be permitted explicitly within a complete system of laws of justice.<sup>116</sup>

Kant’s contractarian commitments led him to posit that the law of nations (*Volkerrecht*): that just social cooperation among nations should be based on a Federalism of Free States. States, to Kant, are by their very nature similar to individual human beings, needing to be guided by laws within a civil constitution.<sup>117</sup> Therefore, states need to be guided at the international arena by a civil constitution that would safeguard their rights towards each other, under a union of nations, and not a world state.<sup>118</sup> In prefiguring the possibility of what he variously calls “a member of the whole community”; “a member of a society of world citizens” (or “the cosmopolitan or world citizen”); or “artificial unanimity”, Kant envisions an interdependent world order governed by international law.<sup>119</sup>

The narrower or wider community of all nations on earth has in fact progressed so far that a violation of law and right in one place is felt in *all* others. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan or world law is not a fantastic and utopian way of looking at law, but a necessary completion of the unwritten code of constitutional and international law to make it a public law of mankind. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually approaching eternal peace.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Clearly, Kant makes the case that the law of nations would to all intents and purposes resemble the social contract of a civil state. See Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 441.

<sup>116</sup> Pogge, T. W. 2010. Kant’s Theory of Justice, p. 422.

<sup>117</sup> Kant also thought that human nature is evil, although he believes that humans possess a greater moral quality as to be willing to seek avenues to overcome our evil tendencies.

<sup>118</sup> Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 446 – 47. Elsewhere, Kant’s comments are translated thus: “The peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it is developed to the point where a violation of laws in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan law is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international law, transforming it into a universal law of humanity.” Kant is quoted here from Harvey, D. 2001, *Cosmopolitanism and the banality of geographical evils*, p. 274.

<sup>119</sup> Kant, I. 2003, What is enlightenment?, *The enlightenment: a source book and reader*, p. 55 – 56; cf. Kant, I. 2001a, Concerning the common saying: this may be true in theory but does not apply to practice, p. 419.

<sup>120</sup> Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 450.

However, Kant notes that the idea of a law of nations presupposes a law made for independent nation-states; a situation which for him constitutes a perpetual state of war, unless, by so doing, as he had suggested, only a federal union of those states is established. Kant here prefers a federal union of all states to “the complete merging of all these states into one of them which overpowers them and is thereby in turn transformed into a universal monarchy.”<sup>121</sup>

At all events, philosophy, Kant envisions, can anticipate a millennium which it can only galvanize from afar. But this philosophical expectation is by no means utopian. It is realisable, given the system-rooted nature of the world.<sup>122</sup> From what we already know about the world, it won't be totally unrealistic to expect the millennium (a world united in justice and peace) with certainty. Indeed, even though the millennium may at present seem improbable, “we could hasten by our own rational efforts the time when this state might occur which would be so enjoyable for our descendants.”<sup>123</sup> Kant's ultimate prediction is that

Even though this [global] body-politic at present is discernible only in its broadest outline, a feeling (for it) is rising in all member states since each is interested in the maintenance of the whole; and this provides the hope that after many revolutions, the transformation will finally come about of that which nature has as its highest intent, namely a general *cosmopolitan condition* as the womb to which all the original predispositions of the human species will be developed.<sup>124</sup>

In the final analysis, Kant recognises that hatred, war and human strife are unavoidable in a world inhabited by people with different languages and religions, but argues that the progress of “enlightenment is a great good which must ever draw mankind away from the egoistic

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<sup>121</sup> Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 455.

<sup>122</sup> Elsewhere, Kant had written: “a philosophical attempt to write a general world history according to a plan of nature which aims at a perfect civil association of mankind must be considered possible and even helpful to this intention of nature.” See Kant, I. 2001b, Idea of a universal history with cosmopolitan intent, p. 131.

<sup>123</sup> Kant's reason for this is that at present, the relationship between states is artificial, such that no state can slacken its effort at internal development without losing, in comparison to the others, in power and influence. See Kant, I. 2001b, Idea of a universal history with cosmopolitan intent, p. 129.

<sup>124</sup> Kant, I. 2001b, Idea of a universal history, p. 130.

expansive tendencies of its rulers once they understand their own advantage.”<sup>125</sup> One of the desirable outcomes of this realisation of advantage is that it would dawn on humanity that war is “a very dubious enterprise, not only because its result on both sides is so uncertain and artificial, but because in its aftermath the state consequently finds itself saddled with a growing debt the repayment of which becomes undeterminable.”<sup>126</sup> The practical lesson of this new understanding is that war could never serve as a sustainable means of engendering justice between nations. Kant’s proclamation is that, “reason speaking from the throne of the highest legislative power condemns war as a method of finding what is right.”<sup>127</sup> Again, he cites the ancient Greeks as saying that: “War is bad in that it begets more evil people than it kills.”<sup>128</sup> For this very reason, Kant’s divination is that a *foedus pacificum* (pacific union), or what elsewhere he variously calls “a union of several states” or “a permanent congress of states” must be established to preserve peace among nations which is higher than just a particular *pactum pacis* (peace treaty).<sup>129</sup> Of course, Kant says this because his concept of peace

is a secularized version of the traditional version of the connection of *pax* and *iustitia*, peace and justice... It asserts a connection between justice within the state and peacefulness between states, and organizes peace as a system for the regulation

<sup>125</sup> Kant’s view here resonates with that of the Platonic-Socrates concerning the claim that if only the leaders know better, it ought to be recognised that it is in their advantage to favour their citizens in all they do. See Kant, I. 2001b, Universal history, p. 130.

<sup>126</sup> Kant, I. 2001b, Universal history, p. 130.

<sup>127</sup> Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 446.

<sup>128</sup> Moreover, Kant was sure that the hiring of other human beings as mere machines for killing others and getting killed themselves (by the state) is directly at variance with the rights of humanity as represented in our own person. It is of course a different matter if a people on their own voluntarily prepare for and execute a war against an invading army. But Kant notes that the spoils of war and the innate desire of powerful nations to go to war combine to frustrate the realisation of perpetual peace. Similarly, Kant cautions against international forceful interference of a state in the constitution of another. And even when war is made inevitable between states, “[n]o state ... shall permit such acts of warfare as must make mutual confidence impossible in the time of future peace: such as the employment of assassins, of poisoners, the violation of articles of surrender, the instigation of treason in the state against which it is making war, etc.” The feuding parties must realise that no state is superior or subordinate to another, and as such no state can justifiably embark on a war of punishment against the other. At all times, the principles of conducting war must apply. One must always set his eyes on the possibility of a future peace accord. It will do no good to block this chance/expectation. War, after all, “is only a regrettable instrument of asserting one’s right by force in the primitive state of nature...” From this, it must follow that, “a war of extermination, in which destruction may come to both parties at the same time, and thus to all rights too, would allow peace only on the grave yard of the whole of the human race.” For the above quotation, see Kant, I. 2001b, Idea of a universal history with cosmopolitan intent, p. 437 – 39; for the citation in-text, see Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 453.

<sup>129</sup> See Kant, I. 1990, Social contract as an idea of reason, p. 137 and Kant, I. 2001c, To eternal peace, p. 447.



of conflicts according to the standard of requirements of justice that are acknowledged on all sides.<sup>130</sup>

The sum total of this scenario, if Kant's views were taken seriously, is the gradual coming together of human beings toward what he calls "a greater agreement on principles for peace and greater understanding" as "*culture increases*".<sup>131</sup> This is a situation whereby collaborations between peoples increase with "the advance of civilization and... broad human concord, conduces to a general pacification based on liberty, equilibrium and emulation."<sup>132</sup> But as already stated, Kant is unable to decide in any one clear direction whether the gradual coming together of peoples of different states should lead to a world state or in the alternative a world federation of states: a fundamental problem of (global) justice that many later globalist political philosophers after him will have no less troubles trying to resolve.<sup>133</sup>

### 1.5.1: John Rawls: Justice as Fairness

John Bordley Rawls (1921 – 2002), The United States' moral and political philosopher is regarded as one of the most important social and political philosophers of the twentieth century. His *magnum opus*, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), is credited with revitalising interest in political philosophy. Rawls is also considered the most successful liberal writer of the Contemporary Period. Among other notable impacts, his work is pivotal for generating the current discourse on global justice. Three points about Rawls life may be considered relevant in discussing his idea of justice. First, Rawls came from a relatively wealthy family. It occurred to him that he was merely lucky to be born in his kind of family. It was only a chance occurrence. And since chance is an arbitrary natural occurrence, it must follow that the wealthy need to justify their wealth along other fundamental ethical lines. Rawls' highly developed sense of justice further led him to question all kinds of social inequality arising from other natural/chance occurrences like

<sup>130</sup> Kersting, W. 1992, *Politics, freedom and order: Kant's political philosophy*, p. 363.

<sup>131</sup> Italics added. See Kant, I. 2001c, *To eternal peace*, p. 456.

<sup>132</sup> Hassner, P. 1987, Immanuel Kant, *History of political philosophy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed., p. 611.

<sup>133</sup> A part of this essay will indeed be devoted to examining and resolving the said issue. However, in his last published work, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant did appear to "place his emphasis on and his hopes regarding eternal peace on the institution of essentially peaceful republican government within states rather than on the submission of the states to a universal civil community." See Hassner, P. 1987, Immanuel Kant, p. 610.

intelligence, talents and physical strength.<sup>134</sup> Second, Rawls was born in Baltimore, Maryland, which is a Southern state, though not in the Deep South. Rawls recognised the profound immorality of slavery, and this greatly informed his work. Notably, Immanuel Kant and Abraham Lincoln are among his heroes and major influences. The former for articulating the moral imperative to treat human beings both in ourselves and others not always as means, but as ends as well, the latter for championing the anti-slavery cause in leading the North against the South in the American Civil War.<sup>135</sup> Finally, Rawls fought as an infantryman on the American side in the Second World War, where he witnessed the deaths of several of his colleagues, and on one occasion narrowly escaped death by a lucky swap, while cheating death once more after being wounded by a sniper's bullet.<sup>136</sup> Rawls was most horrified by the devastation wrought by atomic bomb in Hiroshima, 1945 and consequently turned down an offer to become an officer,

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<sup>134</sup> Rawls is emphatic that the political society is not and cannot possibly be a voluntary association. But it is only a matter of historical accident that we find ourselves in one particular state or society, rather than another. In addition, Rawls considers as contingencies

- a. persons' social class of origin, the class in which they are born;
- b. their native endowments (as opposed to their realized endowments); as well as their opportunities to develop these endowments as affected by their social class of origin;
- c. their good or ill fortune, or good or bad luck, over the course of life (how they are affected by illness and accident; and say by periods of involuntary unemployment and *regional economic decline*).

Rawls then emphasizes that we defeat the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation if we do nothing to ameliorate the inequalities arising from these contingencies. Education is needed to make people realise the need to tackle these contingencies under a political conception. Rawls argues that native endowments are *common assets*, that is, belonging collectively to everyone. So, to say that we do not deserve our native endowments is only a 'moral truism'. Or could anyone deny this fact?, Rawls wonders. "Do people really think that they (morally) deserved to be born more gifted than others? Do they think that they (morally) deserved to be born a man rather than a woman, or vice versa? Do they think that they deserve to be born into a wealthier family rather than a poorer family?" No. But this is not to say that we never deserve the social position or educated abilities we may hold later on in life, which we have obtained under fair conditions. But interestingly, Rawls later queries the paucity of his own accepted list of contingencies with a number of rhetorical questions: "Why are distinctions of race and gender not explicitly included among the three contingencies noted earlier? How can one ignore such historical facts as slavery (in the antebellum South) and the inequalities between men and women resulting from the absence of provisions to make good women's extra burden in the bearing raising, and the educating of children so as to secure their fair equality of opportunity?" Rawls' feeble answer to these questions is that he is concerned with ideal theory for a well-ordered society. However, he did concede that inequalities founded on race or gender is only to be allowed if they benefit the disadvantaged group. See Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness: a restatement*. E. Kelly, Ed., p. 4 – 78.

<sup>135</sup> Ironically, racist remarks are to be found in Kant's writings. More on the subject in later chapters. Cf. Hoffinan, J. and Graham, P. 2006, *Introduction to political concepts*, p. 83 and *Microsoft Encarta Premium*, 2009.

<sup>136</sup> According to Rawls, "the ... incident – Deacon's death – occurred in May, 1945, high up on the Villa Verde trail on Luzon. Deacon was a splendid man; we became friends and shared a tent at a Regiment. One day the First Sergeant came to us looking for two volunteers, one to go with the Colonel to where he could look at the Japanese positions, the other to give blood badly needed for a wounded soldier in the small field hospital nearby. We both agreed and the outcome depended on who had the right blood type. Since I did and Deacon didn't, he went with the Colonel. They must have been spotted by the Japanese, because soon 150 mortar shells were falling in their direction. They jumped into a foxhole and were immediately killed when a mortar shell also landed in it." See Pogge, T. 2007, *John Rawls: his life and theory of justice*, p. 13 – 14.

returning back to America as a Private. He had very serious questions about justice in human affairs to try and answer.

### 1.5.2: Understanding the Hierarchical Order in Rawls' Principles of Justice

Rawls set out to develop a theory of fair shares or distributive justice that its principles feature prior to the calculation of utility; “for there are limits to the way [the rights of] individuals can be legitimately sacrificed for the benefits of others.” And “if we are to treat people as equals, we must protect them in their possession of certain rights and liberties.”<sup>137</sup> But the question arises for Rawls, how do we determine which rights and liberties? If Rawls were to answer this question in any plausible manner, then he needed to evolve an alternative theory of justice to the classically dominant utilitarianism: an alternative that would both escape the charge of what Rawls would call *ad hoc* intuitionism, as well as “capture the essence of political morality.”<sup>138</sup> To do this, Rawls developed a theory of justice in alignment with the social contract tradition especially as found in the writings of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.<sup>139</sup>

In a famous passage, Rawls states the central idea behind his “general conception of justice”: “all social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.”<sup>140</sup> Or stated schematically, the first principle of justice

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<sup>137</sup> See Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 53.

<sup>138</sup> But we should note that critics of utilitarianism including Rawls often conflate the two versions of the theory. For example Rawls argued that utilitarians ignore the separateness of persons and “endorse the principle of maximizing utility because they generalize from the one-person case (it is rational for each individual to maximize her happiness), to the many-person case (it is rational for society to maximize its happiness). Rawls objects to this generalization because it treats society as if it were a single person, and so ignores the trade-offs within one person’s life and trade-offs across lives. However, neither the egalitarian nor the teleological version of utilitarianism makes this generalization, and Rawls’s claim rests on a conflation of the two.” See Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy*, p. 52, n16 and all the references there. For the verbatim quote in-text, see Hart, H. L. A. 1979, *Between Utility and Rights*, p. 828.

<sup>139</sup> Rawls insists that the social contract tradition that he owes allegiance to is that of Locke, Rousseau and Kant, to the exclusion of Hobbes. He further claims that his theory is a better alternative to utilitarianism and avoids the main objections to theories in the social contract tradition, within which his own theory arises. See Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 11, n4, as well as, p. 3.

<sup>140</sup> Elsewhere, Rawls clarifies that the objective character of primary goods, “is not self-respect as an attitude toward oneself but the social basis of self-respect... These social bases are things like the institutional fact that citizens

requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular the least advantaged members of society.<sup>141</sup>

Stated in this way, it is not clear how the general conception helps us decide at all times which goods are to be preferred if the outcome of the general distribution of various goods conflict in the Rawlsian scheme. For example should we allow that a homeless teenager be given accommodation while a part of her basic liberties – like the right to vote in any future elections – is withdrawn? If we allow this, the unequal distribution of liberty here clearly favours the least well off in one way (accommodation), but not in another (liberty).<sup>142</sup> Also an unequal distribution of income might be able to favour everyone in terms of income, but manages to create inequality in opportunity that disadvantages those with less income. Do these improvements in income outweigh disadvantages in liberty and opportunity? Because the general conception does not provide satisfactory answers to the above question, it follows that it suffers similar shortcomings like the intuitionist theories which Rawls rejects.<sup>143</sup> To overcome this difficulty, Rawls breaks the general conception into three parts, arranged according to a principle of “lexical priority”. The arrangement yields the “special conception” of justice.

*First Principle* – Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. *Second Principle* – Social and

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have equal basic rights, and the public recognition of that fact that everyone endorses... a form of reciprocity.” Rawls, J. 2001. *Justice as fairness: a restatement*. E. Kelly, ed., p. 60. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 303.

<sup>141</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 14 – 15.

<sup>142</sup> The least well off or the least advantaged refer generally to those who are lacking in primary goods: or the “various conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good.” See Rawls, J. 2001. *Justice as fairness: a restatement*. E. Kelly, Ed., p. 57.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy*, p. 55.

economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

- (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
- (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

*First Priority Rule* (The Priority of Liberty) – The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. ...

*Second Priority Rule:* (The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare) – The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle.<sup>144</sup>

What these principles show is that some social goods are hierarchically more important than others, such that they cannot be sacrificed in order to allow for improvement in the less important goods. In any situation where there is a conflict between the principles of justice, considerations of equal liberties will come first before equal opportunity, and equal opportunity before equal resources. “But within each category, Rawls simple idea remains – an inequality is only allowed if it benefits the least well off.”<sup>145</sup>

### 1.5.3: The Difference Principle

Rawls’ emphasis on safeguarding our basic social and political liberties is not novel, neither is it a contentious claim to make, at least not in the societies of the Global North (that is, the “West”). But the same could not be said of the difference principle. Indeed, Rawls owes a great part of his fame to the distinctiveness and, one must admit, attraction of the difference principle. The difference principle properly understood, requires that “we are to compare schemes of cooperation by seeing how well off the least advantaged are under each scheme. and

<sup>144</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 302 – 303.

<sup>145</sup> Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy*, p. 56.

then to select the scheme under which the least advantaged are better off than they are under any other scheme.”<sup>146</sup> The further implication of this is that, no one could be justified in earning greater benefits, unless it can be shown that such benefits improve the condition of the least advantaged members of society in ways that would otherwise be impossible.<sup>147</sup> Rawls notes that the least advantaged is not to be defined in terms of race, gender, nationality and the like. “Rather, the worst off under any scheme of cooperation are simply the individuals who are worst off under that particular scheme.”<sup>148</sup> For this reason, Rawls argues, his theory (justice as fairness) is distinctly egalitarian.<sup>149</sup>

But exactly in what way is “justice as fairness” an egalitarian viewpoint? Rawls first notes that there are many kinds of equality, but that he is interested in social and economic inequalities and why they ought to be regulated. Indeed, at the very beginning of *A Theory of Justice*, he makes it clear that he is interested in the justice of social institutions.<sup>150</sup> Among other things, “justice as fairness” condemns inequality of any kind as unjust because it allows some people to be amply provided for, so much so that they can satisfy even their least whims, whereas some others are unable to meet basic demands of daily living. More seriously, Rawls argues that significant political and economic inequality often result from obtuse social imbalances that place some in positions of dominance and arrogance, while others are in positions of servility and orchestrated inferiority. Rawls observes that what makes inequality wrong or unjust in itself, is that everyone can never hope to achieve higher status, for after all, the basis of inequality is that some people occupy a lower social status. The one way to correct this seems for Rawls that society be viewed as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens.<sup>151</sup> This means that “justice as fairness” is hinged on social cooperation

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<sup>146</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 59 – 60.

<sup>147</sup> To illustrate this idea, the Nigerian government in conjunction with the national tertiary institutions admission council and indeed the tertiary institutions themselves, recognises and lowers the merit standard for admitting candidates from educationally less developed states (ELDS), in order to help to equalize the educational inequality among the component units of the federation. Clearly, the inequality here follows Rawls’ difference principle in that it aims directly to improve the lot of the least (educationally) well-off in the society.

<sup>148</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p.59, n26; also see note 135 in pages 31 – 32 of this chapter.

<sup>149</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 538.

<sup>150</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 3.

<sup>151</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 130 – 133.

between equal citizens. This in turn implies an idea of reciprocity; which Rawls claims is absent in the principle of utility.<sup>152</sup> Rawls further points out that

in asking the less advantaged to accept over the whole of their life fewer economic and social advantages (measured in terms of utility) for the sake of greater advantages (similarly measured) for the more advantaged, the principle of utility asks more of the less advantaged than the difference principle asks of the more advantaged. ... For as a principle of reciprocity, the difference principle rests on our disposition to respond in kind to what others do for (or to) us; while the utility principle puts more weight on what is a considerably weaker disposition, that of sympathy, or better, our capacity for identification with the interests and concerns of others.<sup>153</sup>

Rawls further fortifies his principles of justice with two broad philosophical arguments. First, he argues that his theory better suits our intuitive consideration of justice, and that it gives a better “spelling-out” of the very ideals of fairness presupposed by the prevailing ideology of distributive justice, namely the equality of opportunity. The second argument is by far the more important of the two arguments and equally very controversial. According to Rawls, under a hypothetical social contract, his principles of justice would be chosen by people in “the original position”, that is, a pre-social arrangement, as the best for governing their society. And for Rawls, that is precisely why his position is a superior theory of distributive justice.<sup>154</sup> Let us briefly examine the finer points of the second argument only.

#### 1.5.4: The Veil of Ignorance and the Social Contract Argument

The main idea behind the “veil of ignorance” is that parties in the original position where the principles of justice are to be fashioned out and endorsed, should neither know what their

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<sup>152</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 14.

<sup>153</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 27.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy*, p. 57.

situation in society would be, nor their natural assets. In short, “the parties are not allowed to know the social positions or the comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent.”<sup>155</sup> They do not know whether those they represent would affirm a minority or majority religious or philosophical doctrine; and given the non-negotiable nature of comprehensive doctrines, no representative would want to take any risks about them. “They also do not know persons’ race and ethnic group, sex or various native endowments such as strength and intelligence, all within the normal range.”<sup>156</sup> Only in this way is there a guarantee that “no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage.”<sup>157</sup> But it is curious that Rawls could suppose that people at the original position would not know all of these, no matter how thick any veil of ignorance could possibly be. For we are quickly able to deduce that we are more or less intelligent than a fellow once we engage him in any meaningful dialogue, in our town’s meetings for example. It is also difficult to say what “normal range” might mean and who determines it. More seriously, Rawls must suppose that pre-social dialogues about the elements of justice/social cooperation could not possibly be concluded in one day or in one session for that matter. People must then be able to reason for themselves about the relative strengths of their discussants, and perhaps come to realise what everyone’s interest could really be.

However, Rawls further argues that the idea of the original position is set forth as responding to the problem of how to reach fair agreements about principles of political justice that could be applied to the basic structure. Then, in a seeming contradiction of his substantive position, Rawls postulates that “the [original] position is set up as a situation that is fair to the parties as free and equal, *and as properly informed and rational.*”<sup>158</sup> But, how do rational and informed people continue a dialogue under a veil of ignorance for any length of time? The veil of ignorance, must at a point begin to develop cracks, surely? But, Rawls seems to meet this objection indirectly as he attempts to reply to the charge that agreements arising from a hypothetical situation are void and as a result the fruits of the pact at the original position are insignificant. He writes: “the significance of the original position lies in the fact that it is a device of representation, or alternatively, a thought-experiment for the purpose of public and self-

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<sup>155</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 14.

<sup>156</sup> See Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 14 – 15; also p.104 – 105.

<sup>157</sup> Rawls, J. 1971/1972, *A theory of justice*, p. 139.

<sup>158</sup> Italics added. See Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 16.



clarification.”<sup>159</sup> The implication of this is that Rawls may not have meant to convince us about the facts of the original position, but about its rational appeal as a tool for always reassessing our points of view about public (political) justice. To be sure, the values of political justice include that of equal political and civil liberty; fair equality of opportunity, social equality and reciprocity as expressed by the difference principle; public reason allowing for reasonable free and public inquiry. In clear terms, the idea behind the original position is that it simultaneously models and regulates the principles of justice which free and equal (representative) citizens would choose under fair conditions. It is a device of representation modelling reasonable constraints – setting limits beyond which rational representatives may not appeal to.<sup>160</sup> To understand more fully the ideas contained in Rawls’ social contract argument requires an examination of one or two other themes in Rawls theory.

#### 1.5.5: The “Political Conception” of Justice and the Idea of “Overlapping Consensus”

This is an idea that Rawls began to develop in “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”, but which traverses his *Political Liberalism*.<sup>161</sup> It is basically the view held by Rawls that his liberal theory of justice is to be understood as a *political conception*. Under the political conception of justice, political values, rather than “comprehensive” moral, religious or philosophical doctrines form the basis of an acceptable theory of justice. To be sure, Rawls explains, a good number of these comprehensive doctrines are not to be regarded as unreasonable. The point rather, is that in our contemporary human societies, there exists a plurality of such distinct, incompatible and conflicting doctrines as to make it impossible that we base any workable theory of justice on any one of such doctrines.<sup>162</sup> Here, Rawls introduces the idea of “overlapping consensus” to resolve this problem. According to him, a fuller account of the idea of a political conception of justice itself, the idea of an “overlapping consensus” of comprehensive, religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines is needed, “in order to formulate a more realistic conception of a well-ordered society, given the fact of pluralism of such doctrines

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<sup>159</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 17.

<sup>160</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 80 – 88.

<sup>161</sup> See Rawls, J. 1992, *Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical*, p. 186 – 204; Rawls, J., 1996 [1993], *Political liberalism: with a new introduction and the “Reply to Habermas.”*

<sup>162</sup> See Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. xi.

in a democracy.”<sup>163</sup> Overlapping consensus is an ingredient of the political conception of justice which is reached after certain basic questions that have constituted the bases of deep conflicts are resolved – aspects of comprehensive doctrines harmful to political agreement dropped. This is to say, as Rawls later emphasizes, that citizens who have come to affirm the same political conception of justice, do so from different, even conflicting religious, philosophical and moral viewpoints. Thus, the political conception is a product of reasonable overlapping consensus, to be found in a well-ordered society: an overlapping consensus that has endured over time from one generation to the next.<sup>164</sup> There seems, then, to be a link between the idea of overlapping consensus and the idea of moral desert as contained in political liberalism. We say this because, elsewhere, Rawls notes that as a matter of fact that,

[S]ome will insist that they deserve certain things in ways that the political conception does not account for. This people may do from within their comprehensive doctrines, and indeed, if the doctrine is sound, they may be correct in doing so. Justice as fairness does not deny this. ...It only says that since these conflicting doctrines say that we morally deserve different things, they cannot all be correct; and in any case, none of them is politically feasible. To find a public basis of justification, we must look for a workable political conception of justice.<sup>165</sup>

However, Rawls strains to clarify, that political liberalism does not imply that the values articulated by a political conception of justice, though of basic significance, outweigh the transcendent values (as people may interpret them) – religious, philosophical, or moral – “with which the political conception may possibly conflict.”<sup>166</sup> Also, we do not rely on the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist to frame a political conception that “strikes a balance” between what parties in the original position might accept. Rather, the idea is to seek how to frame a political conception of justice for a constitutional regime that seems defensible in its own

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<sup>163</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. xvii.

<sup>164</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 32.

<sup>165</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 79.

<sup>166</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 37.

right and is such that the present and future generations might be brought to support it. An overlapping consensus requires that the political conception be affirmed by citizens irrespective of the political strength of their comprehensive view.<sup>167</sup> To be sure, overlapping consensus is achieved over a long period of time of recognising the fruits of political liberalism. This is because an overlapping consensus is not merely based on some contingent/historical experience, but is based on shared coincidental residues of citizens' comprehensive doctrines. And so it happens that as political cooperation lasts, citizens come to develop trust and confidence in one another.<sup>168</sup>

In Rawls' view, the final ends of citizens are not an adherence to their own comprehensive doctrines, but an affirmation of the same political conception – sharing basic political ends. This is why the overlapping consensus could still be said to yield a political community. This is not to say that citizens are overawed to submission here. At every point in time, rational persons within the society are regarded as free, autonomous and as “self-authenticating sources of valid claims.”<sup>169</sup> To be sure, every individual, as Descartes is able to make us see, is a complete rational being, with a capacity to freely decide or ascertain what clearly and indisputably exists in the real world. Thus, for Descartes as for Kant, the first and indisputable quality of the human person is autonomy. “The autonomous person adopts the principles by which he or she will live ... [by] critical reflection on the principles [of justice] available.”<sup>170</sup> These principles, as the *cogito* emphasizes, are better auto-generated by the detached, skeptical and probing “thinking being”. Drawing from this tradition, Rawls argues that

citizens think themselves as free in three respects:  
first as having the moral power to form, revise, and  
rationally pursue a conception of the good; second,  
as being self-authenticating sources of valid claims;

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<sup>167</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 192 – 193.

<sup>168</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 194 – 197.

<sup>169</sup> Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 23, also see Rawls, J. 2008a [2007], *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, p. 120 and p. 270 and Rawls, J., 1996, *Political liberalism: with a new introduction and the “reply to Habermas,”* p. 72

<sup>170</sup> Dagger, R. 1997, *Civic virtues: rights, citizenship, and republican liberalism*, p. 15.

and third as capable of taking responsibility for their ends.<sup>171</sup>

The citizens who are free in these ways, and as a result, rationally and fully autonomous are able to make valid decisions as to what is in their best interest or advantage in every case of social cooperation. Of course, in the Rawlsian view, the autonomous citizen, under the veil of ignorance, has no God; no authority; no antecedent principles of rights and justice; no prior and independent order of values known by rational intuition, to help them make their decisions as parties or rational representatives. Rather, “the appropriate weight of reasons for and against the various principles is given by their weight for the parties, and the weight of all reason on balance determines the principles that would be agreed to.”<sup>172</sup> So it seems that for Rawls, the autonomous individual does not have to rely on the Cartesian *cogito* or the Kantian *a priori* principles, or indeed any ethical persuasion, in order to perform the role of an autonomous, rational citizen, capable of endorsing only the right principles of justice.

#### 1.5.6: Rawls' Humanism and the Rise of Global Justice

Rawls' humanism is apparent in *A Theory of Justice*. He argued persuasively that “those who hold different conceptions of justice can ... still agree that *institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons* in the assigning of basic rights and duties ....”<sup>173</sup> He further points out that “distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid.”<sup>174</sup> Again, Rawls notes that “each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects.”<sup>175</sup> Here again, Rawls implicitly commits himself to the pursuit of a wider conception of justice beyond state boundaries. It is not exactly clear why Rawls did not move from passages like these in *A Theory of Justice*, to develop a theory of global justice. Indeed, some readers of his book,

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<sup>171</sup> Rawls, J., 1996, *Political liberalism*, p. 72.

<sup>172</sup> Rawls, J., 1996, *Political liberalism*, p. 73.

<sup>173</sup> Italics added. See Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 5.

<sup>174</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 5 – 6.

<sup>175</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 13.

including his students have brought this seemingly natural consequence of his position to his notice, but Rawls held on to the view that justice can only apply to members of the same nation-state. Finally, Rawls was persuaded to spell out, in a new book he titled, *The Law of Peoples*, the elements of his foreign policy. His view on global justice has in turn come under a series of attacks, culminating in a new main discourse in political philosophy.

## 1.6: Chapter Evaluation

The main problem Universalist political philosophers often confront has to do with the clearly immense (institutional and cultural) obstacles in the way of realising universal justice/global justice. How do we reconcile the idea of state sovereignty with some kind of global institution(s) whose mandate it would be to carry out the same functions traditionally associated with the state? In the face of cultural and religious diversity, do we require a World Religion to pursue universal justice? Or, as a matter of fact, is the global acceptance of Christianity/Islam, for example the only or the best way to realise universal justice? What exactly is the *Form* of justice? What kind of institutions do we actually need in order to bring about universal/global justice? On what grounds, if any, can we hope for global justice?

To be sure, this chapter began on the assumption that a thoughtful reading of the history of political philosophy would reveal that philosophers have always aimed to establish a universal morality of justice. In other words, we began this chapter hoping to show that the idea of universal justice/global justice is not entirely new in political theorising among philosophers. We consequently traced the idea of justice in the gamut of the history of philosophy. For our purpose, we selected four of some of the most adept philosophers of all time: Plato, St. Augustine, Kant and Rawls. From examining the theories of these select philosophers, it came to the fore that our earlier assumption was not unfounded. Classical philosophers have indeed explored some kind of implicit or explicit commitment to universal justice. Our main finding, however, is that until Rawls, contemporary philosophy did not begin to pay a close attention to the utopia of global justice. This chapter has then served the dual purpose of helping us to understand what some major classical philosophers thought about justice, and, as we hope, should also help us to appreciate the importance of most of the discussions in the coming

chapters, especially as it has to do with the crucial debate between Rawls and his cosmopolitan opponents. The debate between Rawls and his supporters on the one hand and his critics on the other, is further influenced and authenticated by globalisation; or the growing interdependence of all human societies as a result of major developments in technology. A critical survey of the output of that debate thus far, shall take up much of the analyses in the next chapter.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### PROBLEMATISING GLOBAL JUSTICE: POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVES

*The... world... share[s] two universal values:  
respect for human dignity and a sense of social  
justice. Hunger is the ultimate affront to both.*

\_\_\_The [US] Presidential Commission on World Hunger (1980).<sup>1</sup>

*It is essential that those in power resist the  
temptation to convert extra food into extra babies.  
[S]o long as there is no true world government to  
control reproduction everywhere; it is impossible to  
survive in dignity...*

\_\_\_Garret Hardin, American biologist and ethicist.<sup>2</sup>

This chapter problematises global justice. It attempts to bring into sharp relief the relevant normative, conceptual and practical issues tackled within the contemporary discourse on global justice. The chapter examines the viewpoints of the two main theoretical standpoints in the debate concerning how to realise a just, or at least a more just global order. The chapter's aim is as much to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of both theoretical positions as to show why some of their views must be rejected or modified if the aims of global justice are to be realised. The general viewpoint of this study is that the discourse on global justice is currently deadlocked because of the bipolarity between the two main groups seeking pathways for actualising that objective.

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<sup>1</sup> The Presidential Commission on World Hunger, 1997 [1980], *Why should the United States be concerned?*, p. 397.

<sup>2</sup> Hardin, G. 1997 [1974], *Living on a lifeboat*, p. 411. Similar views are expressed by the same author in the following articles which are at any rate re-printings or adaptations of the same article: 1985. *Lifeboat ethics: the case against helping the poor*, p. 601 – 13; 1996, "The case against helping the poor", p. 469 – 76; 1998. *Lifeboat ethics*, p. 350 – 56.

## 2.1: Problematising Global Justice

The fundamental problem of global justice is precisely about how to develop a (set of) universally valid principle(s) of justice. Thus, the anchoring research question is: can we develop principles of justice that would be applicable and acceptable to individuals and/or societies the world over? If any such principles were uncovered and accepted by societies and peoples the world over, then a new global order would emerge where the rules and regulations guiding international cooperation would be established and recognised in a consistent and fair manner. In the new world order, among other desiderata, the bases of inequalities in wealth and income would be adjusted to a point where every human being would, at least, be allowed a fair chance to earn a living in dignity.

In trying to meet the above challenge, one would have to face other daunting problems. These include, but are not limited to: What are the bounds of socio-economic justice? Do nation-states deserve the proceeds of their natural resources, the same way an individual may be said to deserve the benefits of their talents? If the notion of state ownership of their natural resources (and their inalienable right to dispense with these resources as they deem fit) is disputed, to what extent, if any, do affluent nations and their citizens owe poorer nations and their inhabitants a morally defensible obligation of social justice and/or humanitarian services? Can the shibboleths of state sovereignty be reformed to a point where we can hope to develop a (set of) global institution(s) whose mandate it would be to relocate persons to places (all over the world) where they would more easily enjoy fulfilled lives? Again, if it is disputed that individuals deserve the benefits of their talents and perhaps even the right to keep their private property (because after all, in the first case, they are merely lucky to have such natural talents, and in the second instance, individuals wouldn't be able to show that the initial acquisition of their wealth and property was just), how, on what principles, and to whom could individual persons be made to redistribute some of the wealth they may not need or have (perhaps) unjustly acquired? In short, could there be a defensible notion of natural justice from which an ethic of distributive equality both within and across state boundaries follows *a fortiori*?

The problem of global justice also involves questions like: At what point, if any, could military intervention be justified by a nation or a community of nations against a sovereign state? Or as a corollary, at what point, if any, is it just for a people to choose to secede from an existing



state? What duties of justice, if at all, do we owe oppressed groups and citizens of nations under oppressive regimes?<sup>3</sup> How can a nation – or a community of nations – prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, if that strategy may be regarded as the best means of engendering world peace and progress? Can we justify the use of chemical, biological or thermonuclear weapons even in a just war, if ever there could be such thing as a just war? What roles should a nation or committee of nations play (and to what extent) in tackling and subduing the very real dangers of natural disasters, climate change, global warming, and indeed all kinds of global environmental crises? Where, in short, should we draw the line in delineating and isolating the issues and problems of global significance requiring the separate and concerted efforts of individuals and governments the world over?<sup>4</sup>

The ongoing effort by scholars and theorists to tackle the above questions has (so far) spawned two identifiable dominant and opposing theoretical camps. These are the “*political conception*” of global justice and the cosmopolitan theory of (global) justice. Unfortunately, as this research reveals, neither camp provides a morally satisfactory and acceptable theory of global justice. The inherent difficulties and defects in the identified dominant theories would be better appreciated through an examination of the various strategies they deploy in trying to meet the challenge of global justice. This study begins with the political conception since, as it were, it represents what could be regarded as the traditional political philosophy; or at any rate – alternative theories of global justice usually seem to begin by disputing the political view.

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<sup>3</sup> Like it has been the case in many Arab countries which eventually led to bitter and bloody revolutions in many of those countries between 2011 to the present, giving rise to what is now popularly referred to as “the Arab Spring” or more narrowly as “Islamic Awakening”.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf have attempted to problematise global justice using different wording: “What are persons owed as a matter of fundamental human rights? What are the bases, if any, of duties of global justice? Does justice require global institutions that would distribute wealth and income in ways that are to some extent contrary to market distribution? If so, which principles should form the bases of such redistribution? Which goods should be the focus of global redistributive justice? Who is entitled to own and control world resources? What sort of restrictions, if any, on immigration are just? What should be the scope of governing institutions? What rules should govern in cases in which persons want to secede from an existing state? What role should the interests of persons and corporate bodies, such as states, nations or peoples, play in theorizing about global justice? Which duties, if any, are owed only to compatriots or conationals? What is the basis of state sovereignty and what are its limits? How democratic ought global institutions to be?” If neither list seems exhaustive or totally acceptable to the reader, then it is probably because presently part of the problem of global justice is to uncover the issues and problems of global justice, given that the discourse is relatively new in political theory. Major philosophers have only begun to channel their writings toward tackling the problem of global justice in the last 40 to 45 years. For the views of Pogge and Moellendorf just cited, see Pogge, T. and Moellendorf, D. 2008, *Global justice: seminal essays; global responsibilities*, vol. 1, p. xxv – xxvi.

## 2.2: The Political Conception of Global Justice

In the discourse on global justice, the advocates of the political conception, led by John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, Michael Walzer and David Miller, argue that state boundaries present impregnable limits to social cooperation on the international stage.<sup>5</sup> In other words, national boundaries, according to this view, set off discrete schemes of social cooperation, such that the relations of persons situated in different nation-states or what Rawls calls “self-contained national communit[ies]” cannot be regulated by (the same) principles of social justice.<sup>6</sup> According to Nagel, socio-economic justice is a *fully associative* phenomenon. “We are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we are joined in a strong and coercively imposed political community.”<sup>7</sup> In Nagel’s view, the political conception requires that we accord equality only to members of our own country – upon which the obligation of any other contents of justice may conceivably arise. Put simply, the political conception holds that state sovereignty is the basis of social justice.

The political conception of global justice further denies the cosmopolitan view that global justice may require a wholesale redistribution of global wealth based on identifiable principles of justice. Advocates of the political conception argue that the best efforts of affluent or prosperous nations should stop at the humanitarian level of helping poorer nations to develop the right political culture and institutions necessary for harnessing their available resources, increasing productivity and entrenching a system of fairness and equal opportunities among their citizens. In supporting and extending the above view, Rawls posits that any society, no matter the paucity of its natural resources can be well ordered. And once just institutions have been established in a society, people will live comfortably, even when not affluent. So, rich and powerful nations only owe poorer and burdened societies a duty of humanitarian assistance, including the assistance that would help them to develop just institutions, and never that of social justice.<sup>8</sup> The point, to

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<sup>5</sup> Nagel T., 2005, *The Problem of global justice*, p. 113 – 14; cf. Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*; Rawls, J. 1996, *Political liberalism: with a new introduction and the “reply to Habermas”*; Rawls, J. 1999a, *The law of peoples with “the idea of public reason revisited”*; Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness: a restatement*, E. Kelly, Ed.; Rawls, J. 1999b, *A theory of justice*, Rev. Ed.; Rawls, J. 2008 [1993], *The law of peoples*, p. 421 – 60.

<sup>6</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 457; also p. 4 & 8; Rawls, J. 1999b, *A theory of justice*, Rev. Ed., p. 401; also p.7. Cf. Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 132.

<sup>7</sup> Nagel T., 2005, *The problem of global justice*, p.133.

<sup>8</sup> Rawls, J. 1999a, *The law of peoples*, p. 106 – 108.

put it in a binary schema is: justice within states, and humanitarian assistance to the world.<sup>9</sup> Thus, all that a theory of (global) justice would require, under the political conception, is a “political world” of internally just states.<sup>10</sup>

However, while deep schisms exist between the positions of the two camps, theoretical continuities are sometimes discernible between them. Without being seemingly aware of it, theorists from antagonist camps find that they have to sometimes share views emanating from the platform of the opposition in several controversial issues. For example, most theorists of global justice concede that we owe strangers certain morally defensible obligations of justice, at least based on humanitarian grounds. They all agree that in the very least, we owe all human beings a mutual obligation not to kill or harm them, as far as it depends on us.<sup>11</sup> However, the exact reasons why there is a problem of global justice – the grounds of the disagreement between writers on global justice can be clearly identified. First: Proponents of the political conception of global justice emphasize the traditional idea of national autonomy and state sovereignty, as evident above. The consequence of this is that they regard the state as the basic moral unit in international cooperation, even within a political philosophy/practice where domestic individuals are regarded as autonomous – or in Rawlsian phraseology – where the moral powers of citizens

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<sup>9</sup> Notably, “*justice as ordinarily understood requires more than mere humanitarian assistance* to those in desperate need, and injustice can exist without anyone being on the verge of starvation.” See Nagel, T. 2005, *The Problem of global justice*, emphasis added, p. 118.

<sup>10</sup> However, “it is worth stressing...that duties of humanitarian assistance as... understood by Rawls... are not mere charity; like duties of justice, they are morally required duties.” But the two duties differ in two interrelated ways.

1. Duties of humanitarian assistance are limited-term commitments with a definable goal/cut-off point, but duties of justice aim to remove inequalities between societies and have no cut-off point. 2. Duties of humanitarian assistance do not directly address the global basic structure within which countries interact, but duties of justice apply directly to the background structure. Still, the cosmopolitans aver “...the difference between humanitarian duties and duties of justice does not concern only the issues of a target level of development and a cut-off point (as Rawls points out), but also the fundamental one of identifying what rightly belongs to whom. And this is a question of the basic structure, of how that structure allocates benefits and burdens, which in turn is a question that can be addressed fully by a theory of justice, and not just a theory of humanitarian ethics.” Similarly, Brian Barry points out that humanitarian funds sent to impoverished societies are often conditional upon the use the recipients make of it, whereas justice funds are unconditional, their recipients free to use them as they deem fit, see Tan, K. C. 2004, *Justice without borders: cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patriotism*, p. 22 – 23, and p. 29; Barry, B. 2008 [1982], *Humanity and justice in global perspective*, p. 204 – 05; also cf. Nagel, T. 2005, *The problem of global justice*, p. 118, cited above.

<sup>11</sup> But even this seemingly understandable *humane* obligation turns out to be very contentious in the ongoing discourse on global justice. Some cosmopolitans find that they have to disagree with the adherents of the political conception over what exactly “not to (be) kill(ed)” or the harm principle ought to mean. See for example, Singer, P. Spring 1972, *Famine, affluence and morality*; and O’Neill, O. 2008 [1975], *Lifeboat earth*; compare the arguments in both articles with that of the neo-Malthusians below.

include that of individuals as “self-authenticating sources of valid claims.”<sup>12</sup> In sharp contrast, the cosmopolitans consider the individual as the ultimate unit of moral consideration in thinking about global justice. Second: The political conception insists that the idea of justice is only coherent in a system of coercively imposed cooperative networks; and as it turns out, only the modern state satisfies that criterion. The cosmopolitans would ideally deny that state sovereignty is the basis of justice or international cooperation; and argue that social cooperation, if it is necessary to ground the idea of justice, is certainly a phenomenon that could – and indeed in contemporary times does – hold sway well beyond state boundaries. They would further claim that social cooperation beyond state boundaries is a fact of the current global setting.

At the moment, we examine in some details, the finer points of the political conception. Thereafter, attention shall be focused on the cosmopolitan position. The overall idea is to demonstrate the basis of the rift between the two camps as well as highlight their strengths and apparent weaknesses. Broadly conceived, the political conception of global justice offers several philosophical arguments in defence of the view whose basic outlines we have drawn above. These arguments include the Hobbesian Argument, Argument based on the Treaty of Westphalia, the “Ties of Nationality” Argument and the Argument based on State Autonomy. We examine the prominent prototypes of such arguments here.

### **2.2.1: Nationality and Social Cooperation as Grounds for Political Rights**

The “ties of nationality” argument pursued by advocates of the political conception of global justice is coextensive with the argument which says that social cooperation – that is working together to organise and actualise society’s goals – is a condition sine qua non for the question of justice to arise at all between persons/groups. Exponents of the political conception argue in this way because in their view, social cooperation of the kind that could generate serious issues of justice is traditionally tied to membership of the same state or nation-state; where fellow nationals are seen as acting to advance individual and collective interests.<sup>13</sup> In clear terms, special ties of the kind that simply do not and could not exist between us and foreigners are said

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<sup>12</sup> Rawls, J. 1996, *Political Liberalism*, p. 72. Also see Rawls, J. 2001, *Justice as fairness*, p. 23; Rawls, J. 2008a [2007], *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, p. 120 and p. 270.

<sup>13</sup> See Rawls, J., 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 4.

to dictate our affairs with conationals, so much so that we could be said to share the same social destiny with our compatriots. But since human beings, naturally, may want to get more than their own fair share of social goods or benefits, a conflict of interests inexorably arises in society. It is only in this context; Rawls tells us, that “a set of principles (of justice) is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares.”<sup>14</sup> Rawls is emphatic that he would be satisfied “if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived... as a closed system isolated from other societies.”<sup>15</sup> A “reasonable conception of justice” can only apply to isolated societies because, according to Michael Walzer, another exponent of the political conception, “the idea of justice presupposes a bounded world, a community within which distribution takes place, a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging and sharing, first of all among themselves.”<sup>16</sup> For sure, “it is possible to imagine such a group extended to include the entire human race, but no such extension has yet been achieved. For the moment, we live in smaller distributive communities.”<sup>17</sup> Of course, in Walzer’s view, we may owe outsiders negative obligations like not to kill, rob or defraud them, but obligations of distributive justice can only exist among established groups, between fellow nationals.<sup>18</sup>

The political view may be further defended by arguing, as David Miller does, that national boundaries “may be ethically significant”, such that the duties we owe to our compatriots are more extensive than the duties we owe to strangers.<sup>19</sup> We are and should be committed to fellow compatriots because, as Jeremy Waldron points out, it is believed that we owe the state (and by extension its members) certain special obligations based on natural duty and “acquired obligation”.<sup>20</sup> Again, the special ties or special relationships existing between us and fellow nationals are thought to magnify and multiply our extant moral duties towards one another. In other words, the special relationships emanating from our membership of a particular state somehow make our “ordinary general duties particularly stringent;” and also “create new special

<sup>14</sup> Rawls, J., 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Rawls, J., 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 8.

<sup>16</sup> Here, Walzer seems to be spelling out the full ramifications of “social cooperation”. See Walzer, M., 2008 [1981], *The distribution of membership*, p. 145.

<sup>17</sup> Walzer, M., 2008 [1981], *The distribution of membership*, p. 145.

<sup>18</sup> Walzer, M., 2008 [1981], *The distribution of membership*, p. 146 – 47.

<sup>19</sup> Miller, D., 2008 [1988], *The ethical significance of nationality*, p. 235ff.

<sup>20</sup> Waldron, J., 2008[1993], *Special ties and natural duties*, p. 391.

duties over and above the more general ones that we owe to anyone and everyone in the world at large.”<sup>21</sup> And since these special ties do not and could not possibly exist between us and non-compatriots, Miller approvingly echoes and reinforces Walzer’s views above, concluding with the conviction that

Such an extension [of Walzer’s bounded world] would be wildly implausible. We do not yet have a global community in the sense that is relevant to justice as according to need. There is no consensus that the needs of other human beings considered as such make demands of justice on me, nor is there sufficient agreement about what is to count as need. It is therefore unrealistic to suppose that the choice lies between distributive justice worldwide and distributive justice within national societies; the realistic choice is between distributive justice of the latter sort, and distributive justice within much smaller units – families, religious communities and so forth.<sup>22</sup>

The overall view being canvassed here by Miller and Walzer is that the idea of justice is only coherent and applicable to particular groups and societies bounded together by special ties or special relationships. Nationality, it is firmly believed, provides one such strong and irrevocable basis for special relationships between persons and groups.

A corollary of the nationality argument is that which says that membership of a particular nation-state necessarily situates individuals in a special bond of social cooperation. For Rawls, the problem of distributive justice is about how to develop the right principles upon which the benefits of (social) cooperation may be fairly distributed or allocated *within* a nation-state. Relying on Rawls’ arguments, the political conception of global justice argues that the question of distributive justice should be approached only in contexts and circumstances where both the logistics and incentives for actually implementing a set of consistent principles of justice are

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<sup>21</sup> See Goodin, R. E., 2008 [1988], *What is so special about our fellow countrymen?*, p. 262 – 63; cf. Walzer, M., 2008 [1981], *The distribution of membership*, p. 145 – 77; also cf. Rawls, J., 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 113.

<sup>22</sup> Miller, D., 2008 [1988], *The ethical significance of nationality*, p. 249 – 50.

already in existence. “Logistics” as we use the term here refers to the right social and political institutions that could implement the demands of justice, while “incentives”, on the other hand, has to do with social cooperation.<sup>23</sup> “Logistics” and “incentives” are required because, according to Rawls, a society is to be considered just if its basic structure or social institutions are arranged into a system, that is, one scheme of cooperation for the mutual advantage of its members.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, principles of justice [are to] determine a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens produced by “social cooperation.” If there were no such “cooperation,” there would be no occasion for justice, since there would be no joint product with respect to which conflicting claims might be pressed, nor would there be any common institutions (e.g., enforced property rights) to which principles could apply.<sup>25</sup>

Again, Rawls is strongly backed in the above claims by Michael Walzer, who is incidentally regarded as a prominent egalitarian social philosopher. According to Walzer, a shared institutional scheme is an imperative condition for justice, and where such a scheme is absent, the context and circumstances of justice do not even obtain.<sup>26</sup> It then follows, Walzer and other defenders of the political conception argue, that since the world as a whole does not admit of a common social cooperative scheme, the notion of global justice is vacuous and untenable. There is at present no global basic structure or an array of institutions representing one scheme of cooperation for the mutual advantage of global citizens; that is if the idea of global citizenship could hold any meaning at all. In precise language, for Rawls and those who endorse large parts of his foreign policy, there is at present no such thing as global social cooperation and therefore

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<sup>23</sup> See Rawls, J., 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 54 and passim; Rawls, J. 2008b [1993], *The law of peoples*, p. 446; Also, Waldron, J., 2008[1993], *Special ties and natural duties*, p412; and Goodin, R. E., 2008 [1988], *What is so special about our fellow countrymen?*, p. 280 – 81; also cf Beitz’s rendition of the same point as made by the proponents of the political conception of global justice, in 2008 [1975], *Justice and international relations, Global justice: seminal essays*, T. Pogge and D. Moellendorf, Eds., p. 40 – 48;

<sup>24</sup> Rawls, J., 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 4, 54ff.

<sup>25</sup> Rawls’ view is articulated here from Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations, Revised Ed.*, (with a new Afterword by the author), p. 131.

<sup>26</sup> See Walzer, M. 1983, *Spheres of justice: a defense of plurality and equality*; Walzer, M. 1995, *Response*; also cf. Walzer, M. 2008 [1981], *The distribution of membership*, p145 – 78.

no grounds for enforcing political rights globally, which is really, in the political view, the only way to render meaningful the idea of socio-economic justice or social equality across state borders.<sup>27</sup>

By and large, it is important we understand the basic standpoint of the political conception being exposed here. In clear terms, it generally reads something like this. There is a sense in which we are entirely in the right if we make claims of justice within our home country, that is, against our national governments or against fellow nationals. Our claims of justice within our own country is justified because of three important reasons: (1) the proximity within which we often live with fellow compatriots (or at any rate, with many of them); as a result of which (2) we frequently, if not at all times, stand to gain or lose something (mutually) from what our compatriots or national governments do, and (3) the very fact that the actions or inactions of fellow compatriots/conationals frequently constitute cases of (egregious) injustice against us, our family members or friends. It is also true that such claims of justice can only, in the last analysis, be enforced (to our satisfaction) by the social and political institutions of the country where we are members, once informal settlement becomes difficult, which it very often does. We might be able to make claims of justice against strangers or foreigners – or as strangers and foreigners

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<sup>27</sup>Robert Nozick defends views which could ironically be seen as both a powerful defence and a decisive attack on the views expressed here by the proponents of the political conception of global justice. He writes: “Often writers state a presumption in favor of equality in a form such as the following: Differences in treatment of persons need to be justified. ... Why must differences between persons be justified? Why think we must change, or remedy, or compensate for any inequality which can be changed, or remedied, or compensated for? Perhaps here is where social cooperation enters in: though there is no presumption of equality (in, say, primary goods, or things people care about) among all persons, perhaps there is one among persons cooperating together. But it is difficult to see an argument for this; surely not all persons who cooperate together explicitly agree to this presumption as one of the terms of their mutual cooperation. ... Its acceptance would provide an unfortunate incentive for well-off persons to refuse to cooperate with, or allow any of their number to cooperate with some distant people who are less well off than any among them. For entering into such social cooperation, beneficial to those less well off, would seriously worsen the position of the well-off group by creating relations of presumptive equality between themselves and the worse-off group.” However, Nozick’s claims here, it seems, have been taken up by neo-Malthusians to attack the idea of global justice. More on this below. For the above quotation, see Nozick, R. 1974, *Anarchy, state, and utopia*, p. 223; also see p. 183 – 89.

However, to be sure, by their very nature, (political) rights are legitimate claims and entitlements that human beings have against relevant others; and since rights are claims against others, they in turn generate corresponding duties on pertinent others, so that such claims could be protected, impunity checked, and rights that have been trampled upon restored. See Shue, H. 1996, *Basic rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 14, 59 – 60.; and Raz, J. 1986, *The morality of freedom*, p. 166. To further defend their claims, Rawls and his supporters might also invoke Kant’s arguments in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, that “the concept of Right, insofar as it is related to an obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of Right), has to do, first, only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as facts, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other.” Cited in Tan, K. C. 2004, *Justice without borders: cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patriotism*, p. 33.



ourselves, against our hosts. But once again, within the current system of things, only a particular state wielding coercive instruments could in most, if not all cases, fully guarantee that our rights and liberties are respected or restored.<sup>28</sup> Respecting and restoring our rights and liberties is precisely the meaning of justice.<sup>29</sup> It therefore follows that the idea of justice is only coherent as political justice, where “political” is synonymous with the state.

As a matter of fact, most cases of egregious injustice arise from the actions or negligence of the institutions and members of our own country, or the institutions and members of the country in which we currently reside (especially in the context of the welfare state).<sup>30</sup> Advocates of the political conception of global justice simply observe, or so it appears, that if all states are internally well organised and just, and thus are able to resolve all cases of (in)justice within their borders, then global justice, by the only definition they can allow it to have, would become a fact, period.<sup>31</sup> We may not be allowed to make claims of socio-economic or political justice against persons with whom we do not share certain special ties. Maybe the global poor may justly make pleas for occasional humanitarian assistance from wealthier nations and or foreign nationals, especially if such assistance is in the direction of helping such poorer societies to develop just institutions at home, but that is as far as global justice, according to this view, could and should go. Things might however change if at some point we are able to develop global institutions that would turn the entire world into a just cooperative scheme, especially if socio-politically weaker countries would allow themselves to come under the coercive authority of current world powers.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Although, in rare cases, we might be able to seek redress in more than one state, but the constant constraint of (global) social justice remains “the state”.

<sup>29</sup> However, some dissenting voices in contemporary political philosophy in the Global North would argue that respecting and restoring rights is a one-sided male-dominated notion of justice. If the female gender were taken into consideration, then the morality of justice would correctly be anchored in an ethic of care and thus be conceived as understanding, respecting and protecting relationships and responsibilities, see Giligan, C. 1982, *In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development*, passim; Giligan, C. 1986, *Remapping the moral domain*, p. 238.

<sup>30</sup> Also, it may be contended in some quarters that only states are capable of promulgating formal laws, and evolving institutions and social systems that may be said to be just or unjust.

<sup>31</sup> This view is strongly disputed by the cosmopolitans; global justice for them requires an internationally or globally just world – justice without borders. More discussions on this below.

<sup>32</sup> See Nagel, T. 2005, *The Problem of global justice*.

## 2.2.2: State Autonomy/Sovereignty as Limiting Socio-economic Justice

The nationality argument as developed by the proponents of the political conception of global justice is sometimes extended and deepened by appealing to the modern notion of the state, in which the state is seen as an autonomous entity wielding sovereign authority. Rather than merely noting that a special relationship – leading up to the circumstances of justice – happens to exist between conationals because of their special cooperation and shared interests, or because of the perceived impracticability of extending social and political rights across state boundaries, especially given variations in political cultures; an advocate of the political conception could invoke the traditional view that the state is inherently (metaphysically) an autonomous entity possessing exclusive rights to its territory and the resources within it. Given that the state is entitled to its territory and whatever can be found within, as the traditional view held; it is at liberty to use its natural resources as it deems fit, and may not be required to redistribute the benefits of such resources to aliens, except, perhaps, as we have noted, on humanitarian grounds. Only members of a particular (nation)-state are entitled to any kind of redistribution of its natural resources. But how exactly do advocates of the political conception arrive at the idea of state autonomy, or sovereignty, as limiting distributive justice? Let us examine each argument in turn.

### 2.2.2A: State Autonomy as Coextensive with Personal Liberty

The first argument, that is, the notion of state autonomy, has an intuitive appeal, in that it is drawn by an analogy with personal liberty.<sup>33</sup> Many people, especially in the modern (liberal) tradition, would endorse the view that persons ought to be granted the “unfettered freedom of thought and conscience” in the pursuit of their private ends, or in another rendition, that, “All human beings have the moral entitlement to exist as autonomous agents, and therefore have entitlements to those circumstances and conditions under which it is possible.”<sup>34</sup> Indeed, this idea that we may not interfere in persons’ pursuit of their chosen ends is regarded as the chief good of

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<sup>33</sup> Charles Beitz does not defend the political view under consideration here, but the following analysis owe great debt to his exposition of that idea in 1999 [1979], *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 67 – 123.

<sup>34</sup> See Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 295; Blake, M. 2008 [2001], *Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy*, p. 665.

modern liberties.<sup>35</sup> For this reason, “there is no moral warrant for interfering with a person’s liberty to pursue his ends as long as this pursuit does not offend the equal liberty of others to do the same.”<sup>36</sup> No one may coerce another to engage in any activity they do not on their own rationally endorse, as this would constitute the highest affront to human agency: “an attitude of disrespect, of infantilization of a sort inconsistent with respect for human agents as autonomous, self-creating creatures.”<sup>37</sup>

Put simply,

The idea of autonomy reflects an image of individual human agents as creating value by their creative engagement with the world; their allegiances, choices, and relationships constitute sources of values. [To be sure], [t]his creation of value can be destroyed or respected by institutions in the world. The principle of autonomy ...relies upon a normative conception of human agents... The principle, therefore, demands more than the simple exercise of practical reasoning. It demands that... a plan of life... be understood as chosen rather than forced upon us from without.<sup>38</sup>

The overall idea is that a person’s choice and pursuit of ends have an intrinsic value which cannot be overridden simply by considerations of the social good; instead, we are to respect persons as autonomous agents who are not to be made subject to the will of another unless for the higher and personal-autonomy-reinforcing reason of ensuring the preservation of equal liberties.<sup>39</sup>

A major strategy deployed by those who wish to defend the notion of state autonomy and the political conception of global justice is to substitute “states” for “persons” in the last two

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<sup>35</sup> See Constant, B. 1988, The liberties of the ancients compared with that of the moderns, *Political writings*, trans and ed., B. Fontana, passim.

<sup>36</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 76.

<sup>37</sup> Michael Blake credits the origin of the phraseology to Joseph Raz, see Blake, M. 2008 [2001], *Distributive justice*, p. 666.

<sup>38</sup> Blake, M. 2008 [2001], *Distributive justice*, p. 667.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 76.

paragraphs and simultaneously invoke the Wolffian nonintervention principle.<sup>40</sup> According to Christian Wolff (renowned eighteenth century theorist of international relations), “nations are regarded as individual persons living in a state of nature.”<sup>41</sup> To complete the analogy, he further holds that nations, like persons, are moral equals. For the purposes of exposition and analysis, Beitz cites Wolff at length:

“Since by nature all nations are equals, since moreover all men are the same; the rights and obligations of all nations are also by nature the same.” The “rights and obligations of a nation” are defined by its “sovereignty” which is originally... “absolute” but can be limited by laws of nations which impose restrictions equally on every state. The nonintervention rule follows directly: “Since by nature no nation has the right to any act which pertains to the exercise of sovereignty of another nation ...; no ruler of a state has a right to interfere in the government of another, consequently cannot establish anything in its state or do anything, and the government o[r] the ruler of one state is not subject to the decision of the ruler of any other state.”<sup>42</sup>

By relying on Hegel’s view of the state as expressed in *The Philosophy of Right*, Wolff’s analogy might be further strengthened by arguing that states are moral beings which are organic wholes with the capacity to realise their nature in the choice and pursuit of ends.<sup>43</sup> The sum of the entire argument, as we have pointed out, is to say that states are like persons in certain important

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<sup>40</sup> Scholars agree that Christian Wolff’s argument for the non-intervention principle has been influential to the subsequent development of international thought, see Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 76.

<sup>41</sup> Wolff, C. 1749, *Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum*, cited in Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 75.

<sup>42</sup> Beitz notes that Wolff, even though he has been interpreted from the above passage as proposing an “absolute” prohibition of nonintervention “allows that the community of states as a whole has a right to coerce any state to comply with the law of nations. The prohibition is only absolute only with regards to states, which may not interfere in the affairs of other equally sovereign states.” For this and the quotations of Wolff’s cited in the body of the work above, see Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 75.

<sup>43</sup> Of course, there are problems with views of this kind as cosmopolitans are quick to point out. See for example, Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 76.

respects such that like persons, states could not be made to part (against their wish), with their God-given resources without violating their fundamental rights.<sup>44</sup>

Realists in international relations and defenders of the political conception of global justice often invoke the above Wolffian notion of state autonomy and nonintervention, or the modern notion of state sovereignty that goes far back to the Westphalian Treaty or the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (following the end of the German phase of the Thirty Years' War) and the writings of Hobbes in the 1650s. To complete our discussion of how state autonomy/sovereignty is seen as limiting justice, we turn to these last two.

### 2.2.2B: The Peace of Westphalia and the Hobbesian Foreign Policy

In an oft-cited passage, Hobbes drew a grim comparison between international relations and the (Hobbesian) state of nature.<sup>45</sup> He describes the international system made up of states as existing in a continuous “posture of war”. In the international arena, each state, unhindered by moral or religious restraints, is at liberty to relentlessly seek to secure its own interests; a situation that makes a war of “all against all” always a probability. Hobbes writes memorably:

[At] all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in a state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. Appiah, K. A. 2005, *The ethics of identity*, esp. p. 238ff.

<sup>45</sup> In the Hobbesian state of nature, “nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.” Hobbes’ quote is cited in Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 30.

<sup>46</sup> Hobbes, T. *Leviathan*, p.187 – 88.

A situation like this is only avoided at the domestic level, Hobbes confides in us, because of the emergence of the sovereign power who guarantees basic equality with every other member of the state. “The sovereign had the right and the duty to govern and conduct policy, protect civil society from dissolution, limit or restrict freedom of expression, opinions and doctrines, control subjects’ property, resolve all conflicts through the right of judicature ... confer honours and privileges ....”<sup>47</sup> It is for the very reason that the sovereign state is able to prevent anarchy and maintain civil order within its territory, that some scholars, including Hobbes, grant that part of the morality of the state is absolute control of its destiny, independent of other coercive political communities.

Advocates of the political conception of global justice find Hobbes’ claims above “difficult to resist” precisely because there is no such thing as global sovereignty in the manner just described.<sup>48</sup> “Without the enabling condition of sovereignty,” Thomas Nagel writes, “to confer stability on just institutions, individuals however morally motivated, can only fall back on a pure aspiration of justice that has no practical expression, apart from the willingness to support just institutions should they become possible.”<sup>49</sup> The argument here, to reiterate, is that state boundaries represent insurmountable barriers to justice. Even for citizens of wealthy nations who may be sympathetic to the plight of citizens of poorer countries, there is very little they could do in the way of applying the principles of justice beyond their own country without the presence and support of supranational institutions wielding the necessary coercive and distributive instruments of justice.

If a dissenter is unconvinced of the practical wisdom contained in Hobbes’ view or the Wolffian-Hobbesian dilemmatic strictures on foreign policy, a defender of the political conception could point to an international ratification of views broadly similar to that of Hobbes’ even as he wrote his treatise in the mid-1600s. The framework of international affairs that has continued to shape international relations as ratified by the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 is

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<sup>47</sup>See Mukherjee, S. and Ramaswamy, S. 1999, *A history of political thought: Plato to Marx*. For more elaboration on the modern notion of sovereignty, see Appadorai, A. 1975, *The substance of politics*, 11th ed., p. 48 – 58; Irele, D. 1998, *Introduction to political philosophy*, p. 69 – 74; Hoffman, J. and Graham, P. 2006. *Introduction to political concepts*, p. 28 – 31; Laski, H. J. 1967, *A grammar of politics*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., p. 44 – 88; Anifowose, R. 1999, State, society and nation, *Elements of Politics*, p. 89 – 90; Miller, D. 2003, *Political philosophy: a very short introduction*, p. 19 – 36; Brahm, E. 2004, Sovereignty, p. 1 – 8.

<sup>48</sup> See Nagel, T. 2005, The Problem of global justice, p. 113 – 47, esp. p. 115.

<sup>49</sup> Nagel, T. 2005, The Problem of global justice, p. 116.

summarized (for the purpose of exposition) by David Held, a cosmopolitan advocate of global democracy, in an article he published in 1992:

1. The world consists of, and is divided by, sovereign states that recognize no superior authority.
2. The process of lawmaking, the settlement of disputes and law enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states subject to the logic of “the competitive struggle for power.”
3. Differences among states are often settled by force: The principle of effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection.
4. Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts is a “private matter” concerning only those affected; no collective interest in compliance with international law is recognized.
5. All states are recognized as equal before the law: Legal rules do not take account of asymmetries of power.
6. International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and peoples is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows national political objectives to be met.
7. The minimization of impediments on state freedom is the “collective” priority.<sup>50</sup>

The implication of the above understanding is that the state is deemed to be self-sufficient, able to manage most, if not all, of its own internal affairs in a manner satisfactory to its members and which should by no means be repugnant to other states. This situation safely guarantees each state the right to “independent and autonomous action”.<sup>51</sup> But a problem is immediately apparent in this emphasis on state power in international relations. As Beck explains:

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<sup>50</sup> Held, D. 2008 [1992], *Democracy: from city-states to a cosmopolitan order?*, p. 329.

<sup>51</sup> Held, D. 2008 [1992], *Democracy?*, p. 328.

none of the serious problems that states can only solve through cooperation – the increasing authority and materiality of supranational organizations, the development of transnational regimes and regulations to legitimize decisions, the economization or even ecologization of foreign policy, and in conjunction with this, the blurring of the classical boundary between domestic and foreign policy in general – affect the international legal principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states.<sup>52</sup>

Nonetheless, the general view of the political conception being exposed here is that the morality of the state guarantees it an almost unlimited freedom to act as it pleases in affairs within its jurisdiction/territory, as well as to use every means at its disposal to safeguard its interests internationally. Under this condition, the state certainly has exclusive rights over its resources and to dispense the benefits of such resources as it deems fit.

As convincing as their views may appear, advocates of the political conception of global justice have some tough questions to answer, especially in the face of the current highly interdependent global setting. But before we finally come to critically reviewing their general views, we examine one more argument that could be used to defend the political conception of global justice.

### **2.2.3: The Neo-Malthusian Argument against Global Justice**

The political conception of global justice could be defended using the neo-Malthusians' argument against combating world hunger. The neo-Malthusians, like some of the advocates of the political conception, believe that ill-conceived and poorly executed internal political and economic policies are responsible for poverty, hunger and deprivation in burdened societies. Neo-Malthusians blame the overpopulation of certain countries as the very cause of world hunger. They begin from the writings of the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century British economist Thomas R. Malthus to do so. In a notoriously famous essay published anonymously in 1798, entitled *An*

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<sup>52</sup> Beck, U. 2002-[2000], *The cosmopolitan perspective: sociology in the second age of modernity*, p. 64.



*Essay on the Principle of Population*, Malthus argued that when left unchecked, population growth will inexorably outstrip economic growth and food production.<sup>53</sup> In Malthus' view, "human population increases geometrically, while food production can only increase arithmetically."<sup>54</sup> Even where relative gains in food production are made in a period of population increase, any kind of stability is not achieved because population tends to increase faster than food production, ensuring that increased food production will lead to an even greater population growth. In Malthus' exact words,

Whatever may be the rate at which population would increase if unchecked, it never can actually increase in any country beyond the food necessary to support it. But, by the laws of nature in respect to the powers of a limited territory, the additions which can be made in equal periods to the food which it produces must, after a short time, either be constantly decreasing, which is what would really take place, or, at the very most, must remain stationary, so as to increase the means of subsistence only in an arithmetical progression. Consequently, it follows necessarily that the average rate of the *actual* increase of population over the greatest part of the globe, obeying the same laws as the increase of food, must be totally of a different character from the rate at which it would increase *if unchecked*.

The great question, then, which remains to be considered, is the manner in which this constant and necessary check upon population practically operates. ... When, by extraordinary efforts, provision had been made for four times the number of persons which the land can support at present, what possible hope could there be of doubling the provision in the next twenty-five years?<sup>55</sup>

Malthus' gloomy answer to his own question is "none," no hope of ever maintaining a sustainable balance between population and provision. The reasoning here is that "[t]he world is

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<sup>53</sup> Malthus eventually did a follow-up to that essay in 1830, with the title; *A Summary View of the Principle of Population*. Citations from Malthus in this section will be drawn from excerpts culled from both essays.

<sup>54</sup> See <http://cnre.vt.edu/lsg/3104/Overpop.%20FINAL/Poverty4.html>

<sup>55</sup> Malthus' italics. See Malthus, T. 2009 [1798, 1830], *An Essay on the principle of population; and A summary view of the principle of population*, A. Flew. Ed., p. 1.

a finite size but human population growth is unbounded, so eventually these two will collide.”<sup>56</sup> The unhappy resolution of this situation, Malthus posits, would eventually be famine, disease and war. Also, he found that uncontrolled birth or fertility is the cause of poverty, and poverty, clearly, is the cause of much of the travail of the poor, including starvation.<sup>57</sup>

Contemporary neo-Malthusians invoke and extend Malthus’ arguments above. They begin by stressing that economic growth cannot be sustained. Their arguments are often anchored in political or technical economic calculations, but they all concur that continued economic growth is impossible because of scarcity. And then they blame overpopulation for scarcity. So if there might be any hope of ever sustaining economic growth, population growth must effectively be checked.<sup>58</sup> For some neo-Malthusians, there is just a chance that population will eventually be controlled through birth-control measures, while for some others; “serious political and psychological obstacles” will block any attempt to control population in some countries.<sup>59</sup> This situation will inevitably lead to famines in some countries, unless some affluent nations intervene. Will it be desirable or even acceptable for affluent individuals and nations to intervene?

Neo-Malthusians would answer the above question in the negative. It would amount to a grievous mistake on the part of affluent countries or individuals to aid poor ones. In the neo-Malthusians’ view, Malthus was right in remaining adamantly opposed to monetary transfers from richer to poorer individuals.<sup>60</sup> For the neo-Malthusians, he had also been right in observing that increasing the welfare of the poor by giving them more money would eventually, paradoxically, worsen their living conditions, as they would mistakenly be led to think that they could support bigger families. This situation would in turn

depress the preventive check [against population growth] and generate higher population growth. At the end of this process, the same amount of

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<sup>56</sup> <http://www.bogleheads.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=20392&highlight=>

<sup>57</sup> Malthus’ view is explained in Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds., 1997, *Social ethics: morality and social policy*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., p. 391.

<sup>58</sup> Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds., 1997, *Social ethics*, p. 391 – 92.

<sup>59</sup> Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds., 1997, *Social ethics*, p. 392.

<sup>60</sup> Abramitzky, R. and Braggion, F. Malthusian and Neo-Malthusian Theories, <http://www.stanford.edu/~ranabr/Malthusian%20and%20Neo%20Malthusian%20for%20webpage%20040731.pdf>, p. 2.

resources has to be split between a larger population, triggering the work of the positive check to populations. Moreover, immediately after such a transfer, people can afford buying more food, bidding its price up and decreasing real wages, which [will again, paradoxically], hurt poor individuals whose main income comes from their labor.<sup>61</sup>

In two separate and widely publicised articles, Garret Hardin, American professor of Biology follows neo-Malthusian arguments of the kind mentioned above, to make what may be considered a strong case against helping the poor in general and the poor in foreign countries in particular.<sup>62</sup> He singled out for attack environmentalists like Kenneth Boulding, for trying to sell a false image of the earth as a “spaceship”.<sup>63</sup> Hardin complains that by using this misleading metaphor or image of the earth, environmentalists try to persuade “countries, industries and people to stop wasting and polluting our natural resources.”<sup>64</sup> This incorrect analogy between the earth and the spaceship, Hardin points out, is founded, in turn, on the supposed assumption that the entirety of the human race “share life on this planet” and so, “no single person or institution has the right to destroy, waste, or use more than a fair share of its resources.”<sup>65</sup> Hardin faults the spaceship analogy, as potentially “dangerous” in the hands of “misguided idealists”, who might use it to “justify suicidal policies for sharing our resources through uncontrolled immigration and foreign aid.”<sup>66</sup> An unacceptable scenario like this would lead to what he calls “the tragedy of the commons,” or in another rendition, “a ruinous system of the commons”.<sup>67</sup> For this reason, the spaceship earth must be jettisoned, Hardin reasons, for a “lifeboat earth” where we recognised the finitude of earth’s resources against a limitlessly expanding human population; a situation that is currently worsened by unchecked reproduction in poorer societies of the world.

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<sup>61</sup> See Abramitzky, R. and Braggion, F. Malthusian and Neo-Malthusian Theories, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> See Hardin, G. 1997 [1974], Living on a lifeboat, p. 406 – 12; Hardin, G. 1996, The case against helping the poor, p. 469 – 76. Both articles originally appeared in Oct. 1974, *Bioscience*, American Institute of Biological Sciences, and 1974, *Psychology Today Magazine*, respectively.

<sup>63</sup> Hardin, G. 1997 [1974], Living on a lifeboat, p. 406; and 1996, The case against helping the poor, p. 469.

<sup>64</sup> Hardin, G. 1996, The case against helping the poor, p. 469.

<sup>65</sup> Hardin, G. 1996, The case against helping the poor, p. 469.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> See Hardin, G. 1997 [1974], Living on a lifeboat, p. 412; Hardin, G. 1996, The case against helping the poor, p. 471.

If the import of his analysis is felt, then affluent nations and their inhabitants would, in Hardin's opinion, recognise the folly behind helping the poor and the needy in impoverished societies. In Malthus' view, trying to help all poor persons can only, in the last analysis, lead to a crisis point where all "lifeboats" will either become overcrowded or suffer mortally injurious shortages of resources. As a matter of fact, for Hardin, many countries have already outstripped their lifeboats' carrying capacity or are dangerously at the verge of doing so. Hardin's views here closely resemble what advocates of the ethics of triage often say. The idea of an "ethics of triage" originates from the expression, "method of triage". The "method of triage" traces back to when it was first used to describe the approach of the French to their wounded in World War I. The wounded were placed in three categories. Those with the slightest injuries were given quick first aid. Those who sustained serious injuries and could not be helped were simply allowed to die. Those in-between received the most intensive medical care. So if the method of triage were to be used for the countries with food crisis, we would classify them into three groups.<sup>68</sup> The first would be made up of countries that would survive even without aid. The second group consists of countries that would survive if given sufficient aid, because they are prepared to take the right steps to balance out their population against their resources. Countries under the second group, the exponents of ethics of triage point out, should be given the necessary aid. The third group consists of countries whose problems are insoluble, no matter the effort, because they are not willing to take the necessary population-control measures. Countries in this third group should receive no help, under the ethics of triage.<sup>69</sup>

The philosophical argument behind Hardin's "life-boat ethics" is cognately tied to the ethics of triage. Nonetheless, for Hardin, "the question of triage does not even arise."<sup>70</sup> There is no need, he argues, to give aid to any country at all. After all, is it not the case that nations are only impoverished because of overpopulation, or more specifically, because such countries have refused to pursue the right reproduction policies? And since as he has shown, giving aid to an overpopulated country will bring about harmful consequences, his rhetorical question is: why give aid to any of them – under any circumstances? But the real question is whether

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<sup>68</sup> But here, Hardin says no such distinction ought to be made: no overpopulated country should be given aid, period. See Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds., 1997, *Social ethics*, p. 392.

<sup>69</sup> The (dis)analogy follows Wolffian-Hobbesian lines to liken nations to individuals. See Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds., 1997, *Social ethics*, p. 392.

<sup>70</sup> Hardin, G. 1976, Carrying capacity as an ethical concept, cited in Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds., 1997, *Social ethics*, p. 393.

overpopulation precedes poverty; or are things the other way round? Would population control necessarily guarantee economic prosperity? Or is there a chance that improved standards of living, well-paying jobs and a secure environment could gradually lead many individuals and societies to cut down on population? Ultimately, for the global poor, which is more important?: working to end poverty or drastically reducing population? An exponent of the political conception in the mould of Thomas Nagel or Rawls would say that burdened societies or impoverished countries should work out their own salvation, if a population policy is part of the bargain, so be it; all that affluent societies owe the poorer ones is to help the latter (on humanitarian grounds only) to evolve and implement effective internal policies of certain kinds that would help reduce hunger, malnutrition and disease.

However, non-Malthusians contend that it is at least morally compelling to offer basic assistance to the global poor, even before the expectation of eradicating all social and economic inequalities. They further argue that neo-Malthusians are wrong in blaming factors other than an unjust global arrangement for world poverty. Overpopulation itself is not necessarily caused by ill-conceived or poor internal population control policies. A non-Malthusian argument would make the ironic, but more convincing claim that high fertility rates are in fact greatly influenced by poverty and hunger.

Where hunger and poverty prevail, the population growth rate is more likely to increase than decrease. Under inequitable social and economic conditions, a poor couple's desire for many children is a response to high infant mortality, the need for extra hands to help earn the family's daily bread, and the hope for support in old age. The key to reducing family size is to improve the social conditions which make large families a reasonable option.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> The [US] Presidential Commission on World Hunger [1980], cited in T. A. Mappes and J. S. Zembaty, Eds., *Social ethics: morality and social policy*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., 394.

### 2.3: Reviewing the Political Conception of Global Justice<sup>72</sup>

Overall, the political conception of global justice may retain some merits, but it fails to address the fundamental problem of global justice as outlined in this work. It is a grave mistake to say that “we (should) accord equality *only* to members of our own country” or to maintain that sovereignty is the basis of social justice. Apart from the very fact that many philosophers and social theorists have since successfully defended the idea of human equality (as the study reveals in coming chapters), we are convinced that using the “interdependency theory,” the cosmopolitans are able to show that their rivals are wrong on this count. In contemporary times, what we do in our local domains constantly generate ripples and reverberations in faraway places and across the globe. Also, the rate at which we currently move from one region of the world to another is so frequent that we must find at least one ontologically valid principle upon which we could treat foreigners fairly. What other principle can suffice if not the principle of human biological sameness and its corollary, human equality?<sup>73</sup>

It is not fair on the part of Rawls and the proponents of the political conception to argue that the current absence of global institutions that could conceivably re-distribute global wealth justly is sufficient grounds to jettison the pursuit of the utopia of socio-economic justice across state boundaries. Rorty has argued persuasively that: “No event not even Auschwitz – can show that we should cease to work for a given utopia. Only another more persuasive, utopia can do that.”<sup>74</sup> Rawls and his supporters have failed to offer us a more persuasive alternative utopia to global (socio-economic) justice. It is also false and egregiously insensitive to say as Rawls does, that all societies can become well-ordered and comfortable, no matter the paucity of their natural resources, if they are prudently managed. In the face of global environmental crisis and the need for cleaner and safer energies, for example, some countries’ economies will simply collapse if

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<sup>72</sup> This work is entirely devoted to criticising and modifying the views and positions of the advocates of the political conception of global justice and that of their cosmopolitan opponents. However, this section provides the reader with a quick outlay of the main grounds upon which my criticisms of the political position shall be built and extended in the coming discussions. At any rate, the cosmopolitan standpoint which comes up for discussion in the same chapter helps to further enlighten us concerning the issues and problems highlighted already, as well as provide critical alternative viewpoints to those expressed by the political camp.

<sup>73</sup> This also points to the very fact that in theorising about global justice, we need to also know what certain basic concepts like “equality” and “human value” could hold for different people(s) beyond the domestic level. See Joseph, S. 1998. *Interrogating culture: critical perspectives on contemporary Social Theory*.

<sup>74</sup> Rorty, R. 1991, *Objectivity, relativism, and truth: Philosophical Papers*, Vol.1, p. 220.

they try to meet these challenges unaided.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, because of recurring natural disasters and a poverty of natural resources, some countries simply cannot help themselves. And we can easily imagine a country that is so poor that no level of “prudential management” of its resources can make its inhabitants comfortable. So, global justice is not all about maintaining a world of internally just states. Quite rightly, global justice could begin from a world of internally just states. But it must not end there.

The major defect of the political conception of global justice, however, is that its advocates fail to realise that the basic assumption behind their theory is that in spite of cultural plurality and prejudices, liberal societies could somehow assist or *teach* “non-liberal” or “burdened” societies *the* right political culture upon which they may be well (re)-ordered.<sup>76</sup> No country has the right political culture to teach others. All we can do is counsel against waste or laziness, oppression or class segregation while shifting attention to helping poorer nations to evolve dialectically, *a* right political culture. This political culture would enable it to become internally just and comfortable, as well as progressively become externally just by re-allocating excess resources to poorer nations. The entire idea is to convince socio-politically less-advanced nations by persuasion and not by force to change their political arrangement, especially if their current political situation is harmful to the ideals of (global) justice. The point that must then be made is that the political conception of global justice is restrictive, insensitive, and altogether morally indefensible.

#### 2.4: The Cosmopolitan Challenge

When Paul Streeten asserted in an article published in 1989 that our shrunken world suffers from “a lag” of institutional adjustments behind “technological advance”, he seemed to have spoken the mind of most cosmopolitan.<sup>77</sup> As a matter of fact, exponents of the cosmopolitan theory of (global) justice, Charles Beitz, Onora O’Neill, Thomas Pogge, Henry

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<sup>75</sup> Let us also note that while many wealthy nations may want to play down the logic of global interdependency when the matter at issue is wealth redistribution, industrialized countries easily awaken to the fact of global interdependency when issues about the environment take the centre stage. They unabashedly urge developing societies to embrace contemporary environmentally friendly technologies.

<sup>76</sup> The point here is that advocates of the political conception assume Global Northern (Western) liberal norms to be universally valid; a guilt they share in common with some cosmopolitan writers.

<sup>77</sup> See Streeten, P. P. 1989, *Global institutions for an interdependent world*, p. 1349.

Shue, Peter Singer and Peter Unger sharply disagree with the viewpoint expressed by the political conception of global justice. Cosmopolitans see no reason why socio-economic justice may not be extended beyond state boundaries, especially in a world where persons and societies have increasingly become interdependent on one another for natural resources, services and ideas, exchanged through transnational institutions. In the cosmopolitan view, human flourishing for all persons – or a situation where the lives of all human persons are good or worthwhile in the broadest sense – demands that we “aspire to a *single, universal* criterion of justice which all persons and peoples can accept as the basis of moral judgment about the global order and about other social institutions with substantial international causal effects.”<sup>78</sup>

The cosmopolitans further reject the “meager” concession of limited humanitarian assistance (which must have a cut-off point) granted by the supporters of the political conception. Like their adversaries in the political camp, cosmopolitans try to defend the above claims with some carefully reasoned philosophical arguments. They chiefly rely on the “interdependency theory” and argue for a wholesale redistribution of global resources. Cosmopolitans clamour for the strengthening of global institutions like the United Nations and the International Criminal Court to pursue the aims of global justice. Citing Kant’s claim in the *Metaphysical Elements of Justice* that international economic cooperation creates a new basis for international morality, Charles Beitz argues (and many cosmopolitans concur) that interdependence is a key issue in global justice.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, for Peter Singer, we can be said to be *interdependent* on one atmosphere, one economy, one law, and perhaps one community.<sup>80</sup> He claims that there is a need to develop a new ethic of globalisation favourable to poorer nations in a world where the industrialised and affluent nations are already at a great (perhaps undeserved) advantage.<sup>81</sup>

Globalisation has made economic interdependence a reality, and Beitz explains its hazards: “industrial economies have become reliant on raw materials that can only be obtained in

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<sup>78</sup> Pogge’s emphasis. See Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and reform*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 33 – 39; also cf. p. 42 – 43 and 50.

<sup>79</sup> See Beitz, C. R. 1975, Justice and international relations, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 4.4: 374 – 77, also Beitz, C. R. 2008 [1975], Justice and international relations, *Global justice: seminal essays*, p. 32 – 40; 1999, [1979], Beitz, C. R. *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 143 – 53.

<sup>80</sup> Singer, P. 2004, *One world: the ethics of globalization*, 2nd Ed., passim.

<sup>81</sup> See Singer, P. 2004, *One world*, 2nd Ed., passim.



sufficient quantities from developing countries.”<sup>82</sup> Unfortunately, he observes, participation in the globally interdependent economy, especially by developing countries, has in turn aggravated global inequality and poverty.<sup>83</sup> *Contra* Rawls, Beitz contends that national economies are not autarkic in our currently interdependent world order. Thus, “confining the principles of social justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in ‘just’ regimes.”<sup>84</sup> Or, one could actually say that resource-rich but poor nations are kept poor in order to maintain the consumption patterns in industrialised and affluent societies.<sup>85</sup> For this and other negative consequences of global *interdependencies*, Charles Beitz concludes, and many cosmopolitans would easily back him, “principles of distributive justice must apply in the first instance to the world as a whole, then derivatively to nation-states.”<sup>86</sup>

From another perspective, some cosmopolitans insist that the only way to begin to face up to the unavoidable task of really eradicating poverty, malnutrition and other abuses or underfulfillment of human rights everywhere in the world is to carry out revolutionary social and economic changes in the developing countries themselves, as well as engender “the massive redistribution of resources from the affluent northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere.”<sup>87</sup> A redistribution of this kind, the cosmopolitans argue, ought not to trouble the citizens and governments of affluent societies just because they stand to gain little or nothing in the way of reciprocity. There should be no objection against redistributing resources to help salvage the world poor as it is a morally required duty aimed correctly at protecting and fulfilling human rights over and above considerations of property rights.<sup>88</sup> We owe this moral duty to others, the cosmopolitans contend, because they are human beings like us.

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<sup>82</sup> Note that cosmopolitans do not necessarily see interdependence as a good thing, especially for poorer societies. They only wish to state that interdependence is an unavoidable fact of the current world setting that principles of justice ought to recognise. For the verbatim quote, see Beitz, C. R. 1975, *Justice and international relations*, p. 374.

<sup>83</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 146; cf. Schulz, B. 2001, *Poverty and development in the age of globalization: the rise of foreign aid*, p. 95.

<sup>84</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 149 – 50; also cf p. 2.

<sup>85</sup> See Collste, G. 2005, *Globalization and global justice*, p. 57.

<sup>86</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1975, *Justice and international relations*, p. 383.

<sup>87</sup> The idea is credited to Kai Nielsen, see Mappes, T. A. and Zembaty, J. S. Eds. 1997, *Social ethics: morality and social policy*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed., p. 395.

<sup>88</sup> See Nielsen, K. 1997 [1992], *Global justice, capitalism and the Third World*, p. 413 – 22; and Singer, P. 1997 [1972], *Famine, affluence and morality*, p. 398 – 405. Also see De George, R. T. 1997 [1985], *Property and global justice*, p. 422 – 31.

Like their adversaries in the political camp, cosmopolitans try to defend the above claims with some carefully reasoned philosophical arguments and by interpretation of the prevailing statistical and historical data on world poverty and hunger. We examine the grounds of some of the more prominent of such arguments in the following sub-sections.

#### 2.4.1: The Interdependency Thesis

The “interdependency thesis” is one that is often invoked by those wishing to argue for some kind of global redistribution of the proceeds of natural resources to be found in different parts of the world. Citing Kant’s claim in the *Metaphysical Elements of Justice* that international economic cooperation creates a new basis for international morality, Charles Beitz argues (and many cosmopolitans would concur) that interdependence is a key issue in global justice.<sup>89</sup> After all, for Peter Singer, we can be said to be *interdependent* on *one* atmosphere, *one* economy, *one* law, and perhaps *one* community.<sup>90</sup> He claims that there is a need to develop a new ethic of globalisation favourable to poorer nations in a world where the industrialised and affluent nations are already at a great (perhaps undeserved) advantage.<sup>91</sup>

To cite just one example of how economic interdependence has become a hazardous fact of the current global economy, Beitz further explains: “industrial economies have become reliant on raw materials that can only be obtained in sufficient quantities from developing countries.”<sup>92</sup> But unfortunately, he observes, participation in the globally interdependent economy, especially by developing countries, has in turn aggravated global inequality and poverty.<sup>93</sup> This is because:

1. many economies experience a negative rebound as they try to tailor their domestic economic policies to match with the prevailing situation of global economy which they have little or no way of controlling to suit their own interests;

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<sup>89</sup> See Beitz, C. R. 1975, Justice and international relations, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 4.4: 374 – 77, also Beitz, C. R. 2008 [1975], Justice and international relations, *Global justice: seminal essays*, p. 32 – 40; Beitz, C. R. 1999, [1979], *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 143 – 53.

<sup>90</sup> Singer, P. 2004, *One world: the ethics of globalization*, 2nd Ed., passim.

<sup>91</sup> See Singer, P. 2004, *One world*, 2nd Ed., passim.

<sup>92</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1975, Justice and international relations, p. 374.

<sup>93</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 146; cf. Schulz, B. 2001, Poverty and development in the age of globalization: the rise of foreign aid, p. 95.

2. participation in global trade has not always served to galvanise many domestic economies, not only because the governments of poorer nations are often forced to sign away the actual profits of such transactions by their more powerful and more expert Global Northern (affluent) counterparts at the negotiation table, but equally because the elites – corrupt political elites in poor countries – are often the principal beneficiaries of foreign trade.<sup>94</sup>

So *contra* Rawls, Beitz contends that national economies are not autarkic in our currently interdependent world order. Thus, “confining the principles of social justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in ‘just’ regimes.”<sup>95</sup> Or, one could actually say that resource-rich but poor nations are kept poor in order to maintain the (over)-consumption patterns in industrialised and “affluent” societies.<sup>96</sup> For this and other (negative consequences of) global *interdependencies*, “principles of distributive justice must apply in the first instance to the world as a whole, then derivatively to nation-states.”<sup>97</sup>

From the cosmopolitan camp, Thomas Pogge fingers the interdependence of world institutions as a critical factor behind international inequalities and the underfulfillment of human rights or the “very partial” achievement of the realisation of human rights; at times such interdependence even generates cases of human rights abuses. He writes memorably: “Our” – referring to the affluent peoples and governments of the Global North –

new global economic order is so harsh on the global poor, then, because it is formed in negotiations where representatives ruthlessly exploit their vastly superior bargaining power and expertise, as well as any weakness, ignorance or corruptibility they may find in their counterpart negotiators, to tune each agreement for our greatest benefit. In such negotiations, the affluent states will make reciprocal concessions to one another, but rarely to the weak. The cumulative result of many such negotiations and agreements is a grossly unfair global economic order [in] which the lion’s share of the benefits of

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<sup>94</sup> See Beitz, C. R. 1999, *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 147 – 48; also see p. 1. Pogge pursues similar views in 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 27.

<sup>95</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1999, [1979], *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., p. 149 – 50; also cf p. 2.

<sup>96</sup> See Collste, G. 2005, *Globalization and global justice*, p. 57.

<sup>97</sup> Beitz, C. R. 1975, *Justice and international relations*, p. 383.

global economic growth flows to the most affluent states.<sup>98</sup>

Pogge pointedly regrets that

It is convenient for us citizens of wealthy countries, and therefore common to ignore such interdependencies – to explain the severe underfulfillment of human rights in so many countries by reference to local factors domestic to the country in which it occurs. This *explanatory nationalism*... diverts attention from the question of how we ourselves might be involved, causally and morally, in this sad phenomenon.<sup>99</sup>

What is Pogge really saying? His argument is that people and governments of affluent societies share a large part of the moral blame for the poverty and privations felt in poorer countries.<sup>100</sup> Citing examples of autocratic regimes including that of Nigeria's Abacha and Zaire's Mobutu, who played major roles in determining their people's status in the current global setting, Pogge demonstrates that such (military) despots were able to ascend and hold on to power because of two important factors put in place by the current world order.<sup>101</sup> Indifference by the global community as to how power is acquired, Pogge contends, has resulted in the unfortunate fact that any group with the preponderance of coercive power in a country is recognised as its legitimate government and thus is allowed to represent the country in question in international negotiations. More significantly, such a rogue government is also allowed the privileges to (a) freely borrow in the country's name (international borrowing privilege) and (b) freely dispose of the country's natural resources (international resource privilege). An

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<sup>98</sup> Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 27.

<sup>99</sup> Pogge's emphasis. See Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 55.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Amin, S. 2010a, *Ending the crisis of capitalism or ending capitalism*; Amin, S. 2006, *Beyond US hegemony: assessing prospects for a multipolar world*, P. Camiller, Trans.; Amin, S. 1976, *Unequal development: an essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism*, B. Pearce. Trans.; Amin, S. 2010b, *The law of worldwide value*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., B. Pearce and S. Mage. Trans.; Amin, S. 1990, *Maldevelopment: anatomy of a global failure* and Rodney, W. 2009, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*.

<sup>101</sup> If the following comment by Pogge is true, then its implications could not be more damning for the current global order: "Just think of who made the decision to join the WTO, for example: Myanmar/Burma was signed on by its notorious SLORC junta (the State Law and Order Restoration Council), Nigeria by its military dictator Sani Abacha, Indonesia by Suharto, Zimbabwe by Robert Mugabe, Zaire/Congo by dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and so on." See Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 29.

arrangement like this, according to Pogge, could only generate one outcome: a situation where such countries are progressively plundered and their inhabitants impoverished as one thieving dictator is replaced by another; while on the other hand, the affluent countries of the Global North grow richer from gains made from cutthroat international bargains.<sup>102</sup> Pogge's warning is that continuing to keep a global order like this is increasingly becoming unacceptable and impossible. He writes: "More and more, the transnational imposition of externalities and risks is becoming a two-way street, as no state or group of states, however rich and well-armed, can effectively insulate itself from external influences – from military and terrorist attacks, illegal immigrants, epidemics and drug trade ..."<sup>103</sup> Allowing rogue regimes to take over power and try to sustain themselves can only worsen scenarios like this.

In addition, Pogge blames affluent societies of the Global North for being responsible for creating and sustaining a global order that is greatly increasing international interdependence to the detriment of poorer societies. To stress a point he has made earlier and in several publications, he reiterates that "this order exacerbates the vulnerability of the weaker national economies to exogenous shocks through decisions and policies made – without input from or concern for the poorer societies – in the US or EU (e.g. interest rates set by the US and EU central banks)."<sup>104</sup> The preeminent task of our age is therefore the formulation, global acceptance and realisation of the equally preeminent requirement of our time, namely that all coercive institutional schemes "afford each human being secure access to minimal adequate shares of basic freedoms and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter, education, and health care."<sup>105</sup> Until this is done, Pogge contends and most cosmopolitans would endorse his reasoning, no citizen or government of affluent nations may absolve themselves of the moral guilt of current global inequalities and the underfulfillment of human rights in poorer human societies.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> See Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 118 – 22; and Pogge, T. Jun, 2005. Global justice as moral issue: interviewing Thomas Pogge, A. Pinzani, Ed/Interviewer, p. 2 – 6; cf. Appiah, K. A. 2007, *Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers*, p. 166 – 74.

<sup>103</sup> See Pogge, T. 2008b [1992], *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty*, p. 383.

<sup>104</sup> Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 122.

<sup>105</sup> Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 57.

<sup>106</sup> Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., passim.

## 2.4.2: Cosmopolitan Humanity and Individualism

Global interdependence is indisputable, and so would seem to provide a strong platform for the cosmopolitans to attempt to defend their main position, that is, justice without borders, with their most powerful argument: humanity. The argument from humanity does not simply say something like: as human beings we ought to be kind or benevolent to other human beings when they are in need. It says something a little broader in scope and more complicated. Cosmopolitans wish to expand our *conception* of justice given the fact of interdependence. It reads something like this: *We are all human beings. Nationality, citizenship, and the like should not present obstacles in the way of taking into account each person's morally defensible claims to justice. Each person's interest ought to matter equally. As a result, the individual, not the nation-state, ought to be regarded as the ultimate unit of concern in any application of the idea of justice.*

According to Kok Chor Tan, a staunch exponent of cosmopolitanism against all kinds of narrow nationalism and patriotic sentiments, “from the cosmopolitan perspective, principles of justice ought to apply equally to all individuals of the world as a whole.”<sup>107</sup> And this is because for him as for all cosmopolitans, “cosmopolitanism as a normative idea, takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral concern and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality and citizenship.”<sup>108</sup> Cosmopolitans argue that “the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for the fulfillment of that duty.”<sup>109</sup> Or quite simply, cosmopolitans affirm what Moses Hadas calls “the common nationality of the human race.”<sup>110</sup>


In further analysing and clarifying the implications of the cosmopolitan position which views the human race as belonging to a “*common nationality*”, Pogge points out that

<sup>107</sup> Tan, K. C. 2004, *Justice without borders: cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patriotism*, p. 1.

<sup>108</sup> Tan, K. C. 2004, *Justice without borders*, p. 1.

<sup>109</sup> Even though Thomas Nagel is no friend of cosmopolitanism, he offers an accurate definition of their standpoint. See his, 2005, *The Problem of global justice*, p. 119.

<sup>110</sup> See Hadas, M. 1943, *Notes and documents: from nationalism to cosmopolitanism in the Greco-Roman world*, p. 110.



Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First *individualism*: The ultimate units of concern are human beings, or *persons* – rather than, say family lines, tribes, or ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second *universality*: The status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryan, whites, or Muslims. Third *generality*: This special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern *for everyone* – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists or such like.<sup>111</sup>

What the cosmopolitans are then saying seems sufficiently clear. In thinking about justice, we are to think first about how the interests of individual human beings are to be safeguarded, ahead of any other possible calibrations of human societies. On the strength of the above characterisation of cosmopolitan justice, its advocates launch sustained criticisms against such brute facts of our current global setting as (a) the arbitrariness of state borders, and (b) world poverty and hunger.<sup>112</sup> To close our discussion in this section, we examine the contours of such criticisms.

### (I) The Arbitrariness of State Borders

There are at least two major strategies that could be deployed by cosmopolitans to defend the view that state borders represent arbitrary and therefore unacceptable bases for fairness and justice in the current global setting. One would be to cite historical facts surrounding the emergence of most states – the very fact that many persons feel themselves alienated from their own countries because they were coerced into membership of such states in the first instance – as well as the incessant quests for secession and the harsh fact of stateless persons. Another strategy, one favoured by many cosmopolitans, is to invoke John Rawls' theory of justice and

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<sup>111</sup> Pogge, T. 2008b [1992], *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty*, p. 356; see also his 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 175.

<sup>112</sup> Of course, as suggested by the introduction to this chapter there could be very many other cosmopolitan concerns to do with issues like secession, nuclear warfare and the like. However, many cosmopolitans regard the issues surrounding social and economic inequalities as paramount. And I think this is for very good reasons as well. Most people would agree that if persons could at least meet their quotidian social and economic problems, most of the other challenges they face in life might well become secondary.

accuse him of double standards in his application of equality and the “difference principle” at the domestic and global levels. Whereas the domestic “original position” is egalitarian and individualistic, the global version, the cosmopolitans contend, is surprisingly inegalitarian and statist. We shall at the moment concentrate on this favoured strategy.<sup>113</sup>

The cosmopolitan position here has strong links with Charles Beitz’s notion of the human person aired in passing in his *Political Theory and International Relations* and clarified in his “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiments”. In this later article, drawing from core Kantian aesthetics about the human person, Beitz argues that all human beings have the capacity for justice and the ability to form a conception of the good.<sup>114</sup> If this is granted, then Beitz could find no reason why membership of the Rawlsian original position may not be global – that is, have persons rather than states as the representatives. Beitz, by his own admission, may be wrong about his assumptions (in the earlier essay) to the effect that global interdependencies necessarily situate the world in a position of a global cooperative venture. But he is sure that the human person conceived as possessing the above capacities qualifies to partake in a dialogue for fair distribution. “Thus, Beitz fixes his concept of the person as an Archimedean point from which consensus on justice can be universalized.”<sup>115</sup> In one word, it is the considered opinion of Charles Beitz, which many cosmopolitans would readily espouse, that the morality of persons trumps the morality of states in thinking about global justice.

Following a similar line of reasoning, in an article first published in 1994 entitled “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples”, Thomas Pogge, another leading cosmopolitan critic of Rawls, cites the relevant portions of Rawls’ writings, outlining the basic “egalitarian” components of Rawls’ conception of justice at the domestic level:<sup>116</sup>

1. The requirement that institutions enshrine the fair value of political liberties, “so that persons similarly motivated and endowed have, irrespective of their economic and social class, roughly equal chances to gain political office and to influence the political decisions that influence their lives.”

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<sup>113</sup> My decision here to examine this strategy rather than the other is anchored in the overwhelming historical and philosophical significance of Rawls’ writings to the discourse on global justice.

<sup>114</sup> See Beitz, C. R. 1983, *Cosmopolitan ideals and national sentiments*, p. 591 – 601.

<sup>115</sup> Cochran, M. 1995, *Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in a post-Cold War world*, p. 49.

<sup>116</sup> See Pogge, T. 2008c [1994], *An egalitarian law of peoples*, p. 462.



2. The requirement that institutions maintain a fair equality of opportunity, “so that equally talented and motivated persons have roughly equal chances to obtain good education and professional position irrespective of their initial social class.”
3. The requirement that insofar as they generate social or economic inequalities, social institutions “must be designed to the maximum benefit of those at the bottom of these inequalities” (the difference principle).

Pogge’s contention is that if we apply Rawls’ requirements beyond national borders, we find that the current world order fails

1. to give members of different peoples roughly equal chances to influence the transnational political decisions that shape their lives.
2. to give equally talented and motivated persons roughly equal chances to obtain good education and professional position irrespective of the society into which they were born;
3. The current global order generates international social and economic inequalities that are not to the maximum benefit of the world’s worst-off persons.<sup>117</sup>

Pogge’s last analysis, which many cosmopolitans would endorse, is that theoretical consistency and honesty, as well as the fact of global interdependencies, demands that Rawls allow that his aforementioned requirements of justice apply to persons globally, as this is the only way to justly countermand the imbalances of the current global order and actually eliminate inequality.<sup>118</sup> Rawls himself has admitted that “each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his

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<sup>117</sup> Pogge, T. 2008c [1994], *An egalitarian law of peoples*, p. 463.

<sup>118</sup> For the many writings by cosmopolitans wishing to pursue claims of this nature or those similar to it, see in addition to Pogge’s current article, Beitz, C. R. 1999, [1979] *Political theory and international relations*, Revised Ed., part 3, esp. p. 132 – 36; Beitz, C. 2005, *Cosmopolitanism and global justice*; Beitz, C. R. 1983, *Cosmopolitan ideals and national sentiments*; Barry, B. 1989, *Theories of justice*, p. 183 – 89; Tan, K. C. 2000, *Toleration, diversity, and global justice*; Moellendorf, D. 2008 [1996], *Constructing the law of peoples*, p. 553 – 79; Habermas, J. 2008 [1996], *Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe*, p. 304; or Habermas, J. 1996, *Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*, W.H. Rehg, Trans., Appendix II, p. 491 – 515; cf. Pendlebury, M. 2007, *Global justice and the specter of the Leviathan*, 43 – 56; Cohen, J. and Sabel, C. *Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?* Forthcoming; also see Pogge, T. 1989, *Realizing Rawls*; Pogge, T. 1986, *Liberalism and global justice: Hoffman and Nardin on morality in international affairs*, p. 71; Pogge, T. Apr., 2001, *Critical study: Rawls on international justice*; Pogge, T. Jun., 2005, *Global justice as moral issue: interviewing Thomas Pogge*, A. Pinzani, Ed/Interviewer, p. 2– 6; Pogge, T. 2010, *Politics as usual: what lies beyond the pro-poor rhetoric*.

life prospects.”<sup>119</sup> It must then follow, the cosmopolitans press on, that if personal disadvantages arising from being born into one country or the other are to be removed in order to equalise all “life prospects,” principles of justice ought to apply globally. “If Rawls’ arguments are valid for domestic justice, why would not the same arguments compel the representatives of countries to choose a global difference principle to govern the relations between countries?”<sup>120</sup> Brian Barry and many cosmopolitans have found no such reason. If things go the cosmopolitan’s way, then a lot of unprecedented changes would occur in how states currently apply immigration laws, and international rules on state sovereignty and nonintervention would be drastically adjusted. We expatiate more on this below.

## (II) Eradicating Global Inequality and World Poverty

The cosmopolitan conception of global justice also aims to eradicate world poverty and hunger. As hinted above, cosmopolitans hope for the elimination of social and economic inequalities the world over, among every individual human being. It should follow *a fortiori* that world poverty and hunger would become a thing of the past. Or wouldn’t it?

Beginning once again from the reasoning that all human beings ought to be treated equally at first – especially in a world where we have become largely interdependent – and given that we share one global destiny in the environment, the economy and even politics; cosmopolitans decry poverty, hunger and privations – harsh facts of our world largely concentrated in certain regions.<sup>121</sup> The cosmopolitan contention is that individual rights to liberty and some conditions of equality and fairness far outweigh any consideration of sovereignty and or state autonomy. For this reason, they would be enthused by Barack Obama’s claim that “freedom, justice and peace for the world must begin with freedom, justice and peace for individual human beings.”<sup>122</sup> And yet, countless writings by cosmopolitans and scholars in different social fields, the United Nations and other local and international institutions catalogue numerous cases of human suffering, abject poverty, hunger, malnutrition and disease in many

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<sup>119</sup> Rawls, J. 1971, *A theory of justice*, p. 13.

<sup>120</sup> But Barry’s view here is a little curious for a cosmopolitan standpoint. If individuals to the Global Original Position are only “representatives of countries”, then what does replacing the state with individuals as the moral unit of concern of global justice mean, in the last analysis? For the citation, see Barry, B. 1989, *Theories of justice*, p. 189.

<sup>121</sup> See Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., passim; and Singer, P. 2004, *One world*, passim.

<sup>122</sup> President Barack Obama of the United States in a world-wide broadcast in August 2011.

parts of the world. This is in the face of great affluence in our time among the industrialised and developed countries of the Global North.

To begin to right this wrong at the theoretical level, cosmopolitans once again take Rawls famous theory of justice to task. They criticise Rawls' abbreviated humanitarian assistance to the global poor arguing that his book, *A Theory of Justice*, is marred by a poor judgment of the world. They stress that in a world where in "the midst of plenty, a third of all human deaths are due to malnutrition and preventable diseases," Rawls inexplicably attempts to mislead us into thinking that all that is needed is to give mere assistance to the poor.<sup>123</sup> In actual fact, the cosmopolitans contend, the solution lies in restructuring the basic structure of the global order (just like in the domestic situation) to give room to an environment more conducive to the development of poorer societies and the empowerment of peoples.<sup>124</sup> Cosmopolitans like Peter Singer believe that Rawls has not done enough in the way of tackling world poverty. Rather than his inconclusive *The Law of Peoples*, Rawls ought to have written a book on a different title: *A Theory of Global Justice*.<sup>125</sup> The main issue here is simply that the global poor need far more than humanitarian assistance. They need to become *members* of a just world order.

#### 2.4.3: The Cosmopolitan Reform Agenda

Cosmopolitans like Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer would rather the current global order be adjusted to remove excessive global interdependencies and international economic inequalities. Or that if interdependency must persist; the affluent countries of the Global North must stop the hard bargains they currently strike at international negotiations. Or at the very least, the Global North must stop taking from poor countries through some corrupt leaders who, at any rate, ought not to be allowed to sign conventions and trade agreements on behalf of their impoverished peoples. They urge increased global governance – not necessarily world federalism – to contain the excesses of autocratic regimes and enhance trans-border humaneness.<sup>126</sup> In addition, Pogge is convinced that human rights stand a greater chance of being fully fulfilled worldwide if sovereign power is greatly lessened. This, he argues, could be achieved through what he calls "vertical dispersal of sovereignty," that is a situation in which governmental

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<sup>123</sup> Pogge, T. Apr., 2001, Critical study: Rawls on international justice, p. 253.

<sup>124</sup> Pogge, T. Apr., 2001, Rawls on international justice, p. 251 – 53.

<sup>125</sup> Singer, P. 2004, *One world*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.

<sup>126</sup> See for example Singer, P. 2004, *One world*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 196 & 200.

authority and patriotic sentiments are widely dispersed over a plurality of nested territorial units.<sup>127</sup>

Cosmopolitans, Pogge especially, also propose a more concrete global institutional reform agenda for mitigating inequalities in the current international economic order. Pogge develops a scheme which he christens Global Resources Dividend (GRD).<sup>128</sup> GRD entails that

Humankind at large is to be viewed as owning the minority stake in all planetary resources (including air, water and soil used for the discharging of pollutants). As with preferred stock, this stake does not entitle everyone to participate in deciding how resources are to be used; this authority is to remain with the society in whose territory resources are located. But the stake does entitle all to share of the economic benefits of resource utilization. Because the global poor are otherwise excluded from such a share, the funds raised through the GRD are to be spent on their emancipation.<sup>129</sup>

The implication of Pogge's GRD is that all natural resources wherever they may be found will be taxed (if and only if such resources are tapped by the society where they are found) and the proceeds redistributed worldwide according to need. However, a fellow cosmopolitan, Hillel Steiner, contests Pogge's estimations.<sup>130</sup> Steiner argues along Lockean lines that all persons possess equal rights to self-ownership and natural resources. *Contra* Pogge, she claims that people may *not* refuse to harness or tap their own natural resources, whereas they enjoy proceeds from others who may be more willing to extract. Again, against Pogge, Steiner argues that those who occupy more than an equal share should pay taxes into a *global fund* as restitution to

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<sup>127</sup> Pogge, T. 2008b [1992], *Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty*, p. 355 – 90; or Pogge, T. 2008a, *World poverty and human rights*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., Chapter 7.

<sup>128</sup> See Pogge, T. 2008c [1994], *An egalitarian law of peoples*, *Global justice*, p. 466 – 89.

<sup>129</sup> Here Pogge and Moellendorf correctly articulate Steiner's position. See Pogge, T. and Moellendorf, D. Eds., 2008, *Global justice*, p. 461.

<sup>130</sup> See Steiner, H. 2008 [1999], *Just taxation and international redistribution*, p. 637 – 56.

everyone else. Everyone is entitled to draw an equal share from this fund, “not on grounds of need but on grounds of their valid claim to an equal share of the world’s natural resources.”<sup>131</sup>

Whether it is Pogge’s GRD or Steiner’s global fund, the cosmopolitans seem to be in agreement that some kind of institutionally powered global resource redistribution scheme ought to be put in place. They would generally agree that such a scheme should help us move toward greater international cooperation and the eradication of world poverty.

## 2.5: Reviewing the Cosmopolitan Agenda.

It is curious that cosmopolitans in the dominant group do not move from the above stated arguments to ask for the dismantling of the real factors and social structures behind global poverty and inequality such as unrestricted capitalism, neoliberalism and the “modes of production that place some in positions of submission and powerlessness.”<sup>132</sup> For it is impossible to maintain any kind of socio-economic balance in the face of structural inequality and orchestrated exclusion, which is really what neoliberalism and unrestricted capitalism represent in the current world system.<sup>133</sup> Pogge is one of the few cosmopolitans who actually raise hard questions about harmful global institutions and practices that keep the poor down; but even for him, there are restricted areas, boundaries that must not be removed. These boundaries, as a renowned Indian political scientist, Neera Chandhoke points out, are in the area of political ideology and political culture.

Thomas Pogge is a liberal philosopher, and liberals tend either to pay scant attention to the insights of Marxists or to dismiss these insights altogether. Though Pogge does agree with the Marxist thesis on the causes of global poverty, he would, I think, write off the remedy that dependency theorists offered

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<sup>131</sup> Pogge, T. and Moellendorf, D. Eds., 2008, *Global justice*, p. 637.

<sup>132</sup> Nielsen, K. Jan., 1988, *Global justice, power and the logic of capitalism*, p. 30

<sup>133</sup> Cf. Amin, S. 2010a, *Ending the crisis of capitalism or ending capitalism*; Amin, S. 2006, *Beyond US hegemony: assessing prospects for a multipolar world*, P. Camiller, Trans.; Amin, S. 1976, *Unequal development: an essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism*, B. Pearce. Trans.; Amin, S. 2010b, *The law of worldwide value*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., B. Pearce and S. Mage. Trans.; Amin, S. 1990, *Maldevelopment: anatomy of a global failure* and Rodney, W. 2009, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*.

to the world: that the erstwhile colonized world can develop only if world capitalism is either smashed or radically transformed because intrinsic to capitalism [and neoliberalism] is the exploitation of labor and raw materials found in the Third World. Pogge's resolution of the problem of global poverty is much more modest ... [than one might initially think]. At the same time his resolution may well stop short of what is needed to meet the challenge of global poverty.<sup>134</sup>

In short, Pogge would rather sacrifice his lofty campaigns against world poverty on the altar of protecting the liberal political culture.

At the heart of the cosmopolitan theory of justice is the view that the individual be made the basis of social and economic justice in a world where state boundaries would, perhaps, have (happily) disappeared and state sovereignty sufficiently whittled down to allow for increased global governance. This work disagrees with this view on several grounds.<sup>135</sup> First, the cosmopolitans argue in this way because they hope for a future world-state. Even though many of them would argue that their cosmopolitan sentiments need not lead to a world state, they all clearly anticipate a world order in which it is possible that "nations as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single, global authority."<sup>136</sup> But this kind of revolution is unnecessary. It would amount to a serious mistake to argue that a world-state or even a world-federation is a necessary requirement of achieving the aims of global justice (e.g., the elimination of world hunger), especially if such a federation would be vested with the kind of powers that could be exploited to cause debilities and instability on a global scale. All that a theory of global justice requires is a world of internally and externally just states.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> See Chandhoke, N. 2010, "How much is enough, Mr Thomas? How much will ever be enough?", p. 70.

<sup>135</sup> I do not have any serious objections to the idea of stripping the state of most of its sovereign powers. I only worry about the underlying implication of this (for the cosmopolitans), which is a world state. And more especially, there is the question of who becomes the representative of peoples in international negotiations? Who will put together funds for Pogge's global tax, for example? And for whom? Through who? Any alternative organisation(s) hoping to do this outside of the state is a joke.

<sup>136</sup> Strobe Talbot, Clinton's Deputy Secretary of State, as quoted in *Time*, July 20th, 1992, <http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-chief-says-9-11-paved-way-101904553.html>

<sup>137</sup> I am sure that many cosmopolitans will have no difficulty conceding this much. This because, even though most of them try to undermine the notion of state sovereignty; and attempt to elevate the individual as the subject of justice, they nevertheless show great reluctance in asking for the extinction of the state all together. See Cochran, M. 1995, *Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in a post-Cold War world*, p. 46 – 51.

To be sure, cosmopolitans recognise the fact that the current global order is driven by statism and wish that this be altered. *Statism* here goes beyond a belief in the state control of economic and social life to encompass an unyielding attachment to the traditional shibboleths of nationalism, patriotism, ethnic-nationalism, as well as tribal and cultural peculiarities and sentiments. Yet, cosmopolitans canvass for the imposition of (liberal) individualism on the world as a whole. They quarrel with Rawls and his supporters for denying this. However, contemporary liberal individualism is not just about the autonomy and freedom of the human person from external violation or imposition. It is also about the belief in the cultivation of personal or autonomous values – no matter how self-centered, anti-social and shocking. This is reflected in such phenomena as unrestricted capitalism, the gay sub-culture, nude colonies, posthumanism, artificiality and the abundance of choices, the appeal of private accommodation, as well as the syndrome of “civil” or “civic” privatism, or a general retreat into the private domains of family and friends.<sup>138</sup>

The overall consequence of the above scenario is that it is difficult to make the (apathetic) individual the bedrock of justice or global resource redistribution. Or even if we are able to secure willing representatives to a Rawlsian-type global original position, for example, their preferred principles of justice will be unduly influenced by cultural and sub-cultural sentiments, rather than the vague cosmopolitan individualism. This will inevitably lead to a great difficulty in arriving at any global principle of justice. If the individual is merely interested in his/her private affairs, especially if those private affairs are anchored in cultural and subcultural sentiments, how could he/she be made to recognise and negotiate for values that are only

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<sup>138</sup> See for example Habermas, J. 1996, *Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*, p. 78; Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 294; Nassmacher, K. H. 2003, Introduction: political parties, funding and democracy, p. 3; Norris, P. 2004, *Building political parties: reforming legal regulations and internal rules*, p. 3; Rosenberg, M. 1956, Some determinants of political apathy, p. 160 – 66; Armesto, F. F. 2006, *So you think you are human?: theory, culture and society*: Gane, N. 2006, Posthuman; Paul G. S. & Cox, E. 1996, *Beyond humanity: cyber revolution and future minds*, passim; Bostrom, N. 2003, *World Transhuman Association*, passim; Zhao, S. 2006, Humanoid social robots as mediums of communication, p. 401 – 19; Fukuyama, F. 2002, *Our posthuman future: consequences of the biotechnology revolution*; Zylinska, J. Ed. 2002, *The Cyborg experiments: the extensions of the body in the media age*; Sim, S. 2001, Postmodernism and philosophy, p. 10 – 11; Lyotard, J. F. 1988, *The differends: phrases in dispute*; Toffler, A. 1970, *Future shock*; Ellul, J. 1972 [1963], The technological order, p. 86 – 105; Mesthene, E. G. 1972 [1968], How technology will shape the future, p. 116 – 29; and Hyman, 2006, Enhancing the brain? p. 103 – 11; Emeagwali, P. Apr. 2003, My search for the Holy Grail of immortality; Mba, C. 2010, Posthumanism and the idea of the human person, p. 48 – 55.

meaningful to members of other cultures at the global arena? A global original position will produce too many conflicting personal opinions laden with diverse cultural and subcultural colourations to the point that any kind of dialogue or decision on a principle of justice would be impossible.

In the end, the major defect of the cosmopolitan theory of justice is that it does not take full cognisance of the overriding role culture and cultural prejudices could, and do play in determining the principles of interaction and social cooperation that are likely to be endorsed by parties across cultures, or inter-nationally. It fails to reckon with the current realities of global culture. As a theory of global justice, cosmopolitanism as currently conceived by its adherents, is high flown and impracticable. To be sure, most advocates of the political conception would endorse the critique contained in the last sentence. However, we do agree that cosmopolitans offer a descriptive, if not a normative, improvement over the political conception by recognising the significant impact of global interdependence.

## **2.6: Chapter Evaluation**

Taken together, the dominant theories of global justice share one major defect in common. They have not taken full cognisance of the overriding role attitudes towards culture and cultural prejudices play in determining the bases of international cooperation. To understand the foregoing more properly, what we are trying to illuminate here is that it is often falsely believed that every human being is born into and must necessarily grow up in a particular cultural milieu, believing in and holding fast to certain unique cultural values. Very often, as a result of the erroneous belief in the notion of a world of peoples belonging to quantised cultures; purported cultural differences (as history has shown) have constituted the main basis of egregious injustice both within nation-states and internationally. More importantly, purported cultural differences have been at the root of injustice generally, or (as those of a materialist bent would argue) been exploited as justification for injustice driven by political/economic interests.

When advocates of the political conception argue that state sovereignty is the basis of social cooperation and that all that global justice entails is a world of internally just states, they overlook the very fact that there is no known example of an internally just nation-state.



Unwarranted cultural divisions and cultural sentiments have often meant that certain minorities suffer egregious injustice because of what they purportedly are and how others perceive them. Socio-cultural discrimination is even more rampant on the international stage, especially in the contemporary world where every society seems to harbour at least a minute percentage of persons from other climes. Immigrants in many countries are viewed with some suspicion and very often face disproportionately harsher punishments when accused or convicted of a crime. The mistake of the political conception is that they think that social cooperation should form the basis of social justice within and outside the nation-state. The real issue is that certain groups are always-already excluded from social cooperation within the same state they live in. Thus, it is hard, *contra* Nagel, to show that compatriots would be treated equally within the same nation-state; cultural polarities account for a huge reason why this is so. In the last analysis, it is difficult to see how justice or global justice could be defined in terms of internally (culturally) unjust nation-states.

In the same way, allegations of cultural dissimilarities have constantly stood in the way of international cooperation/justice. Thus, when the cosmopolitans urge that the individual be regarded as the ultimate unit of moral consideration in thinking about global justice, they seem to overlook the very fact that, first, there is no Rawlsian veil of ignorance (and there can never be one) in the world we live in today, and this means that (save for a radical change in attitude), essentialist conceptions of culture would guarantee that certain groups of people would always treat certain others unjustly. Even though, in the contemporary world, it is true that information technology has shrunk the world to a point where people from very different cultural milieux frequently share the same cultural values, we find that many people still treat other human beings who they perceive as the “Cultural-Other” with great suspicion. Cultural distrust has in the past caused untold harm to disadvantaged groups and civilisations. To reiterate, unless there is a significant change in attitude – a global metanoia of some kind – essentialist conceptions of culture will continue to polarise the world and stand in the way of international cooperation and thus of global justice, regardless of however the latter may be conceived.

In the end, the world can only hope to evolve principles of justice that would apply globally if something is done in the way of evolving an ethically grounded *global culture*, both in theory and practice. Both the political conception and the cosmopolitan theory of justice seem

not to realise the unavoidable need for a global culture; at least, they talk about global justice without paying sufficient, if any, attention to the culture problematic. For this reason, and the inadequacies of their theoretical standpoints identified above, the political conception of global justice and the cosmopolitan theory of justice fail to resolve the fundamental problem of global justice or to provide any universally valid principle of justice. Thus, the recalcitrant question remains: can we have a (set of) universally valid principle(s) of justice that would be globally acceptable as just and that would guarantee a stable and flourishing global order? It is precisely in the resolution of this problematic that the promise of this thesis lies.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### FANON'S CULTURAL HUMANISM

*Universality resides in this decision to recognize and accept the reciprocal relativism of different cultures, once the colonial status [and all prejudices are]... irreversibly excluded.*

\_\_\_\_\_ Frantz Fanon<sup>1</sup>

This chapter attempts a critical exposition of Fanon's anticolonial theory, with a view to creating both historical and contextual scaffolding for an understanding of his theory of culture. This would serve the wider purpose of bringing to the fore the kind of difficulties human societies face or are likely to confront once the forces of cultural prejudice are allowed to hold sway. In the preceding chapter, we criticised the extant theories of global justice on the grounds that they neglected the important role attitudes towards culture play and could play in determining the bases of international cooperation. In search of a universally valid principle of justice, we begin to trace the contours of an idea we call *cultural humanism*. We rely on Frantz Fanon's writings to propound this idea. Cultural humanism generates the principle of *inter-cultural equality* which is a universally valid principle of justice. At all events, there is sufficient evidence which shows that the ills Fanon combated still live with us today; hence, the thesis' suggestion that the emergence of a better world of the future is dependent on heeding Fanon's warning. We begin with an attempt to paint a portrait of Fanon's actual struggle with colonialism, *cultural racism* and oppressive injustice.

#### 3.1: Fanon's Struggle against Racism and Colonialism

Born July 20, 1925, in Fort-de-France, Martinique on the Caribbean Island, a French Colony which later became a French *département*, Frantz Omar Fanon emerged one of the greatest heroes in both thought and action, in the anti-colonial struggle of the twentieth century. He was, as it were, a descendant of a slave of African origins and a mother of mixed French parentage. His parents occupied a middle class (*bourgeoisie*) status, regardless of the racial

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<sup>1</sup> Fanon, F. 1995, *Racism and culture*, p. 181.

discrimination prevalent in the French colony. The middle class status, of course, was purchased by his parents as the payoff of a political quid pro quo.

Fanon studied French classic literature at the Bibliothèque Schoelcher in Martinique until the fall of Vichy's French in 1940. Thereafter, he traveled to Dominica to join the Free French Forces where he was wounded at Colmar, near the Swiss border and awarded the Croix de Guerre, a French decoration for bravery in 1944. Before the war, Fanon came under the tutelage and mentorship of Aimé Césaire at Lycée Schoelcher, Martinique. Césaire's passionate denunciation of colonial racism and oppression formed the bedrock of both Fanon's ardent discipleship of his mentor and his eventual grueling struggle against colonialism, both in combat and intellectual terrains.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, while still in the Antilles, the young and dissident Fanon directly confronted the Vichy regime, questioning the maltreatment of fellow Martinicans (Martiniquans) by French troops. At the end of the war, Fanon returned to Martinique to support the election of Césaire, the Communist Party candidate to the first National Assembly of the IVth Republic. Fanon's political sojourn had begun. However, Fanon's relationship with his mentor was to be greatly strained along political lines when in 1958 Charles De Gaulle, following a referendum, allowed French overseas territories the option of complete independence or Franco-African/Caribbean Community, and Césaire led the Martinicans to vote *Yes* to the latter option. A decision Fanon thought was not sufficiently radical or progressive against the forces of colonialism and oppression.

Fanon secured a scholarship, completed his baccalaureate and in March 1946 travelled to Lyon, where he studied medicine, and later specialised in Psychiatry. Notably, Fanon's special interest in neuropsychiatry and neurosurgery stems from his belief that these subjects "best answered his need for humanist commitment."<sup>3</sup> While studying medicine and psychiatry, he found time to study literature, drama, and philosophy from where he occasionally attended Jean La Croix and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's lectures. In addition, he also read the writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Husserl as well as those of Hegel, Marx, Lenin, Heidegger and Sartre. In 1952, Fanon got married to a French woman José Dublé, who shared his convictions against racism and colonialism.

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<sup>2</sup> Notably, Césaire's influence could be perceived from a mile in Fanon's first book, *Black Skin, White Masks*

<sup>3</sup> See Zahar, R. 1974 [1969], *Franz Fanon's political theory*, p. ix.

In 1951, the same year he wrote his first book, Fanon did a residency in Psychiatry in the clinic of Saint Alban de Losère, under the radical Catalan, Francois de Tosquelles. de Tosquelles it was, that impressed on Fanon's mind the significant interface between culture and psychopathology. While in France, Fanon became friends with Jean Paul Sartre and Simeone de Beauvoir, and continually identified with African anti-colonial writers and freedom fighters.<sup>4</sup> It was then a thing of Providence to Fanon, when in 1953 he was offered a job as head of the psychiatric department of Blida-Joinville hospital in Algiers, in Algeria, a country he first visited as a trainee officer during the World War II, in 1944. At Blida, Fanon had an opportunity to practise the method of social therapy he developed with de Tosquelles.

In his treatment, he tried to develop new forms of corporate life infused with a democratic spirit in order to put in motion processes of socialization which should enable the patients to find their bearings in society again. He endeavoured to establish a close link between psychotherapy and political education. But when trying to apply methods that had been geared towards Europeans to his Arab patients, the fact that the social conditions under which the patients were accustomed to living had not been taken into account in prescribing the therapy. The contradictions he met when applying treatment could only be understood in political categories.<sup>5</sup>

Fanon was to quit his appointment in 1956 with his famous "Letter [of Resignation] to the Resident Minister."<sup>6</sup>

Taken together, Fanon's experiences as a student in French schools where he was often treated patronisingly, then as a soldier in the French Army (where he suffered racist attacks despite the sterling quality of his services), and as a psychiatrist (in French and French-Algerian

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<sup>4</sup> See Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, *Black skin, white masks*, p. viii.

<sup>5</sup> In a more recent work, *Fanon's dialectic of experience*, Ato Sekyi-Otu concurs with Zahar by reading Fanon's texts "as though they formed one dramatic dialectical narrative' whose principal subject is political experience." See Alessandrini, A. C. 1997, Fanon and the postcolonial future, p. 2. For Zahar's view in-text, see Zahar, R. 1974 [1969], *Franz Fanon's political theory*, p. x.

<sup>6</sup> See Fanon, F. 1970 [1964], *Toward the African Revolution*, p. 62 – 64.

hospitals), his contact with scholars of anti-colonial zeal like Césaire and Dr. Chaulet, ultimately led him to pitch his tent with the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) during the Algerian revolution beginning from 1954. His great learning and experience positioned him advantageously as scribe, spokesperson, propagandist, and diplomat for the FLN. As a matter of fact, the following year Fanon was invited to FLN headquarters in Tunis, where he collaborated with the editorial board of the party's paper, *el Moudjahid* to reorganise the entire FLN press.<sup>7</sup> His duties here helped shape both the internal and international political orientation of the FLN. At the same time, he doubled as the chief psychiatrist at the nearby La Manouba, the psychiatric hospital in Tunis, and also in the psychiatric ward of the Charles Nicolle Policlinic in the summer of 1958. Eventually, as the spokesperson and representative of the FLN, Fanon visited Ghana and attended Pan-African conferences where he met Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba and Tom M'Boya and other prominent leaders of African independence. Fanon's hard-fought wish was to integrate the Algerian revolution with similar efforts at both articulating the ideologies of black African liberation as well as to perfect combat-strategies for All African emancipation in cases of armed struggles against the colonialist.

It should serve as no surprise that Fanon's work came under censorship in France as it was perceived as some "insider's" effort to uncover the internal contradictions that racism and colonialism represented in European humanism and the values of the Global North in general. Exposing the hypocritical and exclusionary nature of European humanism by "one of their own," clearly, was a situation the French authorities found unsettling and unacceptable.

### 3.2: Fanon's Main Works

- *Les Damnés de la terre*, trans *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1961
- *L' an V de la Révolution Algérienne*, trans *Year 5 of the Algerian Revolution*; (republished as) *A Dying Colonialism*, 1965.

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<sup>7</sup> For some of Fanon's sustained efforts at campaigning for and on behalf of the Algerian revolution, see for example: Fanon, F. 1975 [1959], *Algeria's European minority*, p, 289 – 94 or his more audacious book which contains the same article just cited, Fanon, F. 1965. *L' an V de la révolution Algérienne*, trans *Year 5 of the Algerian revolution*; (republished as) *A dying colonialism*.

- *Peau noire, Masques blancs*, 1952, trans *Black Skin, White Masks: The Experiences of a Black Man in a White World*, 1967.
- *Pour la révolution africaine: Ecrits Politiques*, 1964 trans. *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays*, 1969

### 3.3: Fanon's Anti-colonial Theory

Fanon was aware that the war against colonialism could not be won on the battleground alone.<sup>8</sup> He understood that colonialism is first and foremost, a mental and cultural war. It then became the West Indian's life-long intellectual commitment to provide (along Marxian philosophy), a dialectical but radical account of the unjustness of colonialism – a revolutionary anticolonial theory. The distinctive message of Fanon's anticolonial thought is a call (like his Indian contemporary, Mohandas Gandhi) for an open resistance against colonialism and its vestiges.<sup>9</sup> More than this, Fanon contributed more than his own fair share of the effort aimed at modelling the policies and politics of the postcolonial states against the backcloth of the peculiar experiences of their peoples. Thus, it is acknowledged that “It is in Fanon's own writings that we find a theoretical underpinning for the liberation movements and the revolutionary changes that followed immediately on the heels of independence.”<sup>10</sup>

At every turn in Fanon's writings, he was preoccupied with the task of tracking the history of colonialism and placing the decolonisationist task in perspective. His ultimate aim was to set the record straight and demonstrate just how inhuman and traumatic colonialism was against the colonised. The substance of Fanon's narratives would disabuse the minds of the citizens of the colonising country about the view that colonialism was carrying out a civilising mission.<sup>11</sup> This is an important task for Fanon, because citizens of the colonising countries could

<sup>8</sup> This realisation was even more acute as it dawned on Fanon that the war of aggression against colonialism is to be fought with the very weapons of the Colonialist.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Irele, D. 1993b, *The violated universe: Fanon and Gandhi on violence*, passim.

<sup>10</sup> Bell, R. H. 2002, *Understanding African philosophy: a cross-cultural approach to classical and contemporary issues*, p. 54.

<sup>11</sup> In this respect, in *Black skin, white masks*, Fanon cites approvingly, the following passage from Karl Jaspers' *Laculpabilité allemande*: “There exists among men, because they are men, a solidarity through which each shares responsibility for every injustice and every wrong committed in the world, and especially for crimes that are committed in his presence or of which he cannot be ignorant. If I do not do whatever I can to prevent them, I am an accomplice in them. If I have not risked my life in order to prevent the murder of other men, if I have stood silent, I feel guilty in a sense that cannot in any adequate fashion be understood juridically, or politically, or morally. . . . That I am still alive after such things have been done weighs on me as a guilt that cannot be expiated. Somewhere in

not be allowed to claim any kind of ignorance concerning the activities of their governments in foreign lands. After all, Fanon points out, “Francis Jeanson says, every citizen of a nation is responsible for the actions committed in the name of that nation.”<sup>12</sup> But for Fanon’s anticolonial theory to fully take the radical turn he wanted it to, he had to first engage and sharpen the edges of even his own earlier theoretical tools and convictions. He began with a rebuttal of the position held by the Négritude Movement which he could be said to be a foundational apostle. Let us at the moment briefly articulate the views of the movement.

### 3.4: The Colonial Situation and the Négritude Movement

Evolving from the crucible of the brainstorming of reputable African and Afro-Caribbean intellectuals in the 1930s in Paris, and the French West Indies, was a literary and political movement called *Négritude*. The movement was led by Fanon’s teacher and mentor, Aimé Césaire and two Senegalese, Ousman Soce and Leopold Senghor.<sup>13</sup> The emergence, general pursuits and ideals of *Négritude* were further propelled and moulded by the colonial situation and the colonial peoples’ reactions in Africa, Cuba and Brazil (the rise of *Negrismo*), Haiti (following its occupation in 1915 by the United States), and the surrealist movement in France.<sup>14</sup> The colonial situation is one which Abiola Irele intones in terms which clearly describes the despondence and desperation of the person of colour at the historic moment that Négritude first saw the light of day.

For in the early years of the twentieth century, the Black man’s worth was low indeed, not only in the eyes of the white overlord, but (as a consequence) also in his own eyes. He occupied the lowest rung of the racial hierarchy established by Western civilization. As

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the heart of human relations an absolute command imposes itself: In case of criminal attack or of living conditions that threaten physical being, accept life only for all together, otherwise not at all.” If Fanon is correctly understood (through Jaspers), then no human being, no citizen of Metropolitan or neo-colonial Europe and America can in anyway be absolved of the evils of colonialism, or in the case of the present world order, its unjust arrangement. Not even a level of acceptable ignorance can place any one above ethical blame for world poverty and oppression. See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*, C. L. Markmann, Trans., p. 66, n.9.

<sup>12</sup> Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 67.

<sup>13</sup> See Kelly, R. D. G. 2000, Introduction: a poetics of anticolonialism, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Négritude moment: explorations in Francophone African and Caribbean literature and thought*, p.12.



Césaire has observed, referring to the San Domingo revolution, this was not merely a hierarchy, but even “an ontology: at the top, the white man – Being, in the full sense of the term – at the bottom, the black man... the thing, as much as to say, a nothing.”<sup>15</sup>

The Black elite who were culturally and intellectually assimilated were not spared the colonial inclemency of social alienation. Trapped in a situation like this, Black intellectuals had little choice other than to “fall back on ethnic loyalties” and “combat with all their strength, a counteroffensive that was to infuse a passionate vigor into their movements.”<sup>16</sup> *Négritude* was one of such movements of “counteracculturation”.<sup>17</sup>

*Négritude* as was later to be developed by Senghor himself (who is regarded as the spokesperson/publicist of the *Négritude* Movement) and some other prominent African scholars of pre-independence era, was focused on identifying common fundamental, historical and cultural characteristics that could be said to be uniquely “Negro”. If these features were identified, then they would provide acceptable common grounds for African consciousness and solidarity against the immanent and interlocking forces of colonialism and cultural racism. It was the belief of Césaire that such uniquely African values would serve as “the attitude and defence of a black revolutionary consciousness.”<sup>18</sup> In elaborate terms, for Senghor,

*Négritude is the whole complex of civilized values – cultural, economic and political – which characterise the black peoples, or more precisely, the Negro-African world. All these values are essentially informed by intuitive reason. Because this sentient reason, the reason which comes to grips, expresses itself emotionally, through that self-surrender, that coalescence of subject and object; through myths, by which I mean the archetypal images of the Collective Soul; above all, through primordial rhythms, synchronized with those of the cosmos. In other words, the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the*

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<sup>15</sup> Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Négritude moment*, p. 10 – 11.

<sup>16</sup> Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Négritude moment*, p. 11 – 26.

<sup>17</sup> Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Négritude moment*, p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> Gordon, L. R., Sharpley-Whiting, T. D. and White, T. R. 1996, Introduction: Five stages of Fanon’s studies, p. 2.

gift of rhythm, such as the essential elements of Negritude, which you will find indelibly stamped on all the works and activities of the black man.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, Négritude, as used by its originators, transcends the idea of African Personality, and parallels and percolates the ideals of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism.<sup>20</sup> Thus, even though Senghor's Négritude "starts out as, and essentially remains, a defence of African cultural expression," it carries with it, and contributes to the shibboleths of the politics of the postcolonial states.<sup>21</sup> In totality,

Négritude is "the warmth" of being, living, and participating in a natural, social, and spiritual harmony. It also means assuming some basic political positions: that colonialism has depersonalized Africans and that therefore the end of colonialism should promote the self-fulfillment of Africans. Thus, negritude is simultaneously an existential thesis (I am what I have decided to be) and a political enterprise. It also signifies a political choice: among European methods, socialism seems [for the apostles of Negritude] the most useful for both cultural reassessment and sociopolitical promotion.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Italics in original. See Senghor, L. S. 1998, *Négritude and African socialism*, p. 440, also see Senghor, L. S. 1975 [1961], *What is Negritude?*, p. 83.

<sup>20</sup> The phrase "African Personality" is taken from a complex of arguments, principally originating from the speeches and writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden. It is used to articulate the differences between Africans and Europeans "by defining the African in terms of the complex of character traits, dispositions, capabilities, natural endowments, etc., in their relative predominance and overall organizational arrangements, which form the Negro essence, i.e. our Négritude. Originating in literary circles, at the instigation of Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, the Négritude Movement quickly exploded the boundaries of these circles as the powerful political forces contained in its arguments played themselves out and took root in the fertile soil of the discontent of colonized Africa." See Outlaw Jr., L. 2003, *The smell of death* p. 182, n.13; also Outlaw Jr., L. 2003/1998, *African, African American, Africana Philosophy*, p. 25 and 39, n.16, Blyden, E. W. 1975 [1967], *Africa and Africans*, p. 10 – 18, Nkrumah, K. 1975 [1961], *The African Personality*, p. 57 – 60, Sithole, N. 1975 [1959], *The African himself*, p. 50 – 53, Ki-Zerbo, J. 1975 [1962], *African Personality and the new African society*, p. 61 – 66, Diop, A. 1975 [1962]. *Remarks on African Personality and Negritude*, p. 67 – 70 and Quaison-Sackey, A. 1975 [1963], *The African Personality*. p. 75 – 82. "Pan-Africanism", on the other hand, according to Blyden, is a prophetism that envisions the collaboration of African peoples for political freedom, irrespective of religious persuasions. See Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988, *The invention of Africa: gnosis, philosophy and the order of knowledge*, p. 129, also Mphahlele, E., Enwonwu, B. and Oruwariye, T. O. 1975 [1962], *Comments on AMSAC Pan-Africanism conference*, p. 71 – 74.

<sup>21</sup> Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Negritude moment*, p. 59.

<sup>22</sup> Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988, *The invention of Africa*, p. 106.

Négritude did not just reflect the colonial conditions but provided “the only emotive situational facility to unite a people faced with fragmentation of all kinds;” “a psychological phrase to the social and cultural conditions of the ‘colonial situation’, and ... as a fervent quest for a new and original orientation.”<sup>23</sup> It was, as Leo Kuper says, initially developed as a reaction against white racism – a dialectical opposition to the imposition of “Western” cultural values on the Africans.<sup>24</sup> But Senghor was later to use Négritude to encapsulate what he called the authentic values of African culture and civilisation, which every African person ought to be proud of. In this way Négritude becomes “an attempt to transform the negative [N]egro identity into a positive one by emphasizing the best in African man, culture and nature.”<sup>25</sup>

In political terms, Négritude was for Senghor, a severing of the African Child from the apron strings of the French policy of cultural assimilation.<sup>26</sup> In wielding Négritude as a tool for asserting the humanity and autonomy of the African person, Senghor characterises it (Négritude) in the terms we saw earlier.<sup>27</sup> In addition, he asserts that the new Négritude need not remain adversarial to European values, but ought to complement them; such that “henceforth, its militants will be concerned ... *not to be assimilated, but to assimilate*. They will use European values to arouse the slumbering values of Négritude, which they will bring as their contribution to the universal.”<sup>28</sup> In this way, Négritude is to be compared to “contemporary humanism”. not in any way a form of racism, not even, in Sartrean phraseology, “anti-racial racism”, but “a pan-human humanism, which because of its very nature, appeals to all races, to all continents, ... *above all, to White Europeans and Black Africans alike.*”<sup>29</sup>

However, Négritude was wielded by anticolonial African writers and nationalists as a symbol of freedom from a historical dependence on the Global North; a symbol of maturity, self-

<sup>23</sup> Norbu, D. 1992, *Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism*, p. 51; Irele, F. A. 2003, *Négritude: literature and ideology*, p. 38.

<sup>24</sup> Kuper, L. 1974, *Race class and power*, cited in Norbu, D. 1992, *Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism*, p. 141.

<sup>25</sup> Norbu, D. 1992, *Third World nationalism*, p. 141.

<sup>26</sup> Shutte, A. 1993, *Philosophy for Africa*, p. 22.

<sup>27</sup> That is, as “a whole complex of civilised values – cultural, economic, social and political – which characterise the black peoples, or, the Negro-African world.”

<sup>28</sup> Senghor’s italics. See Senghor, L. S. 1975 [1961], *What is Negritude?*, p. 83.

<sup>29</sup> In coming discussions, we find that Fanon was later to raise strong objections to Senghor and Negritude’s assumption that European values represent a kind of supraltern values that all other cultural values and civilisations must aim to gain assimilation or be integrated. *Contra* Senghor, Fanon argues that there could be no such thing as European (cultural) Universalism, and that European humanism has become warped, contradictory and discriminatory to the point it could not be taken seriously as a universal. For the views of Senghor just cited, see Senghor, L. S. 1973, *The Negritude – a twentieth century humanism*, p. 11. (Note added italics). Our quotation of Sartre is cited in Senghor, L. S. 1973, *The Negritude*, p. 5.

affirmation, unity and independence – a reclamation of epidermal and spiritual dignity, once colonial subordination and alienation have been conquered via struggle or revolution.<sup>30</sup> In clear terms, *négritude* could be seen as a rejection of the values of the Global North (the “West”) which were regarded as stifling and oppressive, for a return to an authentic African culture. And this was, of course, done for the purpose of political rejuvenation – the African Renaissance. But unhappily, for Abiola Irele, it also led to “a myth of Africa ... which involved a glorification of the African past and a nostalgia for the imaginary beauty and harmony of traditional African society, as in Camara Laye’s evocation of his African childhood.”<sup>31</sup>

Following Césaire’s influence, Fanon enthusiastically espoused *Négritude* as both an ideological and cultural construct for effectively dismantling colonialism. To begin with, he notes that “in certain regions of Africa, driving paternalism with regard to the blacks and the loathsome idea derived from Western culture that the black man is impervious to logic and the sciences reign in all their nakedness.”<sup>32</sup> This line of thought later paved the way for him to express the following sympathies for the movement:

When he [the Negro] decides to prove that he has a culture and to behave like a cultured person, [he] comes to realize that history points out a well-defined path to him: he must demonstrate that a Negro culture exists.

And it is only too true that ... [c]olonialism did not dream of wasting its time in denying the existence of one national culture after another. Therefore the reply of the colonized peoples will be straight away continental in its breadth. In Africa, the ... literature ... is not a national literature but a Negro literature. The concept of *négritude* ... was the emotional if not the

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<sup>30</sup> This is how Abiola Irele reports Senghor’s evocations about this: “Early on, we had become aware within ourselves that assimilation was a failure; we could assimilate mathematics or French language, but we could never strip off our black skins or root out our black souls. And so set out on a fervent quest for the Holy Grail: our Collective Soul.” See Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Négritude moment*, p. 26. To read Senghor’s original, see Senghor, L. S. 1975 [1961], *What is Négritude?*, p. 83. Cf. Irele, F. A. 2003, *Négritude: Literature and ideology*, p. 38 – 39, 42 – 44.

<sup>31</sup> But Irele himself is a defender of “critical” *négritude*. He is reported by Senghor as having made the following comments: “I am a defender and supporter of ‘the *Négritude*’ in that I see in the movement a desire to look inwards at the self. I accept even the positive narcissism as an absolutely necessary part of it, and, moreover, *I believe an element of exaggeration is vital for the alienation it induces* (my emphasis). ... [N]égritude is a philosophy which implies a cultural approach adapted to the spiritual and sociological conditions of the black man. Above all else, it is a *universal humanism*” (italics in original). Irele is cited in Senghor, L. S. 1973, *The Négritude – a twentieth century humanism*, p. 5. For the views of Irele quoted in-text, see his 2003, *Négritude*, p. 47.

<sup>32</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1961]. *The wretched of the earth*, p. 130.

logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at humanity. On the whole, the poets of negritude oppose the idea of an old Europe to a young Africa, tiresome reasoning to lyricism, oppressive logic to high-stepping nature, and on one side stiffness, ceremony, etiquette, and scepticism, while on the other frankness, liveliness, liberty, and – why not? – luxuriance: but also irresponsibility. The poets of negritude will not ... hesitate to assert the existence of common ties and a motive power that is identical.<sup>33</sup>

However, Fanon's immanent confrontation with colonial violence as well as his preoccupation with the psychiatric aftermath of colonial subjugation was to lead Fanon to jettison Négritude for a robustly universal humanism, which for him, must begin from radically rejecting colonialism and all forms of oppression and cultural prejudices.

### 3.5: Counter-Violence as a Tool of Anticolonial Humanity

Fanon, it seems, unapologetically defended violence as a tool for anti-colonial struggle.<sup>34</sup> The violent approach served as a decisive break-away from Négritude and as a means of becoming "responsible" for the African destiny. Négritude and its apostles, we recall, defended a uniquely "African Personality" whose recognition as a separate humanity could at once be seen and taken as a critical ontologically normative scaffolding for the reinstatement and reintegration of the alienated consciousness of the colonial peoples.<sup>35</sup> In due course, Fanon saw clearly that this way of thinking about the colonial (African) person is capable of re-inscribing and

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<sup>33</sup> Fanon's unhappiness with Négritude is already apparent in his comments here. For irresponsibility is definitely not one of the values of the new humanism that Fanon thought was required to free the colonial peoples. See Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 212 – 13; cf. 214 – 15; also, Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 170 – 71.

<sup>34</sup> "As Sartre has pointed out, Fanon's ethics of violence has a pedigree within Western political thought, for Friedrich Engels, George Sorel, and V. I. Lenin have all meditated upon the significance of violence in politics. But Fanon gives an original dimension to the question. In his view, the value of violence in the revolutionary situation lies not simply in ensuring the effectiveness of political action, not in being the 'midwife of history,' but in the self-realization of the historical subject himself, it has to do with a vision of man creating his own identity in the effervescence of a progressive movement in history." See Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Negritude moment*, p. 140.

<sup>35</sup> Fanon's canonization of violence as an instrument of revolutionary struggle is no doubt a consequence of his early awareness of the brutality of French troops on his fellow Martinicans; his direct involvement in the World War II as a French soldier where he and other men of colour suffered racist attacks in spite of bravery in active combat; as well as his active role (through the FLN) in the Algerian war of independence.

regurgitating the colonial master's warped view of the African. What this simply meant for Fanon is that if Négritude is allowed to hold sway, then it would be true that somehow the African is not just like other human beings. In practical terms, if the "Negro Agenda" becomes a fact, then the African's chances of reclaiming his pride of place in the embracing bowels of universal humanity will recede into the distant horizon. But if the colonialist's violence is met with counter-violence, then it would quickly be recognised that the damned of the earth are like other humans and feels the same emotions: pain, anger and hatred for example. There must be something wrong with giving in to a peculiarity of the people of colour, especially as some of the contents of this "peculiarity" were in fact inputted by the colonialist.<sup>36</sup> Put simply, Fanon realised as much as Sartre did, that "the person who has an excessive admiration for Negroes is as much of a racist as the one who despises them..."<sup>37</sup>

The abstruse question to ask is: if the Negroes or at least what happened to the Negroes like enslavement and colonisation were curses, why would the Négritude Movement seek to remember this past or the traditional and cultural settings that begot them, in glowing terms? Césaire and his apostles are right in insisting that Africinity or "blackness" could not possibly be considered a curse, in that Africans and other people of colour are not biologically different from other human beings. However, there must be something wrong with extolling the inglorious African past or even certain aspects of its values.<sup>38</sup> In the end, Fanon was unequivocal in asserting that

In no way should I derive my basic purpose from the past of the peoples of color. In no way should I dedicate myself to the revival of an unjustly unrecognized Negro civilization. I will not make myself the man of any past. I do not want to exalt the past at the expense of my present and of my future. The Vietnamese who die before the firing squads are not hoping that their

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<sup>36</sup> As one exasperated woman of colour longing to belong to the white clan rightly retorted, "If Césaire makes so much display about accepting his race, it is because he really feels it a curse." See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 33.

<sup>37</sup> Zahar, R. 1974 [1969], *Franz Fanon's political theory*, p. 28 – 29.

<sup>38</sup> Kwame Nkrumah, Kwasi Wiredu and Paulin Hountondji are among the many other anticolonial writers apart from Fanon himself who have sought to discredit especially the aspect of the Négritude's programme which aims to recollect and extol the African past. See Presbey, G. M. 2003, *Evaluating the Ethiopian wisdom tradition*, p. 423 – 24.

sacrifice will bring about the reappearance of a past. It is for the sake of the present and of the future that they are willing to die. If the question of practical solidarity with a given past ever arose for me, it did so only to the extent to which I was committed to myself and to my neighbor to fight for all my life and with all my strength so that never again would a people on the earth be subjugated.<sup>39</sup>

To be sure, even though Fanon's point of departure in his anticolonial struggle is Négritude, the very fact that he was later to reject the main shibboleths of Négritude owes large debts to Aimé Césaire's brand of radical Négritude which lacks an elaborate theory of Blackness. In Irele's words: "[I]t was the profound impression made upon him [Fanon] by the particular manifestation of its [Négritude] spirit in Aimé Césaire's work that impelled him [Fanon] to this [radical] reflection."<sup>40</sup> In simple terms, Fanon's reflection on violence as a tool of revolutionary struggle originates from Négritude's "total and aggressive response to centuries of denigration and humiliation" of peoples of the Global South.<sup>41</sup> In addition, no one can deny the very fact that the racist and exploitative colonial situation that Fanon found himself in is "supported and kept viable by a steady stream of physical violence from soldiers, the police, and the private vigilantes."<sup>42</sup> Without doubt, "exploitation and overwork, torture, and death are the final manifestations of [colonial] racism."<sup>43</sup> Thus, forced to relate first hand with this scenario, Fanon could find no other rational alternative than to aim to twist free and snatch the weapon of the oppressor to turn it against him. Fighting for freedom presents itself as the only counter-measure against the unacceptable colonial situation. Fanon writes memorably:

Decolonization is always a violent phenomenon ...  
Decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain  
'species' of men by another 'species' of men. [I]t  
influences individuals and modifies them  
fundamentally. Decolonization is the veritable creation

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<sup>39</sup> Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*, p. 176 – 77, cf. Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, *Black skin, white masks*, p. xiv.

<sup>40</sup> Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Negritude moment*, p. 138.

<sup>41</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> Schmitt, R. 1996, *Racism and objectification: reflections on themes from Fanon*, p. 38.

<sup>43</sup> Schmitt, R. 1996, *Reflections on themes from Fanon*, p. 38.

of new men. [T]he 'thing' which has been colonized becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself.<sup>44</sup>

For Fanon, a violent attack against the coloniser is not criminal in nature, in that it is emancipatory for the mentally decrepit and socially alienated native. This is because violence serves as "a potential instrument of disalienation."<sup>45</sup> To clarify the metaphysics of (anticolonial) violence a bit more, Fanon writes: "At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."<sup>46</sup> In fact, violence against the coloniser is the only way left open for the colonised to buy back his personhood and humanity.

But why is there an immediate need, in Fanon's view, for the colonised to resort to violence or any desperate means to make themselves heard? How did we get to the point where anyone would find it impossible to be truly human except through violent actions? The colonial situation which lumps a hard tar of torment in the colonised person's consciousness speaks eloquently in defence of Fanon's view. The wider political relevance of violence as a tool of revolutionary struggle is that it happens to be the only medium open to the colonised to air his views or defend his freedoms. This is because as our foregoing analysis implies, the colonial situation is a Hobbesian state of nature, where there is no identifiable public space, no room for political relationship open to the colonised to express their views/unhappiness.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, in Abiola Irele's view, given "his preoccupation with the psychiatric effects of colonial oppression [and] the distortions it creates within the colonized native..." Fanon is justified in "his advocacy of violence against colonial domination ... as a *prescription*, in the full medical sense of the word."<sup>48</sup> It is Fanon's argument that violence is regenerative and spiritually edifying for the colonised person when directed against the oppressor.<sup>49</sup> Violence simultaneously serves as a means of self-recreation and re-maturation into full humanity "without any limiting

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<sup>44</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 27 – 28; also see p. 67 – 68.

<sup>45</sup> Zahar, R. 1974 [1969], *Franz Fanon's political theory*, p. 56.

<sup>46</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 94.

<sup>47</sup> Allessandrini, A. C. 1997, Fanon and the postcolonial future, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Irele's italics. See Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Negritude moment*, p. 140.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Irele, D. 1993b. *The violated universe: Fanon and Gandhi on violence*, p. 3.



qualifications to his human status and quality.”<sup>50</sup> For “by killing his oppressor, by chasing him away through violence the colonised cures himself of colonial neurosis and thus achieves his freedom of action which seemed to have been lost in apathy and stupor.”<sup>51</sup> As Ronald Judy puts it without elaboration, violence is for Fanon, awakened “consciousness in action.”<sup>52</sup>

The wider socio-political implication of what Abiola Irele calls “Fanon’s ethics of violence” is that “violence provokes violent resistance, and the perpetrators of violence must constantly calculate whether the resistance to continued or increased resistance will provoke an even more vigorous resistance, and whether they are willing to risk that.”<sup>53</sup> Fanon did not worry too much about how the oppressor – the violent oppressor – replies to that question. What matters to him is that the oppressor becomes acutely aware of the dialectics of violence and exploitation. The oppressor must be aware that violence can always precipitate counter-violence. In the last analysis, violence must be seen as possessing a transformative power, the end result of which is a new universality, a new humanity of persons who at first are caught up in a state of anarchy where no one can guarantee their own position and status in the ensuing free for all.<sup>54</sup>

Nonetheless, the flip side of Fanon’s oft criticised celebration of violence and warfare as a means of anti-colonial and revolutionary struggle could be divined from his grim analysis of the psychopathology of colonial violence and the struggle that must follow. His effort to catalogue the many cases of mental disorders induced by the inclemencies and violences of colonialism that he witnessed at the Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in Algeria, taken together, must be seen as an eloquent condemnation of war and violence. It is therefore worrisome that “Fanon’s [ambivalent] views on violence has often been de(con)textualized and thereby misrepresented in terms of his more explicit advocacy of revolutionary *physical* violence in reaction to global racism and colonialism, particularly in the Algerian and African contexts.”<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Irele, F. A. 2011, *The Negritude moment*, p. 140.

<sup>51</sup> Zahar, R. 1974 [1969], *Franz Fanon’s political theory*, p. 82.

<sup>52</sup> Judy, R. A. T. 1996, *Fanon’s body of Black experience*, p. 55.

<sup>53</sup> In coming analyses, we shall come to see that violence can in many cases transcend the bounds of mere physicality. See for example, Gordon, L. R. 1996, *Fanon’s tragic revolutionary violence*, p. 304 – 05. For the above quotation, see Schmitt, R. 1996, *Racism and objectification: reflections on themes from Fanon*, p. 44.

<sup>54</sup> Bernasconi, R. 1996, *Casting the slough: Fanon’s new humanism for a new humanity*, p. 116 – 17; also see p. 119 – 21.

<sup>55</sup> Italics in the original. See Tamdgidi, M. H. 2010, *Decolonizing selves: the subtler violences of colonialism and racism in Fanon, Said and Anzaldúa*, p. 119. Also, see Irele, D. 1993b, *Fanon and Gandhi on violence*, p. 3.

“Critics have had a tendency to use quotations from Fanon’s work to criticize his limitations without realizing the irony that may reside in these quotes ... there will undoubtedly be times when Fanon’s lesson to us has as much to do with his failings as with his successes.”<sup>56</sup> Homi Bhabha puts the entire crisis to do with managing Fanon’s ethics of violence in a more helpful light:

Memories of Fanon tend to the mythical. He is either revered as the prophetic spirit of Third World liberation or reviled as an exterminating angel, the inspiration to violence in the Black Power movement. [We must realize that] ... Fanon’s work will not be possessed by one political moment or movement, nor can it be easily placed in a seamless narrative of liberationist history. Fanon refuses to be so completely claimed by events or eventualities.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, it is worth stressing with Bhabha that

It is not for the finitude of philosophical thinking [n]or for the finality of a political direction that we turn to Fanon. Heir to the ingenuity and artistry of Toussaint and Senghor, as well as the iconoclasm of Nietzsche, Freud, and Sartre, Fanon is the purveyor of the transgressive and transitional truth. He may yearn for the total transformation of Man and Society, but he speaks most effectively from the uncertain interstices of historical change: from the area of ambivalence between race and sexuality; out of an unresolved contradiction between culture and class; from deep within the struggle of psychic representation and social reality.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Alessandrini, A. C. 1997, *Fanon and the postcolonial future*, p. 6.

<sup>57</sup> Bhabha H. K. 1999, *Remembering Fanon: self-psyche, and the colonial condition*, p. 180.

<sup>58</sup> Put simply, we believe that a closer examination of Fanon’s writings will point out new directions for understanding and resolving the problems of justice besetting our current global setting. For the immediate quotation, see Bhabha, H. K. 1999, *Remembering Fanon*, p. 181.

However, in invoking Fanon, we should and will go fully beyond Fanon himself and many of his assumptions, to come up with answers of our own that would be suitable for contemporary human problems, and not necessarily to “put our resolutions into Fanon’s mouth.”<sup>59</sup> This approach must be recognised as an eminently Fanonian wish, in that it is Fanon’s belief that in grappling with contemporary challenges, we ought not to be restricted by ongoing traditions and ideas. Thus, the hope with which this work invokes and elaborates the horizons of Fanon’s oracular vision in dealing with contemporary problems of global justice resides in this shared belief that the cutting edge in Fanon’s writings may reveal no “ultimate radiance,” but will in his own words, expose “an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born.”<sup>60</sup> Fanon may not have all that it takes to accomplish contemporary struggles for social and political rights; but for anyone seeking a profound and authentic change in the status quo, Fanon’s writings readily provide a vivifying wellspring for the initial and most fundamental bases of sound thought and action.

### 3.6: Fanon’s Cultural Humanism and the New Humanity

The very concept of homogeneous national cultures, the consensual or contiguous transmission of historic traditions or ‘organic’ ethnic communities – *as the grounds of cultural comparatism* – are in a profound process of redefinition. The hideous extremity of Serbian nationalism proves that the very idea of a pure ‘ethnically cleansed’ national identity can only be achieved through the death, literal and figurative, of the complex interweavings of history, and the culturally contingent borderlines of modern nationhood.

\_\_\_\_\_ Homi Bhabha<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Alessandrini, A. C. 1997, Fanon and the postcolonial future, p. 5.

<sup>60</sup> See Bhabha, H. K. 1999, Remembering Fanon, p. 181; Fanon’s *Black skin, white masks*, is cited here from Bhabha, H. K. 1999, Remembering Fanon, p. 181.

<sup>61</sup> Italics in the original. See Bhabha, H. K. 1994, *The location of culture*, p. 5.

One could say that while the Senghorian negritude tended to over-romanticise the traditional African culture in its quest for templates for countermanding colonialism, Fanon insisted that the African decolonisationist does not really need to go too far into the past in search of cultural elements that indeed may have failed in the past. What was needed in Fanon's view is a violent confrontation with the colonial master that had encapsulated the native's culture, tear out the usable aspects of the reclaimed culture and remodel it in keeping with the needs of a new world that is guided by visionary political calculations. The quest for an "authentic" Black culture was a mistake we should by now learn to overcome. In clear terms, for Fanon, to believe that it is possible to create an "authentic" and "unblemished" "Black" culture is tantamount to living in the past and chasing shadows; for "there will never be such a thing as a black culture ...."<sup>62</sup> The main problem is to get to know the place of postcolonial peoples, the kind of social relations that they should set up, and the conception that they have of the future of humanity. This self-knowledge of colonial peoples must begin from realising with Amilcar Cabral that

A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of positive accretions from the oppressor and other cultures, they return to the upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by the living reality of its environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of subjection to foreign culture.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 264.

<sup>63</sup> Continuing in this line of thought, Cabral elaborates: "Without any doubt, underestimation of the cultural values of African peoples, based upon racist feelings and upon the intention of perpetuating foreign exploitation of Africans, has done much harm to Africa. But in the face of the vital need for progress, the following attitudes or behaviors will be no less harmful to Africa: indiscriminate compliments; systematic exaltation of virtues without condemning faults; blind acceptance of the values of the culture, without considering what presently or potentially regressive elements it contains; confusion between what is the expression of an objective and material historical reality and what appears to be a creation of the mind or the product of a peculiar temperament; absurd linking of artistic creations, whether good or not, with supposed racial characteristics; and finally, the non-scientific or a scientific critical appreciation of the cultural phenomenon. Thus, the important thing is not to lose time in more or less idle discussion of the specific or unspecific characteristics of African cultural values, but rather to look upon these values as a conquest of a small piece of humanity for the common heritage of humanity, achieved in one or several phases of its evolution. The important thing is to proceed to critical analysis of African cultures in relation to the liberation movement and to the exigencies of progress confronting this new stage in African history. It is important to be conscious of the value of African cultures in the framework of universal civilization, but to compare this value with that of other cultures, not with a view of deciding its superiority or inferiority, but in order to determine, in the general framework of the struggle for progress, what contribution African culture has made and

And for Fanon, “It is this that counts; everything else is mystification, signifying nothing.”<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore, Fanon became convinced that since colonialism is in certain respects, a clash of cultures, a clash of national cultures; which in this case places the European culture atop that of the colonised peoples, how can the “deculturized” native exorcise himself from the drooping weight of an alien cultural quagmire?<sup>65</sup> In what context, in what language and in what discourse, could the Negro who as it were, “has no culture, no civilization, no ‘long historical past’” join the conversation of humankind?<sup>66</sup> The only way out is that the native must, in spite of local differences, band together under the umbrella of a “National Culture” – a national culture which has vegetated under colonial subjugation and which could only be “aculturized” or recognised as a culture if there is a national cohesion, a national consciousness.<sup>67</sup> But Fanon became acutely aware of another problem. The “*aculturized* native” badly needs to survive in a more complex world than his traditional culture had prepared him for. So he must try and “dynamize” his culture, reconceive and grasp it anew from within.<sup>68</sup> The entire idea is that while rejecting undue manipulation from European/American culture, the wary person from a minority culture must avoid the opposite trap of burrowing too deep into his past culture and tradition.<sup>69</sup> He must now come to recognise the reciprocal benefits of all human cultures. When Fanon’s wishes become a reality, then the New Humanity or universal humanity will emerge, because by now, all cultural prejudices have been obliterated.<sup>70</sup> He writes memorably,

The end of race prejudice begins with a sudden incomprehension. The occupant’s spasmed and rigid culture, now liberated, opens at last to the culture of people who have really become brothers. The two cultures can affront each other, enrich each other. In

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can make, and what are the contributions it can or must receive from elsewhere.” See Cabral, A. [1970] 1973. *Return to the source: selected speeches by Amilcar Cabral*, p. 43 – 52.

<sup>64</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 264 – 65.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, *Black skin, white masks* p. xvi.

<sup>66</sup> See Fanon, F. 2008. *Black skin, white masks*, p. 21.

<sup>67</sup> Or was it not the Europeans that had the African societies splintered into impossible coercively imposed political communities and proceeded to put their cultures into poisonous capsules? Fanon seems to canvass for a “National Culture” as an instrument of revolutionary struggle, he nonetheless bemoans the negative imputations of nationalism in the following words: “from nationalism we have passed to ultranationalism, to chauvinism and finally to racism” see Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 125.

<sup>68</sup> Fanon, F. 1995, *Racism and culture*, p. 180.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Sartre, J. P. 1963 [1961], Preface, *The wretched of the earth*, p.12.

<sup>70</sup> See Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 251 – 55.

conclusion, *universality resides in this decision to recognize and accept the reciprocal relativism of different cultures, once the colonial status [and all prejudices are]... irreversibly excluded.*<sup>71</sup>

Fanon's real warning, therefore, is that no nation, no civilisation should claim the monopoly of an unblemished national culture. His cultural *sumum bonum*, finally, is an articulation of a world of reciprocal relativism and *cultural humanism*.<sup>72</sup> Thus, Fanon's cultural humanism emerges from his effort to provide normative grounds for rejecting colonialism and the oppression it begets.<sup>73</sup>

But, what exactly is cultural humanism? Cultural humanism says that in our world of cultural differences, pluralisms and complex identities we ought to

1. consciously eliminate our own cultural monoliths and prejudices, so as to be able to
2. recognise the reciprocal relativism, or the reciprocal benefits of every human culture and
3. move to "dynamize" or reconceive our past customs and traditions so as to eschew the possibility of precipitating oppression, injustice or violence whenever we come in contact with an alien culture.<sup>74</sup>

Cultural humanism is therefore the view that the attitudes and values that inform human society must now be driven by the untrammelled elevation of human interest in general ahead of national, "racial", ethnic or religious persuasions and sentiments.

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<sup>71</sup> Italics added: Fanon, F. 1995, *Racism and culture*, p. 181.

<sup>72</sup> The exposition given to the term "cultural humanism" derives from my reading of Fanon.

<sup>73</sup> Yet the unhappiness and the message in Fanon's writing are not to be historically tied to colonialism. "Fanon's anger has a strong contemporary echo. It is the silent scream of all those who toil in abject poverty simply to exist in the hinterlands and vast conurbations of Africa. It is the resentment of all those marginalized and firmly located on the fringes in Asia and Latin America. It is the bitterness of those demonstrating against the Empire, the superiority complex of the neo-conservative ideology, and the banality of the "War on Terror." It is the anger of all whose cultures, knowledge systems and ways of being that are ridiculed, demonized, declared inferior and irrational, and, in some cases, eliminated. This is not just any anger. It is the universal fury against oppression in general, and the perpetual domination of the Western civilization in particular." See Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, *Black skin, white masks*, p.vi – vii.

<sup>74</sup> See Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *Racism and Culture*, from his *Toward the African revolution: political essays*.

Fanon's cultural humanism is in keeping with any philosophy which elevates the human organism over and above every other entity, temporal and spiritual. Thus, Fanon's cultural humanism has continuities with African humanism, and is significantly different from the "Western" classical understanding of humanism. As Richard Bell clarifies,

Western, classical ... humanism stresses a particular concept of education and civilization; it is premised on ancient Greek ideals such as balance of the arts and sciences, cultivation of individual virtues, and the exercise of rational self-control. It places a premium on *acquired individual skills*, and favours a social and political system that encourages *individual freedom*.<sup>75</sup>

On the contrary, Fanon's humanism is "rooted in traditional values of mutual respect for one's fellow kinsman and a sense of position and place in the larger order of things: one's *social* order, *natural* order, and the *cosmic* order."<sup>76</sup> It is a philosophy of "*lived dependencies*," where in the midst of scarce resources and great human suffering, every human being considered the plight of others in everything they did.

Classical "Western" notion of humanism is at best utopian on the one hand, and dangerous to a majority of the human species on the other, while Fanon's humanism is an alternative trans-generational construct for ushering in a better world of the future. But how does cultural humanism offer us anything better than a world where human freedom and democracy are exalted and cherished human values? The American pragmatist philosopher, educationist and social crusader, John Dewey has informed us that democracy is a system of values; such that for any society to be truly democratic, it must allow democracy to take root within the people. Everyone must be taught the idea and shibboleths of democracy, so that democracy becomes a way of life.<sup>77</sup> One of those values of democracy that everyone must imbibe is "individual freedom." Individual freedom here simply means that one is at liberty to do whatever he likes.

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<sup>75</sup> Bell, R.H. 2002, *Understanding African Philosophy: a cross-cultural approach to classical and contemporary issues*, p. 40.

<sup>76</sup> Bell, R.H. 2002, *Understanding African Philosophy*, p. 40.

<sup>77</sup> Dewey, J. 1972, *Democracy*.

provided he does not infringe on the rights of others. It also means that one does not have to do anything for anybody, the society and his family too; if he finds the task at hand burdensome. A person has a right to remain unencumbered. Tocqueville explains the wider implications of this connotation of democracy a little further. From Shaw, we learn that Lukes reported Tocqueville as arguing that

In contrast to aristocratic society, in which men were “linked closely to something beyond them and are more often disposed to forget themselves” and which formed of all the citizens a long chain reaching from the peasants to the king,” democracy “breaks the chain and sets each link apart” ...Democracy, Tocqueville concluded, “not only makes each man forget his forefathers, but conceals from him his descendants and separates him from his contemporaries.”<sup>78</sup>

What we can make out of this, in the end, is that “Western” notions of humanism, democracy and freedom emphasize the right and autonomy of the individual person at the expense of “relational systems of personhood.”<sup>79</sup> Put differently, the pursuit of personal gains in “Western” humanism is given pre-eminence ahead of the common good. The question is, can we hope to foster a better and sustainable world based on selfishness?; a world where one is not to help the next person except it is most convenient for the one? Or if we hold our own culture as sacrosanct and the source of the truth?

According to Fanon, any person who hopes to be effective in solving contemporary problems of justice (without precipitating other dangerous consequences), must not remain uncritical of his traditional value system or culture. Rather, in this Manichaeic and unjust world divided between the oppressor and the oppressed, the bourgeoisie and the *lumpen proletariat*, the “acculturized” and the “deculturized”, White skin and Black skin, the European and the African, the French and the Algerian; the “*New Man*” must reconceive, grasp anew and dynamize from

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<sup>78</sup> Shaw, R. 2000, “TOK Af, Lef Af”: A political economy of Temne techniques of secrecy and self, p. 26.

<sup>79</sup> Shaw, R. 2000, “TOK Af, Lef Af”, p. 29.



within, his past customs and traditions in the service of contemporary human needs.<sup>80</sup> In Homi Bhabha's Fanon-inspired work, *The Location of Culture*, he argues persuasively that

the borderline work of culture demands an encounter with 'newness' that is not part of a continuum of past and present. It creates a sense of the new as an insurgent act of cultural translation... It does not merely recall the past as a social cause or aesthetic precedence; it renews the past, refiguring it as a contingent 'inbetween' space that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present. The 'past-present' becomes part of the necessity, not the nostalgia, of living.<sup>81</sup>

In Bhabha's view, Fanon seeks to "do battle for the creation of a human world of reciprocal recognitions" of all human beings in their cultural diversities.<sup>82</sup> In all, at every point in time, human culture must always be reconceived or altered to serve broad human interests and never to exult in protecting or extending parochial and exclusionary interests. The iteration is that the "deculturized" and "acculturized" (postcolonial peoples) must re-conceive, grasp anew and dynamize from within, their past customs and traditions in order to exult in the boundless horizons of their newly found personal and national freedom.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, for the quester of justice in the contemporary world, the starting point of such quests is the point where the Self is revealed and elevated. But the rediscovery and restoration of the Self and its dignity must begin from a radical rejection of all forms of oppression and cultural

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<sup>80</sup> See Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 30 – 32, 39 – 40, 56 and 66; Fanon, F. 1995, *Racism and culture*, p. 180.

<sup>81</sup> Bhabha, H. K. 1994, *The location of culture*, p. 7.

<sup>82</sup> But one ought to be concerned about the very fact that some liberal critics have attempted to reduce Fanon's Legacy to the question of "recognition". A notable example of this is Charles Taylor's widely read article "The Politics of Recognition", "which attempts to make a case for Fanon as a prophet of the sort of multiculturalism that maintains that recognition forges identity and thus the ultimate solution to the problem of justice lies in reform curricula allowing for the inclusion of women, minorities, etc. But to reduce Fanon's work to a mere quest for recognition is to ignore the fact that when Fanon writes about the life-and-death struggle of master and slave, it is real life and real death that are at stake; when he protests against the social construction of blackness, against racism's 'epidermal schema'... it is with the understanding that such constructions have the power to kill, or at least to sentence certain members of society to death. The emphasis on the violent struggle for freedom, the recognition, as Gordon puts it, that 'one cannot give an Other his freedom, only his liberty' is central to Fanon's legacy. The kind of cultural and political work that will continue to be inspired by him needs to maintain this sense of urgency." See Alessandrini, A. C. 1997, *Fanon and the postcolonial future*, p. 3 – 4; also see Bhabha, H. K. 1994, *The location of culture*, p. 8.

<sup>83</sup> Fanon, F. 1995, *Racism and culture*, p. 180 – 81.

prejudices. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon enunciates what Ziaudeen Sardar calls “a particular definition” of human dignity that flows from an assumption of human freedom.

Dignity is not located in seeking equality with the white man and his civilization: it is not about assuming the attitudes of the master *who has allowed his slaves to eat at his table*. It is about being oneself with all the multiplicities, systems and contradictions of one’s own ways of being, doing and knowing. It is about being true to one’s Self.<sup>84</sup>

The point here is that human dignity could not hold much value in a world laden with the drivers of colonialism such as oppression, racism and cultural prejudice.<sup>85</sup> Yet human dignity or its restoration, equality and equity are vital to achieving the *open Fanonian universal*.<sup>86</sup> According to Fanon’s conception of the universal, it (the universal) could neither be the product of a particular civilisation imposed on the rest of us, nor could it be the hasty attraction to a particular putative culture or religion.<sup>87</sup> It is something that we choose to accept because it extends our freedoms and reinforces our dignity as human persons.

In clear terms, Fanon here rejects Eurocentricism or what Abiola Irele calls “European ethnocentrism”.<sup>88</sup> Eurocentricism is the view that Europe and by extension America and everything that comes from that part of the world is the best, the most important and most desirable. According to Lucius Outlaw Jr., Eurocentricism is a concept used to denote any view which says that the “Whiteman” or the European/American is a superior human being. It is “a cultural complex of attitudes, sentiments, customs, habits, ideas, norms and practices that motivated, informed and legitimated the social and cultural, economic and political orderings of life, of peoples.” Furthermore, for Outlaw, Eurocentricism is a “complex” way of life, a way of

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<sup>84</sup> Italics are quotations of Fanon and are Sardar’s. See Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, *Black skin, white masks*, p. vii.

<sup>85</sup> Fanon lampoons the very notion of racial prejudice, arguing that it is not just absurd, but has constituted a kind of ailment, a tarnishing accretion to the very purity of humanity. See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p.18 – 20.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, p. xvii.

<sup>87</sup> “Burgers and coke are eaten and drunk throughout the world but one would hardly classify them as universally embraced, healthy and acceptable food: what the presence of burgers and coke in every city and town in the world demonstrate is not their universality but the power and dominance of the culture that produced them.” See Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, p. xvi; cf. Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 215.

<sup>88</sup> Irele, F. A. 1996, Introduction, *African philosophy: myth and reality*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. P. J. Hountondji, p. 12.

looking at the world that encouraged the belief in “White Supremacy”, “a capitalist political economy with universalist aspirations”, and a desire to dominate the globe.<sup>89</sup>

In rejecting Eurocentricism and or Euro-American Universalism, Fanon teaches that an authentic Universalism or what we here call open Fanonian universalism, may be achieved “by referring everything to the idea of the dignity of man,” and by so doing, “ripp[ing] prejudice to shreds.”<sup>90</sup> It then follows that European humanism is in need of decolonisation.<sup>91</sup> This decolonisation process must begin with the untrammelled pursuit of human dignity. All risks must be taken to preserve or restore human dignity, even where such risk-taking could lead to fatal consequences.<sup>92</sup> For “every time a man has contributed to the victory of the dignity of the spirit, every time a man has said no to an attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt solidarity with his act.”<sup>93</sup> It is in this solidarity with all struggles for emancipation that universalism is achieved. Universalism becomes a fact whenever and if the dignity of all human beings is elevated, respected or restored. Thus, open Fanonian universalism, his idea of humanity, does not consist in a competition of any kind. Not even a positive competition, but a genuine desire, a human wish to “‘want to walk always, night and day, in the company of man, of every man’.”<sup>94</sup> Thus, Fanon’s idea of universalism is based not just on the notions of dignity, equality and equity, but also “on a concrete and ever new understanding of man. It is a universalism that does not exist as yet, it cannot emerge from the dominant discourse, and it cannot be seen as a grand narrative that privileges a particular culture and its representatives; it is the universalism we need to struggle for and build.”<sup>95</sup>

Overall, Fanon attaches great importance to the interlocking familiarity traversing culture, humanity and universalism. His idea of cultural universalism is strongly tied to

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<sup>89</sup> Understood properly, “universalist” here refers to European universalism, or that anything European is or ought to be the standard of measuring its kind from any from other parts of the world. Thus, universalism here assumes a restrictive definition, elevating what is only a particular to a universal. See Outlaw JR., L. T. 2003. “Afrocentricity”: critical considerations, p. 157.

<sup>90</sup> Here, Fanon notes that it is only “After much reluctance, [that] the scientists had conceded that the Negro was a human being; *in vivo* and *in vitro* the Negro had been proved analogous to the white man: the same morphology, the same histology.” In addition, Fanon warns against all kinds of quixotic self-aggrandizement, for “there is no forgiveness when one who claims a superiority falls below standard.” See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p.14.

See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*, C. L. Markmann, Trans., p. 90.

<sup>91</sup> Sartre, J. P. 1967 [1961]. Preface. *The wretched of the earth*, p. 12, also cf. p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p.169.

<sup>93</sup> Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p.176.

<sup>94</sup> Fanon is cited by Hountondji, but is reported here from Coetzee, P. H. 2003, *Africa in the global context*, p. 651.

<sup>95</sup> Italics in original. See Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, p. xvii.

humanism, or what he calls a “human minimum”.<sup>96</sup> This is because for him, culture, its universal import is meaningless when people, human beings, members of that culture could not be treated with dignity or have lost their humanity in the wider international social and political fray. This is the reason why Fanon could not keep from imagining “Alioune Diop wondering what place the black genius will have in the universal chorus.”<sup>97</sup> This is a genuine worry in a world where the person of colour is *ab initio* alienated and rebuffed. Fanon’s belief is “that a tru[ly global] culture cannot come to life under present conditions. It will be time enough to talk of the black genius when the man [that is, humanity] has regained his rightful place.”<sup>98</sup>

In short, for Fanon, the struggle for freedom is a cultural phenomenon. The struggle for freedom and independence is a “cultural manifestation”.<sup>99</sup> For “It is not alone the success of the struggle which afterward gives validity and vigor to culture; culture is not put into cold storage during the conflict. The struggle itself in its development and in its internal progression sends culture along different paths and traces out entirely new ones for it.”<sup>100</sup> In the end, colonialism and the “colonized man” are obliterated, and from the crucible of the roiling conflict emerges the new humanity that defines the new humanism.<sup>101</sup> The most important outcome of the new humanism is the outright rejection of race prejudice: the false belief that blackness signifies evil whereas whiteness symbolises “Justice, Truth, Virginity.”<sup>102</sup> But why exactly is the obliteration of cultural prejudices crucially important to the realisation of Frantz Fanon’s universal humanity?<sup>103</sup> To be sure, in the course of human history, apart from cultural prejudices, other sources or drivers of prejudice such as the crisis of political economy, racism, ethnicity, xenophobia, religious intolerance and what one may call *nativist-nationalism* have been separately and conjointly implicated in the most egregiously unjust actions against certain human groups and societies. However, the worst kinds of prejudices that could and have stood in the way of (global) justice, have been culturally created and projected. In some cases where culture

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<sup>96</sup> See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p.142.

<sup>97</sup> Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p. 144.

<sup>98</sup> Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p. 144.

<sup>99</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 243.

<sup>100</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 243.

<sup>101</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 246.

<sup>102</sup> To be sure, “Fanon’s relentless attack on the murderous nature of European humanism should be read as an attempt, not to dispose of humanism *per se*, but rather to bring into existence a new humanism.” See Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin*, p. 139; Allesandrini, A. C. 1997, Fanon and the postcolonial future, p.1; also, Gordon, L. R. 1995, *Fanon and the crisis of European man: an essay on philosophy and the human sciences*.

<sup>103</sup> The answer Fanon offers to this question is vitally important to appreciating more deeply his position in the realisation of my thesis promise.

may not have been directly implicated, it would usually be thrown in to explain the grounds for an existing prejudice. Culture is in many cases simply invoked as a “fashionable nomenclature” to explain prejudices centering around other “containers” of prejudice.<sup>104</sup> This is even truer in the contemporary world; culture has been used to explain away some of the most egregious injustice in our time.<sup>105</sup>

But there is indeed a strong link between culture and other “containers” of prejudice, so much so that it can be argued that culture is the outer bridge connecting hidden prejudices and the outside world. To take just one example – the link between racism and culture. In an essay written in 1956, titled “Racism and Culture”, Fanon writes: “The unilaterally decreed normative value of certain cultures...” has led to the prejudice, first that “[some] human groups hav[e] no culture; then of a hierarchy of cultures; and finally, the concept of cultural relativity. The modern theory of the absence of cortical integration of colonial peoples is the anatomic-physiological counterpart of this doctrine.” Thus, “the enterprise of deculturation turns out to be the negative of a gigantic work of economic consciousness and even of biological enslavement.”<sup>106</sup> To make things much clearer, Fanon reiterates,

To study the relations of racism and culture is to raise the question of their reciprocal action. If culture is the combination of motor and mental behavior patterns, arising from the encounter of man with nature, and with his fellow man, it can be said that racism is indeed a cultural element. There are thus cultures with racism and cultures without racism.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> For example, it is generally believed among literary theorists that discussions of culture in Victorian England were a leitmotif to cover up racism at that time. I thank Nathan Suhr-Sytsma of the English Department, Linory University for pointing this out to me in correspondence. From the flip side, Amilcar Cabral has suggested that colonial imperialism and racism proceeds, first, by moving against the culture of the oppressed peoples which happens to be their strongest weapon against colonial imposition: “In order to escape this choice – which may be called the *dilemma of cultural resistance* – imperialist colonial domination has tried to create theories which, in fact, are only gross formulations of racism, and which, in practice, are translated into a permanent state of siege of the indigenous populations on the basis of racist dictatorship...” We shall return to this topic below. See Cabral, A. [1970] 1973, *Return to the source: selected speeches by Amilcar Cabral*, p. 40 and passim; also cf. Said, E. W. 2003, *Orientalism*, especially the Preface and p. 14.

<sup>105</sup> We shall return to this point below.

<sup>106</sup> My quotation of “Racism and Culture” here is from Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *Toward the African Revolution*, p. 31 – 32.

<sup>107</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *The African Revolution*, p. 32.

But what exactly would “a culture with racism” mean? Pedro Tabensky provides what looks like an acceptable explanation. According to him, racist cultures tend to be more “inward looking” than others that are less racist and their “dubious bonds of solidarity”, their exceptionless rigidity, easily afford its members a confirmation of that which can clearly be seen not to be the case if one’s back is not turned away from the world. “The social origins of ... rigidity ... are earlier attempt[s] by the architects of rigid cultures to ward off the psychic pain generated by a painful realisation that their lifestyles are the offspring of the unspeakable.” Tabensky cites “the white cultures of South Africa, both Afrikaner and English, [as] ... good examples of cultures built on fantasies produced in order to ward off psychic pain.”<sup>108</sup> In sum, for Fanon as for Tabensky, one major way racism becomes successful is because it first arises from a racist culture, and then is expressed by the “liquidation of the systems of reference”; the collapse of the cultural elements of the racialised and oppressed.<sup>109</sup> At the same time, Fanon warns, “racism bloats and disfigures the culture that practices it.”<sup>110</sup> For Fanon, this means that “we must look for the consequences of ... racism on the cultural level,” and then, be able to talk of *cultural racism*.<sup>111</sup> Cultural racism is seen in “the destruction of cultural values, of ways of life. Language, dress, techniques, are devalorized.” And the damaging consequence is that “cultural mummification leads to a mummification of individual thinking,” as well.<sup>112</sup>

In her book, *Starving on a Full Stomach: Hunger and the Triumph of Cultural Racism in Modern South Africa*, Diana Wylie lends credence to Fanon’s views stated above. According to Wylie, theories of “racial or cultural superiority” are implicated in the emergence of apartheid, even though; there was ultimately a “whole world of material interests and political machinations.” She is convinced that cultural racism was behind the ideologies “by which “whites came to persuade themselves of their innate superiority and God-given right to

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<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, “It should be noted that research shows that racists are often the offspring of rigid authoritarian fathers and social milieus. Eichmann, Stangl and De Kock are three prominent exemplars and we know that white South African society was and still is, to a significant extent, deeply rigid, hierarchical and authoritarian, as was Nazi Germany.” For this and the citations in-text, see Tabensky, P. A. Dec. 2010, *The Oppressor’s Pathology*, p. 80 – 91.

<sup>109</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *The African Revolution*, p. 38 – 39.

<sup>110</sup> Samantha Vice has recently espoused a similar view in a now famous article, Vice, S. 2010. “How do I live in this strange place?”, p. 323–342, According to her, “under conditions of oppression, both the oppressed and the oppressors are morally damaged, although of course in different ways, and even if this damage is not their responsibility.” See p. 325 and passim. Vice has maintained the same view in a recent Panel Discussion of her essay at Rhodes University, May 10, 2013. For the citation of Fanon, see his, 1967 [1964], *The African Revolution*, p. 37.

<sup>111</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *The African revolution*, p. 33.

<sup>112</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *The African revolution*, p. 33 – 34.

govern”.”<sup>113</sup> It is therefore for the foregoing reason that Fanon believed, and I think correctly, that the struggle for justice and freedom is precisely the struggle for the elimination of cultural prejudices on both sides – on the side of the oppressor and the oppressed. For this is the only way the new humanity would emerge. When this transhumanisation of culture is over, we shall all once again agree with René Depester that “you can’t have [a] culture without making concessions.”<sup>114</sup>

It then must go without saying that for Fanon, if cultural prejudices are excluded, humanity garners a greater chance of preserving and restoring the dignity of our species in totality. Because then social and economic cooperation would be established on a purely egalitarian humanism. For this reason, Fanon criticises contemporary capitalism, and insists that every peasant *jacquery* (revolt) remains a constant reproach against capitalism and its values.<sup>115</sup> He warns those who currently benefit hugely from the lopsided gains of capitalism (that is, the oppressors) to be wary of the oppressed and deprived because they are never really tamed, only waiting for the right time to fight for justice, for freedom and for their dignity.<sup>116</sup> If anyone is thinking of obstructing this inevitable dialectics towards Fanon’s universalism or his notion of the new humanism, then such a person should not lose sight of the very fact that the starving peasants – the global poor, those segregated by class and culture, and the exploited have really nothing to lose if they relapse into violent revolutions. In similar vein, Immanuel Kant had warned in spite of himself, that those revolutions would have no end, and that there is no reason why those of us who make this prediction should feel any less articulate. This is because,

[E]ven if the intended object behind the occurrence we have described were not to be achieved for the present, or a people’s revolution or constitutional reform were ultimately to fail, or if after the latter had lasted for a certain time, everything were to be brought back onto its original course (as politicians now claim to prophesy), our own philosophical prediction still loses none of its force. For the occurrence in question is too momentous, too

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<sup>113</sup> Wylie, D. 2001, *Starving on a full stomach: hunger and the triumph of cultural racism in modern South Africa*, p. 6.

<sup>114</sup> See Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 182.

<sup>115</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 63.

<sup>116</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 41 & 47.

- intimately interwoven with the interest of humanity and too widespread in its influence on all parts of the world for nations to be reminded of it when favourable circumstances present themselves, and to rise up and make renewed attempts of the same kind as before.<sup>117</sup>

In addition, we must all realise that the weak and incapacitated soon becomes a burden to us all, since as it were, their needs won't just go away, while we regretfully find that their poverty places them in an awkward dependent status – unable to make any meaningful contribution to the global purse.<sup>118</sup> Yet one must observe, that the current international setting perpetuates Fanon's observation that the poor "native has always known that he need not expect nothing from the other side ... in front of a suspicious and bloated Europe."<sup>119</sup> What must in the last analysis count today,

*the question which is looming on the horizon is the need for a redistribution of wealth. Humanity must reply to this question, or be shaken to pieces by it. If conditions of work are not modified, centuries will be needed to humanize this world.*<sup>120</sup>

On the side of the oppressed who have suffered past injustices and oppression, Fanon's view is that they should look beyond that past and the resentment that may come from the dark memories. Iris Marion Young articulates Fanon's recommendations here as follows:

The purported revolutionary who anguishes over the vast crimes of the past will get bogged down in backward-looking resentment... Fanon recommends instead the

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<sup>117</sup> In another translation, the same quote reads: "[E]ven if the end viewed in connection with this event should not now be attained, even if the revolution or reform of a national constitution should finally miscarry, or, after some time had elapsed, everything should relapse into its former rut (as politicians now predict), that philosophical prophecy still would lose nothing of its force. For that event is too important, too much interwoven with the interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in all areas of the world to not be recalled on any favorable occasion by the nations which would then be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind." For the quote in-text, see Kant, I. 1970, The contest of faculties, *Kant's political writings*, H. B. Nisbet Trans., p. 185; for the footnote citation, see Kant, I. 1979, The conflict of the philosophy faculty with the faculty of law. L. Beck, R. Anchor and E. Fackenheim. Trans., p. 159 of the English version.

<sup>118</sup> See Sartre, J. P. 1967 [1961], Preface, *The wretched of the earth*, p. 14 – 15.

<sup>119</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 73 – 77.

<sup>120</sup> Italics added. See Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 78 – 79.



existentialist stance of radical freedom and self-invention.... Only a radical leap out of this pathological structure into a future where everyone is only human will disalienate the person of color... A project of producing guilt among us for the sins of former generations is not likely to succeed, and even if it did, what would be the point of allowing such a guilt to fester? Why not put this past behind us and *start over* on terms of equal humanity?<sup>121</sup>

Overall, it would seem that for Fanon, what defines humanity is freedom for the human subject in the quest for an ethics of the good life. But there is a subtle inversion of this way of conceiving humanity introduced by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida that transcends Fanon's *oeuvre* which this urgent quest for a metaphysical ethic of global justice must think highly of.<sup>122</sup> Rather than conceive "a free subject... [as] the origin of responsibility," on a Levinasian/Derridian conception, responsibility is prior to and ground for freedom..., exemplified in the Fanonian-Patockan exemplar as "living in problematicity" of duty, truth and responsibility to the Other.<sup>123</sup> We shall have more to say about Levinas here. In an insightful reading of Levinas, Roger Burggraeve writes:

Through interpreting human rights beginning from the Other, it becomes clear [to Levinas] how responsibility is also the core of charity: "Everything begins with the rights of the Other and with my infinite responsibility." To love my neighbor is to respond to his Face, to accept his ethical lordship over me and recognize that he has rights over me. A truly humane justice is thus possible on the basis of a "humanism of the Other" which stands in contrast with the classical humanism of the ego. The humanism of the Other implies a dethroning and decentering of the ego: "There can be talk of culture only when one reaches the conviction that

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<sup>121</sup> Iris Marion Young's critique of Fanon that follows her summation here is not entirely true, but I shall let it alone here for want of space. She argues that Fanon's "compelling vision", is "also ultimately flawed." And that "[t]he existential humanism on which it is based is too radically individualist and dehistoricized." For the verbatim citation in-text, see Young, I. M. 2011, *Responsibility for justice*, p. 171 – 72; and for the footnote quotation, see p. 171.

<sup>122</sup> I am grateful to Pedro Tabensky and Richard Pithouse for first pointing out to me the obvious continuities between my work and Levinas' philosophy.

<sup>123</sup> See Young, I. M. 2011, *Responsibility for justice*, p. 119; Patocka, J. 2007, *Living in problematicity*, E. Manton, Ed., *passim*.

the center of my existence does not lie in myself.” ...“The human par excellence—the source of humanity—is the Other” ... justice begins as “heteronomy” and “inequality.” It begins not in my freedom but in the Other him or herself: it is “an-archic.”<sup>124</sup>

The simple idea here is that for Levinas, my very existence, my humanity is not so much about my own value or my place in the world, but that my humanity is ethically grounded in my relationship, my responsibility to the Other. But who is the “Other” here? The Other is my neighbour in whom I stand in proximity with and find signification of my own existence by. But this “neighbour” is not my next door neighbour as such, but the whole of humanity. My proximity to this neighbour is not defined conventionally, logically, legally, geographically or biologically, it is defined morally and transcendentally via a preconditional non-indifference.<sup>125</sup> “The face [of my neighbour] is a singular universal and in “the proximity of the other, all the others than the other obsess me.”<sup>126</sup> Justice is necessary, not to save me from the infinite responsibility to one other “but for the sake of judging in the presence of the whole of humanity—in each face.”<sup>127</sup> In a memorable quote, Levinas writes, “The Other, revealing itself by its face, is the first intelligible, before cultures and their alluvions and allusions.”<sup>128</sup> For this reason, Kwame Appiah is right when he argues that “I am not alone in doubting the imperative to respect cultures, as opposed to persons; and I believe we can respect persons only inasmuch as we consider them as abstract rights-holders.”<sup>129</sup> This is to affirm the independence of ethics in relation to history. “Showing that the first significance arises in morality, in the quasi-abstract epiphany of the face, which is stripped of every quality-absolute – absolving itself of cultures, means tracing a limit to the comprehension of the real by history and rediscovering Platonism.”<sup>130</sup> Thus, for Levinas as for Appiah, and we agree with them, the status of the Other is “absolute” in the strict sense, “absolved from any relation to world, context, culture, homes, symbolic order, rituals, and from any order of reason. The subject is thus constituted in relation

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<sup>124</sup> Burggraefe R., 2002, *The wisdom of love in the service of love: Emmanuel Levinas on justice, peace, and human rights*, p. 105.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Hand, S., 2009. *Routledge critical thinkers: Emmanuel Levinas*, p. 54 – 55.

<sup>126</sup> Thomas E. L. 2004. *Emmanuel Levinas: ethics, justice and the human beyond being*, p. 157.

<sup>127</sup> Thomas E. L. 2004. *Emmanuel Levinas*, p. 157.

<sup>128</sup> Levinas, E. 1990, *Difficult freedom: essays on Judaism*, S. Hand, trans., p. 295.

<sup>129</sup> Appiah, K. 2005, *The ethics of identity*, p. xv.

<sup>130</sup> Levinas, E. 1990, *Difficult freedom*, p. 295.

to a personal rather than a non-personal alterity such as a 'culture' or a 'world.'"<sup>131</sup> And because "the face [the Other] is independent of Worlds, context and culture, because it comes from an "elsewhere into which it already withdraws" even before it arrives, Levinas sees in it a guarantee that the Other is more than a "cultural meaning" who approaches me from out of his cultural whole. Ethics, therefore, must precede culture: as face, the Other is an "*abstract man*," in the sense of someone 'disengaged *from all culture*'."<sup>132</sup>

In disavowing Sartre's assertion that the individual is condemned to freedom, Levinas argues that freedom is an investiture conferred on her by the encounter, the entrance of the Other. It is indeed how I choose to use my freedom in relation to the Other that will either subvert or enhance my authentic freedom. "The heteronomy of our response to the human other, or to God as the absolutely other, precedes the autonomy of our subjective freedom."<sup>133</sup> Yet the question arises for Sartre, why would anyone be unwilling to help their neighbour? That would be because, for Levinas we have not begun to think of humanity in Heideggerian phraseology as *Dasein*, that is, in terms of personhood and mortality, or contemplate the originary ethics of (once more, in Heideggerian phraseology), *humanitas* that is, human values, high enough. But "while what defines man's reality in *Being and Time* is his concern for his own death. for Levinas what constitutes man's very humanity is the concern for the death of the other."<sup>134</sup>

### 3.7: Chapter Evaluation

Fanon's analysis of culture is evidently human-centered. In other words, for the West-Indian, if culture assumes its proper place in the human society, then, it would always be updated to cater for human needs – broad rather than parochial/exclusionary human needs. But how exactly does Fanon hope to achieve this? Or more precisely, what risks do we stand to face if his vision of the new humanity is not achieved? We will find ourselves in an unjust world – a Manichaeian world divided between human beings who will constantly view the Other as inferior

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<sup>131</sup> See Newman, M. 2000, *Sensibility, trauma, and the trace: Levinas from phenomenology to the immemorial*, p. 94 – 104.

<sup>132</sup> Visker, R. 2005, *Dis-possessed: how to remain silent "after" Levinas*, p. 379.

<sup>133</sup> Levinas is paraphrased here by Paul Marcus in Marcus, P. 2008. *Being for the Other: Emmanuel Levinas, Ethical living and psychoanalysis*, p. 43.

<sup>134</sup> Mosés, S. 2005, *Emmanuel Levinas: ethics as primary meaning*, G. Motzkin, Trans., p. 327.

or not worthy of interaction or social cooperation. Under this scenario, humanity would remain constantly under the threat of auto-extinction. We must then go in search of a new human world where we must all be allowed to do things in unique but mutually regenerative ways; in simple terms, a world of reciprocal benefits. We believe that Fanon's analysis provides a veritable thinking platform for a new point of alternate re-entry into the discourse on global justice, in a world where it has become critically important that we develop new ideas for living together in in our only world.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE IDEA OF INTER-CULTURAL EQUALITY

*I am concerned with moving the centre in two senses at least. One is the need to move the centre from its assumed location in the West to a multiplicity of spheres in all the cultures of the world. Moving the centre in the two senses – between nations and within nations – will contribute to the freeing of world cultures from the restrictive walls of nationalism, class, race and gender. In this sense I am an unrepentant universalist. For I believe that while retaining its roots in regional and national individuality, true humanism with its universal reaching out, can flower among the peoples of the earth, rooted as it is in the histories and cultures of the different peoples of the earth.*

— Ngũgĩ, wa Thiong' O<sup>1</sup>

The contemporary discourse on global justice in philosophy is a corollary of the much wider and older discourse on the question of justice. Many philosophers would easily agree that *universality* (applying to everyone in the same way and at all times, given similar circumstances) and *impartiality* (the absence of bias of any kind) correctly articulate the idea (purpose) of justice. But as one must have become aware in reading this essay thus far, that is about where agreements concerning the nature of justice between rival political philosophers usually end. Political philosophers provide and/or espouse conflicting accounts of the morality and contents of justice as they attempt to proffer workable and acceptable answers to the question of what it really means to fulfill the idea of justice. This, in turn, has generated varying accounts or opinions (conceptions) of justice in political discourses in the history of philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, in the discourse on global justice, disputants agree that the world we currently live in is unjust – that is, not tailored to satisfy the idea of justice. They concede that something

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<sup>1</sup> Ngũgĩ, wa Thiong' O. 1993, *Moving the centre: the struggle for cultural freedom*, p. xvi – xvii.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter One in this volume and the references contained therein for some classical examples of this age long disputation in philosophy. See specifically: Barry, B. 1989, *Theories of justice*; and for a good example of a reliable account of contemporary theories of justice, see Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., passim.

should be done to alter the situation for the better, to move towards a more just or better world order. But as with the older discourse on justice, that is where the happy agreements end, unfortunately. The output of the raging controversy is such that, in our critical investigation of the idea of global justice, we are left with nothing but appeals to conflicting accounts of morality, ideologically discordant convictions and traditionally opposed philosophies.<sup>3</sup> However, from the rubbles of this disputation, two identifiable conceptions/theoretical camps – the political conception of global justice and the cosmopolitan theory of justice have been identified.

Simply stated, the puzzle/problematic of global justice is about whether there could be adequate justification for the very fact that some human beings enjoy comfortable lives, sometimes living in affluence in their own countries/societies, while many others live in abject poverty within the same society or in other countries in the same shared world. As noted above, both the proponents of the political conception of global justice and the advocates of the cosmopolitan theory of justice agree that the current world order is unjust. They also agree on the need to make it much better. But they disagree about the modalities of the ‘millennium’. They are polarised as to what an acceptable scenario of a just world should look like. The former group believes that once sovereign states are internally just and are able to give out limited humanitarian assistance to poorer states/societies, the idea of global justice has been fulfilled. Proponents of the political conception implacably defend the view that if the foregoing offer is rejected, then poorer societies must first subject themselves to the coercive domination of the current world powers – as that is the only way members of poorer societies can later make morally defensible demands of social justice – from the affluent super powers. On the other hand, the latter group contends that the traditional political philosophy – in which the above view is anchored – is obsolete inapplicable and unacceptable in the currently interdependent world setting. Cosmopolitans regret that proponents of the political conception invoke such traditional philosophies based on an obsolete reading of our present world order. The cosmopolitans further argue that the individual, not the nation-state ought to be regarded as the ultimate unit of moral consideration in thinking about (global) justice. For this reason, the idea of global justice is rendered meaningful only as “justice without borders” or that “assistance” given to persons in poorer societies ought not to be donated as charity, but must be granted as their rightly deserved

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<sup>3</sup> For the use of similar phraseology in describing contemporary political philosophy, see Kymlicka, W. 2002, *Contemporary political philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 2.

share of global resources and wealth.<sup>4</sup> In addition, some cosmopolitans stress that such assistance must not end until living standards in all human societies and among all human beings are equalised.

The cosmopolitans ought to realise that they paradoxically pursue views that run contrary to what we have identified as the core values of contemporary world setting: *statism* and (liberal) individualism.<sup>5</sup> Even though the cosmopolitans believe that individual persons ought to be regarded as the chief concern of global justice, their claim, if pushed to all its logical implications, ironically turns out as a *reductio ad absurdum*. This is because it seems far-fetched that individuals who hardly care about happenings elsewhere in the world (and in many cases even of events in their own country) could seriously be taken as the “standard bearer” of global justice. After all, most of us would concede that any kind of political right/benefit goes with responsibility. If individual human beings are to be regarded as the chief beneficiary of global justice and international cooperation, then, there seems no reason why they may not also be required to provide the lion share of the responsibility of global justice. Furthermore, in defending their stated conception of global justice, cosmopolitans aver that Rawls’ liberal individualism ought to be globalised as a way of realising his ultimate theory of justice. But they reject Rawls’ unwavering commitment to the view that the individual’s well-being ought to be meaningfully and obligatorily protected only within what Thomas Nagel calls a “coercively imposed political community”. So, cosmopolitans are willing to accept one half of Rawls’ liberal individualism, but would hasten to dissociate themselves from its anti-globalist strictures. In the end, cosmopolitans somehow seek to defend their views against both individualism and statism as understood by the political realism of contemporary international relations.<sup>6</sup>

However, both theoretical camps are criticised here as failing to provide any universally valid principle of justice that could be sustained on their platforms and that would guarantee a stable and flourishing global order. The dominant theories of global justice are not able to

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<sup>4</sup> In a sense justice could be defined as assistance. But assistance here is to be based on the need to achieve equality or an obligation of right. No cut off point is required. Justice is therefore different from “assistance” (as the term is usually understood) in that the latter is based on humanitarian or charitable grounds, while the former is sustained on juridical – morally compelling obligations. For an elaborate exposition of the polarities between the theoretical camps, see Chapter Two in this volume and the references contained therein.

<sup>5</sup> For more on current global culture and the role statism and individualism play in it, see Section 2:5 in Chapter Two in this volume.

<sup>6</sup> For a lengthier discussion, see Section 2:5 in Chapter Two of this volume.

resolve the problematic of providing a (set of) universally valid principle(s) of global social cooperation/interaction, precisely because, in propounding their views, they overlook the significant role culture ought to play in such theories. Both camps fail to take full cognisance of the overriding role attitude towards culture and cultural prejudices play or could play in determining the bases of international cooperation and human interaction. For example, the proponents of the political conception take for granted that states (including multi-ethnically divided societies) can easily become internally just given that its members are of the same nationality.<sup>7</sup> From that same erroneous viewpoint, they also contemplate the equally incorrect belief that in spite of cultural differences and prejudices, liberal societies could assist or teach “non-liberal” or “burdened” societies *the* right political culture upon which they may be well (re)-ordered.

As part of the broader critique of the dominant theories of global justice, we contend that an acceptable theory of global justice must also stipulate how its assumptions would help us resolve the most pressing problems of justice in the modern state, especially the nation-state.<sup>8</sup> It is precisely because of our conviction that the dominant theories of global justice are found wanting in this regard and indeed in the other critical areas we have identified that we find necessary a new approach to problematising global justice. In line with this quest for a theory of global justice that is sensitive to the culture problematic and that equally provides creative prospects for rethinking our convictions about the traditional issues and problems of justice, we here propose a theory of global culture upon which an acceptable theory of global justice ought to be developed and sustained.<sup>9</sup> This theory of global culture, indebted to Frantz Fanon, is based on an idea we have christened *cultural humanism*, and the universally valid principle of justice that emerges is what we have called *inter-cultural equality*. The thesis’ contention is that a resolution of the culture question in global justice creatively unfurls alternate pathways to resolving the substantive problematic of global justice. To develop a deeper understanding of the proposed theories and concepts as used in this section, we presently evaluate the polemical debate on global culture

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<sup>7</sup> The history of many contemporary nation-states proves this assumption to be false. Hard facts like ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, pogroms and the politics of minority exclusion that are all part of the lexicon of the historiography of the modern state. It might be easy to pretend that everyone in principle could be part of the Original Position or the social contract, but that must remain an utopian assumption that requires some serious critical inquiry.

<sup>8</sup> Nation-state here referring to countries made up of more than one nation or ethnic group.

<sup>9</sup> My general argument has been that a theory of global justice ought to be preceded by a theory of global culture.



## 4.1: Problematising Global Culture<sup>10</sup>

This essay is basically a critique of the view that a particular putative culture – a people's putative culture – should form the basis of the identity of each individual born of that society, in an immutable, irrevocable manner. If it is impossible to understand human beings – individual persons, groups, societies or nations – as free moral agents possessing plural identities, the thesis argues, then, the idea of global justice will remain an unachievable utopia. Consequently, the study concludes that a theory of global justice ought to be preceded by a theory of global culture. Global culture is a way of conceiving culture such that culture is understood as the ever-changing framework – principles, ideas, agreements, practices and values – through which human experience is enriched and the world made sense of. Global culture is not the outcome of universalising a particular culture or the allegedly core values of one or two civilisations; it is the aggregate outcome of *inter-culturality* or *cultural freedom*.<sup>11</sup> Here, human beings are allowed what we call *multiple costumes of identity* and suffer no harm as a result of cultural mutation or cultural prejudice. This does not necessarily mean the loss of what some people might understand as their unique cultural identity.<sup>12</sup> As a matter of fact, an individual is capable of, and often embraces cultural values other than those within which he or she is born. People may, and often do repudiate or reject customs, traditions, beliefs or practices embedded in the paraphernalia of the putative culture they were born into.<sup>13</sup> Sanya Osha is right in arguing that identity can be maintained even in the face of multi-cultural dialogue.<sup>14</sup> This is the line of thinking that we believe Richard Shweder had in mind when he argued that

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<sup>10</sup> Undoubtedly, the idea of global culture is galvanised by globalisation; or the growing interdependence of all human societies as a result of advancements in (information) technology. But, to isolate IT (information technology) or globalisation as the sole driver of the shrinking of our contemporary world along cultural lines, and the consequent desire for a global culture is mistaken. Historically, travel, commerce, religion, enslavement, immigration, wars/conflicts, constituted the organic drivers of world cultural mix. IT rose to become both an organic factor and a catalyst of inter-culturality – in that it simultaneously expanded the scope of these other organic drivers of human diversity.

<sup>11</sup> Our view here is similar to Sardar, Z. 2008, Foreword to the 2008 edition, p. xvi; Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 215.

<sup>12</sup> My general argument here is that I do not see that unique cultural identities exist. But if unique cultures or cultural identities are thought to exist, then, they are perpetually in a flux. More importantly, culture must never serve as the only criterion or label for identifying any person, group or nation for that matter, under any circumstances.

<sup>13</sup> For example, it would be erroneous to move from the very fact that many Brazilians have a football culture, to say that all Brazilians belong to a Brazilian footballing culture or as a matter of necessity, that all Brazilians are lovers of the round leather game.

<sup>14</sup> See Osha, O. 2005, *Kwasi Wiredu and beyond: text writing and thought in Africa*, p. 88.

My version of cultural pluralism begins with a universal truth, which I refer to as the principle of “confusionism.” A “confusionist” believes that the knowable world is incomplete if seen from any one point of view, incoherent if seen from all points of view at once, and empty if seen from “nowhere in particular.” Given the choice between incompleteness, incoherence, and emptiness, I opt for incompleteness while staying on the move between different ways of seeing and valuing the world. This version of cultural pluralism is not opposed to universalism. [...] I strongly believe in “universalism,” but the type of universalism I believe in is “universalism without... uniformity”...<sup>15</sup>

To develop a theory of global culture along the above template and vision, the study posits the notion of cultural humanism, as providing a theory of global culture in which an acceptable theory of global justice should be anchored. Cultural humanism is primarily derived from Frantz Fanon’s humanism and cultural theory, to be found in his anticolonial writings.<sup>16</sup> Fanon’s cultural humanism states that a universal cultural mix has become a reality, such that a particular culture is neither the basis of any individual or group identity, nor the grounds for treating anyone unjustly. Cultural humanism generates a principle of justice we call “inter-cultural equality” which would guide a world where human beings live in non-homogeneous but mutually enriching cultural milieux. Given the fact of global interdependence, realising cultural humanism may take some time, but it is not impossible. Here, the key question is, why exactly is culture paramount in our current discussion on global justice? Why does it seem at this point that we are considering culture as a negative thing that needs redemption from itself – a thing that is ultimately in need of humanisation?

Many people – scholars and commentators alike – have used the term “culture” to refer to a large number of unrelated categories.<sup>17</sup> But there is at least one thing everyone seems to be in agreement about human culture: culture is not “nature”, even though it may be said to augment the latter; it is something learned. This work affirms that culture is not a natural phenomenon. It is as Fanon would say, the product of human interaction with nature and our relationship with

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<sup>15</sup> See Shweder, R. A. 2000, Moral maps, “First World” conceits, and the New Evangelists, p. 164.

<sup>16</sup> A detailed exposition of the idea is to be found in Chapter Three of this thesis.

<sup>17</sup> For a good book that attempts to unravel the myriad of complexities in the word “culture”, see Williams, R. 1983, *Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society*, Revised Ed., especially p. 87 – 93.

fellow humans. Similarly, a people's culture does not exist in the same way a people's arts, music, dance and idioms may be said to exist. All the items in the preceding list may all be part of culture, but it is a mistake to think that we can point to an independent entity called "culture". Instead, culture "refers to [ever-changing] customary behaviour and beliefs that are passed on through enculturation [or] cultural learning."<sup>18</sup> It is supposed to help individuals to make sense of their environment and thus be able to live the good life. This is because cultural resources are required, even unavoidable, for creating a sense of entitlement and self-love.<sup>19</sup> "But equally," in the words of the renowned anti-colonial writer and postcolonial activist, Amilcar Cabral, "in some respects, culture is very much a source of obstacles and difficulties, of erroneous conceptions about reality, of deviation in carrying out duty, and of limitations on the tempo and efficiency of a struggle that is confronted with the political, technical and scientific requirements..."<sup>20</sup> At all events, some people – especially cultural essentialists – believe that culture fundamentally controls economic and political development in every human society in every epoch and civilisation. Yet, curiously, no one knows where culture comes from.<sup>21</sup> What may be regarded as the contents of culture and its relationship with religion, politics and ideology, for example, have also remained controversial.

Nonetheless, for the cultural essentialist, a culture and its practices are not merely emblematic of a people's identity; every individual member of any given society possesses a uniquely shared "cultural identity". In this hard essentialist thinking, culture becomes an ontologically primary entity, capable of determining and gauging a society's political, economic and social futures. The essentialists also regard culture as a *sui generis* factor capable of determining the futures of every single individual member of a society that allegedly belong to a given culture, despite their disparate experiences and exposures. If the cultural essentialist is right, then it would almost be uncontroversial to argue that culture determines what we are and what we are likely to become. But the critical question is: should culture really matter? If yes, to what extent? Could a person be correctly defined in terms of a unique, immutable and irrevocable cultural identity? Do we currently need a theory of global culture as this essay suggests? How best should we formulate a theory of global culture, if there is a need? Before we

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<sup>18</sup> Kottak, C. P. 2008, *Anthropology: the exploration of human diversity*, 12<sup>th</sup> ed., p. 294.

<sup>19</sup> Alcoff, L. M. Summer 1998, What should white people do?, p. 18.

<sup>20</sup> See Cabral, A. [1970] 1973, *Return to the source: selected speeches by Amilcar Cabral*, p. 53.

<sup>21</sup> Roskin, M. G., Cord R. L., Medeiros, J. A. and Jones, W. S. 2007, *Political science: an introduction*, p. 10 – 11.

return to this set of questions for the last time, we must look back to some older and contemporary uses of culture. We begin with cultural essentialists of an earlier period.

#### **4.2: Essentialising Culture: the Cultural Nationalist Point of View**

Apart from the contemporary proponents of cultural essentialism, there are a number of theoretical and historical avowals of the essentialist view of culture or at any rate efforts to imply that we can have a unique criterion or criteria for predicting how every member of a society behaves or is likely to behave in specific situations. Those criteria would also, under this view, help us to determine the overall capabilities or values of a people.<sup>22</sup> Essentialists have often backed infamous causes arising from their inevitable prejudiced view of certain peoples because of their culture, or a supposed lack of one.<sup>23</sup> Examples of ugly incidents and attitudes that have been backed or could be sustained using an essentialist view include enslavement, colonialism, apartheid, *nativist-nationalism*, xenophobia, ethnic bigotry and ethnic cleansings as well as certain forms of intolerance.

The writings of some “reputable” European scholars like David Hume, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel represent some well-known products of cultural essentialism originating from the act of telling a single story about human groups and societies. Interestingly, as we have noted, the accounts of some cultural essentialists begin from denying certain peoples even of having a culture altogether. Quite clearly, we probably can do very little about the very (historical) fact of the transatlantic slave trade and Auschwitz. But we certainly can learn critical lessons from such events, vis-à-vis the need for a global culture/global justice. For these events did not occur spontaneously; they were the logical output of the thoughts of some cultural essentialist as much as such events were propelled by politico-economic ideologues and hegemons.

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<sup>22</sup> Even though I will be quoting the most shocking, denigrating views about “other cultures,” I do not want to be understood as suggesting that we should all have kinder impressions of “other cultures.” The problem, as I will show, is the very notion of “other cultures” – of groups of people who uniformly possess cultures that are absolutely different from “our culture.” In other words, I want to question the framework, not its application.

<sup>23</sup> Cultural essentialism tends to go hand-in-hand with cultural prejudice. Also, in Chapter Three, we have demonstrated that the cultural essentialist would rather proclaim culture as the basis of his/prejudice rather than refer directly to race, religion or language, for example.

To take a look at the history of the slave trade and cultural prejudice from one perspective; Europeans have not always perceived Africans in bad light; the earliest recorded encounters between Europeans and African kingdoms were peaceful and even cordial. According to E.C. Eze's findings, the earliest meetings between the two continents (in modern times) took place around the 1400s. During that time, the Africans and Europeans routinely engaged in commerce, and even exchanged diplomatic counsels. And what is more, they related as equals. The Europeans at this time did not think that the Africans were unwise, savages or anything inferior to themselves or their fellow citizens back in Europe. The European merchants at that time compared the fine political organisations they found in Bini, Dahomey and the Ashanti with the Roman Papacy (the best well organised in Europe as of that time and perhaps even now). But something happened to change this regime of things. The dubious "discovery" of America in 1492 is one such event. As Europeans began to settle in America "Afro-European demands shifted from raw materials to human labour..."<sup>24</sup> This meant that the Europeans, needing hands other than theirs to work for them in the new plantations in America, decided to capture Africans (whom the Europeans found capable of withstanding the harsh conditions of the plantations) to work for free.

It would seem that European elite at that time needed some kind of intellectual balm to prevent their conscience from apprehending the very extent of the moral turpitude involved in slavery, the slave trade and colonialism. The Europeans consequently shifted "their literary, artistic, and philosophical characterisations of Africans."<sup>25</sup> One such "shift", it would seem, is to be found in the writings of the man widely regarded as the greatest modern philosopher, the German, Immanuel Kant.<sup>26</sup> Kant and some other scholars of his time unarguably sowed the seeds of cultural prejudices that showed clearly through racism and Nazism in Germany and Europe. The Kantian-Hegelian kind of cultural prejudice is the type that says Europe and whatever comes from it is superior to those of other climes (that is, Eurocentricism).<sup>27</sup> It can be argued that together with Hegel, Kant laid the groundwork for Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and the plagues of World War II.

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<sup>24</sup> Eze, E. C., 1997, Introduction: philosophy and the (post) colonial, p. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Eze, E. C., 1997, Philosophy and the (post) colonial, p. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Even though, as we shall see, Kant obviously had some earlier stimuli.

<sup>27</sup> See section 3.6 in this volume and the references there.

In four separate essays published within almost as many decades (1764 to 1798), as well as in a series of lectures he began in the early 1770s, Kant attempted to demonstrate that somehow, based on his arm-chair philosophical theorising and the writings of a few hearsay-anthropologists (David Hume and Comte de Buffon), he could prove that some human societies have no culture. He could also, presumably, prove that there is such thing as “races”, and that these “races” could be placed in a hierarchical order according to which societies, groups of human beings and countries possess a comparatively or even sometimes, ontologically higher cultures.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, it seemed easy for Kant to order countries and societies according to those that could be said to have a “national character” and those that could not; those whose civilisations are the most advanced, and those that could never hope to escape a subaltern civilisational status.<sup>29</sup> In this respect, in a subsection he titled “The Character of the Peoples” in his lectures on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*; England and France emerged “the two most civilized peoples” of the world.<sup>30</sup> “Also, because of their innate character, of which the acquired and artificial character is only the result, England and France are perhaps the only peoples to which one can assign a definite and – as long as they do not mix... unchangeable character.”<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, Kant is sure that, “*Russia has not yet* developed what is necessary for a definite concept of natural predispositions which lie ready in it ... European *Turkey never have* attained and *never will* attain what is necessary for the acquisition of a definite national character, the sketch of them [Kant assures us] may rightly be passed over here.”<sup>32</sup>

In the last of the four infamous essays published in 1788 (curiously about the same time as the ‘Critical Period’ in Kant’s literature), titled “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy”, Kant re-inscribes his hierarchical theory of “race”, claiming that people from Africa and India lack a “drive to activity”, and as a result, do not have the mental capacities to be self-motivated and successful in northern climates, never becoming anything more than

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<sup>28</sup> Notably, Kant almost never left his hometown Königsberg throughout the period of his lengthy career. The four articles are: Kant, I. 2007a [1764], Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime; Kant, I. 2007b [1775], Of the different races of human beings; Kant, I. 2007c [1785], Determination of the concept of human race; and Kant, I. 2007d [1788] On the use of teleological principles; most of the lectures are published in one volume: Kant, I. 2007e [1798], *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*.

<sup>29</sup> See Kant, I. 2007e [1798], *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, p. 7: 319.

<sup>30</sup> Note that the emphases are Kant’s. See Kant, I. 2007e [1798], *Anthropology*, p. 7: 311.

<sup>31</sup> Here Kant anticipates Hegel, Hitler and Samuel P. Huntington. More on this below. For the citation, see Kant, I. 2007e [1798], *Anthropology*, p. 7: 311 – 312.

<sup>32</sup> Italics are in the original. See Kant, I. 2007e [1798], *Anthropology*, p. 7: 319.

drifters.<sup>33</sup> In praising Nature's wisdom in discouraging migration as a result of human discordant adaptive capacities; especially from warmer to colder regions of the world, Kant laboured to show that Native Americans (whom he placed below the Africans) are weak, inert and "incapable of any culture" because they "are a race (or rather, a semi-race) stunted in its development because their ancestors migrated to a different climate before they had fully adapted to their own environment."<sup>34</sup> Ignoring both empirical, anthropological and theoretical illuminations that ran contrary to his theory of "race" (several works existed at that time that rebut "racial" hierarchism), Kant relied on Comte de Buffon's writings to re-inscribe the "stem species" argument in support of the superiority of the "whites". The argument has it that there was once a "stem species" (*Stammgattung*) in one region of the world which possessed the predispositions for all the different "racial" features. The subsequent dispersal of human beings allowed that each race went away with the right dispositions to help them survive in the particular region of the world where they would find themselves. This developmental process, Kant tells us, is irreversible.<sup>35</sup> This is why migration and cultural mixing would not in any way present the "weaker races" with any hope of enlightenment or progression. Kant was sure and preached that only the "whites" were bequeathed with the (eugenically) appropriate predispositions of the human race.

At all events, Kant reserved his bitterest prejudices for the "Negroes" of Africa, even though he ranked the native Americans lower than them. According to him,

[T]he Arab [is] ...the noblest human being in the Orient ...but his ...inflamed power of imagination presents things to him in unnatural and distorted images, and even the spread of his religion was a great adventure. The Negroes

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<sup>33</sup> The reader should note the parallelism, once more, between Kant's arguments here and the mainly psychotic drivel of the *Mein Kampf*. Also, note that Kant published this article and continued to teach his racist Geography and Anthropology in German universities and public space (up to 1798, when he published the entire lectures) against what empirical facts demonstrated. For example, Ignatius Sancho, Qobna Ottobah Cugoano, and Olaudah Equiano, the three best-known Africans in eighteenth-century England became known as significant writers in the 1780s, with the publication of their respective books in 1782, 1787, and 1789. See Palter, R. April 1995, Hume and prejudice, p. 7. The citation from Kant's essay here is drawn from Kleingeld, P. Oct., 2007, Kant's second thoughts on race, p. 573.

<sup>34</sup> Again, note that Hitler was to adopt this same argument against migration and the Jews. See Kleingeld, P. Oct., 2007, Kant's second thoughts on race, p. 573 – 74.

<sup>35</sup> Kleingeld, P. Oct., 2007, Kant's second thoughts on race, p. 579.

of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. [B]ut the Germans, the English, and the Spaniards [are] those who are most distinguished from all others in the feeling of the sublime.<sup>36</sup>

In yet another notorious passage, in the first of the four essays (published in 1764). *Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant observed that the very fact that the “Negro” carpenter was black from head to toe, was a clear proof that what he said was stupid.<sup>37</sup> Kant’s only defence for an atrocious comment of this magnitude is an appeal to the following equally disastrous claims by the Scottish philosopher, David Hume:

I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent in action or specialization. No ingenious manufacturers amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them... such a uniform and constant difference could not happen... if nature had not made original distinction betwixt these breeds of men.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> However, note the devious implication of Kant’s implicit claim to the effect that there is probably nothing worth talking about the rest of the Orient, since even their best only perceive things in “unnatural and distorted images”. See Kant, I. 2007 [1764], *On the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime*, P. Guyer, Trans., p. 2:243 – 54.

<sup>37</sup> The entire story from Kant runs thus: “In the lands of the blacks can one expect anything better than what is generally found there, namely the female sex in the deepest slavery? A pusillanimous person is always a strict master over the weaker, just as with us that man always a tyrant in the kitchen who outside of house hardly dares to walk up to anyone. Indeed, Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment of his wives, replied: You whites are real fools, for first you concede so much to your wives, and then you complain when they drive you crazy. [Kant continues]. There might have been something here worth considering, except for the fact that this scoundrel was completely black from head to foot, a distinct proof that what he said was stupid.” The citation in-text is reported in Kleingeld, P. Oct., 2007, *Kant’s second thoughts on race*, p. 576; and Eze, E. C., 1997, *Philosophy and the (post) colonial*, p. 7; but the quotation in the footnote is from Kant, I. 2007a [1764], *On the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime*, P. Guyer, Trans., p. 2:254 – 2: 255.

<sup>38</sup> Hume is cited in Eze, E. C., 1997, *Philosophy and the (post) colonial*, p. 7.



Kant may have changed his views on “race” later on, but his earlier writings on this topic have not exactly been committed to flames as “sophistry and illusion”.<sup>39</sup>

To be sure, cultural racism, irredentism, prejudicial theories and actions did not begin or end with Kant, the Germans or any particular civilisation or epoch in human history. More than two centuries before Kant wrote, a London merchant, John Lok, kept a curious account of his voyage to the West African coast in 1561. He reportedly described “black” Africans as “beasts who have no houses,” and who are also “people without heads, having their mouth and eyes in their breasts.”<sup>40</sup> The Nigerian writer Chimamanda Adichie notes that “what is important about his writing is that it represents the beginning of a tradition of telling African stories in the West: A tradition of Sub-Saharan Africa as a place of negatives, of difference, of darkness, of people who, in the words of the wonderful poet Rudyard Kipling, are ‘half devil, half child’.”<sup>41</sup> Adichie couldn’t be more right about how Lok’s writing may have helped to engender a pernicious tradition in Europe and America. Stories of racial/cultural prejudice and implanted animosities do not always end or fade away easily, even if those who implanted them were to recant. If anything, as the following analyses suggest, they become more sophisticated, wide ranging and pernicious.

For example, following the racist footsteps of Kant (in spite of belated efforts to blur them), another prominent German philosopher, G. W. F. Hegel provided in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the ideological basis for the abuse of the peoples of other cultures, Africans in particular. He chose to disconnect the African continent from world history while inscribing a manifesto sanctioning the enslavement of Africans and the colonial experience. His writings provided the immediate tonic for European expansion and the colonial (mis)-adventure.<sup>42</sup> According to Hegel, for any society, culture or civilisation to be seen as such and be treated as important, then it must be part of World History. In the *Philosophy of History*, after using many denigrating, if not unprintable terms to describe the Africans, Hegel goes on to argue that the continent was in urgent need of “moral education”, citing her primitive and “uncultured” situation. Indeed, colonisation for

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<sup>39</sup> The reader should note that Kant’s anthropology has recently been re-published by prominent contemporary philosophers under the *Cambridge’s Edition of Immanuel Kant’s Anthropology, History and Education* in 2007.

<sup>40</sup> For this quote, see the transcript of Chimamanda Adichie’s Ted Talk 2012: The danger of a single story. <http://dotsub.com/view/63ef5d28-6607-4fec-b906-aaae6cff7dbe/viewTranscript/eng>

<sup>41</sup> Chimamanda Adichie, 2012, The danger of a single story.

<sup>42</sup> Irele, F. A. 1996, Introduction.

Hegel became the only way to civilise the Africans, to make them to imbibe human culture and mores and ultimately begin to entertain any hope of the unlikelihood of becoming fully human thereafter.

Similarly, “[J. S.] Mill, for example, made it clear in *On Liberty* and *Representative Government* that his views there could not be applied to India. (He was an India Office functionary for a good deal of his life, after all) because the Indians were civilizationally, if not racially, inferior.”<sup>43</sup> The North American Indians were, for Mill, a people who lacked the requisite cultural and psycho-social dispositions to adopt a system of government based on the ideals of liberty or orderly representation. “Nothing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilized government.”<sup>44</sup> To be sure, Mill continues, “The same might have been said, though somewhat less absolutely, of the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire. It required centuries of time, and an entire change of circumstances, to discipline them into regular obedience even to their own leaders...”<sup>45</sup> In this way, Mill justified England’s colonial misadventure in India, and other parts of the world. The recurring argument, for him, is that the colonial peoples were in desperate need of cultural education and civilisational exposure.

It is also based on the false view that somehow, we can say things that are universally true about a people that I. D. du Plessis, in reinventing the “Malay” people, described the “pure Malay” as “inclined to speak slowly, to be passive and indolent. When aroused, he may lose all self-control and run amok.”<sup>46</sup>

However, the authors cited above are not the only cultural essentialists history has produced. Contemporary cultural nationalists led by scholars like Samuel P. Huntington, David S. Landes and Lawrence Harrison argue that a culturally just world is achieved when every country, nation or nation-state is able to preserve and, perhaps, develop the pristine ingredients of its culture, unadulterated by alien influences. In addition, cultural nationalism holds the view that a nation’s culture defines, symbolises and authenticates individual members’ identity. On the basis of this claim, they arrive at other far-reaching theoretical consequences; (a) since some

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<sup>43</sup> Said, E. W. 2003, *Orientalism*, p. 14.

<sup>44</sup> Mill, J. S. 2009 [1861], *Considerations on representative government*, p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> Mill, J. S. 2009 [1861], *Representative government*, p. 12.

<sup>46</sup> *District Six Museum*, Cape Town. 2013.

societies are more successful than others, it follows that some people – their cultures and/or their values – are better than others.<sup>47</sup> As a result, (b) the “highly advanced” and successful cultures of the Global North should be protected from alien corruption. Thus, in Huntington’s view, if “Western civilization” is to be preserved, America and its culture in particular, should be protected from “alien corruption”. As he attempts to provide plausible answers to the issues and problems surrounding an emerging world order of the kind he envisages, Huntington develops arguments that make his book a manifesto of what we call “cultural nationalism”.<sup>48</sup> Huntington admits that even the currently most “successful” representative culture of the Global North (that is, the American culture) ought *not* to be regarded or be implanted internationally as *the* universal/global culture. Nonetheless, he argues memorably to the conclusion that

Americans cannot avoid the issue: Are we a Western people or are we something else? The futures of the United States and the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically, this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the United States with Asia. Whatever economic connections may exist between them, *the fundamental cultural gap between Asian and American societies precludes their joining together in a common home.*<sup>49</sup>

To further crystallise the standpoint of cultural nationalism, Huntington celebrates what (in citing Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. approvingly) he refers to as the “distinctive character” of “Western” values and institutions. These values include (“Western”) Christianity, pluralism, individualism and rule of law, whose natural output is modernity. In iterating his disapproval for

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<sup>47</sup> For an anthology representing this view, or views largely similar to it, see for example, Harrison, L. F. and Huntington, S. P. Eds., 2000, *Culture matters: how values shape human progress*.

<sup>48</sup> At all events, the world Huntington envisages, that is, a world where culture plays a significant, if not overriding role in human relations both locally and internationally coincides in large parts with the world Frantz Fanon lived in and tried to change. Whereas Huntington tells the story of human divisions along cultural lines, Fanon tells the story of an Open Universal. In this respect, the one is a cultural essentialist, the other a humanist. For Huntington, culture becomes a tool – the compass of world politics – always dividing people into clashing civilisations; while for Fanon, culture is an ambivalent (positive and negative) category requiring dynamic humanisation to serve the purpose of justice, human interaction and political peace.

<sup>49</sup> Emphasis added. Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 307.

any attempt to universalise the culture of the Global North, he insists that “what makes Western civilization valuable is not because it is universal but because it *is* unique.”<sup>50</sup> The roots of the ideas that set the culture of the Global North (the “West”) aside from and on top of other cultures and civilisations, Huntington hastens to educate us, cannot be traced to Asia, Africa or the Middle East; they are simply *European* and *better* than others.<sup>51</sup> It ought to be the distinctive role of the United States as the most powerful nation of the Global North to renew and sustain these extraordinary qualities.<sup>52</sup> For Huntington, one way of beginning to step into this historic role of no minor significance, would be for the United States of America to resuscitate the founding fathers’ wish that it emerges inexorably as a strong and viable nation, protected against degenerating into “a tangle of squabbling nationalities.”<sup>53</sup>

Huntington has one final warning for the deviant multiculturalists (who are merely a coterie of “influential intellectuals and publicists”): “History shows that no [multicultural] country ... can long endure as a coherent society. A multicivilizational United States will not be the United States; it will be the United Nations.”<sup>54</sup> Writing in a different book, but expressing his unequivocal anti-multicultural view in similar words, Huntington reiterates that “America cannot be the world and still be America. Other people cannot become American and still be themselves.” The most important “civilized” pursuit of the American people ought to be in the area of preserving those “qualities” that make America “different”.<sup>55</sup>

It is curious that Professor Huntington reaches the kind of conclusions set before us. For even by his admission, we should expect a more desirable, peaceful and stable world order once world leaders accept and cooperate to “maintain the multicivilizational character of global

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<sup>50</sup> Italics in the original, Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 311, cf. Harrison, L. E. 2000, Introduction: Why culture matters, p. xvii – xxxiv; Huntington, S. P. 2000, Foreword: culture counts, p. xiii - xvi, and Landes, D. S. 1998, *The wealth and poverty of nations: why some are so rich and some so poor*.

<sup>51</sup> Huntington’s views here are unpersuasive. Anyone with basic knowledge about the evolution of the so-called “Western values”, would be aware that most of what Huntington claimed are distinctively “Western”/European values have origins elsewhere or at least were not (classically) exclusively *Western*. We will return to this topic below. See for example, Kies, B. 1953. The contribution of Non-European peoples to world civilization.

<sup>52</sup> Huntington stresses the significant interface between culture and power, 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, passim.

<sup>53</sup> Theodore Roosevelt is cited in Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 306.

<sup>54</sup> Huntington holds the protagonists of multiculturalism beneath contempt, refusing them even the barest polite academic virtue of fair hearing and proper citation due for even one’s bitterest intellectual foes. See Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 305 – 06.

<sup>55</sup> Huntington, S. P. 2004, *Who are we?*, cited in Michaels, W. B. 2006, *The trouble with diversity: how we learned to love identity and ignore inequality*, p. 148.

politics.”<sup>56</sup> Doesn’t it seem that even on Huntington’s account; the “dilution” of American “cultural greatness” would produce a more peaceful and flourishing global order? So why is he worried about a United States without a “cultural core”?<sup>57</sup> Why exactly can he hardly bear the thought of a United States divorced from “Western culture”? The answer to these questions is not altogether unexpected: Huntington and many conservatives of the Global North worry that if the United States becomes “de-Westernised”, it might somehow mean the collapse of the (political and cultural) hegemony of the Global North on the one hand, and the “loss” of the United States to a coreless (or should one say a “boundless”) world of “unrecognisable” peoples. Even if such “de-Westernising” brings an end to the undesirable world of clashing civilisations, that would not help Huntington to see anything good about a committee of nations (United Nations) living within the United States of America. For him, it would be better if the United States of America maintained its unique cultural identity, unadulterated by foreign influence; precisely by preserving those elements of European culture that have presumably made it great.

Pointing out the shortcomings of Huntington’s conclusions shortly after the publication of *The Clash of Civilizations*, Edward Said questioned rhetorically.

How can one today speak of “Western civilization” except as in large measure an ideological fiction, implying a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, immigration, travel and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations their present mixed identities? This is especially true of the United States, which today can only be described as an enormous palimpsest of different races and cultures sharing a problematic history of conquests, exterminations, and of course major cultural and political achievements.<sup>58</sup>

But, Huntington derives his conclusions about the United States of America and the Global North (the “West”) from his reading of the current (emerging) world order. As he states at the outset of *The Clash of Civilizations*, the “fundamental source of conflict in this new world

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<sup>56</sup> Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 21.

<sup>57</sup> See Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 306.

<sup>58</sup> Said, E. W. 2003, *Orientalism*, p. 349.

order will not be primarily ideological,” but will instead be “cultural.” He enjoins us to recall that in ideological conflicts, the key question was “which side are you on?” and people could and did choose sides and changed sides. One can be born in a capitalist country/society but learn about and root for communism and vice versa. But cultural conflicts, for him, are of a very different mould. “In conflicts between civilizations, the question is ‘What are you?’ not ‘which side are you on?’” And what you are, is an irreducible primary entity, “a given that can’t be changed” about your identity.<sup>59</sup> In the very unlikely event that what you are gets altered, what is being changed is not your mind or beliefs, but something more fundamental, *your self*, your *cultural* identity.<sup>60</sup> Stated in this way, it would now be a lot easier to understand and appreciate Huntington’s worries. He is worried that the United States of America – his beloved country – might somehow be lost in an amorphous world of cultural pluralism.<sup>61</sup> But the question we must ask the publicist of cultural nationalism is: what really may be wrong with this possible outcome? After all, in spite of himself, pluralism is named by him as one of the cardinal virtues of Euro-American culture.

Backing, but apparently softening the cultural nationalists’ position, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. urges us to choose national identity against narrow (and indefensible) “ethnic and racial pride”. The superior morality embedded in defending our national identity and culture lies in the

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<sup>59</sup> Huntington, S. P. 1993. *The clash of civilizations*, cited and paraphrased in Michaels, W. B. 2006. *The trouble with diversity*, p. 146 – 47.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Michaels, W. B. 2006, *The trouble with diversity*, p. 146 – 47.

<sup>61</sup> One is not but a little disturbed by the sharp continuities between some of the views expressed by Huntington as reported above and most of the convictions of Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. The man regarded by the whole world as insane had written: “All that we admire in the world to-day, its science, its art, its technical developments and discoveries, are the products of the creative activities of a few peoples, and it may be true that their first beginnings must be attributed to one race. The maintenance of civilization is wholly dependent on such peoples. Should they perish, all that makes this earth beautiful will descend with them into the grave.

However great, for example, be the influence which the soil exerts on men, this influence will always vary according to the race in which it produces its effect. Dearth of soil may stimulate one race to the most strenuous efforts and highest achievement; while, for another race, the poverty of the soil may be the cause of misery and finally of undernourishment, with all its consequences. The internal characteristics of a people are always the causes which determine the nature of the effect that outer circumstances have on them. What reduces one race to starvation trains another race to harder work.

All the great civilizations of the past became decadent because the originally creative race died out, as a result of contamination of the blood.

*The most profound cause of such a decline is to be found in the fact that the people ignored the principle that... in order to preserve a certain culture, the type of manhood that creates such a culture must be preserved. But such a preservation goes hand-in-hand with the inexorable law that it is the strongest and the best who must triumph and that they have the right to endure.*

He who would live must fight. He who does not wish to fight in this world, where permanent struggle is the law of life, has not the right to exist.” Emphasis added. I quote Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* here from an excerpt from <http://www.nazi.org.uk/hitler-aryan.htm> .

very (comforting?) fact that “we don’t have to believe that our values are absolutely better than the next fellow’s or the next country’s, but we have no doubt that they are better *for us*... and that they are worth living and dying for.”<sup>62</sup> But if that is all cultural nationalism says and if a world order of cultural nationalism emerges, then we are stuck with a world of moral relativism and suspended ethical judgments. Quite clearly, certain values are good *for us*, yet may not turn out completely harmless to *others*. For example, building large industrial complexes run on gas may be a laudable aspect of American culture; but could in the long run develop highly negative consequences for both the next generation of Americans and other people outside the American nation. Yet cultural nationalism seems to enjoy a certain appeal. It helps to keep things simple: members of any nation or state are free to think anything, believe in any value or act in any way they deem fit, provided that they neither harm others nor seek to impose such values or beliefs on others in any overt or forceful manner.

The above proposition can hardly be realised, however, in our current world situation. In the currently interdependent world order, it is difficult to see how we can live our lives the way we choose without generating consequences, first for others who may belong to the same nation/state with us, but do not share our values, and second, those whose lands lie well beyond our borders, but may not be free from the consequences of our actions. Our choices, if they have any negative rebounds, often harm those who we assume should not have a say over how we live. Moreover, like colonialism and the Cold War eminently revealed, it is not just true that a people, especially if they are powerful enough, would never try to impose their national values on others by sundry subtle means, or sometimes by applying the extreme measure of warfare.<sup>63</sup> A people – nations and states – are often willing to die for their cultural beliefs and societal values; especially when these cultural values are deemed as imbuing every individual member of that society with a unique, immutable and trans-generational identity. It must then be understood

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<sup>62</sup> Schlesinger Jr., A. 1992, *The disuniting of America*, cited in Michaels, W. B. 2006, *The trouble with diversity*, p. 148.

<sup>63</sup> For example, Nathan Suhr-Sytsma has revealed that the historical irony behind the drive for autonomy by members of the foremost Nigerian literary association, the Mbari Club is that as they “sought to escape the orbit of the colonial university, the local publication venues to which they turned were surreptitiously funded by another global power: the United States. Both *Black Orpheus* and Mbari Publications unwittingly received substantial monies from the Central Intelligence Agency through grants from the Farfield Foundation and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which has been described as the “centrepiece” of the CIA’s “secret programme of cultural propaganda in western Europe” Whatever autonomy Mbari enjoyed was at least partly enabled by an American agency that apparently saw such “freedom” as preferable to African acceptance of Soviet support.” See Suhr-Sytsma, N. 2013, *Ibadan modernism: poetry and the literary present in mid-century Nigeria*. esp. p. 44 – 45.

that cultural nationalism breeds tribalism and intolerance. When a people hold their culture and its values as essential and monolithic in this way, history has revealed their willingness to fight and die for such cultural beliefs and values.

In the last chapter of an influential book, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor*, published two years after Huntington's by yet another self-confessed cultural essentialist, David S. Landes reinvigorates the cultural essentialists' point of view, directly attacking the globalists whom he describes as "simply anti-intellectual", and wallowing in the blatant contradiction of facts and the denial of actual historical events.<sup>64</sup> Landes further complains that

Above all, say the globalists, we must not account for European priority by "essentializing" it, that is, by tying it to European institutions and civilization—explaining it by European "presences" as against non-European "absences." Thus the manifest asymmetry between Europe's systematic curiosity about foreign civilizations and cultures and the relative indifference of these "others" is denied a priori by apologists who unknowingly reaffirm the contrast. The new globalists, not liking the message, want to kill the messenger—as though history hadn't happened. The fact of Western technological precedence is there. We should want to know why, all of us, because the *why* may help us understand today and anticipate tomorrow.<sup>65</sup>

Landes invites the "anti-intellectual" globalist to look to history to find out the truth behind "Western" victories, and the reason why Eurocentricism is true and "anti-Eurocentric thought" delusional. He writes: "If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that *culture makes all the difference*. (Here Max Weber was right on)."<sup>66</sup> Culture, or more precisely, cultural inequality, for Landes, is currently the most important, if not the only reason why some societies (mainly Europeans) have succeeded in the quest for economic and social

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<sup>64</sup> Note once more, Landes' determined effort to hold the globalists he is referring to beneath contempt. Like Huntington, he refuses to name the "globalists" or the "multiculturalists." See. Landes, D. S. 1998, *The wealth and poverty of nations: why some are so rich and some so poor*, p. 514.

<sup>65</sup> Italics Landes'. See Landes, D. S. 1998, *The wealth and poverty of nations*, p. 514.

<sup>66</sup> Landes, D. S: 1998, *The wealth and poverty of nations*, p. 513 – 16.



progress, while some others (mainly non-Europeans) have underachieved and are “so poor.” How about slavery, colonisation and dependency? They no longer matter; the trio are now obsolete explanatory categories of human progress and economic prosperity.<sup>67</sup> If anything, the trio are unassailable evidence of the triumphs of European technical superiority. And it is not as if, (Landes coolly informs us), there is any society where people owned slaves that has ever prospered! But the collage of contradictions here is rather pitiable. As one reviewer rightly observed, in Landes’ desperation to prove his thesis,

He becomes like the lawyer who, in order to defend his client from allegations about the theft of a vase from his neighbor, argues that (1) the vase never existed; (2) the vase is still in possession of the plaintiff; and (3) the vase belonged to his client in the first place.<sup>68</sup>

Be that as it may, cultural nationalists and essentialists, unfortunately, are not to be found only in theoretical writings. Once the seeds of prejudice are sown especially by highly influential persons like those we have pointed out above, there could be no way to determine the extent of the damaging consequences. As recent as 2010, a Nigerian PhD student studying philosophy in an Irish university reported the following anecdote:

I was returning from the library one evening when I was accosted by a boy – ten years old, maybe eleven – and he said, “Is it true that back in Nigeria your people live on trees as you have no houses?” My first thinking was to ignore the urchin and move on, but on a second thought, I paused and replied, “Yes my boy, including your (Irish) ambassador to Nigeria; everyone lives on

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<sup>67</sup> See Landes, D. S. 1998, *The wealth and poverty of nations*, Chapter 29. Cf. Harrison, L. E. 2000, Introduction: why culture matters, p. xvii – xxxiv and Huntington, S. P. 2000, Foreword: culture counts, p. xiii – xvi.

<sup>68</sup> Continuing, Jack Goldstone points out, “Here is Landes on slavery and climate: ‘It is no accident that slave labor has historically been associated with tropical and semitropical climates.’ This is to buttress his argument that in the tropics, it is too hot to work, so people do not labor if they can help it; thus they rely on slaves. And where people depend on slaves, there can be no initiative, no labor-saving devices, no great civilizations. How absurd! Slavery has abounded in all societies where the strong could prey on the weak. The word itself comes from the Slavic peoples of the Black Sea region....” See Goldstone, J. Spring, 2000, Book review: the wealth and poverty of nations: why some are so rich and others so poor by David S. Landes, p. 106.

tree tops in my country.” The boy rolled his eyes, hesitated briefly and disappeared in the streets.<sup>69</sup>

A humorous ad hominem riposte may have been enough for the Nigerian student to force the Irish child to begin to appreciate what Adichie would call the “danger of a single story”, but stories of cultural prejudice and implanted animosities do not always end that way.<sup>70</sup> If anything, they become more sophisticated and wide ranging. No one can say for sure how far a prejudicial comment could live on, to say nothing of how it might affect future generations. Kant has warned, in spite of himself, that “so harmful is it to implant prejudices for they later take vengeance on their cultivators or on their descendants.”<sup>71</sup> The truism immanent in Kant’s sober reflection here can hardly be confuted by any keen observer of human history, including the history of Kant’s Germany where he himself ironically implanted prejudices that yielded highly disastrous consequences.

Amartya Sen has extended Kant’s warning, arguing that: “When there is an accidental correlation between cultural prejudice and social observation (no matter how casual), a theory is born, and it may refuse to die after the chance correlation has vanished without a trace.”<sup>72</sup> As he further demonstrates, London’s treatment of the Irish famine of the 1840s was a clear case in history where the theory or ideology that determined the fate of a people was in large parts rooted in a deep-seated cultural prejudice anchored in a “chance correlation”. Sen writes that while poverty in Britain was typically explained in terms of the vagaries of economic factors, Irish poverty was widely viewed in England as being caused by the Irish culture of “laziness, indifference and ineptitude”. To make a very bad situation even worse, the Irish were blamed for their centuries-old taste for potatoes – as this was considered one of the calamities which the natives had, in the English view, brought on themselves. In the end, the ultimate victory for cultural prejudice in this case, was that while the Irish died in their hundreds of thousands,

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<sup>69</sup> The anecdote was reported in a private conversation.

<sup>70</sup> See Chimamanda Adichie, *The danger of a single story*, passim.

<sup>71</sup> Kant wrote some time after his works in support of racism. For the quote, see Kant, I. 2003, *What is enlightenment?*, p. 55.

<sup>72</sup> Sen, A. 2006, *Identity & violence*, p. 104.

Britain's mission was not seen as one to alleviate Irish distress but "to *civilize* her people and to lead them to *feel* and *act* like *human beings*".<sup>73</sup>

The above worrisome reports are not, of course, the only instances in history where cultural prejudices have carried the day and beclouded human reason, leading to very disastrous consequences and the denial of both humanity and justice. Prior to Pearl Harbour and the United States of America's eventual entry into World War II, a Japanese Prime Minister had to resign from office because the then President of the United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt would not deign to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the escalating conflict with the lowly rated Japanese "animals". Similarly, Harry Truman (who took over from the deceased Roosevelt) after publicly describing the Germans and the Japanese as barbarians and beasts that needed to be treated as such, proceeded to unleash the gratuitous terrors of fire-bombing major Japanese cities. This was followed with the equally unnecessary invasion of Japan and the ultimate horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 6 and 8 1945.<sup>74</sup>

At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, former American president, George Bush, Sr. when tasked by representatives of developing nations to put on the agenda the over-consumption of resources by developed nations had retorted: "the American lifestyle is not up for negotiations."<sup>75</sup> The simple point being made by Bush here is that he couldn't care less if any cultural pattern of his country or others like his were a serious obstacle to global environmental security and global justice. What mattered most to him was that the American culture and that of the Global North, which he construed as completely distinct from the rest of the world, be protected and preserved at all cost.<sup>76</sup> United States' House Representative, Curry Todd's recent reference to children of undocumented immigrants as "rats" that "multiply" is but one more example of how far prejudice arising from cultural nationalism can go:

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<sup>73</sup> Italics added. See Sen, A. 2006, *Identity & violence*, p. 104 – 05. For other accounts that support Sen's report, see for example, The Irish Famine Curriculum Committee, 1998; Donnelly, J. The Irish Famine: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great\\_Famine\\_%28Ireland%29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Famine_%28Ireland%29).

<sup>74</sup> See Duus, P. 1998, Chapter 14: The Pacific War, *Modern Japan*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed, p. 231 – 44; and Rawls, J. 1999, *The law of peoples*, p. 98 – 102, consider esp. n26 on p. 102.

<sup>75</sup> To be sure, as at 2013, New York City consumes more energy than the whole of Sub-Sahara Africa put together. For Singer's views cited, see Singer, P. 2004, *One world: the ethics of globalization*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., p. 2.

<sup>76</sup> I agree with Peter Singer that the United States of America has constituted a formidable obstacle to forming a global community (an argument that runs through his book *One World*), but it is not the only country or the only people in the world today that places big road blocks in the way of global culture and or global justice. Most countries of the world may be equally indicted of cultural prejudice both locally and internationally.

*Program Administrator: [We] do not provide pregnant women coverage.*

*We provide unborn coverage. According to the federal government we cannot ask for immigration documents or verify that information because we are providing coverage to the unborn. The unborn child will be classified as [a] US citizen.*

*Rep. Todd: I understand unborn child. I understand that provision. I'm talking about others. Adults. These are pregnant women.*

*Program Administrator: ... under guidance that was provided to states under the previous administration ... for covering the unborn child we are not permitted to determine citizenship because the child, once born, is a US citizen.*

*Rep. Todd: Well they can go out there like rats and multiply then, I guess.*

\_\_\_\_\_ (US Joint Fiscal Review 2010)<sup>77</sup>

For Natalie Cisneros, Representative Todd's comments are the very manifestation of "backwards-uncitizenship", that is, a scenario where there is always-already a normative dichotomy between the sexually pure citizen on the one hand, and on the other hand, the "alien" subject functions as the perverse anticitizen, sexually deviant and threatening to the wellbeing of the state.<sup>78</sup> Thus, cultural nationalism of the type valued by Huntington and his supporters is not

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<sup>77</sup> The video tape of this interview can be found at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TE237g7K18Y>. But, I was first pointed to it by Natalie Cisneros; see her (Spring) 2013, 'Alien' Sexuality: Race, Maternity, and Citizenship, *Hypatia*, vol. 28, no. 2: p. 291.

<sup>78</sup> Cisneros further analysis of Todd's comments has significant implications for thinking about the possibility of global justice; an implication that is already obvious: "Representative Todd's comparison of maternal alien bodies to 'rats that multiply' and other discourses surrounding the 'anchor baby' and 'alien' reproduction betray... [indeed] illustrates how racist normalizing power has reconstituted the 'alien' subject as a perverse, infesting, and uniquely threatening body. While, in the context of juridical power, the 'alien' is seemingly constituted as a neutrally abstract subject, the functioning of discourses and mechanisms of regulatory disciplinary power betray the construction of the 'alien,' and as particular, the reproductive maternal 'alien,' as always-already threatening to the well-being of the state. In this way, there is no room for the 'invading' and 'infesting' 'alien' subject in the biopolitical constitution of the citizen-subject. This perverse body is not a potential citizen or a noncitizen—the 'alien' subject is the perverse 'anticitizen,' and the perverse 'alien anticitizen' functions as a mirror image and contrast to the 'virtuous citizen'..." [Thus] the normalizing functions of power that constitute the racialized, criminalized, and perverse 'alien'

different from racism and proto-nationalism. Fanon's words have remained historically prophetic: "from [cultural] nationalism we have passed to ultranationalism, to chauvinism and finally to racism."<sup>79</sup>

Yet, as we have been arguing, no culture, in its entirety, need be seen as better or worse than another. Amilcar Cabral has argued convincingly to the conclusion that, "[I]t is important not to lose sight of the fact that no culture is a perfect, finished whole. Culture, like history, is an expanding and developing phenomenon."<sup>80</sup> In addition, "all culture is composed of essential and secondary elements, of strengths and weaknesses, of virtues and failings, of positive and negative aspects, of factors of progress and factors of stagnation or regression."<sup>81</sup> All we can say is that certain cultural traits may have better adaptive capacity in specific situations. After all, it is almost incontestable nowadays to say that other factors, including social, geographical, environmental and political situations combine to influence cultural evolution in every human society. For example, according to Orlando Patterson,

Slavery, in which Afro-Americans spent two-thirds of their existence in this country was ... a viciously exploitative institution that severely handicapped Afro-Americans, especially in the way it eroded vital social institutions such as the family and marital relations, in the way it excluded Afro-Americans from the dominant social organizations and, in the process, denied them the chance to learn patterns of behavior fundamental for survival in the emerging industrial society.<sup>82</sup>

Hence, Afro-American culture would have developed along very different patterns if the "vital social institutions" had not been tailored to exclude Afro-Americans from "the dominant social

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simultaneously reform the borders of citizenship itself." Cisneros, N. (Spring) 2013, 'Alien' Sexuality p. 304: also see p. 290.

<sup>79</sup> See Fanon, F. 1967 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 125.

<sup>80</sup> Continuing with this line of thought, Cabral writes: "[A]s with history, the development of culture proceeds in uneven fashion, whether at the level of a continent, a "race," or even a society. The coordinates of culture, like those of any developing phenomenon, vary in space and time, whether they be material (physical) or human (biological and social)." See Cabral, A. [1970] 1973, *Return to the source: selected speeches by Amilcar Cabral*, p. 51 and for the citation in-text, see p. 50.

<sup>81</sup> Cabral, A. [1970] 1973, *Return to the source*, p. 50 – 51.

<sup>82</sup> Patterson, O. cited in Harrison, L. E. 2000, Introduction: why culture matters, p. xxxi.

organizations.” The cultural nationalist ought to realise that every national culture is contingent, recumbent upon the vagaries of societal evolution, a product of brute luck and many individual decisions. Fanon offers a more compelling alternative to cultural nationalism when he argues that “culture is the combination of motor and mental behavior patterns, arising from the encounter of man with nature, and with his fellow man ...” which is continually open to change and revision.<sup>83</sup> A national culture is not something inherent and immutable in a people. Individual members of a society need not belong to a particular culture in a hard and fast manner. Culture may form the basis of sometimes saying something generally about a people’s adaptation to nature, but not about every individual’s ability and conduct in the society; culture is definitely not worth killing or dying for.

The merits, if any, of cultural nationalism pale in the face of the very reality of a highly interdependent world order, a world where interdependence characterises and also extends to technology and commerce, to permeate the environment, politics and culture itself. In the current world situation, people simply travel; they migrate and mix in large numbers within and between different societies. They also intermarry, learn together and work together on the same jobs and projects from the same or different locations. Consequently, no system of beliefs or aggregate thought is entirely local or unique to any people or civilisation in our world today. “This is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence.”<sup>84</sup> The rival theoretical camp, multiculturalism, has other criticisms to level against the cultural nationalists and we explore the major points here.

#### **4.3: The Multiculturalists’ Agenda**

Multiculturalists like the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, reject most of the claims of cultural nationalism.<sup>85</sup> The main point of Taylor’s philosophy of multiculturalism is the

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<sup>83</sup> Fanon, F. 1967 [1964], *The African Revolution*, p. 32.

<sup>84</sup> See Said, E. W. 2003, *Orientalism*, p. xvii.

<sup>85</sup> The following clarifications by Will Kymlicka prove helpful here: “It is important to put multiculturalism in its historical context. In one sense, it is as old as humanity — different cultures have always found ways of coexisting, and respect for diversity was a familiar feature of many historic empires, such as the Ottoman Empire. But the... [contemporary discourse on] multiculturalism... is a more specific historic phenomenon, emerging first in the

removal of every obstacle in the way of allowing people of different historical, traditional, and cultural backgrounds to retain their multiple identities while flourishing together peacefully in the same country or region, or indeed in any form of human society.<sup>86</sup> Taylor's main thesis is anchored in a politics of recognition. Proper recognition of the 'holistic individual' who must always be understood as a culturally situated or embedded self is vitally important in the contemporary world because as he reads it,

a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. ...Misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.<sup>87</sup>

In Taylor's view, incumbent upon us is not only understanding the beliefs and categories of other cultures, but also working hard to preserve the elements of different cultures. The conclusion that our own culture offers us all we need to know and to survive in our current world is an illusion we should by now have shed. He is convinced that the world is made up of a variety of cultures.

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Western democracies in the late 1960s. This timing is important, for it helps us situate multiculturalism in relation to larger social transformations of the postwar era.

More specifically, multiculturalism is part of a larger human-rights revolution involving ethnic and racial diversity. Prior to World War II, ethnocultural and religious diversity in the West was characterized by a range of illiberal and undemocratic relationships of hierarchy, justified by racialist ideologies that explicitly propounded the superiority of some peoples and cultures and their right to rule over others. These ideologies were widely accepted throughout the Western world and underpinned both domestic laws (e.g., racially biased immigration and citizenship policies) and foreign policies (e.g., in relation to overseas colonies).

After World War II, however, the world recoiled against Hitler's fanatical and murderous use of such ideologies, and the United Nations decisively repudiated them in favor of a new ideology of the equality of races and peoples. And this new assumption of human equality generated a series of political movements designed to contest the lingering presence or enduring effects of older hierarchies. We can distinguish three "waves" of such movements: 1) the struggle for decolonization, concentrated in the period 1948–65; 2) the struggle against racial segregation and discrimination, initiated and exemplified by the African-American civil-rights movement from 1955 to 1965; and 3) the struggle for multiculturalism and minority rights, which emerged in the late 1960s." See Kymlicka, W. 2012, *Multiculturalism: success, failure, and the future*, p. 5 – 6.

<sup>86</sup> Taylor's work on multiculturalism has at least some of its roots in his experience living in Quebec, with its complex francophone nationalism, and his foray into politics there. Cf. <http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=324>.

<sup>87</sup> Taylor, C. 1994 [1992], *The politics of recognition*, p. 25 – 26.

not by “mere accident” but in order to bring about “greater harmony.” It would then be reasonable

to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time—that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable—are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject. ...it would take a supreme arrogance to discount this possibility *a priori*.<sup>88</sup>

He however notes that

what the presumption requires of us is not peremptory and inauthentic judgments of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions. What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many...<sup>89</sup>

In clear terms, multiculturalism in this particular understanding is a celebration of cultural difference and the promotion of diversity. But like one critic has pointed out, promoting difference and diversity “tends to favour ‘billiard ball’ representations of cultures as neatly

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<sup>88</sup> Another reason why many customs and institutions seem so mysterious is that we have been taught to value elaborate “spiritualized explanations of cultural phenomenon more than down-to-earth material ones. Each lifestyle comes wrapped in myths and legends that draw attention to impractical or supernatural conditions. These wrappings give people a social identity and a sense of social purpose, but they conceal the naked truths of social life.” See Harris, M. 1974, *Cows, pigs, & witches: the riddles of culture*, p. 2 – 3. For Taylor’s view cited in text, see Taylor, C. 1994 [1992], *The politics of recognition*, p. 72.

<sup>89</sup> Taylor, C. 1994 [1992], *The politics of recognition*, p. 72 – 73.



bounded wholes whose contents are given and static – hence mainly to be ‘protected and preserved’.<sup>90</sup>

Indeed, multiculturalism presented in this way is ironically hand in glove with cultural nationalism/essentialism and leaves its flanks wide open for various levels of attacks. One main effort to take advantage of those weaknesses is a book written by Walter Benn Michaels, *The Trouble with Diversity*. By postulating some revealing definitions of diversity and equality, Michaels demonstrated that multiculturalism or diversity does not really solve the problem of minorities and inequality among human beings in society. “We like the idea of cultural equality,” he writes, “better than we like the idea of economic equality (and we like the idea of culture wars better than the idea of class wars).” Human beings seem to prefer “being nice to each other” (that is, diversity) to “giving up our money” (that is, equality).<sup>91</sup> For Michaels, in a world where people are much more sincere, protecting a culture or language from extinction need not constitute a moral or social problem; or an egregious wrongdoing, for after all, the loss or eradication of a culture, including the language, is a “victimless crime”.<sup>92</sup> What does indeed constitute a crime with real victims, Michaels points out, are egregiously unjust class-based inequalities in society. This is because, according to him, a person could choose to abandon certain practices embedded in his culture, or altogether, switch one culture for another without suffering any real harm apart from the illusory pathos of having lost something intrinsically part of him. Indeed, the person may have gained more if his new choice of culture helps him to live a much more fulfilled life; but people can hardly elect to switch affluence with poverty, since it seems rather obvious people are less likely to flourish in abject poverty than when financially capable.<sup>93</sup>

Thus, we must realise that what the form of multiculturalism espoused by Taylor and some other liberals may well have achieved over time is the aestheticisation of difference through the “cosmetic celebration of cultural diversity” that reifies difference at the expense of “new patterns of interaction which might arise from their mixing and intermingling.”<sup>94</sup> The greater mistake here, in Tom Sowell’s poetic language, is that “advocates of cultural diversity

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<sup>90</sup> Isar, Y. R. 2006, *Cultural diversity*, p. 372.

<sup>91</sup> Michaels, W. B. 2006, *The trouble with diversity*, p. 17.

<sup>92</sup> Michaels, W. B. 2006, *The trouble with diversity*, p. 165.

<sup>93</sup> Michaels, W. B. 2006, *The trouble with diversity*, passim.

<sup>94</sup> Isar, Y. R. 2006, *Cultural diversity*, p. 374.

want to preserve cultures like butterflies preserved in amber.”<sup>95</sup> Another major critique of multiculturalism is that it tends to talk about oppression without naming any oppressor. After all, Linda M. Alcoff reports Ignatiev and Garvey as having noted that African artistes continue to “suffer through diminished access to and control of means of cultural production.” This is so because “merely acknowledging black influences on dominant cultures does not remedy this [alienation from means of cultural production].”<sup>96</sup> In clear terms, we must note that (1) pursuing cultural diversity distracts from harder, economic inequalities; (2) pursuing cultural diversity attempts to block the internal processes of social change in many societies.

At all events, Michaels’ argument sounds persuasive because it does present a plausible counter against multiculturalism as enunciated above. But there is a sense in which multiculturalism translates to *cultural freedom* which this thesis would endorse. Cultural freedom or the individual’s ability to choose from among available alternative cultures is precisely a multiculturalist programme. As explained by Amartya Sen, cultural freedom or cultural diversity includes *inter alia*, “the liberty to question the automatic endorsement of past traditions, when people – particularly young people – see a reason for changing their ways of living;” or in another rendition, allowing and encouraging individuals to see themselves first as *human beings* and “to live as they would value living (instead of being restrained by ongoing tradition).”<sup>97</sup> In this sense, both Sen and Fanon are multiculturalists or as I would prefer to say, cultural humanists. Fanon thought, and we believe correctly, that culture – a national culture – is not a thing to be treasured for its own sake. It is a thing that we must continue to treasure until its elements, or some of them, are no longer useful as matrices or paradigms for making sense of the world we live in. In this understanding of the significance of culture, human beings are never at risk from culture; rather culture is perpetually at the mercy of human beings who no longer live within an essentialist-particularist culture, but live through a plurality of ever-changing cultural agreements and multiple identities. It ought to always stand as a duty of human beings to jettison

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<sup>95</sup> Sowell, T. Nov./Dec.1991, A world view of cultural diversity, p. 43.

<sup>96</sup> Alcoff, L. M. Summer 1998, What should white people do?, p. 19.

<sup>97</sup> Sen, A. 2006, *Identity & violence: the illusion of destiny*, p. 114 – 15.

a culture or aspects of it that no longer serve human interest in favour of other beneficial cultural and human values, regardless of where they are to be found.<sup>98</sup>

Indeed, Will Kymlicka, another prominent protagonist of multiculturalism, defends views broadly similar to those attributed to Sen and Fanon above. To make clear his position, Kymlicka began by distinguishing between two senses of culture. In one sense, culture becomes the keyword denoting “all manner of groups, from teenage gangs to global civilizations.”<sup>99</sup> But Kymlicka makes it clear that he uses culture only as “*societal* culture”. His explication of societal culture is of great importance to understanding the sense in which this essay may or may not view multiculturalism favourably. According to him, societal culture is the structure, the lens through which the individual is taught the various norms of his society, and is led to participate in sundry human activities, viz.; schools, media, economy and government.<sup>100</sup> When Kymlicka is properly understood, it will come to the fore that for him,

It is through the societal culture that a fundamental part of the individual identity is determined and through which an individual is given the opportunity to learn about and cultivate differing views on what it is to lead a good life. The role of culture is to provide the background against which one can see those beliefs and goals in proper perspective. For without such a background, such an evaluation would be nothing more than self-indulging acknowledgement of the status quo....<sup>101</sup>

While this thesis would agree with Kymlicka that culture is needed to give direction to human life, to give human thought the focus and cohesion necessary for dealing with our quotidian and long term issues, one must worry about the stress he puts on a cultural group being able to speak

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<sup>98</sup> Of course, in relation to the good life, and along individualistic strictures, views broadly similar to this are sometimes pursued by some liberal theorists in America and Europe, including J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. See Section 6 in Chapter Three of this volume. And for the writings of some liberal theorists referred to, see for example, Dworkin, R. 1983, In defense of equality; Mill, J. S. 1982, *On liberty*, G. Himmelfarb, Ed., p. 122; and Rawls, J. 1980, Kantian constructivism in moral theory, p. 544.

<sup>99</sup> Kymlicka, W. 1995, *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*, p. 76.

<sup>100</sup> Kymlicka, W. 1995, *Multicultural citizenship*, p. 76.

<sup>101</sup> Beck, F. F. M. 2012, Liberalism, minorities, and the politics of social differentiation, p. 5.

its own language, enjoy a degree of self-government, and where possible be granted “territorial autonomy”.<sup>102</sup> Do a people need to speak a particular indigenous/traditional language in order to flourish? Does a person or even a people need a particular culture to be able “to learn about and cultivate differing views on what it is to lead a good life”? Is territorial autonomy for each cultural/language group likely to strengthen the multicultural balance of our world or weaken it? Is a unique/differentiated cultural identity necessary for societal flourishing? These and other questions surrounding the significant interface between culture and social cooperation/justice vis-à-vis our contemporary world will occupy our attention for the rest of this chapter.

#### 4.4: The Idea of Inter-Cultural Equality

Cultural nationalism and multiculturalism represent different approaches to telling the same story; the story of our current global order. While the former sees it as a project of partitioning human cultures within and against (nation)-states, the latter conceives global culture as the celebration of diversity and in the Fanon-inspired words of Homi Bhabha, “reciprocal recognitions”.<sup>103</sup> Yet Yudhisthir Raj Isar has correctly re-inscribed the real questions to be tackled by any responsible effort to resolve the problem of global culture.

How can we forge societies that are truly pluralistic yet possess a shared sense of belonging? What can states do to help different cultural communities live together as one national community? Are current policies and practices effective in promoting attitudes and values that encourage mutual respect? How should policies and institutions evolve so as to better respond to the needs of diverse societies [globally]? Can national identity be defined so that all communities may identify with the country and its self-definition?<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> See Kymlicka, W. 1995, *Multicultural citizenship*, 112 – 16.

<sup>103</sup> To be sure, Fanon saw beyond the politics of recognition to ask other more difficult but important questions about our common humanity. To that extent he dreamt Taylor’s dream, but was able to wake from that dream to seek interpretation and application in the real world laden with oppression, cultural prejudices and egregious injustice.

<sup>104</sup> Isar, Y. R. 2006, *Cultural diversity*, p. 374

One of the major tasks of this essay is to attempt to provide credible answers to questions like some of those raised by Isar and those articulated in the previous section. It is argued that unless we find answers to questions like those raised by Isar above, then no real answers can be provided to the problem of global justice either. This work contends that until we have made a decision about how best to view ourselves; how best to perceive and relate with persons outside our own societal cultural milieu; until we have determined the role culture should play in human affairs; we shall be unable to decide on how best to treat those *alien* others justly. All things considered, we cannot meaningfully arrive at a theory of global justice until we have developed and accepted a humanistic theory of global culture. The effort is made here to resolve the above stated problematic by relying on a theory of global culture we call “inter-cultural equality”. But what exactly is inter-cultural equality?

Inter-cultural equality derives ultimately from Fanon’s cultural humanism. It holds that in our current world setting, the interest of diverse human associations and groups matter and matter equally. We can begin to properly understand the contents and implications of inter-cultural equality as well as the arguments that buoy it, if we grasp the role that cultural humanism plays in its formulation and realisation. Cultural humanism says that in our world of interdependencies, cultural differences, pluralisms and multi-formed identities, we ought to recognise the very fact that our own culture and its elements are not necessarily better than those of others; that even though we all have a culture, no human being necessarily belongs to a particular putative culture.<sup>105</sup> Cultural humanism denies that it is possible to describe or identify an individual in terms of a particular putative culture. In addition, the essay contends that humanity, understood in Fanonian-Patočkan terms as free beings “living in problematicity” of truth is more important than culture.<sup>106</sup> This is the only way we can learn to set aside or downplay our cultural sentiments while relating with people from different climes and cultural agreements. Cultural humanism is therefore the view that the attitudes and values that inform human society must now be driven by the untrammelled elevation of human interest in general

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<sup>105</sup> An individual is capable of, and often, share in cultural values other than those within which he or she is born. People may also and often do repudiate or reject customs, traditions, beliefs or practices embedded in the paraphernalia of the putative culture they were born into. For example, it would be erroneous to move from the very fact that many Brazilians have a football culture, to say that all Brazilians belong to a Brazilian football culture

<sup>106</sup> See Patočka, J. 2007, *Living in problematicity*; Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth* and Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*.

ahead of national, racial, ethnic or religious persuasions or sentiments.<sup>107</sup> Cultural humanism must begin from working to eliminate cultural prejudices – while recognising the reciprocal benefits of all human cultures – so as to engender a just global order.

In transcending multiculturalism in conceptualisation, cultural humanism views global culture more broadly as a project that would ultimately free human beings from the shackles of parochialism and uncritical traditionalism – in keeping with *Open Fanonian Universalism*.<sup>108</sup> To be precise, the multiculturalists want us to (1) preserve and recognise all cultures and (2) allow for cultural mix and diversity. This study disputes both propositions, in part. While cultural humanism agrees that we should recognise the value of all putative cultures and allow for cultural mixing and intermingling, it denies that cultures or their values should be preserved at any cost that might be harmful to some human beings/groups. Preserving cultures at inhumane and unjust costs is but one way of essentialising culture at the expense of humanity, at the expense of robust human freedom. In addition, cultural humanism argues *contra* Kant and Huntington that cultures need not survive in their pristine, “unadulterated” forms at the expense of human beings, the reverse should obtain, if need be, in the way of strengthening international cooperation towards achieving global justice or inter-cultural justice. In this way, global culture is understood as humanism, a humanism that in Levinasian terms places our own value, autonomy and freedom heteronomously subject to the existence of the Other, regardless of cultural leanings.<sup>109</sup> One commentator has written

Charles Taylor’s widely read article “The Politics of Recognition”... attempts to make a case for Fanon as a prophet of the sort of multiculturalism that maintains that recognition forges identity and thus the ultimate solution to the problem of justice lies in reform curricula allowing for the inclusion of women, minorities, etc. But to reduce Fanon’s work to a mere quest for recognition is to ignore the fact that when Fanon writes about the life-and-death struggle of master and slave, it is real life and real death that are at

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<sup>107</sup> For an elaborate discussion on cultural humanism, its theoretical origin and vision see Chapter Three in this volume.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Featherstone, M. 1990, *Global culture: an introduction*, p. 1.

<sup>109</sup> See Chapter Three for more on this view.

stake; when he protests against the social construction of blackness, against racism's 'epidermal schema'... it is with the understanding that such constructions have the power to kill, or at least to sentence certain members of society to death. The kind of cultural and political work that will continue to be inspired by him needs to maintain this sense of urgency.<sup>110</sup>

Humanity – all of us – must begin to maintain this sense of urgency. The thinking here is that a theory of global culture needs to transcend Taylor's politics of recognition and the postcolonial desire to reclaim history, creating a cosmopolitan and "postracial" world, to aim for a world of inter-culturality that remedies the masses' suffering – the world's unfortunates' current burdens of "continued exclusion, oppression, poverty, alienation and unfreedom."<sup>111</sup> Inter-culturality, freedom and inclusion are the only ways to begin to position much of the world's populations living in "precarious conditions" in good shape to earn their survival in dignity. Furthermore, cultural humanism denies claims like that made in Michael Didbin's novel, *The Lagoon* (which Huntington cites and thinks it correctly describes the requisite ethics or "grim *Weltanschauung*" of the current world order). The claim has it that:

'There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.'<sup>112</sup>

The greatest rebuttal to views like this is that in our world today, it is becoming increasingly very difficult to say for sure what we are *not*, to identify correctly who our real enemies are and who our true friends might be. For indeed our friends today can be our enemies tomorrow and vice versa. In the area of identity, it is not just true that people can correctly be identified according to

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<sup>110</sup> Alessandrini, A. C. 1997, Fanon and the postcolonial future, p. 3 – 4.

<sup>111</sup> Note that "cosmopolitan" does not imply that my work embraces all of the theoretical assumptions of the cosmopolitan theory of justice. For further clarifications, see Chapter Two. See Gibson, N. C. 2011. Introduction: living Fanon?, p. 4.

<sup>112</sup> Didbin is cited approvingly in Huntington, S. P. 1996, *The clash of civilizations*, p. 20.

a single unique criterion.<sup>113</sup> And if we cannot use a single term or aspect to identify people, including ourselves, how can we then hope to separate *our* selves from those unlike us that we must hate? Amartya Sen has rightly observed that there is no rational impediment to understanding and accepting the very fact that the same person can have very many non-contradicting (different) identities that make her a fuller, fulfilled and integrated person.<sup>114</sup>

More than this, are many of us not able to speak other languages other than that of the putative culture in which we were originally born? Ngũgĩ has argued persuasively that “Language as culture is the collective memory bank of a people’s experience in history. Culture is almost indistinguishable from the language that makes possible its genesis growth banking, articulation and indeed its transmission from one generation to the next.”<sup>115</sup> And since this is so, we are right in agreeing with Fanon that “A man who has a language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that language.”<sup>116</sup> Noam Chomsky echoes this view in arguing that “no individual speaks a well-defined language.”<sup>117</sup> If we recognise the merit of the above argument, then we would in addition think more deeply and appreciate the Platonic-Socrates when he rhetorically asks Alcibiades

[D]o you think that people in general disagree about what wood or stone is? If you ask them, don’t they give the same answers? And similarly for all other cases; I suppose this is pretty much what you mean by understanding Greek, isn’t it?<sup>118</sup>

From the foregoing, it follows that language has the power to bond people of different putative cultures who have come to speak a shared language. And since we have come to learn and share *our* languages (which carry our cultures with them) with others, it makes it very hard to show that

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<sup>113</sup> See Sen, A. 2006, *Identity & violence: the illusion of destiny*, passim.

<sup>114</sup> Sen, A. 2006, *Identity & violence*, p. xii – xiii.

<sup>115</sup> Ironically, Ngũgĩ himself is a cultural essentialist, since he generally espouses views same as the cultural nationalists. For the quote, see Ngũgĩ, wa Thiong’O, 1987 [1981], *Decolonizing the mind: the politics of language in African literature*, p. 15.

<sup>116</sup> In another rendition, Fanon is translated as saying that “To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture.” See Microsoft ® Encarta ® 2009, © 1993-2008 Microsoft Corporation. For the citation in-text, see Fanon, F. 2008, *Black skin, white masks*, C. L. Markmann, p. 9.

<sup>117</sup> See Rajchman, J. 2006, Foreword, *The Chomsky-Foucault debate on human nature*. p. x.

<sup>118</sup> Plato. 1997, Alcibiades, *Complete works*. D. S. Hutchinson, Trans. J. M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Eds.. p. 111b – 111c.



individuals who could speak and learn different languages can be identified as *belonging* to any particular culture.

Thus, “The uniquely partitioned world [of Huntington and the cultural nationalists] is much more divisive than the universe of plural and diverse categories that shape the world which we live.”<sup>119</sup> Huntington and theorists like him set the world stage dangerously for the escalation of violent conflicts, in presuming and actually categorising people uniquely and narrowly based on religion or culture. Theirs is an ominous call for the death of humanity – that humanity be sacrificed on the altar of cultural and civilisational calibrations. This outcome may seem an ironic rebound of their hunger to certify and sanctify cultural purity and civilisational survival at all cost. But what really can partitionists and divisionists hope for?

In contrast, Fanon’s new humanism consists in transcending the negations of humanity such as colonialism, neocolonialism, Manichaeism, cultural prejudice, cultural racism and oppression. The struggle for freedom becomes the driving force behind this urgent demand for change and reason.<sup>120</sup> For Fanon, anti-colonialism or decolonisation is not all that true humanism calls for: “it [humanism] must be filled out and developed into a practice and awareness of political and social inclusion of the most marginal...” and in Sekyi-Otu’s words, “a resumption of [the] interrupted history” of the dehumanised, the deculturised and the unrecognised – the only way the dialogue of humanity may be universally ignited, afresh.<sup>121</sup> Thus, the new humanism that we invoke is a theory of action, of individual and collective participation in the salvation of our species, even if the struggle to do so may require (some) alleged cultural deaths and *the end of (some) civilisations*. Fanon’s real warning, is that no nation, no civilisation should claim the monopoly of an unblemished National Culture. Rather, we should continuously strive after an inclusive humanism. For humanism “is the only, and, I would go as far as saying, the final, resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history.”<sup>122</sup> And this inclusive humanism, we argue, should begin from highly responsive recognition of Levinas’ ‘Face’

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<sup>119</sup> Sen, A. 2006, *Identity & violence*, p. iv.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Gibson, N. C. 2011, *Living Fanon?*, p. 8 – 9.

<sup>121</sup> See Sekyi-Otu, A. 2011, *Fanon and the possibility of postcolonial critical imagination*, p. 45 – 59; also Gibson, N. C. 2011, *Living Fanon?*, p. 9.

<sup>122</sup> Said, E. W. 2003, *Orientalism*, p. xxii.

In a world guided by cultural humanism, it would make no sense for anyone, including the cultural essentialists, to rue the death of any culture, since culture is not an entity deserving of an autonomous life in the first place. Human beings need not go into extinction in order to save a particular putative culture from itself. We do not need to sacrifice human lives so as to preserve a culture, religion or civilisation. There is nothing wrong with having people who do not share certain aspects of “our culture” live among us. As guests, visitors or residents, we have no right to vilify our host because of “their culture”. All peoples may retain the right to protect and preserve their culture, religion or civilisation, but not at all cost. To reiterate, no culture or in Rawlsian terms, no “comprehensive doctrine,” is worth killing or dying for.<sup>123</sup> We need not worry if the putative owners of a particular culture now choose to not just abandon certain ingredients or values of that culture, but also to borrow from or even migrate to another cultural space for the purpose of survival and flourishing.

Japan’s transmutation following the Second World War is an example of the kind of cultural mutation cultural humanism roots for. The militarist posture then apparent in Japanese socio-political culture was effectively jettisoned following the horrors and errors of World War II. Militarism, intransigence and belligerence have been replaced with more agreeable values and instruments of international cooperation so much so that one commentator not too long ago referred to Japan as “arguably one of the most pacifist countries in the world today.”<sup>124</sup> And yet this seems to represent a good case of a people dynamising and or humanising its culture - re-examining the institutions, attitudes and values that have for generations informed and buoyed that society. Interestingly, however, Japan has retained other cultural values like “wisdom, industry, resilience, creativity” and discipline.<sup>125</sup> The country did not need to abandon everything Japanese. It merely picked and chose from Japanese and other cultural values. Japan decided to choose humanity ahead of culture. Its people finally realised that Japan can exist without what may be called an “authentic” Japanese culture or at least that militarism was not intrinsic to such an “authentic” culture.

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<sup>123</sup> See Rawls, J. 1992, *Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical passim*; Rawls, J. 1993, 1996, *Political liberalism*, esp. p. 195 – 96; Rawls, J. 1999c, *Collected papers*, p. 408; Rawls, J. 2009, *A brief inquiry into the meaning of sin and faith with “on my religion”*, p. 266 – 67; Rawls, J. 1999b, *A theory of justice*, rev. Ed., p. 129; Nussbaum, M. C. 2003, *Rawls and feminism*, p. 508.

<sup>124</sup> Schreurs, M. A. 2005, *Japan*, p. 169. Also see Duus, P. 1998, *Modern Japan*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., and Rourke, J. T. 2009, *International politics on the world stage*, 12<sup>th</sup> Ed., p. 371.

<sup>125</sup> See Agbo, A. and Suleiman, T. 2013, *The Problem with Nigeria* (interview with Japanese ambassador to Nigeria, Ryuichi Shoji), p. 32.

Thus, cultural freedom or cultural humanism need not lead to a mono-cultural global culture, after all. It only requires inter-cultural equality which it engenders. For the purpose of clarity, cultural humanism is a conceptual apparatus which says that human survival and flourishing is more important than cultural preservation and irredentism. The further claim here is that if cultural humanism is universally endorsed, then a world of intercultural equality, or a world where the interest of every human group would matter and matter equally, regardless (of their multiple and perhaps conflicting) cultural, religious or civilisational affiliations. The foregoing is defended here as a theory of global culture. The sum total of this argumentation is that the idea of global justice is possible, but must begin as *inter-cultural justice*. This is because the toughest obstacles in the way of realising global justice are in the first place thrown up and sustained by cultural factors and attitudes towards culture. The correct thinking here is that the challenge of global justice – which is to develop consistent principles of justice that would correctly apply to all human societies or globally – can therefore only be overcome in an inter-culturally just world. This would be a world where the humane and humanistic take precedence over parochial cultural prides and the opposite stereotypes. This is our best and the only real choice for creating a sustainable one world. We must never lose sight of the very fact that, “[t]he human, and humanistic, desire for enlightenment and emancipation is not easily deferred, despite the incredible strength of the opposition to it that comes from the Rumsfelds, Bin Ladens, Sharons and Bushes of this world;” and that it is that desire that binds us together.<sup>126</sup>

Without inter-cultural justice, efforts by well-meaning individuals and governments to change the current world situation for the better will continue to yield minimal results. Not even the efforts of some proponents of prejudiced theories to repudiate their earlier false claims have been enough to extinguish the flames of inter-cultural hatred. As history has shown, Kant’s own efforts to repudiate racial hierarchism could not stop a Hegel from writing on the same topic and sharing views similar to his or stop a Hitler from emerging in the German/European political space. Which way then for our culturally unjust world? How exactly can we hope to realise this millennium, namely that the emergence of global justice be heralded by the well-cut crisscrossing paths of a global culture? How exactly should we conceive a global culture capable of forming strong scaffolding for global justice? In simple terms, is a global culture a realisable, desirable millennium?

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<sup>126</sup> Said, E. W. 2003, *Orientalism*, p. xxiii.

#### 4.5: Understanding the Idea of a “Global Culture”

Unlike national cultures, a global culture is essentially memoryless. Where the ‘nation’ can be constructed so as to draw upon and revive latent experiences and needs, a ‘global culture’ answers to no living needs, no identity in the making. It has to be painfully put together, artificially, out of the many existing folk and national identities into which humanity has been so long divided. There are no ‘world memories’ that can be used to unite humanity; the most global experiences to date – colonialism and the world wars – can only serve to remind us of our historic cleavages. (If it is argued that nationalists suffered selective amnesia in order to construct their nations, the creators of a global culture have to suffer total amnesia, to have any chance of success!)<sup>127</sup>

Anthony Smith’s comments above aptly capture the dilemmas and prospects of the kind of global culture canvassed by this study. As emphasized above, cultural prejudices have been behind the most egregious injustices in human history. If we must move towards a global culture, or a world where no particular putative culture is deemed superior or inalienable to any people, we ought to be prepared to forget our painful past and help others to do the same. How to begin to do this is precisely via cultural humanism and intercultural justice. People are more likely to begin to overcome past bad feelings orchestrated by cultural prejudice if they are not reminded of those pains by additional afflictions. For it is precisely in the hope that no further hurts or losses would be inflicted on the collective memory of the people of District Six in Cape Town (to take one example of a case where human beings suffered historic injustices), that the docents and curators of District Six Museum share the hope that at that momentous point in history, in post-apartheid South Africa, “all of us can live. Not as races, [tribes, ethnic groups or races] but as people.”<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Smith, A. D. 1990, *Towards a global culture?*, p. 179 – 80.

<sup>128</sup> Quotation from an iconic document in *District Six Museum*, Cape Town, which I visited in June, 2013.

#### 4.6: Chapter Evaluation

The chapter set out to postulate a theory of global culture which it argues, ought to precede any acceptable theory of global justice. In clear terms, the chapter argued that the death or flourishing of a particular culture/civilisation is not as important as when the permutation is about a particular human group. It should not worry us when a particular culture or civilisation goes into extinction, provided it happens because its members freely choose to jettison that culture for another one. People, should indeed, experience no serious obstacle in the way of cultural mutation. On the other hand, it is always an egregious wrong to impose or allow a people to suffer harm because of cultural or religious reasons. In one word, humanity is more important than culture. The further claim here was that if cultural humanism is universally endorsed, then a world of intercultural equality or a world where the interest of every human group would matter and matter equally, regardless of cultural, religious or civilisational affiliations would emerge. This further implies that a global culture need not emerge in the form of a mono-cultural world.

The chapter further expounded on the idea of inter-cultural equality or inter-cultural justice as a theory of global justice. The chapter did this by examining the question of global culture, analysing and criticising in particular the civilisational account of global culture espoused chiefly by Samuel P. Huntington. In addition to Fanon's idea of the new humanism, the chapter sifted from the writings of Arnarya Sen, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, among others to develop intercultural equality as a principle of global justice. The main argument here was that the aim of global justice would be realised only when people learn to live together without putting premium on cultural identity.

But the question must be asked at this point, what would the world look like if the wishes of cultural humanism are realised? How, really, should we define and apply inter-cultural justice? These and other questions surrounding the "millennium" shall occupy our attention in the last chapter of this work.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### JUSTICE AND THE IMPERATIVES OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER

*We are nothing on earth if we are not in the first place the slaves of a cause, the cause of the peoples, the cause of justice and liberty.*

– Frantz Fanon<sup>1</sup>

#### 5.1: The Intrinsic Value of Justice

The question might be raised as to whether justice is really a desideratum of every human society. In the same vein, the ultimate question of global justice that has been raised throughout this work is, can the principles or morality of justice be identified and applied globally? Under what circumstances would principles of justice apply globally in a consistent and persistent manner? Conversely, it can be argued that justice is something most persons or groups invoke when they find themselves in a position of disadvantage and powerlessness. Yet, at times, if sufficiently cowed, people may “choose” to have an ounce of peace and a little comfort rather than make requests for justice. It does not help at all that we can hardly arrive at a univocal definition of the subject matter. Thus, to argue in response to the above questions that philosophers and theorists including some statesmen often take the subject of justice seriously, even when their own personal or group interest may not really be at stake, is begging the question. It might then be put forward that justice is an intrinsically justified value, a thing that can be sought for its own sake. While the last claim may be metaphysically satisfying, it remains unenlightening to the average person. Perhaps one way of attempting to offer tangible answers to questions concerning the value of justice, especially in the contemporary world is to ask for the aim of justice. What kind of scenarios do questrists of (global) justice seek to bring about?

One major aim of justice, generally, is to integrate persons and groups, making them comfortable and happy in the human society – as much as it depends on *us* – our social and political institutions. Justice does not seek the sole happiness or comfort of any particular person or group, especially if that would be achieved at the expense of others. The underlying aim of justice, therefore, is to remove obstacles in the way of, as well as, stipulating acceptable standards for human cooperation and interaction. Thus, when global justice

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<sup>1</sup> Fanon wrote just four weeks before his death. He is cited in Zahar, R. 1974 [1969], *Colonialism and alienation: concerning Franz Fanon's political theory*, p. xx.

becomes a fact, then the standards of human cooperation/interaction would be stipulated, recognised and applied to the world as a whole. In addition, the following aims of global justice would be realised: (a) the elimination of world hunger, poverty, disease, malnutrition and ignorance; (b) the strengthening of international cooperation to a point where the same principles of justice would apply to all states; (c) the preservation and conservation of the world's atmosphere/environment and (d) perpetual peace within and among nation-states. However, as we have tried to show throughout this essay, the aims of global justice are far easier stated than achieved. At the same time, global justice, that is, justice for everyone in the world is far too important and desirable that no other conceivable alternative is morally defensible or sustainable.

In this chapter, the study points out ways by which the questrists of global justice can overcome the major obstacle placed in the way of achieving the millennium by the inclement current global order driven by neoliberalism. Relying on cultural humanism and Fanon's idea of the *open universal*, the chapter views neoliberalism, first, as a colonial false universal. It attempts to trace the contours of an idea we call *emancipatory universalism* (which is really a corollary of cultural humanism). Emancipatory universalism is a new ethic for protecting human interest by taking cognisance of the non-linear and asymmetrical nature of human needs in different regions of the world. The chapter probes the possibility of a global economic regime that addresses the hegemonic inclemencies of current dominant paradigms and that would constantly review and reconstitute the shibboleths of such paradigms to accommodate weaker economies. In clear terms, this work invokes anew, Fanon's call to urgently humanise this world, precisely by defending humanity – that is, the relentless quest for truth, justice and freedom – against false universals and oppressive institutions like those that undergird the current world order.<sup>2</sup> To raise the question anew, why exactly is the current global order unjust and requiring urgent humanisation?

## 5.2: The Current Global Order

We have in previous chapters pointed to several reasons why the current global order is unjust. Let us reemphasize the unfair structure of the global order by depicting it as an

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<sup>2</sup> Following Fanon, we do not define humanity as this or that value, but as a process towards completeness, a completeness which can only be realised through a relentless quest for truth, justice and freedom. Cf. Patočka, J. 2007, *Living in problematcity*. passim.

imaginary Olympic Games arena. In the sporting events, participants are drawn from all over the world and athletes are placed under two broad categories depending on the teams they represent. Athletes are placed in Group A if they are representing teams profiled under the Alpha Block category; while other athletes are placed under Group B, corresponding to teams classified under the Beta Block category. During tournaments, athletes in Group A are allowed to begin the race nine seconds ahead of athletes in Group B. Most races are finished in approximately ten to twelve seconds. This means that the races are actually between only athletes in Group A. At the end of every tournament, as expected, only athletes in Group A win all the laurels. And just as routinely, the athletes in Group B are blamed for their “poor performances” and tasked to improve on their skills in the next tournament. To encourage them (Group B athletes) to continue to participate (after all this is supposed to be an “all-inclusive” global encounter), they are offered “humanitarian aid” or one form of consolatory gift or the other, and then assigned “expert” coaches and trainers that would help them improve on their skills. Sometimes, these “kind gestures” come from their counterparts from the successful teams in Group A. Of course this does nothing in the way of improving Group B “performances”.

Nonetheless, with the passage of time and different tournaments, some athletes in Group B miraculously win some of the races. But when this happens, such athletes are immediately and unceremoniously disqualified or found guilty of flouting one rule of the Games or the other, and the prizes and monetary benefits immediately returned to the grateful hands of athletes in Group A.<sup>3</sup> (Note that the rule-makers, officials and referees of the games are exclusively drawn from Alpha Block teams in every event!) In cases where no foul play could be pinned on a winning Group B athlete, the category of game she won is simply removed from the tournament.<sup>4</sup> In some other cases, Alpha Block members (having made new rules to allow for it and because they are richer), will hurriedly buy over the talented/miraculous athletes from Beta Block to now represent Group A teams in the next games.

Understandably, teams in Group A have become prosperous through the lopsided wins they have amassed within a long period of time. Group A teams have also directly impoverished Group B teams since all participants to the global games usually pay

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<sup>3</sup> Note that there is a continuum of marginality between Group A and B or Alpha Block and Beta Block, but the discrimination is sharpest between A and B / Alpha Block and Beta Block. Here Group A and B/ Alpha Block and Beta Block are used for the purpose of Occam Razor fashion analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Again, note that we have used “race” to represent the different games that go on in our depiction.



participation levies, and as teams in Group B are never allowed to win, it means that their participation levies are always lost to the eventual winners. After a while, athletes in Group B become demoralised as the prospects of ever winning is non-existent and their capacity to continue to participate in the games systematically weakened. However, desirous to win at all cost after centuries of deprivation, some athletes from teams in Group B invent ingenious approaches to the games. They are fined and banned for their troubles. Others try to develop their own version of the global games. They find insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the powerful organisers of the dominant global games. The entire world becomes conflict ridden and dangerous as a never-to-recede battle line is drawn between the “winners” and the losers.

Replace “teams” with “countries”, “athletes” with “citizens” and substitute “political economy” for “games”, the Global North and Global South for Alpha Block and Beta Block respectively and you are likely to get a picture, as good as any, of the current global order orchestrated by neoliberalism, capitalism and the World Trade Organisation; all indices of global interdependence. Surprisingly, as this study has revealed, the two dominant camps in the debate on global justice seem to be suggesting that the way to remedy the situation and make the games more accommodating and just is mainly that athletes and teams in Group A should endeavour not to kill or “harm” Group B athletes and their teams. If there is any other thing that teams in Group A may owe teams in Group B, it could only be more humanitarian aid and logistic support to train Group B athletes to participate effectively in the global games. Rawls and his supporters as well as the dominant cosmopolitans seem content with the structure of the current global order. For Rawls and his supporters, it seems just fine if the current global order is maintained, insofar as more effort is made towards helping Group B teams (poorer nations) to become better trained for the games or solving their internal problems. Rawls and his supporters seem to forget that the poorer countries (Group B teams) would have to compete in the unjust global arena while trying to solve their “internal” problems. The cosmopolitans on the other hand, would be satisfied if wealthy countries (Group A teams) increase humanitarian aid to poorer ones (Group B teams); only that this time around, such aids ought to be seen as the poor’s just due of global resources.<sup>5</sup> In addition, for the cosmopolitans, such aid should be transferred directly to the athletes/citizens

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<sup>5</sup> The cosmopolitan view seen in this way seems a little ludicrous. Are losers in a game entitled to any just rewards, beyond that which has been earmarked for would-be losers even before the game commenced? How much sense does it make to say that losers in a game ought to share in the winners’ bounty? Maybe it is easy to say this in theory, but the proposition could hardly be put forward to an all-conquering warrior/runner – to share his loot/laurels with those he has defeated – as *their* right.

of teams/countries in Group B. But it would seem that for justice to prevail, for anything to change for athletes in Group B, the rules and the rule-makers governing the games ought to change, if at all it is impossible to dismantle the entire system and allow every stakeholder equal participation in a new process that would engender a new global order. But why exactly has the current unjust system of things persisted? And how should we change the status quo?<sup>6</sup> We begin with the first question.

### 5.3.1: Neoliberalism, Individual Autonomy and Global Justice

The seeming popularity of neoliberalism in the Global North lies primarily in the very fact that it seems consistent with what some believe, has become intuitive folk wisdom in that part of the world.<sup>7</sup> “The founding figures of neoliberalism took the political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of civilization’.”<sup>8</sup> The belief here is that perforce, we can move from the individual as an autonomous moral unit to the individual as a political, social and economically autonomous unit. Holding this cultural belief as unchallengeable, neoliberals seek to defend capitalism, privatisation and the market principle against fascism, dictatorship and communism; as well as all manner of state intervention or collective decision procedures that undercut the individual’s freedom to choose.<sup>9</sup> Capitalism here refers to the private ownership of the means of production, while privatisation means selling out publicly owned economic institutions into private hands and the market principle is understood as the view that the lawful distribution of almost all commodities including essential services, ought to be dictated by market forces, that is the interplay between price, supply and demand.

In the discourse on global justice, the major disputants, advocates of the political conception and the cosmopolitans generally seem to uphold the classical liberal belief in individual autonomy and all its ramifications. While exponents of the political conception hold that the individual is autonomous and independent within a particular nation-state where

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<sup>6</sup> The two questions aptly summarise the whole problem of global justice tackled in this work.

<sup>7</sup> There is the view developed in classical liberal philosophical thought, drawing chiefly from Rene Descartes, John Locke and Adam Smith, which holds that the individual human person is an autonomous entity. According to the fully developed version of this doctrine, the individual human person is an autonomous moral agent and should be treated as such under any socio-political arrangement. Curiously, however, the actual “testing” or practice of neoliberal ethos has always been the imposed lot of many non-Euro-American societies.

<sup>8</sup> Harvey, D. 2005, *A brief history of neoliberalism*, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Harvey, D. 2005, *History of neoliberalism*, p. 5.

his/her interest must be preserved and protected, the cosmopolitans contend that the autonomous individual ought to have their interest preserved and protected not just within the confines – laws and institutions – of a particular nation-state, but everywhere else in the world. In sum, while the political conception argues that the autonomous individual has political rights internally (that is, within the state), the cosmopolitans hold that such autonomy/rights transcend state borders. It should therefore serve as no surprise that not even the staunchest cosmopolitans (including Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz) are willing to criticise and call for an end to the neoliberal world order, regardless of how harmful neoliberalism may be against their avowed pursuits of global justice.<sup>10</sup> But there are plenty of reasons why questrists of global justice should be worried about neoliberalism: neoliberalism is one of the major hinges upon which the current global order (which we have depicted as unjust) stands. We further explain this in some details below.

### **5.3.2: Culture, Class Struggle and the Neoliberal World Order**

It may be argued by stalwarts of the “free market” that neoliberalism successfully enveloped the entire global economic structure, especially within its heydays in the 1990s: because it was freely adopted by the government and peoples of different countries across the world. This seemingly global endorsement of neoliberalism would mean that neoliberalism is not really a cultural or political imposition on any part of the world by a hegemonic power; it would, in short, be regarded as a universal economic paradigm.<sup>11</sup> For Reaganomics developed very differently from Thatcherism; while an in-depth study reveals that Deng Xiaoping’s China and other “middle-income countries” owe their economic transitions to the vagaries of social and political needs probably unknown to other developing countries that equally embraced neoliberalism at that time. Be that as it may, no one can pretend that the widening disparity in income and the ability to “take advantage” of the global “free market” between the poorer Global South and the affluent Global North can or should be explained away in cultural essentialist terms as the product of “backward” versus “progressive” cultures.

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<sup>10</sup>See Chandhoke, N. 2010, “How much is enough, Mr Thomas? How much will ever be enough?”, p. 70.

<sup>11</sup> More on the universal below.

Another perplexing phenomenon is that early in the twenty first century, the world witnessed a global economic catastrophe of a magnitude not known for a long time. Some scholars began to imagine a post-neoliberal world, others made bold to undertake to inscribe the rise and fall of neoliberalism.<sup>12</sup> But the apostles of neoliberalism were distressed only for a fleeting moment. Barrack Obama's brave comments during his inaugural address in 2009 about checkmating the market with "a watchful eye" held some meaning for the briefest of moments. Then the immunisation tactics began. Somehow, neoliberalism became consistent with Keynesian economics, or if not so, the unemployed and the poor are simply too lazy to work or are altogether unemployable. The problem is not with neoliberalism; on the contrary, the problem lies with the global poor for failing to properly understand neoliberalism and use the market principle to their advantage. If there was inflation, then "interim" austerity measures should accompany World Bank and IMF loans and before too long things would normalise. In this way, the first steps towards reinstalling neoliberalism as the dominant economic paradigm gained momentum. In the meantime, the collective wealth of the few wealthy (mostly from the North), has almost toppled the entire earnings of the United Kingdom, whereas the homeless and the world unfortunate – the damned of the earth – who represent the "alternative forgone" of the neoliberal world order continue to increase in their numbers. In the meantime, a dead-end global silence has so far been the lot of the groaning global poor. The question is why may this be so? Why has the world chosen to look the other way in the face of the creatively destructive consequences of neoliberalism?<sup>13</sup>

To be sure, "the world" as used above does not refer to all shades of global opinion. It definitely does not include those who have been making strident calls to the effect that an alternative to "free market" globalism be considered.<sup>14</sup> The "world" here refers to the powerful interests, governments of the Global North and corporations whose primary aim is to maintain the dominance of their own class and perpetuate their interest at the expense of the global poor and the so-called periphery, at all cost. For even though "[a] generation of corporate finance public relations has given the term a near sacred aura,"<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See for example, Macdonald, L. and Ruckert A. Eds. 2009, *Post-neoliberalism in the Americas* and Birch, K. and Mykhnenko V. Eds. 2010, *The rise and fall of neo-liberalism: the collapse of an economic order?*.

<sup>13</sup> I am largely indebted to David Harvey for the foregoing phraseology and for the analysis that follow. See in particular, Harvey, D. 2007, *Neoliberalism as creative destruction*. Cf. Harvey, D. 2001, *Cosmopolitanism and the banality of geographical evils* and Harvey, D. 2005, *A brief history of neoliberalism*.

<sup>14</sup> See for example, UBUNTU Forum Secretariat Ed. 2009, *Reforming international institutions: another world is possible* and Chomsky, N. 1999, *Profit over people: neoliberalism and the global order*.

<sup>15</sup> McChesney, R. W. 1999, Introduction, p. 7.

[N]eoliberalism is ... [after all] a project to restore class dominance to sectors that saw their fortunes threatened by the ascent of social democratic endeavors in the aftermath of the Second World War. Although neoliberalism has had limited effectiveness as an engine for economic growth, it has succeeded in channeling wealth from subordinate classes to dominant ones and from poorer to richer countries. This process has entailed the dismantling of institutions and narratives that promoted more egalitarian distributive measures in the preceding era.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, lowering taxes on the wealthy, and abolishing environmental regulations (or neither making nor enforcing safe environmental laws and regulations especially during mineral extraction from poorer countries), dismantling public education (or undermining it) and paying lip-service to social welfare programmes are all rationalised, if not defended within the “developmentalist” platform of neoliberalisation.<sup>17</sup> In short, “wedded to the belief that the market should be the organising principle for all political, social, and economic decisions, neoliberalism wages an incessant attack on democracy, public goods, and noncommodified values.”<sup>18</sup> Thus, the direct economic consequences of neoliberalisation have not unexpectedly been largely the same: “massive increase in social and economic inequality, a marked increase in severe deprivation for the poorest nations and peoples of the world, a disastrous global environment, an unstable global economy and an unprecedented bonanza for the wealthy.”<sup>19</sup>

Exponents of the neoliberal world order point to Adam Smith’s invisible hand and invite us to observe that inexorably – the invisible hand would gradually spread the “spoils” of the good life to the broad mass of the wretched of the earth – as long as the neoliberal policies that exacerbated their problems in the first place are not interfered with.<sup>20</sup> The fallacy of the invisible and is based on the assumption that Adam Smith is thought to argue that the result of everyone pursuing their own interest will be the maximisation of the interests of the

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<sup>16</sup> Harvey, D. 2007, *Neoliberalism as creative destruction*, p. 22.

<sup>17</sup> McChesney, R. W. 1999, Introduction, p. 7 – 8.

<sup>18</sup> Willis, K., Smith A. and Stenning A. 2008, Introduction: social justice and neoliberalism, p.1.

<sup>19</sup> McChesney, R. W. 1999, Introduction, p. 8; cf. Harvey, D. 2005, *A brief history of neoliberalism*, passim; also Steger, M. B. and Roy, R. K. 2010, *Neoliberalism: a very short introduction*, passim.

<sup>20</sup> See McChesney, R. W. 1999, Introduction, p. 8

whole of society; and that the invisible hand of the free market will inexorably transform the individual's pursuit of gain into the general utility of society. But then

Many people, although Smith did not, draw a moral corollary from th[e invisible hand] argument, and use it to defend the moral acceptability of pursuing one's own self-interest. Smith does use the invisible hand argument; however, a close reading of *The Wealth of Nations* reveals that Smith thought the interests of merchants and manufacturers were fundamentally opposed to those of society in general, and that they had an inherent tendency to deceive and oppress society while pursuing their own interests. How can these two views of what results when merchants and manufactures pursue their self-interest be made compatible?<sup>21</sup>

The answer to this would be "in no way"; unless, of course, we are willing to agree with Noam Chomsky and several other analysts that the Smith of the "invisible hand" is also the Smith of the "helping hand".<sup>22</sup> This is a main fact recognised by George Osborne in a very brief foreword to *The Wealth of Nations*. He notes that Smith was "keenly aware of the limitations of the 'invisible hand' – and therefore understood that effective institutional infrastructure is required to ensure the operation of a free and fair market."<sup>23</sup> This is for the very good reason that Smith realised that unrestricted markets tended towards oppressive monopolies and stifles competition; "and so proportionate government action is needed to create a clear and stable framework that enables free competition to take place."<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Bishop, J. D. 1995, Adam Smith's invisible hand argument, p. 165.

<sup>22</sup> Werner Bonefeld has recently written: "As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown proclaimed to have found the real Smith, whom he sought to wrest from the clutches of the political right. According to Brown, the real Smith 'counterposed the invisible hand of the market to the helping hand of government'. In Matthew Watson's view, Brown got it wrong. He asserts that Smith was 'suspicious of the interventions of a well-meaning government' and argued that for Smith the 'moral critique of excesses of market economy' was not a matter of government. Instead Watson argues, Smith saw the moral sentiments as a 'manifestation of the individual's moral faculties' and asserts that these are 'self-tutored'." For Bonefeld, "Watson is right to argue that the Smithian state is not a countervailing power to the invisible hand and wrong to assert that Smith was suspicious of state intervention." See Bonefeld, W. 2012, Adam Smith and ordoliberalism: on the political form of market liberty, p. 1 – 2. For the wording in-text, see Smith, C. 2007, Book Review of Iain McLean (2006): Adam Smith, radical and egalitarian: an interpretation for the twenty first century, p. 91 – 92. Also see McCauley, J. L. 2002, Adam Smith's invisible hand is unstable: physics and dynamics reasoning applied to economic theorizing.

<sup>23</sup> Osborne, G. MP. 2007. Foreword, p. ix.

<sup>24</sup> Osborne, G. MP. 2007. Foreword, p. ix.

As Noam Chomsky further points out, even for Adam Smith, it is difficult to see how without state intervention, the national economic interest can be articulated and pursued.<sup>25</sup> Smith argued convincingly that governmental action ought to be deployed to overcome the destructive force of the invisible hand. This, the government must do through “regulation in favour of the workmen [which] is always just and equitable;” though “not when in favour of the masters.”<sup>26</sup> Equally usually underreported, Chomsky continues, is Smith’s strong argument for equality of outcomes. For as Smith saw, the “principal architects” of policies in the England of his time (and still much so now) were “merchants and manufacturers” who used the instrument of state power to galvanise their own interests no matter how “grievous” the consequences could be on foreign economies under the direct control of the English government, or even on other citizens of England.<sup>27</sup>

Nonetheless, relying on Smith’s considerable intellectual weight and claims purportedly his, as highlighted above, neoliberals continue to promote a world order where vulnerable societies are routinely forced into stringent structural adjustment programmes without the accompanying Smithean helping hand by governmental institutions, laws and regulations both at local and international stage. The key rationalising factor for unqualified United Nations and World Bank/IMF’s support for harsh neoliberal policies all over the world seems to be the desire to propagate the neoliberal paradigm as a socio-economic universal culture acceptable and applicable to all societies. Yet, in the neoliberal world order, we find ourselves confronting an unacceptable logical outcome. If all societies caught in the web (or should one say “caught in the spell”) of neoliberalism willingly chose their current situation and for their own good, how do we explain the emergence of the global political economy of exclusion, alienation and escalating poverty? How can anyone justify the very fact that some societies are at best passengers in the distribution of the “core gains” of the current international system? If the current global scene is a separately and jointly created universal of *neoliberalisms*, effectively backed by the globalisation of human needs and resources, why has it widened and ossified existing inequalities? Why does it seem that the very survival of some societies presently depend on their ability to work hard to get back into the “neoliberal universal” or alternatively, to be freed or delinked from it? Is neoliberalism a universally valid politico-economic theory? How should we evolve a just global order?

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<sup>25</sup> Chomsky, N. 1999, *Profit over people: neoliberalism and the global order*, p. 20.

<sup>26</sup> Chomsky, N. 1999, *Profit over people*, p. 39.

<sup>27</sup> See Chomsky, N. 1999, *Profit over people*, p. 20. Cf. Smith, A. 2007 [1776]. *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*, p. 427

## 5.4: Emancipatory Universalism

In his most recent article on Fanon, titled “The Open Door of Every Consciousness”, Richard Pithouse through an insightful re-reading of Fanonian-Marxian dialectics of political struggles, urges a contest of the universal. Pithouse seeks to contest the universal precisely because in the current world order, some people have often suffered unjustly because they are deemed different and outside the web of certain universal paradigms.<sup>28</sup> At other times, the “non-universal” person or group is pressured to fit into *the* universal by all means.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless, through Fanon, Pithouse demonstrates that it would amount to a grievous mistake for the damned of the earth, the excluded or the subaltern to lapse into “the singular in the face of the false universal.”<sup>30</sup>

Again, staying close to Fanon, Pithouse cautions against such things as proto-nationalism and irredentism. But the question one must ask is: when the contest of the universal is over and victory in clear view; where exactly should the damned of the earth be found? Clearly, assimilation is not the answer. Neither would the perpetual subalterns and those who have suffered historic injustice be able to endure an evocation of any distressing feeling from the unequal relations of the past. Yet neoliberalism is but one way of extending the inequalities of the past. Is globalisation and interdependence then the answer? Clearly not, as our discussions thus far reveal. Where exactly then, would the politics of inclusion begin and end? What exactly would freedom and self-definition mean? In demanding for inclusion (we take recognition for-granted already), what kind of political actions are open to the damned of the earth, locally against oppressive regimes and internationally against an unjust world order? (This is a poignant question in the age of terror).

In order to provide answers to the above set of questions, this study begins by relying on Fanon’s cultural humanism to view neoliberalism, first, as a colonial false universal in need of emancipation. A reflection on cultural humanism reveals that all true universals would have to meet the hallmarks of emancipatory universalism. Emancipatory universalism

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<sup>28</sup> Notably, Plato held that a universal truth is timeless, immutable and incorruptible. This also implies that a universal truth is true regardless of whether or not we or any other sentient being acknowledges it or is aware of it. If Plato is right, then to say that a thing “X” is a *universal* is to imply its ontological immanence: its inherent objective existence. In political theory, when an idea or theory is held as not just plausible, but applicable to all human societies hoping to solve the problem which that theory is claimed to be able to solve, then, the implicit claim is that that idea is a universal truth.

<sup>29</sup> When this happens, the understanding would be that the idea in question has become an ideology, with all its negative consequences. See Chapter One, section 1:1 in this volume.

<sup>30</sup> Pithouse, R. winter, 2013, “The open door of every consciousness”, p. 97.



means that universality resides in the right disposition to enhance human freedom in its fullest sense, regardless of cultural or religious persuasions. A socio-economic idea is a universal, only if it generates viable frameworks for promoting our overall positive and negative freedoms. A truly universal idea cannot be exclusionary or capable of inhibiting the human will or subverting human rights, especially based on cultural differences. The overall impact of emancipatory universalism engenders a new ethics of economic relations that opens the grounds for alternate engagement with diverse but mutually reinforcing human interest. Human interest must now be understood as not following a particular pattern in different regions of the world. Similarly, the whole idea that any particular culture is the source of the truth is a falsehood, a deliberate falsehood defended by those who stand to gain hugely from the global socio-cultural space created by a dominant culture. Indeed, patriarchy, gerontocracy, capitalism and (neo-)liberalism are examples of culturally created oppressive false universals whose continued endorsement by some persons and societies as immutable, above reproach or as representing the end of history, demonstrate the shallowness of cultural essentialism. Thus, for the damned of the earth, the global poor and questrists of global justice, the struggle for self-definition and political inclusion must begin from realising the shallowness of relying on a (national) culture as the basis for unquestioned approval and support for certain political courses and public policies, especially on the international stage. The greater realisation would be to seek out pragmatic political actions that could actually impact positively on the condition of the poor without necessarily appealing to cultural or religious sentiments.

### **5.7: Chapter Evaluation**

The intention of the chapter was to apply the idea of intercultural equality in our world today. It sought to discover exactly what would change for the better if inter-cultural equality becomes a fact. The basic discovery is that we would realise a world where we would gradually accept justice as a central value of every culture. In addition, principles of justice would be accepted as applying to culturally disparate societies; and global institutions tailored to serve the interest of all human societies without the unnecessary hindrance of cultural prejudices.

## CONCLUSION

This study on global justice has a main constituency: the global poor and the “untouchables” – that is, those who have been rejected because of what they represent to those who wish to hurt them.<sup>1</sup> Thus, at the outset, to highlight in sharp relief the condition which these unfortunate human beings often found themselves, this essay quoted the unknown, voiceless Bahraini teenager. The main claim of the essay is that to make our world just and much better, there is a need to end prejudices, especially cultural prejudice. The realisation is that to argue for these demands requires anchoring a theory of global justice in a theory of global culture. To do this effectively, the essay relied on the classical writings of four major philosophers, one for each major epoch in philosophy, viz Plato, Augustine, Kant and Rawls to seek both a background to the idea of global justice as well as enunciate a definitional approach to the discourse. The critical finding of this essay at this juncture was that philosophers have since begun to seek a universal account of the morality of justice; but it was John Rawls that set the stage for major philosophers to begin to attempt to develop consistent ideas and principles that could apply to the world as a whole.

The essay further examined the extant output of the raging controversy between those who agree with Rawls (that is the advocates of the political conception) that state sovereignty is the basis of social cooperation and since we do not have a world state, it must follow that global justice is an unachievable utopia, on the one hand and the cosmopolitans on the other. The cosmopolitans argue that the individual, not the nation-state ought to be regarded as the ultimate unit of moral consideration in thinking about [global] justice. In the end, the study criticised the positions of both camps for not fully recognising the overriding role culture and cultural factors could play in determining the bases of human social cooperation. The essay concluded that if this fact is recognised, then an acceptable theory of global justice would be preceded by a theory of global culture.

In search of a universally valid principle of justice, our inquiry relied on the writings of Franz Fanon to begin to trace the contours of a new idea we call “cultural humanism”. Cultural humanism (or what at other times we refer to as “cultural freedom”) is a conceptual apparatus which says that human survival and flourishing is more important than cultural preservation and irredentism. In transcending Fanon’s cultural humanism, this study views global culture more broadly as a project that would ultimately free human beings from the

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<sup>1</sup> See King, Jr. M. A. 2000, *The autobiography of Martin Luther King*, p. 131.

shackles of parochialism and uncritical traditionalism. This study agrees that we should recognise the value of all putative cultures and allow for cultural mixing and intermingling, it denies that cultures or their values should be preserved at any cost that might be harmful to some human beings/groups. Preserving cultures at inhumane and unjust costs is but one way of essentialising culture at the expense of humanity, at the expense of robust human freedom. In addition, the study argued that a culture not survive in its pristine, “unadulterated” form, at the expense of human beings, the reverse should obtain, if need be, in the way of strengthening international cooperation towards achieving global justice or inter-cultural justice. In this way, global culture is understood as humanism, a humanism that in Levinasian terms places our own value, autonomy and freedom heteronomously subject to the existence of the Other, regardless of cultural leanings. The simple idea here is that the death or flourishing of a particular culture/civilisation is not as important as when the permutation is about a particular human group. The further claim here is that if the views of this study are universally endorsed, then a new world of intercultural equality or a world where the interest of every human group would matter and matter equally, regardless of cultural, religious or civilisational affiliations would emerge. This further implies that a global culture need not emerge in the form of a mono-cultural world.

Thus, the study further expounded on the idea of inter-cultural equality or inter-cultural justice as a theory of global justice. It did this by examining the question of global culture, analysing and criticising in particular the civilisational account of global culture espoused chiefly by Samuel P. Huntington. In addition to Fanon’s idea of the new humanism, the essay sifted from the writings of Amartya Sen, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, among others to develop intercultural equality as a theory of global justice. The main argument here is that the aim of global justice would be realised only when people learn to live together without putting premium on a unique cultural identity.

But what exactly would happen if a theory of global justice is anchored in cultural humanism and accepted the world over? The most important value of cultural humanism is explicit in its definition; the elimination of cultural prejudices and the recognition that no individual or group necessarily belongs to a particular culture in such a way that we can speak of a unique cultural identity. Furthermore, cultural humanism entails that people will be educated in such a way that human beings would no longer be described with prejudicial terms like “Black”, “White” or “Yellow”. It would serve to describe people in terms of their complexion, as “fair” or “dark” skinned, “light”, or “sepia” in complexion. Similarly,

everyone will come to endorse the on-going effort to eliminate certain tainted and prejudicial terminologies like the “First World”, or “Third World”, or any such discriminatory categorisations of human beings. We will see ourselves as belonging to only one world made up of people living in the Global (North or South and populated by Germans and Israelis; Americans and Russians; Nigerians and the British; Brazilians and Chinese; and so on. Fanon had argued correctly, and Adichie has recently echoed him: it is wrong to lump a whole continent together as if it were just one country.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the new world order that we anticipate is one in which people would have learnt to live together as members of one human culture that expresses itself in many different ways.

Fanon’s *New Man* will then emerge as cultural racism, neo-colonialism, religious intolerance and ideological bitterness are reduced to their human minimum as Fanon would say. Since no one would judge anyone by the standards of any particular culture they allegedly belong; and every nation is allowed leadership by its *residents* at every point in time, then the *New World* will emerge where our most cherished human values are allowed to live in broad day light, once again. Chief among these values will be the notion of inter-cultural equality. We believe that when people realise the mistake of essentialising culture, they would, for example, learn to cheer their own teams, clubs or countries in sports competition without any need to boo or fight members of the opposing team. People would come to realise that there is really no one way of playing the same game at any point in time. A particular culture should no longer form the basis of evaluating any performance in any field of human endeavour or as the basis of closing the room for mutual understanding and tolerance. The final outcome, therefore, of cultural humanism and intercultural equality which it engenders is a world of reasoned tolerance, endless conversations and inter-cultural justice.

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<sup>2</sup> Fanon, F. 1963 [1961], *The wretched of the earth*, p. 211 – 12.

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