1 Introduction

Simon Bekker and Göran Therborn

Capital cities have always played a central role in nation building and state building. These processes are both a symbolic movement and a quest to establish and maintain power. The nation state projects its power through the urban landscape and spatial layout of the capital city. This power is manifested in the capital's architecture, in its public monuments and the names of its streets and public spaces. These urban symbols of power, of state authority, however, are fluid and subject to change. Statues, monuments and public spaces, designed to impress the populace with the authority of power and the law, may be replaced as powerful individuals, political identities and ideologies give way to a new order and their associated legitimacy shifts. There is no fixed symbolism in the landscape and built environment of a capital city: it changes according to the era of control and authority – of power. In the studies of the African capitals in this book, the urban symbolism changes from European colonial rule to independence and new-found nationalism; from autocratic or militaristic ideologies to democracy; from communist-inspired state policy to capitalism. The capital city is a barometer of new ideological approaches, and the study of the city's urban 'geology' a key to understanding its political and historical development.

This book is a study of how power is manifested in the urban forms of several sub-Saharan capital cities. It also examines how the urban populace is at times powerless in the face of these manifestations and how counter-power is often generated in the urban spaces and communities of these capitals. The book uses the examples of a number of African capital cities to examine their different colonial backgrounds, processes of nation building, different kinds of regimes after independence, waves of popular protest, explosive population growth and in most cases stunted economic development. By focusing on the urban forms, symbolic as well as material, of multi-layered power, the book takes a new approach in the study of African cities and politics. The case studies of a selection of sub-Saharan capitals, which span the continent geographically, all have a broadly similar structure. The concluding chapter pulls together the threads of this urban geological study with a comparative analysis of these capital cities in Africa south of the Sahara, and provides contextual reference to other cities not included in the case studies.

In what ways is power evidenced in the capital cities of sub-Saharan Africa? As the seat of the national government, the capital hosts national institutions such as legislative and executive buildings, palaces of justice and others – material edifices which set these cities apart, literally, but also symbolically, from the other cities of the country. However, as the centres of formal political power and administrative authority, they also often become the main conduit to economic wealth and privilege in the country as a whole. These cities accordingly wield power, and are perceived

to wield power, over the citizenry. Hence, the capital often becomes the crucible for opposition political forces mobilising against the very power and authority vested in the capital and manifested in its symbolism. The capital also tends to attract many of the country's intellectuals and activists, and thereby simultaneously may become the centre of counter-power and site of high-stake struggles between government and opposition.

Postcolonial capital cities in sub-Saharan Africa

Towards the end of the 19th century, a set of common architectural and iconographic features emerged in European national capitals. Four elements became prominent, each with its specific function:

- A set of buildings for central national state institutions, conveying the majesty of the nation state.
- The layout of main streets for upmarket commerce and parading.
- The establishment of national institutions of high culture, symbolising national identity through shared national heritage.
- The politicisation and monumentalisation of urban space (Therborn 2002).

These features strongly influenced the emergence of capital cities in sub-Saharan Africa, not least because most were established under European colonial rule. Such landscapes of power provide a useful way to analyse nation building and state building in the countries where these cities developed.

The colonial order created recognisable urban systems and hierarchical civic environments. Colonialism produced segregated cities, particularly the capitals, where the colonial elite lived in formal, serviced neighbourhoods surrounded by informal, unserviced 'townships'. Critically, it also created borders, countries and cities that became self-governed nation states and capital cities after gaining independence. Accordingly, it is to be expected that there are certain commonalities among these capital cities both during the colonial period and after independence. Further research needs to address the influence of colonial legacies on the development of capital cities after independence.

At the same time, there were also significant differences among the colonial states, leading to significant postcolonial variations in these capital cities, which the case studies in this book illustrate. Municipal government, as well as legal, administrative and planning systems differ today in sub-Saharan Africa partly as a result of British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish and German colonial state idiosyncrasies. In addition, in terms of city forms, these sub-Saharan capitals are visibly diverse, despite their shared colonial ancestry. There are cities defined spatially by their function as trading ports (Dakar, Lomé); market towns, such as Brazzaville; and regional transport hubs (Nairobi). A number moreover (e.g. Addis Ababa and Lomé) were significant pre-colonial urban places before European colonisation and retain traces of this pre-colonial history today.

The primary, but not sole, historical focus of this book is the period since the

achievement of political independence from European colonialism, that is, a period of some 50 years or less (2010 marked the 50th year of independence for numerous countries in Africa). Hence, much of the urban landscape and built environment that is discussed is of recent construction, or at least of recently changed symbolic importance. This relatively brief time frame also means that the traces left behind in these towns by the European colonial powers have remained significant.

Each capital city studied in this volume has an introduction that provides a short historical context both of the development of the city itself and of the nation state. This way the legacy of each city's European colonial order is woven into its postcolonial history. Each case study concentrates on the urban geology of the capital – on the use of monuments to commemorate independence (and other later important national events), on street and city nomenclature where names are changed to extinguish the symbolic importance of the past and herald a new ideological period, and on other relevant architectural features of the city. The case studies discuss where and when the cities became arenas of contestation of national power by identifying the locations where public marches, rallies and other forms of mobilisation and protest have taken place. Each city has its own individual national trajectory after independence, the South African case being the most recent, and each chapter examines crucial city-making epochs, as opposed to providing a linear chronological narrative. The power vested in these African capitals is analysed through the political dramas that have taken place over the past 50 years in Africa and through their city histories.

These African capitals also share a critical demographic feature. In contrast to Europe, where the era of rapid urbanisation is past, sub-Saharan Africa is currently experiencing a process of urbanisation that is extraordinarily rapid. In 1980, only some 27% of Africans lived in cities. This rose to 38% in 2000 and is expected to reach 50% by 2020 (Hall & Pfeiffer 2000: 3). Rapid urbanisation creates ties between the city and the countryside, simultaneously disturbs and transforms communities living in urban neighbourhoods and in rural villages close to the city, and has led to substantial numbers of mainly internal, rather than international, migrants who choose the capital cities (mainly) in which to settle because these places are perceived to offer citizens an improved economic livelihood and better educational and health services (UNDP 2009). Most capital city governments have been overwhelmed by the volumes of in-migrants.

The general consequences of urbanisation are well known: urban sprawl becomes ubiquitous and haphazard, and service delivery, such as the provision of water, sewerage, waste removal and, critically, urban transport, is taken over by informal groups or members of resident households themselves. Exacerbating the problems of urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa were the global economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and the Cold War, which was partly played out in this region, as the two superpowers became involved in sphere-of-influence competition in several African states. The combined effect was that the formal economies of these exploding cities shrank and work became increasingly casualised and informalised. Perhaps the

most visible consequence was that housing construction also became informal, and homes were built with locally available materials by informal contractors or residents themselves, sited so as to improve access to work opportunities. As a UN report puts it:

> In sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization has become virtually synonymous with slum growth; 72 percent of the region's urban population lives under slum conditions, compared with 56 percent in South Asia. The slum population of sub-Saharan Africa almost doubled in 15 years, reaching nearly 200 million in 2005. (UNFPA 2007: 16)

The authors of this book identify whether the often weak, cash-strapped capital city governments (and in certain cases, the national governments) have been able to bring a measure of order to the urbanisation process in their cities.

The case studies also examine the profiles of the capital cities and their residents within the broader context of the state as a whole. They include brief discussions of the decentralisation or devolution of power from national to city governments under different political regimes, the changing demographic profiles of the city residents and the economic, social and political relationship between the capital and the rest of the nation. In addition, each chapter outlines the nature of the massive demographic growth of the city and assesses the relative socio-economic and political advantages that accrue to residents who have chosen to live in the capital city.

In the case of certain countries, independence also brought about the need to reappraise the suitability of the site of the capital inherited from the former colonial powers and associated with the ex-colonial regime's authority and symbolism. Brazil and Pakistan previously abandoned their capitals in favour of new ones, Brasilia and Islamabad. A small number of African countries followed this example. Nigeria's colonial capital, Lagos, was replaced by Abuja; these two capitals are the subject of chapters in this volume. Malawi and Tanzania are two other African states that changed their capitals post-independence. Elsewhere, the former capitals were maintained (Christopher 1985). In South Africa after democracy, the new government chose to retain Pretoria, a city founded by Afrikaners and the executive seat of the National Party government, as one of the country's three official capitals.

The city case studies

The book contains chapters on Conakry, Dakar and Lomé in francophone West Africa; Abuja and Lagos (the current and former capitals of Nigeria); and Brazzaville in francophone central Africa. The chapter on Nairobi provides a case study in the East African region. Maputo and Luanda are addressed in a single chapter as lusophone southern African cities. The South African case (with its multiple capital cities) completes the series of studies. This last case is treated as an African example with its own specificities, the primary one being that the 'South African experience lies in the strength of its civil society, both white and black' (Mamdani 1996: 28).

The chapter on Conakry is written by Odile Goerg, a French historian who has extensive knowledge of Guinea both under French colonial rule and after independence. The chapter closes with a short postscript on recent political conflict in Conakry after the death of President Conté in 2008. The chapter on Dakar is written by Amadou Diop, an urban planner and geographer, who looks primarily at the planning and development of the city during the post-independence period. The chapter on Lomé is written by Philippe Gervais-Lambony, a French geographer who has lived for a substantial amount of time in the city. The chapter includes a section on Lomé as a node in the West African economic network of port cities.

Two chapters trace the development of Nigeria's newly established capital, Abuja, and its former capital, Lagos. In his profile of Abuja, Wale Adebanwi, a Nigerian political scientist with substantial journalistic experience, debates why the rationale given for the establishment of a new capital city – to promote national economic development and national unity – has failed. Adebanwi argues that it is the personal interests that Nigeria's political elites had and continue to have in this new capital-city project that are in fact the pertinent motivating factors for the change of capital. The history of the establishment of the port of Lagos in the late 18th century and its subsequent development to the present day is written by Laurent Fourchard, a French historian who has lived in Nigeria for a number of years. In colonial and early postcolonial years, the integration into the world economy of Nigerian trading and other market interests was a major factor in the development of Lagos. This led to continuing tensions between local political and economic interests in the city and national and federal elites bent on transforming the city into a modern and international capital. As Nigeria's oil wealth emerged in the 1970s, resources became available for a new capital to be established in Abuja.

The chapters on Nairobi and Brazzaville are written by two Kenyan geographers, Samuel Owuor and Teresa Mbatia, and Gabriel Tati, a Congolese demographer. In the historical profiles of these two capitals after independence, particular attention is paid to city-level policies and their implementation, and how these compare with similar plans and practice in the other cities in these two countries. Such policies and practices are also located within the changing ideologies of post-independence national governments. Such changes in ideology and government also figure centrally in the chapter on Maputo and Luanda, the capital cities of Mozambique and Angola, two countries that suffered internal wars for long periods after independence from Portugal. Written by Paul Jenkins, a British architect and planner with a great deal of experience in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter also examines the similarities and differences between the historical trajectories of these two southern African capital cities.

The final case study, which concerns itself with Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein in the Republic of South Africa, is written by Alan Mabin, a South African geographer. Why the country has had and continues to have a multiplicity of capitals is one theme addressed by Mabin; the current debate regarding the executive capital of Pretoria and its proposed change of name to Tshwane is another. The trajectories

of the South African capitals may be viewed as transformations from apartheid to post-apartheid, as opposed to colonial to postcolonial, cities – a distinction pointing both to similarities as well as differences between the South African and other sub-Saharan cases.

The cities that have been selected to form this study are in different regions of Africa south of the Sahara. Since this selection was not intended to be representative, let alone exhaustive, the concluding chapter incorporates the experience of several other African capitals to illuminate the themes examined in the nine case studies and provide a comparative context.

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CONAKRY


Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
GUINEA
Conakry
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN

2 Conakry

Odile Goerg

Founded in colonial times, Conakry, the capital of Guinea, with a population today of over 1 million, extends more than 30 km from east to west. Conakry is an urban area that was characterised by rapidly accelerating growth in the second half of the 20th century, which had implications for the city's infrastructure and changing ways of life. From the outset, Conakry's development was the product of several superimposed historical strata: firstly, the planning and creation of facilities for the benefit of Europeans during the colonial phase (1880–1958); secondly, minimal state intervention associated with limitations on private initiatives during the regime of President Ahmed Sékou Touré (1958–1984); and, thirdly, the central role of private investment (both local and foreign) accompanied by the beginning of a development policy for the metropolitan area under President Lansana Conté (1984–2008) in partnership with international actors and organisations.

To examine the development of Conakry, which remained quite a small town for a long time, offers an opportunity to analyse how a historically recent urban presence can become firmly rooted in local structures and practices.

For many years, Conakry remained a kind of museum of colonial architecture and urbanism. The influence of Touré's regime on the city was relatively limited. There are some symbolic buildings that are his legacy, such as the vast People's Palace, an urban freeway and a stadium. However, it is since the 1980s that the city experienced accelerated change – for better and for worse. Conakry is now endowed with elements seen as characteristic of 'modernity'. The state and its strategic partners, and especially private investors, have constructed an increasing number of high-rise buildings, widened the main arteries and installed crossroads.

This chapter describes Conakry's development over more than a century, and demonstrates how a city founded from nothing progressively acquired, from the era of colonisation to the present, the symbols of a metropolis in a context of rigid economic constraints and political autocracy.

From colonial urban planning to recent developments

'White city', 'black villages' during colonial times

Travellers to Conakry, the capital of what was formerly known as French Guinea, and the first port of call along the coast after Dakar, inevitably struck a note of admiration describing the town:

> As much as Dakar is disappointing,…Conakry, brand new, with its geometric arterial streets lined with tall and thick mango trees that

> submerge the city with their green foliage, with its corniche facing the ocean, its leaden sun typical of tropical climates, is generally thought of as a luxurious, well-to-do and very attractive little capital. (Richard-Molard 1961: 11)[1]

How exactly did Conakry develop into a dynamic and sprawling city since its colonial establishment in 1885? How is it lived in and perceived by its inhabitants? Which elements have been preserved as legacies and how has it developed in the course of the past decades?

Conakry is situated in a region with little early experience of urbanisation, where large rural villages coexisted with coastal ports of call, the vestiges of slavery along the '*rivières du Sud*' (coasts of the south). Although urban traditions were limited in the area of Conakry, other models existed in the hinterland. There were the political and religious capitals of the theocratic state of Fouta-Djalon, Timbo and Fougoumba, both with small populations, and especially the prestigious city of Kankan, situated further away and for a long time known as the largest city of Guinea (Humblot 1921). It is difficult to determine what role earlier urban experiences played for the newcomers to Conakry. These may have determined a certain relationship in terms of space, or moulded their expectations of the regulatory authorities in charge of the city and especially the types of social and political organisations within the community (e.g. those in charge of conflict management and other civic services). For new city dwellers either arriving alone or in a group, figures of authority long remained the kinship group, regional structures and neighbourhood notables, rather than the coloniser. As a result, former migrants from Sierra Leone, some of whom arrived in Conakry as early as the 1880s, continued to consult community figures in order to manage their conflicts.

The city was built in a defensive geographic setting which allowed for the construction of a harbour. The initial site was the Tumbo Peninsula (about 5 by 3 km), stretching into the interior. Urban development of the site was restricted, as it could only go in one direction.

The period of colonial conquest and the implementation of the first town-planning project were decisive for Conakry. Planning decisions made at the time of its foundation remain visible in the old city centre and have influenced subsequent developments. They have given concrete expression to various aspects of French colonial urban policy: the spatial distribution of populations, the hierarchical organisation of neighbourhoods, the role assigned to nature, the architectural styles and even the service infrastructures and policy concerning monuments.

This form of urban planning, combining colonial dominance and Western urban conceptions, is well known today. Conakry constitutes a kind of archetype. The colonisers considered the city, created from nothing, as a *tabula rasa* on which they could imprint their mark. The separation of populations, which became widespread in the colonies at the beginning of the 20th century, occurred in Conakry through the division of its urban space, first into two zones (in 1901) and then three (1905).

These zones were delineated according to the purchasing power of the inhabitants, measured mainly in terms of real-estate investment capacity (Goerg 1997: Chapters 19 and 20). The use of land ownership as a criterion to distinguish urban dwellers was characteristic of the French system. It emphasised the disparity between 'individual property' on the one hand (i.e. land titles and registration) and a 'licence to reside' ('*permis d'habiter*') on the other, or in other words, an ambiguous right to property ownership. This French land-ownership policy underlay the spatial dualism present in Conakry, as in many colonial cities. It also translated into administrative duality, with the municipality assuming administrative responsibility for the whole city, but the chieftainships concerned only with the neighbourhoods inhabited by the colonised.

The colonisers' definition of the 'city' was the European administrative, commercial and residential sections (i.e. the 'white city'); the African villages and neighbourhoods were excluded from that mental representation. This dualism encompassed all aspects of urban life: a privileged few had access to private urban installations and services (water supply, sewers, the electrical network, refuse collection), while the large majority made do with collective installations (public drinking fountains, public latrines). This disparity also applied to the streets – tarred roads on the one hand, dirt roads on the other. Given the peninsular location of Conakry, urban development progressed from the west (the coastline) to the east, whereas the northern and southern areas were used for the construction of sewers. The wastewater drainage network discharged directly into the sea and was progressively completed as the city grew, thereby benefiting the European zone. Aesthetic initiatives, such as parks and monuments, were also concentrated in the European area (Goerg 1996).

For the entire period between the two World Wars, the city's expansion was restricted to the peninsula, and it formed a municipal area of about 3 km^2. Granted official status in 1901, the suburbs consisted of a few villages. A 1943 census indicated the following, underestimated, figures: 21 217 inhabitants for the city, 5 586 for the suburbs (ANG, 2D 321: 1943).

Two contrasting testimonies about Conakry from the beginning of the 1950s evoke the city in the post-war period. The first proved far from being an accurate prediction of how Conakry would develop:

> Konakry…has kept and will no doubt for a long time keep its character of an old colonial city: small villas with wide verandas in the middle of thick groves of exotic vegetation, set out along avenues that are planted with mango and coconut trees. The whole conjures up an image of a distant island redolent of the ambiance of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The bush starts at a distance of 15 km from the city. (Houis 1953: 89)[2]

A view that contrasted with this nostalgic image was given by Governor Roland Pré, whose prospective vision for the city was sceptical of the official census figures:

> The built-up area encroaches increasingly upon the peninsula of Kaloum where villages increasingly form one with the Municipality ('*Commune Mixte*')…New huts are being built everywhere in the immediate vicinity

> of Conakry…The city of Conakry is currently spreading its tentacles into the peninsula of Kaloum around three main roads on which the new suburbs and villages have naturally converged: the road to the north, the road to the south and the railway line of the *Chemin de Fer Conakry-Niger*. (Pré 1951: 30, 245)[3]

The situation in Conakry changed from 1946 onwards because of accelerated population growth and the construction of new facilities (e.g. schools and hospitals) undertaken under the aegis of the Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development. Architect Rémy Le Caisne's ambitious urban planning project in 1948 incorporated the city's hinterland and envisioned the reorganisation of basic facilities over a large area of the city.[4] It involved moving the railway station, whose size obstructed buildings in the city centre and whose activities created a variety of problems. The construction of new railway lines to enable the export of bauxite in the late 1950s accentuated these problems. The project also involved the creation of a new administrative area named Taïnakry. Cost, practical difficulties and Guinea's independence in 1958 prevented the plan from being carried out, despite the city council's wish, expressed in 1949, urgently to pursue the development and creation of the City of Taïnakry, the indispensable first stage for any urban planning within Conakry.

Administrators in the post-war years also took into account the need for housing among a specific category of Africans, the 'educated natives' (known as the '*évolués*'), who were generally civil servants. In the 1950s, the *Société Immobilière de Guinée* built for them a few housing estates, such as the houses at Coléah. Houses appeared everywhere, testimony to the capital's pull among the rural population. Uncertainties over the status of land – namely, collective property as opposed to individual ownership – created the ingredients for the current imbroglio: unscrupulous persons sold the same plots to several buyers; local authorities misused public funds; and numerous individuals claimed possession of the same properties. In the context of the struggle for independence, the colonisers chose to remain vague and maintained the juxtaposition of various land-tenure systems. Administrative or former village leaders, notables and those with a command of legal mechanisms took advantage of this confusion to assert their power as purveyors of land titles or redistributors of plots in order to claim land taxes and build up their own private land estates. Land in the suburbs became a precious resource with political and economic stakes. These malpractices were initially restricted to the areas closest to the centre, but progressively spread to all of the outlying areas.

In addition, construction developed and made use of new building materials (concrete) and techniques (air conditioning). Architects took advantage of the freedom offered by the colonial city to redesign public buildings and public spaces. Marcel Lods, Le Caisne's partner, and consulting engineer Vladimir Bodiansky were responsible for the new marketplace in Conakry's Niger Square. In-depth preliminary work on both a technical and sociological level preceded its construction.[5] The new buildings celebrated verticality as a marker of modernity, unlike earlier constructions, which

used this symbol of power more discreetly (the relatively unpretentious governor's palace stood raised by only a few steps, for example). *La Paternelle*, a 10-storey building, and the *Jumelles*, two towers intended to house civil servants in the city centre at Boulbinet, attest to the new taste for the vertical. Nonetheless, when Guinea acquired independence, modernist constructions remained few and far between in an urban space that was still marked by one-storey houses.

The city also expanded beyond the old centre. Although the bridge connecting the peninsula of Tumbo to the continent was replaced by an embankment in the mid-1950s, the roads remained poorly developed except for the north and south corniches and the Leprince Road, the main east-west road stretching from the far end of Tumbo into the interior (see Figure 2.1).

Urban policy after independence

Anyone visiting Conakry today encounters a city characterised both by large construction sites, private ones in particular, and a monotonous urban landscape.

The 50 years since Guinea voted 'no' in the September 1958 referendum on its membership of the French Community can be divided – both on a politico-economic and an urban level – into two roughly equal periods: Sékou Touré's dictatorship (1958–1984) and Lansana's autocratic regime (1984–2008). After limited governmental intervention and restricted private initiative under Touré (the period called the First Republic), whose regime was characterised by the absence of an urban policy, came an explosion of economic liberalism and extensive private, local and international investment. New urbanisation plans in 1963, 1989 and 1997, which were to have a significant impact on the city, were supposed to accompany urban growth. In the past 10 years, however, major development works have addressed the needs of an expanding metropolis that is inhabited today by 1.5 million people and stretches over more than 30 km. These have included the building of transversal roads linking the two corniches (T1 and T4), the creation of a main freeway leaving the city centre, the extension and widening of old roads and the construction of intersections.[6]

Touré, who initially followed an anti-urban agenda, was generally non-interventionist. He destroyed little and constructed on a modest scale. For example, he kept the old governor's palace (renamed the presidential palace) as his residence and scarcely modified its appearance. Nevertheless, he endowed the city with some emblematic buildings, notably the People's Palace, constructed by the Chinese and completed in 1965, which emerged as a symbol of the new regime (Figure 2.2). This monumental edifice was built at the far end of the old city centre in an area that was built up in the 1950s but which remained unoccupied. The People's Palace was situated in a vast open space that served as a gathering place. Later the *Jardins du 2 Octobre* were laid out in this space – the name commemorates the date of proclamation of independence. In the same location, the authorities placed a stela glorifying the people's resistance to the Portuguese aggression of November 1970 (Figure 2.3). The People's Palace remains today a gathering place for the city and the country. It is used for cultural events – Miriam Makeba performed there during Touré's rule – and,

more recently, for political demonstrations and conferences. The palace, built as a testimony to Touré's authoritarian regime and the citizens' participation in it, now houses the National Assembly, created under the 1990 constitution. Negotiations between trade unionists and the state took place there during the 2006 and 2007 demonstrations. The Chinese renovated the palace and its gardens in 2008 for the 50th anniversary celebrations of independence.

Other emblematic buildings of Touré's presidency include the former Polytechnic Institute, later the university, constructed by the Soviets[7] in 1962, and the nearby stadium at Donka (the *Stade du 28 Septembre*[8] – the date of the referendum).

Yet another noteworthy construction was the Palace of Nations and villas constructed in anticipation of an Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit that never took place owing to Touré's death. Badly damaged during a mutiny in 1996, the Palace of Nations long constituted a visible eyesore within the city. It was reconstructed in 2008 as an administrative building. Funded and designed by Saudi Arabia and Morocco, the large Fayçal Mosque in the suburb of Donka is another example of a building that dates from the First Republic, although the first stone was laid only in 1983.

After 1984, private construction flourished, testified by, for example, the buildings of businessman and former Prime Minister Sydia Touré. However, the government invested little in public properties except for military barracks. In place of public investment in construction, President Lansana Conté established procedures that facilitated property investments on his own behalf and on those of his entourage. The state authorised the construction of large complexes, often on state land, which were let to international companies for offices and to expatriates for housing. The best example is the complex belonging to the head of state built on the site of the former railway compound demolished around 1989. It consists of five- and six-storey buildings bearing the names of Guinean cities (Mamou, Labé, etc.). Situated in the old city centre, these properties partly explain why the administrative centre has remained in Kaloum (the current name of the former city centre, previously called Tumbo), obstructing administrative relocation towards the plateau of Koloma (a geographically central area made up of state land reserves).

Regimes also make their mark, or not, as the case may be, on urban space through toponymy and cultural politics with respect to monuments. Under Conté's dictatorship, the ostentatious expression of power remained limited in Conakry in everyday life.[9] An exception is the colonial stela dedicated to the soldiers of both World Wars, which Conté replaced with a very sober nationalist monument bearing the laconic inscription 'The Republic of Guinea to all its martyrs'. Recently, in the context of urban development and in preparation for the 50th year of independence, Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté (in office March 2007–May 2008) instigated a controversial sculpture programme. This cannot, however, be regarded as a political project, but instead an initiative on the part of an isolated group. It bears little relation to the initiatives carried out in Bamako, for example, under the aegis of the president and historian, Alpha Konaré (Arnoldi 2007).

Similarly, the state made little use of toponymy. The colonisers adopted the American system of designating streets by numbers. The city was constructed on a grid of 14 avenues that were numbered starting from the western end of the peninsula, and 12 boulevards that ran roughly north-south. Certain main roads only, such as the *Boulevard du Commerce* (3rd Boulevard) and the *Avenue du Gouvernement* (6th Avenue), were given specific names. Efforts by the colonisers to impose street names of French 'heroes' failed. Instead, inhabitants commonly located a home according to a landmark building or the area of a well-known figure, and still do so today. Other colonial names included the corniches, the *Route du Niger* (the main road from the city centre to the interior of the country used by caravans from Upper Guinea) and the *Route Leprince* (named after a colonial engineer).

After independence, the *Avenue du Gouvernement* became *Avenue de la République*, 4th Avenue became *Avenue William Tubman* (president of Liberia, 1944–1971) and the only freeway was named after Fidel Castro. The *Hôtel de France* became the *Hôtel de l'Indépendance* and the Mangin Camp, named after the inventor of the *Force Noire* (black African troops employed in the French army), became Almamy Samory Camp. Later, the Camayenne police camp was called Boiro Camp, synonymous with imprisonment and death for Guineans. Some educational institutions also acquired names. For example, the Polytechnic Institute was named in honour of Abdel Gamel Nasser and a school was baptised Kwame Nkrumah, after Ghana's prime minister/president, and a well-known supporter of Guinea, who sought refuge there after the *coup d'état* in 1966.

The World Bank instigated a naming operation for the city between 1995 and 1997 in the five *communes* (municipalities) of Conakry, expecting that the authorities would later choose names (Figure 2.4). This bureaucratic procedure was rather impractical: each *commune* was given an abbreviation (KA = Kaloum; DI = Dixinn, etc.) and each street was allocated a number according to geographical orientation (e.g. KA.024).[10] The inhabitants were clearly unable to use such a system. As a result, following past tradition, only a few main roads were given names, most significantly the *Boulevard Diallo Telli* (formerly 8th Boulevard), named after the former representative of Guinea to the UN and a minister of Sékou Touré, who was sentenced to the 'black diet' (death by deprivation of water and food) in 1977.

New buildings and new forms of social hierarchy

The history of Guinea, both during and after the dictatorship of Sékou Touré, left little opportunity for 'donors' to have an influence. Only a few international institutions are present – the United Nations Development Programme, the Islamic Bank and some embassies. Constructed in a so-called international style without much originality, their buildings hardly make a mark on the urban landscape.

Through segregation and secession, minorities privileged by status or money have always maintained a separate place in Conakry's urban space. The parameters that govern their relationship to the city have changed over the decades, but their concerns have remained the same: to ensure mental comfort by seeking to live with

those of similar origins or those sharing the same standard of living, and to live in an environment offering the best facilities available. Today, their elite housing estates originate from local and foreign government initiatives, as Guinea does not have a sufficiently large group of affluent people to justify financially the building of a 'gated community'. In this context, the affluent construct their own protected space within their own compounds, which take the shape of small forts behind high walls covered by barbed wire and protected by metal gates. Guards are the norm, and are now armed. Dogs, previously emblematic of efforts by the Europeans to keep intruders at bay, watch over the homes of the rich, irrespective of their identity.

Over time, the imperative of security has played an increasingly significant role. Collective buildings have taken the place of isolated villas; estates surrounded by high walls have replaced open neighbourhoods. The detached houses built for colonial civil servants, now destroyed, have given way to the Bellevue Ministerial Villas of Independent Guinea (a housing estate designed in the 1950s). The buildings constructed by Moroccan workers for the envisaged 1984 OAU summit have been superseded by the Moussoudougou residential estate (in Lansébounyi), reserved for the French, but let to the Guinean state. Lastly, the huge compound belonging to the American Embassy was completed in 2008.

Each of these forms generate islands of urban facilities, with generators, water tanks and exclusive leisure facilities (pools, tennis courts, etc.). They also represent secure enclaves in the event of political uncertainty. The security motive is heightened by fear of unrest and urban demonstrations. These enclosed units reflect a siege mentality and provide measures for rapid evacuation.

The huge contrasts in living standards, the presence of all kinds of drug trafficking networks, together with the limited prospects for most young people, are major factors contributing to increased crime rates, and particularly armed criminal activities in the capital. Other causal factors of crime seem rather secondary, despite efforts of the city authorities to highlight them as the primary causes. The authorities thus decided in August 2008 to do a survey of all the drinking establishments and nightclubs in Conakry, with the aim of fighting insecurity, which has become a growing scourge in this city of about 1.5 to 2 million inhabitants.

Housing policies and living standards

The colonisers made little effort to provide housing for Africans, except for specific categories, such as policemen, railwaymen and, in the 1950s, employees of the administration. The independent state adopted the same housing policy and merely responded to the needs of some civil servants, particularly teachers. Consequently, housing is dominated by individual construction and by the private sector, which uses housing as an investment.

This variety of housing initiatives, in conjunction with increasingly difficult access to land and the absence of effective urban planning, apart from a small number of well-planned housing operations, largely explains the heterogeneous nature of Conakry's

neighbourhoods. The inhabitants, old and new city-dwellers alike, settle where cheaper space is available, contributing to the city's expansion. As a result, aside from the wealthy enclaves, socially homogeneous neighbourhoods are rare. The multiform juxtaposition of houses, many of them built piecemeal, reflects both the different levels of prosperity and the changing prosperity of individual owners. Dilapidated houses stand adjacent to walled villas constructed in the most diverse styles – neoclassical with colonnades and porticos, Italianate and Arabic. These villas, equipped with their own generators and drinking wells, emerge in an environment that often lacks collective urban facilities and appear to be in a world unto their own. They can be seen as a form of secession, yet they represent a tiny portion of the constructions in the city. Most houses are modest and often lack basic facilities. Collective modes of organisation sometimes make it possible to deal with shortages in the neighbourhood (e.g. through voluntary and self-financed connection to water or electricity networks, types of surveillance, refuse collection and even road maintenance).

Unlike in the countryside, where 93.5% of Guineans are estimated to be home owners, the urban population is principally made up of tenants, even if the goal of every adult is to be the owner of a house (see Table 2.1).

The data shown in Table 2.1 has not been updated. Nonetheless, it shows the type of housing that urban Guineans enjoy. Renting varies from a single room in the courtyard of a family concession with communal use of the bathrooms, to a small flat with individual facilities, or an apartment of varying social standing in residential buildings that have flourished since the 1990s.

The diversity of housing in terms of comfort and standards of living is also reflected in the different levels of access to facilities. As is commonly seen elsewhere, the Guinean cities in general and Conakry in particular enjoy higher living standards than the countryside. These include access to electricity, drinking water and bathroom facilities. Surveys on sanitary conditions provide general information about facilities, but often do not specify the situation in the capital. Such surveys reveal that cities have greater access to drinking water (68% of urban-dwellers have access to a tap, as opposed to 3% of the rural population); 64% are connected to electricity, as opposed to 3% of the rural population. However, there are frequent power cuts and high connection and rental prices for such facilities (EDSG III 2005).

Like all large cities, Conakry produces a considerable amount of waste, the collection and disposal of which are increasingly problematic. There is no central collection

Table 2.1 Home ownership in Conakry and other Guinean cities

	Conakry (%)	Cities in general (%)
Private owners	23.0	39.3
Tenants	54.3	41.9
State-owned (civil servants)	3.6	5.2
Other	19.1	13.6

Source: RGPH 1983: 171

system in place, despite international incentives. NGOs have been created to deal with these issues and small groups of city inhabitants help keep their neighbourhoods clean. The government initiates regular clean-up campaigns and encourages inhabitants to act, but according to an official report, 'almost all households refuse to pay [companies] for refuse collection and tip their bins out into the gutters or the street as soon as it starts to rain'.[11]

The Public Waste Transport Department that falls under the Governorate (the body which supervises the five *communes*) estimates that Conakry produces 800 tonnes of waste per day. Existing installations are inadequate and incapable of dealing with this. Therefore, hygienic conditions in the city leave much to be desired and heaps of waste accumulate at intersections for the greater pleasure of chickens and sheep.

In short, even though the general living standards in Conakry are higher than those in the Guinean countryside, the inhabitants of the capital still suffer from difficult conditions, in addition to the fatigue associated with commuting to work. The capital represents a place of opportunities, but also one of striking contrasts.

Conakry, an ethnically diverse city

Indigenous inhabitants and migrants

The population of Conakry is heterogeneous, although certain large groups dominate. When the French settled there in 1885, the Peninsula of Tumbo consisted of two sparsely populated villages, Conakry and Boulbinet, in the far west; Tumbo, on the eastern tip, appeared later.[12]

The Baga, considered to constitute the demographic foundation of the city, and the Susu were allied peoples that made up the city's initial population. The product of successive migrations themselves, these populations came from the interior under pressure from political unrest in Fouta-Djalon involving Peul movements and the establishment of a theocratic state at the beginning of the 18th century. According to oral traditions and toponymy, the first villages on the coastal region are said to be of the Baga, who lived increasingly under the political and cultural control of the Susu, who are related to the Mande. The villages of Conakry and Boulbinet are said to have been founded in the 18th century and in the 1860s, respectively, by the Soumah and Bangoura lineages.

Peul migrants joined these peoples. The Peul were present in the village of Tumbo from the 19th century onwards and mostly settled in the mainland (and not the peninsula), where they herded their flocks. This initial nucleus was reinforced in 1896 after France subjected the theocratic State of Fouta-Djalon and compelled the dignitaries, with their servants and family members, to reside in the suburbs of Conakry. Other migrants from Fouta-Djalon progressively followed in search of work and brought about considerable internal diversification.[13]

In quantitative terms, the Susu and Baga formed the main demographic basis. During the colonial period, certain estimates based on 'race', as it was understood

then, provide approximate information. One source in 1929 indicates that there were 3 613 Susu and Baga (62%) and 1 383 Peul (24%) out of a total population of 5 811 inhabitants (ANG, 1D 62: 1929). However, in 1936, out of 12 492 inhabitants, it is said that there were 3 576 Baga (32%), 4 693 Susu (42%) and only 799 Peul (7%).[14] Despite the uncertain figures and ethnic categorisation procedures, the last figure tends to confirm that the Peul were more present in the suburbs, particularly in Dixinn-Foulah, a Peul village. At the beginning of the 1950s, the proportions are said to have been generally the same as in 1929, that is, 62% Susu and Baga and 18% Peul. The rest of the population was made up of groups that came from more distant areas (Dollfus 1952: 16).

In the context of the ethnicisation of politics in Guinea, initiated by the French before independence but subsequently pursued – the paroxysm being the so-called Peul plot in 1976 – evaluating the population per group became contentious. The data no longer appear in official statistics, but the ethnic dimension plays a fundamental role not only in Guinean politics, but also in urban topography with populations of the same origin concentrated in specific neighbourhoods.

The colonisers recruited local intermediaries (canton, village and area chiefs) from the Baga/Susu and Peul groups in order to manage and control urban inhabitants (Goerg 2007). From the 1880s onwards, the economic dynamism and central position of Conakry within the colonial system attracted migrants who came to offer their skills. They joined the population of Conakry and reinforced its cosmopolitan image. The Senegalese worked as office clerks in the administration or as artisans (blacksmiths and masons) and were accompanied by Lebu or Wolof fishermen (Goerg 1990). Sierra Leoneans with the same socio-professional traits also settled in Conakry (Goerg 2001, 2009). According to one source: 'Their huts are emerging everywhere as if by magic. They are tailors, cobblers, blacksmiths, carpenters, painters, masons, shop employees, fishermen and cooks. The women are retailers and laundresses' (Raimbault 1891: 139).[15]

These migrant people were mainly Creoles ('Krio'), but also Temne, Mende or Kru, who were known for their skills as sailors and dockers.[16] These demographic and sociological minorities played an important role in the identity of early Conakry, but were subsequently increasingly marginalised. Some of these early migrants settled in Conakry, preserving their own particular cultural characteristics, especially those concerning religion. The Temple of the Sierra Leoneans and the so-called Senegalese Mosque are examples of elements that marked Conakry's urban landscape.

At the same time, migrants from distant regions of Guinea came to look for work in the colonial capital. Initially this was a temporary migration of men, very often the by-product of forced labour on rail and roadwork construction and, from the 1930s onwards, in banana plantations. A colonial expression, the *forestiers*, described migrants who originally came from the forest regions (Kpelle, Kissi, Loma, etc.). The city also attracted Malinke from Upper Guinea.

The increasing diversity of Conakry's population gradually disrupted the initial division of the city into roughly two types of neighbourhoods, distinctive in terms of

population and history. In the administrative quadripartition of the African areas of the city, the neighbourhoods of the Centre (formerly Almamya, the heart of the pre-colonial village of Conakry) and Boulbinet, both close to the white city, had initially been populated by the Susu, whereas Hôpital and Timénétaye became the home for recent migrants, like the eponymous Temne. Other neighbourhoods existed on a smaller scale alongside these colonial divisions and denominations. They included the Manquepas, Sandervalia and Coronthie neighbourhoods, whose place names provide information about the city's history.

Since independence, heterogeneity has characterised the population of Conakry, particularly given its attraction for all of West Africa. Contemporary migratory movements have not modified the general composition. The national political context has, however, exacerbated rivalries. Without wishing to oversimplify, one can note that under Sékou Touré (of Malinke origin) and Lansana Conté (of Susu origin) the Peul have often been singled out for discrimination.[17] The national authorities increasingly exploit the ethnic dimension of Guinean politics in their refusal to allow any real democratisation. This often translates into specific repressive actions in Conakry against members of the opposition, who are often of Fouta-Djalon origins. In this context, urban decisions at times have concealed forms of political repression. For instance, the construction of a new administrative quarter in the geographical centre of the town on the Koloma plateau (based on the 1948 colonial plan of Taïnakry) served as a pretext to counter political opposition in a neighbourhood primarily inhabited by Peul. And the government razed the suburban neighbourhood of Kaporo-Rail to the ground in March 1998, leading to the expulsion without warning of more than 100 000 people. A number of people held legal title to land there, on which constructions ranged from grand brick-built villas to shanty towns. Ten years later, this land is still empty except for a few, such as the head office of Guinean Radio and Television and the American Embassy, which occupies a vast, enclosed, secured space. Similarly, in February to April 2006, during the first large-scale strikes since independence, the most serious unrest took place in Peul-populated areas. In everyday parlance, these areas – Hamdallaye, Bambeto and Koloma – were considered an 'axis of evil'. Kaloum, however, an area mostly inhabited by the Susu (supporters of the ruling Party for Unity and Progress) remained calmer. The calm is easy to enforce, however, by blocking the isthmus with tanks to prevent demonstrators from gaining access to the old centre of Kaloum. Therefore, the main areas of demonstration are restricted to the suburbs along the main roads, particularly along the freeway.

Dynamics of population growth

Like other cities founded during the 19th-century colonial period, Conakry initially experienced rapid growth, which then slowed between the two World Wars, only to be followed by an upsurge at the end of the 1930s and a further acceleration after World War II. From only a few hundred in the 1880s, the population grew to 10 000 towards the end of World War I and 50 000 by the end of World War II. According to the 1983 census, the population exceeded 700 000[18] and was 1.1 million

according to the 1996 census. According to controversial estimates, the current total is said to be between 1.5 and 2 million inhabitants. Guinea is one of those African countries characterised by moderate urbanisation of 30–40%. However, Conakry alone accounts for about 50% of the country's city dwellers and about 18% of the total population. This 'macrocephaly' is a frequent legacy of French colonisation, a trend that was not rectified after independence. Kankan, the second largest city of Guinea, no longer represents a rival to the capital, with its estimated population of just 250 000 (up from 55 000 in 1983 and 100 000 in 1996). Kankan is characterised by a notorious lack of services, in particular electricity (EDSG 1992, 1999, 2005; RGPH 1983, 1996; Bidou & Toure 2002).

Conakry's population growth can be explained by classic factors – the accumulation of administrative, economic and cultural functions. As the country's capital and only sizeable international harbour (an outlet for bauxite exports), Conakry remains the location of rare substitution industries, and has the country's main educational institutions, despite long-standing efforts at decentralisation. As is the case in other countries, Guinea's medium-sized cities are currently experiencing accelerated growth, although a significant percentage of the rural exodus still benefits Conakry.

Rapid population growth from the 1950s onwards went hand in hand with considerable urban expansion, which has modified the distribution of the city's population. At independence, the city and its suburbs had about 70 000 inhabitants,[19] two-thirds of whom lived within the city limits. In 1996, however, out of a total urban population of 1.1 million, the old city centre, now called the Commune of Kaloum, had only 74 327 inhabitants (7%), with the rest of the population divided among the four other communes, namely Dixinn (147 500), Matam (157 177), Ratoma (325 379) and Matoto (389 692). Therefore, although Kaloum has retained the city's main functions of 'command' (i.e. ministries, embassies, the head offices of international companies), its restricted location is undergoing rapid changes.

Health facilities and schools in Conakry

Like the demographic figures mentioned above, socio-economic statistics on Guinea are uncertain and must be considered as rough estimates. The same uncertainty applies to statistics relating to the colonial period and the sociological research conducted in the 1950s on consumption, budgets and nutrition. In collaboration with Guinean ministries, international institutions regularly conduct surveys, which constitute sources of information. The most recent census was in 1996[20] and there are partial thematic data, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (EDSG) of 1992, 1999 and 2005. However, most of the available statistical data do not provide details about the specific situation in Conakry. Undoubtedly, however, the capital enjoys the most favourable indicators in the country, since it benefits from the most developed hospital, educational and cultural infrastructures, as well as a concentration of monetary revenue.

Social disparities are nevertheless marked and define Conakry's urban space, as in all African cities. SUVs and Hollywood-style villas (in the words of one

Guinean commentator) on the outskirts of Lambanyi and Sonfonia testify to the ostentatious opulence of a minority with close connections to the state (political and administrative officials, diamond dealers and drug traffickers). At the other end of the scale, much of the capital is characterised by shacks lacking in comfort and suburbs without infrastructure.

Despite Conakry's status as a large, modern capital benefiting from a considerable portion of Guinea's infrastructure investment, some of its public facilities are in a lamentable condition. A case in point is the Donka University Hospital, whose services are the target of severe criticisms (Kourouma 2005).[21]

In terms of demographic indicators, a gap exists between Conakry and the rest of the country. Fertility rates (number of children per woman) at the beginning of the 21st century are as follows:

- 5.7 (Guinea)
- 4.4 (cities)
- 6.3 (countryside)
- 4.1 (Conakry)
- 7.4 (Kankan)

The low urban indicator reflects the capital's weight in the urban population: 4.1 children per woman in Conakry, which is a low fertility rate for Africa, as opposed to 7.4 in Kankan (EDSG II 1999; EDSG III 2005). This can be explained by very young women's lower fertility rate: 16% of women in Conakry aged between 15 and 19 have been pregnant, as opposed to 41% in Kankan and 26% in Guinea as a whole. This rate is linked to the increased median age of the first union (25–49-year-olds): 17.9 years of age in Conakry in 1999 and 19.9 in 2005 (as opposed to 16.4 and 16.2, respectively, for Guinea). Higher living standards and better education for women also explain decreasing fertility rates in the capital.[22] This downward trend in the number of children per woman is not recent and the gap between rural and urban behaviour is widening, even if family-planning practices in fact only concern a tiny minority of Conakry's population – essentially the educated (Keita 1999).[23] Large households nonetheless exist in the capital as families often lodge relatives and friends.

Some health-related indicators also confirm the gap between Conakry and the rest of Guinea. The infant mortality rate is lower in Conakry than elsewhere: 60 per 1 000, as opposed to 82 per 1 000 in the cities and 118 per 1 000 in the countryside (Guinean average rate: 91 per 1 000). Children's chance of survival to the age of five is also far better in the capital: the infant-juvenile mortality rate is 92 per 1 000 in the capital as opposed to 133 per 1 000 in the cities and 204 per 1 000 in the countryside (Guinean average rate: 163 per 1 000). This may seem surprising, since vaccination coverage among children in Conakry is not markedly better than in other regions of Guinea. Compared with an average of 37% in the country, extended vaccination programme coverage rate of 40% applies to Conakry and the other cities. Access to dispensaries, the quality of water and nutritional diversity also play a significant role. With the exception of AIDS, no figures for other pathologies are available for Conakry. The

prevalence of AIDS, however, is generally higher in the cities and particularly in the capital. Compared with the national average of 2.8%, Conakry's AIDS prevalence rate rises to 5%, with the military worst affected at 9.4% (USAID 2007).

The above data demonstrate that although Conakry is generally a place of better opportunities and longer life expectancy, the capital is also a refuge for a so-called high-risk population.

Against a backdrop of generally low indicators, schooling data are also testimony to the fact that the capital enjoys higher standards. Whereas the gross intake ratio (GIR)[24] was 40% for Guinea, it was 71% in Conakry (1998 figures). The net intake rate (NIR)[25] was, however, significantly lower: 17.4% for the whole country compared to 35% in Conakry for boys and girls. This is due to the fact that children are often sent at a late age to overcrowded schools. Therefore, even from the beginning of junior school, the large majority of children in Conakry do not have access to education. A variety of difficulties plague the educational system: the high number of pupils per class (the ratio in Conakry is 70 pupils to one teacher in public education and 31 per teacher in private education); shortcomings in teacher training in a country where the teaching profession is not held in high esteem; and high numbers of students who repeat grades. Few pupils, and in particular very few girls, reach secondary education and even fewer enter higher education. Progress in schooling is not necessarily linear. Recent studies reveal a de-schooling phenomenon linked to an increase in transport costs (which are a deterrent for parents), a reduction of adults' resources and the poor quality of public education. The result is a high illiteracy rate in Guinea, which is higher among women and increases with age. The illiteracy rate ranges from 53.4% (age group 10–14) to 91.4% (65-year-olds and above). However, no figures are available for the capital.

The low literacy rate is a fundamental factor for understanding how politics functions in Guinea. Although the press is relatively free, it is only accessible to a tiny minority. Airways have only been open to private radio stations since 2006 and the state still monopolises television. Newspaper circulation is limited to the cities, but even in Conakry, newspapers are only available in Kaloum and a few other places. Modern media are not widely accessible, as internet cafés are poorly distributed and expensive, and cable networks only accessible to the most affluent.

Sites of power and counter-power: Changes in the political geography

During the period of colonisation, Conakry had a municipality, which was introduced in 1904 and controlled by the administration until 1956. Its function was to run the city with an autonomous budget financed by local taxes. The municipality made decisions regarding the city's healthcare, urban facilities and road maintenance, oversaw economic activities and was responsible for the police.

Since the struggle for independence, the capital city has been at the centre of the country's political stakes. Whoever controls the city has power over the whole

country. Consequently, the first mayor, elected by direct suffrage in autumn 1956, was Sékou Touré, later to become president. Running the capital administratively and symbolically guarantees access to the control of the country. After independence in 1958, the government redefined administratively the municipality of Conakry to encompass the former suburbs, whose villages became urban neighbourhoods. The municipality's existence quickly became theoretical as the function of mayor fell away at the end of 1959 to the benefit of the governor of the Administrative Region of Conakry, a non-elected office. The overlap between administrative and partisan divisions increasingly marked the city's political structure. In 1963, the administrative circumscriptions of Conakry 1 and 2 were joined to two federations of the ruling Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG). In 1979, three *communes populaires de plein exercice* (CPPE) were created to correspond to three federations of the PDG. With the military's assumption of power in 1984 and the advent of the Second Republic, the terms gradually changed, recalibrated to reflect changing international catchwords. The three CPPE were turned into three 'prefectures'. Then, under the guise of decentralisation and a discourse on good governance, the state created in 1991 five *communes de plein exercice* (an expression borrowed from the colonial era). These communes were henceforth called Kaloum (the former city centre) and Dixinn, Matam, Ratoma and Matoto in the suburbs. The mayors of these five communes were elected in the context of a highly monitored process of democratisation and state clientelism. Notables or former authorities outside of partisan structures played a role locally, particularly the chiefs of those villages that were increasingly included in the urban perimeter because of Conakry's expanding boundaries. These local authorities supported the mayors, were able to give advice and played a role in distributing land for development. With respect to housing estates, the former local communities received certain plots, while the state, its agents and buyers shared other plots (Diallo 2006).

The city has maintained the exceptional status of a decentralised local authority and forms one of Guinea's eight administrative regions, with a governor at its head. More than the various mayors, it is the governor who holds power.

Colonial and post-independence authorities have long restricted or controlled the expression of political opinion, both in the context of support (organised by the government in place) and of contest. The colonial powers imposed a symbolic topography of power gravitating typically around the governor's palace, the esplanade in front of it and the avenue leading up to it. These places were sites of colonial celebrations, in particular to commemorate 14 July and 11 November. At times, the harbour area was also used, notably to welcome visiting dignitaries. Christian authorities established their own ceremonial map between the cathedral, close to the palace, and the archdiocese on the opposite side of the city. Most of the population were Muslims and remained excluded from these ceremonies, and organised their own festivities around the mosques.

After independence, Sékou Touré settled into the former governor's palace and did nothing to change its appearance. This continuity stood in contrast to the political

change at independence. Touré seems to have opted for the symbolic significance associated with the appropriation of the colonial centre of power, rather than seek a new location to represent the outcome of the 1958 referendum. Under the dictatorship, many processions and ceremonies were organised and skilfully orchestrated either along the main roads of the city centre and the freeway, in the *Stade du 28 Septembre*, or at the People's Palace – either national PDG conferences or welcoming events for foreign politicians. The pattern was broken in 1977 when women organised a protest demonstration over the food crisis. They walked towards the presidential palace, broke through the garden gates and demanded to see Touré on the balcony. The site was seen as the centre of power, as it had been in colonial times, but it was in the People's Palace that a political meeting took place to regain control of the situation (Pauthier 2007).

Should the location of Boiro Camp at Camayenne in the city centre, where alleged or real members of the opposition were imprisoned and exterminated, be considered a sign of power? Undoubtedly, yes, since the inhabitants of Conakry perceived its presence as a sword of Damocles suspended above their heads. This threat was indeed frequently carried out by the authoritarian regimes.

The military and its entourage have concentrated power in their hands – directly from 1984 until 1993 (the date of the first presidential elections) and then indirectly. Under military rule, the presidential palace occupied by Sékou Touré disappeared and the cleared land long remained undeveloped. Then, in 1998, a new presidential palace emerged in the same location, built by the South Koreans. It proudly bears the name Sékoutouréya, suggested by Lansana Conté, who officially accepted the political legacy. However, since it is on the outskirts of town in relation to urban expansion, well guarded and generally deserted because the president has not taken up his residence there, it does not attract crowds.

Following the PDG and its networks' central mobilising role under Sékou Touré in support of the regime and certain forms of political repression after 1984, the first demonstrations did not take place until 2006–2007. The trade unions, rather than the much-divided political parties, played a major role in these demonstrations, which led to a new political geography (McGovern 2007; Pauthier 2007).

Since the entrance to Kaloum can be easily blockaded, the main places left for demonstrations are the main roads, especially the freeway, which leave the suburbs in the direction of the forbidden centre. The People's Palace, where the National Assembly (rarely) sits, remains the meeting place of the government, demonstrators and their representatives, especially trade unionists.

With a visible presence in the city, the military camps are also significant power centres (e.g. Samory Camp in Kaloum and Alpha Yaya Camp in the suburbs), but are targets of mutinies rather than civil demonstrations. And, as mentioned above, the Palace of Nations was badly damaged during a mutiny in 1996.

Conclusion

Conakry's phases of development have shown how political regimes have made their mark on the urban space, as much by inertia as by action or destruction. The will to make certain elements from the past disappear is an intrinsic part of urban policy, whether it relates to the colonial past or to more recent periods, such as the repressive regime of Sékou Touré. How can one memory be erased and another created? How can one move from state-directed development to economic liberalism? The gigantic statue of the 'unchained' man erected in 2007 in front of Conakry's 'bridge of the hanged men'[26] would indeed be a symbol of the transition.

Even if the notion of 'heritage' is not self-evident to all Guineans (but rather finds its origins in state, partisan or corporatist UNESCO strategies), certain buildings or places are lasting elements across regimes and make their mark while changing their meaning and symbolism. The People's Palace is the most striking case due to its status as a multifunctional space – political (meeting place of the government, negotiating place); cultural (concerts, ballets); and economic (trade fairs). The *Stade du 28 Septembre* plays a similar role.

Although Guinea's population growth and rural exodus tend to be partly associated with medium-sized cities that are experiencing strong expansion, Conakry attracts individuals who come to seek refuge there. It remains the place where everything is possible. As the capital of Guinea, it is by far the most populous city, with social indicators that are favourable in relation to the rest of the country. However, although a very rich minority struts about, most inhabitants have low disposable income, facilities are blatantly lacking and life in Conakry relies on daily ingenuity.

Post-scriptum

This chapter was written before the death of Guinea's president, Lansana Conté, on 22 December 2008, after a long illness. Conté's death had been predicted for many years, but it caught the Guinean population by surprise, and the government unprepared, as various potential successors had been eliminated. According to the constitution, the president of the National Assembly, Aboubacar Somparé, should have taken charge, in order to organise elections within 60 days, but a junior army officer, Captain Dadis Camara, took over without opposition from the population, Conté's ministers and most of the army. Camara, from the Forest region, had played a role during the 2007–2008 mutinies. He suspended the constitution and formed a *Conseil National de la Démocratie et du Développement* (CNDD) (National Council for Democracy and Development), which launched campaigns against corruption and drug trafficking. The CNDD said it would organise elections within two years, but it quickly became obvious that Camara and other military leaders were reluctant to renounce their positions of power. Under various pretexts, the elections were postponed and Camara's promise not to be a candidate was put into question, which led to growing opposition. On 28 October 2009, the army fired on protesters during a meeting in Donka Stadium, leaving about 150 people dead and many injured. This resulted in an international outcry. In December 2009, Camara was badly injured

when he was shot by another officer. Another military leader, Sékouba Konaté, former minister of defence, took power, ostensibly until Camara's return. The future of Guinea is still uncertain.

Notes

1 *'Autant Dakar est décevante…autant Conakry, toute neuve, avec ses artères géométriques bordées d'énormes et épais manguiers qui noient la ville de leur verdure, avec sa corniche sur l'océan, son soleil plombé caractéristique des climats tropicaux, fait figure de petite capitale, luxueuse, aisée, pleine d'attrait.'*

2 *'Konakry…a gardé et gardera sans doute longtemps encore son cachet de vieille cité coloniale: petites villas aux larges vérandas au milieu des bosquets touffus de la végétation exotique, s'espaçant le long d'avenues plantées de manguiers et de cocotiers. L'ensemble répond à l'image des îles lointaines et respire un air de* La Case de l'Oncle Tom. *A 15 km de la ville commence la brousse.'*

3 *'L'agglomération déborde de plus en plus sur la presqu'île de Kaloum dont les villages font de plus en plus corps avec la Commune Mixte…De nouvelles cases s'élèvent un peu partout dans les environs immédiats de Conakry…La ville de Conakry développe actuellement ses tentacules dans la presqu'île du Kaloum, à l'entour des trois grands axes de communication sur lesquels s'articulent naturellement ses nouveaux quartiers et villages: la route nord, la route sud et la ligne de chemin de fer du Chemin de Fer Conakry-Niger.'*

4 Established in 1948, the project was modified a number of times before being approved in 1953. See ANS, 4: 219.

5 See *Le marché de Conakry* (1952) *Techniques et Architecture* 5–6: 65.

6 Prime Minister Sydia Touré (1996–1999) inaugurated the extensive urban development works that were subsequently continued. Under Prime Minister Kouyaté (2007–2008), the freeway was then separated from the city by walls and split in the middle by a fence. It was equipped with solar lighting that can also be found at some intersections.

7 It is interesting to note the consistency and kinds of specialisation of the foreign contractors: the Russians (*Rusal Aluminia* company) constructed two stadiums in 2007/2008, one on the coast in Kaloum close to the Samory Camp and the other at the University of Sonfonia. The Chinese and Koreans erected official buildings (People's Palace, Palace of Nations, Presidential Palace). The Chinese were also responsible for the renovation of the *Stade du 28 Septembre* in 2005/2006.

8 In addition to large political meetings and memorable matches of the 'Syli National', the stadium is used for concerts. The Ivorian reggae musician Tiken Jah Faloly performed there in June 2007.

9 Although this was not the case during official visits or commemorative ceremonies, for which the people were mobilised to attend.

10 See *Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat* (1997).

11 APANEWS Guinée (17 August 2008) *Conakry mène une campagne pour évacuer plusieurs tonnes d'ordures.* Accessed August 2008, http://www.jeuneafrique.com

12 The name Tumbo referred both to the peninsula and one of the villages.

13 In addition to differences in status (between former prisoners, free African and coloured

people and ruling families), it is possible to note rivalries between competing lineages and between lineages from the region of Fouta-Djalon and Conakry.

14 CAOM, Aff. polit. 630 d.4 (Huet inspection 1936/37), report on the *Commune mixte* of Conakry.

15 *'De tous côtés leurs cases surgissent comme par enchantement. Ils sont tailleurs, cordonniers, forgerons, charpentiers, peintres, maçons, employés de commerce, pêcheurs et cuisiniers. Les femmes, elles, vendent au détail et lavent le linge.'*

16 It is impossible to discuss here in detail the complex history of Sierra Leone and its migrants, who are characterised by great religious (Christianity, Islam), professional, social and cultural diversity.

17 The repression has, however, affected all layers of the population and representatives of all regions.

18 This figure may be an overestimate because civil servants who were heads of households benefiting from subsidised supplies acted out of self-interest by increasing the size of their households. Some authors argue that the population figure was only 500 000.

19. These estimates include temporary residents; the figure of 115 000 is suggested for 1960.

20 Intended to be carried out every ten years, the census (initially scheduled for 2006) was postponed due to social unrest, frequent changes of government and funding problems.

21 The hospital at Fria, however, performs particularly well.

22 The level of education plays a major role: the fertility rate is 6.2 for uneducated women and 3.3 for women who have reached or gone beyond secondary education. Similarly, in better-off households, the rate is 4.2, as opposed to 6.5 for poorer households.

23 See ESDG III: 14% of women in Conakry use a modern contraception method, as opposed to 6% in Guinea.

24 The GIR is the ratio between new entrants in the first grade of primary education, regardless of age, and the total population at the official entrance age to primary education (i.e. seven) (Diallo, AM 1999).

25 The NIR is the ratio between new entrants in the first grade of primary education, aged seven, and the class of seven-year-olds.

26 Built in memory of those hanged in January 1971. The official name is *Pont de Tumbo* or *Pont du 8 Novembre*, with reference to the date of the 1964 political meeting that marked the 'break with the way of capitalist development'.

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DAKAR


Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
SENEGAL
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN

3 DAKAR

Amadou Diop

During the 20th century, the city of Dakar figured as the capital city of several territories, including countries such as Mali and Gambia. This attests to the central role it has played, and continues to play, in West Africa. Today, Dakar is firmly established as the capital of Senegal. A port city with a population of over 2.5 million and a location on a peninsula which continues to attract people from the country's hinterland, Dakar has grown rapidly. It is administratively known as the Dakar Region, and comprises four *départements* (administrative districts) (see Figure 3.1) – Dakar, the original old city with a population of 1 million; Pikine, a large, sprawling department with a population of some 850 000; and Guédiawaye and Rufisque, two smaller departments of some 300 000 residents each (Diop 2008). The latter two represent the most recent peri-urban incorporation of settlements in the Dakar Region. Each of the four departments, in turn, comprise a number of communes, or smaller administrative units.

This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first, 'The urban geology of Dakar', commences with a short history of the establishment and growth of the city, its economy and population. Subsequent sections discuss urban-planning activities before and after independence, government attempts through policy and practice to address the urban housing and urban transport challenges, and attempts to plan secondary commercial centres in the Dakar Region as more and more urban settlements are developed at some distance from the city centre of Dakar. These sections deal with the major governmental and private-sector challenges posed by the massive urban migration streams that flow into the city and its peri-urban areas. The last section of this part discusses the notion of symbolic power that the government and the three presidents of Senegal since independence have invested in the built environment of the capital city. This includes the construction of public buildings, statues and monuments, as well as changes to the nomenclature of streets and other public areas, which serve as indicators of new ideological approaches, particularly after independence from colonial rule.

The second part, 'Dakar in the national context', begins with a discussion on the comparative demography of the capital city within the national framework. This section examines the ethno-linguistic characteristics of Dakar in the national context. Subsequent discussion addresses national governance and the role it plays in the capital city, in terms of both policy and practice. The third section describes events of counter-power or opposition to the actions of national governments that have taken place in the capital. Attention is paid both to the organisations that have asserted their counter-power and to where their actions have taken place.

The urban geology of Dakar

The creation of Senegal's capital

In the pre-colonial period, traditional power was in the hands of the Lébou community, who settled in the Dakar region in the 15th century. At that time, the region was organised as a republic, with Ndakaru (on the site of present-day Dakar) as the capital. This settlement entered into trade relations with European colonial powers and was incorporated by the French into a military settlement during the 19th century. Members of the Lébou community, however, managed to maintain their identity and draw the attention of the various state authorities to their interests. Today, the Lébou continue to practise their mystical powers through collective sacrifices in some areas of the capital.

The post-independence political ascendancy of Dakar is often considered to coincide with the end of the occupation of the country by the French colonialists and with reconciliation between competing groups beyond the city in the interior of Senegal. Events were more complex than this, however. Formal French recognition of Gorée Island and Dakar dates from the late 19th century and the island was incorporated into the city in the 1920s. The first black mayor of the city, Blaise Diagne, was elected during that decade. At that time, infrastructural and urban development, which mark the true beginning of Dakar's political significance, included the building of a wharf and port, and the construction of a railway station and railway line. These developments led to the city replacing Saint Louis as the capital of French West Africa in 1902, and to the construction in Dakar of the palace of the governor general. Ernest Roume, the first governor, also undertook numerous other infrastructural projects in the city. Reasons for the transfer of the colonial capital included the relatively small size of St Louis, the evident economic development of Dakar and the establishment of this infrastructure.

During World War II, the control of French West Africa – as it was then called – and its capital, Dakar, was a strategic military objective for the warring nations. A tentative allied landing in 1940 led to the memorable Battle of Dakar. One should not overlook the successive visits of two colonial French Presidents to Dakar: Vincent Auriol and, during the 1958 referendum, General de Gaulle, who gave the Senegalese the opportunity to vote either for independence or to remain under French sovereignty. De Gaulle's historic speech, which took place on what is today known as Independence Square, was an important political moment for the French West African capital. Senegal chose to remain within the French community in the context of a legal framework that granted the country a substantial measure of decision-making autonomy. Independence was granted in 1960 after the short-lived establishment of the Mali Federation – an attempt at the union of Mali and Senegal with Dakar as its capital – which collapsed soon after its formation.

Established during the colonial period, Senegal's economy was focused on the processing of local products destined for metropolitan France. The construction of the railway enabled the transportation of products from the country's hinterland

and the export of raw materials. The harbour, a stone's throw away from the railway station, and close to the administration centre of the Plateau – where most ministries and state administrations have their headquarters – played a crucial role in trade with metropolitan France. An intensive period of public works ensured the concentration of trading activities in the harbour neighbourhood. This was the first location in Senegal where both economic and political power were sited in one place – an institutional arrangement that was preserved during the independence era of the early 1960s.

After independence, the Dakar region underwent sudden and rapid development for a second time. Dakar's population first soared after it became the capital. From 1960 to 1976, the annual population growth rate in the city was 5.1%, and between 1976 and 1988 it was 3.9%. Analysis of land occupation shows that the effects of urbanisation were well documented, but remained largely uncontrolled. The following figures (Diop 2004) show the rising urbanisation rates:

- 23% (1960)
- 30% (1970)
- 34% (1976)
- 39% (1988)

The last figure, which exceeds the sub-Saharan average of 29%, is a rate of urbanisation that is detrimental to rural areas – an issue of concern in a country which claims to have achieved food self-sufficiency. Within a 20-year period, the population in Dakar almost doubled, from 1 609 820 in 1990 to over 2.5 million in 2007 (Diop 2008). The rapid population growth was largely due to a massive rural exodus. Over the period 2003 to 2007, some 117 000 people are reported to have migrated to Dakar. In 2004, 54% of the national urban population lived in Dakar, as opposed to 52.6% in 2002 (ANSD 2008). Dakar appears to be the final destination for most migrants from rural areas, from other cities in the hinterland and from outside the country. An analysis of migrant profiles in the Dakar region reveals that one in two people under 25 were born outside the region, a statistic implying that large numbers of young people are migrating to Dakar, mainly, it would seem, for economic reasons. These enormous migrant streams pose serious challenges to such matters as the environment, sanitation, public security, management of public infrastructure, housing planning and employment.

Urban planning before and after independence[1]

Urban development plans for the Dakar region date from 1862. In 1901, urbanisation levels in Senegal meant that the colonial administration was urged to design a new city development plan. The built-up area in Dakar at that time was no larger than 2 km^2. Between 1914 and 1915, a development plan was designed for Plateau and for Médina, and in 1915, after an outbreak of plague, a Médina urban neighbourhood was declared. However, there was no integrated and credible planning programme in place for the city until the mid-1940s.

Half a dozen urban planning programmes were launched in Dakar between 1946 and 2001. Their model was the 1946 Urban Development Plan (PDU), which consolidated most of the aspects of previous urban policy, with a few changes to the planning rules and division of zones that had preceded it. The PDU aided the huge infrastructural programme entrusted to the Temporary Planning Service of Greater Dakar, which entered into operation soon after the PDU was initiated. Ten years after its approval, in 1961, the 1946 PDU was reviewed by the Housing and Planning Directorate, part of the national Ministry of Public Works, Planning and Transport. As a consequence of the review, a new PDU was compiled in 1967, based on a projected city population of approximately 1 million by 1981. (The census population figure in 1980 was found to be 1 161 677.) This plan included programmes aimed at addressing the burgeoning population of the city and identified as major issues to be addressed the lack of financial means to implement the PDU; the need for a 'once-off' solution for the relocation of illegally settled people; and the ineffective efforts to anticipate the occupation of undeveloped areas.

Dakar's 2001 PDU – also the result of a review of the previous city plan – aimed to offer a consultative framework to all urban stakeholders. It included the following four key objectives:

- To develop a balanced spatial plan for the three main *départements* of the region, Dakar, Pikine and Rufisque, while maintaining the centrality of Dakar.
- To prioritise public transport in a bid to improve urban traffic flows.
- To meet communities' expressed needs through planning that took into consideration the particular socio-economic and spatial characteristics of the various groups.
- To design a development programme tailored to the capacities of the local public authorities and households.

The housing delivery system

Given the massive migration streams into the Dakar region since independence, private-sector companies and the two main state organisations responsible for housing provision (the former Société Immobilière du Cap-Vert and the Société Nationale des Habitations a Loyers Modérés) had not been able to keep up with housing demand. By the early 1970s, it was estimated that less than 25 000 houses had been provided. Demand during this decade was actually established to be at least 25 000 houses annually. Accordingly, a significant change in the institutional arrangements set up for the provision of housing in the Dakar region took place from the late 1970s. In 1979, the Housing Bank of Senegal was established with the key role of securing savings intended for housing investment. In 1981, HAMO, a company specialising in the construction of prefabricated houses, was established and in 1988, an urban-development company (SCAT-URBAM) was created with the mandate to develop and sell plots. To support the many professional groups working for easy access to land, a local government assistance office for housing provision was created in 1989 within the Ministry of Housing and Planning. These various

organisations, which operated mainly, but not exclusively, in the Dakar region (with 40 000 members and 9 billion CFA francs saved in 1998), have helped bridge the housing gap, particularly for professionals and others in formal employment residing in Dakar. Moreover, given shortages of land available for residential development, the government has recently earmarked a 660-hectare area in Mbao (between Pikine and Rufisque) for development, with professionals and private-sector employees as target customers.

There is a lack of adequate accommodation among poorer communities and migrants, most of whom operate in the informal economic sector. Put another way, there is a high and growing demand for social housing in Dakar, which neither the public, nor private, nor non-governmental sectors have been able to provide satisfactorily. The consequences have been wide-scale squatting, non-compliance with city planning regulations in terms of both the location of units, as well as the nature of the constructions themselves, and land speculation by individuals seeking illegal renting arrangements from squatters. Land invasions by residents desperate for plots have also taken place in, for example, Niayes, a fertile strip of land along the coast used for small-scale agriculture.

Government policy in Dakar between 1970 and 1980 was aimed at evicting squatters from settlements deemed to be illegal. On numerous occasions in that decade, squatters were physically removed and their shelters destroyed. Since 1985, a new policy has been emerging (though squatter shelters continued to be demolished until as recently as 1999). Elements of this emergent policy include the construction of units of shelter that are environmentally sound; the recognition by state authorities of selected squatter communities; and the installation and delivery of public services in these settlements. A number of squatter communities have also succeeded in obtaining support from local politicians to be officially recognised. A pilot squatter upgrade project in Dalifort, a community of about 7 000 inhabitants, located between Dakar and Pikine and composed of wooden shacks, is being implemented with the support of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). More generally, over the past decade, government authorities, with the support of foreign partners (GTZ, the French Development Agency, the European Union and the Fondation Droit à la Ville), have been attempting to address this huge challenge.

Implementation of this new policy faces a number of challenges. The nature of many self-built shacks and the manner that land was occupied make upgrading an uphill task. Households in many squatter communities tend to resettle when their immediate circumstances change. Often, the areas occupied by these communities suffer from inadequate drainage systems, which leads to inferior sanitation environments. Access to transport also tends to be restricted in such areas. Current estimates in the Dakar region of the number of residents living in squatter communities range from 36 to 40% of the total population, that is, some 900 000 to 1 million people (Diop 2008).

Commercial centres and transport in the Dakar region: The challenge of decentralisation

Senegal's capital is not only the most densely populated and fastest growing city of the country, but also the hub of trade and commerce. For most residents, markets provide their essential, everyday consumer activity. As a result of the highly centralised urban structure inherited from the colonial system, Plateau and Almadies – both in the heart of the old city – are the administrative, commercial and communication centres. Other minor commercial centres include the markets of Colobane, HLM, Tilène and Castors – all in communes belonging to the department of Dakar itself – as well as Ndiobentaye and the fish market of Pikine, both of which are further from the centre in the new departments of the Dakar region. Given the rapid increase in the urban population outside the original department of Dakar, it is apparent that decentralised commercial centres are required in the three other departments of the region. Four such new centres are being established: Sicap Liberté-Dieuppeul/ Derklé-Grand Yoff and Mermoz/Sacré Cœur in communes of the old department of Dakar, together with Keur Massar and Sébikhotane in the departments of Pikine and Rufisque, respectively. The Mermoz/Sacré Cœur centre is associated with the establishment of colleges and secondary schools close by, whereas the Keur Massar centre is associated with improved housing provision in that neighbourhood.

The Dakar region is geographically funnel-shaped, and this has moulded the transport system, the administration of which remains a great challenge. The transport sector is characterised by poor professional organisation, ageing vehicles and unwieldy companies. Urban transport and tarred roads originated in the old department of Dakar and communities established in the other newer departments have lost out accordingly. An improved, sustainable solution to this system is dependent on the willingness of the authorities to reduce the transport-flow density towards and within certain areas like Plateau in the old department of Dakar. This means that the local urban authorities in the other three departments, which are poorly equipped, need to be improved, as do the roads connecting the four departments. The public authorities responsible for roads and transport have been confronting this challenge since 2000. Private-sector initiatives and improved infrastructure in the communities beyond the old *département* of Dakar (to organise traffic and create business initiatives) seem to be another strategy to stem the flow of traffic into old Dakar. Another is to develop more secondary commercial centres in the departments of Pikine, Guédiawaye and Rufisque.

Urban manifestation of nationalism in the built environment

Although the urban reality in Senegal since the country's independence has been characterised by uncontrolled occupation of land and inferior state provision of infrastructure and services, monuments and other physical symbols heralding a new post-independent nationalism are visible throughout Dakar's urban landscape. The new regime's interest in modernising the capital through such manifestations was often at the expense of the vital needs of urban residents. Different emphases in

the expression of this new nationalism through the built environment are apparent during the three presidential periods after independence.

During the first period, a preoccupation – which became a cultural passion – of the president of the republic, was the belief that nation building would succeed through the meeting, mix and free expression of Senegal's various cultures. President Léopold Senghor encouraged a standardisation in urban planning and architectural designs. Public buildings were constructed according to a particular design typical of African sculpture. He insisted on respect for the laws on land-use planning, and attempted to ensure that zoning and planning standards were adhered to. During his term, for instance, residential areas were limited to one-storey houses. This use of the built environment as a tool to exhibit the various aspects of the Senegalese way of life led to the construction of broad roads in which Independence Day could be celebrated. This approach to the built environment, however, did not succeed in opposing the forces of modernisation and probably contributed towards concerns regarding security during celebrations. Independence Day is now celebrated in Obélisque Square, also known as the Independence Memorial, on General Charles de Gaulle Avenue. The 30-metre-high memorial is one of the city's key symbols. Others include religious and sports venues. The central mosque, inaugurated in 1963, is one of the most conspicuous buildings in the city. The Demba Diop Stadium hosted one of the country's most memorable sporting events, when the Senegal national soccer team defeated the French for the first time in history. On the cultural side, Dakar's Daniel Sorano Theatre has hosted significant cultural events, including the World Black People's Arts festival in 1966.

As a result of the global economic crisis of the 1980s and Senegal's subsequent so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes, the Senegalese government scaled down the building of monuments nationally. The second president, Abdou Diouf, continued to change the names of roads, schools and public places in the capital. This was partly a strategy on his part to be seen to rid the capital of the vestiges of French imperialism and neocolonialism, which his political opponents accused him of supporting. As his mark of attachment to the national identity, many schools and streets with colonial names in Dakar and in other cities have been renamed after national heroes.

The third period, that of President Wade, saw a return to the construction of physical symbols manifesting Senegalese nationalism in Dakar. One example is the Millennium Gate, which opens to the ocean and which symbolises the beginning of a new era with a new political regime (see Figure 3.2). This monument represents the youth, who are said to have brought the president to power. A second symbol of political change is represented by a bronze statue of a young football player, which immortalises the country's various victories during the African Cup of Nations and the 2002 FIFA World Cup (Figure 3.3).

President Wade also engaged in the implementation of an old project – the construction of road interchanges to ease traffic flows in Dakar – and supported the ongoing construction of a motorway from Dakar to Diamniadio. The building

of memorials also became a top priority. These included the Corniche, the commemorative monument of a ferry disaster (a government-owned ferry, the *Joola*, capsized in 2002, drowning close to 2 000 passengers); and the controversial statue, in a public station, by Dupont and Demba, erected in memory of the native Senegalese infantrymen who supported the French during World War II (Figure 3.4). These physical manifestations of nationalism have done little to challenge the built environment of the colonial era, and most are located downtown in the capital's old area, where the main roads converge, despite the growth of new decentralised commercial centres elsewhere in the Dakar region.

Dakar in the national context

Comparative demographic trends

Occupying an area of 550 km^2 (i.e. 0.3% of the country's total surface area), Dakar is home to a large portion of the national population: 14% at the time of independence, 17% in 1971, 18.8% in 1976 and 21.6% in 1988. Today, the city accounts for 25% of the country's population and generates over 80% of Senegal's economy. In 1960, the city's population density was 930 inhabitants/km^2 and 2 707 inhabitants/km^2 in 1998. By way of comparison, in the Tambacounda region south-east of Dakar, the averages were six inhabitants/km^2 and 35/km^2, respectively. Administrative, commercial, industrial and tertiary activities, among others, are all concentrated in Dakar. The Dakar region contains more than 46% of the country's civil servants, 97% of transport and trade staff, 96% of bank employees, 95% of industry and commerce and 87% of permanent urban workers. Dakar contributes 55% of the country's GDP, with an active, formally employed population of 591 790 (MUAT 2007).

Migration to Dakar has led to an ethnic mix of residents, with the Wolof group remaining prominent. Cruise O'Brien has argued convincingly that by shifting the centre of influence in Senegal into cities, the French colonial administration privileged the Wolof group, whose language has become the prevailing language of business in Dakar and in the country as a whole.[2] The residents of Dakar are a mixture of the Wolof, Mandinka, Peul, Diora, Soninke, Lebou and Serer ethnolinguistic groups. Nationally, the Wolof represent the largest group (followed by the Peul, the Serer and the Lebou). As discussed later, religion has also played an important role in the public life of the city.

Character of the national state and city government

In discussing national governance in Senegal and the part Dakar plays within it, it is necessary to distinguish between the formal system of government and administration and the ways in which these operate in everyday life.

Officially, Senegal is a unitary state, with power decentralised to the local-government level. The country's 2001 constitution, approved through a national referendum, grants freedom of association and speech subject to safeguarding

territorial integrity and national security. Institutions have been put in place to guarantee the separation of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The supreme court was only recently established. Executive power is controlled by a parliament that is composed of a national assembly and a senate, with direct and indirect votes. In 2006, the number of members of parliament increased from 120 to 150. In terms of administration, Senegal is divided into regions headed by governors; each region is made up of departments managed by prefects; and each department is subdivided into districts (of which there are 94), controlled by sub-prefects. Together with state administration there are rural and urban local governments, which are legal entities with financial autonomy.

In Dakar, central government has delegated various responsibilities to the ten local authorities that operate in the region. Although each local authority ought in theory to be able to wield authority in its local jurisdiction, in reality, this authority is held by the political party in power at the national level. This is an unfortunate system, particularly during election campaigns. In effect, the local authorities have a restricted role, are beholden to the central government and are rarely able to be responsive to people's needs. This situation is particularly evident in the capital city, where central government has a monopoly over the public finances[3] and effectively manages local urban affairs with the involvement neither of local authorities nor of community groups. Such a system is rarely able to be responsive to urban residents' needs. Central government's control over the capital city is not only evident at the local-authority level, but its security strategy is also visible in the number of military camps throughout old Dakar – a concentration of power inherited from the colonial era. This strategy is reinforced by the presence of a home ministry office and two police stations. The state media, one of the key institutional tools for managing the state, are also headquartered in this department.

At a general level, from 1960 to 2008, populism appears to have characterised the management of both central and local public institutions. Many of the public successors of the pioneers of independence have been corrupt, which has damaged administrative structures and wasted national resources, and unfortunately, there appears to be no change in the speeches of political and religious leaders and of civil-society representatives. A good example of executive interference in the administration of justice was the delay in establishing who was culpable for the sinking of the *Joola* on 26 September 2002.[4] This ferry was state-owned and those responsible for the tragic event have yet to be identified and tried. A close analysis of Senegal's postcolonial history reveals the existence of a core group made up of public workers, businessmen, politicians and various brokers who have taken advantage of the postcolonial situation by means of populism. Alliances between these groups, and especially religious leaders among them, have brought about what may be called a 'confusion of powers'. Administrative reforms have not succeeded in reducing central control over local governments, and populism has prevailed over sound management and the creation of an effective administration.

Power and counter-power

As the capital, Dakar has witnessed not only the institutional power of its various post-independence governments, but also meetings, rallies, demonstrations and violent confrontations symbolising opposition to these governments, or counter-power. This has been exhibited by opposition political parties and groups, trade unions and other economic groups, religious groups and informal traders. Demonstrations of counter-power have tended to take place at particular sites in the old city of Dakar.

Before the emergence in the 1990s of political parties as legitimate competitors at the polls, such opposition parties were weak and operated mainly in secret. University students based in Dakar had the main part to play in crystallising residents' concerns and translating them into public demands. These led in the 1970s and 1980s to a number of violent protests. Cheikh Anta Diop Avenue and Independence Square (where people had gathered to demand freedom from colonisation during General De Gaulle's visit in 1958) were popular sites for political protests. The growth of political parties from the 1990s onwards shifted opposition activities from the university to a number of densely settled neighbourhoods, mainly in Niary Tally, Colobane and Obélisque. Sites used for demonstrations in these neighbourhoods were places typically used by the communities for traditional wrestling shows and dances. Although 10% of city space in the Dakar region is set aside for parks and gardens, these are completely absent in the old city. In fact, during the 2002 FIFA World Cup, fear of demonstrations led the public authorities to instruct the ministries to develop space around Lycée Kennedy in order to prevent soccer fans from heading to the presidential palace in the event of the national team winning matches. In its urban-development policy, the state government seems to have created a mechanism for reducing the opposition's activities by significantly modifying the places where opposition parties mobilise and meet. For instance, Niary Tally was made into a public garden, complete with dustbins and parking lots, after opposition rallies took place there. Today, opposition groups generally meet at Obélisque Square around the national radio and TV station. Some demonstrations are also held in poorer areas.

Prior to multi-party democratic competition, introduced in the 1990s, public meetings were generally authorised, but rallies were not. Such provisions aimed to promote security in the city, but in reality only served to exacerbate the discontentment of people who, at that time, had limited channels to express their frustrations and seek solutions to their demands. As a consequence, demonstrations were typically spontaneous and often led to acts of vandalism. At the same time, the period of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (together with more recent rises in the prices of oil and other essential commodities) resulted in a flourishing informal sector as the only economic sector capable of providing work for the semi-skilled and unskilled. However, the city centre is designed to exclude these thousands of young informal traders from operating their small-scale businesses on which their livelihoods depend. This rapidly led to the unorganised and illegal occupation of land in the old city and to widespread non-compliance with urban regulations regarding the use of public roads and setting up commercial businesses. In October

2007, a major violent confrontation took place in the old city as state police clashed with informal traders operating small businesses in markets, stores and bus stations.

It would be inappropriate to neglect religious power in this discussion. Many forms of resistance against the colonial power were based on religious teachings. These included the creation of *zawiyas* (dedicated religious and prayer areas) – mainly in St Louis, Tivaouane, Rufisque and Dakar – which promoted peaceful negotiations with the colonial authority before independence. Zawiya Elhadj Malick and Dakar Cathedral are examples of sites where such mediation took place. These forms of peaceful mediation continued after the colonial era, and for years the Zawiya of Dakar has been used as a place where citizens and political parties meet to reconcile their differences. In the 1980s, for instance, this took place through the mediation of the religious leader Elhadj Abdoul Aziz Sy. Economic activities have also played a role in the exercise of religious power: close to the main market of the old city, Sandaga, an area owned by a religious leader has emerged. Keur Serigne bi has become a well-known site for selling traditional medicines. Many other such trading activities developed during the 1980s throughout the city.

Throughout the period after independence, trade unions have played a critical role in fashioning the development of presidential and central-government powers. Indeed, certain trade unions have been affiliated with the regime in power, whereas others have maintained their independence from government. To date, the government appears by and large to have succeeded in keeping political party and trade union opposition in check by using its experience in managing social conflicts without resorting to force. Two illustrations may be given.

The central government has consistently attempted to control the mass media, and there is accordingly a substantial gap between government statements and government action regarding state media. In reaction, protests both from the main media trade union (the Trade Union of Communication and Information Professionals) and from the National Conference of Opposition Party Leaders[5] led to the creation of the Radio and TV High Council in 1991 and the Audiovisual High Council[6] in 1998. Both these bodies are recognised by the central government as legitimate sites for negotiation. A second example is found in the establishment of an informal sector trade union, the National Trade and Industrial Union, which has successfully challenged public authorities on a number of occasions.[7] This was achieved after regular discussions between the two parties took place over a series of both local economic, as well as political, issues. It is worth noting that members of this union have become successful businessmen in their own rights, rather than through political patronage.

Conclusion

Dakar accounts for 0.3% of the country's surface area, accommodates 25% of the population and provides goods and services that amount to well over half of the national economy. The key characteristics of this city are, as we have seen,

uncontrolled growth, unorganised and unbalanced land occupation, a marked housing crisis and a declining urban environment. In addition, state administration of the Dakar region is complex and based on different types of government systems involving local and national, as well as urban and rural authorities. This mix typically leads to fragmented planning and policy implementation and associated conflict between these authorities at various levels, partly because there is no consultative forum in place to bring together representatives of these bodies. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude by identifying the strategy that is currently being followed in the Dakar region to address these various and daunting challenges.

The Dakar Region Development Strategy (*Stratégie de Développement Urbain du Grand-Dakar* [see www.sendeveloppementlocal.com]) is a project that is designed with the support of the Cities Alliance – a global coalition of cities and their development partners – to improve metropolitan governance, ensure better access to basic urban services and stimulate the economy in order to assist in the reduction of urban poverty. This project envisages a new participative approach to urban management by involving different stakeholders in the identification of common solutions to these issues. A broad coalition has been established which includes the national government, a number of international organisations and the local governments of the Dakar region. In addition, a pilot project has been launched that aims to promote urban development across communal and departmental boundaries and may accordingly be seen as an exercise in coordination and collaborative analysis and planning. The potential of such initiatives engender hope about the future of the Dakar region.

Notes

1 This section is partly derived from data drawn from Diop (2004).

2 See Cruise O'Brien (1979).

3 For further details, see the study by Mbow (1992), specifically the sections related to systems for allocating public funds in the urban sector. Mbow states that up to the late 1970s, unlike the local governments (*communes*), urban investments were relatively important, even though some specific expenditure was prioritised. The period 1981–1990 was earmarked for a significant reduction in the government's capital spending. For further details, see World Bank (1993).

4 See Lombard (2003) and Aïdara (2003).

5 See *Sud Hebdo* 131, 15 November 1990.

6 The Audiovisual High Council was replaced by the National Audiovisual Regulation Council in December 2005. For information about and the challenges faced by this council, see http://www.osiris.sn/article2158.html (Accessed August 2008).

7 See Diop, Thioub & Boone (1997).

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LOMÉ


Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
TOGO
Lomé
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN

4 Lomé

Philippe Gervais-Lambony

The political capital of Togo, Lomé, is by far the largest city in the country, with a population of 1 million in 2005. It is the political capital of what can be defined as a poor country – Togo has been classified by the UN among the world's least advanced countries since the beginning of the 1980s. In 2005, Togo's GDP was $1 500 per inhabitant, its literacy rate 50 per cent and its life expectancy at birth 54 years. There are no sufficiently reliable statistics available that would make it possible to compare these national figures with those of Lomé, but it is a known fact that it is in the capital that Togo's economic potential is concentrated. This has particularly been the case since Lomé's industrial and harbour free zone was created in 1989, which has benefited from the favourable situation at the crossroads between the maritime outlet of the landlocked states of West Africa and the coastal axis between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire.

Situated on a lagoon occupied by Éwé farming villages, Lomé was founded in 1874 by African, British and German traders. The Germans established a protectorate in 1884, of which Lomé became the capital in 1897. The German colonial power developed a large administrative district next to the commercial district that centred on the central market. This original double city-centre core still exists today, but is being challenged by the extensive developments in the northern part of the town. In 1920, Togoland was divided between the French and British colonial powers. The western part was integrated into the Gold Coast colony (today Ghana) and the eastern part became a French territory (today Togo). Lomé became a frontier town and the capital of the new French colony. The French developed the facilities and affirmed the power of the Éwé chiefs and the Mina traders, who were important, influential landowners in the various municipal 'councils' of the colonial period.

Experiencing two colonial powers in succession is the main characteristic that distinguishes Lomé from other African capitals. However, there are two other aspects that are of fundamental importance: the pre-colonial character of the city, which was founded before the establishment of the German protectorate, and its location on the border between a French and a British colony due to the division of the German protectorate in 1920. Another, albeit less distinguishing, feature is that the city saw disproportionate spatial expansion over a large area in relation to its population growth. This is due to the lack of vertical development.

From the 1950s onwards, the city expanded beyond the lagoon towards the Tokoin Plateau. After independence in 1960 and for about 20 years after that, population growth increased at a rate of 7.5% per year. The population started to diversify owing to the arrival of migrants from the northern part of the country. Urban sprawl accelerated

owing to the expansion of public land banking (University, Presidential Palace in Lomé II, military fields and airport). Where the city is blocked by the border to the west and the harbour area to the east (the limits of which were defined after construction of the deep-water harbour in 1969), it spreads to the north up to 20 kilometres from the sea, well beyond the borders of the district of Lomé (see Figure 4.1).

In 2002, the population growth rate was still high, at an estimated 6.1% per year. This implies that low-density residential development in the peripheral suburbs continues to take place, partly as a consequence of speculative investment. The growth is also associated with the quest for 'a place to call one's own' – being the owner of a plot is a deeply meaningful social symbol (Gervais-Lambony 1994), which impels city dwellers to seek out available land further and further from the city centre.

This urban expansion corresponds to patterns that are common in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Lomé has shown marked anomalies for a long time, namely a high level of homogeneity in the suburbs and, consequently, low levels of social segregation. However, recent trends are showing heightened contrasts.

Besides providing a background to Lomé, this chapter aims to show the relationship between the entity of the political capital and the city itself. A capital city is also an ordinary city, one that is influenced by external forces that are particularly linked to the processes of the current phase of globalisation. However, in the case of a capital, the impact of politics on the urban landscape is particularly strong: political powers mark space, as do political conflicts. Hence, urban space itself becomes conflictual in political struggles. This chapter proposes to expand on this by taking into consideration the local specificities of the city and the country.

Urban geology: The history of an African capital

A colonial city?

As the capital of Togo, Lomé is historically an African and commercial city that developed from the middle of the 1870s. Even in its pre-colonial era, it was nevertheless largely foreign. The German protectorate in Togo goes back to 1884, but it was not until 1897 that the German colonial administration chose Lomé as its capital over Aného, a city situated further east on the coast. Therefore, Lomé was actually founded before the protectorate was established. Indeed, when the British colony on the Gold Coast (currently Ghana) was established in 1874, a group of traders from different origins (German, Mina, Haoussa, Afro-Brazilian) wanting to escape customs controls and taxes came to settle on the site of Lomé – especially from 1879 onwards – because no colonial authority was to be found there. In Lomé, it was possible for traders to trade freely. They mainly exchanged palm oil, but were also involved in smuggling. The Ahoulan, a subgroup of the Éwé, were the first to settle in Lomé, then the Mina,[1] who came from the east, and the Haoussa from the north. Finally, German trading companies (and one English company) were established at Lomé, which was initially met with protests from the British, followed by calls for German protection.

The site of Lomé was occupied by Éwé villages, whose people, it is believed, had come from Notsé in the 16th and 17th centuries. Living in the villages of Bè and Amoutivé, the Éwé farmers were not attracted to the coast, but instead cultivated the rich lands of the Tokoin Plateau and practised subsistence fishing in the lagoon. The commercial establishments next to their villages did not concern them. From 1880 onwards, therefore, the main groups of city dwellers found in Lomé today were already in place: the indigenous Éwé and the foreign traders. The latter were the real founders of the city of Lomé, which is 'neither an autochthonous [indigenous] city – old villages that would have grown – nor a colonial city created by making a clean sweep of the former rights' (Marguerat 1987: 82). The German colonial power established itself next to the existing city (the current trading quarter), in the current administrative quarter (150 hectares), and recognised land ownership by the inhabitants of Lomé from the outset. This ownership was in fact made official from 1904 onwards by the introduction of the first land register. From the beginning of its history, Lomé was, therefore, a city with a double urban core based on private land ownership. The Germans recognised all former land rights and only intervened in matters where they had earmarked land for administration. And this low-key state intervention in matters of small-scale urban space has been a constant trait of Lomé's history – although this is not the case for large-scale urban space.

Between 1914 and 1920, Lomé was annexed by the British from the Gold Coast. However, this short period did not leave any traces on the urban landscape. Only from the French period onwards was it possible to notice a change in urban policy. The 1920s were crucial in the history of Lomé. These years corresponded to an extensive development programme, including the completion of the *Boulevard Circulaire*, extensions to the hospital, construction of the law courts and the town hall and the construction of a new wharf in 1928 (Lomé is not a natural harbour and the colonial wharfs played a vital role in the economic development of the city). At the same time, the French focused on the properties that had been recognised by the Germans. The 'concession' system of plots, commonly used in numerous cities of French West Africa, was only implemented in the quarter of Hanoukopé in 1928 to house civil servants.

As far as land was concerned, the French reaffirmed the power of the two city-dwelling groups that had already been recognised by the Germans: the customary chiefs and the Mina traders. Both groups were the real owners of the city. The chiefs Adjallé d'Amoutivé and Aklassou de Bè had succeeded in having huge plots of land registered in their names and had received the status of canton chiefs from the Germans and the French, making it possible for them to evict other Éwé families. The Adjallé possessed land on both sides of the lagoon between the border and Amoutivé; the Aklassou owned land south-east of the city. The Mina traders owned hectares of coconut plantations south of the lagoon, which they had purchased from the natives and had registered by the Germans. Both groups also wielded political power because they were represented in the various 'councils' that were created by the French and in which a number of seats were reserved for the Togolese. The council of notables was created in 1922; the municipal council, chamber of

commerce and economic and financial council were created from 1933 onwards. The important Mina trading families carried well-known names (e.g. Olympio, De Souza, Anthony), which have today been given to the suburbs built on the coconut plantations that they owned. As traders, planters and landowners, the Mina notables were the main negotiators with the colonisers and contributed politically and financially to the development of the city.

Lomé's post-independence development and markings of urban space

Four 'strata' of political symbols can be identified in the urban landscape of Lomé: the colonial stratum; the stratum of the first Republic of Togo from the beginning of the 1960s (the old presidential residence of the republic, parliament, the independence monument); the stratum of the authoritarian regime of General Eyadéma from 1967 to the beginning of the 1990s (rich in statues and official buildings, such as the building of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* [RPT][2] and the presidential palace of Lomé II); and, finally, the drafting of a new symbolism since the beginning of the era of 'democratisation', which saw statues toppled (in the true sense of the word).

It was in the administrative district of Lomé that the independent power of Togo chose to place its symbols of success, just as the colonial power had done. Independence Square was the first site (see Figure 4.2). Where the German town planners had initially intended to lay out a park, the political regimes of Togo imposed their marks. A monument was erected in the square at independence: a statue of a man breaking his shackles, representative of freedom from the symbolic shackles of slavery and colonialism. Later, this square was also chosen by the Eyadéma regime to create a symbolic statement. It was there that General Eyadéma's regime wanted to pay respect to the 'miraculous survivor of Sarakawa'[3] rather than independence. The name Independence Square was kept, but the original statue commemorating independence now finds itself surrounded by constructions that have henceforth dominated the landscape of the square. The colonial town hall has also been demolished and replaced by new buildings. The municipality no longer has great power or great importance. Independence, which this square celebrated until the beginning of the 1990s, is no longer the highlight of Togolese history. The site was used to affirm the power of the RPT (the monumental building of the Communist Party stronghold was built in the beginning of the 1970s, on one side of the square, with the financial and technical help of North Korea) and General Eyadéma (whose statue dominated until recently the esplanade of the Communist Party stronghold). Independence Square is also home to the single skyscraper of the city, the imposing *Hôtel du 2 Février*. CASEF (the Administrative Centre for Economic and Financial Services) is a modern building that was constructed not far from there in the newly baptised *Avenue de Sarakawa*. It houses the Department of Finance. Lastly, another new building – also a tower – can be found near the Central Bank. Since the end of the 1980s, it is not so much the state that is being symbolised there, but the power of an ethnic group and family: the Evala Convention Centre, situated in front of the Hôtel du 2 Février, has imposed a Kabyè name[4] in the heart of the capital. A statue

was erected of General Eyadéma's deceased mother behind the hotel in 1988 and a small square was named after her, Mama Ndanida.

Since 1991, Independence Square has become a contested space (see Table 4.1). When the Eyadéma regime was at its lowest point, demonstrations by students and secondary schoolchildren in March 1991 often ended in the square. In April 1991, young demonstrators attacked each other in front of the general's statue, but in an attempt to pre-empt more trouble around this symbol (as happened in the city of Kpalimé, 120 kilometres from Lomé, where a statue of the general was toppled by protesters), the powers that be decided to dismantle the statue after the opening of the national conference held in the main Evalas conference room at the *Hôtel du 2 Février* in July 1991. In August of the same year, the RPT had to disinvest from Independence Square. Its headquarters became a convention centre and the RPT head office was moved north of the lagoon to Tokoin Wuiti.

In March 2005, the funeral ceremony of General Eyadéma took place in Lomé (although he is actually buried in Pya, his village of birth in Kabyè country). His coffin was displayed on the esplanade of the convention centre, after which his body was carried inside the building before being taken to the airport (not before the funeral procession had taken two symbolic detours via Lomé II and the military base). During the presidential electoral campaign in April 2005, Independence Square was still being used for competing demonstrations of the 'RPTists' (the local term for the partisans of the RPT) and the opposition. Yet symptomatically, in announcing their respective routes, the organisers did not use the same terminology to refer to the square. It was called Independence Square by the opposition, whereas the RPT referred to it as the Convention Centre Esplanade.

Table 4.1 Chronology of important political events in Togo

Year	Event
1880	Foundation of the city of Lomé
1884–1914	German colonisation
1920–1960	French colonisation
1960	Togolese independence
1963	President S. Olympio assassinated
1967	• *Coup d'état*
	• The *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* takes power
	• Général Gnyassingbé Eyadéma becomes head of state
1990–1994	• Democratic transition
	• Violent political conflict and general strike
1998	General elections; Eyadéma stays in power
2002–2003	• New constitution
	• General elections; Eyadéma 'elected' again
	• Political violence
2005	Death of General Eyadéma; the army impose his son, Faure, as new president
2009	Faure Eyadéma re-elected

Watching the news on national television is enough to confirm the symbolic importance of Independence Square in the national imagery. The news bulletin opens with four photographs in the background: the conference centre, the Dove of Peace (discussed below), an aerial view of Lomé and the *Hôtel du 2 Février*. An illustration of this building also appeared on the cover of the official map of Lomé that was published by the municipality in 2001.

Over and above its political message, the Dove of Peace is systematically integrated in the RPTists' routes in the city (see Figure 4.3). A statue of a dove was constructed in 1988 (and inaugurated in 1989) in Tokoin at the intersection of the Atakpamé and Airport Roads. Standing on a pedestal, it holds a branch in its beak. The weight of the statue and its lack of aesthetic qualities did not deter the authorities from valorising this new monument and trying to turn it into a symbolic urban focal point. The intersection was well chosen. The Airport Road – renamed Boulevard de la Paix (Peace Boulevard) – is the main road of political symbolism, the route used by the state to 'show off' its primary exhibits. And the Atakpamé Road (renamed Boulevard Gnassingbé Eyadéma)is the busiest main road serving the northern part of the city. Commenting on the Dove of Peace, *La Nouvelle Marche* (a daily newspaper in Lomé) provides the following heading: 'The Dove of Peace at the entrance to the city of Lomé, expression of man's politics on 13 January in Togo, Africa and the world'.[5]

These sites of RPTist power in Lomé are complemented by the feared and shunned military base, and by the distant Presidential Palace in Lomé II, which personifies political power (although Faure, the current head of state and son of General Eyadéma, actually lives in the residence of the National Social Security Fund,[6] not far from there). Lomé II, situated in the middle of a vast space, cannot be seen from the road. It remained undeveloped for a long time, as there had been plans to construct an exclusive residential estate. The most extraordinary rumours about the palace do their rounds. It is even said that there are rooms packed to the ceiling with banknotes. What is certain is that 'if you go to Lomé II, you will eat',[7] meaning that you will be part of the corrupt system that is in power: no place has better symbolised the power of President Eyadéma.

The insignificant impact of international players on Lomé's urban space

From the end of the 1980s, one could observe that the state was withdrawing funding from the city, especially in terms of urban services and facilities. Concomitantly, international donors also withdrew, in particular the European Union and France, both of which interrupted their cooperation to show their disappointment at the failed transition to democracy. The privatisation of urban services has in the meantime been completed. However, as is the case elsewhere, privatisation policies in Lomé were accompanied by a decentralisation policy spurred on by the World Bank and aid donors. However, without political autonomy, does this decentralisation mean that the government is giving up or making real changes? The official halting of international cooperation programmes in Togo in the beginning of the 1990s stripped the state of a large part of its resources, while the slow process

of democratisation called into question the possibility of true decentralisation. Since 1990, no large-scale projects have been successfully completed except for the renaming of streets, a project funded by the World Bank and the French Cooperation. Similarly, private investments have been extremely low, which means that there have been no urban developments in Lomé, such as large shopping centres or enclosed residential suburbs (except for the Fund estate and its extensions, but those are relatively old developments). However, this phenomenon has not prevented the appearance of trends that are linked to globalisation: the shifting of centrality to the northern suburbs, more pronounced socio-spatial segregation (Biakouyé 2007) and growing numbers of land property investments by Togolese nationals living abroad.

Lomé in the Togolese national fabric

A dominant capital in an ethnically diverse country

There are about forty ethnic groups classified into a few main groups throughout Togo. Two dense population centres can be distinguished. Kabyè territory in the northern part of the country was a place of refuge for the ethnic group of the same name. They practised intensive agriculture on the hill slopes. The Kabyè (the Kabyè-Tem group) make up about 30% of the country's population. In the south is the other dense population centre made up of the Éwé/Mina/Ouatchi (the Adja-Fon group). They represent more than 40% of the country's population. The history of Togo was played out between these two groups. Even though the Éwé people were favoured during the colonial period because of their greater proximity to the authorities, better access to the education system and assimilation into the economic system, they were discarded from political, but not economic, power after General Eyadéma took over power in 1967 with the help of the army. In the extreme northern parts of the country, between the Kabyè Mountains and the border with Burkina Faso, 16% of the Togolese belong to the Para-Gourma group (with the Moba and the Gourma being the main ethnic groups). The country's other ethnicities are minority groups.

This ethno-linguistic division is roughly adhered to by the country's administrative division into five regions (which are themselves subdivided into prefectures) from south to north: Maritime, Plateaux, Central, Kara, Savannah. The population distribution among these regions is out of proportion: close to 50% of the 6.2 million Togolese (2006 estimates) are concentrated in the Maritime region, 1 million of whom live in Lomé, situated in the far south-western corner next to the border with Ghana.

These regions also experience enormous socio-economic inequalities. The Maritime and Kara regions are the wealthiest. Indeed, Maritime essentially encompasses the entire national economic potential – the capital, Lomé, the economic hub of the country; the Kpémé phosphate mines, the long-standing main source of national wealth (until phosphate prices fell at the end of the 1970s); the coffee and cocoa plantations (Kpalimé region); and the coconut plantations and palm groves on the coast. The Kara region corresponds to Kabyè country and benefited from all the

attention of General Eyadéma's regime. The city of Kara was richly endowed with infrastructure, particularly since 2002, including a university and an international airport (at Niamtougou), and received private investments from dignitaries of the regime. This, of course, had a negative impact on Lomé. This impoverished state was withdrawing its investments from the national capital and attributing its scarce remaining resources to another city. On the other hand, the centre of the country, and even more so the far north (Savannah region), are two less populous regions and can be regarded as being far more underdeveloped.

It must be added that this unbalance in the socio-economic strength of the country's different geographical regions translated into a poorly organised urban network. Lomé is both the political and economic hub of the country, as well as the entry point to Togo, thanks to its harbour to which an industrial zone is linked (modest by international standards, but without competition in Togo). The other cities in the country are comparatively speaking small towns – all with fewer than 100 000 inhabitants. Apart from Kara, their functions are essentially administrative and their markets local. Sokodé is the second largest city in the country, followed by Kara, Atakpamé and Kpalimé.

The dynamics of Lomé's population and spatial growth

The pre-eminence of Lomé over the other Togolese cities was established very quickly because of two factors. On the one hand, unlike its rival towns, Baguida, Agbodrafo and especially Aného, Lomé's function was focused more on redistributing imported goods towards the interior than on exporting. On the other hand, the fact that the Germans chose Lomé as the capital in 1897 was the main driving force behind its growth. Indeed, the Germans put in place infrastructures which no other coastal city enjoyed: the coastal railway line, Lomé–Aného, was completed in 1905; other routes into the interior were subsequently developed (to Kpalimé in 1907 and Atakpamé in 1911); and, in particular, the first wharf began construction in 1900. By 1905, Lomé had the monopoly over maritime trade.

Thus, Lomé's supremacy was guaranteed from before World War I. At that time, its population was more than 10 000 inhabitants; the current centre of the town was already in place; and its functions were already those of a political, commercial and also religious capital (with the construction of the Catholic cathedral in 1902 and the Protestant church in 1907). There was also industry – a printing house, an oil factory and a soap factory were constructed before the war. Besides the Éwé villages, the city dwellers during that period were traders of different origins (Mina, Haoussa and Ahoulan) and there were already 186 white people living in the city by 1912 (civil servants, traders and missionaries).

The war of 1914–1918 marked a period of confusion during which Lomé changed administration twice. After the Germans left in 1914, the city was governed by the British, but it was taken over in 1920 by the French when they were allocated two-thirds of the territory of former Togoland by the League of Nations. The entire western part of the country was attached to the British Gold Coast, which still

causes tensions today between Togo and Ghana. The 1920s saw a phase of economic prosperity and demographic and spatial growth of the city.

This growth was halted from 1931 onwards by the Great Depression. Reduced trading and public expenditure caused much unhappiness. Lomé, and Togo in general, only came out of this slump after World War II.

Lomé's population increased by approximately five times between 1938 and 1959, from 18 000 to 90 000 inhabitants. This was also a period when the city underwent development, including the tarring of main roads, electrification of the city centre and construction of a new airport, schools and main teaching establishments. Independence in 1960 came at a time of growth and development that was maintained for a decade and accompanied by an annual population growth of 7.5%. A new phenomenon after independence was the diversification of the population due to the arrival of migrants from the northern, and especially central, parts of the country. Until then, Lomé had remained a city of 'southerners.'

Until today, population growth has not been interrupted, even though it may appear to have slowed down slightly (6.5% annual growth from 1970 onwards). Lomé's spatial growth took place in a pattern of progressive expansion, with the city centre as its starting point. As the densification of one suburb was completed, so another one started further away from the centre. A suburb's construction is slow and many years are needed for it to reach considerable density. As building plots are rarely up for sale, particularly in the centre, heads of households looking for properties must find plots where they are available, i.e. on the outskirts. The absence of upward densification (except for an upper floor on villas) and the large size of plots (mostly 600 m^2) make for high consumption of space and disproportionate spatial growth in relation to population growth.

It can be said that when Lomé's population more or less doubles, its surface area triples. This phenomenon must not be repeated. The most northern suburbs are already more than 20 km from the sea. The topographical constraints of the city's location alone prevent further spreading to the north and north-east because the marshy region of the Zio Valley, which is difficult to manage, has already been reached. Since the city was founded, the spatial growth stages corresponded to the stages of population and economic growth. Starting from the old city centre, the city spread up to the *Boulevard Circulaire* in the 1920s. That part of the city is characterised by Lomé's typical hallmark urban features. Indeed, it is in these suburbs that one can best find the typical Lomé house with its gate (Brazilian influence, freed slaves), four-sloped roof, rectangular shape and ochre colour.

After World War II and through the 1950s, the city extended beyond the *Boulevard Circulaire* towards the north, then past the lagoon to the Tokoin Plateau (in 1958, Tokoin was in fact integrated into the district of Lomé), first around the hospital (Tokoin Hospital) and the Gbadago suburb, where the plots of land were blessed by Chief Adjallé. The Nyékonakpoè and Octaviano Nétimé suburbs south of the lagoon (on plots of coconut plantations belonging to the Olympio family) were developed

in the 1950s, as were the areas surrounding the village of Bè. It was at this time that the contrast between the east and west of the city became apparent and this has been consistent ever since. Fewer villas are to be found in the eastern suburbs, which are considered to be working class.

The 1960s were a major turning point for the urban landscape. Stone became the predominant building material replacing the clay bricks (extracted from quarries on the edges of the Tokoin Plateau) that had been used up to that point. The building style also changed, from the smallest homes to the most upmarket villas. At that time, and particularly at independence, the city's spatial growth suddenly accelerated. The 1960s marked the beginning of the rush for property, with people hunting for their own home. The 1970s were to confirm this trend. The city spread even more rapidly, as those years were marked by increased public land banking: the grounds of the University (255 hectares), Lomé II (800 hectares), the army and the police force (300 hectares), in addition to the airport grounds (180 hectares). Spatial growth was channelled towards the corridors that were left between the cracks, which quickly became built up, from Agbalopédogan and Hedzranawoé in the north to Akodessewa Kpota in the north-east. The process south of the lagoon was the same, but the vast industrial harbour zone (measuring 550 hectares, with the boundaries drawn after construction of the deep-water harbour of Lomé in 1968–1969) temporarily blocked Lomé's growth in that direction.

Spatial growth in the 1980s took place at a distance from the centre. Once public spaces now find themselves incorporated in the built-up space. Moreover, Lomé's average population density has continued to decrease in relation to the city's spatial sprawl. It went from 235 inhabitants per hectare in 1920, to 85 in 1959 and to 64 in 1981 (Le Bris 1987). The number of Lomé inhabitants living north of the lagoon has recently exceeded the number of inhabitants living in the south. This shift from the demographic centre of the city has resulted in secondary business centres emerging north of the lagoon, in particular the newly established market of Hedzranawoé.

Sites of power and counter-power in Lomé

Spatial demonstrations of power: Opposition between north and south

Urban space today is often interpreted by Lomé's inhabitants through the distorting prism of ethnic distribution. This is the main consequence of recent political events. The politically troubled period that started in 1990 and stopped for a while in 1994, before flaring up again at the death of President Eyadéma, seems initially to have been gradually caused by the reinforced partition between the suburbs situated north and south of the lagoon. The latter are alleged to be the bastions of political opposition, whereas the former are said to be the RPTist strongholds. This distinct intra-urban boundary is one of the legacies of a political regime that always preferred displaying symbols of its power in the northern suburbs. The military base,[8] and even more so the Presidential Palace of Lomé II (two sites of Eyadéma's power), are situated north of the lagoon. As former symbols of a failed democracy, the prime minister's office, the presidency and the assembly are, however, to be found in the

so-called administrative quarter south of the lagoon. It was also here, long ago, that the German and French colonial powers were concentrated.[9]

The ethnic opposition superimposed on the city dweller can be found at this political and spatial intersection. The lagoon is considered to be the dividing line between suburbs belonging to the opposition and those supporting Eyadéma. Hence, the suburbs situated north of the lagoon are regarded as northern Togolese neighbourhoods. This reputation of being from the northern suburbs is recent. They involve specifically Tokoin Adewi, Agouényivé, Nukafu, Agbalopedogan and Djidjolé. However, northern Togolese far from dominate in terms of numbers here; their number is greater in some neighbourhoods, but this was, until recently, only for practical reasons. Having migrated from the north to Lomé during the last decade, these people settled where there was space, namely in the northern outskirts.[10] However, the southerners are in the majority everywhere here. By the same token, some suburbs south of the lagoon, especially in Nyékonakpoe and Kodjoviakopé, have a high number of people from the north of the country. In short, a number of institutions that are politically hostile to the powers that be are situated north of the lagoon: the University, the Technical Secondary School at Adidogomé (from where the opposition movement left in 1990) and the Tokoin Secondary School.

Territorial identifications that mix ethnicity, regionalism and political adherence are simply the basis of competing identity discourses. These discourses are subsequently projected onto urban space. The artificial division between the north and south of the city is a practical way of making spatial reality conform to the image of a divided country. The issue here is not about the opposition between 'ethnic' territories, but about territorial control by minority groups on the one hand, and the production of identity discourses about the city's suburbs on the other. This is clearly expressed in a leaflet by pro-RPT militias handed out in November 1991, itself a 'producer of territories':

> The legitimate defence, guerilla war re-affirms its existence and is from now on called 'Ton' Mog'...For that reason, I would like to remind Ekpémog[11] that his area of command is situated between the beach and the lagoon. I am the one who commands the area going from the lagoon up to Togblékopé past Agoényivé and Adjidogomé; knowing full well that my base is in Adewikomè,[12] called 'red base' by the history of democracy.

Suffice it to say that the lagoon has become the main boundary with regard to the manner in which space is represented in Lomé. It constitutes a material division that is easy to transform into a demarcation line. In 1991/92, it was along the lagoon that gangs confronted passers-by and attacked people from the north. It was in the lagoon that the bodies of Lomé inhabitants were found in 1991, assassinated by the military. And in 2005, military barricades controlled the traffic around the lagoon after nightfall.

Besides the opposition between the north and south of the lagoon, it is possible to detect much stronger political divisions in Lomé in terms of 'strongholds'. Bè is a stronghold of the opposition which was impossible for the police and RPT militants

to break into, as well as for the people putting up posters of Faure in 2005. Tokoin Adewi, a suburb situated north of the lagoon, close to the university campus, is a bastion of the RPT. Adewi is a suburb consisting of a large number of people coming from the north, and can also be regarded as a stronghold because it has been controlled by local pro-RPT militias. With regard to Bè, there is strictly speaking a relative corollary between its ethnic homogeneity and political opinion. Bè is made up of a number of suburbs around the sacred forests and the old villages of Bè (which existed before the city of Lomé). The Bè residents are indigenous Éwé from Lomé. As owners of land far up into the north (Adewi, Klikamé), this community played an important role in the city's history. The people from Bè have always been the most sensitive and hostile to the dominance of the military and the 'northerners'. From their dense, popular suburbs, Bè families have been able to play on their land power, but have also linked their reputation of power to magic and religion. With its two sacred forests, Bè is the heart of voodoo worship in Lomé. Since the 1990s, 'being from Bè' has taken on a very precise political meaning, but the symbolic association of Bè in terms of political opposition also has a message: it stands for conflict between indigenous people and 'foreigners'.

Yet, if one is to consider the demographic evolution of the Togolese capital, it can be noted that the relative proportion of the population of the suburbs south of the lagoon has reduced as a result of the urban extension towards the north. Out of Lomé's 1 million inhabitants, hardly a quarter live south of the lagoon. When one looks at the city's long history, the extension towards the north is a major feat. The fact that the population density has swung to the suburbs north of the lagoon is indicative of the shifting of the site of political power and the out-of-town economic hubs (e.g. the new Central Market and the commercial development of the far northern suburbs such as Agouényivé). To affirm, therefore, that the 'real' Lomé is south of the lagoon no longer makes sense, except to say that the real Lomé is a colonial and pre-colonial city.

Politicisation of urban space

Since the 1990s, the image of Lomé as a peaceful capital or an oppressed and frightened capital – depending on the point of view – has been shattered. Representations and practices seem to have been profoundly transformed by recent history. In 1990, the march towards a multi-party system was undertaken in an atmosphere of violence that was to last. The state opposed partisans of the opposition and movements of young schoolchildren and students opposed to the single political party in power, the RPT, its militias and army. Violence invaded the city, or, more precisely, it became visible: beatings, insults, attacks and murders. Violence of the military against city dwellers was omnipresent. Politically or ethnically based violence between residents of Lomé exploded on occasion. There was violence in day-to-day encounters, this no doubt more long term. This violence, added to the effects of a general strike that lasted several months, suddenly turned Lomé into a tougher city. On different occasions, there were mass exoduses of people (in the beginning of the 1990s, and again in 2005) when many city dwellers left for the rural areas and neighbouring countries.

The first anti-government demonstration in Lomé took place on 5 October 1990, after judgement had been passed on some young people accused of having circulated political leaflets. Starting out from the suburb of Bè, but also from secondary schools and the University, this demonstration was the first phase of protests and repression that ended in July 1991 at the opening of the National Conference. Marked by strikes and demonstrations, this first phase was followed by a surge of urban violence that culminated in the army murdering Lomé residents in April 1991. The discovery of about twenty bodies in the lagoon was a shock to the Togolese and international communities, and had a considerable influence on the atmosphere in which the National Conference took place. Assembled on 8 July 1991, the National Conference ended on 28 August with the nomination of an interim prime minister, Joseph Kokou Koffigoh.

The second phase of the Togolese crisis hinged on the power struggle between the prime minister and part of the opposition, the army and the former single political party (the RPT) close to General Eyadéma, and, lastly, the radical members of the opposition who recognised neither of the two leaders. After several violent interventions by the army, one of which was the attack on the Prime Minister's Office[13] on 3 December 1991, this phase ended in a compromise that was favourable to Eyadéma. On the decision of the High Council of the Republic on 28 August 1992, Eyadéma regained the most important privileges that had been removed from him by the National Conference. This period was marked by political attacks against members of the opposition, military violence against civilians and confrontations between political militias of the opposition and RPT militants (or 'security agents'). The suffering and fear of the Lomé residents were such that an exodus began in April 1992 out of the capital towards Ghana, Benin and the Togolese rural areas. This exodus characterised the next phase of the crisis, when it escalated massively, especially from January 1993 onwards. In the night of 31 January, the military and police invaded the city, murdered, pillaged and sowed terror in a 'reprisal' against the hostile population. About a third of the population allegedly left the city within a couple of months. The situation subsequently calmed down in a deserted and terrified city where people were living in anticipation of the coming elections that were continually postponed. Elections were organised in August 1993 without participation of the opposition. The results were a fait accompli, with Eyadéma taking 99% of the vote.

The 1994 elections were followed by the end of the general strike, then by a succession of elections that were marred by serious ballot rigging (the 1994 legislative elections), boycotted by the opposition (the 1998 legislative elections), or the results of which were not published (the 1998 presidential elections). Lastly, after an imposed revision was made to the constitution in 2002, authorising the head of state to seek a third term, General Eyadéma organised his re-election in 2003. His death in February 2005 interrupted this term.

After this event, the army immediately and illegally conferred power to the general's son, Faure Gnassingbé, causing a chain reaction of anger from the opposition and international condemnation. This did not prevent Faure from staying in power as

was confirmed by the April 2005 elections, which were marked by obvious ballot rigging. Elections had taken place in an atmosphere of military violence and near daily demonstrations by the opposition that were violently suppressed.

Public space: A political challenge

During the period 1990–2006, the struggle for control over public space was characterised by actions of demonstrators aiming to be as visible as possible in public spaces and to conquer symbolic places.

The typical routes of the political demonstrations illustrate both the will to control public space and the actual symbolic sites of the city.

A demonstration by the political opposition usually starts out near the market of Bè, follows the *Boulevard Houphouët Boigny*, then the *Rue du 24 Janvier* and goes past Fréau Garden in order to try to reach Independence Square (see Figure 4.4). Finally, the demonstration splits into *Boulevard du 13 Janvier* (the old *Boulevard Circulaire* which surrounds the old city in a semicircle) to take the administrative quarter in a pincer movement. This route is eminently symbolic. Leaving Bè also means leaving the old city, the Éwé city and bastion of the opposition. There are also practical reasons: it is a known fact that the police will not bother a gathering and departing procession in Bè. From that point onwards, and this is still symbolic, the demonstrators rush to reconquer the administrative and colonial city. Having said this, it is always out of the question for the demonstration to pass the lagoon and go in the direction of the real sites of power (i.e. the military base and presidential palace of Lomé II). Far removed and heavily guarded, these places remain inaccessible.

The turbulent period immediately following the death of General Eyadéma shows to what extent the political life of the city had taken hold south of the lagoon. In the north, 'we saw nothing', say the city dwellers! The first demonstration after Eyadéma's death (which cost the lives of three people) took place on 12 February 2005. It had been announced by the opposition press, which had called for a gathering at Bè Goka Kodjindji (a small piece of land situated along the *Notre Dame des Apôtres* Street not far from Bè market) at 7 o'clock in the morning. It was intended to end at Fréau Square. That same day, barricades were raised in the suburb of Bè to prevent a possible intervention by the army. Hardly two months later, on 5 April 2005, two opposing demonstrations were organised to openly compete for visibility in the public space. One was a demonstration by the opposition demanding the postponement of elections,[14] the other was an RPT demonstration to show support for Faure's government. The opposition's demonstration followed a habitual route (Kodjindji, *Boulevard Houphouët Boigny*, *Boulevard Circulaire*, *Fontaine Lumineuse*, LONATO, *Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky*, Town House of Lomé), led by young people wearing yellow T-shirts bearing a palm tree (the colour and symbol of the UFC,[15] the main opposition party). The RPT demonstration had selected its symbols differently: it departed from the Dove of Peace and finished at the esplanade of the Conference Centre (the former head office of the RPT). Everyone thus converged on Independence Square.

With regard to the symbolic spatial deployment of power, the Togolese political opposition has a network of places that is more limited than the state forces, but can nevertheless potentially mobilise the previous strata of national history. Fréau Garden,[16] named after the Commander of the Circle and Administrator-Mayor of Lomé in 1933 and 1935, is an urbanistic legacy dating back to the colonial period. It is at the intersection of *Avenue de la Libération*, the major road linking the town centre to the northern suburbs, and *Avenue du 24 Janvier*. Surrounded by a parapet, planted with trees and lined with public benches, this Céline-style colonial square boasts a bandstand that is typical of a park of the French prefecture.

A number of spatial factors have turned Fréau Garden into a vital place of political geography in the city. Being excellently placed on the main roads from Bè, the square is easily accessible. Rarely found in a dense city centre, it is an open space, which makes it possible for a large crowd to gather. In the event of a demonstration heading towards Independence Square nearby, the crowd is able to stop en route and gather at Fréau Garden or, which is more often the case, remain there when access to Independence Square is blocked by the police. A few hundred metres from Fréau Garden on *Avenue du 24 Janvier*, the UFC head office can be easily spotted by the many mopeds and yellow T-shirts of the militants that guard it. This colonial square has thus become the 'natural' meeting point of the opposition, and it is possible to observe a near permanent military presence around the square.

Another favourable aspect is the fact that the Fréau Garden is free from any political markings of Eyadéma's regime. Instead, the square speaks of the French colonial regime. The main surrounding places include the Central Post Office of Lomé, the old Gouverneur Bonnecarrère Secondary School and the French Cultural Centre on *Avenue de 24 Janvier*, the latter being in a sense the 'protector' against military aggression because it is frequented by the foreign French-speaking communities.

From October 1990 onwards, there were confrontations in Fréau Garden. During a prohibited demonstration in January 1993, some young members of the opposition gathered there – only to be shot at by the army, claiming at least 20 lives. Panic was running particularly high because it was said that military helicopters were going to come and pour burning fuel over the square. In March 2005, the first anti-Faure demonstration after the death of General Eyadéma ended with speeches at Fréau Garden.

In a sense, the Togolese political opposition has its political centre outside of the suburb of Bè – Fréau Garden, a colonial public space converted to another use, a vital core of local political geography.

Conclusion: A capital that reflects national territory?

In conclusion, it is important to reflect again on the regional and national levels in order to have a better understanding of the city of Lomé. Indeed, there are two possible readings of Togo's geography and, therefore, of Lomé's positioning in that geography. In terms of the economic flux, the country lies along a north-

south axis. The national road that crosses the country from Lomé to Burkina Faso is an international transit axis that leads to the harbour of Lomé. As one of the rare deep-water harbours in West Africa, it is a hub port for regional trade and a lung for the landlocked Sahelian countries. Another advantage of Lomé's port is that it is integrated into an industrial port zone that was given free zone status in 1989. Perpendicular to this north-south axis, the coastal road makes this southern region of the country a true corridor of regional communication because it links Nigeria to Côte d'Ivoire. Customs duties and levies on illegal trafficking are a real godsend for Togo. Speculating in Nigerian and Ghanaian currencies in relation to the CFA franc makes cross-border trafficking very profitable. It is beneficial for the simple reason that the Éwé group is a cross-border community. Besides, the Éwé have long dreamt of constituting an Éwéland State, which explains the frequent periods of political tension between Togo and Ghana. This crossroads situation made it possible for an economic elite to emerge in the south of the country, the most emblematic representatives of whom are the famous female fabric traders, the so-called Nana Benz's (Cordonnier 1982). Their business enabled them to diversify their investments, making them a real politico-economic force. The international exchanges also benefited the strong Syro-Lebanese community of traders in Lomé.

Another geographical reading of the country, however, is the one that places north and south in opposition. This pseudo-division of the country goes back to the German colonial period, during which the north was excluded from colonisation. This reading corresponds to cultural differences (for example, groups and regions can be distinguished in terms of their traditional dietary habits: millet in the north, yam in the centre and maize in the south). This division was subsequently reinforced and politically exploited by the Eyadéma regime.

These different readings of Togolese space are in competition: space of exchange or space of isolation? Politics leans towards the second, economics towards the first. Lastly, the city's history can only be understood as an oscillation from one to the other over time, depending on the historical period. It is, therefore, because of Lomé's double status as a political and economic capital that it experiences strong territorial contradictions. In other words, it is neither possible to describe Lomé without considering its status as a political capital, nor possible to do so by only considering that status.

Notes

1 Marguerat (1987: 84) defines this group as follows: 'A group of traders of different origins (including the people repatriated from Brazil between 1835 and 1850) that conducted commercial activities in the region of Aného.'

2 The single political party founded by General Eyadéma in 1969.

3 On 24 January 1974, the plane that was carrying the head of state crashed in Sarakawa, in the north of Togo. He came out of the 'accident' unscathed, but it was suggested that it was a colonialist attack which he 'miraculously' survived (see Toulabor 1986, on the political construction of a 'myth' following this incident). After the Sarakawa incident, General

Eyadéma launched a 'triumphant return' to Lomé where he announced on 2 February that the phosphate mines would be nationalised. This was to mark his victory over the old metropolis and to take possession of the country's main source of revenue.

4 The *evala* is a form of traditional Kabyè wrestling that represents the initiation rite for young men and was revived by the Eyadéma regime. Every year, the general attended these celebrations in the Kabyè region and was reputed to select the most vigorous men as his personal bodyguards.

5 *La Nouvelle Marche*, 30 August 1989. During the 1980s, peace was the main theme of the Eyadéma regime propaganda. It was presented as having brought peace to Togo by protecting it from ethnic violence, and to Africa by means of diplomatic missions.

6 Situated north of the city, this secure housing estate is practically the only luxury residential enclave in Lomé.

7 Interview with a group of Lomé inhabitants, November 2005.

8 The army, of course, provided major support to the Eyadéma regime. The general very often spent the night at the base rather than at his Lomé palace situated further away north of the suburbs. He chose to do this either because he feared 'terrorist' attacks or because he preferred to do so.

9 Hence the popular name of the suburb, Yovo Komé ('white suburb' in Éwé). Developed in German colonial times, this suburb was reinvested in by the French colonial power and distinguished itself clearly from the African commercial suburb that centred on the central market.

10 This is also because they always seem to have preferred to settle around the main routes leading to the north of the country and because they wanted to remain close to the bus stations that made it possible for them to go there. This is why they are not found in great numbers in the eastern outskirts of Lomé.

11 'Stone throwers', an expression designating the group of activists from the opposition.

12 Namely, the suburb of Tokoin Adewi.

13 This is where the offices of the prime minister's cabinet and his residence are situated. The Prime Minister's Office is on the seafront on the boundary of the administrative quarter and the suburb of Kodjoviakopé. It used to be the old palace of the colonial governor, then became a residence for foreign guests and finally became used as the Prime Minister's Office at the beginning of the 1990s.

14 The opposition rightly felt that it was disadvantaged by the hasty and undoubtedly manipulated drawing up of electoral lists.

15 The *Union des Forces du Changement* (Union of the Forces of Change), party of Gilchrist Olympio, son of the first assassinated post-independence president.

16 Sometimes called Fréau Square, this typical colonial square was named Fréau Garden by the city dwellers. It became its official name, and the name of the small suburb that surrounds it. As part of President Faure Gnassingbé's policy of appeasement, the square was recently renamed Amarré Santos Square, after a former lawyer and leader of the *Jeunesse du Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (JUVENTO) (Youth Movement of the Committee of Togolese Unity).

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LAGOS

5 Lagos

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At the end of the 18th century, Lagos became the first slavery port in West Africa. From the 19th century onwards, like many other port cities in Africa, it was increasingly involved in the circulation of people, goods, ideas and technologies. By the 20th century, Lagos had become the main port of the most populous African country and was the federal capital of Nigeria from 1914 to 1991. Today, the city of Lagos boasts a concentration of capital assets, trading companies and public investments, a large bureaucracy and a transnational political, intellectual and religious elite. Since the 19th century, in fact, Lagos has been at the forefront of new cultural and social practices in Nigeria, despite Abuja (the new federal capital since 1991) and Port Harcourt (the oil capital in the Niger Delta) having recently acquired increasing influence.

Lagos has been shaped both by its national history as the federal capital and by remaining at the centre of political opposition to colonial rule (from 1920 to 1960), to military and civilian regimes (from 1966 to 1999) and to the current ruling party (from 1999 to 2008). This history has deeply influenced the way the city is governed, in particular in an international context.

Not surprisingly, the economic and political importance of Lagos has already been stressed by several authoritative studies (Baker 1974; Barnes 1986; Mabogunje 1968; Mann 2007; Olowu 1990; Olukoju 2003a; Peil 1991). More recently, the city has attracted the attention of planners, geographers and art historians (Enwezor et al. 2002; Gandy 2005, 2006), most notably among them the architect and urban theorist Rem Koolhaas. He considers Lagos as the 'paradigm and the extreme and pathological form of the West African city' (Koolhaas et al. 2000). According to Koolhaas, the city has freed itself from the constraint of colonisation or post-independence town planning, and despite a total lack of infrastructure, systems, organisation and management, the city is 'working'. Lagos is thus at the vanguard of a globalising modernity, mainly because the government has no impact on the city and because the city's inhabitants regulate themselves. Koolhaas believes that in the near future Paris and New York will be like Lagos.

This chapter goes beyond Koolhaas's analysis and asks to what extent colonial, national and international norms have shaped town-planning policies, architecture and urban management in the capital city. It refutes the assertion proposed by some authors that Lagos was an orderly colonial city in the past, and that it is nowadays a paradigmatic African city. Instead of focusing on its 'exceptional character', the chapter considers Lagos as a place of negotiation and confrontation between international norms and between national and local politics, as well as a place where

Western and African influences mix. The chapter argues that the battle for the control of Lagos between different political factions has emerged as a central feature of the port city, rather than the city being characterised by its supposedly African nature. In essence, the chapter looks at the influence of national and world history on the making of the metropolitan port city of Lagos.

A cosmopolitan and disorderly colonial city (1861–1945)

Capturing the resources of the port

Originally, Lagos was an island located between the sea and the lagoon, which is what gave it its name in Portuguese. At the beginning of the 19th century, Lagos became the main slavery port along the Slave Coast. It was still a small town when the British annexed it in 1861 – officially to stop the slave trade, but more pragmatically to use it as an administrative and military settlement for the conquest of the hinterland regions (Law 1983). During the second half of the 19th century, its population increased gradually from 25 000 in 1866 to 38 387 in 1901.[1] The progressive substitution of the slave trade with the palm oil industry and the consolidation of the position of Lagos on the West African coast attracted European merchants, freed slaves from Brazil and Cuba, slaves freed by the British on the coast and refugees from the interior. After the conquest of the hinterland, the British colonial administration developed commercial agriculture (palm oil and cocoa in the south, cotton in the north), exploited the few mineral resources available (copper and iron) and set up the main railway of the colony (the Lagos–Ibadan–Kano line was completed in 1911). The port then became the main interface between the hinterland of the main and most populated of the African British colonies and Britain.

The port became the headquarters of the Federation of Nigeria in 1914, after the merging of three former colonial administrative entities: the colony of Lagos, the protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Like many other coastal colonies of Africa, the rationale was to concentrate administrative staff and corporate companies in the best-connected site within the federation. The customs duties paid on imported goods in the port of Lagos were the main source of revenue, which was used to meet the rising administrative costs of the Lagos colony. From 1880 to 1906, customs duties (on spirits, cotton goods and tobacco) provided an average of 84% of the total annual revenue (Lawal 1987: 70). From 1862 to 1905, the value of imported goods in the Lagos colony increased by 15 times, the revenue of the colony by 53 and its expenditure by 63. However, heavy investments were subsequently required for the physical development of the port, which lacked a natural harbour, and charges were levied to compensate for government investment in the port. Therefore, throughout the colonial period, Lagos remained a very expensive port with very high port tariffs, in spite of mercantile pressure from the Lagos, Liverpool, London and Manchester Chambers of Commerce (Olukoju 1994).

The making of a cosmopolitan lifestyle

Lagos emerged during the colonial period as a heterogeneous town populated by groups of people of various origins. This gave the town its eclectic character, with increasing social stratification and contrasting lifestyles. The historical core of the town, Lagos Island, developed from the four main sub-communities who lived in relatively distinct districts (Baker 1974: 1). Firstly, the heterogeneous European community represented a small group (300 people by 1901). This community established the physical foundations of the city, which consisted of warehouses and government buildings built along the Marina and around the racecourse. Secondly, the old town of Isale Eko was the larger district and residence of the chief of the town (Oba). It rapidly became overcrowded and was considered insalubrious by the local administration. Thirdly, the town of Saro developed to settle a growing group of educated ex-slaves who came from Sierra Leone. Until the end of the 19th century, these were the main merchants in Lagos and they built storehouses along the Marina rivalling those of the European merchants (Baker 1974: 27; Mann 2007: 126). As active agents of Christian missionaries, this group also constituted the first intellectual elite cadre of Lagos (they acted as interpreters and administrative assistants). The fourth community in Lagos, the Brazilian community, descended mainly from freed Brazilian slaves[2] and had various Portuguese cultural attributes (e.g. names, language and Catholicism) and Yoruba worship. Most of them turned to the crafts they had learnt in captivity (masonry, carpentry, cabinet making, tailoring and smithing) and introduced what came to be known as Brazilian architecture throughout the city, along the coast and in the hinterland (Mann 2007: 127; Smith 1979: 48–50).

Despite the different cultural backgrounds of these groups and the inequitable distribution of wealth between them, some common cultural practices emerged in 19th-century Lagos among this cosmopolitan, but Victorian-style, elite. They shared religious, cultural and entertainment venues (church, racecourse, theatre) and set up new voluntary associations (Echeruo 1977). Up until the 1950s, Lagos Island remained the commercial and political core of the country, as well as its most cosmopolitan settlement (see Figure 5.1). Despite the growing emergence of settlements – Ebutte Metta, Yaba, Mushin, Agege – on the mainland around the train station of the Lagos–Ibadan railway, Lagos Island also remained the most populated area of the city (90 000 inhabitants out of a total of 120 000 in 1931).

A disorderly colonial city and the rise of nationalism

Unlike most other port cities of the Atlantic coast, in which segregation schemes were introduced between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, for decades there was no official segregation scheme in Lagos. It was only after Lagos was made the capital in 1914 that a classification of Nigerian cities was proposed in 1921. Lagos was the only city belonging to the 'Class A township', which combined a residential area reserved for Europeans (Ikoyi) and a commercial area in which Europeans lived, worked, traded and interacted with Africans (Lagos Island) (Olukoju 2003b).

It was impossible to relocate either the Western companies or the African traders and inhabitants beyond the historical core of the city. But in the 'next-door' island of Ikoyi, a European Reservation Area was laid out in 1928 exclusively to accommodate the increasing number of Europeans (which grew from 301 in 1901 to 4 000 in 1931).

Overcrowding and a lack of housing in the old indigenous part of Lagos Island rapidly gave rise to what became considered by the British colonial town planners as a slum. The outbreak of a severe plague in 1924, which lasted for six years, forced the administration to initiate an anti-plague campaign (including quarantining, house-to-house sanitary inspections and payment for rats brought to the city council), which was largely opposed by the residents. As in many other colonial cities of the empire, the plague led to the creation of the first town-planning institution of the federation, the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB), whose initial task was to implement the city's first slum-clearance scheme, that is, the demolition of 400 unhealthy shacks and houses and the resettlement of a few thousand inhabitants to the mainland (Olukoju 1993: 98–99). However, this operation did not solve the problem of overcrowding in Lagos Island, where the population density increased from 25 000 per square mile in 1901 to 53 000 per square mile in 1931 (Baker 1974: 35).

With the growth of indigenous settlements, keeping the city orderly became more complicated. The increasing monopoly of trade by European companies and Lebanese traders, the will to escape taxation on markets and the limitation of job opportunities during the 1930s depression all led to the important development of street trading and hawking. This form of work, which had been rapidly growing in the port cities of Mombasa, Dakar and Lagos, was strongly affected by the economic crises of the 1930s (Cooper 1987; Fourchard 2005; Lakroum 1983). In 1932, the administrator of the colony complained that 'there is no street in Lagos or Ebute Metta [a new settlement on the mainland] where hawking or selling outside the houses does not take place'. According to the secretary of the town council, 4 000 petty traders were congregating every day around the main markets in Lagos. However, the administrator stated that this figure was closer to 10 000, a number representing around 10% of the population of Lagos.[3] Traders started to erect temporary, unauthorised structures, and an illegal evening market was even discovered in 1932.[4] Within the context of widespread economic hardship, groups of young destitute street boys, known as Jaguda Boys and Boma Boys, were beginning to harass the public around markets and 'motor parks' (car parks) in Lagos Island. Their aim was forcefully to extort money from women traders and, during World War II, to act as illegal touts for soldiers of the empire (Fourchard 2006).

More importantly, Lagos soon became the main centre of political parties and nationalism in Nigeria. The increasing number of an educated elite, composed of journalists, barristers and professionals, were prominent in the early nationalist movements (Sklar 1963: 41). In 1923, Herbert Macaulay, a civil engineer and editor of the *Lagos Weekly*, launched the first genuine political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party. This party remained, however, confined to the Lagos political arena and was mainly concerned with local matters, in particular with elections

(to the Legislative Council every five years and the Lagos Town Council every three years) (Sklar 1963: 46). The aims of the party were more general: to promote higher education in Nigeria, compulsory education at primary-school level and the Africanisation of the civil service. A major change occurred in August 1944, with the creation in Lagos of the National Council of Nigeria, which included 40 organisations united in their demand for independence. These included political parties, tribal unions, trade unions, literary associations, social clubs, religious groups and women's organisations. Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, a journalist and founder of the *West African Pilot* newspaper, became the main leaders.

Promoting a federal capital (1946–1976)

Nigeria's independence in October 1960 resulted in no major changes either in town-planning policy or architecture. However, as Frederick Cooper has recently demonstrated, it was World War II and its aftermath that brought about important changes in the history of the African continent, with a new set of colonial officers and experts introducing the projects of 'modernisation' and 'development' (Cooper 2005). It was within this context that architects, town planners and political leaders developed new ideas and beliefs about transforming the city of Lagos into a modern capital. Subsequently, 1976 represented a major rupture, since the federal government decided to move the capital from Lagos to Abuja that year.

Capturing the resources of the nation

More than three decades of economic growth (from 1946 to 1983) followed the economic recession of the 1930s and World War II. The discovery of oil in the Niger Delta in 1959 and its exportation at very high prices during the 1970s dramatically increased the federal state budget (it multiplied by a factor of 14 between 1970 and 1976). Colonial officers and nationalist independent leaders promoted Lagos as an industrial centre. There was the creation of a Department of Commerce and Industry in 1948, two industrial estates in 1958/59 and a growing concentration of industrial federal establishments. The value of industrial production of the port city increased from 29% of the national product in 1963 to 70% in 1980. The development of a major wage labour market, combined with the decline of agriculture in the 1970s and the demographic transition of the Nigerian population attracted many migrants, resulting in a fivefold increase in the city population during this period. At independence, Lagos was the largest city in Nigeria, having overtaken Ibadan in 1963 (665 000 and 600 000 inhabitants, respectively). By 1975, Lagos had become the largest sub-Saharan city, with an estimated population of some 3 150 000 inhabitants.

By the 1950s, Lagos was developing into a predominantly Nigerian city, with migrants from the Nigerian hinterland becoming more numerous than the initial population who had settled on Lagos Island. The very high percentage of the population born outside of Lagos (59% in 1931, 63% in 1950) indicates that since the 1920s, migrants contributed significantly to the growth of the city (Mabogunje 1968: 264; Olukoju 1993). The major regional sources of immigrants were originally

the immediate hinterland (the Yoruba areas in Abeokuta, Ijebu and Oyo states), but then, increasingly, migrants came from all over the country, including the north after the colonial period, and there was a substantial influx of Igbo refugees during the civil war of 1967–1970. Immigrants also came from neighbouring countries, such as Benin, Ghana and Ivory Coast. The most important factor stimulating immigration to Lagos was the widening gap in employment opportunities between Lagos, the main job market in Nigeria, and the rest of the country. Largely as a result of the inflow of migrants throughout the 20th century, Lagos remained a very youthful city. The age composition shows an increasing proportion in the under-30-year-old age group, which climbed from 62% in 1921 to 78% in 1972 (Baker 1974: 40; Peil 1991: 22).

While Lagos was the initial resource base of the country, the site and government of the future capital became a hotly debated issue in the 1950s during negotiations for independence between the Colonial Office and the nationalist parties. At this time, there were intense debates on the future of the Nigerian constitution and the federal character of the state, in which considerable internal power was given to three new powerful regions – the Northern, Eastern and Western Regions. There were two main issues at stake (Adebayo 1987): could Lagos remain the capital of the country? And should the federal capital be part of the Western Region – in which Lagos was situated – or should it be administered separately? The debates reveal an ongoing conflict around the sharing of the economic resources of the independent state among the elite cadres of the three regional political parties. The British administration and the northern and eastern political parties wanted Lagos to be the capital of Nigeria, but they wanted it excised from the Western Region. The reason was mainly financial: the port and the growing industrialisation of Lagos provided large resources for the state.[5] To abandon Lagos to the Western Region ran the risk of reinforcing the financial power of its dominant political party, the Action Group. This party wanted to keep Lagos within the Western Region for the opposite reason and suggested building a new capital city in a central and neutral place. For the Colonial Office, however, the building of a capital city was too costly for a new nation and it was eventually decided to keep Lagos as the capital, but administered by the federal government. This victory for the northern and eastern delegates was perceived as a direct threat by the Western Region, whose leader, Obafemi Awolowo, predicted the fiscal and economic suicide of the Western Region and never abandoned the idea of merging the capital territory into the Western Region (Benna 1989: 253).

After 1954, the federal government controlled the federal territory of Lagos. It created a federal Ministry for Lagos Affairs in 1959, and then in 1966, the Lagos State[6] was established, whose governor, like other governors, was nominated by the federal government until the Second Republic of 1979–1983. In other words, most of the policies implemented during this long period came from federal-government initiatives. The majority of the city's population, who favoured the Action Group party, remained unhappy with this federal-government policy.

Problems with the management and provision of services in Lagos, moreover, were growing rapidly. In 1962, a UN team of experts considered that key problems in metropolitan Lagos included traffic congestion, a shortage of housing, lack of

housing finance, the substantial size of the slum areas, the unsanitary conditions of most of the houses, lack of human resources and the absence of a metropolitan government (Abrams et al. 1980). Only one of the recommendations proposed by the expert mission was implemented by the federal government – the building of transport infrastructure in the form of new roads, bridges and highways. This policy absorbed a large amount of the capital expenditure from the federal government (between one-fifth and one-third between 1962 and 1980) and from the Lagos military state government (half of its expenditure in the 1970s) (Olowu 1990: 61)[7]. The policy was a response to the priority given to the development of cars for individuals over any other means of public transport in the context of the 1970s oil boom, and a response to federal policies designed to attract international car companies interested in the development of the growing middle classes and the emerging car market (Fourchard & Godard 2002). Whereas housing policy and public transport were totally neglected, expensive, prestigious infrastructure was built (e.g. the stadium, the National Theatre and the residential quarter for the Second Festival of Black Arts and Culture). Consequently, when the same UN team returned to Lagos in 1980, they concluded that the problems identified in 1962 were identical, but had got worse. Accordingly, it is pertinent to investigate how the policy of establishing a modern capital city came into being during this period.

Promoting nationalism and modernity

The town council and federal government alike were keen to remove what appeared to be disorderly elements in the historical core of the city of Lagos, as well as to project an image of modernity, by sponsoring international events, through modern architecture and by publishing numerous images of a modern city in the press. There was in fact a clear continuity in policy and planning between the last set of colonial town planners, architects and administrators and the first generation of political leaders in Lagos. On the other hand, disagreements were equally clear in these regards between the federal government and its political opponents in Lagos.

The urban renewal of Lagos Island which took place in the second half of the 1950s is a good indication of the ongoing struggle between a new ruling political elite and the population of Lagos, backed by the opposition party to the government, the Action Group. As mentioned above, overcrowding in Lagos Island was not solved by the 1928 Slum Clearance Scheme, and became even more pronounced in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1951, the town council and the LEDB prepared the Central Lagos Slum Clearance Scheme, intended to transfer 20 000 to 30 000 people to Surulere on the mainland, 6 km from the centre. However, unlike the 1928 operations, the main aims of this scheme were not purely sanitary. The intentions of the LEDB and the Ministry of Land, Mines and Power of the new federal government were to have an area rebuilt in a manner that befitted a capital city.[8] The Lagos Slum Clearance Advisory Committee stated that:

> Lagos is the capital of a country of growing commercial importance which is developing rapidly. It is taking an ever-increasing part in world

> affairs and is on the threshold of independence. Nigeria needs a capital city of which she can feel proud, and in which her people can live, work and play under conditions which are in accord with modern town planning practice for the well-being of all members of the community.[9]

The need for a modern capital city with larger roads and without shacks in the central area was key to the ministry's decision to relocate. As mentioned by Maris (1962), the disorder and overcrowding in Lagos Island were a central challenge to the dignity of the future capital of Nigeria. Because they took place in the commercial core of the city, slum clearances stimulated the rapid rise of rents in the surrounding areas, greatly disrupting the social life of the inhabitants, and eventually causing economic hardship to residents, especially to women petty traders, who relied on doorstep selling. The scheme was, therefore, difficult to implement and was delayed by resistance from these residents. On the one hand, the federal government and the LEDB persisted in their implementation of the scheme; on the other, the Action Group persevered in their advocacy of support for the people who were to be displaced. As a result, the uses to which urban space could be put became a salient political issue. The resultant politicisation of city planning, and more generally of urban space, became a major trend in the development of Lagos during the second half of the 20th century.

The will to organise the city as a prestigious, orderly federal capital failed. The will to limit the 'invasion' of the streets by traders and hawkers became an ongoing struggle in which the city council, the federal government, market women and the opposition were the major players. In the 1930s, this 'problem' was limited to the areas around the main markets on Lagos Island. By the 1950s, it concerned all of Lagos Island, as well as the primary residential areas of the mainland. The town council tried to regain control over these spaces. It forbade street trading in several neighbourhoods[10] and tried to regulate trade on Lagos Island: street vendors were forbidden to work along the commercial hub of the Marina, on the four main roads, on the seven avenues and on 56 streets.[11] But a few years later, the four main avenues – Victoria Street, Broad Street, Balogun Street and Ereko Street – were said to be 'out of control', and car travel became virtually impossible in many of the adjacent streets. The new Martin Street, widened by the Slum Clearance Scheme in order to become a major axis of the metropolis, was already occupied in 1962 by an army of merchants and street traders, and goods and parked cars (Abrams et al. 1980: 60).

During this period, the Nigerian political elite developed a strong interest in modern architecture. As in other places, post-war architecture was becoming a political tool used to forge national identity and unity. Most of the first generation of African architects were trained in Europe and were fascinated by modernist architecture (Elleh 2001: 237). Nigeria was no exception, and Lagos soon became endowed with international-style buildings, especially new state constructions, including the parliament, town council and ministries.[12] Interestingly, some of the main buildings erected in the 1950s, such as the US Embassy, the British Petroleum headquarters and the Bristol Hostel, were located within the former central Lagos

slum, and projected Lagos as a resolutely modern city. These early developments deeply influenced successive generations of Nigerian politicians, as well as qualified Nigerian architects, most of whom were public officers working in the Public Works Department of Lagos at independence.[13] Ulli Beier, a renowned specialist of contemporary art in Nigeria, complained that Nigerian architects in 1960 were only interested in 'modern architecture', forgetting the 'traditional' architecture of their country.[14] This trend lasted for the next 20 years. Most articles and photographs published by the *Nigeria Magazine*, an academic journal read by the European and Nigerian educated elite, clearly reveal this ongoing fascination with international-style buildings in Lagos.[15]

Close to the historical Lagos Island, Ikoyi, the former exclusive European colonial settlement, and Victoria Island, a new upper-class neighbourhood, became the preferred residences of the new Nigerian elite working for the government. In June 1967, the headquarters of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (see Figure 5.2) was officially opened on Victoria Island. This building, sponsored by the federal and regional governments and the UK and US governments, became a major academic institution in Nigeria and also served as a regular venue for the meetings of the Organization of African Unity. Its image was intended to promote the modernity of a country that was claiming leadership on the African continent (Vaughan-Richards 1968: 17). This concern over continental leadership is well captured by a major cultural and political event which took place in Lagos in 1977 – the Second Festival of Black Arts and Culture (FESTAC). The event illustrates successive military governments' use of oil money to forge a new national culture, to erase the colonial legacy from memory and to display the richness of Nigerian culture to other countries on the continent (Apter 2005). To herald the festival, city authorities inaugurated the massive National Theatre (Figure 5.3) in 1976 and built a luxurious (and contested) residential quarter, known as Festac town, to welcome the various official delegations from the African continent. FESTAC was accordingly a cultural extravaganza which celebrated a global vision of black nationhood and citizenship, animated by the exuberance of the recent Nigerian oil boom (Apter 2005).

The gradual shift into a state capital 1967–2008

The last two decades of the 20th century and the first of the 21st were marked by sustained conflict between the Federal State and the Lagos State, especially during the periods of civilian regimes of 1979–1983 and after 1999. The result has been the continual politicisation of urban space, which is one of the main features shaping the contemporary Lagos urban landscape.

Conflict between the Federal State and the Lagos State

The recurrent problems associated with the growth of Lagos (i.e. shortage of land and housing, extension of slums, traffic congestion and general lack of urban space) led President Gowon to launch in 1972 a national debate on the possibility of establishing a new capital. The decision to build a new capital in Abuja, in the

centre of the country, was taken in February 1976 by President Murtala Muhammed. Although a number of reasons were given to justify this decision, it was political considerations which proved to be decisive. After the civil war of 1967–1970, the policy of national reconciliation called for a politically neutral capital. Abuja was selected because it was at the centre of the country and, accordingly, at the confluence of the three main regional political forces in Nigeria, whereas Lagos was perceived by northern politicians as being the focal point of the Action Group. The cost of building a new capital was no longer a problem because of the dramatic increase in the Federal State budget. Building a modern capital with the necessary infrastructure was seen to be less burdensome than dealing with the ongoing problems associated with the growth of Lagos. In addition, maintaining Lagos as federal territory was no longer a persuasive financial argument for the northern politicians in power, as 80% of the federal budget was now coming from Niger Delta petrodollars. The port city, once deemed central to nation building, was no longer financially essential to the new oil state. Nonetheless, it took 15 years to build Abuja (from 1976 to 1991) and another ten years to move all the ministries (from 1991 to 2000). The decline of the oil price in the 1980s and 1990s, the return of a highly corrupt military regime (during the period 1983–1999) and the implementation of Structural Adjustment Policy recommendations in 1986, drastically reduced the Federal State budget and diminished capital expenditure.

This new political and economic context radically modified the pace of public investment in Lagos, and gradually, but inevitably, changed the federal capital into a state capital.[16] Since the late 1970s, the political climate had been clouded by the reluctance of the national government to make long-term commitments to Lagos in view of the political differences between the state and the federal government, particularly during the period of civil rule (from 1979 to 1983) (Olowu 1990: 151). This political constraint continues to the present: since 1999, the neglect of metropolitan Lagos by the federal government is generally believed to flow from the political struggle between Abuja and Lagos.

Since the civil war, major fiscal resources (notably duties on export and import goods) have been gradually centralised into the federal budget, thereby increasing the dependence of the states on federal government allocations. The situation in Lagos is somewhat different due to its position as a port city, as the main industrial city of Nigeria and as the main wage-labour market of the country. Consequently, its internal resources[17] have over time become more important than the federal grants (47% in 1968, 29% in 1983) (Olowu 1990: 151). Significantly, this fiscal autonomy increased during the period of the civilian regime (from 1979 to 1983), when Lagos State was governed by the opposition. Despite this, there remains serious opposition to the appropriation of Lagos resources by the federal government. This is illustrated by the ongoing struggle over the exact figure of the Lagos population. Since the late 1960s, federal allocation to the states has been based on state populations. During the Fourth Republic, the 2006 federal census found that Lagos State had 9.4 million inhabitants, a figure which was considered totally incorrect the following year by the Lagos State government, which organised its own census and put the number

at 17 million inhabitants (Fourchard 2007a: 5). This battle over population figures demonstrates Lagos's ambitions as a world metropolis and its political battle against the federal government.

The capacity for infrastructural implementation of the Lagos State government also appears superior to that of the federal government operating at state level. For example, in ten years, the successive military governors of Lagos State (nominated by the federal government) were only able to complete one waterworks to serve the upper-class town of Festac (supplying 4 million gallons of water a day), whereas in four years, the Jakande civilian state government (which was in power from 1979 to 1983) managed to build ten waterworks in various poor and middle-class areas of Lagos (21 million gallons per day) (Olukoju 2003a: 69). Similarly, more primary schools were built by this civilian government in five years than all the schools built by the former military governors.

During the Fourth Republic, the Lagos State government initiated an important project aimed at the revitalisation of the historical core of Lagos Island in order to reverse the economic and environmental decline of the two last decades (Lagos State Government, 2006). This project was focused on the same area addressed by the 1950s Slum Clearance Scheme, but was radically different from its colonial ancestor, as it involved regeneration and upgrading rather than clearance and resettlement. Its intention is overtly to create an environment conducive to foreign investment and thereby to make Lagos 'comparable to other major cities in the world'. As the Lagos State governor explained, 'our vision is to make Lagos State the reference point of harmonious physical development in Nigeria through best practices and physical planning and development matters' (Lagos State Government 2006: 5). Since it is a Lagos State, rather than a federal, initiative in both financial and political terms, the challenge to the federal government goes without saying.

Politicisation of urban space

The most enduring consequence of the Federal vs. Lagos political struggle has been the sustained politicisation of urban space. This process started in the early colonial period, developed with the creation of the first political parties (after World War I) and continued after World War II to the end of the First Republic (1966), before going underground (1966–1979, 1983–1999) and emerging, often violently, during civilian periods or during elections (1979–1983, 1992 and since 1999). Intense rivalry between two opposite political parties is an often neglected, although central, factor in the changing urban landscape. Lagos has effectively been the seat of two major rival powers. On the one hand, it has been the seat of the colonial and federal government (1914–1991), which was dominated by a coalition of eastern and northern political parties during different civilian and military regimes. On the other hand, the dominant party in the Western Region, the Action Group and its leader, Obafemi Awolowo, were regularly in opposition to the federal government – during the late colonial period and the First Republic (1954–1966), during the Second Republic under a new political banner, the Unity Party of Nigeria (1979–1983),

and during the Fourth Republic (1999–2007), with the Alliance for Democracy, an offshoot of the Action Group and the Unity Party of Nigeria. Ongoing conflict between the federal government and the major political force in the Western Region was routine, and Lagos was often the site of violent confrontation between the two.

This opposition has taken various forms. Most often, it was an open confrontation between political parties, especially during civilian periods. But it also took the form of religious, ethnic and communal riots or student and union protests when political parties were banned. It is not the place here to mention all the successive political events and riots which took place in 20th- and early 21st-century Lagos. The most dramatic event was probably the chaos which followed the cancellation by the military government of the June 1993 election, in which a Yoruba candidate, Moshood Abiola, was due to be elected president of Nigeria.[18] Instead, in order to illustrate the politicisation of urban space associated with conflict, three case studies of urban actors, all of whom have become politically incorporated into this political competition and all of whom have used public space as sites of confrontation, will be discussed. The actors are thugs, market women and motor-park union leaders, and the public space they use are streets, markets and motor parks.

Since the 1950s in Nigeria, journalists, intellectuals and political leaders have commonly called the foot soldiers of political parties 'the thugs' or 'the political thugs'. Most of these foot soldiers have been recruited from among the so-called 'Area Boys', who receive a salary during election campaigns. During the four months preceding the 2007 presidential election, the *Nigerian Tribune*, a leading south-western opposition newspaper, described more than 40 street fights in which political thugs were actively involved (Fourchard 2007a). Since the return of an electoral regime, thugs are being recruited more and more by political parties. However, this phenomenon is not limited to the Fourth Republic. In the south-west, and particularly in Lagos, political parties hired thugs during the Babangida and Abacha periods, and during the First and Second Republics. Even before this, in the 1950s, the historical ancestors of the Area Boys, the Jaguda Boys, were employed (Fourchard 2007a: 10; Momoh 2003: 186). This practice may go back even further: in the first half of the 20th century, the Egungun masquerades were co-opted to serve the political objectives of its chieftaincy (Adeboye 2007).

Market women also became politicised when the first political party of the 1920s mobilised women for their own partisan politics, most notably to agitate against the imposition of the water rate. In the 1950s, the political incorporation of market women developed to the point where they formed an auxiliary wing of every major party in Lagos, establishing factions that continued to be meaningful even after the imposition of military rule (Baker 1974: 241; Mba 1987). Politicians feared the potential impact of the activities of market women and one consequence was that the town council was unsuccessful in its attempts to enforce the ban on street trading, especially in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1980s. Military regimes, especially the Buhari regime (1983–1985) and its Lagos military governor, Gbolahan Mudashiru, demolished stalls and illegal shops, and forbade street trading in the main streets of

the capital and in some specific quarters, but once the Buhari government ended, streets were once again invaded by traders. To this day, trading on the streets in Lagos remains an issue.

The politicisation of urban space is most obvious in relation to the third case study, that of public motor parks. Since the 1980s, the involvement of the Nigerian Union Road Transport Workers in the Second Republic elections gave the union enormous power to manage motor parks, first in Lagos, and then throughout south-western Nigeria (Albert 2007). This enabled the union to act almost at will, and members over time established unauthorised motor parks all over Lagos (there are probably about a thousand today), leading to an aggravation of traffic congestion in the city. The management and control of these motor parks is a highly contested political issue in Lagos, as well as in other Nigerian cities. Since the return of the Fourth Republic, the Lagos state government has attempted to gain control of the union, which was formerly perceived to be too close to the federal ruling party.

Conclusion

As the main port city of the most heavily populated country in Africa, Lagos has benefited immensely from the integration of Nigeria into the world economy. During both the colonial and immediate postcolonial periods, a large proportion of national investment accrued to the city. When Nigeria became a wealthy oil state in the 1970s, Lagos became less important to the national economy and was largely neglected by the Federal State. However, since Lagos State has remained the only financially viable state of the 36 that make up Nigeria, due in the main to its government's ability to generate a substantial amount of its own revenue, it has been able to resist the authoritarian trends of the federal government. Simultaneously, over this long period of development, the city's population has changed from a markedly cosmopolitan one in the 19th century to a significantly more Nigerian one in the 20th century, as a consequence of the permanent influx of migrants from the hinterland.

Koolhaas's perception of Lagos as the 'paradigm and the extreme and pathological form of the West African city' (Koolhaas et al. 2000) is a romanticised re-reading of the history of the city. Lagos was neither an orderly colonial or postcolonial city, nor is it today a paradigmatic African city which has escaped the constraints of the former colonial order. The presence of unlawful street traders was already a feature of the city in the 1930s and was a contentious issue for the town council in the 1950s and 1960s. Koolhaas introduces an 'aesthetic of chaos' (i.e. that the city works because of the chaos), but this vision is not shared by Lagosians themselves: it underestimates the ongoing criticism by Lagosians of their city, of the corruption of its elite and of the permanent failure of the mass public transport system (Fourchard 2007b; Fourchard 2010; Gandy 2006). In effect, Koolhaas has developed a depoliticised vision of Lagos, in which conflicts and disputes over the use of the space are absent from his analyses of the city. In his fascination with a 'city which works', he ignores the fact that this kind of city works mainly for those who are able to extract resources, in particular resources from the use of its public spaces.

The new civilian regime at the beginning of the 21st century is attempting to rehabilitate metropolitan Lagos after more than three decades of neglect and marginalisation by the federal government. There remain a number of contentious issues between the federal government and Lagos State, but since 2006, the new political generation in power in Lagos (Governor Tinubu and Fashola) have been trying to attract Nigerian and international private capital to revitalise the city, and to promote it worldwide. It is too early to say if this will improve daily life in Lagos, but these initiatives are bringing hope of change, particularly to many Lagosians.

Notes

1 The various censuses carried out by the British in Lagos were based on house-to-house estimations, which give only rough estimates of the population.

2 Large-scale emigration of ex-slaves from Brazil to Africa developed after the rebellion in Bahia in 1835. They engaged in commerce with Brazil in palm oil, locally made cloth and black soap. These trades declined in relative value during the reorientation of commerce from the South to the North Atlantic in the second half of the 19th century (Law 2004: 179; Mann, 2007).

3 National Archives Ibadan (NAI), Comcol 1, 1368, Memorandum from the secretary, town council, Lagos, 1 April 1932, to the administrator of the colony; Letter of 2 April 1932 from the administrator of the colony to the chief secretary to the government, Lagos.

4 NAI, Comcol 1, 963, Squatters on crown land, Lagos, 1930–1932.

5 From taxes on foreign and national corporate companies; duties on exported and imported goods; taxes paid by the minority of Europeans, Indians and Lebanese and on the salaries of African workers; and taxes on land sale.

6 After the 1966 coup, the military government decided to subdivide the initial three regions into 12 states. Lagos became capital of the Lagos state and included the former town council area and four other administrative districts excised from the former Western Region (Olugbemi 1987: 321–322).

7 One-fifth was absorbed by the first development plan (1962–1968); one-third by the second plan (1970–1974); a quarter by the third plan (1975–1980).

8 It should also be also added that 'the area to be cleared includes the main roads in and out of Lagos, which at the moment are most dangerous, and which will be considerably widened and improved when the rebuilding has been effected'. (NAI, Comcol 1, 5860, Memorandum on the central Lagos Slum Clearance Scheme, March 1954.)

9 NAI, Comcol 1, 5860, Centre Lagos Slum Clearance Scheme. Draft, 1954.

10 Apapa (the port area), in Ikoyi (the former European residential area) and in Yaba (a 1930s residential area).

11 NAI, Comcol 1, 3502/2, Markets, parks and cemeteries committee. Minutes of 22 April 1954.

12 Public commissioned works left little room to escape the modern style, as noted by architect, Oluwole Olumuyiwa, in 1985: 'The government wants modernism, which is an outward and visible sign of progress and success' (Adeyemi 1992: 340).

13 The first school of architecture was not established until the early 1950s in Ibadan and was transferred in 1955 to the University of Zaria, in the north. In 1960, there were only 15 qualified Nigerian architects in Nigeria (Ayedemi 1992).

14 Quoted by Vaughan-Richards (1968: 110).

15 See: Lagos views. *Nigeria Magazine* 1959: 90–104; Architecture in Nigeria. *Nigeria Magazine* 91, 1966: 247–255; The UAC in Nigeria's economic growth. *Nigeria Magazine* 87, 1967: 2–18; Lagos art galleries. *Nigeria Magazine* 92, 1967: 2–18; Future architectural design. *Nigeria Magazine* 93, 1967: 107–114; New buildings in Lagos. *Nigeria Magazine* 96, March 1968: 17–23.

16 Since the creation of 12 states in 1966, 24 other states have been created, making 36 states today in total.

17 Mainly based on personal income tax on wage workers, transactions on state land, licences, fines, etc.

18 One of the most vivid accounts of these events is provided by the recent publication of Wole Soyinka's memoirs (Soyinka 2006).

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ABUJA


Mediterranean Sea
NIGERIA
Abuja
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN

6 Abuja

Wale Adebanwi

To establish a city is to recreate the world and reproduce society. (Monnet 1996)

Capital cities are supposed to make statements. They often represent the best face of their countries, in both symbolic and concrete terms. Nevertheless, some capital cities, in some ways, beg questions. As sites where complex processes are articulated, some capital cities may also constitute a process of disarticulation and contestation of the very idea that they are meant to represent. Capital cities, thus, can be as much about what is affirmed as what is contested.

The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Nigeria's capital city, which succeeded Lagos, the former capital, begs questions. From the long-drawn-out struggle to replace Lagos as capital in the colonial period to the actual search for a new capital city in the postcolonial era and from the establishment of a new political capital to the federal government's formal move to Abuja, the idea of a new capital city for Nigeria has always been rooted in the ethno-regional, religious, social, political and economic dynamics and crises which largely define the country.

Therefore, the decision to establish a new capital city for Nigeria and the character of the city that came out of this can be fully understood in the context of the many visions, ethno-regional ambitions and national challenges that predisposed the ruling elite to shift the capital. The primary, publicly articulated reason was the need to create a 'centre of unity'. Even this primary reason, in its official context, was a sufficient reflection of the challenges of nation building in its negative and positive senses. When 'virgin land' was acquired in 1976 in the geographical centre of Nigeria to build a new FCT, Abuja, it was proclaimed that all the problems of Lagos, which had been the capital of amalgamated Nigeria since 1914, would not be transferred to the new capital. And although not all the problems and disadvantages encountered in Lagos were reproduced in the new capital immediately, Abuja did eventually replicate old problems and create new ones, which counteracted the reasons for the ruling elite's resolve to change Nigeria's capital.

Scholars have noted that 'new [capital] cities reflect the challenge on the creation, organization, extension and consolidation of control'. Being a 'site of everyday practice', the capital city is capable of providing 'valuable insights into the linkages of macroprocesses with the texture and fabric of human existence' (Low 1996: 384). In this sense, the capital city, particularly in the African social formation, can be understood as a space where the manifestations of cultural and sociopolitical contestations within a polity become intensified (Low 1996: 384).

In the context of such contestations, Abuja was constructed as a national, collective,

unifying space, first to overpower and subsume the indigenous people who lived in the area that was acquired for the building of the new capital city, and then to overwhelm the profoundly heterogeneous ethno-regional and religious identities and ties integral to the very constitution of Nigeria. There was, therefore, a moral dimension to the idea of the 'centre of unity', in that Abuja represented not only an attempt to transcend the multifaceted cultural (ethnic and religious) identities in Nigeria, but also an attempt to capture a national essence to which all were implored to subscribe.

This chapter reconsiders within a historical context the challenges of nation building that produced and nurtured the idea of Abuja and examines the challenges that Abuja eventually posed to the efforts at nation building in Nigeria. In this context, Abuja as the FCT, the putative 'centre of unity' and 'no-man's-land' is captured as an oxymoron, in that the city makes statements, yet begs questions.[1] As *The Guardian* (Lagos) puts it, Abuja is 'a bundle of contradictions [with an] ironic and paradoxical persona'.[2]

Postcolonial Africa has been largely represented as a problem – or, at best, a challenge – both internally and externally. Nowhere is this problem of state formation and nation building in Africa more visible than in the city, particularly the capital city. The rest of the country is often a reflection of the problem represented in and posed by the capital city. Therefore, studies of capital cities in Africa, meagre as they have been, are often pathways to understanding the larger, complex socio-economic and political crises that plague many of the African states. On the other hand, capital cities in Africa also reflect the few successful, and mostly ongoing, attempts at confronting the challenges faced by the state through the political will that manifests itself in bureaucratic rationality. Shortly after the independence of many African states in the 1960s, the importance of the capital city in the development of the beleaguered continent was quickly identified by scholars and practitioners alike (see, for instance, Hamdan 1964).

In the early postcolonial years, the challenge was how the political capital in Africa would fit the responsibilities, challenges and new obligations imposed on it by independence. Although not many of the African capital cities acquitted themselves well, the capital city in Africa has witnessed important transformations. In many cases in the post-independence era, they became oases of power, privilege[3] and pleasure, which eventually degenerated into bloodily contested spaces of power, as civil strife, violent protests and military coups overtook democratic governments and turned African capitals into zones of tanks and guns. Thus, from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, capital cities in much of Africa under military, or civil autocratic, rule became not expressions of national will, but centres of oppression and tyranny.

For the most part, in terms of geographical location, the African capital city is 'undoubtedly...excessively marginal...within the political framework, so much so that we can safely say that Africa was (is) the continent of eccentric capitals' (Hamdan 1964: 245). This is because few capitals in the continent are centrally located. In many cases, their locations were dictated by the norms of European penetration and colonial political/economic interests (Potts 1985: 182). Another critical problem was that peripheral capitals often acquired regional rather than truly national character

(Hamdan 1964: 245; Potts 1985: 182). This way, the political capital became 'the subject of protest and contention instead of being a factor of harmony and integration between the regions of the state' (Hamdan 1964: 245; Potts 1985: 182), particularly in ethnically heterogeneous and plural states.

Many of the states have made no attempt to remedy these problems or limitations, for many reasons, including the incapacity of the national economy to accommodate the building of a new capital; the character, location and ethnic composition of the ruling elite in relation to the inherited capital; the nature and interests of the leader of the country, etc. Some, however, have taken bold steps to address the problems. In general, Potts (1985) noted two positive reasons for the establishment of new capitals. The first is the importance of a more central position for the capital city and the provision of a new focus for national pride, as in the case of Abuja, Nigeria (Moore 1982; Olusola 1993; Salau 1977) and Gaborone, Botswana (Best 1970). Potts argued that in these two cases 'specific attention was also paid to the question of promoting ethnic accord by choosing a "neutral" site' (Potts 1985: 183). Theoretically, '[a] more central and neutral location for the capital...allows for more effective administration; it may also help to legitimize the government by allaying the regional jealousies and feelings of neglect engendered in areas of the country outside the "core" area of the old capital' (Potts 1985: 183). The second reason noted by Potts is what may constitute a 'convenient rhetorical justification for an expensive project'. In other words, the creation of new capitals is a means of enhancing the regional spread of 'development'. This could be an excuse because, indeed, in Africa '[t]he functional structure of some new capitals has little potential to fulfil such a role effectively, reflecting a lack of true commitment or the inability to implement policies that might promote such role' (Potts 1985: 183).

However, it is important not only to stress the *positive* reasons rendered for the creation of new capitals, but also to consider the specific reasons offered in specific contexts, rather than merely establishing global or continental patterns. As the case of the movement of Malawi's capital from Zomba in the south to Lilongwe in the central region in 1965 shows, the bureaucratic and rational political justifications for the movement of capitals do not always suffice (Potts 1985: 188). This chapter relates the case of Abuja to the general disappointment that has been experienced in the few cases of capital relocation in Africa by examining how the new capital fits the ambitious goals that necessitated the choice and building of a new capital.

What are the links and tensions that exist between capital cities and national unity in the African postcolony? How do capital cities express, represent or misrepresent national unity in Africa? The author's approach to these questions is through social relations, symbols and political economy using the example of Abuja, Nigeria's 17-year-old capital city. Against the tradition of constructing an unproblematic link between national identity and capital city, Abuja is exemplified to highlight the problems in this relationship. The author seeks to interrogate the assumptions of such links and lay them bare within the dynamics of inter-ethnic, inter-faith, socio-economic and political rivalries, dialogues and clashes in Nigeria.

From Lagos to Abuja: 'No-man's-land' and the spatial logic of power

The status of Lagos as federal capital and the implications of this for ethno-regional politics and the struggle for hegemony among the three major ethno-linguistic groups in Nigeria – the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba – were for many decades of central importance in the overall nation-building process (Adebanwi 2004). The formal annexing of the city by the British on 30 July 1861 marked the beginning of an era that led to the creation of a new territory of Nigeria. The Northern and Southern (British) Protectorates were amalgamated in 1914 to form a single colony of Nigeria, with Frederick Lugard, the former head of the Northern Protectorate, as the Governor General. Lugard had favoured Kaduna, the capital of the Northern Protectorate, as the capital of the amalgamated Nigeria (Hamdan 1964: 247). The southern coastal – and more advanced – city of Lagos was favoured by the Office of the Colonies in London. However, barely five years after the amalgamation into a new country, agitations began for a new capital. The agitators included northern elements and sympathetic colonial officers, who described Lagos as 'the nerve-centre of agitations and grave of official reputations'. Many of these people called for shifting the capital to 'an uninhabited spot in Kaduna, 570 miles away from Lagos', somewhere behind Lokoja. The recommended location is roughly around Abuja, the present FCT. At one stage, the rumour was rife in Lagos that the Governor General, then Sir Hugh Clifford, had ordered the removal of the 'administrative headquarters', as Lagos was then called, to 'the high plateau immediately behind Lokoja known as Mount Patte, situated in the *very centre* of the Protectorate'.

Sir Clifford had to tour the whole country, in the light of these rumours and agitations, and then addressed the colonial Nigerian Council in Lagos on the subject. On 29 December 1919, Clifford stated:

> After giving this question the most careful consideration, I have arrived at the conclusion that, at any rate, for a great many years to come, the only possible place at which the principal seat of Government can be located is Lagos.[4]

The reasons for the retention of the city of Lagos, which a nationalist politician saw as containing 'the genius of the country', were not only social and economic, however. Clifford argued further that any government ought to be domiciled near wherever there were the greatest and most effective articulation of public dissent and critical appraisal – as evident in Lagos (Adebanwi 2004: 27). Argued Clifford:

> This is a function which [we] can hardly hope to fulfil unless the principal operations of the Government are carried on in the *midst of the most active life and thought of the country*, whence it is able to maintain the closest touch with every section of the community, and where *its activities are exposed to the closest scrutiny and criticism*. Such things, I contend, are aids to good government with which no administration can safely afford to dispense...(I)f the seat of Government be situated in some position

> of *comparable isolation*, it must inevitably tend to become *increasingly bureaucratic*, and *automatically deprive itself of the assistance in the framing of its measures which articulate public opinion* of those whose affairs are its charge can alone efficiently supply.[5] (emphasis added)

Consequently, the Governor General concluded that the idea of moving the capital from Lagos was 'definitely abandoned', and he expressed hope that it would not be revived for decades. But the rationale and purpose behind the agitation for a change in the political capital of Nigeria were not informed by the reasons offered by Clifford for the desirability of the retention of Lagos as capital city. Therefore, as the tempo of nationalist activities and agitations increased in the 1940s and 1950s, with their attendant ethno-regional plots and manoeuvres, the battle for Lagos again raised the issue of, and need for, a change in the location of the capital city.

The three major ethno-regional groups (the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) were represented, broadly, by the three major political parties that emerged in the period of limited self-rule – the Northern People's Congress (NPC) (Hausa-Fulani North), the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Igbo East)[6] and the Action Group (AG) (Yoruba West). The battle for hegemony and/or accommodation waged by the elites of these three groups against one another dictated the tone and tenor of every major national issue in this period. The direction of politics and governance in Nigeria since this pre-independence era has been largely dictated and determined by complex ethnic, ethno-regional and religious dynamics and formations.

However, the NPC did not initially participate in the controversy over Lagos, particularly because the matter first revolved around the issue of the 'ownership' of Lagos. The NCNC argued through its mouthpiece, the *West African Pilot*, that the Yoruba metropolis, which had attracted a myriad of ethnic groups over the decades, particularly the Igbo, was not a 'Yoruba city'. The *Daily Service*, the mouthpiece of the AG countered that Lagos was an *authentic* Yoruba city.

From the battle over the ownership of Lagos, the NCNC and AG, and by that token, the Igbo and the Yoruba and their mouthpieces, the *West African Pilot* and *Daily Service*, moved to the battle over the administrative separation of Lagos, as the federal capital city, from the Western Region of Nigeria, which was eventually controlled by the AG. When the independent status of Lagos was removed in the early 1950s through the reform of the Lagos City Council, the city became part of the Western Region, which led to the upstaging of the NCNC, and Igbo, mayor of the city by the AG. At this point, the *Pilot* argued,[7] 'If Lagos is still assumed to be the capital of Nigeria, surely in all its phases, institutions must exist to act as unifying media so that the centric force created will be Nigerian, neither entirely Yoruba, nor Igbo, nor Hausa. It is in this light that the proposed Lagos Town Council reforms must again be examined.' The *Pilot* argued further that 'this Atlantic City[,] a truly worthy capital of Nigeria' must be made to 'serve as a *unifying force*' (emphasis added). Pursued the *Pilot* in the same editorial:

> If *we* succeed in making Lagos Nigeria's capital, where all tribes of the nation can live without feeling themselves ostracised, where the

> government system of the city will not be biased in *nature* but based on *progressive formula*, if *we* can indeed make Lagos a sort of London, or New York, where all citizens from all parts can commingle and inhabit without animosity, then surely *we* would have succeeded in *cementing the Nigerian ideal*. (emphasis added)

Lagos was critical for both parties and both ethno-regional groups for a number of economic, social and political reasons, hence the battle to control it. The Western Region needed to add Lagos to bolster its size, population, influence and economic resources. Also, because the NCNC was more popular in the city, the AG could control the city indirectly only if it were incorporated into the region. For the NCNC, Lagos was similarly important. The party controlled the city and was able to use the control to protect the rising Igbo population in the city, which strongly desired that Lagos be a 'no-man's-land' as the national capital (Adebanwi 2004: 40).

The *Service*, the mouthpiece of the AG and the Yoruba, was happy with the dual status of Lagos, both as capital city and as part of the Western Region, dismissing the 'NCNC rascals' who had dominated the city council since 1952. On its part, the *Pilot* argued: 'The only solution lies in the creation of a new capital unfettered by regional legislations [because, given the merger of Lagos with the West] Nigeria remains without a capital.' In this context, the *Service* asked that Nigeria's political capital be moved elsewhere, so that Western Nigeria could continue to enjoy the incorporation of Lagos into the region. Even though the West and its leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, would later oppose the shifting of the capital to Abuja, their mouthpiece, the *Service*, argued in the 1950s for the relocation of the capital. Stated the *Service*:

> The people of the Western Region are not compelling the whole country to make Lagos their capital. But, at least, it is the duty of the Governor to make it clear that the *only alternative to the present situation of Lagos* is for the people of Nigeria to buy a piece of land and establish on it a *federal capital independent of the three regions*. (Adebanwi 2004: 42, emphasis added)

However, during the Constitutional Conference in 1953 in London, the NCNC and the NPC supported an independent status for Lagos, which angered the AG. The city was subsequently separated as the federal capital city from the Western Region. Another significant event that would determine whether Lagos remained the political capital of Nigeria occurred later the same year. After a vigorous and bitter debate in the federal parliament, the motion by a ranking member of the AG that Nigeria be granted independence by the year 1956 was opposed by the NPC (northern) leaders. The northerners were booed in Lagos and at every railway station in Western Nigeria as they journeyed back north. They were not spared until they crossed over to the Northern Region. For the aristocratic leadership of the Northern Region, particularly their leader, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of the powerful Sokoto Caliphate, the experience with the 'southern rabble' was an expression of absolute lack of respect for northern leaders by southerners. The actual motion for independence and the insults traded against northern leaders over their position on the matter even provoked agitation for secession of the region from the rest of the federation. After having

been persuaded against separation from the rest of Nigeria by the British, some have argued that the experience indicated to the northern leaders that Lagos was not a place where they would like to continue to do business with the rest of Nigeria.

However, given the pluralism of Nigeria and the complex nature of its national politics, the issue of the political capital of Nigeria was not raised again officially until 1975, when the military regime, headed by a northerner, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, constituted a panel to advise the regime on the creation of a new capital city for Nigeria, with suggestions to the panel that already indicated preference for the centre of Nigeria. Given that the Northern Region, which had since been broken into states, accounted for more than half of the land space, it was obvious to many that the political centre of Nigeria would lie in the old northern region. Also, given the nature and character of ethno-regional rivalries, for the other two major ethno-linguistic groups – the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo – this was acceptable. However, even though a Yoruba judge headed the panel that eventually chose and recommended Abuja as the proposed FCT, most Yoruba, and Lagosians in general, were not particularly happy that the political capital of Nigeria was to be taken to 'the north'. Many in this category saw the reasons offered for moving the capital as post hoc rationalisations by the core Hausa-Fulani power elite. Since the initial move came from the north, and given the history of the struggle over Lagos, ethno-regional motives could not be ignored. Such attempts, according to Schatz (2004: 120), 'to undermine [the] rival [ethnic] patronage network and bolster one's own' have been suggested for the relocations of other capital cities. One example is Lilongwe in Banda's Malawi, which was near the president's birthplace and where his ethnic group, the Chewa, were concentrated. Thus, in the case of Malawi, the capital's relocation was used partly to 'consolidate power against rival ethnic groups' (Schatz 2004: 120). Inevitably, the Chewa had the opportunity to staff the new administration (Schatz 2004: 120). Another example is Ivory Coast, where President Houphouet-Boigny moved the capital from Abidjan to Yanoussoukro, his birthplace. In both cases, Schatz argues that 'the move shored up the president's power base in the face of perceived opposition' (Schatz 2004: 120).

Given the demonstrated incapacity of the national political elite to mobilise the people and Nigeria's abundant resources towards achieving national development – despite the perpetual rhetoric of 'development' – some would see the move to Abuja more as the triumph of ethno-regional manoeuvres than a rational attempt at fostering national unity and even development. The worsening of inter-ethnic and inter-faith relationships, no less accentuated by the federal government in Abuja, is evidence that this view cannot be dismissed. However, while Lagos was, at the political level, an ethno-regional challenge to the dominant ruling elite, admittedly, at the social level, it was an urban, or metropolitan, mess in dire need of rebuilding. Indeed, there were plenty of tenable political, economic and social reasons that could be – and were – given for Lagos to cease being the political capital of Nigeria.

The first was the dual role of Lagos as both a state and federal capital, which at that time produced conflicts between the state and federal governments. Indeed, the Lagos State Government in its memorandum to the committee on the location of the federal

capital, stated some of the flashpoints (Olusola 1993: 20). The flashpoints were induced by the fact that before the creation of Lagos State in May 1967, Lagos Municipality was administered by the Federal Ministry of Lagos Affairs, while the City of Lagos was administered by the Lagos City Council. Also, the metropolitan areas (the old Colony Province) of Mushin, Ikorodu, Ikeja, Badagry, etc. were administered at a point by the Western Regional Government. After Lagos State was created, the Lagos Island still served the dual role of federal and state capital, with occasional problems over jurisdiction on different matters, including tax and land. Although these problems could be constitutionally and amicably resolved, given the incompetent and chaotic nature of public administration in Nigeria, the problems lingered.

Another point raised for the unsuitability of Lagos as the federal capital was inadequacy of land space, added to the limitations imposed by the Lagos terrain, with its lagoons and creeks. Even though some suggested land reclamation and the expansion of the city towards adjacent areas (including Ogun State) so as to create a new capital city, the arguments were rejected in favour of a more central city. Others offered the view that Lagos, being a coastal city, was more vulnerable to external attacks, a point rejected by critics, who argued that in the age of long-range missiles, no location of a capital city would put it out of range of easy attacks by enemies. Other reasons offered for the relocation of the capital city included Lagos's inadequate infrastructure, overpopulation, the ethnic pattern (with the dominant Yoruba population) and the high cost of living (Olusola 1993: 19–28).

However, critics of the proposed relocation of the capital city argued that aside from the ethnic pattern of Lagos, which had changed considerably over the years, even though the inhabitants of the city remained predominantly the Yoruba, most of the other reasons offered for the relocation of the capital could have been confronted and resolved by a more efficient, effective and creative ruling elite and government. For such critics, the relocation of the capital to the centre of the country, even if it were to solve some of the problems, would recreate the old problems and create new ones in the future, given the unresolved fundamental contradictions in the very constitution of Nigeria and the nature and character of its ruling elite. It was evident, however, that the need to move the capital to the 'centre' of Nigeria had been established by the dominant elite, and the process for achieving this was only a matter of time. It was interesting, therefore, that the new capital was more or less the same location that was proposed in the early 1920s by those agitating for capital relocation.

Abuja: The ironic 'centre of unity'

For here we build for/eternity/edifices, to stand the test/of time/And express in robust structures/The size, majesty, and vision/that is Nigeria. (Walter Ofonagoro, March 1997)

...Go to Abuja, millions dey roll and vanish forever in a capital hole. (Unlimited Liability Company, 1983)

Ordinarily, a certain form of bureaucratic rationality, informed by political, economic and social conditions and reality, determines decisions to relocate political capitals. It is in this sense that most capital cities make statements. As Linge (1961: 468) argues,

a federation, in particular 'seems to need a centre, often removed from existing commercial and industrial concentration, that is devoted largely to housing the federal administration and its associated machinery'. Indeed, Abuja, like Washington D.C., Brasilia and Canberra, was ostensibly 'created from the scratch as a political act of faith' with its 'roots...implanted deep in the facts of political geography' (Linge 1961: 468). These facts, in the Nigerian case, reveal the challenges posed to the national elite, who faced acute state and nation-building dilemmas, and the kinds of responses adopted by the factions of the elite (Schatz 2004: 112). Even though capital relocation is not one of the most frequent or common modes of statecraft or ethno-regional politics, this 'expensive and risk-ridden step' is nevertheless sometimes taken by particular elites (Schatz 2004: 13).

Shortly after the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), General Yakubu Gowon, the military head of state, stated at the convocation ceremony of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria – the top-class university in the north of Nigeria, where the cream of the northern elite were trained – that there was the need to find a solution to the problems of Lagos as the country's capital. He, therefore, challenged people to come up with alternative proposals. By this time, it was evident that the dominant elite were already resolved on changing Nigeria's political capital.

When the largely inept and misdirected Gowon regime was overthrown in a coup, the task fell to General Murtala Muhammed's regime to carry out the proposed rethinking of Nigeria's capital city. In his inaugural speech, Muhammed spoke about the crisis facing Lagos and affirmed that his regime would confront the issues. In August 1975, he set up a panel headed by Justice Akinola Aguda, a high-court judge, to examine the desirability of the retention of Lagos or the relocation of the capital city.

Members of the committee included Dr Tai Solarin, educationist and social reformer, Colonel (Monsignor) Pedro Martins of the Nigerian army, Alhaji Muhammed Musa Ismail, a businessman, Chief Owen Fiebai, a Jos-based lawyer, Dr Ajato Gandonu, a researcher with the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, and Professor O.K. Ogan, a medical doctor. The secretary of the committee was Chief E.E. Nsefik, a deputy permanent secretary in the Federal Civil Service.

The committee's tasks were to examine the dual role of Lagos as a federal and state capital and advise on the desirability or otherwise of Lagos retaining that role. In the event of the committee finding that Lagos was unsuitable for such a role, the committee was to recommend which of the two governments (federal or state) should move to a new capital; and in the event of the committee finding that the federal capital should move out of Lagos, it was to recommend suitable alternative locations, taking into account the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the federation. The committee was to submit its recommendations to the federal military government not later than 31 December 1975.

The terms of reference already indicated that the military regime's preference was a new capital, with pointers to which new site would be favoured. The committee toured the whole of Nigeria – and relevant cities worldwide – and came to the

conclusion that Lagos was no longer suitable as the federal capital. Rather than simply naming an alternative site, the committee considered certain criteria to suggest alternative sites.

These included:

- Centrality, which was already mentioned in the terms of reference by the military regime, given that Lagos was 'geographically peripheral' and Nigerians 'in some parts of the country...express[ed] very strong feelings as regards their sense of remoteness from, and neglect by, the Federal Government'. Hence, 'any location which was too far removed from the centre of the country' was ruled out (Olusola 1993: 36).
- Health and climate. Given that 'some parts of the country are naturally more pleasant for the majority of Nigerians to live in relative comfort', the committee came to the conclusion that an 'equable' site which was 'neither too hot, nor too cold, neither too dry, nor too wet' would be acceptable (Olusola 1993: 38).
- Land availability and its uses. The committee recommended that no less than 8 000 square kilometres should be designated as the FCT for immediate and future uses of the new capital.
- Water supply. The proximity to water in sufficient quantity and quality was considered.
- Accessibility. The location of the capital 'where population centres are fairly distributed in all directions of the compass...and reduce the problems of inequality of distance to the capital' was also considered (Olusola 1993: 38).
- Security. It was agreed that the location chosen should not be 'easily destroyed by a foreign enemy or in a civil war', including 'local political disturbances and riots...and threats to Nigerian unity' (Olusola 1993: 40–41).
- Existence of building materials locally.
- Low population density (Olusola 1993: 40–41).

Other criteria included power resources, drainage, soil, physical planning convenience and ethnic accord. Although the committee said the latter should not be overemphasised, it was sufficient, the committee insisted, that the new capital should 'for political convenience...generate internal peace so as to establish a unifying nationalist image for both internal and external consumption'.

In the context of these criteria, the area favoured by the committee fell roughly within the present FCT (Olusola 1993: 45).

The committee also charged the federal military government to take its final decision in the light of the following factors. Firstly, that a majority of the memoranda submitted to it favoured a new capital city. Secondly, that care should be taken not to create a 'life-less' city like Brasilia, which would be empty at weekends. Instead, the new capital should be a 'symbol of unity', given that it will be 'created on a virgin land where every Nigerian could feel assured that he [sic] had an equal opportunity and right...without any fear of domination'. Thirdly, that the cost factor should be considered, given the state of the economy, even though the creation of a new capital should not be delayed (Olusola 1993: 45–47).

On 3 February 1976, Muhammed made a broadcast to the nation and announced the decision to relocate the federal capital. Two days later, Decree No. 6, 1976 (Federal Capital Act) was enacted, and thus a new capital city was born in the lands of Niger, Plateau and Kwara States. A Federal Capital Development Authority was created to supervise the preparation of a comprehensive master plan for Abuja and the building of the new capital. The new FCT occupied 8 000 square kilometres of land, about two and half times the size of Lagos.

Contrary to the idea of a 'no-man's-land', which had been touted during the creation of the new capital city, the history of Abuja – whose name derives from the old Abuja, renamed Suleja – revolved around the old Abuja Emirate. This was formed around 1825, in part as a result of the Fulani Jihad. The area was populated by a few ethnic groups, including the Habe (Hausa), Gwari, Koro, Gade and Ganagana people. There were also the Gwandara, Bassa and Fulani. However, the aborigines (the Gwari, Gade, Gwandara, etc.) and the settlers (Hausa, Fulani, etc.) were to be fully resettled in adjoining areas of the FCT and compensated in order to make the city a true 'no-man's-land'. However, as usual with official plans in Nigeria, this was done in a haphazard way and many of the original inhabitants were never resettled or compensated. Some of those who were resettled moved back to their lands.[8]

In the campaigns that heralded the Second Republic (1979–1983), political leaders expressed their different positions on the question of Abuja. Indeed, the issue of Abuja became a major political debate (Salau 1977: 13). Some stated that the movement of the capital would be a priority; others that it would not be. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the presidential candidate of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), who eventually became president, said that his government would ensure speedy implementation of the Abuja master plan, whereas Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), stated that if elected, he would not spend a penny on the Abuja project (Salau 1977: 13). Analysts saw the positions of both party leaders as expressions of the attitude of the dominant ('conservative') power elite of the north (NPN/Shagari) and the opposition ('progressive') power elite of the west of Nigeria (UPN/Awolowo). Whereas the northern leaders were committed to moving the capital away from the Yoruba south-west, the elite of the Yoruba south-west saw the Abuja project as an ill-conceived, wasteful attempt by the Hausa-Fulani elite to further consolidate their hold on power.

When Shagari eventually took up office, his government made huge allocations for the development of the new capital territory. Indeed, his first visit outside Lagos was to Abuja to ascertain the level of work completed. As a result of the gross ineptitude and rabid corruption of the Shagari era, the Abuja project became a cesspit of corruption, prompting Nigeria's famous writer and later Nobel laureate, Wole Soyinka, and his musical team, the Unlimited Liability Company, in a lyrical response to the corruption that marked the Second Republic, to sing 'Go to Abuja, millions dey roll, and vanish forever in a capital hole.' (Go to Abuja, millions are flocking, and vanish forever in a capital hole.) Shagari was committed to ensuring that the seat of government moved while he was in power. He commenced the

gradual movement of the federal government to Abuja in 1982 with the relocation of the Ministries of Defence, National Planning, Finance, Justice, Internal Affairs and Federal Capital Territory. Every organ of the federal government was scheduled to move to Abuja by 1987 at the latest. However, Shagari was overthrown in a coup in December 1983 while holidaying in the presidential villa in Abuja, even though the seat of government was still in Lagos. This delayed the relocation.

Nevertheless, while Shagari was in power, major steps were taken to ensure the realisation of 'the national objective of making sure that the population of Abuja [was] truly federal in character, thus satisfying the desire of all Nigerians to live and work together in peace and harmony within the new Federal Capital' (Olusola 1993: 110). Land was allocated on the basis of certain criteria, the issue of the promotion of national unity and integration being the primary one. Other criteria included ensuring that the population was federal in character and had the capacity and ability to build or develop the allocated land on a first come, first served basis.

Not much was achieved under the regime of General Muhammadu Buhari (1984–1985). However, when General Ibrahim Babangida seized power in August 1985, his regime, which became one of the most corrupt and profligate in Nigeria's history, allocated huge sums to the development of the FCT. The regime became even more committed to developing the FCT and formally moving the capital from Lagos when it survived a bloody coup on 22 April 1990. The coup, led by middle-level army officers of Middle Belt and southern extraction, spoke volumes about the fundamental crisis of Nigerian nationhood. In the abortive coup speech, Major Gideon Orkar announced the excision of all core northern states from Nigeria 'on behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern parts of this country' because, according to the coup plotters, Nigeria's history was replete 'with numerous and uncontrollable instances of callous and insensitive dominatory [sic] repressive intrigues by those who think it is their birthright to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the south'.[9] The coup shocked General Babangida, who thought he had a firm grip on the armed forces and an able intelligence network. The manner in which the coup plotters were able to penetrate the Dodan Barracks, where the president lived – which necessitated Babangida's hurried escape – forced Babangida to hurry the process of the movement of the capital and to expand the initial concept and plan of the presidential villa in Abuja. The villa, which initially comprised mainly the presidential lodge, incorporated Akinola Aguda House.[10] Babangida had it redesigned as a fortress and constructed a more elaborate presidential villa which was rumoured to have 'myriads of underground, bomb-proof bunkers and tunnels...an impregnable fortress from where [the head of state] can successfully defend [his] government against ambitious soldiers'.[11] *TELL* magazine described it as 'a castle of dreams. By its sheer mammoth size, this monstrous beauty is a feat of modern engineering and architecture.'[12] Newspapers reported that the military president gave Julius Berger, the ubiquitous German construction company, a blank cheque to make Abuja ready as soon as possible for the capital to move.

Less than two years after the abortive coup, on 12 December 1991, Babangida moved Nigeria's capital officially to Abuja, the beautiful new city designed as a 'showpiece' for Africa. Babangida, like members of the core elite, realised that it was easier for the capital to be moved under a military regime than under a democratic government, which would require obtaining democratic consensus and the approval of parliament. Therefore, Babangida committed his successors to a fait accompli.[13]

In its early years, Abuja's city centre had (and still has) some of the best road networks in Africa, unlike most Nigerian cities. It had running, piped water; electricity was constant; and its digital telephone system worked.[14] When General Sani Abacha took over in November 1993, he stayed in Lagos for the first few months. This led to agitations by core northern leaders to the effect that Abacha, also a core northerner, should move to Abuja so that there would be no risk of the capital returning to Lagos. This, for many, was also an indication that the core northern elements did not see Abuja so much as a 'centre of unity', but as a capital located within 'their' old region. It turned out that Abacha only stayed in Lagos to consolidate his control of the armed forces, stem the tide of opposition to his hijack of power and 'cleanse' Babangida's Aso Rock Villa, both in security and spiritual terms. He later moved to Abuja.

Capital excess: A 'parasitic city' as a mirror of the national crisis

Although there are serious limitations to the bipolarity of the theoretical, heuristic model which argues that cities are either 'parasitic' or 'generative' (Spodek 1975), the idea of a city as a parasite is partly useful for understanding the role that Abuja has played in Nigeria, particularly in terms of the critical issue of national unity – which ostensibly informed the building of the new political capital. Even in a specific analysis, the functioning of a capital city has to be put in a national and international context.

In general, Abuja as the political capital seems to have followed the same principle of gigantic consumption without production that feeds and sustains the core of the Nigerian national elite. Indeed, as *TELL* magazine argued, 'despite the idyllic conception of Abuja as model city, the contradictions in Nigerian society are already settling there'.[15] Apart from the rabid corruption that surrounded Abuja's construction and continued expansion, the violations of the master plan and countless other problems, given that the main function of Abuja is political administration, the type of federal administration that the country has experienced in Abuja cannot be said to make the cost of its construction worthwhile. Indeed, as a symbolic 'centre of unity', Abuja has not been a success, and as a practical 'centre of unity', it has largely failed. As the construction of the new political capital progressed, controversies and debate over the 'northernisation' of Abuja, in symbolic and material terms, were raised as evidence of the fact that Abuja was far from being a centre of unity.

First, for a capital that was designed to be a 'neutral' ground for all Nigerians, critics in the south have raised many objections not only to the way in which Abuja has been 'northernised' and treated as part of the north of Nigeria, but also to the concomitant 'Islamisation' of the capital city. Shortly before Babangida

moved to Abuja, a magazine published a major story in which the designs of some public constructions in the city, including bus stops, were alleged to be Islamic in architectural style. Muslim northerners countered that the architecture was 'eastern', and not 'Islamic', as evident in the former Soviet Union (see Figures 6.1 to 6.3). Later, critics were particularly irked by the dome on the National Assembly, which they said resembled the dome of a mosque.

Furthermore, for a 'centre of unity', the traditional rulers of the original inhabitants have either continued their reign in the capital city or constructed newer centres of power. And given that the original settlers were predominantly Muslims, these traditional rulers are Muslim rulers too, as in the Hausa-Fulani north of Nigeria. The Abuja Emirate that existed before the FCT was created was sustained and expanded. Such places as Sarkin Garki (in the Garki District) and Ona of Abaji are occupied by Muslim northerners. The administrators of the FCT seem to have turned a blind eye to this headship of districts by Muslim traditional rulers, thus affirming their traditional claim over the areas that are supposed to be 'no-man's-land'. Indeed, by the time General Babangida moved to Abuja in 1991, Sharia courts were already springing up in the territory alongside traditional institutions. Indeed, often in matters related to the north and Islam, there are constant references in the media to the 19 states of the north and FCT, Abuja.

Again, the fact that only Muslim northerners have been made ministers of the FCT has also raised concerns. Apart from the democratic issues raised over the refusal to allow for the election of a mayor of the city,[16] others have asked why only a section of the country has monopolised the headship of the Ministry for the FCT, with wide-ranging implications for the character of the city and for land distribution. In relation to this, it is clear that given the dominance of Muslim northerners in the highest decision-making organs of governments over the years, little thought was originally given to the multicultural and multi-faith status of Abuja. To give two examples, a 'national' mosque was designed in the original plan of the city and the construction began under President Shehu Shagari, even though it was said that it was not being fully constructed with public funds. The Christians, under the auspices of the vocal Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), had to mobilise public opinion on this before a Christian equivalent, a church called the 'national' Ecumenical Centre, was planned and built. The government gave the CAN a grant to build the church, as it had done for the Muslims. However, the Ecumenical Centre was completed much later than the mosque – in fact, it was only fully completed under a Christian president.[17] Also, within the presidential villa, a small mosque was constructed for the use of the head of state and his staff. Christians inferred from this that a non-Muslim – and a southerner in general – could not be expected to lead Nigeria. This sentiment was not totally misplaced, given the nature of the leadership debate in Nigeria since before independence. It was only when President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian, took office in 1999 that a chapel was constructed in the villa.

Another sore point is that the original inhabitants of the FCT contend that Abuja ought to have a proper status. Given the attempt at ensuring 'federal character' and inclusivity in terms of ethnicity, many public positions are expected to reflect these.

However, because Abuja is not a state, this is not provided for. Therefore, as Major General A.B. Mamman, one of the original inhabitants, said, 'Abuja is underprivileged' (Mamman interview) because the Abuja 'indigenes' – or those who now or in the future would claim Abuja as their home – would be allocated no positions in public office, public-sector jobs or (quota-based) university admissions, which are done on the basis of state origin. Despite the huge financial commitment of the federal government to Abuja every year, Mamman insisted that this arrangement was not fair. This is particularly so because, for anyone to win the presidential elections, the constitutionally stipulated percentage of votes that must be won in two-thirds of the states of the federation leaves the FCT out of the equation because it is not a state.[18]

The indigenes have also faced the challenge of attempts to impose an Emir on the FCT, particularly by the Hausa-Fulani. With the proliferation of traditional rulers in the towns and areas that make up the FCT (which goes against the vision of the founders of the new capital), there have been attempts to have a central traditional authority for the whole city – an Emir of Abuja, in effect. In 1995, the Emir of Karshi, who was also the president of the traditional rulers in the Abuja Emirate, tried to mobilise his supporters so that he could be pronounced the Emir of Abuja, but this was resisted. He was later murdered, allegedly over land matters. An FCT Ministry official told a newspaper in 1996 that 'the appointment of an Emir of Abuja would violate the spirit of Abuja. He would not just be a traditional but [a] spiritual head of Abuja. As an (Islamic) head, what would happen to Christians...[in his domain]?'[19]

Indeed, in the mid-1990s, the attempt to appoint a Sarkin Hausawa (head of the Hausa community) in Abuja was resisted by indigenous groups who saw this as an underhand way of appointing a Hausa-Fulani emir for Abuja. General Mamman said in 1996 that '[t]here will be Sarkin Hausawa of the FCT. There will be no centralized traditional authority. The issue does not arise'.[20] Emirs and chiefs have emerged consistently in the 'centre of unity'. Therefore, whether the issue arose or not, the very existence of traditional authorities in the towns, areas and districts of Abuja identified with 'indigenous' groups and particular religious lines, are ostensibly a violation of the spirit of Abuja and the vision of the city's founders. However, this phenomenon has become accepted, as the FCT minister, through his governing powers, appoints and removes the traditional rulers and makes allocations to them as he pleases.

Some of the socio-economic motives for relocating the capital have also failed in Abuja. Metropolitan Abuja (which comprises the city centre, Apo districts, Garki and Wuse) has equalled Lagos Island in terms of congestion, both vehicular and human, while satellite towns (such as Gwagwalade, Kubwa, Bwari, Lugbe, Nyanya, Karu, Karchi and Jukwuyi) are in an appalling state of squalor, poverty and misery. The way in which the Abuja master plan became distorted – not totally unexpectedly, given the nature of the Nigerian ruling elite – resulted in 'exponential population growth, proliferation of overcrowded slums, heavy traffic jams along major roads, inadequate infrastructure and social services as well as [an] astronomical rise in violent criminality'.[21] Even though some still warn that 'Abuja should not be allowed to become another Lagos',[22] others argue that the 'Lagosification' of Abuja is already complete.[23] The problem of slums and illegal structures all over the city became so

acute that a minister of the FCT, Malam Nasir El-Rufai, embarked on a massive, though unpopular, destruction of illegal structures and evictions of illegal squatters. Between 2003 and 2007, 800 000 people were forcefully evicted. *Thisday* newspaper, in an editorial, once captured the misery suffered by huge numbers of people in the FCT by describing a proposed grandiose project by the federal government in Abuja as 'the search for splendour amid excruciating mass poverty'.[24]

Conclusion

There is a school of thought in urban anthropology that emphasises a representational approach to the study of cities, according to which it has become important to focus on how the city can be an 'ideological [or political] tract' (Low 1996: 386) – with urban studies paying attention to the discursive realm of cities. As is the case with Abuja, which is presented as a 'centre of unity', what the city as an 'ideological tract' announces is as critical as what it (seeks to) hide or suppress. Although bureaucratically rational reasons are publicly given for capital relocations – be they political, economic, social, ecological, etc. – in many cases, the selfish, ethnic or ethno-regional reasons that underlie such relocations are often not publicly stated, or at any rate, they do not constitute official reasons for capital relocation.

However, as this chapter has tried to show, official accounts are only partial explanations for capital relocation. Indeed, on a general level, as Potts (1985) has pointed out, the claim that capital relocation generates economic growth and improves administrative efficiency, although plausible, has not been borne out in actual practice. In the Nigerian case, it is clear that the relocation of the capital has not engendered national unity, or strengthened the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal government or increased the administrative proximity of the central administration to all the parts of the federation. With violent inter-faith and inter-ethnic clashes increasing in the aftermath of the relocation and worsening economic conditions, added to a totally criminalised political space where election rigging has become the rule rather than the exception, the capital relocation has only enhanced elite bargaining and increased the gap between a stupendously rich, comfortable, tiny national elite and the larger population, who continue to wallow in misery, from the suburbs of the FCT to the other parts of the federation.

This brings to the fore the pivotal role of elite cadres in capital relocation. Even though the role of the elite in capital relocation is generally understated in the literature, some scholars have emphasised it and pointed out how a focus on this role can illuminate our understanding of the reasons for and dynamics of capital relocation, particularly in the global south.

In this context, two approaches to capital relocation have tended to dominate the literature. The first is the *authoritarian preferences argument*; the other is the *rational-technical argument*. In the first, an argument is made for 'an authoritarian ruler, who is understood to make the decision against the grain of common sense, against popular opposition, and against the advice of wiser policy makers' (Schatz 2004: 117). For instance, in line with this, Potts argues that in Malawi's case, capital

relocation was for the personal prestige of the authoritarian leader, rather than for the rational explanations offered of state and nation building. Thus, Schatz comments that '[c]learly, the personality quirks of an authoritarian ruler – often his megalomaniacal tendencies – play a role' (Schatz 2004: 117). In the Nigerian case, a measure of the evidence for this was present. The actual relocation was, in a sense, part of General Babangida's megalomaniacal wish to dominate the Nigerian sociopolitical landscape; the presidential villa he constructed for himself in Abuja testified to the grandeur of (his) power.

However, this explanation does not sufficiently emphasise the role of the ruling (dominant) elite in the postcolonial era. Although the authoritarian powers of the ruler and his quirks are critical, these are often subsumed, or tactically embedded, in the overall ethnic, religious, or ethno-regional calculations of the ruling elite groups within multi-ethnic postcolonial states. The authoritarian figure also needs his own form of legitimacy, and this can be bought or widened by linking personal ambitions to group interests, even where these are then promoted publicly as rational-technical motives. In this context, Schatz notes correctly that capital relocations are easier to achieve in a non-democratic setting. However, the authoritarian explanation has been found to be insufficient because most authoritarian regimes have not moved their capital.

The rational-technical reasons, including administrative efficiency, creating economic opportunities and government services for the hinterland, in line with the discarded ideas of modernisation theorists, have also been found to be unsatisfactory because capital relocations premised on this argument in the postcolonial age have shown extremely limited success. Schatz (2004), therefore, elaborates a 'political geographic explanation' that emphasises state and nation building. However, he does not suggest that capital relocation *solves* state- and nation-building dilemmas – as evidenced, for instance, by Nigeria.

Although this is very true in the case of Nigeria, what the present author has tried to point out in this chapter is that, even though capital relocation was attractive in Nigeria on the basis of the identified problems and the advertised prospects, the result obtained has fallen short of the desired effect. Against the backdrop of the unadvertised, 'hidden' rationale for capital relocation as it related to ethno-regional rivalries and competition, this chapter has shown the limited success achieved by capital relocation in the context of the rational-technical prospects that ostensibly recommended it. Thirty-two years after Nigeria's political capital was moved from Lagos to Abuja and 17 years after the actual relocation, Nigeria is still far from achieving the lofty goals that lay behind the capital relocation. This is even more so as the new capital now experiences many of the limitations that dictated the relocation, particularly in terms of engendering greater national unity – thus betraying the limited imagination and incompetence of the political leadership and the ruling elite. The country is less united than it was at the time of the capital relocation, as many separatist movements, either calling for a looser federation (in the language of 'autonomy') or the outright disintegration of the federal union, have emerged. It

can thus be argued that capital relocation is far too insufficient a condition for the promotion of national unity, particularly in the absence of other critical elements that help in the promotion of national identity and national identification.

Notes

1 In an essay published in a Nigerian daily, *Thisday* (Lagos), as former city editor of a newspaper in the capital city, this author took a journalistic approach to the contradictions of Abuja. See Adebanwi W, Abuja as oxymoron (*Thisday*, 27 February 1997).

2 Abuja: Thirty years as federal capital (editorial) (*The Guardian* 5 November 2006).

3 Harrison has popularly conceived big cities as 'islands of privilege'. See Harrison (1993: 145).

4 *Lagos Weekly Record*, 14 February 1920: 1.

5 *Lagos Weekly Record*, 14 February 1920: 1.

6 The NCNC was initially called the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons, before Southern Cameroon voted to join the Cameroonian federation. It was the most national of the three parties, but eventually became associated more with the Igbo East.

7 Symbol of Nigeria (*West African Pilot*, 16 July 1952: 1).

8 The minister of the FCT, Dr Aliyu Moddibo Umar, however, argued that there should be a rethinking of the idea of resettlement, since these people were also Nigerian citizens. This would contradict the original purpose of resettlement, which was to make the city a 'no-man's-land'.

9 Gideon Orkar's coup, broadcast on Radio Nigeria, 22 April 1990.

10 This was named after the chairman of the Capital Relocation Panel.

11 See *TELL* magazine, 23 December 1991: 9.

12 Ibid.: 10.

13 Ibid.: 14.

14 Ibid.: 10. For different views on Abuja's monuments and the city in general, see http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=645923 (Accessed September 2008).

15 *TELL* magazine, 23 December 1991: 15.

16 Elections are held in the six area councils, but the head of state is the 'mayor' of the city. He then delegates his powers to the minister of the FCT.

17 The immediate-past minister of the FCT explained in an interview with the author that this was due to the denominational nature of Christianity and the doctrinal disunity of Christians, as opposed to the greater doctrinal unity among Muslims in Nigeria. Abuja, 16 September 2008.

18 Abuja is underprivileged (*Tribune on Saturday*, Ibadan, 2 March 1996).

19 Battle for Abuja (*Tribune on Saturday*, Ibadan, 2 March 1996).

20 Battle for Abuja (*Tribune on Saturday*, Ibadan, 2 March 1996).

21 *Punch*, 16 January 2008.

22 *Sunday Tribune*, Ibadan, 18 May 2008.

23 *Sunday Tribune*, 18 May 2008. See also Abuja groans under refuse heaps (*Punch*, 4 January 2008). A newspaper even reported that '[f]or Abuja, crimes have come to stay' (*Tribune*, 16 June 2006). See also Oloja M, Abuja at 16 (*The Guardian*, 13 December 2007); Abuja not different (*Vanguard*, 7 August 2008).

24 The Abuja monument (*Thisday*, Lagos, 19 September 2006).

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BRAZZAVILLE



7 Brazzaville

Gabriel Tati

One of the most striking trends in the spatial development of the Republic of Congo has been the rapid population growth of its two major cities, particularly since political independence in 1960. According to the national census conducted in 1974, 38% of the total population were urban dwellers. Ten years later, the national census indicated a substantial increase, with 52% of the total population living in urban areas, and the majority of these people residing in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. The urban population growth that occurred between 1974 and 1984 signalled a shift from a traditional rural populace to a predominantly urban one. According to UN sources, in 2007, 72% of the Congo's population was living in urban areas (UNFPA 2007). The reasons Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire have grown so rapidly derive from historical, political and economic strategies and events experienced in the country. In particular, several years of 'Marxist-Leninist' policies led to a firm urban bias dominating the country's spatial developments and to dramatic demographic growth in the capital, Brazzaville (Achikbache & Anglade 1988; Sautter 1966; Soret 1978; Tati 1993, 1994a, 1994b). Today, the capital has more than 1 million residents out of a national total of some 4 million inhabitants.

It is pertinent here to explain how the concept of 'urban' is defined in the Congo, as different definitions apply in different national settings. The Congo, which covers an area of 345 000 km^2, is classified into regions, of which there are currently ten. Each region is subdivided into localities, which are classified according to their population size and service-delivery functions. Using the Congo's official French nomenclature, a locality may be a district, a prefecture, a *sous-préfecture*, a *commune* or a *municipalité*. According to this classification, an urban locality is either a commune or a municipality (the latter comprising a minimum population of 10 000 together with certain service-delivery functions). There are six *communes* that constitute the major cities of the country – Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, Dolisie (previously named Loubomo), Nkayi (previously named Jacob), Ouesso and Mossendjo (see Figure 7.1). Various smaller urban centres that perform administrative functions for their rural hinterlands qualify as municipalities. All the other small, densely populated centres are classified as rural. The application of this classification, however, has changed as decentralisation policies have been introduced by the national government. After 1990, Brazzaville became a region comprising six *communes*, one of which is the centre of the capital city.

This chapter focuses on the capital city, Brazzaville, and is structured into five sections and a conclusion. The first section addresses the character of the national state and its political relationship to Brazzaville. It is appropriate here to list chronologically a number of major political events that have taken place in the

Congo since independence (see Table 7.1). A detailed discussion of these events is provided in this section. The long period of Marxist-Leninist rule was followed by multi-party elections and more or less continual violent conflict in the capital city during the 1990s. This section also examines how the city may be described as a site both of power and counter-power. In the next section, the cultural image of the city in the eyes of its inhabitants is identified. Subsequently, city planning in Brazzaville is discussed, particularly after independence in the context of its colonial, and later its socialist, legacies, both of which are visible in the city's built environment. A socio-demographic profile of the city is provided in the next section. The fifth part deals with the influence that Kinshasa, the capital city of the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, has had on Brazzaville. The final part is a short conclusion addressing the city as a national capital.

The character of the national state and its political relationship to Brazzaville

After independence, central authority in the Congo remained a dominant feature in the development of Brazzaville, and this has severely curtailed the power invested in the municipality. Whereas economic power is located in oil-rich Pointe-Noire, Brazzaville hosts the institutions of national decision-making and is the site of political power. From 1960 until the formation in 1989 of the Sovereign National Conference (*Conférence Nationale Souveraine* [CNS]), a national one-party system – the Congolese Labour Party (*Parti Congolais du Travail* [PCT]) – was responsible for

Table 7.1 Chronology of political events in Congo post-independence

Year	Political event
1960	Independence
1963	New national constitution and assumption of scientific socialism as the official ideology
1968	• Coup d'état
	• A people's republic inaugurated
	• The ruling party takes on the name PCT
1968–1992	• President Ngouabi assassinated (1977)
	• Congo aligned with Eastern bloc
	• Policies explicitly Marxist-Leninist
	• Sovereign National Conference formed (1989)
1993	• Multi-party elections
	• New president inaugurated – shift towards more liberal ideology
	• Violent political conflict in Brazzaville
1997–1999	Civil war between government forces and private militias, particularly in Brazzaville
2002	• National elections and a new constitution
	• President Sassou re-elected
2009	• National elections
	• President Sassou re-elected

producing and promulgating from Brazzaville all national legislation. Membership of the PCT was dominated by residents of the northern regions, and most of the military coups that took place between 1968 and 1992 were led by residents of the southern regions. In short, since the 1960s, this politically divided city has been the site of confrontation ostensibly between two distinct ethnic groups – the Kongos and the Laris (from the south) and the Mbochi (from the north). The Kongos consider Brazzaville as a natural extension of their hinterland, the Pool region, in which Brazzaville is located. The Mbochis, on the other hand, have migrated to Brazzaville from more distant regions and continue to make up a sizeable proportion of the central state's workforce (and of the PCT).

Under the socialist regime during this period, the central government wielded virtually absolute power over the city. It determined the city's resource allocation, and set the limits of power of the various levels of the city authorities. The function of appointing the mayor and all the city deputies was vested solely in the state government. The mayor and the entire city management board were accountable to the national president. The mayor was also obliged to represent the PCT, as were the deputy mayors in Brazzaville's suburbs.

The city government had little financial autonomy, since its budget came from national public funds. Its responsibilities were confined to land management and the provision of social services to urban residents and their households. Permission for any major developments had to be obtained from central government. Reforms introduced in 1981, promoted as decentralisation and the public participation in regional and civic government, were fundamentally ambiguous in practice. In theory, regions were assigned greater power, but autonomous decision-making at regional and city levels proved to be a sham because leaders at these levels were not elected, but appointed by central government from within the ranks of the party faithful.

A major political transition, heralded by the CNS and addressed in a new constitution, led to the first democratic elections in the early 1990s and conferred a special status on Brazzaville as both a commune and a region. This was intended to remove some of the institutional ambiguity that derived from the fact that the capital city formed part of a region hostile to the socialist regime. Brazzaville, therefore, became a tenth region of the Congo, and as such, was supposed to enjoy a democratically elected local parliament twinned with an executive body made up of individuals appointed by central government. The first elected mayor under this new arrangement was the leader of the main political opposition to the ruling party, the *Union pour la Paix et la Démocratie Sociale* (Union for Peace and Social Democracy).

City authorities were given a new range of delegated responsibilities under this arrangement. However, these did not match the resources available to them. The central government continued to demonstrate great reluctance to provide the necessary resources, and the generation of local revenue was restricted by the widespread poverty of urban households. Moreover, city authorities failed to implement good governance principles in their management activities. As the country became entangled in yet another round of political tension, the day-to-day challenges

associated with effective management made it difficult for the city government to implement development projects. Overlapping city and national functions continued to constrain initiatives launched by the chief executive of the city.

The collapse of the one-party system in 1989, which led to the establishment of democracy under an elected presidency, was relatively short-lived. From 1991 to 1997, Brazzaville became the site of armed conflict produced by political rivalry between leaders of the former PCT and those of the newly created parties. Armed militias, locally called cobras, ninjas, cocoyes and Zulus, supported rival groups. The prolonged violence that erupted resulted in the death or displacement of thousands of residents, and the ensuing political and economic chaos led to the intervention of the Angolan army in the city. During these civil wars, Brazzaville was politically divided into northern and southern factions, and effectively controlled by rival militias. This geographical divide, moreover, reflected the ostensible ethnic character of the political conflict.

These violent clashes in the capital city paralysed and destabilised the entire country. The central government offices in Brazzaville no longer operated, as what national authority was left was transferred to the suburbs, from where members of the government struggled to manage national affairs. The city also lost a significant portion of its population, as many residents fled to safer places, like Pointe-Noire, often at a great distance from the capital city. By 1999, when the civil war ended, Brazzaville had lost much of its vitality as a result of both widespread physical destruction and the continuous exodus from the city.

The year 2000 marked a return to a peaceful social climate for most of Brazzaville's population. In addition, the city authorities gradually regained a measure of power over civic affairs. Despite widespread infrastructural decline, agreements that were signed for the cessation of hostilities established conditions for the rebuilding of a city devastated by seven years of violent civil strife. These agreements also convinced international donors of the need to provide considerable funding for post-conflict reconstruction. The European Union and the French government, through organisations such as the European Fund for Development and the Aid and Cooperation Fund, played vital roles in both the financing of humanitarian programmes and entrenching reconciliation. Multilateral organisations such as the World Bank began to address means to alleviate the large debt that the Congo had contracted before the conflict. In addition, the country embarked on a five-year structural adjustment programme (from 2001 to 2005), which required a budget of CFA 11 billion for the reconstruction of Brazzaville. The World Health Organization provided considerable support for this plan of action. This international assistance helped to speed up Brazzaville's recovery.

Some years after the war, Brazzaville was a transformed city, especially in its central business district, with construction sites everywhere to be seen, newly built hotels, buildings renovated that were destroyed in the 1990s, new main roads, repaired bridges and a series of new public projects in the built environment of the revitalised capital city. Visits by businesspeople from Europe and the US, who came to assess

investment opportunities in a country internationally regarded as one of the most promising in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, attest to this. The reopening of the railway between Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire to allow regular supplies of petrol and concrete to the capital city – an event widely reported in the national and international press – symbolised the promise of a better quality of life for city residents.

The cultural image of the city in the eyes of its inhabitants

From 1960 to today, Brazzaville has always been prominent as the location where major national political change has occurred. Typically, national governments have come to power by means of events – often military coups – that took place in this city. For its residents, however, life in the city holds more than just living through political change. Cultural experiences have been equally important.

The vibrancy of cultural life in the capital centres on such activities as soccer, music, fashion, popular literature and the arts. Generally, the people of the Congo look to Brazzaville as the home of soccer, the place that is home to the most successful local soccer teams (such as the Diables Noirs, Etoile du Congo, Aiglon Cara and Patronnage, to name but a few). These teams are widely considered to be national institutions, and they have brought home trophies at both national and continental levels. This cultural image of Brazzaville is reinforced by the presence in the city of the only stadium authorised to host international sports events. For several years, the Revolution Stadium was the rallying point for fans from diverse cultural backgrounds living in the city.

Until the end of the 1980s, television reception was only available in Greater Brazzaville, pointing to the privileged status of the city in the country, and providing an important exclusive medium for artistic expression in literature, music and fashion. The television network has subsequently been extended to incorporate Pointe-Noire, and a second television network, established during the civil war of the 1990s, *TV liberté* (TV freedom), also broadcasts from the capital city and is widely considered to be an instrument of propaganda for the Congolese Working Class Party, currently in power in the country. Musical and literary expression is also drawn to the capital city, since music finds particular resonance in the national language, Lingala, spoken by almost every Congolese in the city and because the only CD manufacturer in the country is located in Brazzaville. Lingala also played an important unifying cultural role in the city's suburbs, particularly before the civil unrest of the 1990s. With the country's main university, the capital is also the locus of its intellectual life. Most of the political and economic think-tanks are based there, and their ideas appear to somewhat passively influence leaders in the rest of the country.

Residents from the northern regions of the country choose to reside in the suburbs of Talagai, Mougali and Ouenzé, whereas residents from the southern regions mostly settle in the suburbs of Bacongo, Makelekele and Bifuiti (Figure 7.1). In between, there are suburbs which are ethnically diverse. Until 1994, this pattern of settlement was not associated with any form of ethnically-related fear of violence. Brazzaville was

a peaceful, socially cohesive city. In contrast to the role that ethnicity commonly plays in sub-Saharan Africa, the case of Brazzaville points to the political construction of different spatial units of administration and governance – rather than 'ethnicity' – as the fundamental determinant of political contestation and its associated violence.

Urbanisation and planning in the capital city

Before colonialism

As was the case in the rest of what is today known as Central Africa, in pre-colonial Congo urban development was the exception rather than the norm. Although by the end of the 15th century there were a few small settlements along the Congo River Basin that had contact with the external world, these could not really be called urban areas. There are very few details regarding the territorial distribution of the population during the pre-colonial second half of the 19th century. It appears, however, that there were a number of settlements on the coast that were relatively densely populated. This was mainly due to the role of Loango, which at that time served as the capital of Mbanza Congo and was also at the crossroads of the slave and trade routes from the hinterland. In the eastern region of present-day Congo, the population was significantly smaller.

Urbanisation in the colonial period

Urbanisation in the Congo developed concurrently with colonisation, which brought about profound changes to the spatial configuration of the population. The early years under the colonial regime were marked by the establishment of administrative and military posts to demarcate the zones of colonial control for trading purposes. The French colonialists established Brazzaville as a trading city, and in 1890, Ouesso was established in the northern forests as a military post to control the Sangha Basin. Thereafter, colonial authority was concerned with the need to consolidate its control through proximity to the various ethnic groups, and established urban centres and prefectures that had no other spatial justification in their rural surroundings. These urban centres provided the foundation upon which the basic urban structure of Congo developed.

The railway, built by the *Chemin de Fer Congo Océan* (CFCO) company, and the maritime port of Pointe-Noire were major infrastructural elements that contributed to the formation of the main urban areas. The construction of these substantial projects was completed in 1934, and together they symbolised the infrastructural dreams of French colonial power. The railway stations and their associated marketplaces attracted more and more people to the urban centres. These population concentrations were reinforced by the presence of industrial and agri-business centres, such as Nkayi and Loudima, which rapidly became administrative centres serving a burgeoning urban population. In 1930, for instance, around the railway station of Brazzaville, the CFCO built several housing complexes for their local 'indigenous' employees.

After World War II, a shift in colonial administrative policy led to the recruitment of locals in public urban administration and to the promotion of formal primary and secondary education for local youth. This had a considerable impact on the growth of urban centres. It was reported, for example, that from 1952 to 1960, the population of Brazzaville grew from approximately 50 000 to 100 000 (Sautter 1966). A few smaller administrative centres also experienced population growth through the influx of young people seeking educational opportunities.

Job seekers also contributed to urban growth. People came to town to earn a wage and escape rural life, which was increasingly experienced as limited in terms of work opportunities. By 1958, two years before the Congo's independence, there was a noticeable migration of the national population towards the two major cities of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. These migration streams were facilitated by the development of central administrative functions in these two cities, designed to accommodate the functional demands of the new independent state. As a consequence, smaller, secondary urban centres started to lose their inhabitants and stagnate, at least in demographic terms. This pattern persisted during the years after independence.

Post-independence urban development

From 1960, the year of the Congo's independence, to the mid-1980s, attempts were made by the central authorities to plan urban development. Initially, these relied on planning methods initiated in France, the former colonial power. 'Master plans' drawn up with the use of strict urban norms were developed in line with French technicians' intentions to control city growth. A site-and-service approach to the housing delivery process was advocated. However, as migration to the cities kept increasing, the authorities abandoned this approach in favour of what they called a more 'nationalistic' methodology. In effect, the magnitude of urban demands generated by urban growth far outpaced the projections calculated in terms of these master plans. The use of this approach in the early years following independence was in fact a reflection of the political and economic system of that time. The prevailing position was that the state should have strict control over the use of national resources. Land was regarded as state property to be managed and controlled by the state. Traditional authorities were to have no say over the supply of land for residential use.

During this early post-independence period, municipal authorities in each major city were established by the central state ministry in charge of urban development. These municipal authorities were tasked to prevent the development of informal housing settlements and the illegal occupation of vacant land both in the inner city and city peripheries. The authorities resorted frequently to forced evictions to 'free up' illegally occupied zones. This may be one reason why despite the rapid growth of Brazzaville, squatter or informal settlements of the kind seen in urban South Africa and Nairobi did not appear in the urban landscape of the Congo. Negative consequences of this policy and practice included overwhelmingly bureaucratic

housing delivery and frequent corrupt practices favouring elite demands for personalised services. The central state ministry also promoted policies aimed at regional decentralisation. These efforts did not progress smoothly, partly as a result of the reluctance of civil servants to relocate away from Brazzaville or Pointe-Noire. These two cities developed much faster than the rest of the country.

This early centralised approach to urban development became increasingly financially demanding. The Ministry of Public Works and Urbanisation provided the capital city with a portion of the finances needed to implement some of the major infrastructural projects. External funds from multilateral or bilateral donors were critical in building the city. Such finances supported a wide range of urban infrastructure – water and sanitation, transport and communication, housing, public lighting, waste collection and treatment, marketplaces and bus ranks are some examples. Until the late 1970s, the housing delivery strategy of city authorities included subsidies made available by state-owned property development companies and home loans made available by banks. Provision was made for 'decent' housing for public servants and for extended serviced sites in newly zoned urban areas for other residents. All these initiatives were undertaken, however, in the absence of a strategy on how to recover the costs from the recipients of these housing units. By the late 1970s, most of these public services collapsed due to a lack of finances. Moreover, international donors had become reluctant to provide further assistance to a country they perceived as socialist and allied with the Soviet Union and China.

From the early 1980s, the Congolese government decided to prioritise major public works – ministerial headquarters and well-constructed roads – in and around Brazzaville's central business district (CBD). The rationale was to develop an image of the capital city comparable with other large cities on the African continent. Popular perception was that the national leaders were attempting to transform Brazzaville into a city that could match Kinshasa, the capital of what was then Zaire, visible on the opposite bank of the Congo River. To achieve this ambitious programme of construction in the CBD, the government required massive funding. It committed itself to financing the programme through the use of oil-derived revenue and through signing contracts with domestic operators. This commitment was limited, however, as the programme relied heavily on external loans. This led to massive debts being incurred with multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the European Development Fund and the African Development Bank. The booming oil sector – located in Pointe-Noire – had helped access these foreign loans. A second consequence was the further deterioration of urban service delivery to the majority of the capital city's residents.

Brazzaville and its changing urban landscape

To examine the changing built environment of the capital city reveals the shifting ideologies and intentions of both the country's national government and its city authorities. It was not only in the early 1980s that the Congolese government intervened in the city's landscape. It is useful to identify three periods in this regard:

the colonial legacy, socialist-inspired urban development and changes that the city underwent after the socialist period.

The colonial legacy

During the colonial period, Brazzaville first served as the capital of French Equatorial Africa (*Afrique Equatoriale Française*), a colonial domain much larger than the future Republic of Congo. Subsequently, during World War II, Brazzaville served as the capital city of Free France (after the German occupation of France). The reputation gained by the city as a consequence of this dual-capital status led to a period when students from a number of neighbouring former French colonies went to study at the city's university.

Traces of its colonial past are visible in the built environment of the capital's CBD. This was not only an important commercial centre, but also the main residential area of white officials and colonialists, and has come to be known as the old city or *centre ville*. Most dwellings were constructed before independence; some still serve as trading stores, whereas others have been converted into multiple-unit housing. Ownership patterns have changed significantly: in the 1960s and early 1970s, most shops and business premises were owned by Portuguese and French expatriates. Thereafter, under the socialist political regime, these were either expropriated or transferred to local owners. Some of the buildings along the main avenue leading to the railway station (popularly referred to as *la gare*) were converted into ministerial departments or general service offices for the public. Colonial architecture is apparent in the central post office, a number of catholic churches in the *centre ville*, the city hall and the railway station, among others (Figure 7.2). It is worth noting that the national government did not engage in the transformation of the built environment of the CBD during its early decades of rule. Instead, most state-led spatial and physical developments took place in residential areas outside the CBD.

Socialist-inspired urban development

The prioritisation of public works in the CBD in the early 1980s has been described above. The political tone adopted by the military and political elites during the period 1969 to 1989 emphasised a severing of ties with the former colonial government and the capitalist-driven economies of Western countries. This political discourse aligned Congo with a revolutionary approach towards the construction of the nation, and in terms of urban development manifested itself particularly in the erection of monuments and other public works and in the designation of public infrastructure in line with national ideology (see Table 7.2).

Education was at the forefront of this ideological change, with a policy of education for all (*'l'école pour tous'*), which was pursued by successive military regimes. Several schools were built to promote mass education in Brazzaville. Their names were selected to express the ideology of 'scientific socialism' of the liberation movement. Some were named after left-wing activists from other countries, such as Salvador Allende and Amical Cabral, others after national heroes, such as Andre Mastoua.

Table 7.2 Selected public infrastructure and nomenclature of Brazzaville

Public institution/infrastructure	Name/date
Learning/training institutions	• Marien Ngouabi University, 1978
	• Emery-Patrice Lumumba (grammar school), 1971
	• 1st May (grammar school), 1971
	• Libération (grammar school), 1971
	• Drapeau Rouge ('red flag', grammar school), 1971
Roads	• Indépendence (avenue), 1964
	• Trois Martyrs ('Three Martyrs Avenue'), 1971
	• Trois Francs ('Three Francs Avenue'), 1966
	• Matsoua (avenue), 1965
Stadium	Stade de la Revolution (Revolution Stadium), 1970
Museum	Marien Ngouabi, 1982
Parliament building	Palais des Congrès ('Congress Palace'), 1983
Bridge	Pont du Centenaire ('Century Bridge'), 1984

The national university, the *Centre Universitaire de Brazzaville*, was renamed Marien Ngouabi University, in tribute to the first president of the socialist period. Donor funds were used to build the *Ecole National de Magistrature*, a tertiary institution to train public servants. The government instructed Elf, the country's biggest oil company, to locate its headquarters in Brazzaville rather than in Pointe-Noire. This resulted in the construction of one of the tallest buildings in the city, locally known as *Immeuble ELF*, the Elf Building (Figure 7.3). Other developments undertaken at this time included the construction of the head offices of the Ministry of Economic Planning, the National Insurance Company, the Congolese Commercial Bank and a large extension of the General Hospital of Brazzaville. A major electrification programme was also undertaken by a local company.

Changes after the socialist period

The socialist period of rule in the Congo and in Brazzaville came to an end as a result of, inter alia, poorly conceived economic policies and excessive public borrowing. At the end of the 1980s, the Congo had the heaviest debt burden in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, many of the public infrastructural projects were left incomplete as a result of corruption. A significant consequence was the implementation of two structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), introduced under the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, from 1986 to 1996. The short-term consequences for urban residents were both harsh and deeply unpopular. Some positive change, however, did emerge from the SAPs. They enforced drastic cuts in public spending and the rolling back of state authority. This discredited, albeit indirectly, the ideology of the one-party state system. The SAPs nudged the city of Brazzaville towards a more market-oriented approach to the provision of basic services. Drastic cuts in public spending that the programmes required put great pressure on the labour market, and social protest escalated as a result. Over time, the

political discourse became less ideological as tensions began to emerge between the socialist discourse on the one hand and the social hardships of residents on the other. In addition, the wave of political liberation that swept across the African continent from the late 1980s and early 1990s brought a consciousness of the advantages of democracy to many Brazzavilleans.

In a series of street demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, particularly, but not solely, in the national capital, residents gave vent to their frustrations and objections. This social movement led to the convening of a conference, the Sovereign National Conference, in Brazzaville in 1989, during which scientific socialism was rejected as the national political ideology. Recommendations included instituting a new pluralist political system, freedom of expression and association, and a market economy. This tidal change in national ideology is symbolised by the replacement of the red flag (the *drapeau rouge*) – the icon of the socialist regime of the Congolese Workers' Party – with the old national flag used in pre-1969 Congo. Significantly, the conference also recommended that the name changes of public buildings and national monuments instituted during the socialist period be scrapped and that their previous names be reinstated. The democratisation process also changed the nature of city management, and its leadership passed to an elected mayor.

A socio-demographic profile of Brazzaville

In demographic terms, since independence, Brazzaville has been one of the fastest growing cities in the whole of Africa. The capital's population has grown tenfold since independence (see Table 7.3) and there are currently approximately 1.2 million residents. Historically, the city was chosen as the national capital because of its origins as a small, densely populated centre (originally known as Mfoa) and its geographical location on the river. However, this has not proved to be enough to provide the city with the political and economic foundations required by a national capital, since the town lacked both a local political class and a basis for economic production sufficient to the task.

In the first decade after independence, as mentioned above, the new elites in the city failed to develop a new urban-planning model and thereby reinforced the city's

Table 7.3 Population change in the urban system of the six *communes* (1960–2005)

Year	Brazzaville	Pointe-Noire	Dolisie	Nkayi	Ouesso	Mossendjo
1960	124 030	54 909	12 266	7 617		
1974	302 459	140 367	28 577	28 957		
1984	585 812	294 203	49 134	36 540	11 939	14 469
1990*	668 464	351 520	51 864	31 118		
1995*	773 647	418 947	54 878	21 416		
2000*	858 884	498 832	57 498	9 324		
2005*	1 019 665	593 402	59 521	9 299		

Sources: *Estimates from projections (see Tati 1993); other figures derived from population censuses (1974 and 1984) and socio-demographic surveys (1960)

former colonial and economic orientation towards the service and construction sectors. The viability of these sectors was dependent on urban growth and the influx of migrants from the rest of the country. Brazzaville reflects this contradiction, in that it has remained both a city with the *centre ville* of a national capital and a periphery characterised by informality and disorder. As the capital city, it promised the national population educational opportunities and healthcare facilities superior to those elsewhere in the country. The consequence has been continuous streams of migrants into the city and the concomitant continuous demand for urban housing. The 1990s were the exception to this pattern when civil unrest dissuaded many potential migrants from coming to Brazzaville.

As a result of these urbanisation streams, the majority of the population of the Republic of Congo has become urban, with Brazzaville as its largest, and still growing, city (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Its only rival in population terms is the port city of Pointe-Noire, the administrative centre of the country's oil resources, which has consequently become the country's economic capital. The political elite in Brazzaville, however, have ensured that political functions in this rival city have been kept to a minimum and have been controlled by Brazzaville, as the politicians have a real fear of relinquishing their control of these resources.

The middle classes in the capital city have remained a small portion. By the second half of the 20th century, Brazzaville was a city of proletarian inhabitants, predominantly made up of small traders and employees in the services sector. The vast majority of its residents were involved in non-industrial activities – many made a living from rental accommodation (without reinvesting their income in the city economy). Others were involved in urban agricultural activities within the city itself or in outlying peripheral areas, particularly along the banks of numerous streams and the two rivers (Djoué and Congo) that flow within or next to the city. The proliferation of pockets of collectively and privately owned vegetable gardens, locally known as *cultures maraichères*, is an example of the non-industrial nature of work in the city.

The social and economic consequences of this urban growth have been dramatic: with little influence from a middle class in the private sector to limit the activities of the political elite, formal political activity has been dominated by state bureaucracies

Table 7.4 Projected populations and percentage of the urban population residing in Brazzaville (1990–2015)

Year	Total population (000s)	Urban population (000s)	Rural population (000s)	Urban percentage in Brazzaville
1990	2 422	1 316	1 106	53.5
1995	2 793	1 576	1 217	52.7
2000	3 203	1 868	1 335	52.8
2005	3 610	2 172	1 438	56.0
2010	4 011	2 492	1 520	60.4
2015	4 459	2 862	1 597	60.4

Source: UNFPA (2007)

and tertiary activities (with associated corrupt practices, nepotism and other rent-seeking behaviour connected to this elite). Simultaneously, a parallel, informal and 'illegal' set of economic activities in the agricultural, commercial and housing markets emerged.

The first decade of the 21st century saw a slow return to peace and stability in Brazzaville. This change is most evident in the *centre ville* where new construction and renovation are highly visible. In residential areas some distance from the centre and in the city's periphery, change has been slower and informal practices continue. This is evident in the health and education sectors where, after severe deterioration in the quality and scope of delivery during the strife-torn 1990s, improvement has been slow and largely confined to inner-city areas, with peripheral areas continuing to suffer from poor delivery. A similar situation in the housing delivery process is also evident in a sector that continues to be influenced by privately financed – and often corrupt and parasitic – activities.

Kinshasa and its multifaceted influence on the urban life of Brazzaville

It is not possible to examine the dynamics of Brazzaville adequately without considering its multiple linkages with Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC. The proximity of Kinshasa to Brazzaville has deeply influenced its various areas of urban life – cultural, economic, demographic, political and social – throughout its development. These influences should not come as a surprise given Kinshasa's relative size and economic power, as well as the fact that these two cities are the most closely situated capitals in the world – a fact widely known and proclaimed by residents on both sides of the Congo River. The river represents a natural border that is easily crossed, even in some of the most rudimentarily made dugout canoes.

The strong cultural ties between the two cities are cemented by two common languages widely spoken in both countries: *Lingala* and *Kitumba*. It is, again, not surprising, therefore, that Kinshasa plays an important role in the cultural dynamism of Brazzaville and that there have been, and continue to be, visible and sustainable economic linkages across the river, predominantly driven by traders arriving in Brazzaville from Kinshasa. A daily, inexpensive ferry service transports passengers from one side of the river to the other. Traders from Kinshasa sell all kinds of goods, such as clothes, food products, watches, electronics and alcohol, to name but a few. Female traders commute on a daily or weekly basis to sell food products in the marketplaces of Brazzaville's suburbs, where they have established networks with local female traders. And Brazzavillean women frequently travel to Kinshasa to purchase supplies of various goods, which they then sell in the same marketplaces. Poto Poto and Moungali, two of the older and most widely frequented suburbs of Brazzaville, have become places where a large number of migrants and visitors from the DRC rely on trading activities for their livelihoods. Some of them have lived in the Congo for decades. Elsewhere in the city there are numerous concentrations of foreigners from the DRC, as well as other migrants from West Africa.

Kinshasa was particularly important in the daily lives of residents of Brazzaville during the long period of civil unrest from 1993 to 1999. The supply of food and other vital goods came mainly from Kinshasa, as Brazzaville was periodically cut off from the rest of the Pool region, which the city relied on for its staple food supplies. During the second civil war (1997–1999), in fact, virtually the only food supply depot for Brazzaville was the wharf in the suburb of Mpila (at that time under the control of the Cobra militia led by Denis Sassous Nguesso, a former president during the final period of the socialist regime). This wharf served as the immigration office responsible for monitoring travellers between the two cities (and for selling smuggled petrol from Kinshasa, locally called *Khadafi* after the Libyan president). People on both sides of the river found highly innovative ways of sustaining their trading activities during these harshest of conflicts. Non-governmental organisations also used this access point to provide humanitarian services to victims of the fighting. It is also worth noting that Brazzaville played a similar supportive role during times of unrest in Kinshasa.

Kinshasa's role was also crucial in the post-conflict period of reconstruction. Most of the products required during the early years of Brazzaville's reconstruction came from Kinshasa, since the railway between Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire was not operating. The persistent climate of insecurity in the southern regions of the Congo long after the end of the civil war discouraged the Congolese government from using the railway for the transportation of merchandise, even after its service was restored. Consequently, trade between the two capital cities across the Congo River increased considerably during this period of reconstruction.

Relations between the two cities have not always been harmonious: harassment by immigration officers and police, and demands for bribes upon arrival in Kinshasa, particularly during the regime of the late President Mobutu, were commonplace and fluctuations in the exchange rate between the CFA (in Brazzaville) and the Congolese franc (in Kinshasa) affected trade relations. In the recent past, however, with a return to peace in the two capital cities, trade and other exchanges have flourished, and Kinshasa once again serves as an important supply centre for various goods sought after by Brazzavilleans. The two cities remain inextricably connected to one another.

Conclusion

In terms of its urban space, Brazzaville appears to have expanded, unplanned and sprawling, in concentric semicircles. This is partly driven by the elites' speculation over land and by other profit-seeking behaviour. Nearby towns – such as Kinkala, at 120 km from Brazzaville – which could develop into neighbouring satellite cities within the region, remain cut off from the capital city's formal economic activities. In short, although the *centre ville* has specialised tertiary activities related to international trade, information technology, and new types of services associated with finance, trade and national administration, as well as specialised education, which are needed in a capital city, little attention has been given by the authorities to building a city framework aimed at anchoring the new sprawling residential neighbourhoods and the city's immediate hinterland into the urban core.

The main reason for this has been the fact that the city was and remains an object of rivalry among competing elites in the Congo. Brazzaville is both the main city of the Pool region (with its associated elite groups) and more broadly the national capital (many of the elites beyond this region have migrated to the capital). Accordingly, although urbanisation remains high, the capital city is disconnected from its region because regional leadership is largely excluded from metropolitan decision-making. In addition, the capital city is also disconnected from the country as a whole because national leadership has no viable urban vision for the role Brazzaville ought to play in the national urban system. Since the civil wars, a significant degree of 'ethnic localisation' has taken place within the city at neighbourhood level, reflecting this rivalry of elites.

City leadership is aware of the challenges it faces and of the associated need to close the big divide between residents of different ethnicities – in effect, the need to regain the city's status as a social capital that was built up before, and destroyed during, the civil wars. Progress in this regard is currently slow.

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NAIROBI


Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
KENYA
Nairobi
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN

8 Nairobi

Samuel Owuor and Teresa Mbatia

Nairobi is in many ways an archetype of the African colonial city, having purely colonial origins, which shaped its structure and management at the time of Kenya's transition to independence. In fact, Nairobi was born of a European colonial project, the Kenya-Uganda railway line, to access newly colonised land (Blevin & Bouczo 1997). Like other African cities after independence, Nairobi experienced a rapid increase in rural-to-urban migration. This influx brought unserviced and unauthorised housing, a proliferation of small-scale trade and petty-commodity production (Lee-Smith 1989).

The city of Nairobi is situated at the southern end of the agricultural heartland of Kenya. The present administrative boundary covers an area of 696 km^2, which has expanded from 3.84 km^2 in 1910. Other official physical expansions to the city occurred in 1921, 1926 and 1964. Nairobi is still by far the smallest administrative province in Kenya, but the most important in terms of the activities and functions it performs. Besides being the capital city of Kenya, it is also the country's largest urban centre, and one of the largest in Africa. Currently, there are eight administrative divisions in Nairobi – Central, Makadara, Kasarani, Embakasi, Pumwani, Westlands, Dagoretti and Kibera (see Figure 8.1).

Urban geology of Nairobi

Pre-colonial patterns of urbanism and ruralism

During the pre-mercantile period, the caravan route which linked the East African interior to the Indian Ocean passed to the eastern side of Nairobi through the present-day Kariokor (Anyamba 2004). At this time, there was a thriving trade in ivory, beeswax and hides and skins, among other commodities. The exploitation of resources by various communities through time and space led to local trade, initially involving small-scale exchanges within and among neighbouring interior settlements. In the case of Nairobi, the resources were water and pasture. In fact, Nairobi is derived from a Maasai word, *Enkare*, meaning a place of cold waters. Because of its resources, Nairobi was used by the Kikuyu and Maasai to water and graze their livestock. As the two tribes exploited the natural resources in the region, they interacted in other ways, especially to trade grain, copper (jewellery), pottery and iron products.

Thus, Nairobi did not start as an African village (Hirst 1994). Most of the region appears to have had no permanent settlements, although the nomadic Maasai built their *manyatta* (cow-dung huts) on the higher ground from time to time (Emig & Ismail 1980). Nairobi's pre-colonial urbanism was not in the Western pattern of

towns, but as a location where the functions of a town, such as barter trade, were carried out, with few – if any – permanent structures. Therefore, on the basis of economic and sociocultural functions performed spatially and temporally, there was pre-colonial urbanism in the region.

In the colonial period, the transfer of the provincial offices from Machakos to Nairobi, and later the protectorate headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi, contributed to the change of Nairobi from a railway town to an administrative and commercial centre within the British protectorate. It was then that urban culture began to emerge for the first time. Even so, after the initial burst, urban growth tended to be somewhat slow and the African communities remained overwhelmingly rural in orientation (Nevanlinna 1996).

Urban origins and the European colonial legacy[1]

Nairobi was first established as a transportation centre, which later grew to become an administrative centre. The site was chosen by the Kenya-Uganda Railway (KUR) constructors in June 1899 (when the railway line reached Nairobi) because it offered a suitable stopping place between Mombasa and Kisumu. There was an adequate water supply from the nearby Nairobi and Mbagathi Rivers; ample level land for railway tracts, sidings and quarters; an elevated, cooler area to the west suitable for residential purposes; an apparently deserted land offering freedom for land appropriation; and the area was free from tropical diseases (Blevin & Bouczo 1997; Boedecker 1936; Foran 1950; Owuor & Obudho 1997; Walmsley 1957).

This marked the beginning of Nairobi's growth into an administrative and transportation centre (Achola 2002; Morgan 1967). Once the railway depot was established, certain spatial patterns began to emerge – the railway station, a shopping centre, housing quarters and the Indian bazaar (Obudho & Owuor 1991). This layout basically followed the 1898 Plan for a Railway Town and the 1899 Plan for Railway Staff Quarters (Nevanlinna 1996). Nairobi was going to be a railway town for Europeans with mixed European and Asian trading posts. This design laid the foundation of the physical appearance of Nairobi as it still is today, and provided the basis for the segregation of the town's functions, as well as its segregation by class and race (Emig & Ismail 1980).

The city was first incorporated in 1900 as the township of Nairobi. This marked the birth of local government in the town (Tiwari 1981). By this time, the city had already become a large, flourishing area with settlements consisting mainly of the KUR buildings, separate residential areas for Europeans and Indians, and a small African settlement in Eastlands (Owuor & Obudho 1997). In 1905, Nairobi was confirmed as the capital of the country (Nairobi Urban Study Group 1973) with seven distinct zones: the railway centre, Indian bazaar, European business and administrative centre, railway quarters, dhobi or washerman's quarters, European residential suburbs and the military barracks outside the town (Tiwari 1981). The zoning of the city was a result of the Plan for a Settler Capital, which further enhanced segregation, enclaves and spatial limits to the advantage of European settlers.

By 1906, the original KUR depot and camp had grown to an urban centre of 11 000 people with particular land-use zones, but no spatial planning. After the completion of the KUR and the influx of more non-African settlers, the city expanded rapidly, both in size and population (Odada & Otieno 1990). By 1909, much of the internal structure of Nairobi, especially the road network in the central business district (CBD), was already established (Obudho & Owuor 1991). In 1919, a municipal council with corporate rights was appointed, thus making Nairobi a municipality (Lee-Smith 1989).

In these early years, the growth of the town had been controlled only by economic forces, with no coordination of development other than by the layout of a gridiron street pattern in the CBD. In an attempt to order the situation, a town-planning consultant was appointed in 1926 to make recommendations on zoning arrangements (Nairobi Urban Study Group 1973). However, little was done to curb land speculation, and development proceeded in an uncontrolled manner. Then, in 1928, the powers and responsibilities of the Municipal Council of Nairobi were considerably extended by a new municipal ordinance.

The first comprehensive plan of the city (the Nairobi Master Plan for a Colonial City) was commissioned in 1948, but was never adopted fully. The plan laid down guidelines for Nairobi's future development, earmarked land for major uses and made important proposals for extensions to the road network. Using the concept of functionalism, the plan created a modern national city to cater for industrial expansion and the growing numbers of African wage earners working in the industries. The plan also used the garden-city concept to divide residential areas into neighbourhood units.

Like others before, this plan was to some extent responsible for the present layout of the built-up area of Nairobi. In March 1950, Nairobi became a city by the Royal Charter of Incorporation, but Nairobi was not free from rapid-urbanisation problems, which have persisted to date. Some of the earliest documented urbanisation problems in Nairobi included transport (Hake 1977), housing (Blevin & Bouczo 1997; Obudho 1987), drainage and sanitation (Tiwari 1981), water and sewerage (Nairobi City Council 1974), overcrowding, poor sanitation and unhealthy living conditions (Achola 2002).

Nairobi's districts still demonstrate the racial segregation that was created in the early stages of the city's development. Europeans resided to the north and west of the railway. These areas were located at higher altitude with richer, volcanic red soils. Africans and Indians were mostly confined to the plains east and south of the railway line where non-porous black cotton soils prevail. These areas were unhealthy as a consequence of frequent flooding, high incidence of malaria and neglect of municipal services, such as refuse and sewage collection (Achola 2002). This resulted in a city organised as a social patchwork with very high territorial segregation (Rodriguez-Torres 1998).

Urban planning efforts of the independent Kenya

At the time of Kenya's independence in 1963, the new nation inherited the existing resources and infrastructure, as well as certain challenges. In Nairobi, one of the challenges demanding immediate action was the city's explosive growth. Just before and immediately after independence, there was a large influx of the African population into the city following the relaxation of the colonial rule of restricting Africans' access to the city. Between 1962 and 1969, the population of Nairobi increased at a very high rate (12.2%), further complicating the problems and challenges of the city (Agwanda et al. 2004).

Faced with a series of sectoral pressures in 1967, a number of ad hoc study groups were set up to deal with the specific consequences of Nairobi's population growth. There was a need for planning, housing, transport, business and integration of urban residents into one developing city, as opposed to the segregated colonial city. As a result of these sectoral pressures, the Nairobi Urban Study Group was formed in 1973 to develop the 1973 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy to guide the growth and development of the city to the year 2000 (Nairobi Urban Study Group 1973). However, very little was achieved in terms of implementing the recommendations given by the Nairobi Urban Study Group. The 1973 Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy recommended, among others, decentralisation and development of alternative service centres; modification, upgrading and extension of the road network; formulation of realistic housing programmes; and extension of the city boundary to the west and north-east as and when required, as well as encouraging the growth of satellite towns surrounding the city, that is, Thika, Athi River and Machakos.

The second notable urban effort of the independent state was the 1984–1988 Nairobi City Commission Development Plan, which outlined the development needs of all sectors: housing, health and environment, sewerage, social services, transport and public works, workforce development and financial management (Nairobi City Commission 1985). Again, nothing much was achieved as regards the plan's implementation.

In 1993, the Nairobi City Council organised a stakeholders' open forum (called the Nairobi City Convention), comprising stakeholders, professionals and ordinary citizens, to map out strategies and practical solutions for a better Nairobi, an initiative known as 'The Nairobi We Want'. The recommendations of this convention were broadly organised around four areas: issues dealing with the use of space and the physical environment; problems pertaining to the provision of services; issues relating to the social sector; and administrative, legal and political issues (Karuga 1993). Again, many of these ideas were not taken into account in the planning of the city.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, most local authorities in Kenya, including Nairobi, were faced with increasing unresolved debts, reliance on the central government for capital investments, poor leadership and economic governance and poor

service delivery. To address these problems, the Kenya Local Government Reform Programme embarked on policy and legal changes aimed at decentralisation and local empowerment. The Local Authorities Transfer Fund, introduced in 1999/2000 through an act of the Kenyan parliament, is a grant from the central government to equip local authorities with means to provide their citizens with basic services. The key objectives of the Local Authorities Transfer Fund are, firstly, to enable local authorities to improve and extend service delivery; secondly, resolve municipal debts; and, thirdly, improve local revenue mobilisation, accountability and financial management (Owuor et al. 2006). Within the same reform framework, in 2001, the government introduced the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan, which is a participatory planning and budgeting tool for identifying priority needs in the local authorities.

As the city grows in size and population, the provision of urban services has not been, and will not be, able to keep pace with the demand, despite the numerous policies, plans and strategies that have been adopted to date. Faced with the problems of poor services – or lack of services in some areas – city residents have resorted to self-help efforts and community-led management initiatives as a means of accessing such services as sanitation, water supply, refuse collection and security in their neighbourhoods. Participation and partnerships of all kinds have emerged to improve the urban environment – more often than not leading to new forms of urban governance. Nairobi City Council is, therefore, encouraging public-private partnerships in urban management and provision of urban services to its residents. Examples of such public-private partnership initiatives in Nairobi include the Nairobi Central Business District Association, neighbourhood associations and community policing.

Most recently, in 2008, the (coalition) government of Kenya created a Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development charged with the development issues of the Nairobi Metropolitan Region, and aiming at area-wide governance interventions. Specifically, this ministry is in charge of roads, bus and rail infrastructure; creating an efficient transport system; replacing slums with affordable low-cost and rental housing; enforcing planning and zoning regulations; facilitating efficient water supply and waste management infrastructures; and promoting, developing and investing in adequate public utilities, public services and infrastructure.

Vision for a world-class metropolis: Nairobi Metro 2030

Responding to urban-growth projections and in an attempt to address the current and future challenges of the Nairobi Metropolitan Region (NMR), the government of Kenya is preparing an ambitious Nairobi Metro 2030 vision to spatially redefine the NMR and create a world-class city region envisaged to generate sustainable wealth and quality of life for its residents, investors and visitors.[2] The plan's elaboration and implementation fall under the responsibilities of the newly established Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development. The vision of the NMR is to create the best-managed metropolis in Africa, providing a dynamic, internationally competitive

and inclusive economy supported by world-class infrastructure and a skilled labour force. Based on the core values of innovation, enterprise, sustainability, co-responsibility, self-help and excellence, the strategy is to optimise the role of the NMR in national development by building on existing strengths, including Nairobi's hub function in air transportation, the large number of regional and international bodies already present and its educational and research institutions. Nairobi Metro 2030 seeks to brand and promote Nairobi as East Africa's key gateway city by creating a framework for comprehensively addressing a broad range of policy areas, including the economy, trunk and social infrastructures, transportation, slums and housing, safety and security, and financing. The proposed NMR covers the 3 000 km^2 that depend on Nairobi's regional core functions for employment and social facilities. Planning will initially involve a 40-km radius, despite Nairobi's functional outreach covering 100 km or more. Apart from the Nairobi municipality itself, the NMR vision embraces 14 other adjacent independent local authorities.

Urban manifestations of nationalism in the built environment

Contemporary Nairobi contains fragments of colonial Nairobi. In Nairobi, the expression of nationalism in the built environment has mostly been in the form of naming and renaming important buildings, popular streets, roads and parks, and replacing English colonial names with names of nationalists, freedom fighters and words that signify principles of nationalism.

Buildings as manifestations of nationalism

Several of the city's landmark buildings have become manifestations of nationalism. Examples are the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC) (see Figure 8.2), the parliament building, the law courts, Nyayo House and Harambee House, among others. For example, the KICC became a landmark of the city after independence, not only because of its location and easily identifiable form, but because it was perceived as an expression of the new international role of Nairobi and Kenya, the meeting point of people from all over the world with common global, regional and national concerns.

Monuments as manifestations of nationalism

Public monuments have been used to shape the symbolic landscape of Nairobi since colonial times. With the attainment of independence, the removal of some of the colonial monuments from the landscape of the city marked a shift in the nature of Nairobi's iconography. Postcolonial monuments differ greatly in form from those erected during the colonial period and represent a transformation of Nairobi's symbolic space. The city is now dotted with public monuments that celebrate the achievement of independence and the Kenyan nation state.

Public monuments are commonly erected in squares, gardens and recreational parks in and around the city. The monument to Kenya's first president (Mzee Jomo

Kenyatta) (see Figure 8.3) is strategically located in the KICC compound. Uhuru Monument, signifying self-governance and nationalism, stands in Uhuru Gardens on Langata Road. The Nyayo Monument, celebrating several years of President Moi's rule, is located in Uhuru Park in the city centre. The Dedan Kimathi Monument, which was erected in 2007 in honour of his contribution as a freedom fighter, is located in a street named after him – Kimathi Street.

Street and place names as manifestations of nationalism

As a sign of nationalism, many streets and places in Nairobi were renamed after independence. The colonial names were replaced with Kiswahili names or the names of Kenyan nationals who fought for independence (see Table 8.1).

Some streets have also been named or renamed after admired nationalists of neighbouring countries: Nyerere Road (after President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania) and Haile Selassie Avenue (after Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia). In addition, several residential estates in the city, especially those in Eastlands, where the majority of Africans lived during the colonial period (now occupied by the middle-to-low income groups), have acquired symbolic names, most of them expressing nationalism (see Table 8.2).

Table 8.1 Colonial and nationalistic place and street names

Colonial name	Nationalistic name
Dalemere Avenue	Kenyatta[1] Avenue
Donholm Road	Jogoo[2] Road
King George's Hospital	Kenyatta National Hospital
Princess Elizabeth Highway	Uhuru[3] Highway
Victoria Street	Tom Mboya[4] Street
Government Road	Moi[4] Avenue
Government House	Jogoo House
Louis Leakey Memorial Museum	National Museums of Kenya
Royal Technical College	University of Nairobi

Notes: 1 The first president of the Republic of Kenya
2 A Kiswahili word for cockerel, an image on the then ruling party's (KANU) flag
3 A Kiswahili word for independence
4 Notable personalities who fought for independence

Table 8.2 Meanings of some residential estate names in Nairobi

Estate name	Meaning
Umoja Estate	A Kiswahili word for unity
Buru Buru Estate	A Kiswahili connotation for bullets, used by the colonialists against freedom fighters
Harambee Estate	A Kiswahili word for 'pulling together' or 'working together' to build the nation
Kimathi Estate	Named after Dedan Kimathi, a freedom fighter
Madaraka	A Kiswahili word for freedom, self-rule or independence

Influence of international donors on the urban landscape

The contribution of international donors to the urban landscape of Nairobi is evident in housing and infrastructural development. Donors involved in development aid and cooperation programmes in the 1960s and 1970s saw Nairobi as an urban conglomeration in a developing country that needed intervention, financial resources and expertise (Nevanlinna 1996). For example, the period after independence witnessed a massive shortage of housing due to the rapid influx of African people into the city. The Kenyan government, the National Housing Corporation, Nairobi City Council and funding organisations, such as the Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya, with financial support from development partners and donors, such as the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank and the International Development Agency, devised development funding plans whereby families with middle-range incomes could gain ownership of a house (Ochieng 2007).

Within this framework, a large number of housing schemes were built in Nairobi, among them Kibera, Umoja, Buru Buru, Dandora and Kayole – all specially planned and complete with related infrastructural facilities (Nevanlinna 1996). Kibera, currently one of the largest informal settlements in Africa, has also witnessed a number of interventions in terms of slum-upgrading programmes from UN-HABITAT and national and international NGOs. In another example, the Chinese government is currently involved in resurfacing and redesigning the road linking Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and the UN Environment Programme headquarters.

The impact of globalisation

Cities are traditionally engines of social modernisation and economic growth, and at the same time the theatres in which globalisation stages its scenarios. Whereas some countries and their cities are incorporated into the global world, sometimes at huge social cost, others are not. For Africa, globalisation has fuelled the already unprecedented urban growth phenomenon and increased the challenges that go with it.

As in other African cities (UN-HABITAT 2005), globalisation has created significant economic, social, political, spatial and demographic stresses in Nairobi. On the economic front, advances in communication and information technologies, improved transport and deregulation of capital markets (but not labour markets) have enabled private investors to take advantage of national differences in tax rates, labour costs and environmental restrictions to maximise financial returns by moving development, production and marketing functions to the most profitable locations. It has also been observed that globalisation reinforces urban primacy, thereby increasing the scale of urban growth.

The global recession and economic reforms (under structural adjustment programmes) in the last two decades have affected the city of Nairobi in several ways.

Standards of living have deteriorated and urban poverty appears to be increasing as life in the city has become more expensive. Unemployment in the formal sector has risen and many residents have turned to self-employment or informal employment, while real wages have not kept up with price increases.

Further consequences of globalisation occur through spatial segregation and unequal access to urban services, infrastructure and housing. At the societal level, such inequality has not only affected political and social stability, but also productivity and poverty levels. Although segregation dates from the colonial period, globalisation has enhanced the segregation and polarisation of Nairobi. Segregation is most evident in the gated communities of the middle- and higher-income neighbourhoods of Nairobi. The gap between rich and poor has continued to increase, and increased incomes (for the rich) have led to changes in lifestyles and consumption patterns for a minority of city dwellers.

The rich have been the beneficiaries of facilities such as the malls located in strategic, high-income areas of the city. Examples of such malls are Village Market, Yaya Centre, Nakumat Junction, Nakumat Westgate and Sarit Centre, among others. These shopping complexes stock competitively priced and relatively expensive goods, as well as cheap imports from multinational and transnational suppliers, at the expense of local products. Therefore, the local urban economy of Nairobi suffers from the effects of liberalisation and globalisation.

In the political realm, the most significant impact of globalisation on Nairobi has been the weakening of national and local public institutions relative to external private economic power. The privatisation of public services in many cities is one outcome of this process, in which investors pick the more profitable services, further eroding urban revenue which must cope with the poorly performing services.

At the metropolitan level, important changes can also be seen. Nairobi has expanded well beyond its boundaries. These changes have institutional and economic dimensions. One of the most visible aspects of recent metropolitan development has been the city's spatial expansion, spilling over into adjacent jurisdictions and incorporating them into the larger municipality of the central city. Decentralisation of jobs in the manufacturing sector is an important part of this process, in many places leading to polycentric forms, with economic activities clustered around transport nodes.

In the institutional realm, spatial expansion has been accompanied by a proliferation of administrative entities with responsibilities for different aspects of metropolitan government, including a metropolitan planning authority and the newly created Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development.

Structure of the housing delivery system

According to Ochieng (2007), there are several housing delivery systems which have been used or are in use in Nairobi. These include provision of housing by the employer, national government or the city council; tenant-purchase, site and service

schemes and self-help housing; private tenement housing; and conventional and non-conventional housing delivery systems. Due to the lack of affordable housing, especially for the populous urban poor, non-conventional housing is becoming an important housing delivery system in Nairobi. Acknowledging this, the government recently started supporting this type of housing delivery system.

The government increasingly supports housing delivery by encouraging the creation of relevant housing institutions, developing relevant by-laws and regulations and putting in place an appropriate framework for housing delivery. After more than 40 years without such a framework, the government has recently formulated one. Among other things, it is concerned with nurturing an environment that would prompt potential investors to engage in housing delivery. This includes facilitating the private sector by enacting relevant acts of parliament on housing and finance to promote housing development for both the low- and middle-income populations.

In other words, the government has changed its role to that of an enabler, facilitator and catalyst in the housing delivery system (Ochieng 2007). Furthermore, the government has embarked on upgrading slums and urban informal settlements under the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), currently in its first phase in the Kibera slum of Nairobi.

Provision of housing by the employer, government and Nairobi City Council

Urbanisation policy during the colonial period was racially discriminatory, restrictive and control-oriented. The Employment Ordinance Act required Africans to have passes and salaried employment before they could be permitted to reside in the city. This policy not only discouraged the stabilisation of the African migrant labour force in the city, but also discriminated against African men who wished to bring their wives and children to live with them in the city (Macoloo 1998). Employers were required to provide suitable housing for their employees at all times and where housing was not provided, a housing allowance was to be given in lieu. Employers provided accommodation suitable only for single men – which came to be popularly known as bachelors' quarters.

Despite the growing demand for housing, the colonial administration was intolerant of attempts by Africans to provide shelter for themselves, and residential structures built from temporary materials were violently demolished. To house the residents of the demolished structures and to maintain control and surveillance over the African urban population, the colonial administration constructed the first public housing for Africans in Nairobi in 1939 at Shauri Moyo (Macoloo 1998). This was to be the start of the exclusively African residential areas. Other housing schemes that followed during this period were Ziwani (1940), Bondeni (1942), Kaloleni (1945), Bahati (1950), Gorofani (1952), Makadara (1954), Mbotela and Maringo (1955), Jerusalem (1958) and Jericho Lumunba (1962). These were planned in a neighbourhood concept, with common sanitary facilities, shops, schools, hospitals, social halls and open spaces. All of these residential areas are now part of Nairobi City Council.

With Kenya's independence in 1963, restrictive colonial policies were relaxed, resulting in a rapid influx of people into Nairobi. This situation aggravated the housing problem, especially in Nairobi, in terms of supply and demand, resulting in overcrowding and the proliferation of informal settlements. The government and major employers in Nairobi (e.g. Kenya Railways, Kenya Post and Telecommunications and the University of Nairobi) continued to provide housing for their employees. However, this could not be sustained and, therefore, these employers were forced to provide allowances in lieu of houses that they could not provide. On the other hand, Nairobi City Council built a few more estates for its citizens where subsidised rents were charged. This method of housing delivery was not sustainable and was subsequently scrapped. The last city council rental houses were built in 1978.

Tenant-purchase and site and service schemes

During the 1970s, the government changed the housing delivery strategy and adopted tenant-purchased and site and service schemes for housing provision, especially for the low-income groups. However, this delivery system could not satisfy the demand, as the resources invested were inadequate. Furthermore, the low-income target group was not able to access this type of housing. With time, these houses were taken over by the middle-income group. Consequently, the low-income groups were pushed out of the formal system into the informal realm. Examples of site and service schemes are the Dandora and Ayany estates.

Private tenement housing

Houses for rent are delivered largely by private developers (individuals or companies). Depending on economic ability, one has a choice of rental units ranging from single rooms with shared facilities to three-bedroom self-contained units. In Nairobi, private tenancy is common in the middle- and low-income neighbourhoods, where the large majority of citizens reside. Most of these rental units are in high-rise flats to maximise both land space and profits for the landlords. Even those that started as low-rise buildings have been transformed into high-rise flats (Anyamba 2004).

Although private tenement housing provides a substantial portion of reasonably affordable housing stock to poor city residents, some of the units are clearly substandard, in breach of city housing by-laws and regulations, ageing, congested, poorly lit and ventilated, lacking in basic services – and yet the rents are relatively high. Densification is the order of the day, and demand has taken control of the process, with no space left to accommodate and facilitate necessary development and services (Ochieng 2007). Examples of residential estates in Nairobi where this housing delivery system is common include Tena, Zimmermann, Mathare North and Umoja I Innercore. Although housing delivery by the private sector has helped improve the housing supply for both the poor and the middle-income groups, it needs regulation and standards.

Conventional housing delivery system

After independence, a number of financial housing institutions were licensed by the government under the Building Societies Act to facilitate the purchase and/or construction of houses. Except for the East African Building Society and Housing Finance of Kenya, none of these still exist. Some collapsed, whereas others, such as the Equity Building Society and the Family Finance Building Society, have since become established and allowed to trade as banks. Financial institutions (both private and public) are also increasingly playing an important role in facilitating individual house ownership for those who are willing. Commercial banks, such as Barclays Bank of Kenya, Kenya Commercial Bank, Stanbic Bank and Standard Chartered Bank, have since embarked on housing mortgage schemes for interested borrowers, mainly targeting the middle- and upper-income groups. These financial institutions offer various mortgage conditions to their customers, most of which cannot be met by poor residents (Ochieng 2007).

Non-conventional housing delivery system

A number of organisations, such as the National Cooperative Housing Union, the National Christian Council of Kenya and Pamoja Trust, are involved in housing delivery especially for socio-economically disadvantaged groups, whether they work in formal or informal employment. To achieve their aim, these non-profit organisations undertake negotiations on behalf of their clients with the relevant authorities for lending conditions that favour housing. They also source funding from various categories of national and international donors, as well as assisting with land acquisition and technical support. Through such efforts, affordable, low-income housing has been delivered to urban groups. Such non-conventional housing delivery is mainly concentrated in the slum and informal-settlement areas (Ochieng 2007).

Slums/informal settlements

Many people in Nairobi have no access to cheap conventional housing. The lack of access to affordable housing has driven the majority of low- to very-low-income earners to seek rentals in the Nairobi slums. While the public and formal sectors cannot build enough houses to cater for the need arising from an increasing urban population, the private sector has for a long period mainly targeted the middle and upper classes. Therefore, the only opportunity for the majority of the low- to very-low-income population has been the unregulated and unplanned slum settlements, where rents are relatively affordable (Agwanda et al. 2004).

Although dwellings in the slum settlements are supposedly cheaper, during the past few years, Nairobi has witnessed demonstrations by slum dwellers who maintain that the rents currently charged are still high, given the conditions they are living in, and that they are being exploited by wealthy and well-connected landlords and landowners. This has mainly occurred in Kibera, Kariobangi and Mathare, the main slum locations in Nairobi (Agwanda et al. 2004). Based on UN-HABITAT's shelter

deprivation factors, 38.5% of the households in Nairobi can be considered slum households. Out of these slum households, 26.9% experience at least one shelter deprivation.[3] Although official figures are lacking, it is estimated that over 60% of Nairobi's population live in slum settlements (UN-HABITAT 2006).

Upgrading initiatives, such as KENSUP and Kenya Slum Upgrading and Low-cost Housing Infrastructure Trust Fund (KENSUF), are currently taking place in Nairobi. KENSUP (partly funded by UN-HABITAT) has started with Kibera in Nairobi. The objective is to improve the overall livelihood of the people living and working in slums through targeted interventions to address shelter, infrastructure services, land tenure, employment issues and the impact of HIV/AIDS in these settlements. KENSUF is a central depository of all mobilised financial resources for slum upgrading, and draws its funds from donors, community-based organisations, the private sector and government budgetary allocations. The fund is meant to pool resources from all potential donors to an amount sufficient to carry out significant slum-upgrading activities.

Nairobi in the national fabric

Ethnic history, composition and socio-economic indicators

The citizens of early Nairobi came from different parts of the world. During the colonial period, Nairobi consisted mainly of Europeans (colonial administrative officers, railway workers, etc.) and Asians (railway workers, masons, leather workers, tailors, dukawalas [shop owners], etc.). At that time, the few Africans were mainly labourers, domestic servants or shop assistants (Nevanlinna 1996). In 1962, just before independence, the African population had increased to 59% of the total Nairobi population. Asians formed 33% and Europeans 8% of the population.

Owing to rural-to-urban migration after independence, in 1970, the European population dropped to 4%, the Asian population to 14% and the African population increased to 83%.[4] The African population is currently made up of a mix of Kenyan ethnic groups. Most immigrants in Nairobi come from the Central, Nyanza and Eastern Provinces of Kenya. Wars in the neighbouring countries of Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi also increased the population of these country's citizens in the city.

Nairobi is a cosmopolitan city, with foreigners working in various international organisations located in the city. It is composed of Europeans, Asians, Somalis and Nubians, who are citizens of Kenya; citizens of various African countries; and Kenyans from all parts of the country. Despite this cosmopolitan nature, it is interesting to find residential neighbourhoods dominated by certain ethnic groups, especially in the low-income areas. For example, Kibera and Kariobangi are dominated by Luos; Kawangware and Kangemi by Luhyas; Embakasi, Ongata Rongai, Ngong and Ruai by Kisiis; Mathare, Githurai and Zimmerman by Kikuyus; and Eastleigh by Somalis.

Socio-economically, Nairobi employs 25% of the country's workforce and 43% of the country's urban workers, and generates more than 45% of national GDP (UN-HABITAT 2006). However, socio-economic conditions are deteriorating

quickly, especially in the last two and a half decades. The proportion of the population living below the poverty line increased dramatically, from 26% in 1992 to 50% in 1997. The dependency ratio[5] is 71.3% for the poor, 48.1% for the non-poor and 52.75% in Nairobi as a whole. The total fertility rate is 3.5% for the poor, 2.6% for the non-poor and 2.8% for Nairobi as a whole (Kenya 2008).

Dynamics of population growth and its influence on East Africa[6]

At the time of Kenya's first population census in 1948, there were 17 urban centres with an aggregate population of 285 000 (see Table 8.3). The urban population was proportionately small (5.2% of the total), but disproportionately concentrated in Nairobi and Mombasa (41.2% and 32.2% of the total urban population, respectively), with the majority of the urban dwellers being non-Africans. By 1962, the number of urban centres had doubled to 34 and the urban population had increased to 671 000, with Nairobi accounting for 33.8% of this population. Whereas the overall urban growth rate stood at 6.3% per year, Nairobi's growth rate was 4.6%.

The growth in the number of urban centres and their population accelerated after independence, when Africans were allowed to migrate to the urban areas without legal and administrative restrictions. The urban population rose to 1 million in 1969, growing at the rate of 7.1% per annum. This represented 9.9% of the total population, with Nairobi and Mombasa accounting for 67% of the total urban population (Nairobi, 47%; Mombasa, 20%). This period also saw Nairobi recording its highest growth rate of 12.2%.

By 1979, the overall level of urbanisation had risen to 15.1%, with 91 urban centres and an urban population of 2.3 million. Nairobi and Mombasa accounted for 51% of the total urban population (Nairobi, 35.7%; Mombasa, 15.3%). Although the urban population increased from 2.3 million in 1979 to 3.8 million in 1989, the growth rate was only 5.2%, compared with 7.7% in the previous decade. With 139 urban centres, the 1989 population results indicated that 18% of the population resided in the urban areas. Nairobi and Mombasa accounted for 46% of the total urban population (34.1% and 11.9%, respectively). In 1999, about 20% of the population

Table 8.3 Urbanisation trends in Kenya and Nairobi (1948–1999)

Year	Kenya population (000s)	No. of urban centres	Urban population (000s)	Urban population (%)	Urban growth rate (%)	Nairobi population (000s)	Nairobi growth rate (%)	Nairobi as % of total urban population
1948	5 406	17	285	5.2	–	119	–	41.7
1962	8 636	34	671	7.8	6.3	227	4.6	33.8
1969	10 943	47	1 076	9.9	7.1	506	12.2	47.0
1979	15 334	91	2 314	15.1	7.7	828	4.9	35.7
1989	21 444	139	3 864	18.0	5.2	1 325	4.7	34.1
1999	28 159	179	5 429	19.3	3.4	2 083	4.5	38.4

Source: Compiled from the 1948, 1962, 1969, 1979, 1989 and 1999 Kenya population census reports

lived in urban areas, of which more than half were in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu. The urban growth rate decreased further to 3.4%, but the number of urban centres increased to 179.

As a consequence, the urban primacy index[7] showed an upward trend between 1979 and 1999, indicating that most of the Kenyan urban population live in Nairobi. In other words, Nairobi continues to be a major urban centre for socio-economic and political activities in Kenya. Whereas, in the past, rural-to-urban migration was the major contributor to the urban growth of Nairobi, natural growth and *in situ* urbanisation (the absorption of adjacent settlements through the spatial growth of the city) are increasingly becoming important factors.

Nairobi plays an important role in the global, regional, national and local economy. It is the most populous and prominent city in East Africa. It is the home and headquarters to many regional and international companies and organisations. It is an established regional hub for transport, communications, business, trade, commerce, tourism and conferences. Nairobi's central location has also been a very significant factor in the growth of agriculture and the marketing of produce, as well as in highly concentrated manufacturing and agribusiness industries.

Character of national state and city governance[8]

Kenya became a multi-party democratic state in 1992, when the constitution was repealed to allow for many political parties. Kenya has an elected president who is both the head of state and head of government. However, following the disputed December 2007 presidential election results, post-election violence and the subsequent formation of a coalition government, the position of prime minister (with power and authority to coordinate and supervise government business) was created. Executive power is exercised by the government, while the legislative power is vested in both the government and the National Assembly, which comprises elected and nominated members of parliament. The judiciary is (supposedly) independent of the executive and the legislature.

Kenya has experienced three political regimes. From independence to 1978, Kenya was ruled by the founding father of the nation, Jomo Kenyatta, under one political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The second president, Daniel arap Moi, ruled from 1978 to 2002 and continued KANU's one-party rule until 1992, when the constitution was repealed to allow for a multi-party system. In 2002, President Moi peacefully relinquished power to the current regime of President Mwai Kibaki of the NARC (which stands for the United Democratic Party of Kenya). Under President Kibaki, the government has laid down ambitious socio-economic development reforms that have had an impact on Nairobi – both directly and indirectly. In fact, Nairobi is slowly regaining its lost glory of the city under the sun.

The president, together with members of parliament and councillors, are elected every five years by the citizens of Kenya. Nairobi has eight electoral constituencies: Makadara, Kamukunji, Starehe, Langata, Dagoretti, Westlands, Kasarani and Embakasi. These constituencies are represented in the National Assembly by their

elected members of parliament, currently from two dominant political parties: the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Party (ODM). Each constituency is further subdivided into electoral wards, represented by an elected councillor. A large majority of the councillors in Nairobi come from the two dominant parties, PNU and ODM.

Nairobi is governed by Nairobi City Council, which, like all other local authorities in Kenya, is composed of councillors (elected and nominated), chief officers and technical and support staff. The councillors are the policy-makers, whereas the executive arm, headed by the town clerk, oversees the operations of the council. The political leaders of the city or municipal council are the mayor and his or her deputy,[9] who are elected through a secret ballot by the councillors.

Like all other local authorities in Kenya, Nairobi City Council is governed in its operations by a variety of legal statutes and administrative decrees, mainly from the Ministry of Local Government. The Local Government Act, Chapter 265 of the Laws of Kenya, is the main legal statute that governs the operations of local authorities, including Nairobi City Council. In essence, Nairobi City Council is supervised by the central government through the Ministry of Local Government.

In executing its mandate, Nairobi City Council is divided into several operational departments, supervised by related standing committees made up of councillors. The city council provides a wide range of services through the various departments. In this role, the city council's efforts are augmented by a number of government ministries and agencies, private-sector organisations and multi-stakeholder partnerships. The partnerships involved in addressing urban problems, especially those concerning service delivery and urban management, have included the private and public sectors, civil society, business persons, city residents and donors.

The Local Government Act gives central government the power to oversee the running of local authorities in Kenya. For example, the minister must approve the sources of revenue of various local authorities, as well as any measures they take to access basic services. It can also dissolve a council and appoint a new commission if such a decision is called for. Even though the authorities are clamouring for more autonomy, they are not in a position to be completely independent of the ministry, since municipalities do not have the political, financial or human resources needed for proper provision and management of their services (Owuor et al. 2006).

For proper coordination of services to urban residents and implementation of national policies, local authorities work closely with relevant ministries and government departments. This is mainly in the areas of health, education, road construction, housing, physical planning and water. In other words, for every newly implemented project, local authorities must refer to the Ministry of Local Government and the relevant government technical ministries and departments. More recently, the newly created Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development is supposed to be coordinating its activities with the Ministry of Local Government and Nairobi City Council (Owuor et al. 2006). This calls for harmonisation of policy formulation and implementation.

The main national issue

Kenya was left with deep scars from the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed presidential election of December 2007. In just a matter of weeks, Kenya was transformed from one of Africa's most stable democracies into chaos. More than a thousand people died in the post-election violence and over a quarter of a million people were forced to flee their homes due to the unprecedented levels of violence. A coalition government was formed, but national reconciliation and reconstruction is yet to be fully achieved.

The post-election violence brought into focus a number of national issues to be addressed, some of them historical in nature. Currently, these national issues include a constitutional review to address issues of equity, devolution of power and enhancement of the rule of law; land reforms; resettlement of internally displaced persons; forging national unity and cohesion, especially within the government of national unity; justice and the culture of impunity; and generally implementing the recommendations made by the various committees and commissions investigating post-election violence and related issues.

Sites of power and counter-power

Manifestations of power

At the governmental level, manifestation of power is situated in State House, Harambee House, Parliament Building and the Law Court. Except for State House, all are located within the CBD of Nairobi. State House is the official residence of the president, and often serves as an office for government meetings and business. Harambee House is the Office of the President. Although the three presidents of Kenya have rarely used it, it houses a number of governmental ministries and departments within the Office of the President. Parliament Building is where legislative business is conducted on behalf of the Kenyan constituents, Nairobi included, while the Law Court houses the judiciary. At the local level, Nairobi is governed from the City Hall, which is located within the CBD. The City Hall houses all the departments of Nairobi City Council. Political party headquarters are also situated in various parts of the city.

Channels of mobilisation and protests

Channels of mobilisation and protests in Nairobi are as varied as the problems they are supposed to solve and the types of groups involved. Political parties, NGOs, community-based organisations, religious organisations, civil society, trade unions, formal and informal organisations, neighbourhood (or estate) associations and educational institutions (tertiary colleges and universities) have been channels of mobilisation and protests in Nairobi since independence.

Locations of marches, rallies, riots and protests

Marches, rallies, riots and protests are not a new phenomenon in Nairobi. Rallies and protests occurred during the agitation for independence. At that time, the well-known Kamukunji[10] grounds in the eastern part of the city provided an open space for gathering, expression and agitation. Kamukunji grounds is rich in historical significance, as it is the site of Kenya's political mass actions. For example, the first multi-party mass rally, which degenerated into riots between pro-reform citizens and the police, was held there on 7 July 1990. This date is commemorated yearly as *saba saba*[11] day.

After the introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya, Uhuru Park became another popular place for political rallies owing to its central location. Major declarations affecting the political landscape in the country have taken place in this park. Riots and protests also occur in the streets of Nairobi, in neighbourhoods and universities.

Immediately after the December 2007 disputed presidential election results were announced,[12] protests, riots and violence erupted not only in Nairobi, but also in many other parts of the country. There were street protests, blocking of roads, burning of property, stoning of vehicles, looting, ethnic victimisation, rape and even killing. Furthermore, people were displaced from their homes. In Nairobi, the riots, protests and violence took place on the major streets and roads and in low-income neighbourhoods, especially Kibera, Mathare and Dandora. For a very long time, Uhuru Park was permanently guarded by the police to prevent a major protest which had been planned to take place there. In some instances, residents of Kibera, Mathare and Dandora were barred from going to the city centre for fear of further riots and violence.

The effect of the post-election protests, riots and violence was not only felt at the city level, but also nationally and regionally. At the city level, many residents were displaced from their homes due to ethnic tension. Most of the displaced persons took refuge in Jamuhri Park (the showground) and Huruma Chief's Camp, where they stayed for several months, relying on food donations and other forms of help from the Red Cross Society of Kenya and well-wishers. Others retreated to their rural homes.

In the low-income neighbourhoods, several properties were destroyed. There was looting in the surrounding areas and business premises were burnt. For example, Toi, a popular informal market in Kibera, was burnt to ashes. Surprisingly, the CBD was relatively calm, except for businesses being closed. Business came to a standstill, the school calendar was disrupted, livelihoods were lost and the supply of food and other commodities was cut, leading to shortages and high prices. The same situation was experienced at the national level in farming, tourism, trade and commerce, noticeably affecting the economy. For a couple of weeks, neighbouring landlocked countries like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were cut off from their normal supplies via road and rail because the roads were blocked by protesters, and part of the Kenya-Uganda railway line was uprooted.

Conclusion

Nairobi has purely colonial origins that have shaped its structure and management to date. Despite city planning and management efforts, Nairobi's population will continue to grow, bringing inherent challenges. Notably, service delivery has been and continues to be a major concern in Nairobi. As much as this situation arises from the inability of the local government and authority to cope with the increasing urban population, it is at the same time related to the perennial problem of mismanagement of city affairs by those entrusted with the responsibility. It is an unhidden fact that the demand for urban services is far higher than the available supply. Faced with the problems of poor services, or lack of them in some areas, city residents have resorted to self-help efforts as a means of accessing such services as sanitation, water supply, refuse collection and security in their neighbourhoods. Participation and partnerships of all kinds have emerged to improve the urban environment – more often than not leading to new forms of urban governance. The need for Nairobi to be an *inclusive* and *sustainable* city is, therefore, an urgent priority, given the fact that cities worldwide are the main driving force in the global, national and local economy. In fact, the major challenge of the 21st century will be how to make cities more inclusive and sustainable. The concept forms a bridge between vision and action in the challenging task of transforming our cities. To make Nairobi inclusive and sustainable, there is a need for a radical change of mindset, new strategies and, finally – but crucially – new governance structures to support development and foster a new generation of urban leadership.

Notes

1 This section is partly based on Bocquier et al. (2009: 2–4).

2 Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2008. Nairobi Metro 2030: A vision for a world-class metropolis, first and foremost in Africa and the world.

3 Data from Global Urban Observatory, UN-HABITAT (2008). Accessed March 2011, http://www.unhabitat.org

4 The Kenyan population census reports no longer disaggregate population data by ethnic composition.

5 The dependency ratio is equal to the number of individuals aged below 15 or above 64 divided by the number of individuals aged 15 to 64, expressed as a percentage.

6 This section is partly based on Owuor (2006: 3–4).

7 The primacy index is the ratio of the population of the largest urban centre to the combined population of the next three largest urban centres.

8 This section is partly based on Mitullah (2003: 5–7).

9 In town, urban and county councils, the council chair takes charge.

10 Kamukunji is a Kiswahili connotation for an informal meeting. It is a widely used term in the universities and parliament when an informal meeting has to be called to address a pressing issue.

11 Kiswahili for 'seven seven' (meaning 7 July).

12 Both the PNU and ODM presidential candidates claimed that they had won the presidential elections.

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MAPUTO AND LUANDA



9 Maputo and Luanda

Paul Jenkins

This chapter examines two capital cities in lusophone Africa: Maputo, Mozambique, and Luanda, Angola, with a slight emphasis on the former. Despite undergoing initial mercantile and subsequent colonial exploitation by the same European power – Portugal – the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial contexts in these two cities all exhibit significant differences. Whether the similarities between them are greater than the dissimilarities – and the degree to which they also share similarities with other sub-Saharan cities – is difficult to assess given the great diversity across the macro-region (as this book illustrates). However, Maputo probably demonstrates more regional convergence with more sub-Saharan cities than Luanda at this time.[1]

Urban geology

Pre-colonial patterns of settlement

Human settlement has been identified in and around Maputo since the first century in the Common Era through archaeological remains. The site provided a mix of seafood gathering, hunting and eventually agricultural potential for early human settlement. This, however, was not permanent, and temporary settlement based on shifting cultivation techniques, including pastoralism, continued as the basic form of human settlement up to and through most of the European mercantile period, as evidenced by the earliest historical records from Portuguese explorers and shipwrecked mariners from the mid-16th century onwards. Luanda, on the other hand, did not benefit from the relatively consistent seasonal rain, as did Maputo in the south-east of the continent, and its hinterland was dry and semi-arid. However, the cold Benguela current provided an abundance of fish, and fishing communities and some salt panning were established around the bay in fairly permanent form by the time of the Portuguese arrival in the late 15th century.[2]

The Portuguese can be seen as heading the first major wave of globalisation. Although Italian city states had been engaging in overland trade with the east for some time, this was not as widespread in terms of geographic impact.[3] As part of this European mercantile expansion, Luanda (initially called São Paulo de Assunção) was founded in 1576 as a military requirement for Paulo Dias de Novais's 1571 concession of Angolan territory by the Portuguese crown (in a similar approach to that of the *capitanias* of early Brazil).[4] The small fortified trading settlement of Luanda (this name was adopted in the 17th century) grew slowly during the next three centuries as Portugal concentrated its efforts in Asia and South America.[5] Trade was mainly based on slaves, and the city became the main export port for slaves on the west coast of Africa for some time (Miller 1988). It remained, however, a fairly small settlement (from 400 inhabitants in 1621, it grew to only some 4 500 by 1810).

The fort dominated the bay on a promontory and was accompanied by other religious, military and administrative buildings in the Cidade Alta, whereas most of the housing and trading areas were on the lower beachfront in the Cidade Baixa, similar in urban form to contemporary Salvador de Bahia, where the majority of the slaves arrived.[6] However, Brazil's independence from Portugal in 1822 and the official ending of the slave trade in 1836 created an exodus of the European population from Luanda, which stagnated until the mid-19th century, when Portugal sought other forms of raw-material exploitation based on agricultural plantations in the hinterland plateaux.

In 1544, the Portuguese navigator Lourenço Marques had discovered what is now Maputo Bay, although no permanent settlement was created for the subsequent sporadic trade visits of the Portuguese to the indigenous inhabitants of the area. The significant indigenous residential groups in the region around the bay of Lourenço Marques (which Maputo was called until independence in 1975) not only traded with the Portuguese, but also the Dutch (established at the Cape of Good Hope from 1652), French and English.[7] The Portuguese subsequently founded their first settlement in 1752, but soon after also retreated north to their more established trading 'factories' at Inhambane, Sofala and Ilha de Moçambique. During this period, conflict between the various clan-based indigenous groups in the area and its hinterland continued to shift the indigenous human-settlement landscape, all based on shifting cultivation, but with a growing element of trade – initially predominantly ivory, although with a later introduction of slavery. Significant instability between the existing clans led to the formation of a more limited number of strong indigenous states, and territorial competition between the Portuguese, Boers and English underpinned the continued limited growth of the settlement.[8] In 1858, there were only some 900 inhabitants in the settlement and its direct sphere of influence probably did not extend more than 10 km.

The situation changed dramatically, however, when gold was discovered in the Boer Republics – first at Lydenburg in 1873 and then subsequently in the Witwatersrand in 1886. The gold rush that ensued led to fast-developing trade through the port of Lourenço Marques, especially after the construction of the railway link to Johannesburg towards the end of the century. This coincided with the Berlin Conference in 1884/5, called for by Portugal, which was increasingly concerned about the encroachment into territory it considered to be under its control in the continent's east (Mozambique) and west (Angola) – challenged by Britain in the former case and Belgium and Germany in the latter.[9]

The colonial legacy

Having established European recognition of its overseas territories, Portugal was obliged by the agreements to demonstrate control; economically, it also wanted to begin different forms of exploitation. After several failed attempts at planting sugar and cocoa inland from Luanda, eventually cotton and coffee met with some success – especially the latter – in the high plateau some distance inland. Whereas slave trading had depended on African kingdoms supplying slaves and Afro-Portuguese

trading elites to commercialise them (all taxed by the Portuguese crown), the new colonial economic developments were based on settlers, and required subjugation of the indigenous states – mainly the Mbundu in the inland plateau and the Kongo in the north – towards the end of the 19th century. Similar military campaigns were waged in the north and south of Mozambique, with the eventual subjugation of the Gaza state in 1895 being of significance for the emerging port of Lourenço Marques, which became the country's capital from 1896, owing to the changing economy and links with South Africa. In the latter part of the 19th century, Lourenço Marques expanded rapidly in demographic and territorial terms, with land speculation rife and a series of public buildings and infrastructure being installed.

Similar trends were in evidence in Luanda, and in both towns indigenous urban settlement was also beginning to take place on the peripheries – called *musseques* in Luanda, a term which derives from the red, sandy soil on the higher land where these informal areas were established. At this time, vagaries in the international commodity market led to a decline in Angola's emerging plantation economy and, with this, the fortunes of Luanda, which only picked up again after World War I. Lourenço Marques, on the other hand, grew in trading and transport importance, as well as through the contractual establishment of migrant labour for the mines of South Africa, which was generally administered through the town.

Importantly, both towns were also the main entry points for settlers emigrating from Portugal, generally in search of colonial plantation and small-holding developments, although a significant proportion remained in (or returned to) the towns as small traders. The growth of this European population led to increasing racial segregation in terms of access to jobs, education, etc., despite the struggle by previously established local mixed-race and indigenous elites to retain their social, economic and political positions. For the majority of the indigenous people of these countries, colonial subjugation led to enforced labour and cropping, as well as state taxation and a general undermining of their pre-colonial patterns of economic as well as political and social activity. The Portuguese state created local chiefs to administer the territory, and in large areas of Mozambique for several decades, also awarded administrative and judicial rights to large concession companies due to its weakness in effective colonisation.

This inner colonisation of society led to a dual urban form emerging in Lourenço Marques and Luanda, as various attempts to control indigenous labour were never adequately implemented. Both cities grew rapidly in the first half of the 20th century: Maputo up to 44 700 by 1940 and about 90 000 by 1950, some three-quarters of whom were of 'indigenous' status, mostly in the growing *caniço* informal settlements[10] to the north-west of the city centre. The population of Luanda grew to 50 000 by 1930 and 61 000 by 1940, with the majority of the growth being accommodated in *musseques* on the slopes above the city centre. World War II saw an economic boost for both countries, with a boom in coffee in Angola, as well as cotton, sisal and other exports in both countries – Mozambique's economy still being strongly linked to the industrialising Witwatersrand area. Limited industrialisation took

place in both Portuguese 'overseas territories' from the 1940s, mainly in the form of raw-material processing and some local production of consumer goods (food, beer, etc.). However, it was not until the change of foreign investment laws in Portugal, in a new political regime in the 1960s, that this began to have any marked effect. The late 1960s and early 1970s thus saw a new economic boom, similar to that in other newly independent neighbouring states, although Portugal was already having difficulty defending its colonies, both from the criticism of the international community and from internally created, but externally supported, independence movements.

The urban form produced in the colonial period was markedly dualistic, with the establishment of inner *cidades de cimento* – permanent buildings aligned along leafy boulevards in southern European style (in the Cidade Baixo and Cidade Alto), most clearly represented in the first modern urban plans from the middle of the 20th century (Jenkins 2006b) – surrounded by areas of informal settlements. These areas were predominantly occupied by indigenous and mixed-race populations, although a significant part of this was on formally registered land in the names of (mostly) European settlers who 'farmed' land and rental housing, as the indigenes did not have land rights.[11]

Infrastructure provision in the *musseques* in Luanda and the *caniço* in Lourenço Marques was minimal and overcrowding widespread. As the city populations expanded, these rings of informal settlement – which were largely ignored by the state in a laissez-faire attitude to urban planning and in-migration – eventually created difficulties for horizontal urban expansion, as did land speculation by the relatively small land-owning elite in both cities. The initial result was vertical expansion and densification in the inner cities – from the 1940s in the form of three-to-four-floor walk-up buildings, and from the 1960s with higher-rise developments with elevators. However, the urban expansion soon 'leapfrogged' the informal settlements into more peripheral land, with various urban boundary extensions and expropriation of indigenously controlled land for new developments. In Lourenço Marques this led to the creation of a new contiguous sister city (Matola) to the west, and in Luanda development pushed out along major access routes towards Viana (south-east) and Cacuaco (east). Much of the new permanent development was unauthorised or *clandestino*, as the state failed to keep up with the often frenetic pace of spurts of economic and physical development.

This form of urban development – mirroring that of Portugal – reflected weak government capacity to control land markets and produce urban plans with any realistic basis (Jenkins 2003a), as well as the limited nature of urban decentralised local government – all quite different from other colonial powers in the region. It also reflected tendencies in other realms of governance, where a pragmatic laissez-faire system tended to dominate practice, despite legislation. The laissez-faire approach had two sides, however – less formal control, but also more informal control. Thus, although the Portuguese state claimed its overseas territories were the most integrated in racial terms, compared with other colonies, social and economic discrimination was rife and repression continued long after other European powers

had adopted managed decolonisation processes. Also unlike other colonising powers, there was very limited engagement by the state in providing the indigenous population with schools, healthcare, infrastructure, etc. In the early 1970s, there was a realisation that this had now become necessary as part of the fight against liberation movements, and urban and rural areas were targeted by a late rush of new state investment. In Lourenço Marques this included new primary schools and water supplies being made available through the *caniço* peri-urban areas and some limited sites and services programmes being started, and there were similar activities in Luanda. This was, however, all too little, too late. It was, therefore, no wonder that the impact of struggles for liberation from colonial rule were so fierce and their effects so long lasting.

Post-independence urban policy and practice

Independence struggles by liberation movements were conducted rather differently in the two countries, although both were affected by the Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal in 1974. This was highly influenced by the liberation wars. At the time, around half of Portugal's GDP financed, and most of its armed forces were engaged in, the fighting in Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde (MacQueen 1997). Rather than a gradual, managed decolonisation process, Portugal instituted a more or less immediate withdrawal, leading to a massive exodus of settlers and those who saw no future in the independent African states generally flooding back to Portugal (and to neighbouring South Africa, in the case of Mozambique), accentuating the demand for rapid political change in the metropole.[12] However, whereas Eduardo Mondlane had managed to bring the various Mozambican liberation groups together in the united *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Front), in Angola each movement continued to fight for control of the new state. It was the Marxist *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) that won the struggle by capturing Luanda and gaining UN recognition, with a subsequent short period of relative peace in the late 1970s.

After some initial military and social turbulence around independence in 1975, Mozambique was able to enter a relatively peaceful period, although sporadic attacks from (then) Rhodesia developed in the centre of the country. Angola, however, staggered on with internal conflict which developed into full-scale civil war between the three main liberation movements, all with different international backing (and ethnic links – see below). In time, after Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, Mozambique also was subject to South African-backed involvement and a form of proxy civil war, and this affected development opportunities in the 1980s through to the peace settlement in 1992. Angola's return to internal war in 1981 was also the focus of a peace settlement brokered in the early 1990s, but the country reverted to civil war in 1992–1994, after the elections, and again in the late 1990s, and only established peace in 2002, a decade later than Mozambique. These internal wars were driven mainly by the Cold War in the 1980s, with different sides of the international

conflict supporting different internal groups. However, this ideological stance was also overlaid in Angola's case by the struggle to control the oil and diamond wealth, and after the end of the Cold War, this continued to be the main rationale and source of differential funding for conflict.

The lack of peace severely affected both countries' development opportunities and also urban development. In Angola, the war was generally based in rural areas, but most towns were also affected, with many being taken as military strongholds, only to be contested, sometimes various times, with disastrous physical and human destruction. The highly financed nature of the war led to Angola experiencing more set-piece battles with widespread use of heavy artillery and bombardment. The effect was the destruction of much of the built environment in many secondary cities and towns, and an increasing concentration of the population in Luanda, which grew vertiginously through the 1980s and 1990s (Jenkins 2003b). From 475 000 in 1970 (the last full census to date), with 44% of the population in *musseques*, the city grew to an estimated 2 million in 1995 and 3 million in 2000 (CEHS/DW 2005), representing some 20–25% of the national population and 60% of the urban population. Luanda's population was estimated to have grown to between 4.7 and 5.4 million by 2010 (Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002a).[13] The fact that oil was discovered offshore not long before independence led to the rapid development of exploitation, with no serious effect from the war – although the diamond region in the north-east was generally controlled by the opposition movement, UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The Angolan rural economy thus collapsed with no severe impact on the country's general wealth, which fuelled the war and vastly accelerated urbanisation.

In Mozambique, unlike Angola, the war was carried out mostly in rural areas, with only sporadic incursions into urban areas, which led to less concentration of the national population in Maputo in the far south, but also led to significant increased urban in-migration as rural development opportunities collapsed. This was due not only to the war, but also the exodus of skilled personnel and small-scale entrepreneurs (for example, most rural shopkeepers fled the countryside and many left the country); an over-reliance on large-scale state farms (taking over the mostly abandoned private-sector plantations); and a general lack of management skills and capital to continue supporting the existing agricultural production. Food security was hit by the collapse of the rural economy – be it plantation-based crops (as was the tendency in the centre of the country), small-scale farming and peasant cropping (in the north) or private sector farming (in the south) – and exacerbated by a series of droughts and floods, which affected the whole region.[14]

Whereas in-migration to urban areas had been controlled in a laissez-faire manner in the colonial period – especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as industries required labour and the state adopted a 'winning hearts and minds' approach – the independent government intrinsically applied no controls, which led to a surge of in-migration. By the first post-independence census in 1980, the (then combined) Maputo conurbation (renamed after independence and then including the sister

city, Matola) had reached some 755 000 – nearly 100% growth since 1970. By the 1997 census, the population of the combined cities (albeit once again separated administratively) was some 1.4 million, representing 9% of the total population and some 45% of the urban population nationwide. The city population was projected to rise to some 2.4 million by 2010, or approximately 12% of the projected national population (Jenkins 2000a).

While the general context of war/peace, and rural and other development options varied significantly between the countries in the post-independence period, the general attitude of the two governments to urban areas was somewhat similar. For instance, there was an implicit anti-urban bias in the dominant rural and agricultural development policies of Mozambique, made all the more explicit in the late 1980s with Operation Production, which tried to expel all 'parasitic' city dwellers from Maputo to spur on rural development in the least developed province of Niassa in the north-west. This had disastrous effects in social, economic and political terms[15] (Jenkins 2001b). In terms of official urban development, the Mozambican government developed some new towns for agro-industry and accepted it needed to complete unfinished buildings, mainly in Maputo. However, these generally became offices for the growing state bureaucracy.

Government housing activity was focused on nationalisation (including abandoned and rented housing and all land) and state rentals of housing. However, this policy only represented a very small proportion of the total stock, even in Maputo where it was concentrated, let alone nationwide. Some alternative housing and urban interventions were undertaken by the central government in Maputo with UN assistance (Jenkins 1990), but there was limited assistance for the new non-elected city executive councils, although some indirect support for basic urban interventions was possible (Jenkins 1998). This situation continued through to the late 1980s, when the UN and other international agencies renewed their engagement with Mozambique (which had recently signed the Inkomati Accord with South Africa) and the UN and the World Bank engaged with housing policy, urban programmes and pilot projects in Maputo and Beira (Jenkins 2000b; Jenkins & Smith 2002).

In Angola, the government had less of a rural-development focus in its policy, due both to the war and the oil revenues. However, government attitudes to, and action in, urban areas were similar to those in Mozambique. Here, however, not all land was nationalised, but significant land holdings of Portuguese settlers were confiscated, as was abandoned property, including housing, subsequently rented through a state housing agency (most of this occurring in Luanda). Cuban assistance led to the construction by the state of some medium-rise housing, but tiny in quantity in relation to demand in Luanda (similar to East German housing assistance in Maputo). Self-help construction in Angola was awarded some more attention with a new law in 1982, but again with so few resources in relation to demand that it soon collapsed. In 1987, the UN also assisted with a pilot project of *musseque* upgrading in Angola, again, however, with no replication or general policy acceptance – although its community-based activities in service provision were continued by a local NGO,

Development Workshop, with strong international agency connections (Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002a, b). The World Bank started some studies in the country in the early 1990s with a view to urban-rehabilitation projects (as it had undertaken in Mozambique), but pulled out along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The UN activities that continued were mainly focused on monitoring urban growth, with limited action on the ground.

Urban realities

Influence of international agencies

International agencies have played rather different roles in Angola and Mozambique. In the former, they have had a rather tenuous engagement, given the government's position on the war and the economy – and especially the lack of fiscal transparency (Hodges 2001). International agency activity in Angola has been predominantly dealing with humanitarian aid, although some development activities have been implemented in the periods of 'no-war, no-peace', as they are known locally. The end of the war has led to a deterioration of relations, with a stand-off between the government, the IMF and the World Bank; the UN was requested to close its humanitarian aid offices in the country in 2008.

In general, Angola's attitude is that it does not need international agency assistance, as it has booming oil – and other mineral – exports, especially sought by China. More important for Luanda are bilateral and private-sector engagements which affect the city, such as China's promise to build 250 000 housing units nationwide with 50% around Luanda (high-rise flats), or joint-venture programmes such as Luanda Sul, with Brazilian capital engaging in mostly luxury, gated condominium housing developments in the rapidly sprawling southern edge of the city. In addition, in recent years there has been an enormous boom in private-sector building activity, as well as state-sponsored major urban infrastructure projects. Other bilateral agencies have been active in promoting diversified rural development and basic services delivery, such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the British Department for International Development. These came together to help civil society and non-governmental organisations lobby during the unique opportunity for public comment on the proposed new land law for rural and urban areas (CEHS/DW 2005).

The influence of international agencies has been much more marked in Mozambique, where several multilateral and bilateral agencies have been active since independence and have made a significant impact, as the country has been heavily reliant on such assistance. This has been both in macroeconomic terms (e.g. humanitarian assistance in the floods and droughts, restructuring and debt relief) and policy development and investment, as private-sector investment has been limited and decreasing in impact – as is the case in most of the sub-Saharan African region (Jenkins, Smith & Wang 2006). Although the government's post-1992 new constitution opted not to denationalise land, long-term leasing arrangements permitted private-sector investment in rural development. However, in the 1990s, many multinationals

abandoned their agricultural activities in the semi-privatised plantations they took over with state partnership (e.g. Lonhro).

More recent inward foreign direct investment has been in mineral extraction, energy development and large-scale automated processing of basic minerals, such as aluminium. There has also been investment in tourism and a range of subsidiary secondary instruments facilitating economic activities such as banking and insurance. This has led to strong macroeconomic growth rates (relatively easy from such a very low starting position) and the country has been hailed as a success story by the World Bank and other international agencies. However, there is limited growth in employment and indeed a decrease in overall formal employment through privatisations and retrenchments in the formal sector (Hanlon & Smart 2008).

In Maputo, although the UN and the World Bank were active in urban development and housing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this changed with a shift in the focus of international agencies in the late 1990s towards supporting decentralisation and some urban management activities and minor pilot activities, mainly involving urban infrastructure and services (Jenkins 1998, 2000b; Jenkins & Smith 2004). However, the investment from international agencies in urban areas is minimal compared to rural areas – and minimal compared to the urban demand for services and, arguably, economic opportunity, which drives real (and generally 'informal') urban socio-economic life (Jenkins 2001a).

The impact of current globalisation

As can be seen from the above, the current phase of globalisation in the northern hemisphere (as opposed to the previous phases of mercantile expansion and colonial imperialism) has affected the two countries and capital cities in very different ways. Mozambique is still a relatively poor country in global terms, with a reliance predominantly on commodity exports (fishing and agriculture, and minerals and energy) for funding development, which is seen primarily as rural, despite a growing proportion of economic output becoming urban-based. Its economy is still closely tied to that of South Africa, especially in the southern part of the country, where Maputo lies and where economic development tends to be concentrated. Macroeconomic stabilisation has restricted the 'wild west' capitalism in the urban areas that was apparent in the immediate economic restructuring and liberalisation period of the early to mid-1990s. However, widespread development, especially in terms of employment, is limited. To date, globalisation has exacerbated socio-economic polarisation and has brought about the rise of a new wealthy economic elite joining the previous political elite, who have managed this transition quite easily. Despite this polarisation, widespread social unrest is tightly controlled, as will be discussed below.

In general, therefore, Mozambique has closely followed the advice and direction of the 'Washington consensus' and is not dissimilar to many sub-Saharan countries in its wider policy environment. Although urban growth is not as marked as in some other countries (e.g. Zambia), it is significant and becoming more so. Increasingly, the

proportion of the country's poor is shifting from rural to urban areas as in-migration continues, but, more importantly, natural demographic growth in urban areas accelerates differentially more than in rural areas, and poverty is only barely being held at bay. Some 60% of the urban population are still in absolute poverty and some 50% of the urban population are active in the informal sector, with much of this being economically marginal (Jenkins & Wilkinson 2002). New international and national investment is doing little to provide employment opportunities, and this is leading to growing crime and unrest as living costs rise, and possibly to a more overtly policed state.

The picture in Angola is rather different owing to its well-established petroleum and diamond exports, soon to be reinforced by other mineral extraction. The demand for these commodities – especially oil – is increasing at a time of uncertainty over world supplies. The main challenge for Angola will be how to use this high level of new income. To date, the political/military elite is firmly entrenching its position in the economy with limited opposition from others, as confirmed after the national elections in September 2008 and as government settled down to peacetime activity. The initial trend seems to be that this has led to accommodation among the contesting parties of the existing elite cadres, as opposed to access to power by new elites, as the political position of the latter does not represent the broader majority. It is estimated that at least 60% of Luanda's population is living in poverty, and some 55% of the workforce is engaged in the informal sector (Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002b). Angola's position of 'going it alone', in terms of the international agencies, may be dangerous when it comes to its evaluation of options, as these are chosen by existing power blocs, and the possibility of widespread economic diversification is unlikely, given these circumstances. Oil has been seen to be as much of a curse as a blessing in development terms for various countries.

Luanda thus presents an extremely polarised socio-economic profile with high and rapidly increasing urban poverty levels. Government's attitude to urban redevelopment is based on social exclusion, as the government assumes that the urban majority are war refugees and should 'return' to their places of origin, despite evidence that a growing proportion are urban-born and that those who are in-migrants have limited interest in relocating or options to do so (CEHS/DW 2005). Current urban development action in the capital is large scale, top-down and private-sector oriented (e.g. new housing developments, major infrastructure, new economic services, such as shopping malls, etc.). This clashes frequently with existing poor residents and those in the informal sector, whom government treats unfavourably in terms of human and other civil rights.

Both cities are clearly affected by the most recent wave of globalisation, and are to some extent the main points of its impact in these countries. Whereas previous global contact led to local/national political and economic change, with marked social and cultural impacts, the recent wave is also led by strong cultural penetration and associated social activity, as significant numbers of Mozambicans and Angolans engage with global culture. This is done via mass media – especially television, particularly *telenovelas* (TV 'soaps') from Portugal and Brazil, music videos via

MTV and the like, which have a major cultural impact on youth – and through wide social networking permitted by cellphones, and to a lesser extent, the Internet. It is, however, important to emphasise that all of these impacts are mitigated by the local dynamics – political, economic, social and cultural – to some extent through the structural peripherality of the majority, but also through proactive agency.[16]

The structure of housing delivery

In the above contexts, the vast majority of housing is delivered by so-called 'informal' household activity – that is, through land allocation or purchase and unauthorised 'self-help' (actually self-managed) building, or through the informal subdivision and rental of existing housing stock (Jenkins 2001a, 2001c, 2004, 2006a). In Maputo, since the liberalisation of housing in the early 1990s, more private investors have led to an upsurge of new upper middle-class housing in emerging suburban areas to the north and west, some in closed (gated) condominiums, with many funded through private rentals of privatised state housing in the inner city, and others through institutions such as state departments and international agencies. This previously pent-up demand seems to have stabilised, however, and there is now something of a hiatus in the formal-sector delivery of housing. This is particularly so for low- and middle-class housing, which requires housing finance mechanisms which are virtually non-existent. The financial sector is beginning to gear up to this, but the limited domestic savings do not provide an adequate base for widespread housing-finance schemes.

The state still directly and indirectly subsidises a very limited supply of housing for key workers, but most of the urban population have to fend for themselves. A significant proportion of the previously state-rented units were not privatised due to poverty, and these are declining into a state of dereliction. New land laws in the early 1990s seemed to provide an opportunity to upgrade and provide secure tenure for the urban majority in peri-urban 'informal' settlements, which probably represent more than 70% of housing stock. However, this process has been held up for a decade and a half through the insistence on new planning legislation – which, in effect, only postpones any responsibility by the state, in its limited capacity, to act. The lack of a clear urban policy undermines any attempts to develop a different vision for housing that would permit incremental upgrading through household investment, with land regularisation in parallel (Jenkins 2003a). Arguably, this is in the elite's interest, as speculation on urban land and housing is a key source of income (Jenkins 2009).

The situation in Luanda is not substantially different, although even more extreme. The formal sector is restarting its housing delivery for higher-income groups – pioneered by the Luanda Sul joint partnership mentioned above – but the demand for this is limited. Massive new state investment in housing production has been promised by the newly elected government, but is likely to be focused on relocation activities for new urban economic investments. Although the capacity of the state to subsidise such housing is much stronger, it is still small in relation to social need and effective economic demand. As with Mozambique, state housing stock has been

privatised since the early 1990s, but represents a relatively small proportion of the overall housing stock. The vast majority of urban dwellers will continue to fend for themselves against state interference in informal settlements, which can only proliferate no matter what the government does, given the extremely high urban-population growth rates. More than 75% of the population are already seen as residing within informal areas of one sort or another (including many areas existing from the colonial period), and informal rental housing is very widespread – probably more so than in Maputo (CEHS/DW 2005).

Luanda's much larger scale and the concentration of the national economy within the city will tend to lead to continued rapid growth, and Luanda is likely to fall into the category of 'mega-city' in the coming decade, similar to Lagos. Maputo's more limited population and economic base, however, will probably see the city expand in line with many other large sub-Saharan African cities, such as Dar es Salaam. Whether peace will bring a significant redistribution of the population from Luanda remains to be seen (there has still not been any post-war census, and the one now planned will only report in 2012), but the negative effects of globalisation on rural development in Mozambique seem to be promoting significant growth of secondary and tertiary urban areas, which will increase in the next decades. And this may also become a phenomenon in Angola: certainly, secondary urban areas like Huambo are (re)developing fast. However, without diversification of the economy and increasing employment options for the majority, the informal sector will still tend to concentrate in the capital cities for the foreseeable future, as globalisation also concentrates wealth and power in these cities.

The cities in their national fabric

Ethnic composition

The differences in ethnic composition of the two cities are largely due to their geographical location and pre-colonial indigenous occupation. However, in the case of Luanda, the ethnic composition is much more affected by the recent wars. Maputo is located near the extreme south of the country and has a significant level of ethnic homogeneity, with two major clan-based ethnic groups sharing a similar language and cultural base.[17] Apart from Portuguese settlers and a smaller contingent of other in-migrants,[18] the colonial period led to a more diverse indigenous population. This included a relatively small mixed-race population (which was considerably affected by the exodus around the time of independence) and the institution of migrant and forced labour, which led to various other groups from the southern part of the country passing through and often settling in the city. These included Tonga and Chopi groups from around Inhambane north of the Gaza empire.[19]

After independence, a wider range of Mozambican ethnic groups became represented in the capital, including a small but influential number of the northern Makonde people, as they had served as an initial point of support for the liberation war and many were involved in the armed forces. Other large (and nationally dominant) ethnic groups, such as the Yao and Macua (north) and the Sena and Shona (centre/

Zambezi Valley) peoples, continue to be, however, proportionally quite under-represented – both in the capital and among its political, economic and social elites. The initial post-independence period also saw the exodus of most of the Portuguese and an influx of other nationalities to support the new government. The latter included fairly large groups of Tanzanians, exiles/liberation fighters from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa, and Soviet Bloc, Cuban and other politically motivated *cooperantes* from around the world.[20]

The more recent post-independent Mozambican governments have deliberately attempted to create a more balanced ethnic (and gender) composition, but there is still a tendency for the dominant Frelimo government to be composed of people from the south (especially Changaan) or some of the historically supportive peoples in the north (e.g. Makonde). The initial attacks from Rhodesia led to the funding of armed opposition groups taken over by South Africa, which based themselves largely in the centre of the country. Hence there is a tendency for the Sena/Shona people to support the opposition party, Renamo, which was created as part of the early 1990s peace settlement, and there is a more general disaffection with the Frelimo-led government by other northern ethnic groups, such as the Macua. However, no clear regional-based ethnic politics has emerged at national level other than Renamo's tendency for support.[21]

Luanda, as noted above, had a very small indigenous population that only began to grow with the colonial development programmes of the early 20th century, and as such is much more ethnically diverse than Maputo. Apart from the Portuguese settlers (the majority of whom left around independence) and a relatively small but historically influential mixed-race population, the indigenous population is predominantly made up of people from the Kimbundu, Ovimbundu and BaKongo ethnic groups. The Kimbundu are a large ethnic group accounting for some 25% of the total Angolan population, living in the eastern hinterland areas of Luanda. (The country's name derives from the head of the Mbundu kingdom, the N'gola.) The Kimbundu have been migrating from the rural to the urban areas of Luanda and Malanje since the 1960s. The Kimbundu were aligned with the MPLA party, which won the independence struggle for control and has dominated government since. The Ovimbundu, from the highland plateau of the centre of the country, are the largest ethnic group in Angola, making up some 37% of the country's population. They were linked to the UNITA liberation and rebel faction, which now is in political opposition as part of the peace settlement of 2002. Many Ovimbundu fled to Luanda during the war, as the towns in their homeland (especially Huambo and Kuito) were heavily involved in military conflict, and there are significant numbers of them in the capital. The BaKongo originated in the ancient kingdom of the Kongo in the north of Angola (and across the Congo river) and represent some 14% of the national population. This ethnic group was aligned with the FNLA liberation movement (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* – National Front for the Liberation of Angola), supported by the US, China and Zaire, losing out, however, in the armed struggle. The FNLA became a political party before the 1992 national elections, in which it won some seats, but the parliament never sat as a result of UNITA's pulling

out and returning to war. The BaKongo are very influential in the commercial sector in Luanda. Despite the different alignments in liberation movements and the war, there seems to be little overt inter-ethnic rivalry in Luanda, and limited ethnic segregation in territorial occupation across the city.

Maputo also has limited ethnic polarisation in physical terms, with only a few *bairros* (neighbourhoods) with any historical ethnic links (e.g. Mafalala and the Macua minority). Although the nature of the political dispensation in Mozambique means that any ethnic tension is more likely to be played out in wider geographic terms – for example, opposition parties based in different city governments (and maybe even provinces when provincial governments become elected) – the situation is both reasonably open (e.g. fairly transparent election processes), yet at the same time, carefully stage-managed by the government (e.g. the level of decentralisation of power permitted to municipalities). As such, the impact of inter-ethnic friction on politics in Angola and Luanda is much more difficult to predict, as there has been little democratic opportunity (the first elections since 1992 were in 2008 and there was no strong opposition presence). However, there is a much stronger history of ethnic division – perhaps one of the reasons for the extremely hesitant moves to any form of political opening.

National cultural image of the capitals

The image of the city in Mozambique and Angola – as argued above – has been affected by the highly dependent nature of political and economic development predicated initially on a weak colonising power with limited traditions of managing urban development, and the dynamics of the geopolitical contexts for urban development. Hence, in the colonial period, cities were seen as the location of the political and economic settler elite and designed in a southern European style, culturally linking power and dominant values to urbanism – and effectively excluding the indigenous population from such opportunity, albeit informally via laissez-faire policies. Although the fascist colonial government espoused rural development and the concept of the noble rural worker, it celebrated the urban milieu for the 'civilised' – as evidenced in its grandiose, but economically and socially impractical, urban plans (Jenkins 2006b), which were very different from the explicitly segregated, pragmatic urban planning of the anglophone colonies in the continent. This radically changed with the coming to power of the liberation army elites, indoctrinated in Soviet, Chinese and Cuban approaches, which saw the cities as essentially parasitic on rural society, and made policy decisions which reinforced these values. However, this did not undermine their reliance on urban economies and societies for their support, especially those of the capital cities and their hinterlands. Hence, while instigating anti-urban policies, the administrations accepted the need to keep urban populations relatively content – for example, through food rationing and imports.

These images of the city have been expressed in cultural artefacts such as architecture, street nomenclature, monuments and public art. Up to independence, public art was predominantly in the form of statues (except for a few murals in public buildings).

In both cities, most of the classical Portuguese hero statues were pulled down, unceremoniously dumped and replaced with political figures – and in Luanda, with statues of indigenous heroes of resistance to colonial domination (Figure 9.1). In the post-independence period, Communist-style murals and wall paintings also appeared, notably at the Heroes Place near Maputo Airport, with its sinuous Latin American-style mural depicting the struggle for independence. Road nomenclature changed various times in both cities, including with regime change during the colonial period, but, ironically, with capitalism, roads named after socialist heroes, such as Karl Marx, have been retained.[22]

As regards architecture, the earlier fascist colonial state in both countries opted for neoclassicism in general, albeit in a rather florid (almost baroque) form – although art deco also made its mark in architecture (especially in 1930s–1940s residential and commercial buildings). However, the economic acceleration process in the late 1960s permitted a new modernism to develop, which oscillated between the formal Modern Movement, associated with the state (see Figure 9.3), and more plastic versions of this, such as that of the renowned architect Pancho Guedes – associated with private architecture (see Figures 9.2 and 9.4).[23] Post-independence architecture became both more monumental and more utilitarian. New buildings were initially developed for functional reasons, often entailing the completion of buildings left unfinished and abandoned in the hasty decolonisation process. New residential architecture of the immediate post-independence period reflected the Communist Bloc assistance, with distinctive Russian, Cuban and East German influences. In both cities in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new parliamentary and other government buildings were produced with more architectural investment, usually following late Modern Movement styles. In Maputo, the 1990s peace and capitalist orientation led to a flurry of new residential architecture for the upper middle class, and the development of Luanda Sul in Luanda, arguably dominated by overdesigned postmodernism.

Sites of power and counter-power[24]

Manifestations of power

The city as a site of power is manifested by the dominant power structures in the region and those outside of the region that impinge on it. Thus, in the pre-colonial period, the capital cities of both countries (at the time, small towns) were the physical manifestation of the mercantilism which created them as settlements, and were dominated by foreign interests. Power was contested between different foreign groups, with no clear hegemony, albeit with different manifestations of power. In Maputo (Lourenço Marques), there were initial struggles between European powers for control of trade and the indigenous groups of the hinterland. Eventually Portuguese dominance was established, but in a relatively limited territory outside of which indigenous groups also competed for control of the new trade opportunities.

The Portuguese dominance was further challenged externally by the new Boer

states and the British, leading to the colonial settlement, and internally by the local mixed-race elites that brought foreign and local power bases together. The prevailing need to retain territorial dominance through the race for colonial control, and the success in international agreements in this area, led to the relatively weak Portuguese state confronting the rural indigenous groups outside the urban areas, and semi-indigenous elites within the urban areas, and subordinating their powers – politically, militarily, economically and socially. Culturally, however, there was less domination, and cultural expression became an important channel for the contestation of power through, for example, song and dance, even within the core of colonial control, both urban and rural (Penvenne 1994).

This colonial hegemony was maintained in Mozambique not only through internal social engineering – that is, settler in-migration with limited *de jure* and extensive de facto segregation of social and economic opportunity – but also through external subordination of the colonial state to the regional economy of South Africa (especially migrant labour and transport services) and the wider world, through export commodity plantation trade. The main challenges to colonial power came externally, with pressure to modernise the economy in the later European industrial period, and engage with managed decolonisation (as other European powers had instituted after World War II). However, internally, a parallel and linked influence was the growing consciousness of the indigenous population in terms of education and politics. Education was often based on non-state schools, such as mission schools, and there was also growing worker resistance in urban areas (Cruz e Silva 2001; Penvenne 1994). International support for the struggle for independence was crucial, but more so was the collapse of the Portuguese state, and the new post-independence political elite that emerged was rooted psychologically in a rural, rather than urban, milieu, as noted above, and a proto-socialist hegemony.

Resistance to the new political dispensation came, as before, from outside (e.g. Rhodesia and South Africa, with US backing) and from within – in rural areas ,from ethnic groups disposed to assist the Renamo party, but also eventually from growing urban dissatisfaction. This urban dissatisfaction was allayed initially through state rationing, but came to a head through actions like Operation Production in Mozambique. The main opposition power bases, however, remained rural throughout the civil war. The peace settlement brought some of this into the political domain, and was of a predominantly urban expression (as municipalities represented the only alternative to first-past-the-post national elections). However, the main players in the power contestation in the country remained the previous political elite in the ruling party, Frelimo, who managed to survive the transition to a great extent by extending their economic and political control to the new capitalist-oriented, multi-democratic regime. Manifestations of power in this period continued to be mainly rural (e.g. in policy and electoral mobilisation), despite the growth of importance of urban economic functions. The development policy that followed, largely a result of structural adjustment, was centred on rural development and the export of primary commodities. There were also other limited activities (e.g. largely automated industrial transformation of these commodities).

In all of this history, power has been increasingly manifested through forms of centralised authority – the indigenous states' control of pre-colonial trade; the colonial settler-oriented export economy; the post-independence proto-socialist 'counter-dependency' experiment; and the post-war liberal democracy, with its reversion to export-led economic growth and continued anti-urban bias.[25] Manifestation of power in the city of Maputo has, therefore, passed through forms of central political, military and economic control. The fact that the majority of the urban inhabitants have limited engagement with this power in their daily lives and work has led to widespread 'exit' strategies, as opposed to 'voice', and a parallel, subaltern manifestation of this through cultural expression.

Channels for protest

Channels of protest against the colonial and postcolonial dominance of centralised control in Mozambique have been generally through non-engagement, with only a small minority engaged in direct protest. In the colonial period, state repression led to most direct protests being based outside the country, and although this is less the case in the post-independence period, nevertheless it is still only a minority who raise their voice in protest – for example, through independent local news-sheets, and sometimes with severe consequences, notably the murder of independent journalist and publisher Carlos Cardoso.

During the colonial period, organisations within civil society were deliberately restricted by the state, which exerted strong controls over the religious and recreational associations that were permitted to form. In the immediate postcolonial period, these controls, if anything, were extended through state- and party-based organisations for youth, workers, women, journalists, etc., and dissent was similarly dealt with in a summary manner. This has led to a reliance of horizontal forms of organisation within society based on kinship and proto-kinship mechanisms (Lundin 1991), which essentially have their roots in the pre-colonial period. However, the impact of the civil war and structural adjustment, with their associated urbanisation and informalisation, has led to challenges to such mechanisms – basically the transfer of emphasis from kin to proto-kin, and a much more flexible approach to reciprocity in social relations. Associational life has become much freer in this latter post-independence period, and this has also been part of the wider picture of redistributive socio-economic activity, especially through the widespread growth of churches, mostly the Pentecostal and syncretic forms, which, arguably, are taking over this role from traditional clan structures. However, these rarely provide channels for protest and the kinship and proto-kinship mechanisms are vehicles for 'exit strategy' survival rather than direct contestation through 'voice'.

Consequently, there are few explicit channels for social protest in Mozambican society. However, as in previous periods, culturally embedded forms of protest continue their subaltern role, especially music, with rap becoming a vehicle of more explicit expression in recent times. However, such expression has to follow a fine line between protest and engagement, as the authorities can control its more

public expression (e.g. radio and television access). This tends to reinforce the self-containment of protest, leading to occasional flashpoints when this breaks down, with what seems fairly random and excessive violence on both sides – on the part of the protesters, but especially the state's reaction.

Sites of explicit protest

Explicit protest is generally urban in location, but does not only happen in the capital, Maputo. Protest occurs with more formal political intent through protest marches in some of the opposition-dominated cities, such as in the centre and north of the country. Reaction by the state authorities to most cases of explicit protest has been swift and brutal.[26] However, there have been two main sites of protest in Maputo against the last two political regimes, generally in the city streets, but taking different forms. One which has recurred is organised by Mozambicans who had once been young migrant workers in the now defunct German Democratic Republic. They were recruited by the German government and repatriated suddenly with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many of these *madjermanos*, as they are known, have had difficulty in reintegrating and adapting to the lack of formal-sector opportunities, and have demonstrated various times to be repaid the portions of their salaries that were paid to the government by Germany. A settlement was reached in late 2005, but sporadic demonstrations continue, the most recent of which was in March 2008.[27] These protests are organised and take place in the city centre and involve the collective invasion of government offices.

Another series of protests, less organised, but also involving a specific group, were arranged by those who were maimed in the civil war and who have protested in the city centre and other locations on various occasions about pensions and other state benefits, such as access to housing plots. These protests have often been violent and generally more or less spontaneous (e.g. in Matola in 2004). A different form of spontaneous protest was witnessed in February 2008 – riots in reaction to the government's fuel hike, affecting all minibus public transport in the city. These disturbances effectively closed down transport around the city – mainly at key access points between the peri-urban and central city areas, that is, outside the city centre. These protests were seemingly disorganised and effected mainly by young people, with some violence and destruction of property – especially to vehicles. This form of 'pent-up' social outburst has happened a few times before over other price rises, and in all cases the state's reactions have been severe.

This was evidenced again in early September 2010 when the central city area was effectively closed off by rioting mobs for three days of protest (and associated looting) over proposed rises in minibus-taxi fares and basic food prices. The protests were organised by cellphone text messages, and mostly involved youth. Eventually calm and order were restored with a considerable level of force. Soon after, the government announced continued subsidisation of these basic necessities. However, for how long is still unclear.

A key concern in Mozambique is that young people, already challenged by difficult access to education – and even more so, formal-sector employment (with informal employment becoming increasingly saturated in the urban economy) – and increasingly socially alienated in family networks which struggle to survive with the high dependency rates, will take the existing implicit subaltern forms of culturally based protest to the streets in explicit ways, albeit with limited organisation and/or objectives. In this situation, although deeply felt social concern may find some form of outlet, the opportunity for such 'voice' to have any impact is usually lost owing to repressive reaction. However, with few other options for voicing themselves, this may well be the tendency in future. As argued elsewhere,[28] there is an urgent need to integrate cultural issues with development strategies in less instrumental ways (e.g. not just advertising HIV/AIDS avoidance practices) in order to permit the youth, who represent a significant proportion of the national and urban population, a channel for expression which may well challenge the established order. Whether the current political regime feels itself sufficiently secure to permit this, or whether this would be seen as legitimate by wider society, is something that urgently needs to be explored.

Conclusion

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Maputo and Luanda have distinct similarities due mainly to their mercantile and colonial pasts and initial postcolonial trajectories, and in this they also display structural differences from other sub-Saharan African capitals. The most obvious facets of similarity were weak colonial development and laissez-faire attitudes to urban development. Another key aspect of similarity is the evolution and current nature of the national state. Although the implementation of democratic representative elections in Angola was very recent (2008) compared with the past 14 years of such in Mozambique, both countries remain dominated by the initial, single, post-independence parties, and political opposition is weak and divided.

However, there are also significant differences between the capital cities, which derive initially from the pre-colonial context and underpin issues such as ethnic structure and even patterns of governance, and hence may have greater influence in the future. The nature of the immediate postcolonial conflicts led to increasing structural divergence, as have development options, and the social and economic impact of the more recent form of globalisation has a tendency to lead to even more divergence. A key aspect of the difference between these capital cities lies in the decentralisation of government. In 2008, Mozambique held its third successful autonomous local government elections and decentralisation is taking effect, albeit slowly,[29] including a few municipalities where opposition parties have power. However, Angola is only just beginning to move in this direction. One effect of this, however, is that Greater Maputo has problems of urban management stretching across two autonomous municipalities and two districts, subordinated to a province, whereas the whole of Luanda is governed as a province.

Within this context, the main national issue facing Mozambique is its relatively weak economic position and the choice between economic growth led by foreign direct investment – typically in mining, energy and possibly tourism and agriculture – and the need to create higher employment in rapidly growing urban areas, as well as rural. To date, urban areas in Mozambique remain low in terms of government policy priorities, yet they account for ever more of the population and provide real economic activity – Maputo being the main, but not exclusive, focus. Angola, on the other hand, has strong exports and capacity to invest, but the longer war in that country and higher levels of urban concentration will lead to difficult decisions on investment locations and target populations. With a significant proportion of the national population living in the capital it is inevitable this will be a prime site for public, private and individual investment, and thus may limit the extent to which the country can widen its longer-term economic development options. What is clear in both cities is that they will continue to play highly important roles in national political, economic, social and cultural life, as well as providing possible international linkages.

Although both capital cities continue to dominate the urban systems in each country, this domination is much more marked in Angola, as Luanda is many times the size of the second largest urban area. In the absence of more accurate data, this is generally considered to be Benguela, on the central south coast. In 2010, Luanda's population was certainly more than 5 million and maybe as high as 7 million, with Benguela's population probably still around a tenth of this.[30] The main urban areas of Angola remain the coastal ports (Benguela, Lobito, Namibe, Cabinda), although inland trading and administrative centres, such as Lubango and Huambo, are also rapidly expanding.[31] Although estimates that put one-third of Angolans in the capital are probably excessive, Luanda clearly dominates national political and economic life, although this is likely to change as the country invests in development.

In Mozambique, Maputo also dominates the urban system, but in a much more qualified way. Maputo and Matola, as a conurbation, had a combined official total of 1.77 million inhabitants in the 2007 census. This compares with the next largest cities' populations: Beira (436 000), Chimoio (239 000) and Nampula (236 000), making Maputo four times the size of the second largest city.[32] Although Mozambique's port cities continue to play their important historical role (e.g. Maputo/Matola, Inhambane/Maxixe, Beira, Quelimane, Pemba), according to recent observation, inland cities are now emerging as some of the fastest growing as the country nears its third decade of peacetime. These include Chimoio, Nampula and Tete. This seems driven by different factors – Chimoio, possibly by the problems in neighbouring Zimbabwe; Tete, as a result of large-scale foreign investment in mining and a new dam across the Zambezi; but also internal economic growth in agriculture and services, in the case of Nampula. Again, as argued above, Mozambique probably mirrors most sub-Saharan African countries in the development of secondary urban areas, whereas Angola may follow other petroleum-export-dominated states with continued high urban system differentiation. Nevertheless, in both countries, the capital is the centre for political and economic power and often of social and cultural change.

Given the tendency towards divergence in urban development, the extent to which colonialism is a useful reference point for understanding the longer-term trajectories of cities in the macro-region is questionable, and hence a 'postcolonial' structural analytical framework is inadequate. However, as with 'postmodernism', scholars are rather at a loss for an alternative, as they are with the much criticised analytical framework of 'formal/informal' urban milieux (Jenkins 2004). What seems to be needed is a new set of reference points for understanding what is – and can be – 'urban' in such a context, that is, new forms of emerging cities which avoid postcolonial and informal analysis.

As African countries enter into the major demographic change of urbanisation, they are doing so in uniquely economically challenged contexts. However, the frames of reference which tend to permeate urban studies are essentially still derived from the European experiences of early urbanisation and, as such, need to be substituted. One challenge to the development of such an analytical understanding of sub-Saharan Africa is the relatively weak 'intellectual superstructure' of the macro-region, with economies restricting higher education and indigenous research institutions, as well as other endogenous research traditions – hence the dominance of exogenous research. Particularly problematic in this respect is the tendency for limited fundamental research funding by international agencies – a classic example of this being the contemporary focus on 'best practices' (Jenkins & Smith 2004). As such, a significant portion of research undertaken in the region is still resourced by external agencies, and academic institutions (both internal and external) often become aligned with the form of limited self-critical research which pervades international agencies, due to lack of alternative funding sources. We thus see cities through lenses which have limited analytical power to challenge preconceptions, and our disciplinary traditions in academic circles limit this even more to 'monofocal' vision.

For urban research to have more significance, what is needed, arguably, is a trans-disciplinary inductive approach embedded in and arising from the African urban milieu, and not the deductive (and often reductive) approaches of urban research and studies which produce lists of worthy, normative exhortations, or meta-theoretical analysis which has little bearing on realpolitik or engagement with a contextually embedded, socio-economic and cultural understanding of African cities (Jenkins 2009). This is not to argue that African cities – or countries for that matter – can develop in isolation from global influences, but that they need to be understood, and proactively develop their own 'spaces' for agency, within such structural parameters, in a less externally conditioned manner – including intellectually. In doing so, however, researchers also must avoid the trap of associating the endogenous with the indigenous.

Notes

1 This chapter is based on extensive research and work in Maputo since 1980, with more limited experience in Luanda, especially during the past seven years, and draws on a series of previously published studies, particularly two city profiles – Jenkins 2000a; Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002a, and a more detailed research paper on Maputo (Jenkins 1999), which themselves draw on myriad sources.

2 The Portuguese also tried to take over the important salt mines in the hinterland of the River Kwanza south of Luanda, but the indigenous interior states, for which this was an important trade item, successfully resisted (Birmingham 1999).

3 From a non-European standpoint, China was an earlier globalising state.

4 *Capitanias* were a feudal form of territorial allocation by the crown to Portuguese nobles, with conditions for protection and development. The city of Salvador de Bahia was founded in 1546 as one of the earliest similar forms of such fortified settlements in Brazil (Jenkins 2010).

5 For most of the first century of engagement in Angola, the Portuguese merchant adventurers concentrated their efforts on engaging in trade with (and trying to dominate) the relatively centralised Kongo kingdom, based at Mbanza Kongo (also known as São Salvador) in contemporary central north Angola (Birmingham 1999). In this, their approach was initially similar to mercantilist engagement in West Africa, which led to a different colonial form. However, Angola eventually developed the settler form of colonialism more prevalent in central, eastern and southern Africa.

6 Unlike the Spanish, the Portuguese did not adopt a rigid gridiron urban pattern, but developed more 'organic' urban forms, albeit determined by the three main 'powers': the military, the administration and the church.

7 The Dutch were in fact the first to try to occupy the bay, with a fortified outpost in 1721; they retreated in 1730.

8 During the first half of the 19th century, there were major changes in the political structure of the hinterland of the Lourenço Marques settlement, with the formation of strong militaristic Nguni states (Zulu, Swazi and Gaza), and a series of wars led to widespread displacements of the indigenous population, known as the Mfecane. In the 1840s, further disruption was caused by Boers trekking from the Cape, creating new states in the high interior plateau at Lydenburg and Zoutspansberg and trying to claim territory as near as 10 km from Lourenço Marques. Portugal finally negotiated the border with the Boer states in 1871, and subsequently with the British, who sought expansion north from their base in Port Natal (now Durban) in 1875. However, the range of influence of the Portuguese settlement was much smaller, given the establishment of strong indigenous states in Swaziland (west) and Gaza (north), each with their own spheres of influence.

9 Ironically, it was Britain's support which helped Portugal fend off most (but not all) of the challenges to the north and south of Angola, while undermining Portugal's attempt to link across the continent.

10 *Caniço* means cane, or reed, with which most houses were built. These were either rented – or built on land rented – from Portuguese settlers, although outside the city administrative limit, local chiefs allocated land to incomers, also for a fee, permitting peri-urban settlement.

11 Some mixed-race and *assimilado* land holders also engaged in this practice.

12 An estimated 200 000 people left Angola, and between 100 000 and 200 000 left Mozambique in this period.

13 If UN urban growth projections turn out to be correct, with 44% of the national population being urban by 2015 and 53% by 2030, Luanda could come to represent one-third of the national population by 2010.

14 Abrahamsson & Nilsson (1995) provide a good analysis of Mozambique's transition from colonial fascism, through proto-socialism to liberal capitalism.

15 In social terms, many transferred people died, and of those who survived, few returned. In economic terms, the national airline was made virtually bankrupt and the influx into Niassa just drove demand and not supply. In political terms, although the overt reaction was muted, it deterred many from supporting the government.

16 For an analysis of how local context and agency affect structural engagement with wider political and economic forces on urban land, see Jenkins 2009.

17 These included the longer-resident Ronga in the immediate bay hinterland and the mid-19th-century ingress of Nguni-originated Changaan (or Tsonga) based in the Gaza empire (now Province) to the immediate north.

18 Other in-migrants included the British, because of the port and railways, and some Chinese, Indian and Pakistani indentured labour.

19 In addition to ethnic classifications, the Portuguese state created the *assimilado* position for those of indigenous origin who proved themselves adequate as colonial subalterns through various forms of social assessment.

20 Although many of these subsequently left in the early 1990s with the changing geopolitics in the region, some remained as long-term residents.

21 The local government elections in November 2008 had a large turnout, but opposition parties lost ground and very few local governments were elected other than Frelimo.

22 The American School is situated on Av Karl Marx in Maputo.

23 Guedes left Mozambique at independence to teach at Wits University in Johannesburg, but, ironically, remains the best-known Mozambican architect outside the country.

24 This section focuses on Maputo, as the author has more direct personal experience of work and wider social life in Mozambique, on which this discussion draws to some extent.

25 Jenkins (2008) reviews this with reference to land access in Maputo throughout historical and contemporary periods. For analyses of the 'construction' of the new state and economy, see Alden (2001), Pitcher 2002 and Sitoe 2003.

26 For instance, the imprisonment of 96 people in a small cell in the northern town of Montepuez in late 2000 after an opposition-party protest rally, when 75 subsequently died of suffocation.

27 This entailed some 16 000 former workers being paid an average of $3 000 each, staggered over a period. The 2008 protests were related to a breakaway group from that which negotiated this settlement.

28 Challenges of urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa. Invited address by the author at the African Issues Symposium on AIDS, War and Urbanisation – African youth under pressure, International Development Centre, Open University, April 2008.

29 Mozambique is also moving towards some form of elected provincial government.

30 In 2003, the population of Luanda was estimated at more than 3 million, and three growth scenarios showed its population growing to 4.8 million (low projection), 5.5 million (medium projection) and 7 million (high projection). At that time, Benguela and Lobito had some 450 000 and Huambo some 250 000 inhabitants (CEHS/DW 2005).

31 The 2010 African Cup of Nations football tournament, hosted in Angola, hosted games in Luanda, Benguela, Cabinda and Lubango.

32 The National Census Institute has provided the urban populations of the provincial capitals; there are now officially 43 autonomous urban local governments, most of which are smaller than the provincial capitals, however.

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SOUTH AFRICAN CAPITAL CITIES

10 South African capital cities

Alan Mabin[1]

Even if many elements of South African society continue relatively unchanged since the demise of apartheid – with continuing social segregation in much of private life, huge disparities in wealth and a persistent broadly racial income distribution – it would be difficult to gainsay the enormity of changes in government. A thoroughly democratic constitution, disappearance of the bantustans which feigned separate government in fragments of the country, massive participation of the 'rainbow nation' in national and local elections, a peaceful succession of black presidents in the once white-minority-ruled state and vast personnel changes in administration: all these and more symbols of new forms of government, citizenship and power have become the norm.

Intriguingly, however, *where* formal political power is exercised at the national level appears at first sight little changed since the first democratic elections of 1994:

> [When] the presidential inauguration of 1994…took place at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, home to successive South African governments for most of this century, and an architectural symbol of white rule… Afrikaans poets shared the stage with African gumboot dancers, while above, apartheid-era military jets swooped past, sketching out in the clear blue sky the new colours of the post-apartheid South African flag. (Silverman & Low 1998: 20)

There seems to be very little interest in the literature to date in the question of *where* state power is exercised in South Africa, and the implications as well as the framing of this 'whereness'. The subtitle of Gill Hart's (2002) book, *Places of power in post-apartheid South Africa*, may imply exploration of the subject, but in fact – and typically of the recent urban, regional and spatial literature, as well as the more political and sociological – her book addresses something else entirely – in this case, the industrial periphery.

Acknowledged universally as unusual in its division of the usual functions of a national capital city among several distant centres, South Africa has different legislative, executive and judicial capitals (usually named as Cape Town, Pretoria and Bloemfontein, respectively). The major theme of this chapter is the question of why South African democracy has continued the complexity of its multiple capitals and, in so doing, what has it made of them? First, the chapter traces some potential parallels between South Africa's capital situation and those of other countries. Then the author poses the obvious dual question: why does South Africa have such a profusion of capitals, and what are the effects of this state of affairs? As the most important site of state political power in South Africa, and given its official status as

executive capital, it is necessary to treat Pretoria in more detail: the third and major section of the chapter does this. What is Pretoria today as the seat of executive and administrative government? What has shaped its form and its representations of power? What is happening to the city currently as a place of government? And how can Pretoria be situated and understood in relation to the other sites of political power, formal and informal, in South Africa today? The chapter concludes by examining some unresolved questions about the nation in South Africa and its implications for the capital city debate.

What parallels to South African capitals?

The South African capital city phenomenon is no different at one level from other countries: 'Almost all social action…takes place somewhere, in some local setting. Capital cities are settings of power, exercise and contest, truly "landscapes of power"', notes Therborn (2006: 520). The concentration of politicians and others associated with power in government in capital cities seems to create a special case of the importance of place. 'Virtual government' is hardly a reality in present society.[2] As seats of power, capital cities owe their site to the spatiality of power. Surely it is because of the existence of *alternative* possibilities for the physical location of the activities of government and the surrounding politics that the sites of capitals have been disputed and at times changed? It is often supposed that place, in addition to being shaped by actors, is also to some extent significant in moulding the actors. This idea is developed in various sources (cf. Cox 2001). The question here is whether the sense that a capital city may sometimes be critical in shaping the political and other actors of government – in Tbilisi for example (Therborn 2007) – can be generalised. Were the sole capital of South Africa Pretoria, with no national government activity in Cape Town, I imagine that the nature of government would be different and the interactions of actors would be different. I imagine that if all capital functions moved to Johannesburg from Pretoria, the nature of government might change owing to the changed range of social interactions in which political actors engaged. It is not possible to research counterfactuals, but it may be possible to explore some of the effects of locating the capital and other political matters in several places, which is certainly the South African case. Thus, this chapter necessarily engages with the issues which arise from the multiplicity of its capitals.

In addition to this general question of the consequences of particular sites for capitals, there are three particular features of South Africa which impinge on discussion of the capital question: that of dramatic political change; the setting of the African continent, a site of centuries of slaving and colonising, with the later shift to the creation of new, independent states in the 20th century; and the fact that South Africa's overarching colonial past has parallels with many other British colonial territories. All three comparisons raise issues pertinent to the sites of political power in South Africa.

Firstly, the spatial question after momentous change occurs in the structure of the state and even the territory of a country. Revolutions can see the transfer of

the capital from one city to another: Russia comes to mind. Debate over the site of government in reunited Germany provides a useful set of areas of inquiry into the capital city question in South Africa. Are all major functions of government to be headquartered in the same city? Or is there reason to place some functions – a constitutional court, in the case of the German (or Georgian, or Czech) example – away from legislative or executive centres? Does the capital imply something larger than the country itself – an attempt to create a continental, as well as a national, base? What are the costs? And how does government choose to represent itself, the idea of the nation and its place in the world – through architecture, memorials and other imagery, especially in the capital(s) (cf. Cochrane & Jonas 1999; Davey 1999a, b, c, 2004)? The German comparison is not the only one which is relevant in thinking about South Africa, although it is more or less simultaneous with the South African case in the 1990s, and with many east European and central Asian cases.

Secondly, South Africa is of course an *African* country and the experience of decolonisation and the establishment of national capitals in Africa may offer some insights. The metaphor of new wine in old bottles comes to mind in thinking about many African capitals. But there have been both continuities and changes, not all being continuities of physicality framing changes of the cast of actors. Most significantly, the 'stability of capital sites has prevailed since independence' (Christopher 1985: 53). It is possible to think then of the changes and the lack thereof surrounding questions of capital cities in South Africa in the democratic period through similar questions relating to the postcolonial situation and its representation.

And thirdly, South Africa's colonial history, along with its Dutch and other periods, reveals a predominantly British set of forms and connections in common with many territories in all continents. During most of the 20th century – indeed, with roots going back at least to the adoption of 'responsible government' in the Cape Colony in the 1870s – South Africa had many commonalities also with the 'dominions' of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and by extension, the dominion capitals. In those cases, capital cities were established as something new and uniting – not in the old, established, larger cities (Melbourne, Montreal, Auckland), but either in existing lesser towns that were selected and consequently expanded through being allocated capital functions and investment in new buildings (e.g. Ottawa and Wellington) or, in the well-known Australian case, in an entirely new site with a design competition for a new capital city. Instead of following either of these routes, South Africa's national unification convention in 1909 chose to split the capital functions among several of the capitals of the pre-union territories. However, the motivation was the same – a choice of capital spaces in an attempt to contribute to unity. Sharing among the existing, rather than submerging in the new, was the chosen solution. This potentially precarious path was selected in the context of many being reluctant to merge into a single state, federal or not.

That choice reflects the fact that South Africa was a different dominion. Apart from the fact that 400 000 imperial troops had been required to defeat the strong challenge to British authority from the Boer Republics (1899–1902) – and many

thousands of others with African allies to defeat a series of African polities (Thembu 1878, Pedi 1878/9, Zulu 1879, Tswana 1895, etc.) – European power in southern Africa continued to be exercised by a minority, even if largely settled, in the face of an almost inevitably increasing majority. In that sense, the representation of government in South Africa would come to parallel that of colonies in other places where colonial settlers and administrators were a small minority – and the largest of those was India. Not coincidentally, the tricky job of designing a 'seat of government' for British India went to the same accomplished, complex tradition of architecture as did Pretoria. Those who visit both New Delhi and Pretoria never fail to remark on the dramatic similarity of the Lutyens-Baker Government House and its surrounds in the former to the Baker Union Buildings in the latter. The assertion of imperial power, at the same time symbolically sympathetic to its local setting, achieved through complex and indeed sometimes contradictory symbolism in the buildings made in local and locally workshopped materials, is a striking commonality, quite apart from the resemblance of the outline (on a rather different scale, however, with the Union Buildings being, not inappropriately, about a sixth of the size). 'East and west can and do meet, with mutual respect and affection', Lutyens is reported to have said – although he came to this conclusion after a grand rejection of 'adolescent' and 'hideous' elements in Indian architecture (Hyam 2006: 21). However, Government House remains 'one of the few pieces of colonial architecture to have received continuing critical acclaim' (Ridley 1998); and the Union Buildings happen to be another. These comparisons between the South African and Indian capitals remind one that representations of power in capital cities are always complex and shift through time. There is nothing fixed about the landscape of London or of Dakar – although some features, many even, may mutate very much more slowly than other human artefacts and practices.

South Africa: A profusion of capital cities

There has never been an uncontested singular capital in South Africa. There have always been multiple sites of political powers, which have claimed degrees of at least cultural, in some ways political and sometimes national, autonomy. In the late 19th century, these capitals included Dithakong, Dzata, Mafikeng, Ulundi, Sekhukhuni and more. Some such places ended up being outside the colonial borders which ultimately became those of South Africa after 1910 – like Thaba Bosiu, in what is now Lesotho. Unlike many other places in the European colonised world, these capitals largely disappeared. Unlike northern Nigeria or most of India, pre-existing urban forms were eliminated and only Mafikeng survives as a sizeable urban place of African, as opposed to colonial, foundation. Different spatialities of power are captured at Mafikeng in the contrast between the Kgotla, a place of meeting and traditional leadership, and the Imperial Reserve, the place of colonial rule, almost next door to each other, but so different in form and style. Other textures of contest are reflected in surviving evidence of competition between numerous Boer – or, if preferred, Afrikaner – capital places, reflected in Winburg, Lydenburg, Schoemansdal, Potchefstroom, Vryburg and others.

At the end of the 19th century, the number of places of autonomous governmental power had declined to a handful. Except for Dzata, base of the Venda kingdom, African foundations had all but been totally subjected to colonial rule. Boer republican independence was governed from just two places: Bloemfontein (Orange Free State) and Pretoria (South African Republic, the Transvaal), the latter established in 1855 to foster unity across different factions in the territory north of the Vaal River – something which took time to accomplish. And despite occasional diversions, Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg were clearly established as the two British colonial capitals of pre-union territories. Cape Town in the Cape Colony was also the major base of British power in southern Africa and the headquarters of the high commissioner, whose role included oversight of all British colonies in southern Africa.

After the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, British rule extended and deepened throughout the region. At first, the new British colonial 'state' in the Transvaal was ruled from Johannesburg, where the chief British representative, Lord Milner, established himself. But in a few years – just as had been the case for at least a generation in the Cape Colony – settler rather than external political authority was re-established in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. As early as 1904, a nascent new state developed contours as representatives of the different colonies worked together in the South African Native Affairs Commission and agreed on essentially common approaches to minority rule over the majority black population. In 1908, elected politicians from several territories, all essentially what we could term white settlers, met to negotiate an agreement to unify the territory of South Africa which could realise that vision and provide a platform for rapid capitalist development. In 1909, this 'national convention' reached agreement, which the British parliament approved in September 1909. The Union of South Africa became a dominion similar in status to Canada and Australia from May 1910 (Brand 1910; Thompson 1960). The century-old effects are still deeply etched in the geography of political power.

A key sticking point in the 1909 negotiations related to *where* unified government would be established. The convention agreed to give something to each of the four territories. Perhaps because of the association of Johannesburg with the imperious Milner regime during and immediately after the devastation of the war, it seems there was no question of Johannesburg being named a formal political centre. Nor was the contemporary Australian option of a new capital supported. Given the rivalries among different politicians, territorial groupings and cities, unity was instead fostered by sharing out the functions and institutions of the new state across three of the existing four colonial seats. The fourth, Pietermaritzburg, was compensated financially over the next quarter of a century, as was Bloemfontein, through a small annual payment towards the municipal debt of both cities (Section 133 of the South Africa Act 1909). The three-capital scenario was described in these words in the South Africa Act 1909:

> (18) Save as in section twenty-three excepted, Pretoria shall be the seat of Government of the Union...(23) Cape Town shall be the seat of the Legislature of the Union...(109) The Appellate Division shall sit in Bloemfontein...

The distribution perhaps suited the personalities concerned: John X Merriman, the prime minister of the Cape, was a classic parliamentarian, but lost out on appointment as the first union prime minister to Louis Botha, a decisive Transvaal Boer general who had come back to politics after the war (Lewsen 1982; Meintjies 1970). The division continues to the present. It requires that every year at the start of the parliamentary session a large number of civil servants and politicians transfer from Pretoria to Cape Town for a sustained period. Of course, the two-hour air flight between the cities means that today it is more common for politicians and officials to commute between the centres during sittings of parliament than physically move. Fifty years ago, the day-and-a-half train trip meant made it a much longer and more dramatic process. A relic of that era remains in the maintenance of twin embassies in Pretoria and Cape Town by many countries, with a certain amount of competition between the inevitably dual diplomatic party circuits. However, Pretoria firmly became the main seat of the executive arm of government, and what probably remains South Africa's most remarkable government edifice was commissioned and built to house and represent that power – the Union Buildings (see Figure 10.1).

The Union of South Africa, 1910–1961, is historically analysed in a vast amount of literature and the present author does not attempt to repeat any of that here (various surveys can be found in Magubane 1979, Thompson 1990 and Worden 2007). Two major currents characterise the political history. One is the slow and chequered development of a united opposition to white rule – which seemed to have reached a point of strength in the 1950s, only to suffer massive defeat and a period of quiet in the 1960s. That theme saw a resurgence in the 1970s, rising struggle for power in the 1980s and ultimately victory in the 1990s. The installation of democracy and quite different political forces in government after 1994 is something to which this chapter returns.

The second theme is that of Afrikaner nationalism. Defeated militarily in 1902, Afrikaner nationalism grew nonetheless through the 20th century. Over decades of resurgence, compromise, setback, dispute, division and debate, twin goals remained: the advancement of the material position of white Afrikaans speakers, in particular the elite, and the stronger establishment of institutional and identity aspects of what came to be called 'Afrikanerdom' (Adam & Giliomee 1979). The movement created monuments of various kinds and scales across the landscape, but none matches the impressive site, design and proportions of Gerhard Moerdijk's Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria (see Figure 10.2). The monument was a private initiative, finally opened in 1948 (Fisher 2006a, 2006b) and installed as a remarkably successful competitor to Baker's Union Buildings on the other side of the valley. Subsequent National Party governments never produced a more impressive symbol. The very fact that this massive monument was a private rather than a government project illustrates the long struggle over the nature of the state and of its capitals in South African history. With the establishment of the republic in place of the union in 1961, Afrikaner nationalism could at last turn the Voortrekker Monument into an official representation of the past.

If power over the nature of the existing capitals remained contested, the multiplication of official sites of state power also marked the second half of the 20th century in South Africa. That was in large measure due to the immense project of creating multiple governments – the bantustan plan. By this means, from the 50s to the 80s, central government attempted to reduce the black majority to non-citizens of South Africa, instead making them citizens of supposedly ethnically defined fragments carved out of the national space and festooned with the symbols of national status. Government decided that there should be 10 such ethnic states – a number which grew over the decades. Taken to a conclusion, these bantustans had to take on the form of independent states. And to parallel other states, each bantustan thus had to have its capital. With only one exception – Umtata in the Transkei – that required the design and building of new capital 'cities'. Between the early 70s and the late 80s, therefore, over perhaps a decade and a half, the notion of the 'capital' underwent an important deviation in South Africa as 'national' capitals were created in 10 new places, in addition to the three existing sites of branches of 'real' national government. These bantustan capitals allowed an outpouring of architectural and related attempts to create something new. In the case of Mafikeng (Mmabatho), with some naivety, architects welcomed such new building as a very special opportunity:

> The president, Lucas Mangope, was a man of grandiose ambition, and he commissioned architects Michael Scholes and Bannie Britz to design a central government square, ministerial offices and civil service buildings in a brand new city which he called Mmabatho. As the official magazine of South African architecture, Architecture SA, noted: 'The opportunity to design a building of this scale, having an importance for the Tswana people similar to the symbolic value of a building such as the Union Buildings, is rare…composed with considerable architectural sophistication… the intention here was to give architectural expression to…essentially white notions of tribal identity and to authenticate the spurious political legitimacy of a new homeland.' (Silverman & Low 1998: 23).

The bantustan regimes came to an end with apartheid in 1994. A vital feature of the new regime was the negotiated re-incorporation of the former bantustans into the national polity. A key means to accomplish that end was the choice of a new kind of province as a subnational scale of government. The country was divided up once again for the era of democracy, and seven of the nine new provincial governments became a means of incorporating former bantustan civil servants – and in some cases politicians – into the new democracy (Khosa & Muthien 1998). In one case, the new Northwest province, it meant that a new provincial government was very largely based upon a former bantustan bureaucracy (that of Bophuthatswana). In another, Limpopo (at first called Northern province) served to draw officials from three former bantustans into provincial service. Apart from the extraordinary opportunities for corrupt practice which these changes created, a remarkable feature of the process was that only two of the bantustan capitals became the seats of new provincial governments. Elites largely failed in their bids to maintain some kind of capital status (Umtata, Ulundi and others).

Those who succeeded – in Mafikeng and Bisho – did so only after some struggle. One feature of their bids for provincial capital status was the reuse of the capital buildings created in bantustan imagery as new, democratic capitals, no longer pretending to be national seats of power but homes of regional governance under a democratic constitution. In some of the other provincial capitals, no government-style built environment existed. In two of the newly selected provincial capitals – Kimberley and Mbombela for the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga – the architecture of the new provincial government complexes consciously tries to create something hospitable to a new democracy (Noble 2007).

Other than Johannesburg, most prominent of the present provincial capitals is Cape Town. South Africa's original colonial city, Cape Town began the long history of urban places established by soldiers, missionaries, governors, miners and speculators of European ancestry – the urban landscape which dominates the scene today. Well over three centuries old, Cape Town has always been a capital, and in addition to its large provincial installations, which in some respects still try to reflect their rootedness in the long history of 'the Cape', it is the legislative capital of the country and has continued to be so since 1994. Cape Town and some of the other urban places in the Western Cape province remain sites in which the large majority national population of more or less purely African ancestry makes up only a minority. Identity issues present themselves differently perhaps in this province from the rest of the country (cf. Bekker et al. 2000). The results include some hostility to the experience of the city for members of the majority – although it may be a bit strong to suggest that the demographies and geographies of Cape Town are experienced as 'malevolent' (Elder 2003). This point clearly played out in different directions for the dominant ANC in negotiations in the early 1990s: Cape Town could have been totally rejected as a national capital on the grounds of its being a hostile environment for wider democracy. Or, as Albie Sachs, now judge of the Constitutional Court and key figure in the negotiations, put it: 'There were strong reasons to give up Cape Town as a capital. There was a purely parochial defence of Cape Town as site of parliament. But the point was the African minority and the role parliament being there could play in keeping, making the city more African. Which could be lost by removing parliament' (Sachs interview, 9 September 2008). It seems that this is a crucial reason why Pretoria – or a third place – did not become a sole national capital at the dawn of democracy. And, of course, Cape Town provides a spectacular setting for displays of the attractions of South African society – a key reason for Fifa World Cup football matches to be played in a stadium in that city in 2010, to draw billions of viewers to impressive South African scenery and architecture – something much harder to accomplish in Pretoria. At the local scale in Cape Town the new, and very expensive, stadium abandons the township side of this segregated city in favour of a telegenic site between sea and mountains (see Figure 10.6). That controversial choice demonstrates that in the new democracy one should not necessarily expect new elites to favour the poor when it comes to representing the country to the world through their capital cities (see Adam, Moodley & Van Zyl Slabbert 1998; Dubresson 2008; McDonald & Smith 2004).

By contrast with Cape Town, except for its brief period as the base of Milner's post-Anglo-Boer War regime just over a century ago, Johannesburg had no history as a capital city prior to 1994. However, '[s]ome felt Johannesburg should be capital in 1910. But in the 1909 negotiations it was marginalised. *Because* Milner had been in Jo'burg, it was seen as merely a British imperialist implant, even though it was the most vital city, the source of productivity. From a political point of view, the exclusion of Jo'burg was very odd. Very incongruous' (Sachs interview, 9 September 2008). Johannesburg was part of the territory of the old South African Republic and the 1910–1994 province called the Transvaal. The capital of both was firmly Pretoria. Therefore, when the new Gauteng (then called Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, or PWV) provincial cabinet first met in May 1994, its choice of Johannesburg as the site of its new capital was greeted with shock in Pretoria – especially since some were rather pyrrhicly arguing for Pretoria to be the sole capital of the country at the time, trying to build an alliance of Afrikaner nationalists and sections of the ANC hostile to Cape Town (cf. Du Preez 1995).

The choice of central Johannesburg as home to a provincial government led to a coalescence of interests between city and province on the 'regeneration' of the city centre, an area generally held to have fallen into some decline through massive suburbanisation, a degree of business (and white) flight and fears of crime and chaos in the area (Bremner 2000). The reinvention of the city centre – an area of several square kilometres even in a narrow definition – has been propelled by new agencies created by provincial and municipal government. They found an extraordinary lever to gear up the project in the creation of a home for a new institution of democratic, *national* government in the form of the Constitutional Court, established under the new constitution.

Much has been written about the new court, its site and buildings in Johannesburg (Gevisser 2004; Law-Viljoen 2007; Madikida, Segal & Van den Berg 2008; Noble 2007; Segal, Martin & Court 2006) (see Figure 10.5). Existing texts concern the architecture, reconstructing memory and related subjects. The court is at the old fort, a site of notorious prisons, with immense potential for heritage and memory development, and next to the most densely populated part of the city, Hillbrow, a site of extraordinary change over a generation (Morris 1999). Yet nothing seems to have been published to date on the choice of *Johannesburg* as the site for the court, as opposed to any other place. Since 1910, South Africa has had not one, but three capitals, corresponding to the three branches of government – Bloemfontein being the seat of the Appeal Court, the apex of the judicial system, completing the geographical separation of powers created in 1910. Why would the new court not be located there? Or why might another site in a less prominent city not have served – as in the cases of Georgia, the Czech Republic and Germany?[3]

The newness of the constitutional court was a key reason not to place it in Bloemfontein: 'We wanted to emphasise that the Con. Court was not just a branch of the Appeal Court, so it could not be cheek by jowl with the Appeal Court' (Sachs interview, 9 September 2008). Explicit reasons provided by the ANC side in

negotiations were that Johannesburg provided the best site for the court because, according to Sachs, '50% of the bar is in Jo'burg, there are several universities here, the city has a very strong high court, and it was the most dynamic legal centre in the country at the time'. However, there was a further and more important reason as to why the ANC argued for a Johannesburg site, according to Justice Sachs, who played a central role in the choice:

> ...in the period of the 80s and before, Soweto [the vast township complex of Johannesburg] was the storm centre, the powerhouse of transformation. So in a way, Soweto had to be more than just a place bypassed. Bringing something to Johannesburg was meant to demonstrate new power on that basis. This was a very specific reason – but we couldn't use that in the negotiations, it was subjective. So we had to give objective reasons. (Sachs interview, 9 September 2008)

The court site is far from Soweto, and, as Hlongwane (2007) points out, the routes of struggle for freedom and democracy created in Soweto 'do not really lead to Con Hill'. But in the absence of a contest in negotiations, it was agreed that the Constitutional Court would go to Johannesburg. In a strange result, South Africa effectively acquired a fourth national capital city in the sense of a site of a key national institution. And of all the public architecture so far created in South Africa post-1994, it is the Constitutional Court building (Figure 10.5) which demonstrably represents an architecture of a discourse of human rights and democracy, albeit with contested attempts to realise an African expression in its architecture (cf. Noble 2007).

One thing that does not need much regeneration in Johannesburg is the presence of political power. The overwhelmingly dominant party in the country in the post-1994 period, the ANC, largely expresses and exercises its power in Johannesburg. The site of this power is Luthuli House in Sauer Street, central Johannesburg, where the ANC has had its headquarters since soon after the unbanning of the organisation in 1990. Newspaper headlines often demonstrate this place as a site of power, as evidenced by *City Press*, a Sunday paper aimed at a middle-class black readership, on 14 September 2008: 'Luthuli House acts swiftly to oust Mbeki' (the second democratic president, removed from office by choice of the political party), indicating that key decisions are those made in Johannesburg.

Indeed, political organisations in South Africa generally do not have their headquarters in Pretoria. The second largest party in the first period of democracy, the Democratic Alliance, is headquartered in Cape Town; the Inkatha Freedom Party in Durban; the Independent Democrats in Cape Town; and the United Democratic Movement is one of the few vaguely significant political bodies to have its base in Pretoria. The newer Congress of the People is based in Johannesburg. This diversity emphasises the obvious fact about the country's governmental and political spatiality: it is diffused and centred in multiple ways through the major cities and sometimes through smaller places, and is by no means focused exclusively, or even primarily, on one capital city. The dispersion of the formal functions of government across four different cities today both captures and reinforces this, and it seems at

present very unlikely that rapid change could occur in this geography of state and informal political organisations. Each centre is an essential component of national political life, and all are deeply and increasingly tied together, yet each continues to assert its own linkages in diverse inward and outward directions. Nevertheless, one city does emerge above the others as the main site of government on a national scale – Pretoria, or Tshwane, to use its official municipal name. In the context of the dispersion of political power across the country, Pretoria may be thought of as a capital city which has the complex task of representing national governmental power both to itself and the world.

Pretoria: Executive capital of the Republic of South Africa

Thabo Mbeki, president from 1999 to 2008, liked to use phrases such as: 'In the name of the people, welcome to the Union Buildings, the seat of government…' (Mbeki 2005). This narrowing of the idea of the seat of government from the capital city to the office of the president may be more characteristic of the Mbeki approach to politics and government than of South African perceptions in general, but it may also provide a clue to thinking about the phenomenon of the capital city in the case of Pretoria. At the same time as exploring this notion from various perspectives, this section aims to provide a geography of the layering of Pretoria, an 'urban geology', if you will, as well as an analysis of the representations of political power in the city.

Much difficulty surrounds discussion of any South African city, starting with a definition of the space of the city (municipal area? Something smaller or larger?) and continuing through the naming of the place to providing basic information, such as population numbers.[4] In the case of the name 'Pretoria', there is no longer a local or municipal government with that name. Officially, the city, in the sense of a municipality, is now called Tshwane. The municipal area itself is very large, stretching over 70 kilometres from end to end. It is a creation of local government reform in post-apartheid South Africa, a metropolitan municipality in terms of the present framework which came into being in 2000 and which through a process of consolidation effectively replaced numerous pre-existing local authorities. The municipality's move to change its name from Pretoria to Tshwane was controversial (Unisa 2004). The name Pretoria is still simultaneously widely used – certainly as a geographical expression which at minimum describes the older, inner-city parts of the urban space, perhaps extending for several kilometres in all directions from Church Square, the original heart of the city. Hence, on one hand, it is not clear whether government really thinks of the *city* as its essential 'seat of power', or rather a set of buildings; and on the other, if indeed it is the city, there is some uncertainty both about the scope and size of the area to be considered 'the capital city', and even about the naming of the place. This uncertainty also pervades the relationships between Pretoria as capital and other cities which concentrate both formal and informal political functions, as the previous section of the chapter noted.

National government in South Africa has a ministry for local government. The

minister concerned, Sydney Mufamadi, remarked in 2001, when Tshwane had been created more or less as it is today from many previous authorities, that:

> The new political boundary of the City of Tshwane, for the first time in fifty years, reflects both the formal and the functional metropolitan region. This is significant, because it marks the first opportunity for equitable development for all the people of the region. A single area of political governance and administration means that the slogan that characterised the mass struggles in the 1980s: 'One City, One Tax Base', can now be realised. The constitutional, legal, administrative and budgetary prerequisites for an inclusive and people-centred city development strategy for Tshwane are in place. (Mufamadi 2001)

If there is some lack of clarity on spatial and place-naming issues in the wake of the consolidation of local into metropolitan government – not to mention the fact that it is very hard to separate Tshwane from other areas, including Johannesburg – there are also considerable differences in the descriptions of the city:

> With the lilac splendour of jacarandas as its trademark, Tshwane has grown into a metropolis that encapsulates the rainbow nation. It is here where people of all races, colours and creeds gather. Tshwane resembles Africa with a touch of Europe and a pinch of oriental spice. Hooting taxis, cars old and new, buses and trains drive past hawkers selling an array of fresh fruit and other articles of interest.[5]

Whereas the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality describes the place as cosmopolitan, others use different notions: 'Pretoria is the least African of South Africa's metropolitan areas'.[6]

The disputed naming of Tshwane or Pretoria signifies distinct traditions. Pretoria was founded as a new capital. Like Abuja today, its foundation came about from an attempt to unify diverse factions – in Pretoria's case, of trekkers, Boers or early Afrikaners in the mid-19th century. Pretoria thus has long carried a Transvaal Afrikaner culture, but always pretended to its unity, never quite sealing it, never quite placing its comprehensive stamp upon other centres of Afrikaner power, whether in Potchefstroom or Bloemfontein or, more seriously, Stellenbosch or Cape Town. However, this was the capital of what Dunbar Moodie called the Afrikaner civil religion – indeed with its more overtly religious overtones. Suitably, there is no single religious centre to Pretoria. Church Square is without a church, and very much an urban public space shared by all today.

The city was settled originally between ridges which stretch across it east to west. Various pieces of monumental architecture also structure the sense of Pretoria. The Union Buildings stand on one ridge. The Voortrekker Monument crests one to its south-west. Across an incised valley to the east of this monument is the vast, modular, modernist complex of Unisa (the University of South Africa). And more recently, still in long-term development, on a ridge south of the city centre, is Freedom Park (Maré 2006).

Oldest and most impressive, the very architecture of the Union Buildings tries to blend the symbols of white South Africa a century ago, a precursor by Herbert Baker of his and Edward Lutyens' New Delhi. It is too simple to appreciate the Union Buildings (1910–1912) as imperial architecture. The insertion of local elements and use of materials makes it perhaps an unlikely, but nevertheless a highly successful centre for the power of post-apartheid government. At the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as first president of all South Africans, hundreds of heads of state and governments from around the world were seated in the amphitheatre immediately below the building. The careful division of the crowd into three, separated by fences (dignitaries at the top, necessary members of the ceremony and close associates ranged down the gardens, and perhaps 100 000 ordinary people on the lawns below), prefigured the maintenance of a steep hierarchy in government and society after apartheid. Unlike the monuments of Washington or Brasilia, this is not a building which symmetrically dominates the city. It almost awkwardly faces only its own grounds. Just as these buildings do not dominate the city, government does not absolutely dominate either – commercial centres old and new, as well as major industrial areas, testify to that.

Diversity is present rather than a single ethos, just as there is an absence of monolithic dominance. Naboth Mokgatle (1971) described his struggle to insert himself into the city more than a generation ago, as so many unknown South Africans that came to the city – and in many cases came to the city from terribly disrupted and dislocated places. The city itself bears terrible scars from attempts to expunge traditions beyond those of the rulers, forced removals under the notorious Group Areas Act and other legislation being largely responsible (cf. Carruthers 2000; Friedman 1994; Ralinala 2002). Yet pieces of sites remain which demonstrate the failure to create a model apartheid city. Evidence of messier pasts abounds.

Mufamadi (2001) made the following summary of the city's historical geography:

> For many decades, the previous government together with the former City Council of Pretoria attempted to plan and administer Pretoria as a model apartheid city. The first phase of this process came with the forced removals of Bantule, Marabastad, Lady Selbourne, Eastwood, Highlands and Newlands and the creation of segregated townships on the urban periphery such as Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, Eersterus and Laudium. This had the effect of displacing those who could least afford it furthest away from places of work and economic opportunity. It also destroyed the economic livelihood of many families. The second phase, at the height of 'grand apartheid', came with the establishment of townships such as Winterveld, Mabopane, Soshanguve, Hammanskraal and Ekangala. The aim was to create a whites-only city with decentralised industrial areas such as Rosslyn and Babelegi served by black labour located in 'homelands'… The spatial consequences of displaced urbanisation can be seen in the way Tshwane functional metropolitan region is shaped today: An urban core, surrounded by an inner periphery, where 40% of the population lives, and

> which produces 91% of the economic output; an outer periphery in the north-west and north-east, home to 60% of the population; high volumes of long-distance commuting, requiring huge transport subsidies, between the outer periphery and the urban core every day.

Pretoria is a place where ruling regimes have wielded power, but several times lost it dramatically too. That happened in 1877, when a column of British troops raised the Union Jack and extinguished Boer republican power – only to concede to its reassertion four years later. Early in a bitter war which caused incredible destruction to rural life and forever altered Pretoria's relationship to rurality and to the other cities of the region, British troops again occupied the city in 1900. The resulting colonial regime gave way to settler authority in the Union of South Africa, establishing Pretoria as the executive among three capital cities from 1910. However minor they may appear from the outside, the three occasions on which elections or parliamentary votes ended white regimes (1924, 1939, 1948) all brought traumatic changes to government in Pretoria – especially in the aftermath of the 'apartheid' election of 1948.

Then in 1994, the world gathered in Pretoria to celebrate the commencement of democracy in South Africa as Nelson Mandela was installed as the first black president of the country. As the adopted capital city of post-apartheid government – adopted in the sense that non-racial (largely black) government took over the buildings, offices and symbols of the previous regime – there was remarkably little symbolism of a challenge to power to build on, much less so than in Johannesburg, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, in relation to the siting of the Constitutional Court there. Never having strongly expressed itself except in some highly symbolic, but ultimately rather pyrrhic, demonstrations in the past (the women's march to the Union Buildings of 1956 being perhaps the best example [Kros 1980]), there is nonetheless a sense of settled and changed governance about the city. The presence of a very large diplomatic corps, with embassies of almost every African country, adds to at least a superficial sense of cosmopolitan Africanism. Although this may not be what Achille Mbembe terms 'afropolitan', Pretoria somehow expresses the possibility of this ideal.

However, away from the busy diplomatic context of inner Pretoria, to the north, north-west and north-east of the city centre, is evidence of something to be found in other major South African cities such as Durban or East London: not quite urban settlements and related forms of displaced urbanisation situated relatively close to a major city and its markets. Once a city straddling a bantustan boundary (Bekker 1991) and later a city with sections in different provinces, its tortuous historical geography reveals a huge diversity of character across different parts of the city. In the north-west, for example, there is a distinct sense of a new African urbanism rapidly being made. This is why Maliq Simone (2004) focused one of his four case studies in *For the city yet to come* on Winterveld to the north-west. Here, special forms of associational life allow the survival and even the flourishing of life. And in many ways, the 'townships' – Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, GaRankuwa – are sites of similar ways of being.

In stark contrast, Pretoria may also be the place where poor whites are most prominent: left aside by the demise of race-reserved, basic bureaucratic jobs, the closure of the old iron and steel works and other industries, railway employment shrinkage – a phenomenon which some other older cities share (Schuermans & Visser 2005). Yet despite these remarkable and dynamic features of urban change, Pretoria is not the best served city in South Africa from the point of view of scholarly or, indeed, other types of literature. The presence of power seems to have attracted little creative or academic writing (but see Horn 1998). Some of that writing could expand on the massive suburbanisation which has taken place, particularly towards the south and east of the city. Here the impacts of current globalisation – wired areas, decentralised office parks, giant shopping malls, gated neighbourhoods, multinational corporations and the related enclaves of globalised privilege – spread across the landscape, as they do around all other South African cities from Mbombela to Cape Town.

At the same time, it has become impossible – it has been so for perhaps half a century – to appreciate the nature of Pretoria without inserting it into the wider context of an urban region which has its northern limits at the northern edge of Pretoria, but which stretches more than 100 kilometres to the south – an urban region centred on Johannesburg much more than on Pretoria. The original centres of the two cities are 60 kilometres apart, and the newcomer to the south is thirty years younger – but it is also several times the weight in economic and other terms.

Pretoria *lost* its function as the capital of the richest South African province, and over more than 10 years as the site of the new Gauteng provincial government, which chose Johannesburg as its seat, removed provincial activities from Pretoria, while others migrated to Polokwane, Mafikeng and Mbombela as the capitals of the three new provinces which covered most of the rest of former Transvaal territory (a small piece also went to KwaZulu-Natal). At the same time, the scale of national government administration has continued to expand and there is little visible impact of the loss of this provincial function today – except that, given the long history of Pretoria as the capital of the Transvaal, the old legislature (Raadsaal on Church Square and some other buildings) now has a rather incongruous presence in the landscape.

Increasingly part of a larger city region, Pretoria is also at the time of writing being physically more closely tied into it. The largest infrastructure project in the country at present is the construction of a new railway for a fast passenger service to connect Johannesburg, its suburban areas, Pretoria and their common international airport. This system is named Gautrain, and is supposed to be the solution to massive road congestion. Thus in some respects one might be tempted to think of the capital of South Africa today as the Gauteng city region, with its presidential seat at the Union Buildings and many other parts, including the Constitutional Court, spread across the rest of the region. Furthermore, with Johannesburg as the main base of the political elite presently in power, the usefulness of describing Pretoria as the capital may even be declining.

The diffuse character and dispersed geography of political power and its centres

in South Africa form a key theme of this chapter. Not surprisingly, protest from many points of the political compass has been directed at those in power. Pretoria is a common, but far from exclusive, physical focus of such protest. There has undoubtedly been a spreading of protest in the post-apartheid period (Desai 2002: 1). However, much of this protest action takes place in isolated sites, often within poorer communities, and not with any particular focus on the capital cities.

Parliament in Cape Town is one particular target of protest. For example, disgruntled defence force soldiers as well as Christian conservatives have mounted demonstrations outside parliament. Some of the more vigorous have been concerned with housing questions. And early in 2009, sex workers protested against police harrassment.[7]

Pretoria does of course offer sites for protest action. The most well-known protest in Pretoria in earlier eras was probably that of 9 August 1956, when thousands of women marched on the Union Buildings to protest against the extension of passes – the notorious identity documents used to control movement during apartheid – to women (Kros 1980). The often ignored downside, however, of this much celebrated event, is that it did absolutely nothing to deflect the then government from its course. And indeed, despite the importance of protest action in broad ways and in very diverse places – mostly in the townships – in edging apartheid government towards negotiation, it would be hard to identify an event in which large crowds achieved significant reform during that period. Pretoria was never the site of Prague-style mass events which rocked the foundations of a regime.

Once the former apartheid government conceded to negotiations for a transfer of power, the period of negotiation – sometimes euphoric and sometimes tense – between 1990 and the first democratic elections of 1994, revealed quite different forces using the spaces of Pretoria to protest in very diverse ways against the direction of the last white government of FW de Klerk. In January 1991, for example:

> Police used batons and tear gas...to arrest protesting farmers who paralyzed traffic in the capital city by parking 1,000 farm vehicles on downtown streets. Police also declared the city centre an unrest area – an action usually reserved for demonstrations in black townships. Officers arrested about 120 of the estimated 5,000 white farmers protesting high interest rates and low prices for their produce. [A] Supreme Court justice…ordered farmers to remove their trucks, tractors…[8]

A narrower protest occurred at much the same time, when an ambitious, but ultimately laughable, leader of the white right wing, Eugene Terreblanche, fell off his horse in what was meant to be a highly symbolic demonstration against democracy and in favour of Afrikaner power, in Church Square, Pretoria.

And in 1992, newspapers around the world reported that 'Mandela leads blacks in huge demonstration in Pretoria, South Africa'.[9] 'Nelson Mandela led 100,000 cheering black marchers to the seat of white power, Wednesday, in one of the biggest demonstrations ever to demand an end to President FW de Klerk's government', the report went on to say.

Yet, as Barbara Harmel noted at the time, '[a]n impressive display of mass opposition by the African National Congress, these protests alone posed no serious challenge to the De Klerk government'.[10]

A peculiar feature of political authority over the state in South Africa since the end of apartheid is that it has largely been wielded by an alliance which sometimes shows cracks. Thus an oddity has been the types of protests whereby supporters of government march to demand changes in policy. The Union Buildings remain an occasional site of such events. Indeed, one may imagine that the lawns below the impressive executive buildings will remain the key site of protest action in Pretoria, although the direction of political action in coming years may vary greatly from the established patterns of recent decades. For in the second decade of the 21st century, old certainties of South African politics, like those of many other parts of the world, seem to have washed away. In this context, contest not only over government policy, but also over the nature of the state itself, and thus over the form and experience of its capital city, is to be expected.

What kind of capital for democratic South Africa?

Faced with the complexity of South African cities, many authors have noted that there are alternative centres of power in South African life. These centres are essential components of national political life, deeply and increasingly tied together, yet each continuing to assert its own linkages in diverse inward and outward directions. The country is complex, and the idea of the nation elusive. For this reason as much as any, the question of the capital city is not resolved. Why it is not resolved and some lines of approach are the subject of this last section of the chapter.

What kind of capital could be expected or might be possible for South Africa? The phrase 'nation building' is frequently heard and read in South Africa. It is an unstable concept. The ANC, the party of power since 1994, preparing for its convention in 2007, put out a discussion document which noted that '[t]he national question can never be fully resolved...as we seek to integrate South African society across racial, language, ethnic and other barriers, we are also engaged in the process of developing those individual elements that distinguish these various communities from one another'.[11]

Between powerful political forces, revival of traditional leadership (Van Kessel & Ooman 1997) and diverse portrayals of the country as perhaps on varied Creole pathways (Nuttall 2002), it is obvious that the concepts of the nation, democracy, unity and the representation of these ideas will be contested. Chipkin (2007) has argued that South Africans as a nation share little more than a democratic polity. Yet the (apartheid) cities have not been 're-mapped' as 'spaces of democracy' (Robinson 1998). As Shepherd and Murray (2007: 10) put it, 'South African cities are caught between continuing forces which reproduce similar patterns to those which made them in the past, and enormous social and political changes, the full effect of which on built and other environments are still very much seeking to be seen.' Thus the

capital city or cities of South Africa will continue to demonstrate the most enduring feature of South African cities: that whilst they accommodate diverse and parallel lives with severe separations, they also involve their citizens in a shared series of spaces and institutions. In this they are not unique, but perhaps provide a hopeful example of ways in which urban societies can cohere and continue, despite high levels of hardship and tragic histories of state violence, including bitterness and rancour, finding ways to endure.

Such conditions hardly facilitate the development of Pretoria as an uncontested and coherent capital city. Yet at the same time, parts of government focus new attention on making Pretoria look and feel more like the capital of Africa's wealthiest country. The very fact of the lack of 'capitalness' justifies such attempts. Then City Manager Blake Moseley Lefatola complained in 2005 that 'coming in from south, east, west and north of the city, you have no idea that you are entering the administrative capital of the country', and went on to indicate that the city was thinking of creating landmarks to demarcate its status and shape to travellers.[12]

Such schemes were far from the first to seek to change the impression created by the city. Perhaps the earliest was Herbert Baker's unimplemented scheme in relation to his design of the Union Buildings. He proposed to create a capital precinct, not in front of his masterwork (unlike, say, the Mall in Washington), but to its side. Decades later, something similar again emerged. In the period of reconstruction after World War II (Mabin 1998), Pretoria, like other South African cities, sought a new plan. Into this context came (Lord) William Holford directly from his inner-London rebuilding activities, hired by the Pretoria City Council to produce proposals for the central area of the city (Mabin 1994). Innumerable meetings during the period discussed ways and means of improving the housing of government departments and the impact that reconstruction in this regard could have on the urban scene in the capital. 'Pretoria has a chance to develop into a new kind of capital city...', Holford remarked in August 1949 when presenting his draft report.[13] The central feature of his plan for Pretoria's central area was the idea of a government precinct along the sole central city street (Struben Street), which provided an impressive view of the Union Buildings on the hill to the east. The scheme entailed expropriation, widening and a gradual concentration of new government buildings in that area. However, the council failed to persuade government that the best feature of the plan should be implemented. Once the then provincial administration undercut the scheme with huge new buildings near Church Square instead of along Struben Street, the idea of a government precinct for the capital faded away.

One cannot identify more than some motley incursions of large new buildings and continual tinkering over the long period of National Party apartheid rule as regards the development of Pretoria as a grand capital. The addition of the State Theatre and the adjacent Strijdom Square – where the bust of an apartheid-era prime minister conveniently crashed off its pedestal after the installation of democracy – could be mentioned among the more coherent schemes. Thus, at the dawn of democracy in 1994, Pretoria remained a rather eclectic collection of private and public buildings

and spaces, almost as though it had been waiting for a new direction to reorganise and re-present its capitalness.

Some debate around other possibilities then took place. One idea was to move the capital away from Pretoria – which seems not to have been considered very seriously. The question of what to do with Pretoria dragged on for years. Cabinet kept the matter on its agenda, it seems, from October 1997 to February 2001. At that point, it took the decision that national government headquarters would remain located in 'inner city Tshwane', in part 'to promote urban renewal', and although things moved slowly, within the next three years a new directive emerged. In June 2004, the president mandated the Departments of Public Works (the government's internal landlord) and the Department of Public Service and Administration to 'develop a framework to improve the physical work environment for the public service'. This programme, which has become called *Re Kgabisa*, was in principle approved by the cabinet in May 2005 (Department of Public Works 2005).

In some respects, the programme is surrounded by the kinds of myths which seem typical of capital city development programmes. In Berlin, the notion of restoring a past glorious centre has framed rather more grandiose plans than the real scale and significance of what has actually been achieved by the city (Cochrane & Jonas 1999). In Pretoria, the exaggerated notion of the continental and global importance of South Africa, symbolised by the mantra of 'our vast diplomatic community', serves similar purposes and sometimes drives a sense of the need for Pretoria to be something quite different from what it has yet become. Some ministries have been rehoused in major new buildings since the late 90s, but thus far there has not been a major plan or implementation which has accomplished a significant alteration to the physical nature of the city.

Nevertheless, a large amount of planning and design work has been going on intended to bring a new sense of organisation and power to Pretoria (see Figure 10.3). There are several components of this work, portrayed as likely to stretch 'over 10 to 14 years starting 2005…' (Department of Public Works 2005). Its purpose is summarised as:

- Exploring African-ness: giving content to the notion of an African city using urban art as a metaphor for social dialogue.
- Re Kgabisa Tshwane Programme: R20 billion government physical reinvestment in the CBD.
- City Living Initiative: institutional housing intervention based on a coherent urban design framework with viable typology and packaged as bankable projects.
- Tshwane Kopanong/Crossing: vibrant public square, establishing a growth node between Hatfield and CBD while revitalising Sunnyside (also residentially) (these being areas adjacent to the city centre).

The proposals which have emerged thus far have been more about incremental change than grand plans. The historical role of the Union Buildings is assured, it seems – documents describe them as being 'the host precinct to the Presidency, the top level of government and heart of governance' (Department of Public Works

2005). But perhaps there is a gathering pace of change towards something different in Tshwane. One corner of the re-imagining and re-presentation of Tshwane-Pretoria has indeed developed in recent years under the aegis of the Mbeki government. This is Freedom Park, the largest expression of something new and different in the city, another hilltop site which has been developed as a place of memory (see Figure 10.4). It is a major attempt to alter the iconography of the city. Freedom Park could be read as an attempt to do something towards the deep-seated feeling that South Africa's cities have not changed enough to reflect the new era. Freedom Park monumentalises those who died in numerous wars involving South Africans, ending with the struggle for liberation. Its architecture is certainly new from the perspective of the monuments and major government structures of the past. In its early stages, however, the new precinct remains somewhat peripheral to Pretoria's life – not easy to find and less easy to enter and explore. Despite the expenditure of considerable effort, such seems the fate thus far of attempts to remake the physical, as well as symbolic, sense of the city. Indeed, the same sense is present in proposals to change road names from those of the 19th century and the apartheid era to something more diverse. And exaggerating the possible effects of this symbolic change seems tempting – as was the case, for example, when the speaker of the Tshwane Council suggested that '[t]he process intends to undertake a comprehensive reconstruction and transformation of the image of the city'.[14]

In short, in a context of lack of clarity about the nation, multiple capitals and diffuse political power, Pretoria is definitely not a 'total capital', 'dominant culturally and economically as well as politically', which one would have 'expected (other things being equal) to favour socially and culturally cohesive political elites, and through them more consistent public policies' (Therborn 2002: 516). It is not yet, at least, a place 'where governments are installed, and where governments lose their power'; and it is far from being the sole 'center of political debate about the orientation of the country...[a place] where national differences are made' (Therborn 2002: 513).

Pretoria is not the most cosmopolitan nor most globalised part of South Africa. Pretoria today remains a place where the 'political iconography of the city' (Sonne 2003) is perhaps more in flux, less clearly developed, than in many other capitals. Although there is a growing attempt to place a new impress on this city – and the other South African capitals – the underlying diffuse nature of power in the country, and the lack of cohesion around the idea of the nation, let alone its capital, are likely to preserve the perhaps disordered, and indeed perhaps more human, character which Pretoria seems to have settled into in the early decades of democracy. Of course, there is a chance that this picture will change radically under a new, more centralising president, or under still more fractured political circumstances.

Notes

1 Stacey Leader provided creative research support in the production of this chapter.

2 Physical spatiality is obviously reduced by intensive virtual space contact through electronic means – e.g. cellphones and email, which free people up from particular desks and landlines. However, how much difference this means for places of human action and interaction since the telegraph is not well studied.

3 The Constitutional Court of Georgia moved from Tbilisi to Batumi in July 2007; the Czech court is in Brno; and the German court established during the divided years in the west remains in Karlsruhe, intentionally dislocated from the other federal institutions, which are mostly in Berlin.

4 According to the 2001 census, Tshwane has a population of 1.985 million in a municipal area of about 2 200 km^2. Urban development is continuous beyond its boundary in several directions. It is the fifth largest municipality by population. Its rate of growth has been declining – from over 4% per year a generation ago to around 3% in the 1990s, and less than 1% today. The number of households, however, is growing at over 5% per year. Unemployment is over 30%; monthly income for those employed averages about $1 000. Informal types of housing accommodate perhaps 22% of the households, a decline from around 25% five years ago, indicating rapid construction of formal housing. 90% of households have electricity connections, but only 78% have weekly refuse collection. In other words, this is a middle-income, slowly growing city with a wide disparity in incomes, but signs of progress in development and social indicators – except for health: largely as a result of HIV/AIDS, there has been a rapid fall in life expectancy in the last decade.

5 City of Tshwane (August 2008). Accessed 1 September 2008, http://www.tshwane.gov.za/cityprofile.cfm

6 Bernstein A & McCarthy J, Pretoria – apartheid's model city, *The Star*, 9 July 1998. See also Bernstein & McCarthy 1998.

7 For example, see Cape Town residents protest against gateway to hell (*Mail & Guardian*, 16 July 2007). Accessed 1 March 2008, www.mg.co.za/article/2007-07-16-cape-town-residents-protest-against-gateway-to-hell

8 Associated Press, 30 January 1991.

9 *San Antonio Express*, news, 6 August 1992.

10 Harmel B, Let people power finish the job in South Africa, *International Herald Tribune*, 5 September 1992. Accessed 1 August 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/1992/09/05/edba.php?page=1

11 Accessed 1 August 2008, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/discussion/nation.html

12 *Mail & Guardian*, 10 November 2005.

13 Sources for this material are Transvaal Archives, Pretoria (TA), Pretoria Town Clerk series (MPA), cited in Mabin (1994).

14 South African Cities Network (15 September 2008). Accessed 20 August, www.sacities.net/2008/september15_tshwane.stm

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Albie Sachs, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Johannesburg, 9 September 2008

11 Conclusion

Göran Therborn and Simon Bekker

Cities are living geology, shaped by and functioning through historical layers of ambitions, efforts and constructions of meaning, set in natural environments of topography and climate, and subject to change. This volume concerns itself with African capital cities south of the Sahara, which means a particular geological focus. This book, and much less this conclusion, cannot claim to cover the rich and varied African urban experience in any full and systematic way. What the authors offer is a systematic perspective, a set of thorough case studies and some illustrative examples. Within the tight confines of space at our disposal in this volume, the authors have brought together a set of multifocal studies of sub-Saharan African capital cities. The contributions deal with the historical development of the capitals from their origins up until today, with the political dramas staged in them since independence, with the urban symbolic legitimation of power and with its contestation, with housing conditions, land allocation, urban services (or, mostly, the lack of them) and with the location of the capitals in the ethnic, economic and demographic fabric of their nations.

Our perspective of urban geology in this chapter entails a historical focus – not in the sense of a chronological narrative, but an attention to crucial city-making epochs, their manifestations and their enduring urban sediment. We begin by revealing the traces of colonial power found in a number of capital cities, before turning to the varied relationships that the states of African independence and their capitals in particular have forged with these preceding colonial powers. Subsequently, we focus on the explosive surge of urbanisation experienced by African cities and the series of crises associated with urbanisation, before shifting our attention to a number of potentially beneficial urban projects dating from the 1990s. The chapter closes with reflections on capital cities within their national fabrics by assessing different levels of living within the capital city and comparing these experiences with the rest of the country. Throughout this chapter, we use our knowledge of other African capitals, as well as drawing from the monographic studies of capitals found within this publication.

What emerges from these compact monographic studies is a sense of the power of African capitals – and a sense of their powerlessness. Power, because almost all current capitals of Africa are political creations – pre-colonial in the case of Addis Ababa; colonial in most cases; postcolonial in the cases of Gaborone, Kigali and Nouakchott – urban creations that have grown because they are the location of national political power. Proximity to the centre of patronage and of redistribution, rather than of economic development, has driven the explosive growth of African capitals since independence, actually starting in the last, more inclusive decade

of colonialism. Between 1950 and 1990 the population of African capital cities increased more than tenfold (UN-HABITAT 2002: 4). Apart from the special history of South Africa and Johannesburg, few African countries have a major economic centre outside the political capital. Pointe-Noire in Congo-Brazzaville, Douala in Cameroon and Lagos in Nigeria after the recent establishment of Abuja, are exceptions. Nairobi, for example, generates 45% of Kenya's GDP, that is, it has a national economic role of about the same proportion as Lima and Bangkok.

But 'power over' is not the same thing as 'power to'. In terms of 'power to', our studies show a great amount of powerlessness. Powerlessness to implement one's own plans; powerlessness in front of massive immigration; in terms of pervasive informality and the basic service demands of exploding populations; powerlessness in front of ethnopolitical violence. Africa is the continent of slum cities.

According to the latest UN-HABITAT (2008a: 90) definition and estimates, 62% of sub-Saharan African urban residents live in slums, or rather in deprived housing.[1] The overall African slum rate is by far the highest in the world, followed by South Asia at 43%, although Bangladesh and Haiti, with about seven out of ten people living in slum conditions, can match several African countries. The North African situation, on the other hand, is much better, at only 15%. Within sub-Saharan Africa, urban slumming ranges from 18% in Zimbabwe and 29% in South Africa, to 97% in Sierra Leone and 94% in the Central African Republic. Among the larger states, slum living is the fate of 82% of the Ethiopian urban population, 76% of the DRC's and 66% of the Nigerian urban population. In Kenya, the home country of UN-HABITAT (2008a: 248), the prevalence is 55%. Among the southern capitals, Harare (6% slum habitation) stands out at the upper end, with Lilongwe (78%) and Luanda (75%) at the lower. Maputo had 66% living in slum conditions, Pretoria/Tshwane 56%. In Cape Town, more than one in four households lived in slum conditions in 2006 (Small 2006). In East Africa, the range is between Addis Ababa and Dar es Salaam at the bottom, with two-thirds of their households in slum conditions, and Nairobi – in spite of its huge slum areas – at the top with two-fifths. In between are Kampala and Kigali, at 50% (UN-HABITAT 2008b: 148, 106, respectively). The overall slum figures refer to 2005, and, except for Zimbabwe, there has been a significant improvement since the mid-1990s.

Nevertheless, the lack of urban services remains a striking feature of African cities, including the capitals. In 2008, less than a tenth of households in Lagos had access to piped water on the premises. The figure is 25% in Luanda, about a third in Addis Ababa and Kinshasa and 40% in Abuja. 90% of Luandans and 80% of people in Maputo had no waterborne sewerage. Only about half of the people in Lagos and Kinshasa had access to sewerage or latrines, and in Addis less than one household in ten. Among sub-Saharan African capitals, only Abuja provides every household with electricity (UN-HABITAT 2008b: Tables 5.3.1 and 6). Public transport is typically scarce or virtually non-existent (as in Kinshasa) and the street systems are rarely able to accommodate private traffic adequately.

Traces of colonial power

Although some modern nation states of sub-Saharan Africa, like Ghana, Mali and Zimbabwe, have adopted names of pre-colonial realms, the only non-colonial capital of sub-Saharan Africa is Addis Ababa, which, though founded just before the late 19th-century European scramble for Africa, was actually built as a reactive modernisation after the Italian invaders had been repelled in 1896. Any modern account of African capitals has to start with the colonial layer. Each of the colonial powers left its urban remnants or heritage – the British, the French, the Portuguese, the Belgians, the short-lived powers of Germany and Italy, and the marginal Spanish influence in today's oil-rich Equatorial Guinea.

There were commonalities of colonial power: most importantly, the segregation between the colonial city proper, primarily for the colonisers, with its modern layout and stone buildings serviced with water, sewerage and refuse collection, and the unserviced and informally built and laid out surroundings. The latter, for example, are the 'medina' in Dakar, the *cités* in Léopoldville/Kinshasa and the 'locations' and 'townships' around Pretoria, Cape Town and Johannesburg. Between the two was an open divide. In Belgian Congo this was defined as somewhat greater than the distance a mosquito could fly. The colonial capitals were located on the basis of their convenience for the export of commodities, which usually meant ports, occasionally river ports or, as in the case of Nairobi, high-level railway stations. Gold in Johannesburg, on the other hand, represented the commodity itself. Colonial power was expressed in dominant public buildings, often city halls, as in Lourenço Marques, Luanda and Abidjan. Governors' palaces were often in reclusive off-centres, as in Nairobi, Salisbury and Accra. Although in Lusaka, for instance, the colonial rulers held it essential for Africans to be able to see the Governor's Village frequently (Myers 2003: 65). The governors' buildings were usually relatively modest by European standards. The Union Buildings of Pretoria – by Herbert Baker, who later built Government House in Nairobi – is an exception, although dwarfed by the somewhat later vice-regal palace in New Delhi (as Mabin points out in Chapter 10). The British journalist Michaela Wrong has given a devastating summary of the British colonial legacy of housing power. She describes the governors' palaces – now state buildings – of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia: 'Behind the white-pillared porticoes…these buildings are resolutely dowdy…The overall impression is of a dusty members' club crossed with a gloomy British country pub' Wrong (2009: 33).

The colonial order created its own urban system and hierarchy of colonial cities. Dakar was developed into the centre of French power in sub-Saharan Africa. Dakar was backed up by equatorial Brazzaville, which was then superseded after World War II by Belgian Léopoldville across the river (described in a Brazzavillean song as *poto moyindo,* 'the Europe of Blacks' [Lelo Nzuzi 2008: 17]). Brazzaville was subsequently challenged in urban significance from the 1950s by economically prospering Abidjan. The British colonial centres were Lagos in the west, Nairobi in the east and Salisbury/Harare in central Africa. In Portuguese Africa, Luanda was the prime city, located inside the scenic *Avenida Marginal* (an echo of the

Avenida Atlantica in Rio on the other side of the ocean), but was not functionally superordinate to Lourenço Marques/Maputo. The latter was instead something of a seaside resort for Johannesburg. Under Belgian rule, Bujumbura governed both Ruanda and Burundi, but was an outpost to Léopoldville.

There were also important inter-colonial differences, deriving both from different metropole administrative traditions deployed in the various colonies and from different conceptions of urbanism and architecture. There was, for instance, the British garden city concept, with its spread out villas, which influenced the layouts of Nairobi, Harare and Lusaka, and was also applied in Cape Town. Then there were the compact continental European cities of Dakar and Abidjan, both on their high plateaux; Léopoldville on two hills along the left banks of the Congo; and Maputo and Luanda with their 'high' and 'low' cities, separate from the African suburbs, as is also the case with Dar es Salaam. In architecture, the brief German rule of Tanganyika left solid, enduring government buildings, still used, and prominent churches in the city centre. The French in Dakar created in the interwar period a 'neo-Sudanese' style, inspired by the famous mosque of Djennë, resulting, among others, in a Catholic cathedral with a mosque-and-minarets style (Shaw 2006). The Italians turned Asmara into a showpiece of interwar international modernism (Denison et al. 2003), but left much less of an impact on Addis, although there is the Italian-named *mercato*, which is still used. Malabo and Bata, the political and economic capitals of current Equatorial Guinea, were built as Andalusian-style towns centred on the *ayuntamiento* (city hall) surrounded by houses with wrought-iron balconies and patios. Addis Ababa retains its coeval non-colonial legacy, although Emperor Menelik relied on modern contributions by European engineers and Indian craftsmen in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is revealed in the imperial, now presidential, palace, the Saint George Cathedral and the pattern of servants' and poor retainers' quarters (originally circular huts with thatched conical roofs) next to the hill palaces of the wealthy and powerful.

The colonial powers also left very different state-municipality relations, with more local autonomy and resources provided in the British Empire colonies than those of the Latin Europeans, with their Napoleonic administrative centralism. Thus in the 2000s, total local public expenditure in ex-French colonies Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal and Togo amounts to less than 1% of national GDP, and in Mali only 0.25%. In ex-British Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe, by contrast, local public expenditure makes up 3 to 5% of those countries' GDP (Kersting et al 2009: 131).

Colonialism is obviously central to any urban focus on power and politics. However, a broader view of African urban history would have to take a much wider cultural perspective, including the Arab-Islamic influences in East Africa and along the savannah belt; the Indian influx into East Africa (Indians made up a third of Nairobi's population in 1962); Levantine traders in West Africa; and contributions of non-colonial Europeans, like Greek café owners in Addis and shopkeepers in Léopoldville. There are also the strong indigenous urban traditions in West Africa, with big modern cities, such as Ibadan and Kano. A significant layer of

such traditions are also found in largely colonial cities like Lagos and Lomé. In his excellent comparison of Lomé and Harare, Gervais-Lambony (1994) notices the huge lingering differences between the successor of white-settler Salisbury (Harare) and Lomé, where the German and then French colonial powers recognised existing African property rights, leaving the city of Lomé with a central African market and relatively little spatial segregation. Furthermore, there is the influence of former slave returnees to Africa and their descendants not only in Liberia and in Sierra Leone, but also in other West African cities, including Lomé and Lagos, with its Saro (Sierra Leonian) town and Brazilian quarter.

Aside from colonial power, there is a rich cosmopolitan urban tradition in Africa, generating new languages of inter-ethnic communication, like Swahili in the east, Lingala in the lower Congo and the pidginised Fanagalo of the mining communities of Johannesburg. And there are long chains of musical influence and inspiration (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1991; Freund 2007). One example of modern extra-colonial African urbanism is the cultural intertwining of Brazzaville and Kinshasa, on opposite banks of the Congo River – expressed in Afro-Latin rumba, a common obsession with fashion and communication in Lingala – which was sustained by varying streams of economic exchanges during those countries' series of postcolonial disasters (Balandier 1985; Gondola 1996; Martin 1995; Tati, Chapter 7, this volume). A second example is found in urban South Africa where *marabi* music, the Cape Minstrels and South African jazz have been important elements in forging non-colonial urban identities (Martin 2008).

African nationalism and its relation to colonialism

The states of African independence have had a very varied relationship with their preceding colonial powers. This has ranged from amicable relations with the coloniser on a formal level in francophone Africa from 1960 (Guinea excluded) – two years after the elites of those countries had opted to remain in a French 'union' – to the break out of protracted armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), and the long combat against the settler colonialism of South Africa. In between are several variants: complex configurations of militancy, including armed struggle in Kenya, negotiations in British Africa, and the abrupt surrender of the Belgians in Congo, Ruanda and Burundi. African nationalism usually developed in the colonial capitals, like Lagos and Accra. Several of the first African presidents were city mayors: Sékou Touré of Conakry, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Abidjan, Sylvanus Olympo of Lomé and Joseph Kasa-Vubu of one of the communes of Léopoldville.

The new capitals of independent Africa dealt with their colonial legacy in different ways, as did the capitals of ex-colonial Asia before them, with the cities on both continents reflecting different paths to independence. Brazzaville in the 1960s, still named after its colonial founder, was perhaps the epitome of continuity, as indicated by Tati in Chapter 7, later reflected by the country's policy of post-socialist liberalism. In 2006, a year after the centenary of his birth, the Congolese government brought

the bones of Pierre Savorgan de Brazza back from Senegal to a new mausoleum.[2] There was no rupture from the colonial past in French West Africa either, as the example of Dakar shows in Chapter 3, to which the monument to the Senegalese riflemen who served in France in World War I still testifies (although there has been debate about how and when they should be remembered). Critics have recently argued that the French massacre of war veterans protesting against non-payment in December 1944 should be remembered, but the current president of Senegal, Wade, decided otherwise. The riflemen are officially remembered for their contribution to the 'free world'.

Maputo and Harare, on the other hand, shed their colonial names, Lourenço Marques and Salisbury, respectively, and embarked on a new monumentality and toponymy – Marxist-Leninist in Maputo, pan-Africanist in Harare. In independent Harare, Cecil Rhodes was immediately removed, and the Mugabe regime took help from the most monumentalist regime in the world, North Korea, to build an enormous shrine and cemetery in memory of the anti-colonial war, the Heroes Acre. Léopoldville became Kinshasa in 1966, after the Mobutu coup, and *Place du Trône* became *Place de la Nation*, as in Paris. Occasionally, the new country needed to build a capital, as was the case in Bechuanaland (later Botswana), which had been administered from Mafikeng, South Africa; in Mauritania, administered from Saint Louis, French Senegal; and in Belgian Ruanda, administered from Bujumbura, Burundi. Hastings Banda of Malawi built a new government centre closer to his main ethnic base in Lilongwe, with help from apartheid South Africa, as a kind of campus outside the native city and with the presidential palace in protected isolation far from the city.

Apart from a general celebration of national independence, in monumental forms and in the naming of important streets and squares, African capitals have few features in common in terms of their national iconography. Their toponymy has a continental flavour – most frequently referring to political leaders of other African countries – which can also be found in the Americas, but is rare in Asia and Europe. Summits of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have typically provided occasions for major monumental buildings, from Addis Ababa to Conakry. In the new capitals of Abuja and Dodoma, parliament is the impressive building, in Lilongwe it is the complex of ministries. The ex-imperial presidential palace in Addis is centrally located and clearly visible in its vast hilltop compound. New, is an imposing modernist city hall. The parade ground of the Mengistu regime remains, de-sloganised, as well as the 'struggle' obelisk (Hancock 1995; Zewde 2002).

The first two leaders of black African independence, Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré, had very different symbolic visions. Nkrumah had a huge bronze statue of himself made by the state artist of Liberia, as early as 1956, when he was prime minister of the still British Gold Coast. Independent Ghana was provided with a major parade ground in Accra, Black Star Square, complete with a presidential stand and a Roman-style Independence Arch. A new State House was built, but in the old colonial compound of Christiansborg Castle – of Danish origin, as the name indicates (the same name as the palace that today houses the Danish parliament).

Following Nkrumah's increasingly authoritarian tendencies, the construction of a new parliament was postponed and the site used for an OAU building. Although there was a nationalist promotion of traditionalist culture, in architecture, international-style modernism became the idiom of Accra's National Museum and of the state and party buildings (Hess 2000, 2006). Sékou Touré, by contrast, built and erected very little and resided in the old governor's palace in Conakry, as Odile Goerg describes in Chapter 2. A sober stela to the martyrs of the nation replaced the colonial war memorial. The Chinese built a huge assembly hall, the People's Palace, and the Soviets a stadium with a name referring to the referendum of independence.

Lomé and Nairobi also represent two different national trajectories. Gervais-Lambony in Chapter 4 distinguishes three periods of postcolonial monumentality in Lomé: the First Republic with its Independence Square and its monument and parliament; second, the personal cult of General Eyadéma and his party regime; and third, the semi-democracy after his death, with the removal of his and his mother's statues and the conversion of the party building into a convention centre. Nairobi, on the other hand, is a rare example of change with symbolic continuity (Owuor & Mbatia in Chapter 8; Wrong 2009). The colonial government district is reinvented as establishing the institutions of the nation and of the national capital, with a paternal statue of the first president, Kenyatta, in the middle, and with the Kenyatta Conference Centre added on. Elsewhere in the central city, the second president, Arap Moi, and his slogans are amply commemorated. Central Park has become Uhuru ('Freedom') Park, and harbours a modest official parade stand and Freedom's Corner. Several nationalist African regimes took initially, and for some time, a ruralist, anti-urban stand, devoting little interest to the capital. This was also the case with the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Mozambique and Angola, and in Nyerere's Tanzania. The relative monumental restraint of Mugabe, who has always had primarily a rural base, is also noteworthy, with the exceptions of the Heroes Acre and the naming of the commercial main street, Mugabe Road. There is no central monument to the ruler, and the ruling-party headquarters, for instance, is a mediocre, medium-sized office building with nothing of the flair of Eyadéma's party building in Lomé. Mobutu took the Belgian monuments and main street names out of his capital, renamed Kinshasa. But he had as little a symbolic programme as a political one. He did start a big monumental complex south of the city centre. First, it was announced as a homage to Patrice Lumumba, Congo's murdered first prime minister, but Mobutu changed his mind, and sometimes it was referred to as a monument of independence. However, it was never finished. What remains is a tall, slender concrete landmark tower with a set of big copper cups and a golden spire on top, now known as *l'Échangeur* ('the switch'), and a long, bridge-like ramp of concrete (Fumunzanza 2008: 163 ff.).

The democratic movement in South Africa has followed two major symbolic tracks. One is a major toponymical change, replacing a large number of European city names with African ones, including the government capital, which changed from Pretoria to Tshwane. The other is more conciliatory, with the retention of virtually all the apartheid monuments, but adding on new democratic ones. The imposing

Voortrekker monumental complex outside Pretoria/Tshwane, commemorating the Boer exodus from the British Cape Colony and the defeat of the Zulus in the Battle of Blood River – a celebration of Afrikaner ascendancy after World War II – is to be balanced by Freedom Park on a hill nearby. The latter, inaugurated in December 2006, but not quite completed in December 2009, has nothing of the heroic bombast of the former. It features a Wall of Names that commemorates the victims of colonial and apartheid wars and violence, from the Dutch 17th-century conquest onwards, and a Resting Place of Spirits, with a symbolism referring to, inter alia, the nine provinces of the South African Union and, as a tenth participant, 'the international community'. The day of the Boer Blood River massacre victory, December 16, has been renamed as the Day of Reconciliation and Nation Building.

Inside the city, the historical African Chief Tshwane now stands as a statue outside City Hall, a stone's throw from the first president of the Boer Transvaal, the son of the Pretorius who gave the city its first name. The clumsy, expensive system of a government capital and a parliamentary one, Cape Town, originally a day-and-half's train journey from each other, which was part of the white Union of South Africa, of the British and the Afrikaners, has been retained by democratic South Africa, perhaps for other geopolitical reasons, as Mabin indicates in Chapter 10.

Capital city toponymy, or street nomenclature, is an interesting ideological indicator. Africa is a receptacle of many different external political and ideological influences, which is often expressed in remarkable juxtapositions of street and place names. In Dakar, for instance, the *Avenue Fedayin* continues into *Avenue G. Pompidou*, which leads on to that of Hassan II, and *Avenue Faidherbe* (the French conquistador) gives onto *Place Cabral*. The colonial and the anticolonial interconnect. In Abuja, Winston Churchill, Tito Broz, Mao Zedong, Charles de Gaulle and Jimmy Carter all share the same neighbourhood. In another, a street named after Lenin runs between J.F. Kennedy and Queen Elizabeth II. And all the Nigerian presidents have their central streets there, even those military thieves from whose heirs the Nigerian government has tried to retrieve stolen funds stacked away in Swiss banks. In Dar es Salaam, it is Africa's political leaders who share pride of street-name place: Nkrumah, Samora Machel and, latterly, Nelson Mandela.

Architecturally, independence sometimes heralded, like in India, the arrival of modernism, as in Nkrumahist Accra, as we have just noticed, and later in Tanzania (ArchAfrika Projekt 2004), for example. In Nigeria, it was successfully translated into what was known as tropical modernism, deployed in central Lagos (when it still was the capital), and reaching its iconic peak in the university library of Ibadan (Elleh 2001; Immerwahr 2007).

Urban growth explosion and crises

Like Latin America about 150 years earlier, the independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa did not have a happy childhood. One disaster after another rolled over the continent in the last third of the 20th century – collapsing commodity prices,

colonial wars, Cold War interference, local political megalomania, ruthless imports or impositions of ill-adapted dogmas of political economy from Marxism-Leninism to neo-liberalism, massive violence, even genocide, kleptocracy, AIDS, and so on. There is no need to repeat the horror story here, nor is there any space to try to explain it. What may be underlined in this context is that it was under these dark clouds that the African capitals saw their populations swelling and their national primacy further enhanced. This is a configuration opposite to the economic growth and employment-fuelled expansion of Latin American capitals a century ago.

The post-independence growth of African capitals has no historical equivalent. A couple of illustrations suffice: between 1960 and 1978, Abidjan grew from 180 000 inhabitants to 1.27 million (Dubresson 1997: 264); Kinshasa, between 1960 and 1980, grew from 476 000 to 2.41 million (Fumunzanza 2008: 61), a sevenfold and fivefold increase in 18 and 20 years, respectively. The annual growth rate in Abidjan was 11–12%; Lusaka achieved 14% in the 1960s; and Dar es Salaam 10% (Potts 1997: 468–469).

By comparison, Buenos Aires grew by around 5% a year from l869 to 1914, from 813 000 in l895 to 2.33 million in 1914 (Gutman & Hardoy 2007: 346). Berlin, the then fastest-growing European capital, had a growth rate little more than 3%, and took 60 years to increase its population fivefold (1850–1910) (Lees & Lees 2007: 287); Chicago took 30 years (1870–1900) (D'Eramo 2002: 44). In Asia, Jakarta grew from 1.78 million in 1952 to 6.48 million in 1980 (Abeyasekere 1987: 171), with an annual rate in the 1960s of about one-third of Lusaka's (Forbes 2004: 273); and Seoul grew from 1.57 million in 1955 to 9.64 million 30 years later (Kim 2004: 62).

This unprecedented urban growth was primarily politically driven: public-employment opportunities in the new states (Rogerson 1997: 344), financial gain from commodity rents, growth in urban education and increasing urban-rural differentials in standards of living. 'Everybody goes to where the state is', as the mayor of Noukchott, the post-independence capital of Mauritania, recently put it.[3] There was little industrialisation or any other labour-demanding urban economy. When the current economic crisis hit hard, the urban immigration rates did go down, but continued massively. Kinshasa went from 2.4 million in 1980 to 6 million in 2000, and Abidjan added another million between 1978 and 1991, reaching a population of 2.28 million.

Politics, moreover, was not only pulling Africans to their capitals, it was also pushing them there, as a refuge from civil wars, from rural banditry and from an economically collapsing countryside. Escaping from war was a major reason for urbanisation, raising Luanda's population from 475 000 in 1970 to about 2 million in 1990, as Paul Jenkins points out in Chapter 9. Kinshasa and Abidjan have had the same experience. However, sometimes the civil wars reached the capital itself (Freetown in 1999, Monrovia in 2002/3, for instance). Brazzaville was actually the centre of conflict in its country in 1993/94, in 1997 and again in 2000. Kinshasa was violently looted in 1991 and in 1993, and became a battlefield in August 1998.

The economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s drastically diminished the formal economy. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, cities like Léopoldville and Lagos were cities of workers and employees. In 1958, a good 70% of the male population of Léopoldville aged 15 and over were wage earners (La Fontaine 1970: 48), and in 1963, 40% of the Lagos labour force were production or transport workers (Baker 1974: 41; cf. O'Connor 1983: chapter 5). During this period, African cities became leaders in the global trend of informalisation of urban labour markets into self-employment and precarious employment (National Research Council 2003: 331–340). While Léopoldville in 1958 had 86 000 wage and salary earners out of 380 000 inhabitants, Kinshasa in 2002 had somewhat less than 120 000 (in the formal economy) with a population of 6.5 million (Fumunzanza 2008: 61–66). Another example is provided by indices of the minimum wage. If the index was 100 in 1974 in Ghana, it was 12 in 1984; if 100 in Tanzania in 1972, it was 18 in 1989; and if 100 in 1981 in Nigeria, it was 10 in 1990 (Potts 1997: 452). As a consequence, urban labour forces in capital cities in Africa include substantially more self-employed, rather than wage-employed, adults than was the case earlier. This is due both to the casualisation and informalisation of labour and to changes in the nature of urbanisation. These labour forces also include more women than earlier.

The cities were powerless in the face of problems posed by this avalanche of fleeing immigrants and of informally employed residents. Their resources were collapsing as the formal economy diminished and IMF demands to cut public employment increased. State bankruptcies became common. Service delivery – water, sewerage, waste removal, housing delivery and, critically, public transport – was taken over by informal groups. As the monographic chapters in this publication demonstrate, even before the crisis, urban plans were sparsely implemented in post-World War II Africa, and the current crisis swept them away. It was now that Africa became the continent of slums. But the crisis and its effects were nevertheless managed by the state – the central state – not the city. African capitals and other big cities did not collapse into general misery. They polarised, between the large, impoverished majority and a tiny political clique around the president and around business protégés of the president, with sumptuous, well-guarded villas, ample private services, a fleet of awe-inspiring SUVs and luxury cars, and shopping sprees and bank accounts abroad. Political power has in this way become the crucial agency of social polarisation. The ruthlessness with which political posts are fought for, even under electoral auspices, is rational, given how much wealth and privilege is at stake.

Most African states degenerated into kleptocracies and systems of corruption – Mobutu of Zaire/DRC and Abacha of Nigeria were probably the fattest of the fat cats. 'Eating' is the term used in Kenya for this type of political pillage (Wrong 2009), and one of the classic analyses of the African state in the 1970s and 1980s called it 'the politics of the stomach' (Bayart 1989). There was no bureaucratic tradition in sub-Saharan Africa, neither pre-colonial nor, with a few exceptions – such as the four communes of French Senegal – colonial, as very little of an African civil service or professional officer corps was developed. Nor had there been much, if any, urban planning in the neighbourhoods of the colonised countries. The chieftaincy survived

the colonial regime, strengthened by the 'indirect rule' of the latter, but could not sustain any national aristocracy, even less one with any sense of noblesse oblige. The colonial example was that wealth could be acquired mainly from political power and its connections – exceptions were some foreign minorities of Levantine merchants in the west, South Asians in the east, and some small commercial African groups of West African traders and Ivory Coast cocoa farmers. In brief, the independent African states and their capitals had precious little constructive experience and precious few positive or adequate models to go by in the dark decades of the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa, the apartheid and racist white regime, stood out during this time as the antithesis of the way forward. Accordingly, the field was opened to power-grabbers of various kinds, convinced that now it was their 'turn to eat'. The socialist attempts ran aground with leaders' disconnect from the native peasantry – rigidified by an uncritical import of Soviet or Maoist orthodoxy – and the lack of cadres capable of running a socialist state. Independent Africa became a field of failed ideological experiments, of ill-adapted and ill-understood ideological and institutional imports from abroad, of 'scientific socialism' and Marxist-Leninist workers' parties in the 1960s and 1970s, of neo-liberal 'structural adjustment' in the 1980s and 1990s.

However, the pervasive mismanagement, corruption, incompetence and uncontrolled violence are also making these regimes precarious and vulnerable, and their international economic and political weakness subject to external pressures and susceptible to international ideological currents. The breakdown of urban infrastructure and services has not meant a disappearance of urbanism, in spite of city agriculture and a rustic lack of sanitation. Fashion awareness and nightlife entertainment are present, as well as street children. 'Kinshasa is a big bar', says one of its local cognoscenti (Nlandu 2002: 189). The city is the home of what one of its leading musicians has called the '*société des ambianceurs et des personnes élégantes*' (or SAPE) – a 'society of fun lovers and elegant persons' (De Boeck 2002). Francis Nyamnjoh has also captured both the cultural awareness and disenchantment of urban youth in West and southern Africa (Nyamnjoh 2004). Under more democratic conditions and some relief from economic crises, a more organised urbanism may begin to redevelop rapidly.

African urban renaissance

Africa was hit badly both by a global crisis of plummeting commodity prices, and by bad neo-liberal advice of structural adjustment, including devastating admonitions to charge for primary education and basic healthcare. And, thirdly, by domestic kleptocracy, of which the Cold War US – and, therefore, World Bank – hero, Mobutu, was the unrivalled master, and which the Nigerian military rulers successfully emulated. Enormous sums of money were wasted, and ended up in European outlets. In spite of all this, Africa continued to develop, and from 1990 a number of capital city projects have actually materialised and moved forward. One of the most significant is the new capital of the largest country of sub-Saharan

Africa, the new capital of Nigeria, Abuja, although it may not, as Adebanwi argues in Chapter 6, have achieved its official national goal of a 'centre of unity'. The languishing, even if intentionally much more modest, new Tanzanian capital project of Dodoma got a push from Chinese assistance in the mid-2000s, and managed to complete a new parliament building on schedule. It has become a real town with some public functions, in contrast to Houphouët-Boigny's megalomaniac project for his native village, Yamoussoukro, of which little more is left than the gigantic basilica (Elleh 2002). Burkina Faso is building a new political capital, a second Ougadougou outside the old one.

There is also a roster of recent, more modest capital-city developments of note. Accra has improved in many respects under democratic rule, and its once famous university is reviving. Mali's democratically elected archaeologist president, Alpha Konaré, adorned Bamako – until then a large village with a few imposing donor buildings from a bygone era of Soviet, Yugoslavian and Maoist Chinese influence – by paying homage to martyrs of democracy (during the 1991 demonstrations), as well as to national independence. New artefacts include a pedagogic historical mural, beginning with the French conqueror General Faidherbe and ending with Mali's first, and subsequently very unpopular, President Modibo Keita (Arnoldi 2003). A similar historical mural has been painted in Kampala, celebrating the National Resistance Movement of current President Museveni and the constitution, depicting prosperity and joy following upon his victory. Nairobi still has some of the largest slums of the continent, sites of recent post-electoral ethnic violence, but it never broke down like many other African cities, and in recent years, at least, its centre has been upgraded significantly, with good bus transport, functioning public telephones and even a couple of clean public toilets. In 2008, as Owuor and Mbatia describe in Chapter 8, the city announced a grand vision for 2030, for it to become a 'world-class metropolis'. On the other side of the continent, Lagos and Abuja have also presented high-flying long-term visions: Lagos, for example, attempting to position itself as a major tourist destination. Brazzaville, in turn, has announced its ambition to become a financial centre, a distant hope also of Rwanda's Kigali. Until the global financial crisis hit around the turn of 2008/9, the 2000s had been an improved decade for Africa, with substantial economic growth in many countries. In the cities, this has translated into a notable de-slumming, and into waves of new office and (mainly) upper-class residential construction, and tourism. The construction boom has been remarkable, not only in places like Nairobi, Abuja and Accra, but also in generally less resourceful cities, from Brazzaville to Conakry and Dakar. Awash with oil money, Luanda – where immediately after independence in 1974, according to Jean Daniel, then editor of *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 'nothing, absolutely nothing, functions' – is being presented by an Angolan public relations publication, put out by the national oil company, as a 'West African Dubai' under construction (Redvers 2008). Another publicity endeavour touts it as an African Miami, where trees have been imported to the *Avenida Marginal* along the ocean.

It is too early to tell to what extent these ambitions will be achieved. So far, it is clear that African cities have not yet escaped their cycle of postcolonial crises. Commodity

prices keep swinging up and down. The Wall Street-generated crisis of 2008/9 did hurt African exports and investments. However, it seems that most African economies were hit much less than the rich economies or than eastern Europe, still courted as they are by Chinese and Indian import interests. The new flourish of Nairobi was damaged by the ethnopolitical riots after the fraudulent presidential election of 2007. The promise of a free South Africa pioneering new regional economic and political initiatives was dealt a severe blow by extensive xenophobic violence aimed at foreign African migrants in the capital and large cities of the country in mid-2008 (Bekker 2010). The grandiose plans for Abuja, laid out in 2008 by the federal minister for the capital territory, are running into doubt, as he has recently been replaced.

Capital cities in their national and regional contexts

In terms of living standards, African capitals are usually very different from the rest of the nation. Abuja is known by its admirers as the most developed part of Nigeria. Although the evidence is mixed, the main picture, in this book and elsewhere, is that urban dwellers are better off than rural, and capital and big-city residents best off on average. They have lower mortality rates, their children are less stunted and wasted by malnutrition, they have more children at school, better housing and less poverty. The urban poor tend to be less disadvantaged than the rural poor (National Research Council 2003: 272 ff.; UN-HABITAT 2008a: 85). The capital attraction is thus quite rational, in spite of the lack of services and steady employment.

These are average figures, however, and inequality is considerably higher in African cities than in the African countryside. South African cities are among the most unequal in the world, Johannesburg with a Gini coefficient of 75 and Pretoria/Tshwane of 72 (UN-HABITAT 2008a: 72). The inhabitants of Johannesburg and Tshwane are thereby more unequal than the households of the whole planet, having an estimated Gini coefficient of 70 (Milanovic 2008: 427). Staggering urban inequality is not only a legacy of apartheid. It can also follow from an expanded reproduction of colonial dualism. In Abidjan, for instance, district investment per capita in the richest, already well-provided-for neighbourhood, the Plateau, was 43 times higher than in poor, unserviced Attécoubé in 1990 (Dubresson 1997: 287). Lagos state, which is less than the whole Lagos agglomeration, has a higher incidence of poverty than Nigeria, but Abuja is much below the national rate (National Bureau of Statistics 2006: Table 5). The Nairobi slums have higher infant and child mortality rates than the Kenyan countryside (National Research Council 2003: 286).

In political terms, the African capitals are national cities, run either directly by, or closely supervised by, the national government – Abuja, for example, by a federal ministry. But because of the ethnic diversity of the African nations, the capital usually had a particular ethnic mark or location. Lagos and Nairobi, for instance, may have been cosmopolitan, but primarily they were Yoruba and Kikuyu cities, respectively. Lomé was Ewe-Mina. In Kinshasa, the lingua franca is Lingala, a language which Presidents Kabila Sr and Jr did and do not speak. With huge urban immigration, populations have become much more ethnically mixed, which, in turn, may create

its own problems, as in the vicious ethnic riots in the Nairobi slums of Kibera and Mathare in 2007/8 or in the civil war in Brazzaville in the 1990s. Kampala is ethnically dominated by the Baganda, who have kept their own pre-colonial royal traditions, whereas the Museveni government has its main support among more peripheral peoples of Uganda. The core of Baganda traditional institutions are located in the Mengo district, which has municipal autonomy from the rest of Kampala. The centre of the Zimbabwean opposition, for instance, is in Ndebele Bulawayo, whereas Harare is situated in Shonaland, a region that is Mugabe's power base – although the capital itself has developed into another oppositional stronghold. That the capital may be a national centre of the opposition – as well as, by definition, of the government – is well known from modern European history – social democratic-cum-Wilhelmine Berlin being a case in point. In Africa, it is also the case of Lusaka, of Lagos during its capital period, of Nairobi in the 1990s, of Addis Ababa in the 2000s and in the very bitter, high-stake struggle for power between the mayor of Antananarivo and the president of Madagascar in 2008/9. Where there is a certain duality of power between an entrenched regime and a persistent opposition, the capital may be de facto a divided political space, as in Lomé, or earlier in Brazzaville.

African capitals are all deeply embedded in the layers of their national history. None of them is a 'global' or 'world' city in the manner of currently predominant urbanist discourse. However, they are not cut off, and never have been, from the rest of world. In their own way, they are 'worlded', in the felicitous term of Abdou Maliq Simone (2001), or hooked into various networks of transport, migration and communication. Nor are their locations static, but changing economically and culturally. Dakar is currently reasserting its colonial status as the regional capital of francophone West Africa, benefiting from the continuous strife of Abidjan, which after independence, became the economic capital of the region. The federal minister of Abuja, as well as the elected governor of Lagos, both harbour plans for new landmarks. Similarly, Nairobi is bouncing back as the capital of anglophone East Africa with a new, much better urban management. UN-HABITAT (2008b: 127) is lavishing praise on the appointed governor of Addis Ababa. In southern Africa, Harare is rapidly losing out, inter alia, to Luanda. In West Africa, the so-called Greater Ibadan-Lagos-Accra Urban Corridor, connecting Lomé and Cotonou within the network, is already becoming a regional metropolitan reality.

Mainstream *miserabiliste* views of African cities pay no attention to political symbolism and urban iconography, and in the context of abject misery and jarring inequalities it may even appear frivolous to take notice of them. However, as our studies, and specialised art and architecture studies, show, the symbolic investments of urban space constitute significant aspects of African capital-city life. In 2002, Kinshasa finally got a monument to the first prime minister of independent Congo, the murdered Patrice Lumumba, 36 years after his official rehabilitation by Mobutu. Eight years later, Lumumba's enemy, Kasa-Vubu, the first president, also got a monument, in a smart gesture by the Katanga-based Kabila regime towards the Bakongo people, whose leader Kasa-Vubu had been. By unofficial initiative, the colonial memorial to the veterans of World War II has been refurbished into a

commemoration that includes the postcolonial combatants of the wars of the 1990s (Fumunzanza 2008: 136–137). Kinshasa's main sports and political rally ground is known as the *Stade des Martyrs*. Not only do rulers take them very seriously, pleading with foreign donors and spending a lot of money on such iconography, but they are also often the focus of popular contestation, rallying centres of protest as well as government celebration. Statues are fought about, for or against, and, as shown by Gervais-Lambony in the case of Lomé, names and name changes are hot politics, most recently exemplified by the case of Pretoria/Tshwane. More than 30 years after its construction, the national meaning of Abuja remains controversial. And iconography can take many forms. The current construction of two luxury mixed-use residential towers in one of the main public squares of Dakar, the Place Soweto, dwarfing both the famous, now sparse IFAN Museum of colonial pseudo-Sudanese style, the National Assembly, and even the presidential palace nearby, tells us something important about current power in Senegal.

The importance of such symbolism in poor countries and cities is actually what political theory and political history should lead us to expect. Colonial powers asserted their conquerors' legitimacy by building separate, 'modern' cities and through monumental buildings of imperial power, religion and modern transport, as we have noted above. Colonialism made nationalism into the central political force of modern Africa. Nationalism is intrinsically a symbolic movement. National independence everywhere in Africa involved major symbolic changes, although initially less so in parts of francophone Africa, including pioneering Guinea-Conakry, than in the rest. In many countries of independent Africa, politics soon became heavily ideologised, high on imported ready-made ideologies. These ideologies strongly influenced the cityscapes of Lomé, Brazzaville, Addis Ababa, among others, and shaped the toponymy of central Maputo. The ensuing move to capitalism entailed hauling down the red flags and removing local dictator homages, as in Addis Ababa – although Marxism-Leninism still appears on the major street names of capitalist Maputo, and Mao Zedong and Kim Il-Sung still meet on one street corner, signalling the continuation of the political elite. However, it also meant a new urban look, of corporate towers, closed condominiums and international business hotels. The politics of market economies is also in need of public symbols, as manifested in Bamako, Dakar and Accra, no less than in post-apartheid South Africa. The capital of Ghana, for instance, mutated from rejection to historicising the personality cult of Kwame Nkrumah, by erecting a mausoleum in 1992 and moving his 1956 statue there. In 2008, the city was ready to inaugurate a new State House, as a modernist version of a traditional Asante royal stool. While the Millennium Gate in Dakar, opening out to the ocean, already had a somewhat abandoned look in September 2008, an anonymous footballer on the city's Corniche is an interesting addition to African symbolism, in which sports stadiums also often function as important political meeting grounds, an established convention in post-apartheid South Africa.

African cities on the world map

The ambition of this book has been to put on a world map the capital cities of sub-Saharan Africa, their national politics and representation, as well as their urban history, urban growth and urban services (or lack of them). The monographic studies and the concluding overview have covered West, Central, East and southern Africa, and British, French, Portuguese and Boer colonialisms, with some mention of German, Italian and Spanish legacies, as well as of the unique non-colonial Ethiopian heritage. African capitals add a new experience to the global geology of cities, to postcolonial and post-imperial urban history and to the political economy and culture of continental connections and competition.

These capital cities reflect both the attraction of power, as the designated centres of national government and administrative authority, with their patronage of education and access to jobs, and the powerlessness of cities in the face of explosive urbanisation, economic precariousness-cum-informality, soaring service needs and frustrated individual and collective violent behaviour.

African cities are also outstanding examples of urban resilience during devastating crises and against incredible odds. Kinshasa, for instance, arguably the urban heart of African darkness, has kept up its cultural vibrancy through music, religion, fashion – and simply daredevil entertainment. Its university managed to survive the abyss of the Mobutu regime and its long agony, and is now reviving (cf. Trefon 2004). Urban renaissance projects are thriving, from Dakar to Nairobi, from Addis to Luanda. Spectacular new urban designs are developing, from Nigerian Abuja to the transformation of apartheid Pretoria into multicultural African Tshwane. This urban resilience is another remarkable African contribution to urban studies of the world.

Notes

1 UN-HABITAT (2008a: 106) defines 'slum condition' as deprivation of improved water, improved sanitation, sufficient living area, durable housing, and/or secure tenure, and a slum area in which half or more of all households live under such conditions. ('Improved' may be rather modest by international urban standards, and refers to access to water from a bored well or a standpipe and sanitation by latrine.)

2 Reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, 30 November 2006.

3 Mandraud I, *Nouakchott, première capitale née africaine, Le Monde*, 23 December 2010.

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

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

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

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

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