



**Thèse**

**Présentée par**

**Joseph MBENOH**

**WUAKOH**

**INSTITUT DES RELATIONS  
INTERNATIONALES DU  
CAMEROUN**

**Domestic economic relations as a  
determinant of the foreign policy  
orientation and behaviour of the  
developing state : an empirical and  
comparative study of Cameroon,  
1960-1982**

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**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING STATE :  
THE CAMEROONIAN EXPERIENCE, 1960 - 1982**

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BY :

Joseph MBENOH WUAKOH

Supervised by :

Jean Emmanuel PONDI (Ph.D)

*Senior Lecturer in International Relations (IRIC)*

Programme de Petites Subventions

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«The true nature of the struggle taking place in [Cameroon]. Africa and the world today, between [the rich and the poor, between the «North» and the «South»] the forces of reaction and those of progress, is in the ultimate analysis a struggle of the common man against injustice and privilege»

Kwame Nkrumah : *Class struggle in Africa*,  
(New York, International Publishers, 1970), p. 26

TO

LATE Peter AKEMDA WUAKOH

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R E S U M E

Dans le cadre d'une étude comparative, cette thèse s'inspire de l'expérience Camerounaise entre 1960 et 1982 afin d'étudier l'incidence du sous-développement économique tant sur l'option de politique étrangère que sur le comportement d'un pays en voie de développement sur la scène internationale.

L'Objectif premier de notre étude est de démontrer que les facteurs économiques influencent de manière significative la politique étrangère et/ou le comportement des pays en voie de développement sur la scène internationale puisque la majorité de leurs transactions extérieures interviennent dans le domaine privilégié des échanges économiques traditionnellement traité de "Fonctionnalisme".

L'étude de la politique étrangère d'un pays exige une analyse approfondie tant des actes, des échecs du pays concerné que des propositions pouvant servir de base pour son action sur la scène internationale. Ainsi, si la préoccupation primordiale dans une étude de politique étrangère est l'identification et l'examen des paramètres qui justifient le comportement d'un état sur le plan international, notre étude, pour sa part, se propose de prouver que les mobiles économiques de la politique extérieure des pays en voie de développement ont été marginalisés et ignorés par la majorité des spécialistes.

A Cet égard, notre travail met un accent aussi bien sur l'importance de l'orientation de la théorie dans le sens d'une étude approfondie des mobiles économiques qui interviennent dans l'option de la politique étrangère des pays en voie de développement que sur les bénéfices à tirer d'une telle approche. Ce, par opposition aux approches et analyses classiques de la politique extérieure qui, elles tendent plutôt à faire la publicité de et à justifier la politique des grandes puissances. En outre, nous affirmons dans cette étude que contrairement à la notion de polyvalence qui caractérise la majorité d'études de politique étrangère, il convient de mettre davantage l'accent dans ce genre d'étude, sur les problèmes socio-économiques et les énormes difficultés que connaissent les pays du Tiers Monde. Ce, d'autant plus que ce sont ces problèmes qui leur ont valu des appellations révélatrices telles "pays en voie de développement", "pays en cours de modernisation", "pays sous-développés"...

Tout au long de cette étude, donc, nous allons démontrer que la politique étrangère d'un pays en voie de développement sur l'échiquier mondial ne constitue que la partie émergente de son environnement économique interne. L'attention accordée à cette approche se justifie par le fait que les facteurs économiques (plus que d'autres facteurs) interviennent dans l'option et l'orientation de la politique extérieure d'un pays en voie de développement.

A B S T R A C T

This dissertation seeks to examine the effects of economic (under)-development on the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state drawing from the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982 as a case study. Foreign policy analysis has in most cases consisted in a critical examination of those actions, inactions, reactions and proposals for action of a state in relation to its external environment. Therefore, the primary purpose of foreign policy analysis has been to identify and explain the basic variables which determine a state's behaviour in relation to its external environment.

Although foreign policy analysis has produced a group of theories (the credibility of which is now generally established) such as bureaucratic politics, misperception, groupthink and cybernetic decision-making, no single overarching theory of foreign policy has emerged. Given the so-called "primacy of domestic policy", most of these theories have focused on the organizational structure of the Foreign Ministry or the other departments of government, or on the political processes of foreign policy or the relationship between the domestic political structure and foreign policy. Such an orientation has, in most cases, taken the form of a mere description and analysis of how the political decision-making and institutions work and how their working affects foreign policy. Thus, in these theories emphasis is placed generally on the role of the most important decision-makers, the nature of their influences on the purposes of policy formulation and execution as a whole, the identification and examination of such component processes as the source and nature of stimuli, the amount and quality of information and how it gathered and transmitted, the channel and directions of communication and how the information flow affects decisions, the process of policy formulation and the political factors within the domestic and external environments which impede or assist policy execution. By focusing on how the different units of the international political system communicate or interact, such theories have been anchored on the assumption that the domestic political setting of the state itself - the political society and culture, the political resources and capability of the state, the social and political or para-political groups and elites, the public opinion and mass media and the general political

climate of the state - is the most important determinant of foreign policy. In this way, the economic foundation of the foreign policy of the developing state in these theories has either been under-emphasized or completely left out of analysis.

Nevertheless, with regards to the foreign policy of the developing state, the theories have serious drawbacks since fully formed institutions are either rare or totally absent. The dominance of "power politics" theories which relegate economic factors to a peripheral status accounts for the prominence these theories give to the politics and administration of diplomacy. Thus, even in their attempts to root the study of foreign policy in the inter-connection between the internal and external environments, the significance of the economy has not been given the attention it deserves. Indeed these theories treat the elements that constitute the internal environment in their foreign policy models as autonomous entities shaping the perceptions of policy-makers. Eventhough conflicts are not seen as representing the driving force for decisions such conflicts are not located in the economic foundation of the state and society. The impression is created that the field of foreign policy is wide open for all the competing elements in the domestic environment, irrespective of the positions they occupy in the ownership structure of the economy. In this perspective, these theories in their search for the existence and role of political forces focus erroneously on the peripheral issue - areas of security and high diplomacy often because this is the area in which reputed theories on the foreign policies of developed industrialized states have stressed.

The basic postulate of our investigations in this study, therefore, is that economic factors to a very large extent shape or determine the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state because most of its external transactions occur in the issue-area of economic exchange traditionally described as "low politics". Anchoring the study of foreign policy on the economy, therefore, brings out in bold relief the social and political forces that influence not only the operations of the economy but also the orientation and parameters of foreign policy itself. The domestic and external agencies and forces that the decision-making theorists analyze get a concrete, materialist expression by unravelling the manner in which human beings reproduce their lives on a daily basis.

The basic relationships are necessarily contradictory since they determine the way in which social wealth is produced, distributed and consumed and set the basis for the development of society. Through foreign policy, the state is forced to call on foreign resources to support the national economy and politics. Political parties, interest groups, international organizations, social movements, business cartel, media organizations, etc, develop having a direct or indirect relationship with the contending forces in foreign policy.

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## THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The organization of our research aims at combining theory and empiricism in the analysis of the foreign policy of the developing state. In this perspective it challenges two basic assumptions in international relations. The first is the inter-changeability assumption which consists in the elaboration of "universal models" where all actors are considered as inter-changeable "eggs in the same basket". The second is the small state-as-pawn assumption in which a distinction is made between "small underdeveloped states" and "big developed powers" but with the former generally assumed to be objects of the latter's competition - pawns in the East-West conflict rather than sovereign entities in their own right. The organization of this study, therefore, embraces two alternative assumptions. The first is that rather than continuing a tradition of foreign policy analysis verging on becoming a literature of (big) power politics, considerable enrichment and relevance in current theory can be achieved by means of exploring the material-economic (economic development) foundations of the foreign policy patterns of developing states. In the second place, it is argued that contrary to the inter-changeability assumption which characterizes most existing foreign policy theories, emphasis should instead be laid on the socio-economic problems and conditions that pre-occupy Third World actors and underscore their designation by such suggestive labellations as "developing countries", "modernizing states", "underdeveloped states", etc. That is why it is argued throughout the study that the foreign policy of the developing state at the global level is only the visible iceberg of its economic conditions. This is all the more so because there is much more to be discovered within the economic development framework of the developing state to account for the choice and mode of practice of its foreign policy. In this vein, the study has been organized in three main parts comprising ten chapters.

Part One (made up of Chapters One, Two, and Three) constitutes the theoretical overview of the study and is intended to shed light on the salient conceptual and methodological issues which appear indispensable for an adequate study and understanding of the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state. The objective here is to disentangle relevant economic development and foreign policy variables or determinants in an attempt to establish the subtle linkages between the two sets

of variables that might not appear at first glance. This conceptual orientation draws its tools of analysis from different fields in social sciences such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy and others. In this way, efforts at inter-disciplinary integration are consolidated and bridges extended towards the works of theory-oriented research in foreign policy.

Against this background, Part One of our research is organized to follow two basic steps. In the first place, since conceptualization about the economic foundations of the foreign policy of the developing state has to be situated within current attempts at theory-building in foreign policy an effort is made in the analysis of the relevant literature on the developing state to discover what leading scholars have to say on the "basic questions" and to examine critically their conceptual bases as far as they are related to our subject matter. As a result, the conceptual - methodological contributions and limitations of these approaches are brought to attention. This first step provides some justification not only for the alternative methodological assumptions and conceptual decisions that are made in Chapter Two but also for the basic research questions contained in the Research Design and Orientation which is the object of Chapter One.

As a consequence Chapter Two critically analyzes samples of the dominant modes of thought in the dependency model of international relations and emphasizes their methodological and/or conceptual limitations. By showing why the dependency model of analysis suffers from both conceptual crudeness and empirical short-comings in its attempts to explain the foreign policy of the developing state, the pay-offs of the model are exploited and a conceptual framework attuned to our research objectives is developed. This conceptual framework which is an adapted version of dependency theory through its integration with Rosenau's "linkage theory" in foreign policy presents the basic concepts used to indicate eventual hypotheses and to contain supporting empirical data. Consequently, the basic premises of this "dependency-linkage matrix" are operationalized and oriented to adequately account for the economic development dynamics of the foreign policy of the developing state.

Part Two (Domestic Economic Relations) and Part Three (External Economic Relations) of this study constitute the empirical application and

verification of the theoretical postulates and hypotheses proposed and discussed in Part One of the study in their domestic and external dimensions through a comparative analysis of the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982 and englobe Chapter Four through ten. The organization of Parts Two and Three is oriented to embrace a major set of problems and issues faced by the developing state in their (problems) real or empirical perspectives rather than in their abstract and often unrealistic models of how countries develop or sterile debates about comparative economic performances. In this way, these sections recognize the necessity of treating the problems of economic (under) development from an institutional and structural (i.e. a "non-economic") as well as from an economic perspective with appropriate modifications of the received "general" economic principles, theories, and policies. These sections therefore incorporate relevant theory with realistic institutional analyses. Furthermore, by viewing economic development and foreign policy in their domestic and global contexts, these two sections stress the increasing asymmetrical interdependence not only of the world economy but also of the internal and external environments in the developing state. In this way, the organization of research in these two sections takes a problem - and policy-oriented focus in looking at the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state since important economic concepts are best explicated in the context of actual development problems. Finally these two sections are organized to show that economic social and institutional problems of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state are highly inter-related and requiring simultaneous and coordinated approaches to their solution at both the national and international levels. They are based on the premise that economic development and foreign policy in the developing state even when defined in terms of both the rapid growth and more equitable distribution of national incomes and opportunities is a necessary but not sufficient condition for evaluation. The problem is that one cannot talk about economics for development without placing economic variables squarely in the context of socio-political systems and institutional realities. To ignore "non-economic" factors in analysis of so-called "economic" problems both within and between nations weakens analysis.

Against this background, these two sections analyze Cameroon's post-colonial domestic and external economic relations as well as the ensuing

social relations of production in relation to its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour. Parts Two and Three of our study argue that because of the manner in which Cameroon (like most developing states) was economically integrated into the capitalist international division of labour through colonialism and because of the continuation of these unequal structural and functional economic relations after independence, economic dependency became the main determinant of the country's foreign policy format and provided the linkage between its internal and international politics. As a result the achievement of the objectives of its foreign policy in terms of nonalignment and independence was circumscribed by the fundamental incompatibility that existed between the objectives of self-reliance development at home and the interests of the foreign economic agencies of advanced industrialized countries on which the Cameroonian state depended. This incompatibility (because of the weakness of Cameroon's domestic power base due to her economic underdevelopment and dependency) only helped to reinforce and ensure the positive responsiveness of the country's diplomatic postures to international capitalist mutations and interests.

Finally Chapter Ten provides a statistical regression of the main findings of our research and a general evaluative summary of our investigations as well as some propositions.

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

Though the choice of, and responsibility for writing on, Economic Development and Foreign Policy in the Developing State: The Cameroonian Experience 1960 - 1982 is mine, its successful completion would have been impossible without the assistance of many people and institutions. Therefore, in the course of the long, arduous and painful process of writing the present dissertation, I benefited from the intellectual advice and guidance, moral support, encouragement and material assistance of many individuals (Professors, friends, relatives, colleagues and students) and institutions to whom I owe an immense debt of gratitude. I owe such a debt first to all my Professors of the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) and the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, for introducing me to vast new horizons of knowledge, learning and research and for providing me with the most stimulating intellectual environments for my academic endeavours.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND ORIENTATION

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#### 1.1: INTRODUCTION :

Since our investigation is intended to advance the study and understanding of the foreign policy of the developing state, Part One of our research (which comprises chapters One, Two and Three) is intended to shed light on the salient features of theory and conceptualization in the study of the foreign policy of the developing state. It tries to answer the questions of how and why it has come to be what it is today and how existing foreign policy analysis have perceived it to be. The analysis in Part one of our study has taken an interest in examining and following the logic and dynamics of events to see where they might lead us, rather than trying to bring the foreign policy of the developing state into a particular state of "being".

There is a common tendency among foreign policy analysts to ignore or under-emphasize the fact that most of the external transactions of the developing state occur in the issue area of economic exchange traditionally described as "low" politics. This leads to a number of other related mistakes. For example, it leads to the following common but erroneous assumptions which seriously affect the quality of analysis of the foreign policy of the developing state : These are :

a) that the foreign policy of the developing state is what the Foreign Ministry does and therefore the roles of other ministries like Finance, Trade and Industry, Mines and Power, Economic Affairs and Planning, Education and Information, etc, are outside the scope of inquiry;

b) that the foreign policy system of the developing state is highly centralized with the chief executive (Head of State and/or Government), assisted sometimes by his foreign minister playing the role, not just of chief decision-maker, but infact, often of the only decision-maker;

.../...

c) that a clear distinction could be established between domestic issues and policies and external conditions or between domestic conditions and foreign policy;

d) that the stimuli from the domestic environment are generally more important than external stimuli in determining the orientation (direction) and/or behaviour of the foreign policy of the developing state.

In general, the above assumptions suffer from an excessive focus of attention on the behavioural dimension of action without due regard for its motivational basis and as such lead to the isolation of foreign policy action from the values and ideals that motivate it. In a significant way, therefore, these interpretations of the foreign policy of the developing state not only dichotomize the politics and administration of foreign policy into its domestic and external dimensions but further break them down into their economic and political realms without due regard for causes and effects in such interactions.

In assuming that only political factors are central to external relations such approaches consider economic factors as marginal in determining the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state. As a consequence, they consider that the state as the political entity acts as the one and only entity in transactions with other states and that, therefore a **meaningful** boundary can be established between the domains of external and internal affairs. Therefore, to such interpretations, the critical factor in the foreign policy of the developing state concern the configuration of political power and interest within the external environment. And as such the failure or success of the foreign policy of the developing state depends essentially on the benign or hostile effects of this configuration of political power on state's interests. The interaction between the internal and external forces as well as between the economic and political factors is assumed to be relatively unimportant and either peripheral to analyses or left

out of them completely.

Inevitably, therefore, between the era of Greek antiquity and the mid 1970's existing literature on the foreign policy of the developing state has focused analyses on the political and administrative dynamics of foreign policy occasionally pointing out some of the economic development variables which play a part in the process. While they pay attention to the role of political as well as domestic factors and forces in the developing state, they neglect the importance of their economic as well as external interactions for the orientation and configuration of the developing state's power and interest in the world community. In any case, they only relate political and domestic variables to foreign policy, and do not make a reciprocal analysis of the impact of external as well as economic development conditions and variables on the foreign policy orientation and behaviour. However, failure to integrate external and domestic variables in their analyses of the foreign policy of the developing state has diminished their explanatory power and value. Similarly the compartmentarization of economic and political variables without paying attention to the economic cause and effect in foreign policy has weakened their analyses.

Therefore defined in terms of transactions and responsiveness, the developing state's foreign policy system is not confined to national geographical boundaries. It includes economic enterprises in both the external and internal environments and foreign economic powers. More specifically, it consists essentially of (a) foreign organizations and states (b) foreign enterprises in the country (c) the national leadership (d) local subnational groups and individuals. However an informal alliance exists between the advanced capitalist countries and foreign enterprises on the one hand, and between the national leadership and the subnational groups and individuals on the other. Since the interests of these two blocs are fundamentally incompatible and the power balance favours the external forces,

.../...

the interests of the latter prevail in foreign policy. Nevertheless, a certain measure of autonomy is available to the national leadership especially on purely local issues. But the degree of autonomy is in practice governed by the balance of economic power between these transnational forces and the national leadership in terms of the structure and orientation of trade, sources of aid, foreign investments, external monetary policy and the nature of political support in world politics.

Therefore, material conditions particularly the economic system (because of its pervasive influence in society) are the decisive and determining influences on the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state and as such constitute the essential point of departure for discovering and understanding the "Laws of Motion" of the foreign policy and for explaining it.

If foreign policy is the process by which states design actions to achieve a set of identified goals<sup>1</sup> then it (foreign policy) can be viewed as the range of actions taken by various sections of government in its relations with other bodies or states similarly acting on the international stage in the hope of advancing their own interests.<sup>2</sup> From the above, it becomes clear that the set of goals and actions are a function of the material conditions or economic development of the societies concerned. Therefore, anchoring the study of the foreign policy of the developing state on its economy brings out in bold relief the social and political forces that influence not only the operations of the economy but also the orientation and parameters of foreign policy itself. The domestic and external agencies in foreign policy in this case, get a concrete, materialist expression by unravelling the manner in which human beings reproduce their lives on a daily basis. The basic relationships are necessarily contradictory since they determine the way in which the social wealth is produced,

distributed and consumed and set the basis for the development of society. Foreign policy becomes an extension of the domestic system. The state is forced to call on foreign resources to support the economy and its policies. Political parties, interest groups, international organizations, social movements, business cartels, media organizations, etc develop having a direct or indirect relationship with the contending social force. The state becomes very central in maintaining and, in some cases reconciling the underlying competing social forces.

In attempting to cope with such a taxing task, this chapter is organized around six main issues :

1. Background to the research Problem
2. Diagnosis of the Research Problem
3. Literature Review
4. Scope and Delimitation of the Problem
5. Purpose of the study
6. Significance of the study

## 1.2 : BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

### (A) MOTIVATIONS

International relations could be conceived as a study of the interactions between various actors on the global scene of which the state is the most important. If states are key actors in international relations, it becomes quite obvious that an important part of the subject of international relations is constituted by the dynamic processes and exchanges that define interstate relations. These exchanges and interactions-complex, multiple and in our highly interdependent world essentially continual constitute the domain of foreign policy. If we define foreign policy very schematically and provisionally as those actions of a state that are designed to achieve particular objectives involving other states beyond the state's own boundaries,<sup>3</sup> we can see clearly that foreign policy is the sinew of national development and state-building strategies in the developing state. This is because it is difficult to conceive of national development and state building as existing entirely independently of the cross-currents of the foreign policies of state-actors in the

international arena.

Thus, as a result of this relationship between national development and foreign policy in the developing state, the world has witnessed an acute revival of interest in questions of dependency and interdependence among nations. This interest and scholarly debates have progressed beyond the Latin American Countries, where the major earlier contributions were made, and now include important contributions from Scandinavia, Western Europe and the United States.<sup>4</sup> The scope of the debate has enlarged in other ways too. From the problem of "dependent" non-autonomous development" stressed by Latin American Scholars,<sup>5</sup> the current contributions range in interest from small-state difficulties in autonomously achieving national goals to interdependence of advanced industrialized economies.<sup>6</sup> The focus has shifted from one of exclusive preoccupation with North-South problems to a much more varied inquiry in which North-South problems are supplemented by an examination of relations among industrialized countries, among developing states (South-South relations) and among producer organizations such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and regional actors such as the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). Neither has the literature on dependency been limited to application in the field of international relations. Working within an exchange theoretical framework, psychologists have made logical bases of dependent relations while scholars from sociology and organizational theory have enhanced our knowledge of the social structuring of dependent relations.<sup>7</sup>

The contemporary discussion of dependency recalls some of the fundamental problems of political organization in this century. In a remarkable book, written in 1941, E.H. Carr foresaw the future dilemma of the international system as one of striking balance between self-determination and political independence on the one hand, and the economic,

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technological and military dependency of these sovereign units on the other.<sup>8</sup> The trend towards the creation of small politically sovereign units, set in motion by the peace settlement after World War II continues to the present day. A recent review article on "small states" notes that members of the United Nations include states such as the Maldives Islands (119000) and Qatar (180.000).<sup>9</sup> While the drafters of the post-World War II settlement were aware of the dangers of unbridled military power and sought to check this with a collective security scheme, they were unresponsive to an equally serious problem, i.e. that "the self-determination of small nations was incompatible with unbridled economic power and complete economic interdependence."<sup>10</sup>

Carr predicted that the tension created by the simultaneous processes of political self-determination and growing economic interdependence would be resolved by the division of political and economic organization. The dismantling of colonial empires and the demand for national independence assured the creation of more sovereign political units just as the lack of self-sufficiency and the presence of technological interdependence demanded the creation of multinational economic blocs. The European Economic Community (EEC) Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), Central American Common Market (CACM), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) etc are just a few examples of the push towards larger economic units. These two historical forces, one pushing towards a more comprehensive international organization and the other towards smaller sovereign political units, were bound to raise a dilemma for the developing state. That of how much global involvement should the state foster and how much to suffer? Historically, this raises the possibility of the pursuit of an isolationist or autarkic foreign policy, a policy which sacrifices the rewards of involvement in favour of the decreased vulnerabilities of national isolation.

For most countries, however, the advantages of international involvement and the sheer impossibility of insulating themselves from the vicissitudes of international politics make autarky an unattractive strategy. For the great majority of countries, then, the costs must be continually weighed against the gains.

However, the dilemma between the imperatives of international involvement and those of national sovereignty raised from a political economy stand point by Albert O. Hirschman in 1945<sup>11</sup> anticipated many of the contemporary issues involved in the foreign policy behaviour of the developing state. Not only did he integrate economic and political considerations but he also provided a compelling economic analysis of international influence relationships. The incorporation of this economic analysis into a foreign analysis of specific countries demonstrated that contests among nations were no longer to be viewed solely in terms of clashes of wills among actors armed with certain resources. Nations also came into the international system equipped with a location in an activity structure, a location which could be changed through conscious effort. Thus, Hirschman focused on the "structural characteristics of international economic relations that... make the pursuit of power a relatively easy task?"<sup>12</sup> But it is regrettable that since then most studies<sup>13</sup> of foreign policy have either ignored or understressed the importance of economic variables in foreign policy analysis and only or mostly concentrated on the purposes of state action (political), the form it takes, the processes which initiate it or the societal sources from which it derives. Taken together or singly, these political analyses have presented a number of substantive and methodological problems, not the least of which is the nature of the relationship between foreign policy and national development and state-building objective.

.../...

(B) FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Foreign policy analysis has produced a group of theories, the credibility of which is now established - bureaucratic model, rational-actor model, organizational model, communications theory, misperception and perception, group-think, and cybernetic decision-making.<sup>14</sup> A common use of the framework and basic concepts is evident. This is based on the distinction made in systems theory between actors and their various environments (Linkage theory)<sup>15</sup>. The overall environment in which the decision-makers operate is divided into the "external" (or "international"), the "domestic" and the "psychological" environment, an umbrella term for the set of images held by decision-makers of their world (home and abroad) in contrast to its "operational" reality. These categories are themselves broken down into the many variables to be found in any process as complex as that of national policy-making. There is broad agreement on the identity of the variables, if not on the boundaries between the respective environments, in particular what is foreign and what is domestic.

Obviously the goals of foreign policy are a function of the processes by which they are formulated, just as these, in turn, are influenced by the objectives sought and the country's aspirations for its development. Similarly the form of state action is determined partly by the goals of its internal development towards which it is directed, partly by the resources available to sustain these goals and partly by the organizational and intellectual processes through which these goals are selected. Indeed, the interrelationships between the various aspects of foreign policy and the internal development of a state are so intricate that the foreign policy actions that underlie a state's internal development are affected through feedback by the actions themselves and thus operate differently as a source of future development and actions.

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In short, like all behaviour, foreign policy action is sequential in relationship to internal development and like the process of this development, it does not have a beginning, an existence and an end.<sup>16</sup> Indeed foreign policy and economic development are twin processes which are constantly unfolding and at any given moment are partly a function of what they were previously and what they may become in the future.

The concept of foreign policy has been defined in various ways but such definitions in the ultimate analysis have always been the products of a specific economic world-view. Just as there are two broad schools of thought - liberal and Marxist-in economic development studies,<sup>17</sup> so are there at least two broad schools of thought - the functionalist and sociological-in foreign policy analysis corresponding to the Liberal and Marxist schools of thought in economics. Thus in the various definition of the concept of foreign policy it is possible, however, to discern and distinguish between those that are functional in the sense of focusing on the nature and overall purpose of the actions that constitute foreign policy and those that view these actions within a broader Sociological perspective.

The functional conception of foreign policy in terms of economic development corresponds to the liberal theory of economic development based on the notion of growth,<sup>18</sup> that is the quantitative increase in time of the production of goods and services in a given socio-political system. This theory analyzes the phenomenon of underdevelopment in terms of deficiencies in factors of production - capital, technology, labour and entrepreneurship. The deficiencies, in the light of this theory, constitute the obstacles which should be removed before development can take place both internally and externally. The liberal theory of development, politically and economically, highlights a universal and unique scheme of development valid at all times and everywhere. According to this scheme, the developing nations have to undergo the same stages of development which the developed countries underwent by going through "stages of growth"<sup>19</sup>

In terms of foreign policy, one example of such a worldview is George Modelski's definition which views foreign policy as the process whereby a state adjusts its actions to those of other states so as to "maximize" the favourable actions and to "minimize" adverse actions of foreign states.<sup>20</sup> Policy is seen here not as actions based on some grand design to consolidate the development of a society but as a continual process of pragmatic adjustments to the actions of others in the external environment. The purpose of the adjustments is to make the environment more hospitable, favourable, at least, less hostile and disadvantageous. This conception is no doubt valid as far as states with a high level of development, mutual interaction and sensitivity are concerned but when used in the context of highly asymmetric relations, it becomes too general and too abstract. It lacks the clarity that would highlight both the general and specific character of foreign policy as a mode of state action in an international system characterized by power and material stratification.

Let us turn to the sociological definition of foreign policy. Such a worldview, on the other hand, corresponds to the radical conception of development,<sup>21</sup> which holds that the underdevelopment and dependency of the developing countries, politically and economically, are inherent in the nature of the capitalist system and the configuration of world politics. That these phenomena resulted from the progressive integration of the developing countries in the "state of nature" international capitalist dominated system through successive and adverse processes of colonialism, and neo-colonialism. Furthermore, that this process of integration resulted in an organized system of exploitation of the Third World based on the principle of "unequal exchange". The rupture with the world capitalist is considered as an a priori but not a sufficient necessity for development. At the level of strategy this worldview stresses on development rather than on growth.

In this case, development is conceived as a global phenomenon which covers the qualitative and quantitative structural transformation of a society. The ultimate objective of development within this conceptual framework is, therefore, the qualitative and quantitative amelioration of the conditions of life of the whole society. Precisely, the idea of development, here, implies the capacity of a society to increase the means of mastering its environment (self reliant capacity).

A rather more elaborate example of this worldview in terms of foreign policy has been suggested by I.D. Levin who asserts that :

Foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by the given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defence of these purposes and interests. The aims and interest of a state in international relations are realized by various methods and means; first of all, by peaceful official relations, maintained by a government, through its special agencies, with the corresponding agencies, contacts maintained by state agencies as well as by public and private institutions (economic, political, scientific, religious, etc), which provide opportunities for exercising economic, political and ideological influence on other states; finally by armed forces, i.e. by war or other methods of armed coercion.<sup>22</sup>

This means, then that the objectives and interests that a state seeks to promote or safeguard as it interacts with others must be viewed against the background of its internal socio-economic structure and the configuration of political power within it.

More specifically, the class that controls and wields states power necessarily shapes foreign policy and so, as might be supposed, in accordance with its perceptions, even though these tend to be rationalized ideologically as the interests of the intire nation. The latter should not be taken to mean that there are no interests which could be shared by the members of a nation-state in common.

Depending on the given political circumstances, defence of state sovereignty, national independence, and the territorial integrity of a country, among other things, all correspond to the interests of the nation as a whole. However, in the majority of cases, foreign policy decisions are not concerned with matters directly related to such "core" interests or values as K.J. Holsti<sup>23</sup> has termed them. Rather, routine foreign policy decision-making tends to centre on the so-called "middle range objectives,"<sup>24</sup> such as inter-state commercial, economic and political relations, including attempts to influence the behaviour of other states in desired directions. While these actions and objectives may have a bearing on state sovereignty or territorial integrity, the relationship is not an intrinsic one. Hence one can argue that it is over "routine" matters of this kind affecting the development of a society that perceptions tend to have a decisive influence on policy-making. It is also with respect to such matters of development that foreign policy tends to be invested with an overlay of ideological rationalization. Aggressive imperialist adventures - gun - boat diplomacy which have often been rationalized in the name of the defence of "national" honour and "security" frequently turn out, on close examination, to be no more than the perceptions of the regime of the day.

The preceding discussion of the concept of foreign policy suggest that like all systems of action, the foreign policy system comprises an environment or setting, a group of actors, structures through which they initiate decisions and respond to challenges, and processes which sustain or alter the flow of demands and products of the systems as a whole. The boundaries and products of this system encompass all inputs and outputs which affect decisions whose content and scope lie essentially in inter-state relations. As such, the boundaries fluctuate from one issue to another. It is necessary, therefore, to explore the content and interrelations of these key variables - environment, actors, structures, and processes - all placed with a framework of demands on policy or inputs and products of policy or outputs.

Like economic development, foreign policy may be likened to a flow into and out of a network of structures or institutions which perform certain functions and thereby produce decisions. These in turn feedback into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of demands on policy--- policy process, and products of policy. All foreign policy, then, comprises a set of components which can be classified in three general categories: inputs, process, and outputs. Thus there is the notion of flow and dynamic movement in foreign policy which is constantly absorbing demands and channelling them into a policy machine which transforms these inputs into decisions or outputs. Indeed, all data regarding foreign policy can be classified into one of extension or complement of domestic policy and that any distinction between the two is more academic than substantive. Rather it derives from the fact that a state's foreign policy takes account of the relevant attitudes, actions and reactions of other actors whereas its domestic policy is not in general, burdened with such considerations.

(c) CRITIQUE OF FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

The study of foreign policy in general and that of the developing state in particular is "underdeveloped" in that its theory content is inadequate, and analysis for the most part lacks rigour. Thus a majority of the scholarship on the foreign policy of the developing state holds a view of foreign policy which assumes that effectiveness in foreign policy formulation and implementation is simply a function of both the streamlining of the organizational structure of the Foreign Ministry and the quality of the diplomatic service.<sup>25</sup> In this case state behaviour is seen exclusively as a reaction to external stimuli and internal processes and pressures are not recognized as affecting foreign policy. Yet as Rosenau has cogently observed, "to identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other."<sup>26</sup>



It is because of these analytical errors that most studies of the foreign policy of the developing state have often not recognized the role of economic development (defined as the national power and influence) as a means of achieving foreign policy goals. Generally, foreign policy strategies are never consciously and systematically studied from such a perspective. Rather emphases are placed on enunciating generalized creation and appeal to conventional principles analyzed as the only available means for attaining the nation's goals.

Furthermore, many of these studies<sup>27</sup> reflect the behaviour of the developed states rather than that of the developing state they tend to study. Generally these studies hold that the foreign policy of a developing state consists of coherent and, for the most part fairly national goals formulated in the light of realistically assessed means for their achievement. Such goals and ends are usually represented by the generic term "national interests"<sup>28</sup> and are often broken down into clearly specific and concrete objectives. Also, the strategies and means of pursuing such ends are specified in terms of threat, promises and rewards or "sticks and carrots", the use of which enables the state to exercise power and influence on the international scene.

Such a conception reflects only the foreign policy of the developed state<sup>29</sup> where the formulation and implementation processes involve a more or less conscious series of steps including the definition of long-term goals, the breaking down of these goals into concrete objectives, the ranking of these objectives into orders of priority, the assessment of the nation's capabilities, and the choice of appropriate strategies for achieving the selected goals or objectives. The process also involves long-term planning and sometimes the building of abstract and massive grand designs. This in contrast with the pragmatic "deal-with-issues-as-they-arise" approach of the majority of the developing states.

These two contrasting views of foreign policy between the developing and developed states should, however, not be seen as a dichotomy reflecting a clear distinction between

the developing states' conception of foreign policy and that of developed states, but as two ends of a continuum along which developing and developed states may be placed. Generally most of the developing states will, of course, be found at the ad hoc end of the continuum while most of the developed states may be placed at the long-term end. However, there are a few developing nations which have now begun to adopt the second view of foreign policy just as there are few developed nations which still regard long-range planning as inappropriate in foreign policy formulation. In practice, however, no nation can be said to adopt entirely one view.

It would be wrong to regard a nation at the ad hoc end of the continuum as having no foreign policy. Conversely, it would be grossly erroneous for a foreign policy analyst to assume that government leaders of a country holding a second view are ipso facto rational persons who consciously weigh "national interest" by the yard stick of national power and try to tailor their actions to match the level of their national capabilities. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin<sup>30</sup> have shown the definition of goals, objectives and strategies derives from both conscious calculations and rational choices, unconscious motivations and inner (often non-rational) drives of individual officials in authoritative positions. This is true of decision-makers in both developing and developed countries - in both cases, the decision-maker's "definition of a situation"<sup>31</sup> is determined by his perception and coloured by his value system. For both groups of states, therefore foreign analysis involves a critical examination of those actions inactions, and proposals including an inquiry into the decision-making structures and processes. If it is assumed that the nature of the foreign policy system determines the characteristics of the foreign policy itself, then in general, the primary purpose of foreign policy analysis is to identify and explain the basic variables which determine a state's behaviour in relation to its external environment.

Thus for the most part, analysts of the foreign policy of the developing state have failed to distinguish the crucial variables of the foreign policy processes of these states.

They have not established relationships among them. Their categories have remained descriptive and their major concern has remained a narrative of events which form the cumulative flow of foreign relations. They have ignored or under-emphasized the fact that most of the external transactions of these developing states occur in the issue area of economic exchange and development, traditionally described as "low" politics. This has led a number of related mistakes, which have seriously affected the quality of their analyses. For example, these analyses have assumed that a clear distinction can be made between domestic issues and policies and external conditions or domestic conditions and external policies; and that the stimuli from the domestic environment are generally more important than the external stimuli in determining the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state. Indeed, the analysis of the foreign policy of the developing state has remained in an infant state relative to the volume and quality of its international relations literature as a whole.<sup>32</sup>

But foreign policy like most aspects of politics in the developing state is the product of the mode of allocation of scarce valuable resources in the domestic and external environments. States either cooperate to share the scarce goods and services of the internal environment or fight over them. But the degree to which a state achieves its foreign policy objectives in this struggle for the allocation of goods and services depends on the level of its socio-economic development. Thus in an attempt to outline some of the analytical weaknesses found in the existing literature, on the foreign policy of the developing state, this study proposes to identify and explain the extent to which economic development conditions determine the foreign policy of the developing state

### 1.3 : STATEMENT AND DIAGNOSIS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM.

The major focus of this study relates to the assessment of the degree to which economic development determines the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state drawing from the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982..../...

The problem here entails both analysis and synthesis. To analyze is to unravel, to separate the strands or to take to pieces. To synthesize is to reassemble, to piece together the parts in such a way as to compose the whole that makes sense. Therefore, the study of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state consists of identifying the important determining variables—noting the significant properties of each, examining the relationships between them, and describing the patterns formed by the relationships. Interesting problems arise at every stage. Some of these will be methodological. How should we set about observing these relationships, defining them; measuring them and comparing them? Others will be theoretical, because theory consists of forming ideas or concepts to describe aspects of the world, classifying them, and considering the various ways in which they interact. In short, the problem consists of ascertaining the appropriate units of analysis and the significant links between them as well as the right levels on which to conduct analysis.

In concrete terms, the problem, here, consists of the analysis and synthesis of the consequences of the contrast between formal political equality and the actual economic inequality of the developing state in the actual international system. The combination of the socio-economic differences to be found amongst states in the modern world and the wide contrast between the formal equality and real inequality of states, is conspicuously unique to the post-1945 international system. The system has become inclusive, but the reality of the developing state's membership in the international society lacks meaning in the absence of the political, social and economic resources required for full participation in the political structure. In terms of foreign policy, decolonization becomes an uncompleted process which must be extended so that political power is genuinely redistributed. First and foremost this redistribution requires a change in the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the developing state. In this perspective, this study seeks to examine the extent to which the changes in the socio-economic conditions of the developing state, from the Cameroonian experience, 1960-1982, affect and condition its participation in the global political structure.

(A) THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

Economic development has been defined as higher growth in the production of goods and services and in the efficiency and equity with which these goods and services are allocated within a state.<sup>33</sup> It is a result of effective integration and utilization of its human and non-human resources. However, within the framework of this study, economic development will not only refer to the quantitative changes in the production of goods and services but will be extended to include the structural and functional transformation of society as a whole in time and in space with a premium placed on economic self-reliance, i.e. the extent of sectoral specialization and integration of the economy.<sup>34</sup> In this perspective, the analysis of economic indicators is designed to include the mode of production and the social relations of production. In other words, economic development will refer to the quantitative and qualitative changes in the mode of production of goods and services in a given system as well as the ensuing social environment and relations of production in such a system.<sup>35</sup>

To be effectively integrated, the economy must allocate goods and services and other resources between consumption and investment in the best possible way. Investment may be in the form of capital investment or investment in education and research. This task often entails the need to acquire extra foreign exchange through increased exports and external aid which is then used to finance capital imports and technology transfer. The foreign exchange needs are so great that most developing states are reduced to greater dependency (through trade, aid and investments) on the developed states. Obviously the requirements and the performance in turn affects the power capabilities and thus the foreign policy orientations of the developing states. Indeed theories abound which depict the foreign policy of a state as a function of its level of economic development.

Apart from Lenin's theory that imperialism represented the highest state in capitalist development, there are more specific theories linking stages of economic growth to the foreign policy behaviour of states. W.W. Rostow<sup>36</sup> identifies five stages of economic growth - the traditional, the pre-take-off, take-off, maturity and high mass-consumption. A.F.K. Organski<sup>37</sup> and G. Lovell Field<sup>38</sup> have merged Rostow's traditional and pre-take-off stages into one stage - the pre-industrial stage. The succeeding stages are the industrial, the post-industrial and overabundance which correspond to Rostow's last four stages.

The pre-industrial stage is characterized by a foreign policy of national consolidation - consolidation of national territory, population and resources. As such the state is cautious, conservative, non-aligned and avoids hostility. The industrial stage is characterized by what might be called adolescent exuberance, with the state acting without balancing expenditure and resources. It pursues prestige policies involving regional aggression and local imperialism as a way of generating domestic progress. The post-industrial stage for its part is concerned with national security since its industrial achievements might be coveted by others. However, this stage is characterized by a sense of measure, by calculation and balancing expenditure and resources. In practice this means playing the balance of power game in order to preserve the status quo. However if a state has a massive industrial base this often entails further expansion - "anti-imperialist imperialism" - in order to pre-empt a rival, ideological posturing in order to win satellites and buffers and arms transfers to smaller states to fight proxy wars. The final stage, that of overabundance is characterized by a foreign policy best described as extravagance and international good will; self-abnegation becomes the order of the day. This involves the pursuit of altruistic goals which may even run counter to the national interest - but no state has yet reached this stage in its foreign policy. The discussions of various theories have taken us far afield, but they do indicate the degree of importance which scholars and

practitioners attach to economic attributes of a state as a base of power capabilities and, therefore, as a limiting factor in foreign policy and international politics. Therefore the subterranean economic rhythms in a national economy may generate internal economic socio-political configurations that result in changes in the fundamental attribute which in turn affects the political power. That is, the internal motions in patterns of production, distribution and marketing may have a causal relationship with the external political behaviour of a nation-state. Again the production of a relatively scarce commodity, with the resultant high level of political consciousness will facilitate a drift towards changes in the fundamental attribute (economic development) that is highly correlated with political power. Hence the central focus of this study is to examine the extent to which the nature of economic development in the developing states affects the behaviour of the state towards the other nations. V.I. Lenin (1917)<sup>39</sup> and Choucri and North<sup>40</sup> (1975) both have shown how changes in the rates of the economic development of Great Britain, Belgium, Germany and the United States led these major powers to build up their national capabilities (military, economic and political strengths) which were later utilized for trans-national expansion. Both historical accounts led to colonialism and economic imperialism of these powers which had an antecedent in the changes in their respective fundamental attributes. While the motive for the economic expansionism of the United States might not have been the acquisition of territories abroad as it was with the other powers, however, the motive for economic imperialism (domination) did exist. Past and present economic relations<sup>41</sup> of the United States with other nations support this contention.

While we do not reject Lenin and North's assertions, we do make some modification. We uphold that any growth (qualitative and quantitative growth in economic productivity) of a developing state will substantially influence its foreign policy orientation, that is the nature of its national income, national income per capita, trade, energy, population, agriculture and industry will affect the relations of such

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a nation with other nations, not necessarily in a colonial status or patron-client relationship, but in terms of the capability of that nation to attain a quasi-economic independence and the utilization of that economic leverage for political ends. We recognize that the aggregate economic motions in a national economy are both influenced by exogenous factors and endogenous variables. The exogenous factors are made up of the international trade relationships which are broken down into export, import, balance of trade, balance of payments, commodities of trade, where they are going, and where they have come from. Also included in this category are the international and regional political environments. The nature of the international and regional political environments has a direct relationship with the rate of aggregate economic motion, Peaceful atmosphere is a necessary and desired political environment that tends to promote international trade. While war or threat of war is undesired and hence regarded as a negative factor to the flow of international trade; it does have some positive side effects to some of the non-belligerent nations whose commodities are critical to the survival of other nations. For example, the Egyptian/Israel War of 1973 saw the oil embargo placed on some of the major supporters of Israel by the Arab states. The shut down of the supply of this critical commodity from the major suppliers, reduced the world supply to increase the demand. The prices went up as a result. Those who supplied it indirectly gained from the politically rough environment prevalent in the Middle East.

The production of the critical and non-critical commodities at home which enter the international system is determined in part also by the endogenous factors that are determinants of national power. A state's economic capability equals the productive resources that its society possesses such as labour, technology, real capital (in the form of factories, power dams, railways, inventories and the availability of and agricultural manufactures) and the availability of nature resources.



Population and size of the territory (critical mass)<sup>42</sup> that a nation possesses make itself felt in world affairs. Increases in economic productivity, have a direct relationship upon labour which is supported by population and the size of the territory. But the quality of the critical mass is determined by the numeric economic strength behind it. China's critical mass is higher than that of the United States but the latter's critical mass is qualitatively superior because of its economic strength. Military strength has a direct link with the critical mass and the economic capability. The production of military strength is dependent upon the economic potential and population of a polity. The level of technology is also an unquestionable asset. The strategic location of a nation as perceived by the major powers, affects not only its military capability in relation to her neighbours, but her regional and continental alliance with other nations as well. These alliances may be in the form of economic regionalism as the central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) or a political union like the Organization for African Unity (OAU).

The consciousness or will of the people to rise beyond the domestic political partisanship into international political and economic concerns depends first on the level of its development, the political leadership it has, and the commitments of the resources by the leadership to raise the level of such consciousness. Consciousness could be expressed in ideological form as in the form of Pan-Africanism. It is akin to the realism of political freedom of the African people. History of subjugation, domination and colonization by alien powers, have a concept of political freedom not only in the partial granting of independence to some of its people, but in the total liberation of all its people from colonial rule. The ideology of pan-Africanism has contributed to the proliferation of this concept. Thus consciousness reified in its abstract form as Pan-Africanism could be expressed in support of such concretized forms as national liberation struggle. Thus, a developing state born out of colonialism with some of its people still in that colonial bondage has all of the sympathies for the inhuman condition characteristic of that

colonial bondage; and is morally committed to fight for the liberation of those people. Fighting may take various phenomena political forms. While putative military power may be one form, diplomacy and foreign policy become another. Its formulation then, has antecedents in the exogenous and endogenous factors whose logical connection we have established above.

Foreign policy as we saw above is a strategy or planned course of action, developed by the decision makers of a state vis-a-vis other states or international entities aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interest. The objectives to be achieved (depending on the state) vary from (1) domination (2) harmony (3) sustained economic growth and development and (4) liberation. The policy of domination is often utilized by the big powers (United states, Great Britain, France, Soviet Union. etc) to exercise hegemony over weaker nations. Domination through economic relations take many forms. The overt form is colonialism and outright exploitation. France and Britain colonized most of the African countries and filtered resources to their home bases, while the United States exploited Latin America and tapped its raw materials for the former's domestic advantage. The covert form adopts the mechanics of neo-colonialism and dependency.<sup>43</sup> Foreign aid, foreign investment, and the classical and neo-classical doctrines of international trade that protect and buffer the strong vis-a-vis the weak are the machinations of continuous domination.<sup>44</sup> Harmony exists, and is often interpreted when foreign policy goals and execution between two equal partners are exercised for the benefit of mutual co-existence. The united states with canada, Europe and Japan, tend to follow this course. The benefits are mutually inclusive. The exchange might be unequal, but political and psychological satisfaction derived from such relations is a compensating factor for the inequality in economic strength.

Every nation (developed or developing) aspires towards the goal of economic development and self-sustained growth, although few ever achieve it.

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The struggle to achieve this goal is the struggle for peace and war, the struggle for domination, harmony and sometimes the struggle for the so called national liberation. Nations interact with one another in many spheres of activities. Economics seems to be one of top priority. Diplomacy follows economics as the protocol that legitimizes the economic interaction. Political actions emerge as the power struggle for, "who gets what, when and how".<sup>45</sup> Empirical analysis shows that at the domestic as well as at the international level, behind every diplomatical or military move, hides a naked materialistic motive.<sup>46</sup> The United States signed a treaty of friendship with China, not because China represents a threat to its national interest, but basically because

(I) China's critical mass has a potential market of , more than a billion consumers for the United States, and (2) its strategic location with the Soviet Union is of strategic importance to the new ally. James D. Cockcroft has pointed out that at the international level, the naked economically motivated ventures of a state are dressed with the "ex post facto" concept of economic instruments of national policy.<sup>47</sup> Robert Dahl, in "Who Governs" illustrates how power elite cliques are located within economically influential circles.<sup>48</sup> Lenin, at the beginning of the century had noticed that all political actions spring from economic motives, and capitalism leads inevitably to imperialism. In other words, economic issues dictate politics. Lenin attributed the causes of the outbreak of the two World Wars to economic factors. Lenin and the Marxist school of thought have been attacked by the conservative right<sup>49</sup> as being economically deterministic and a unimodel. The conservative right asserts that the actions of states in the international system are governed and controlled by multivarious motives. Some of which are psychological, political while others are sociological and cultural. Some theoreticians even tried to separate economics from politics (foreign policy). Richard J. Trethewey<sup>50</sup> distinguished some aspects of international relations that are economic from those that are political.

But when Lenin is revisited and contemporary international relations are analyzed, national interest tends to sound stronger than international interest (if there is any like that). It is often equated with national security, whose purpose, Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie define as the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.<sup>51</sup> Vital national values can never be anything more than the concern for national survival in a world where survival is guaranteed by being the fittest. The survival is historically and fundamentally rooted in economics. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel which President Carter shuttled the Middle East for, was a political overture for peace in the Middle East. Behind that political demonstration was the real issue of an energy shortage in the United States. The survival and continuous economic growth of the United States and of any nation, depends in part on energy. Peace in the Middle East did not only mean the settling of life-long disputes between Egypt and Israel, but the settling, protecting and consolidating of the sources of energy supply lines vital to the United States national interest. Economic development and growth, where it fails to have a topical expression in foreign policy objectives enunciation, is inherently equated or relegated to national interest or national security. The big powers are fond of doing this.

The policy of liberation (national liberation) often is relatively undertoned by some nations, as compared to economic growth and development. While the former has a radical connotation and implication that challenges the status quo, the latter is often the authentic goal generally appreciated and pursued, and sometimes, the means utilized by the powerful to propagate the status quo. The foreign policy "goal of liberation" in this context means an independent but radical foreign policy geared towards the realization of national interest. It is independent because the uncompromising goal pursued is characterized by conflicting multinational interests, and therefore, demands an autonomous policy that embraces only the Pan-African ideals -

"the decolonization of Africa.<sup>52</sup> Radical, because the means employed to reach the goal, do not only call for radical economic policy but also for military incursion. The support for a war of national liberation means the support for the justification of military violence to win that freedom especially when people fighting for that freedom and the people supporting that struggle are one and the same people - sharing the same habitat and demarcated by powers stronger than their will. Also in a dialectical context, it delineates the support for an ongoing struggle for universal human freedom. The economic theory of national Liberation is a point of departure from traditional theories of national economic growth, which generate imperialism and international violence.<sup>53</sup> It is a radical outgrowth of national economic expansion that generates national Liberation theory and praxis. Raised to a high level of consciousness the theory transcends the national borders. The struggle for freedom is the struggle for decolonization, and the consciousness needed to sustain that struggle supercedes micro-nationalistic sentiment. Inherent in this specific struggle is the Pan-African consciousness - the African political freedom that has often found expression in Cameroon's foreign policy statements such as "Africa is not free until all Africans are free." Cameroon's engagement in such struggles as occurred in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is a manifestation of the support for the national Liberation struggle in those areas. Again the conflicts in Namibia and Azania demand, the same weapon of the theory and practice - the revolutionary praxis nexus that Cameroon is consciously or unconsciously committed to. Political commitment beyond national borders is not independent of the internal economic motions.

Hence, it we could posit here that the level of economic development of a developing state affects its foreign policy format and the higher the level of economic development, the lower the economic and political dependency and the more independent is the foreign policy output. The growth tendencies in the Cameroonian economy are influenced by endogenous and exogenous variables that we shall later explain.

The combination of these variables contributes to the changes in the fundamental economic attributes of the state which have a relationship of causality with its foreign policy. Since Cameroon like any developing state pursues a policy of economic development a change in the structure of Cameroon's economic development represented by the Gross National Product (GNP), the Gross National Product per capital, balance of payments, foreign reserves, export trade, energy output, educational output and social infrastructure, extends the range of political modernization, and affects the level of political consciousness. Modernization in this context is defined as a special case of the economic development process with capacity to widen the range of human choice and alternatives.<sup>54</sup>

That is, with true economic modernization, the political system differentiates and moves sequentially from neo-colonialism to economic and political independence. The widening in the range of human choices and alternatives indicates the attendant maturity of the political system to mobilize its resources, and to formulate foreign policies that serve its national interests. Changes in the level of economic development affect the capacity to formulate alternative foreign policies. The logic of this argument can best be explained in the level of changes in a nation's productive capability that would generated changes in the political independence which would check a dependent socio-economic relationship. As the political system differentiates, neo-colonialism and dependency decline. This implies an inverse relationship between the level of economic development and the dependent foreign policy format. The by-product of this inverse relationship is an independent foreign policy posture. Independent because it attempts to control and consolidate national economic capabilities that spill over the international political and economic system. For example, the progressive indigenization of Cameroon's economic system from 1960 constituted independent and radical policies of economic nationalism that limited and reduced foreign equity participation in certain key industries by more than 60 percent.<sup>55</sup>

The drift towards an independent foreign policy pre-empted a drift in the locus of quasi-economic independence utilized as a political bulwark to change the "probability

of outcomes". It is akin, to the production of a change in the probability distribution of events<sup>56</sup> in colonial African enclaves, in the economic regionalism or continentalism (such as UDEAC). Besides causality a drift is an indication of consequence. A political consequence that recognizes the state's economic potentiality as an effective demand has the capability of translating theoretical demands into practical demands in terms of foreign policy.

The interrelationship between the nature of economic development and the foreign policies of developing states has been widely studied by scholars<sup>57</sup> of international relations and comparative politics. Most of the work done in this area has been done cross-politically. The criticism we often hear are that the concepts thus devised are "formulated at levels of abstraction that defy systematic comparative empirical application."<sup>58</sup> The scholars' attempts to draw operational axioms from such theorizing and social science model-building, often result in curious justifications for whatever patterns of power and administration are actually emerging in the developing states.<sup>59</sup> Until recently the conceptual framework most frequently used by political analysts tended to relegate economic relations to the periphery of inquiry. The interrelationship between domestic and international power were not systematically examined, and interest other than those of states were virtually ignored. However, some recent developments have brought the economic dimension of world politics back into focus. New conceptual orientations are fostering systematic analysis of the relationship between economics and political behaviour in contrast with paradigms focusing exclusively on power and security aspects of world order.

The dollar devaluation of 1971 and 1973, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 were national economic issues with international and political configurations. Instead of theories that focus on states as sole actors, we now have the conceptual schemes that focus on the attributes of states in the course of their dynamic economic interactions. In this study, we attempt to look at these dynamic economic interactions through a particular attribute. We acknowledge the relative importance of other attributes in the calculus of national power,

but posit that their potency is fundamentally derived from the configurations of the primary economic attribute. We therefore hold economics to be at the basis of other derivatives of national power that a state possesses.

(B) : ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS NATIONAL POWER.

National power<sup>60</sup> is not a static phenomenon. It is the kinetic energy of the state reflective in multivarious national and international activities. One of such activities is foreign policy which we define as a planned course of action developed by a state vis-a-vis states or international entities for the purpose of achieving specific goals. It involves a dynamic process of applying relatively fixed interpretations of national interest to the highly fluctuating situational factors of the international environment to develop a course of action. The term, foreign policy, can be applied more precisely to describe a single situation (such as Cameroon's policy towards South Africa) and the actions, (military, economic, and political) that a state utilizes to accomplish a limited objective. Since the scope of this study cover a period of twenty-two years (1960-1982), the specificity of the inquiry confines us to distinguish between economic development and economic growth for the operational purposes of the model. We distinctively recognize the qualitative differences between the two phenomena. French economist François Perroux distinguished growth and development.<sup>61</sup> Economic growth he said consists of rising national and per capita income, while development entails a good deal more (structural change, technological advance, resource recovery and closing sectoral and regional gaps). But development in dialectics lies not in the infinite arithmetic addition of one unit to another, but in the emergence of new and higher forms which create within themselves the preconditions for further development.

It is a chain of dialectic negations. Kenneth Arrow, in "Mathematical models in the Social Sciences" asserts that the philosopher as a theory builder must necessarily concern himself with the meaning and implications of his activities. "This is a distinctive obligation".<sup>62</sup>



We wish therefore to explain the meanings and implications of some of the critical concepts that we used to model the theory. In this way, the economic structure is analyzed in connection with the different phases of the foreign policy orientation. A macrometric economic power weight theory of Cameroon's perceived power is formulated holding economics as a determinant. We analyze other factors of national power as a mixture of strategic, military, economic, idiosyncratic, group and the critical mass that may depict strengths and weaknesses in foreign policy.

However, in the relationship between economic development and foreign policy of the developing state the government as the legitimate authority for the exercise of power of the state within and outside a country has the task of regulating and controlling the economy. This task is performed through fiscal (tax) and monetary (banking and currency control) measures, through development planning and through other legislative and indirect measures that independently and collectively change population trends, savings and investment habits, attitudes to work, and the kinds of tools employed for production. A government's ability to perform these economic functions obviously depends on many factors which economists collectively call the social relations of production.<sup>63</sup> One of these is the congruence of governmental forms and structures with the economic mode of production and political culture. Any lack of congruence between the political structures, political culture and the economic mode of production results in instability and disorder, thereby reducing the ability of the state to achieve its foreign policy goals. This explains in part why in post-colonial Africa the democratic forms adopted at independence had to be adjusted to suit the underdeveloped economy and authoritarian political culture inherited from both the traditional and colonial past. The changes to one-party states and from parliamentary to Presidential systems are examples of this adjustment.

Obviously the form and actual mode of operation of government and the economy (democratic or dictatorial, open or closed) will affect its ability to develop, mobilize and harness its resources in foreign policy. It will, therefore, also affect its estimate of its own capabilities and as a result has a bearing on its foreign policy. The structure of the economy and government, therefore, along with the ensuing values of society and the experiences of leaders during their rise to prominence are the three factors that determine the nature of leadership which in turn largely determines the nature of foreign policy. Kissinger<sup>64</sup> identifies three contemporary leadership types - ideological, bureaucratic/pragmatic and revolutionary charismatic. These types, when added to the differences in the economic structures and values which produce them, cause a gulf between reasonable aims and methods of international statecraft as well as producing conflict criteria for resolving differences. Indeed, often differences arising from conflicting domestic sets of economic values are one of the principal issues of international politics, as states feel that their own set of values moulded by their economic and political systems are being threatened by those of another state.

It is clear, in sum, that the power capabilities of states derive largely from the socio-economic attributes of states. Because of this, it should come as no surprise then that these socio-economic attributes determine the definition of the core-interest or "nation-entity" value (which may be defined as the value attached to the survival of the nation as an entity) which the state upholds and defends at all times in its foreign policy. Thus the level of economic development of the developing state determines the definition of such core interests which include (1) the defence of the territorial integrity against both external aggression and internal secessionist movements; (2) the protection and preservation of the political independence (3) the protection of the integrity of government which makes sedition and treason the most heinous crimes; and (4) the quest for economic development and self-reliance.

Other values that the developing state values and upholds are private but assimilated to state interests or they are transient

Examples of the former are exchange controls and import restrictions which are primarily for the benefits of entrepreneurial individuals, groups or organizations whose activities are regarded as ultimately beneficial to the state. Examples of transient values are the international fight against apartheid, support for liberation movements and the projection of an "African personality". It is clear that there are qualitative and quantitative differences in the extent to which states are endowed with the socio-economic attributes of statehood, and that changes occur in these over time. The populations change in number and quality, the economy develops, and even territory may be lost to or gained from neighbours, states though sovereign equals (equal in the legal sense) are unequal in power capabilities. This inequality results in unequal influence, and therefore, creates a hierarchy or stratification of states based on power and influence. It is for this reason that A.F.K. Organski sees world politics as an economic pecking order system, with states struggling for high places in the hierarchy.<sup>66</sup>

### (C) ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Despite these considerations, the economic foundations of the foreign policy of the developing state have often been ignored by most analysts. Like their counterparts in domestic policy studies foreign policy analysts tend to give more prominence to the politics and the administration of foreign policy.<sup>66</sup> The dominance of "power politics" theories which relegate economic factors to a peripheral status partly accounts for this anomaly. Even when attempts have been made to place the study of foreign policy in the inter-connection of internal and external environments, the significance of the economy has not been given the attention it deserves. Indeed, the pioneers of decision-making theories, Snyder et al,<sup>67</sup> treated the elements that constitute the internal environment in their foreign policy model as autonomous entities shaping the perceptions of the policy-makers.

Even though conflicts were seen as representing the driving force for decision-making, such conflicts were not located in the economic foundation of the society. The impression is created that the field of foreign policy is wide open for all the competing elements in the domestic environment, irrespective of the positions they occupy in the ownership structure of the economy.

Anchoring the study of foreign policy on the economy therefore brings out in bold relief the social and political forces that influence not only the operations of the economy but also the orientation and parameters of foreign policy itself. The domestic and external agencies that the decision-making theorist analyze get a concrete materialist expression by unravelling the manner in which human beings reproduce their lives on a daily economic basis. The basic relationships are necessarily contradictory, since they determine the way in which the social wealth is produced, distributed and consumed and sets the basis for the development of the society. Foreign policy becomes an extension of the domestic system. The state as a socio-economic organization is forced to call on foreign resources to support the national economy and its politics. Political parties, interest groups, international organizations, social movements, business cartels, media organizations to name but these few, develop, having direct or indirect relationship with the contending socio-economic forces. The state as an political organization becomes very central in maintaining and, in some cases, reconciling the underlying socio-economic forces. In the specific case of the developing state, these socio-economic forces include not just the contending classes in production, but also non-class forces such as nationalities, religious groups to mention but these few.

For example, the current world economic recession has, put in bold relief the problem of such dependency and disarticulation and has made the study of foreign policy central in the understanding of the dynamics of the economic crisis itself. But how does this mode of production affect foreign policy?

The state and the national economy depend on the capitalist world market for the most important inputs in production e.g. raw materials and capital goods. The economy in the developing state imports a high proportion of domestic consumer goods and rely on the international financial market and Western World institutions for loans and technology. The colonial experience of the developing state and its continued incorporation in the world market have created a radical impulse of anti-imperialism. This radical impulse is fuelled by the national struggle against underdevelopment and dependency. Local ruling classes exploit such struggles and global inequalities to support their own quarrels with transnational business. The issues of national self-determination, national sector linkages, restructuring the world economy, creating an integrated regional Third World market become significant items on the agenda of the developing state's foreign policy. Under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, the objective is not to promote an exclusively regionalist policy of the nationalist ruling class, but to establish the power structures that will allow this class to play its role as an equal in the international community of business powers.

That is why most attempts at restructuring the developing state's economy do not actually challenge the fundamentals of private capitalist accumulation, but instead provide clearly defined roles for a collaborative, if competing, partnership with foreign capital. Contrary to the conclusions of dependency theory the foreign policy of the developing state cannot however be reduced to that of a simple appendage of the western powers. In the pursuit of a proper international climate that will support the domestic economy the developing state's foreign policy may run counter to the policy positions of some of the capitalist powers themselves without actually undermining the roots of incorporation of the local economy into the capitalist financial system. What it means is that a range of policy options is open to the developing state in its international relations. The extent of collaboration depends, in the final analysis, on the strength of the popular anti-neo-colonial forces and the way in which the elites and decision-makers handle their complex relations with the foreign powers.

But this range of options, it should be emphasized, is dictated by the system of national accumulation, the character of the national economy and the social relations and forces of production.

(D) : INDICATIVE QUESTIONS

The nature of our problem of study, therefore, is centred on economic (development) implications of foreign policy in the developing state. This involves a systematic inquiry into the "cause-effect correlation" between economic development and foreign policy as well as the search for patterns of regularity in the behaviour of the developing state on the international scene in terms of its domestic economic development. In this vein, an attempt will be made to answer two fundamental research questions:-

- (1) To what extent and in what ways is the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state determined by nature of its domestic socio-economic structure and relations.
- (2) To what extent and in what ways is the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state conditioned by the pattern of its external economic relations?

Other subsidiary questions which might help to throw light on the main research questions involve an inquiry into the relationship between:-

- (a) the post-colonial economic structure and the foreign policy of the developing state
- (b) the social relations of production and the foreign policy of the developing state.
- (c) Foreign trade and foreign policy in the developing state.
- (d) Foreign Aid and foreign policy in the developing state.
- (e) Foreign Investment and foreign policy in the developing state.
- (f) Monetary policy and foreign policy in the developing state

In fact, the above principal and subsidiary research questions are designed to provide a systematic guide into the central problem of this study which

amounts to an investigation into the economic determinants of the "action and reaction" processes in foreign policy decision-making and execution in the developing state. In other words, these research questions are meant to investigate the relationship between economic inputs and foreign policy outputs of decision-making in the developing state. As we can remark, while major question (1) and subsidiary question (a), (b) and (c) above probe into the domestic economic determinants of the foreign policy of the developing state by focusing on the structure and processes of the developing state's domestic socio-economic environment, major question (2) and subsidiary questions (d), (e), (f) and (g) emphasize the external aspects of its economic development by investigating into the nature and effects of the developing state's commercial, aid, investment and monetary policies on its external behaviour.

Foreign policy has been defined as internal policy carried beyond the boundaries of the state.<sup>68</sup> In this case, the foreign policy of a state (be it socialist or capitalist, developed or developing) is primarily geared towards promoting its internal interests. Thus, the economic development of the developing state constitutes an effective, instrument of its foreign policy with its foreign policy itself being integrated into the overall national strategy of development and translated into intervention.<sup>69</sup> The concept of intervention in terms of foreign policy includes influence, pressure, power status, prestige and autonomy. Therefore to understand the extent to which the developing state has been able to translate intervention in foreign policy into influence in order to promote essentially domestic goals and interests, an analysis of its socio-economic structure and processes appears indispensable.

#### 1.4 : LITERATURE REVIEW

Commenting on "the large amount of work done" in international relations up to the mid-seventies, Kenneth Waltz deplored that "nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism."<sup>70</sup> Studies of Cameroon's foreign policy in particular and those of other developing states in general are in

an even worse state, and can still be called "the underdeveloped study of underdeveloped countries".<sup>71</sup> The authors of the volumes reviewed here would agree that nothing worthwhile exists to build up. Yet even general foreign policy theorists who do not concentrate on the Third World<sup>72</sup> affirm its importance for theory building in foreign policy. On going debates in the area of development studies and even in epistemology attest to the importance of the Third World in other fields of social analysis.<sup>73</sup> Is the lag in foreign policy studies due to a lack of reliable data or the state of theory itself? Without underestimating the problems of data collection in the non-Western World, one cannot avoid maintaining that current foreign policy theory has failed to raise the necessary questions and to provide the proper guidelines for cumulative, empirically rigorous, and conceptually relevant studies.

(A) WHY THE LAG

If the importance of the Third World is not in doubt, is the lag due to data problems? It is that in many Third World countries the press is technically less developed, and is also more "guided" than in the West. Moreover, the inadequacy of documentary and archival facilities makes the analysis of past decisions very hazardous. Even pure information reported by the international and "élite" press is sometimes of modest quality, low credibility, or just incorrect. Difficulties increase when we search for systematic data to build indicators of international behaviour<sup>74</sup> or scales of diplomatic interaction. Though data problems are acute for the Third World, they are not unique to it. However, they have not prevented the publication of well-documented research on the U.S.S.R. or on China or of some solid works on the Third World by scholars in comparative politics. This discrepancy directs attention to the state of foreign policy theory. Foreign policy may well be older than the nation-state itself.<sup>75</sup> Yet, Rosenau admits that the categories in his often-cited essay, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" are "imprecise, incomplete,



impressionistic and over lapping"<sup>76</sup>. The "Linkage" concept<sup>77</sup> he elaborated, which proved popular both in academia and political parlance resulted in 3,800 combinations. In 1975 the authors of a through survey of the field could not help observing that "when scholars characterize the study of foreign policy as in a primitive theoretical stage, and when they feel compelled to insist that our first steps be the definition and classification of foreign policy... those over fifty may be swept by despair, while those under thirty may sense unlimited opportunity".<sup>78</sup> For foreign policy theory to mature, three basic problems have to be posed in such a way as to guide cumulative empirical studies. In this section, we shall evaluate how the volumes under review cope with problems of theory and empirical studies. The discussion of these contributions is organized in such a way as to answer three basic questions of foreign policy analysis, viz.

- (1) the "what" question:—the definition and measurement of foreign policy output;
- (2) the "why" question:—the determinants or sources of foreign policy;
- (3) the "how" question:—the conversion of inputs into outputs, the decision-making process.

#### (B) THE "WHAT" OF FOREIGN POLICY

Major landmarks in the literature of foreign policy studies have neglected to specify what is to be explained. Does the general label "foreign policy" mean general objectives, specific behaviour (acts or decisions) or objectives and behaviour combined? In the article cited above, Rosenau deals extensively with foreign policy sources and their different degrees of potency, but neglects to define what he means by foreign policy output.<sup>79</sup> Textbooks that are supposed to single out major problems and to synthesize their solutions are also neglectful.<sup>80</sup> Even an overview of foreign policy analysis published recently still defines the object of the field as the "hows and whys of state behaviour"<sup>81</sup>. The "what" question remains undefined, and is consequently easily overlooked in the analysis.

### THE "WHY" OF FOREIGN POLICY

The focus of "foreign policy theory" has thus been on the determinants, inputs or independent variables. Yet, despite the heavy investment of several generations, the picture is not a rosy one for researchers who deal with Third World policies. Two major foreign policy theorists - Brecher<sup>82</sup> and Rosenau<sup>83</sup> - have differed on various aspects (such as the number and potency of independent variables, the analytical techniques used, and the type of comparative method). They could agree, however, on the ranking of determinants in Third World foreign policy analysis:- the primacy of the psychological variables. Indeed, that is part of a general bias that has dominated the field all along. From Snyder's decision-making approach to Allison's "bureaucratic politics model", the bias has been in favour of domestic sources, with very little interest on the "foreign sources of foreign policy."<sup>84</sup> When this last dimension was taken into account at all, no distinction was made between external determinants and global-systemic determinants (global structures, stratification patterns, and "rules of the games").<sup>85</sup> Since we talking about countries that are "underdeveloped", on the periphery", "dependent" or "dominated", should we not at least explore the powerful global determinants?

### (C) THE "HOW" OF FOREIGN POLICY

The process of converting inputs into outputs (the decision-making process) is the crucial one, especially for the Third World. The fact that it lags furthest behind in analysis is due to psychological reductionism-a modern version of the "great man" theory of history - which attributes everything to the leader's idiosyncratic or perceptual variables.<sup>86</sup> Consequently, the psychological traits of the leadership have become a substitute for the analysis of how different foreign policy determinants do infact shape foreign policy decisions.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, we have not yet started to ask the questions as to whether, how, and when such factors as the domestic social structure, regime characteristics, trade patterns, treaty obligations, and membership in international organizations will influence the making of foreign policy.

Thus most works on the political economy of foreign policy in the Third World have avoided and/or confused the "what"; the "why" and the "how" questions in their analyses. And that is why most of the previous contributions to the literature on the economic development and/or foreign policy of the Third World have failed to raise problems which should have been basic in the understanding of the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state. The real concern over the issues raised in the various works arises from their methodological inadequacies which, in turn, are due to their excessive emphases on the traditional historical approaches in the explanation of human behaviour and institutions. However these methodological defections express themselves in three main issues. First of all, most of the interpretations on the political economy of the Third World foreign policy are theoretically unstructured although most of them contain arguments, concepts and assumptions which are valid in nature. In the second place, most of these contributions are subjective and based on value judgements and untestable assumptions. Most of the explanations are not scientific because they are not based on rigorous arguments from which theoretical conclusions could be derived and which are capable of being verified empirically. Thirdly, most of these contributions have demonstrated the inability to resist the strong, but baneful temptation of being the ideological flag-bearers of their respective schools of thought.

Thus, in their attempt to disclose the realities of the political economy of Third World foreign policy, most contributions have ended up by generating more heat than light; in part because of their use of polemical and complicated semantics of doubtful relevance, and in part because of the obfuscation of the economic development implications of foreign policy and the foreign policy implications of economic development - that is, a systematic inquiry into "cause-effect" relations as well as the search for patterns of regularity in state behaviour .

Indeed, in a critical test of validity and objectivity, the ideological character of the different contributions has amounted to making the debate on the political economy of Third World foreign policy nothing less than a dogmatic simplification of the fundamental considerations basic to its understanding. Consequently, the debate has served only as a pointless discussion of the political economy of Third World foreign policy by uprooted subjective methods and concepts, rather than constituting a guided raid into the basics, complexities and consequences of such foreign relations. With our three basic points, we are now ready to evaluate the contributions of the different studies.

(D) SITUATING THE DIFFERENT STUDIES.

The research that underlies the works of Clapham, Richardson, Rothstein and Willetts<sup>88</sup> is presented in clear, readable, quantitative and/or qualitative form. Although the volumes were published in Britain and the United States, their methods and techniques do not conform to popular perceptions about a qualitatively oriented European political science and a quantitatively oriented American political analysis. Willett's work is close to the empirical end of the empiricism-conceptualization continuum. It is based on the analysis of variance, with correlation and regression (linear, logarithmic, and multiple). Reading the two longest of the sections (about cluster bloc analysis and the complex sociomatrix) will not only be a laborious task for most political scientists but contrasts with Rothstein's work which does not contain any statistics. Richardson's study with its coefficients and social regression comes nearer to that of Willetts. But despite the similarity of their techniques, Willetts and Richardson differ in their assumptions and conceptual orientations. Willetts's are much more akin to Rothstein's nonquantitative ones. Both Willetts and Rothstein still talk about "communist China" and both reveal a certain condescension in dealing with

many issues of Third World societies, with Rothstein occasionally indulging in cynicism, especially when talking about Third World elites. The seven contributions to Clapham's collection cannot be easily pigeonholed; in any case the various authors and the editor are interested neither in logarithms nor in sophisticated equations and matrices. All of them try to provide data-based illustrations, but of the "soft" type. On the conceptualization-empiricism scale, all of the authors are - like Rothstein - near to the conceptualization end. In looking at each study individually, we will start with a discussion of the dependent variable.

**(E) DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OUTPUT**

The authors of the two conceptually oriented studies are conscious of the importance of specifying the dependent variable as the first step. Rothstein deals particularly with orientation (in the economic issue area) as well as with decisions (pp 32-33). In the Clapham volume, Hill tells us in his introductory theoretical chapter that "although the "why" questions... are fundamentally the most important of all... they cannot be answered without establishing beforehand exactly what phenomena need to be explained" (pp. 1-2). The studies that contribute most to the operational definition and measurement of the foreign policy output are the two that are quantitatively oriented - Richardson's and Willett's. Together, they use four indicators to operationalize a country's foreign policy output viz (a) United Nations (UN) vote; (b) diplomatic alignment; (c) military alignment, and (d) anti-colonialism. Starting from political economy, Richardson asks whether and how the economic dependency of Third World countries is reflected in their foreign policy behaviours (p. 69). If a dependent foreign policy behaviour exists, what are its manifestations and how can they be identified and measured? He decides to equate "dependent" with "compliant" or "differential" behaviour (p. 70). This definition is in keeping with his political economy approach and the (dependency) status of the countries considered, since compliance means that the behaviour's "well-springs are external rather than internal to the actor" - that is, "the foreign

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policy behaviour of a dependent country will be ... more or less in accord with the preferences of the country that dominates its economic life" (pp. 69-70). Compliance itself is disaggregated into four subtypes which, in turn, correspond to four hypotheses (pp. 136, 143, 147, 152) that test the relationship between dependency on the United States and the degree of compliance in foreign policy behaviour of 23 dependent countries.

In combination, the indicators that measure foreign policy behaviour are: (a) UN General Assembly roll-call vote on cold war issues, using Lijphart's index. Willetts uses the same indicator to identify non-aligned behaviour. Even though one might admit that all Third World countries are eager to participate in the United Nations and through it hope to influence world diplomacy, can one reduce all the diversity of a country's international behaviour to its roll-call votes, as Richardson does? Because of the complexity manifested in nonaligned behaviour, Willetts realizes the limiting aspect in the use of one indicator. Consequently he goes on to collect data on other manifestations of Third World behaviour; (b) Degree of diplomatic alignment measured by a relatively simple scale of diplomatic representation with countries divided along the lines of the cold war; (c) Degree of military alignment measured by military treaties with, and arms purchases from, the two blocs; (d) Anticolonialism, measured by U N voting, trade boycotts of both South Africa, and diplomatic relations with South Africa and and pre-revolutionary Portugal. In addition to unearthing some little-used but relevant data for analysts of international relations in the Third World, Willetts pushes technical rigour and comprehensiveness even further than the use of multi-indicator procedure, in order to identify and grasp the diversity of nonaligned behaviour. For example, he tries to discover the degree of correlation between the different indicators in the cluster. Thus, in the East-West alignment cluster, the correlation between military alignment and East-West U. N. votes ranges from 0.77 in 1964 to 0.88 in 1970 (p. 203).

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Willetts even tries to establish a correlation between the clusters - the East-West and the anticolonial dimensions of nonalignment (p. 207).

That is not a small feat, especially in the analysis of a concept-nonalignment - that as Mazrui says in his foreword; "has changed in meaning and operational implications since its inception in the 1950s". But Willetts tries to go further. Encouraged by his success in measuring and identifying nonaligned behaviour, he starts to deal with another basic question - the "why" of nonalignment. He concentrates on this explanatory aspect in the last few pages of the very last chapter under the title "Toward a Theory of Nonalignment". Interestingly enough, he situates this attempt at theory building within the wider field:

There are two theoretical approaches that are relevant. Several Neo-Marxists Writers see most (if not all) of the Third World as being bound to the West by a complex network of links to maintain capitalist exploitation. It is argued that the extent of these links determines the extent to which each country is subject to Western political control. Alternatively traditional international relations theory would postulate each state as having a degree of alignment with the West that depended on the government's perception of what best served that state's interest (p. 209).

The two approaches are caricatured in 14 pages. For instance, neo-marxism is stripped of the diversity of the various arguments and approaches among the different schools, and is reduced to mechanical analysis and economism (which Samir Amin has criticized precisely).<sup>89</sup> The main thrust of Willetts's proposed "theory" of nonalignment is to regard this orientation "as no less than a new form of alignment" (p. 223). Admitting that such "a theoretical conclusion ... should not be seen as having been tested in the earlier empirical analyses" (p. 223), the author nonetheless affirms the basic proposition of the "theory": "when the nonaligned met in Belgrade in September 1961, they were setting up an informal, non-military alliance" (p. 224). There is no inventory of conceptual and empirical proposals of alliance theory to see whether and how much they apply to the proposed "theory", rather, the reader must contend with expressions such as "by extension of the above argument" and "it does not seem

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unreasonable to imagine ..." Willetts draws a usefull chart classifying all possible reasons for joining an alliance, but rather than attempting to demonstrate its explanatory plausibility by applying it to a few detailed cases, he ends up with statements to the effect that Morocco chose the non-aligned alliance because of its claims on Mauritania, Nepal because it si "a follower of India", and Saudi Arabia because it is "a follower of the U. A. R "(p. 227). Accustomed to Willetts's earlier technical sophistication and rigorous testing, and then faced with trite or unsupported affirmations, the reader is baffled.

Lack of familiarity with basic social science conceptualization, and especially the part thereof that deals with the Third World, is the cause of Willetts's handicap. He defines ideology as "concerned with the role of individuals in society" (p. 29). Should we assume then, that Marxism - which deals primarily with collectivities - is not an ideology? He tells us that his book's subject matter is the collective movement rather than a specific policy because of "the wide range of information that is available on their (the nonaligned states') foreign policy decisions" (p. 2). But he fails to mention any systematic study of a Third World country's foreign policy decision-making. Thus the basic and preliminary survey of the literature is short-circuited.<sup>90</sup> Even when Willetts refers to previous analyses of nonalignment (acimovic, Anabtawi, Burton, choucri, crabb, Jansen, Korany, Lyon, Mates, Martin, McGowan, Rana, Rubinstein, Sayegh) we are not told how his findings converge with or diverge from, these earlier ones. Surely, cumulativeness - or at least the objective of attaining it - should be the premise of every scientifically oriented work, which Willetts's certainly is. Perhaps his reasons for not relating his work to that of others is to be found in Willett's statement at the outset: "The book breaks new ground, both in being the first study to examine the diplomatic origins and the development of new institutions for the movement and in being the first attempt to present a systematic profile of all the membership of the Nonaligned" (p.XVII). Moreover, the work is not related to recent conceptualization in international theory.

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If Willetts's conceptual attempts could be situated within any paradigm, it would be that of traditional international relations theory as opposed to neo-Marxism. Yet, apart from five books published in the 1960s or before, none of the "grand foreign policy theorists" or any of their disciples who worked on Africa (Willetts's area of concentration) are mentioned. We could continue nitpicking for examples of conceptual naiveté or even factual mistakes, but that would not be fair to Willetts. Since no author can do everything, Willetts emphasizes his strong point - measurement. He has done an admirable job of providing important and systematic information on the institutional aspects of the nonaligned movement prior to 1970. Those who wish to work on the movement cannot do without this information. It is a big achievement in the take-off of Third World studies.

Do Willetts's empirical credentials and conceptual limitations constitute an indication that the gap between empiricists and theorists is still unbridgeable? Richardson's input-output linkage shows that we are growing out of the sterile dichotomy of "theorizing without data or data-gathering without theory."<sup>91</sup> Interested in measuring compliant international behaviour, Richardson also links it to its basis-dependency. "The foreign policy behaviour of dependencies is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country." (p. 64). The trust of the argument is thus conceptual as well as empirical, and Richardson makes this clear throughout the book by discussing the independent variable (dependency), by means of the framework of political economy (pp. 14-17) or by emphasizing conceptual distinctions between "compliant" and other sorts of behaviour (pp. 65-70). How does this affect his findings? By collecting and tabulating data on U.N. roll-call votes (1950-1973), Richardson is able to test four hypotheses linking dependency with four subtypes of compliant behaviour

1. Linear compliance :—"The greater is its economic dependence, the greater is a dependency's agreement with the United States on Cold War roll calls" (p. 136).

2. Decreasing marginal compliance:—"greater economic dependence yields decreasingly more frequent agreement with the United States on cold war roll calls (p. 143)
3. Defiance:—"a dependency's cold War voting agreement with the United States is lowest when its dependence is either lowest or greatest, maximum agreement occurs at intermediate levels of agreement (p. 147)
4. Deteriorating compliance:—"a dependency's Cold War voting agreement with the United States decreases over time" (p. 152).

Richardson rejects all four hypotheses. What actually seems to happen is that dependencies are responsive to forces that act similarly on all delegations to the U.N (p. 168). If the greatest stimuli on the dependencies and non-dependencies elicit the same response, the situation of dependency obviously does not make much difference, at least at this level.

Briefly "dependence itself is ... a poor voting predictor" (p. 159). It is a sign of scientific maturity that an author accepts that his initial hypotheses have been proven wrong, and says so. Nevertheless, we are bound to ask again whether limiting the operationalization of foreign policy behaviour to U.N. roll calls is enough to reveal all the complexities of a countries foreign policy output.

#### (F) WHAT DETERMINES FOREIGN POLICY

The testing procedure advocated by Richardson raises another issue that has increasingly become part of a controversy about ways - and indeed the possibility - of testing dependency theory. The controversy came into the open in the mid-1970s; when aggregate data and Pearson's "r" correlation coefficients were used to measure the association between (capital and trade) dependency and its social, economic and political effects.<sup>93</sup> The idea that bivariate analysis of type x (external relations of dependency) would determine Y (result in dependent countries) elicited a very angry response from "Los Dependista." They protested against the reduction of (complex) dependency relations to (mechanistic) statistical methods. Cardoso's reaction in imagining the response of a hypothetical observer from outer space was that

"the brains of these beings appear to limit their images and thoughts to binary opposites."<sup>94</sup> He even expressed skepticism about the proper understanding of "dependency" in some North American quarters. Richardson's synthesis of dependency, however, is clear; interdisciplinary and representative of the main literature. Its main flaw (aside from the reductionism of compliant foreign policy behaviour to measurement by one indicator) is the simplification of the presumed linkage between dependency and foreign policy. For instance, even admitting the dominant "superimperialist" weight of the United States in the global system, the analysis of its relations with dependent countries cannot be equated with the dependency perspective. The premise of this perspective is not limited to asymmetrical bilateral relations as such; rather, this asymmetry is seen as a reflection of a historically determined macrostructure characterized by specific stratification patterns and modes of production. If this historical - structural conceptualization of the World system is what distinguishes dependency from other macro-approaches (Kaplan or Aron); it is not enough to test the relations between "dependent" countries and the United States. In any dependent country's foreign relations, there can be a change, say, from the United States to Great Britain or France or Japan.

However, that is not a change in the country's dependent status, only in its dominant partner.<sup>95</sup> Although Richardson is conscious of this bias (or validity trap) (pp. 173-74), he maintains that "dependence on the United States declined in the last decade under study. This is true for the dependent group as a whole, and for a substantial number of individual countries. The unqualified assertion that external dependence is self-perpetuating is therefore oversimplified" (p. 126). This statement should at least have been qualified. We must reiterate our earlier insistence on the distinction between external<sup>1</sup> and global-systemic variables.

In attempting to avoid another danger of dependency analysis - the modelling of dependent relations as the sole causal factors<sup>96</sup> - Richardson explores the explanatory potential of other conceptual islands - the "non-economic

possibilities" of regionalism and incrementalism.<sup>97</sup> If compliant behaviour is not determined by dependency, is it then determined by regionalism or incrementalism (pp. 88-93, 158-64)? Richardson's analysis gives the trumpcard to regionalism. But it is not only the testing that is important, the demonstration itself is valuable. Richardson worked with 19 Latin American and 4 Afro-Asian states. If regionalism were the most potent determinant of behaviour, it should show itself in the degree of difference that exists in voting patterns between countries that are contiguous and noncontiguous to the United States. That is indeed, what happens. The (neighbouring) Latin American countries agree with the United States position 68.5 percent of the time, whereas the (distant) Afro-Asian countries agree with the United States just over 56 percent of the time. The difference is not great but it is nonetheless significant - especially when we take the following two elements into consideration :- (a) the average voting behaviour of the 4 Afro-Asian countries is virtually the same as the of nondependencies generally; (b) nondependent but neighbouring countries (Barbados, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay) agree with the United States Cold War preferences more (62.2 percent) than do dependent but distant countries (56 percent). Richardson ends his analysis of the impact of regionalism by synthesizing the results for those who are uninitiated in regression and correlation studies (p. 164).

If regionalism is a potent indicator, does this mean that incrementalism is of no consequence in determining foreign policy behaviour? Since bureaucracies "are increasingly prominent in the government of less-developed countries", Richardson equates his discussion of incrementalism with Allison's theory of bureaucratic politics (pp. 89-90, 158-60). But Allison and Halperin made clear that their framework is to "apply to the behavior of most modern governments in industrialized nations"<sup>98</sup> In addition, the few systematic studies that have been made on the role of foreign ministries in Third World countries do not reveal that these bureaucracies have played an important role.<sup>99</sup> Third, incrementalism as used in Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence is an even

greater departure from the initial explanatory endeavour than regionalism. Richardson seems to be conscious of the problem, but he does not confront it. He merely juxtaposes the two approaches (p. 90). Consequently, the potential use of incrementalism as an explanatory alternative has not been exhausted. While its presentation is synthetic, the whole exercise is very sketchy. As a result, bureaucratic politics has not really been tested by Richardson - only mentioned and summarily brushed aside. It is a pity that Richardson does not attempt to adapt incrementalism to the societal context of developing polities, thereby opening the black box to discuss their foreign policy making process. He would have been able to relate dependency of foreign policy making process by examining, for instance, how dependency structures could affect the composition and participation of the different social groups and their transnational linkages.<sup>100</sup> The analysis of the dynamics of the political process is the focus of the volumes by Clapham and by Rothstein.

(G) THE "HOW" QUESTION: THE NEED FOR A PROCESS ANALYSIS

The contributors to the collection of essays edited by Clapham are looking for the variable "that might conceivably affect foreign policy decisions" (p.1). Similarly, Rothstein affirms the need for analyzing the decision-making process (chaps 6 through 9). The two books, however, differ in dealing with the problem of decision-making in foreign policy. Participants in the decision-making process vary in number and in relative weight, based on such factors as the type of political regime or the decision's issue area (for example, "high" versus "low" politics). These differences, however, do not affect the general decision-making pattern which is dominated by the executive power around or through "el señor Presidente", or "la monarchie présidentielle".<sup>101</sup> In addition to the president, the decision-making group may consist of the foreign minister, the party, the military, the clergy (the church and the Ulama), landowners, technocrats in state-centred enterprises, intellectuals and artists (at least creators of public opinion), and ethnic groups. (For instance, the salience of the Middle East conflict in some Latin American

countries is due to the presence of one million Jews and one and one-half million Arabs in the continent). All the contributors to the clapham volume share this view and substantiate it in their analysis - obviously with varying degrees of success. Even Michael Leifer, who does not use the same categories, as the other contributors, and who admits his inability to obtain enough data to analyze decisions (pp. 33, 35), does not depart from this perspective (p. 39) in his general chapter on Asia. Despite this agreement, or perhaps because of the nature of an edited book, no coherent decision-making framework ever develops.

A coherent approach to decision-making is what Rothstein aims for. Eventhough he does not limit his volume to decision-making, his aim objective is the analysis of internal societal dynamics of underdevelopment and its interaction with the external environment to modify the lot of the Third World (pp. 10,35-38, 181). When he includes external factors in his analysis, it is mainly in search of balance, and sometimes just to pay lip service to external constraints. Based on the concept of a "resource gap", Rothstein's decision-making framework is inspired by a political economy approach of the "liberal" type as distinct from Richardson's dependencia" type. Its basis is thus the domestic environment: "We cannot develop a sense of how policy making might be improved without understanding the political process - the style and rules of the political game - within which policy making operates" (p. 181). The pattern of this political process is a function of two characteristics of Third World systems : conflict and poverty. Conflict is caused by the fractionalization of the polity, the presence of divisions on primordial and/or economic basis; tribal, ethnic, religious, regional or class. Political identification thus is with narrow groups rather than with the state - a "we/they" division within the country itself. The frequency and the intensity of conflict are heightened by ever increasing poverty; rising demand and insufficient disposable resources. Rothstein quotes Harold and Margaret Sprout<sup>102</sup> to the effect that "spreading knowledge has stimulated demands, gradual and hesitant at first, then

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insatiable" (p. 187). The pie is no longer constant, but appears to be shrinking. The result, then of limited availability of limited resources is a scramble on the part of mistrustful groups who are committed above all to the protection of their narrow interests. Consequently, "everything is politicized, for control of the state is also control of the economic and social marketplace" (p.182). The description comes very close to the mechanism of Huntington's "praetorian" society.<sup>103</sup> Without referring to Huntington, Rothstein concurs with this society's characteristics, for instance, (p. 213): the dictum becomes "control the state or control nothing" (p. 182). But since the groups are badly organized, the fighting takes place mainly among the elites which "converge on the capital and struggle against each other for control of the state" (p. 184).

The picture may be overdrawn; it is certainly incomplete and suffers from some limitations, spelled out in part by Rothstein himself (pp. 62, 186). But the conceptualization of the decision-making process as a "resource-gap problem" involving group conflict is a big step forward from the conceptual blinders of psychological reductionism. Analysts can now go beyond Rothstein to investigate how and when an alliance between domestic and external groups can influence the resource gap and determine the decisions to be taken.<sup>104</sup>

The road taken by Rothstein, then is the right one. If the foreign policy field as an arena of choice is a field of opportunities and constraints for each and every state, the underdeveloped country enters this arena with the double burden of an "international system of increasing complexity" and a "domestic base that is less secure and less manageable" (p. 62). The impact of underdevelopment on policy making may be heightened by the fact that "new and inexperienced elites were forced to decide critical strategic issues without much knowledge or expertise, without many useful precedents, and in the face of sharp domestic cleavages and serious foreign pressures" (p.90.).

This situation is of course favourable to the infiltration by outside groups into the dependent country's decision-making process. Rothstein does not study this angle, nor did he intend to. However, his conceptual scheme directs efforts to look for data substantiating this unexplored research problem. It also helps us to situate and grasp better what the contributors to Clapham's volume say about the decision-making process in their different regions (sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, the Commonwealth Caribbean, Latin America, and the Middle East).

Rather than providing systematic, in-depth, data-based analyses of a representative sample of decisions, all the chapters in Foreign Policy Making in Developing States are general syntheses with some illustrations from the authors' respective regions. Without a conceptual framework to guide their research and data collection, there is only minimal cumulativeness among the different contributions. It is thus hard to find systematic answers to some of the general conceptual questions that have been raised. Still, the book is not only relevant in its focus, but meets an immediate need by bringing together competent authors and making them deal with their areas of expertise in relatively few pages. In his insightful chapter on the Middle East, Adeed Dawisha expresses the general view represented in the volume by affirming that "the dependent variables of foreign policy behavior lie outside the scope of this analysis," and that "the concentration will consequently be on the independent variables (human and non-human factors which influence decision makers) and intervening variables (processes, procedures whose task is to convert policy inputs into policy outputs" (pp. 44-45). In contrast to the enumerative and classificatory approach used on inputs, the few pages on the decision-making process are synthetic, analytical, and perceptive. Foreign policy decision making generally is considered as an activity of the top leadership, even more so in a region characterized by relative weakness of the cabinet, by parliaments that are rubber stamps, and by political parties (when they exist) that perform primarily mobilizing and/or legitimizing functions.



Consequently, Dawisha posits that analysis should focus more on "leaders' personalities, perceptions, values and needs than on examining organizational procedures or bureaucratic competition..." (p. 63).

This proposition-as said earlier-is well-known and established in studies of Third World foreign policies, but Dawisha links this presidentialism to its societal-historical bases. First, the political culture of the tribe and village traditionally bestowed authority on one man. Second, Islam historically concentrated religious and political power in the hands of one man - the prophet, and after him, the caliph. Similarly, in attracting attention to "the profuse and pervasive influence of the military over the decision-making process," he links this influence to its societal bases by quoting Rostow to the effect that the traditional culture of the region "rests upon a religion that accords a great prestige and legitimacy to the military" (p. 65). Vatikiotis has earlier expressed similar views, and one can accept or reject these justifications. What is important here is Dawisha's attempt to avoid the trap and limitations of psychological reductionism. At the same time, he directs our attention to one important characteristic of decision-making participants in Third World polities: their increasing militarization. Not only was the average defense expenditure in the Middle East 13.2 percent of GNP in 1974 (as compared to 5 and 6 percent, respectively, for Britain and the United States), but one-third of the 21 states in the region were headed by a man with military credentials (pp. 59, 64, 65, 66).

In his solid chapter on sub-Saharan Africa, Clapham disagrees on the increasing influence of the military in foreign policy decision making. Although the rate of relative militarization of governments in Africa is higher than in the Middle East, African armies have not been able to influence foreign policy. He explains that "the institutional structure of African societies as a whole, and not just of the military, is still in most cases so fluid that it can scarcely be looked to for any enduring influence on the foreign policy-making

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process" (p.89). The issue is thus more controversial than expected, yet no data are provided to demonstrate either contention.

Clapham does agree with Dawisha on the personalized foreign policy process; he emphasizes factors that give the leader latitude in foreign policy decision making - for instance, lack of diplomatic representation (because of its costs for many underdeveloped states) and hence, scarcity of information on which to base decisions. Consequently, "bureaucratic approaches to decision-making derived from more institutionalized political systems clearly fail to apply" (p. 88). This argument is in keeping with Allison's previously quoted skepticisms: it differs from Richardson's contention.

Clapham's chapter is rich in data - for instance, on African diplomatic missions. It is also suggestive in alluding to the linkage between foreign policy and African history (p. 75), the state's permeability (p. 85), and the role of expatriate economic groups in the management of crossnational transactions (p.78).

Fruitful suggestiveness, rather than data collection and processing, is characteristic of Vaughan Lewis's chapter on the Caribbean (pp. 110-30); his subtitles are different from those of the other chapters, and there are none for the decision-making process per se. Despite its generality and lack of "stress on the analysis of the actual making of particular decisions" (p. 126), the chapter can be extremely useful to an empiricist graduate student who wants to put flesh on Lewis's "theoretical explorations" and to see how the "structural bases of Caribbean economic and political systems" determine decisions (p. 126).

In addition to its holistic approach to decision making, Edy Kaufman's long chapter on Latin America (pp. 131-64) raise the question of constraints. Although internal constraints may be few and ineffective, external hegemonic ones are not (p. 157).

The case of Paraguay's President Stroessner is a good example in this respect. His "policy of alignment is defined in terms of 'complete adhesion to the policy of the United States'. ... During a visit to Washington in March 1968 President Stroessner offered to send troops to Vietnam and was quoted in the U.S. press as saying that he saw the American Ambassador in Asuncion as a member of his cabinet" (p.148). This may well be an extreme instance of unconditional support, but it also shows that satellization is not limited to Central America's banana republics. Aside from the special case of Cuba, "continuing ... dependent status of the regimes in the small countries has been the norm, regimes with independent foreign policy orientations have had only a short life" (p. 148). The subordination to the U.S. applies also to larger countries, such as Brazil. Thus, the U.S. "role in Joao Goulart's fall... in 1964 included the withholding of any direct financial assistance to his central government" while "at the same time, it extended military support to encourage the efforts of the conspirators to overthrow the civilian regime" (p. 145). Penetration can also be through student organizations, trade union movements, women's associations, opposition mass media, or even the church; the latter may be convinced to deploy its efforts to prevent change from arriving too fast and going too far.

These cases are good examples of the question of the permeability of the state, which Clapham raises in his chapter on sub-Saharan Africa. But it is important to emphasize that domestic penetration by external actors need not be limited to formal political means and structures; it can be both societal and informal. Indeed, Kaufman - quoting Chalmers's relevant synthesis - attracts attention to some cases of informal/ societal means of external penetration :

- 1 - groups with special ties abroad may emulate policies, organizations, standards of living- and so on, introducing exogenous patterns of behavior that might stimulate chains of disequilibria;
- 2 - unequal access to foreign resources may alter the distribution of power ;
- 3 - unstable or exceptional demands may be injected into the system by groups acting "under order"  
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from abroad, or by local groups seeking to compensate for deprivations experienced in their dealings abroad ... (p. 145-46).

These are important theoretical leads, more suggestive than exhaustive. They are as unexplored as the assessment of the exact role of the military, or the degree and modes of the bureaucracy's influence in foreign policy decision making. Even the definitions used by the different authors on the role of global factors in foreign policy making of dominated states differ: Kaufman's is close to the dependencia perspective, whereas Dawisha's concentrates on the impact of an issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Alas, the positions of the various authors are brought together neither in Christopher Hill's introductory chapter, nor in Clapham's concluding one.

Both of these chapters are synthetic and to the point, concentrating on general conceptual issues of comparative foreign policy and their relation to Third World countries. For instance, Hill codifies the three alternatives open to the foreign policy student interested in Third World countries. He chooses the intermediary position between complete intellectual integration in "made in North America" theories and approaches, and complete intellectual separation from them (pp. 1,5). Few researchers would disagree with this view. The analysis of Third World foreign policy has been plagued, however, much less by what position to take than by how to apply this position systematically. It is a pity that Hill did not proceed in this direction far enough to give operational guidelines to the different authors writing on different regions; if he had Clapham could have brought their findings and the different threads together in the final chapter, telling us what to take and what to leave from present international theory in its relative applicability to the Third World. In view of this absence of systematic findings, Clapham's concluding chapter does not have any empirical generalizations - except his own - to build upon.

Clapham manages to do an admirable job, however. Although he is never far from the basic concerns of international theory, he is always close to the reality of Third World politics: problems of development, dependence and

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identity, ethnicity and national integration, as well as the permeability and relative autonomy of the state.

If potential cumulativeness had been pursued as an objective, the individual contributors might have been able to solve some of their definitional problems, thereby paving the way for typology building and making their essays more comparable and comparative. For, despite the attempt to use uniform subtitles, the chapters are more juxtaposed than compared. Even though "comparaison n'est pas raison," comparison will multiply and advance our knowledge. If we are analyzing one entity - the Third World - with the help of competent specialists who concentrate on their different areas of expertise, and the essays are found between the covers of a single volume, and yet we cannot compare, where and when could we possibly do so? If the authors had worked in concert, many other problems would have been solved - even organizational ones. For instance, the succinct and functional bibliographies at the end of each author's chapter could have been combined at the end of the volume to promote the integration of the different parts and heighten the work's thematic unity. In that way, the different bibliographical annotations could have been synthesized to form a bibliographical guide and a working tool for the young researcher in this developing area of analysis. As a result of these lacunae, the book does not rise above being the mere sum of the individual chapters.

Are we asking too much when we expect books of readings to contribute to scholarship? Anthologies can indeed disseminate the "basic" literature of the field to a scholarly audience too busy to have digested it in its original book or journal form. They can also organize knowledge in fruitful and previously unexplored ways. Their degree of success depends, of course, on many factors. One of these is the way in which editorial work can prevent the edited book from having too much of a "shopping center" flavour, and can thus guarantee that its organizational logic is not lost on the reader.

In view of the credentials of the editor and the authors, the value of Clapham's volume could have been much greater in some of these ways. The organizational dimension is important because this format of authorship may well be a good means of coping with many of the problems that plague the analysis of Third World foreign policies. The cost of systematic empirical research on foreign policy decisions will continue to be high, and each of us working individually will continue to suffer from limitations. Therefore, the edited book, or the "reader", could be a good means of minimizing the various disadvantages and guiding the young researcher in the field.

When we move away from these to Andrew Kamarck<sup>105</sup> we shift from the specific to the general. That is, we move away from concentration on approaches adapted to the Third World (that is from writings on the economic determinants of Third World to African foreign policies in particular) to more specific approaches. Andrew Kamarck, in "Economic Determinant's of African foreign policy", illustrates that the economic forces affecting politics and foreign policy are derived from: (1) the domestic structure of the economic system and ~~the~~ international linkages of the economic and political system, (2) the objectives of the government and the people as to what form of government they want in relation to their external relationships, and (3) the conflict between the first and the second.<sup>106</sup> He characterized African economies as being highly dependent. African trade and investment, he said, are comparatively of little importance to the rest of the world. Because African trade is less important, African states have little or no influence in international politics.<sup>107</sup> His contention is also that even if the African states were organized in a monolithic bloc in the United Nations Assembly, they could not use economic power (which they do not have) as a bludgeon to serve their political interests in the world arena. When Kamarck treated African states as a monolithic bloc he certainly included Cameroon in that categorization. Kamarck's insightful observations delineated some of the major constraints placed upon the effective exercise of the developing state's foreign policy.

While Kamarck's theoretical current descends from the intellectual tradition (of Samuel Huntington, Horowitz, Edward Shils, Lucien Pye, Janovitz Morris, David Rapoport and Claude Welch)<sup>108</sup> that views economic development as an agent of foreign policy independence and effectiveness in the developing state, his conclusions are highly debatable. There is no doubt that the lack of economic development has caused the lack of influence of the developing state in world affairs, but there is every doubt that even as a monolithic bloc, the developing states cannot exert such an influence. To attribute the lack of unity to the low economic development is to confuse the cause with the effect. It is common knowledge that African balkanization and lack of unity has been fundamentally responsible for the low level of economic development in Africa and therefore, the cause.

Beyond Africa, there have been quite a few pieces of literature on economics and foreign policy written by Western and non-Western scholars. Most of what has been written on the economic determinants of foreign policy has some flavour of ideological propaganda of the pre-and post-cold war era. Here, we have dichotomized the controversy (which is basically from two schools of thought) into the pluralist views and the marxist views.

Feliks Gross<sup>109</sup> styled economic determinants of foreign policy as being monocausal in approach and therefore, marxist. Gross is not alone. Most of the conservatives and Liberal democrats of the Western School of thought are behind him. They range from (James Rosenau, Waltz, Macridis, Hoffman, K. Holsti, Hans Morgenthau, J. Stroessinger, J.D. Singer, etc)<sup>110</sup> international relations scholars to the comparativists who interpret economic factors of foreign policy to be literally a marxist or neo-marxist doctrinaire approach. They maintain that there are other interacting causal factors which carry relative weights as economics. The theoreticians of war and its aspects (G. Blainey, L. Brasom and G. Goethals, M. Russett, Q. Wright, G. Pruitt and R. Synder, G. Stroessinger and et al)<sup>111</sup> view the multiplicity of variables, ranging from socio-psychological, anthropological, economic causes

and effects of war, whose elimination, reduction, or proliferation, victory or defeat is a major foreign policy concern of all nations. Quincy Wright in A Study of War<sup>112</sup> analyzed causalities of six major wars, from the French Revolution to World War I and concluded that war was political, technological, juridico-ideological, socio-religious and psycho-economic. Then the political theorists (Arnold Brecht, Alvin Gouldner, Karl Deutsch, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, et al)<sup>113</sup> critiqued what they called economism or economic determinism. Alvin Gouldner posits that it is a unimodel<sup>114</sup> and therefore fails scientifically to explain other interacting or intervening variables. Weber replaces Goulder's unimodel with his protestantism<sup>115</sup> - another unimodel, while Parsons introduces a theory of voluntaristic scheme, based on morality, for Weber's structural functionalism.<sup>116</sup> Brecht repudiates economism on the grounds that Marx and Engles, in denouncing the value judgements of their contemporaries and of former generations, expressed values judgements of their own, both negative and positive.<sup>117</sup> That "their polemic emphasis that the prevailing idea of justice and morals in each epoch depended on economic factors, in particular on methods of production and class interests was merely subjective and relative",<sup>118</sup> that in the transpositive and transtraditional sphere of value judgements their ideas were rather absolutistic in character.<sup>119</sup>

Yet the methodologists (K. O'Leary, Karl Deutsch, P. Burgess and R. Lawton, J. Rummel, P. McGowan, R. North and Choucri, J.D. Singer, et al)<sup>120</sup> attempt to second rate the motivation of economic underpinnings as being the driving force in foreign policy. However, McGowan's statistical analysis of 45 nations of the 1960s supported the proposition that the level of a nation's economic development affects the formulation of its foreign policy.<sup>121</sup> Bandyopadhyaya finds that economic development is a major influence on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan.<sup>122</sup> Bunker also finds a relationship between the two variables for Peru, in a diachronic analysis of the period 1958 to 1960.<sup>123</sup> Rummel<sup>124</sup> finds that economic development is one of the two major factor (the other being size) accounting for the activities of nations in the international system. Moore's study<sup>125</sup> of 119 nations in 1963 supports

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Rummel's but Salmore and Herman<sup>126</sup> contradict these two, finding that economic development does not explain much of the variance in the activities of 76 nations during 1966 and 1967. It must be mentioned that the methodologists were far from concentrating on the economic variables alone; their list of variables (twelve in number) range from individual variables, elite variables to linkage variables.

But the marxists, neo-Marxists and the radicals view economics as the overriding factor in the political relations of nations. Karl Marx, although he did not write much about the foreign policy of nations, laid a philosophical foundation of the economic theory of foreign policy. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx asserted that "men in their social production, get involved in definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production, which correspond to a definite state of their development of their material productive forces."<sup>127</sup> The sum of these relations, he contends, constitutes the economic structures of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political super-structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness<sup>128</sup>. In Historical Materialism Versus Economic Determinism,<sup>129</sup> Engels tries to explain more fully the limits of economic determinism. He remarks that (1) economic conditions are regarded as the factor which ultimately determines historical development; (2) political, judicial, philosophical, religious, literary and all kinds of development are based on economic development. But all of these react upon one another and also upon the economic base. It is not that the economic position is the cause, and alone active, while everything else has a passive effect. There is rather an interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.<sup>130</sup> Engels knew that there would be a confusion about the model (economic determinism) he and Marx had given and he further modified it in this way;

"according to the materialist conception of history, the determining element in history is ultimately production and reproduction in real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have asserted. If, therefore, somebody twists this into the statement that the

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economic element is the only determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basic, but the various elements of the super-structure ... also exercise their influence upon the course of historical struggles and many cases preponderant in determining their form."<sup>131</sup>

In actuality, people have twisted Marx and Engel's economic model into a unimodel inspite of Engel's attempt to rephrase it. V. I. Lenin laboured to save the Marxian model in a major theme of international relations developed in his major work - Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.<sup>132</sup> He empirically illustrated the economic imperatives of the foreign policies of Britain, France, Germany and the United States, in relation to other countries, and (the attendant) war as the effect. The history of colonialism was for the first time scientifically diagnosed, and fitted into the dialectical materialist radiography.

In contemporary times there has been more substantive concern over the economic motive of foreign policies than ever was before. The activities of nation-states (the powerful states) in their interactions with the less economically powerful, tend to raise these concerns. The classical and neo-classical theories of international trade were conceived to be borne of comparative advantage to each participant. But they have instead, under the tutelage of the imperialist nations, created dependencies and underdevelopment. The poverty of many nation states, in the midst of the very rich, in the twentieth century has produced the critiques of the traditional world economic order. Some have seen in the military industrial complex societies a direct relationship between economics and foreign policy. Gabriel Kolko, in The Roots of American Foreign Policy<sup>133</sup> sees that the relationship between the objectives of foreign economic policy and direct political and military intervention, has been a continuous and an intimate one, and very often, identical.<sup>134</sup> The world is full of many examples. Chile was a case in point. Paul Baran noted that the diplomatic, financial, and if need be, the military facilities of the imperialist powers are rapidly and efficiently mobilized to help private

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enterprise in distress to do the job.<sup>135</sup> H. Magdoff supports Baran on the ground that a substantial portion of the huge military machine, including that of the Western European nations is the price being paid to maintain the imperialist network of trade and investment in the absence of colonialism.<sup>136</sup>

The fact that we have kept in mind all the work to be done in the future should not detract from the contribution of the volumes under review. Despite their individual limitations, these books have collectively achieved great progress both for foreign policy theory building and for the study of Third World foreign policies. They have unearthed unorthodox sources of data and tackled the operationalization of the foreign policy output. At the explanatory level, a systematic attempt to analyze how global asymmetries affect foreign policy patterns has been initiated both empirically and conceptually. Despite (or perhaps because of) the limitations of this attempt, a political economy approach to foreign policy analysis is maturing. Insights about the foreign policy process have been systematized to liberate us from the blinder imposed by psychologism - the modern version of the great-man theory of history. It is to be hoped that the 1990s will see more cumulative studies of this type. To analyze the foreign policy process fruitfully, however, students of the Third World will have to explore the structure and mechanism of the postcolonial state. For, in discarding "a priori" the analysis of all types of formal-legal structures, many behavioralists have ended up by overlooking the Third World state both as an institution and as a historical-sociological phenomenon. Indeed, the anatomy of the postcolonial state would reveal the importance of informal groups in policy making - for instance, those based on marriage, kinship, religion, ethnicity, and socioeconomic factors. Thus, the student of Third World foreign policies will start not where his colleague in comparative politics left off, but where he too, started. The link between economic development and international relations is, after all, what we have been insisting upon since the 1960s. Nowhere are these two fields

more organically connected than in the permeable societies of the Third World. If the 1990s witness the application of this linkage, we will be able to maintain the momentum of the take-off given us by the works reviewed here. Since the economic determinants of the developing state's foreign policy from the Cameroonain experience, 1960-1982, is the basis of our inquiry into the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, our research will be dealing with the impact of economic relations on foreign policy output. However, this study denies the monocausal and pluralistic approaches because they are insufficient in explaining the concrete situation in the developing state using the Cameroonain example. Instead our study views economics as the overbearing factor among other multivarious factors in the determinants of foreign policy.

#### 1.5 : THE SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The scope and delimitation of a research problem are in the ultimate analysis always suggestions and propositions on how to deal with the problem. This in turn involves a "unit of analysis" and "level of analysis" delimitation. However, the observation of different societies (even the so-called "stagnant" ones) shows that fluctuations, transformations and mutations are an inherent aspect of social reality. This universality of the process of social change has justified its separate treatment as the "historical experience" of a people in sociological theory. Yet it is the generality and universality that create difficulties in conceptualization. But when we consider the historical experience as the "systematic study of variation in social life",<sup>137</sup> it is not very different from the definition of sociology as a whole. If the historical experience is viewed, on the other hand, as the study of the "unfolding of man's social arrangements through time, it appears to be indistinguishable from social change".<sup>138</sup> But rather than reviewing the arguments and counter-arguments about the theory of history, we shall limit ourselves here to two main objectives:

a) methodologically, we shall not dwell on detailed cases of social change or the comparative applicability of particular historical generalizations but deal mainly with "deal-type" constructs following max Weber's example.<sup>139</sup>

b) substantively, we shall not deal with the effects of social change in the different societal sectors except insofar as they affect the structure and functioning of the national system as a whole in terms of its foreign policy.

Before proceeding any further, it is important to state the meaning of "historical experience" as it is used here. Historical experience can be defined as "the observed difference between the earlier and later states of a given area of social reality or rather what happens between these two moments in time. Thus change or experience is not the final observed modification but the process leading towards it"<sup>140</sup> But since social change historical experience is defined as a process, it should have - like any other process - sources and consequences. As for the sources or mechanisms which produce change, one notices that social theorists have emphasized on the whole, since the 18th century, single-variable explanations of historical experience. However, those theories emphasizing the primarily endogenous sources of change (e.g. the technological theory, the economic theory, the conflict theory, the malintegration theory) are more dominant in the literature than those emphasizing exogenous sources (e.g. the cultural interaction theory, the adaptation theory and also the ideational theory).<sup>141</sup> As far as the developing state is concerned, this can already be a weakness in the sociological and historical literature on social change.

For in any treatment of this set of actors, it appears indispensable that a big part of the analysis should be devoted to the analysis of the economic factors and their influence on ethnic identities, the colonial relationship and the structure and functioning of these states, leading in many cases not only to changes in the social system but also through an intensive cumulative process - to changes of the system.<sup>142</sup> This will bring us to our second argument which is the consequences of this continuing process of social change and its impact on the political system - whose agents plan and direct foreign policy.

.../...

(A) UNIT OF ANALYSIS

This study thus is designed to analyze the link between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state. In this case it is limited to evaluation of the "action and reaction" (or cause and effect) processes in the foreign policy of the developing state in which economic variables are considered as the determining pole in these interactions. In other words, it is limited to an examination of the ways in which the economic exchanges or relations (production, distribution and consumption) of the developing state as a political unit determine its orientation or reaction towards its environment. In this perspective, it is oriented to give a proper understanding of the relationship between economic development and foreign policy within the context of major sets of material problems and issues faced by the developing state.<sup>143</sup> Though the study is centered on Cameroon, it draws examples from a wide range of developing states not only in their individual capacities as independent nation-states but also in their interactions with rich nations and in their relationships to one another. In these efforts the ultimate aim is to be able to make useful general statements about the impact of the economic constraints of the developing state on its foreign policy.

The choice of Cameroon is, in part, the result of our physical proximity to the nation's political and economic situation, and therefore the sources of data. In addition, Cameroon like many African countries became independent in 1960. Since foreign policy is an act of sovereignty, it is only from this date that one can begin to assess the impact of problems of economic development on its foreign policy. Moreover, between 1960 and 1982, Cameroon under President Ahidjo's administration outlined the nature of a socio-economic development which bore the characteristics of many third World development strategies. In the same manner she adopted some strategies towards her external environment in an attempt to consolidate her domestic goals and articulate her identity. It is, therefore, easier to assess the role of her economic development in such an external orientation. Thus by stressing on the increasing interdependence that existed between the general orientation of the socio-economic system

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and the general orientation of external relations in Cameroon, 1960-1982, this study provides the limits (or framework) within which comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the foreign policy of the developing state can be grasped. In this case our investigations are conditioned by the nature of the linkages that exist between economic relations (both internal and external) and foreign policy in the developing state.

Such a scope of the problem of research will entail analyzing the main economic structures which in linking domestic and international environments of the developing state constitute the decisive and determining formative influences on its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour. Because of methodological - conceptual consciousness, students of foreign policy have created a false dilemma about the choice between international system - oriented and actor-oriented frameworks. This false dilemma is not unknown to those of economic development and social theory. Cohen has stated that :

The are two different approaches to study social phenomena. The first may be called "holistic" and the second "atomistic". The holistic approach has tended to treat societies or social wholes as having characteristics similar to those of organic matter of of organism; it also stresses... the "systemic" properties of social wholes. On the other hand, the "atomistic" approach... stresses the importance of understanding the nature of individual units which make up the social wholes. <sup>144</sup>

Thus, though we have to be aware of the properties and analytical distinctions between the different levels and units of analysis, <sup>145</sup> we need not consider them as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, an attempt is made to render them complementary <sup>146</sup>. The first unit of analysis is the global. Here the foreign policy of the developing state is analysed in its world setting and covers the whole of Part One. The second unit of analysis which attempts to bring out the specific character of the foreign policy of the developing state is represented by Parts Two and Three of this study which focus on the Cameroonian experience, 1960-1982.

## (B) LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

In this perspective our study of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state is to be based on two principal assumptions which embrace the three levels-of-analysis<sup>147</sup> in foreign policy analysis and emphasize the economic development key attributes of the developing state. These levels include the domestic, international and the psychological. In other words the study will take as its focus of conceptualization and analysis not the frame of reference<sup>148</sup> of the developed states, but the perspective and the specific situation of the developing state. It is because of this that this study concentrates on the economic situation of the developing state in relation to its international role. As early as 1950 a sociologist, Robert Bales, took as the starting point of his Inter-action Process Analysis<sup>149</sup> the assertion (following Parsons) that all empirical observations can be described under two heads; namely, action, which includes interaction, and the situation, in which the the action takes place. Similarly, in 1953, a political scientist, David Easton, referred to "situational analysis" when he started his "Inquiry into the state of Political Science".<sup>150</sup> Easton remarked then that few scholars use the concept of "situation" explicitly and "yet the ideas underlying it constantly appear".<sup>151</sup> The present state of foreign policy analysis is not dissimilar to the state of Political science at the time Easton was writing. For indeed the "economic situation - international role" construct cannot be ignored since it consists of those variables (psychological, societal, systemic or environmental) that shape and condition the developing actor's foreign policy. But perhaps, as Easton again said, "because the point is so obvious... it is often neglected".<sup>152</sup>

Yet explicit commitment to the "economic situation - international role" analysis of the foreign policy of the

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developing state and the awareness of its different issues will promote interdisciplinary investigation and conceptualization, and serve to bring foreign policy analysis of the developing state into closer integration with the other social sciences.<sup>153</sup> Put simply, this "economic situation - international role" study of the foreign policy of the developing state stipulates that the foreign policy orientation or behaviour of the developing state is a function of the economic situation it confronts. In other words, we are not interested in this study in adopting single-variable explanations, but in substituting for it the concept of socio-economic situation which emphasizes the interdependence of numerous variables. As Snyder et al. expressed the same idea; "situation is analytical concept pointing to a pattern of relationships among events, objects, conditions, and other actors" around a focus which is the center of interest for the policy-maker (and hence for the researcher)<sup>154</sup>

### (C) SUBJECTIVE SITUATION

Yet this seemingly straight forward definition does not eliminate all the conceptual problems, for a controversy has arisen among social scientists,<sup>155</sup> as to whether the "economic situation" is internal or external to the actor—that is subjective or objective. The emphasis on the "subjective" situation is particularly advocated by psychologists. Their argument is that the policy-maker (or foreign policy elite) acts "not on the basis of surrounding forces but on the basis of the subjective) integration he has fashioned."<sup>156</sup> As early as 1953, David Easton examined this problem for political science when he discussed the view which argues.

that the most significant kind of data is psychological. Policy is to be understood in the light of the kind of people who act in political life, not as a result of the kind of institutions or structures through which they act. Those committed to psychology have insisted that to explain political activity, even the institutional patterns, political science must turn to the motivations and feelings that individuals bring to political life or acquired through the political process itself. This group has stressed the study of what is often loosely called political

behaviour in contrast to political institutions. For this reason we call the group behaviourists, so long as we do not confuse their views with that of strict, and now antiquated behaviourism<sup>157</sup>.

(B) OBJECTIVE SITUATION

On the other hand, the emphasis on the "objective" situation is mainly advocated by sociologists. This mode of conceptualization seeks illumination for studying "the confluence of outer forces that act upon" the actor. In other words, "Causation is seen as residing to a greater or lesser degree behind and beyond" the actor.<sup>158</sup> The justification, sociologists indicate, seems to be related to operationalization since "we can only imagine what structuring" of the situation takes place in the actor's phenomenal field, "but actually we can only know for certain the outer (i.e. "objective") situation".<sup>159</sup> As for political scientists, Easton advocates this point of view. He considers only the "objective" aspects of the "situation", which he calls situational data, whereas the internal aspect of the situation he calls psychological data. Thus he says:

As a determinant of policy, the situation by implication has been conceived to be quite distinct from, and more significant than, the kind of people who acted in the situation. What is thus meant by situational as contrasted with psychological data will become apparent in due course.<sup>160</sup>

Thus, rather than emphasizing the interdependence between personality variables and societal variables in shaping the actor's behaviour, Easton considers them opposed or "contrasted". This attitude is more explicitly expounded in the way Easton defines the components of the "situational data". "The situational", he says, "refers to those determinants which shape activity in spite of the kind of personalities and motivations in the participants. There are at least three separate categories of situation data to be identified: (1) the physical environment; (2) the non-human organic environment; and (3) the social environment or patterns of human activity flowing from social interaction."<sup>161</sup>

But he soon realizes the impasse, and in order to complete his explanation, he is soon forced to include the "internal situation" or "psychological data" as Easton calls it. As he says :

We can appreciate the independent influence of situational data on activity if we look at the role that a fourth and final element, the personality, plays in the situation. I am not denying here the obviously indubitable, that how a person reacts to a given set of so-called objective circumstances is conditioned in part by the kind of person he is. A party leader who is stable and free of severe internal tensions will clearly be able to evaluate his surrounding circumstance, such as the strength and tactics of his opponents, more reliably than a leader who is riddled with frustrations and a deep sense of persecution. Identical situations will elicit quite divergent responses from each of these leaders. Identical situations will elicit quite divergent responses from each of these leaders. Each will define his situation differently in terms of the predispositions of his personality.<sup>162</sup>

What is our position towards this presumed polarization? We suggest that this is a false dilemma, as false as the polarization of "holistic" versus "atomistic" frameworks in modern social theory<sup>163</sup> or "systemic" versus "actor-oriented" levels of analysis in the evolving paradigms of international relations. In other words one does not have to choose between "subjective and "objective", "internal" and "external" components determining the definition of "the economic situation-international role" of the developing state but one can emphasize one component rather than the other depending on (a) what issues are involved and (b) which contexts we are investigating. This is because it is difficult to "generalize about which factors are most important in each situation, since policy-makers seldom draw up careful lists assessing the relative weight of each component of the "definition of the situation."<sup>164</sup> We can then reiterate our definition of the "economic situation - international role" construct of the developing state provided at the beginning of this section and express it, as did the social psychologist Kurt Lewin,<sup>165</sup> in equation form :

$$B = F(A \cdot E)$$

.../...

Where the developing states foreign policy behaviour (B) is a function (F) of the interaction between the actor's economic situation (A) and the role it plays in its environment (E) In this equation, then, both the actor and the environment are viewed as two interacting (sets of) variables since they are considered "a constellation of interdependent factors".<sup>166</sup> In other words, our study will not solely emphasize "objective" external events but also the "meanings" which actors assign to them. Thus psychological factors-rather than being considered constants are regarded as important variables.<sup>167</sup>

Therefore, the study of the "economic situation- international role" of the developing state emphasizes the totality of the foreign policy making process. Holsti expressed the idea very explicitly when he said that :

the "definition of the (economic) situation" would include all external and domestic, historical and contemporary (socio-economic) conditions which policy makers consider relevant to any given foreign policy problem. These might include important events abroad, domestic political needs, social values or ideological imperatives, state of public opinion, availability of capabilities, degree of threat or opportunity perceived in a situation, predicted consequences and costs of proposed courses of action and the time element of "requiredness" of a situation.<sup>168</sup>

Many of these "components" in our definition of "the economic situation - international role" of the developing state will be treated explicitly and in greater detail in order to concretize our basic assumption on the complementarity of levels of analysis.

Though there are other methodological-conceptual issues in our study that can still be elaborated upon, none is perhaps more significant than the rank among the different components, units and levels of analysis we have proposed. Since we have argued that the definition of the "economic situation-international role" linkage is the basis of foreign policy orientation in the developing state, the question now is that of knowing which component (systemic, national , personality) is the most crucial in defining this linkage. Within a certain component, which variable is the most relevant (e.g. within the national component, it is the historical influence, the public opinion mood, the geographical-topographical characteristics)? The problem of the relative importance of the different components and variables is not a purely academic one, for pragmatic policy-makers must debate the issue. In fact, some policy-oriented controversies over the mainsprings of - for instance-soviet foreign policy<sup>169</sup> illustrate the problem :

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(I) Some observers of soviet politics give priority to "deological imperatives" and argue that "all middle-range and long-range objectives and the diplomatic strategies used to achieve them are deduced from Marxism - Leninism";

(II) Other observers have emphasized "the persistence of purely "national" themes in soviet foreign policy" and insist that "the Soviet Union is primarily continuing Tsarist foreign policies, albeit under communist slogans";

(III) a third category of observers emphasize "the leadership qualities and role" as a more important component than ideology or traditional policies in Soviet external relations; and

(IV) still a fourth type of explanation is that "the leadership is increasingly concerned with fulfilling domestic needs and responding to consumer demands. Thus, domestic needs and expectations will loom as important components of any definition of the situation".<sup>170</sup>

The review of literature above analyzing the external relations of Third World States reflects the same uncodified diversity.

(1) There are studies which emphasize the personality component, that is, the idiosyncratic source of policy-making. Thus one of the very few complete studies recently published of the foreign policy of a developing state (Ghana) decides to begin "with an examination of Nkrumah's role, for Ghana's foreign policy was the first in character and stamp. It was most significantly a reflection of Nkrumah's characteristics and desires, of his perceptions, of his reactions to external events" consequently, the author affirms, "Ghana's foreign policy was Nkrumah's and a reflection of his moods and ambitions."<sup>171</sup> Other scholars have generalized this conclusion to apply to International Relations in the New Africa.

Accordingly, the different conflicts and feuds between Mali and Ivory Coast (1958-1960), Guinea and Ivory Coast (1958-1960), Upper Volta and Ivory Coast (1961), Ghana and Ivory Coast (1957-1964), Ghana and Togo (1957-1963), Mali and Senegal (1960-1963), Morocco and Algeria (1962-1964) and

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Tunisia and Algeria (1962-1963) were "either caused or prolonged by personal reactions of pride and anger usually felt by the head of state."<sup>172</sup> (ii) There is the opposite tendency that emphasizes the "national" component or the more "permanent" variables shaping foreign policy (e.g. size, geographical location" historical and cultural background, industrial and military capabilities...). A representative sample of this tendency is the study of the foreign policy of Burma,<sup>173</sup> which has emphasized such "permanent" determinants as the religious-cultural (Buddhism), the historical (e.g. "colonial-capitalist experience"), geographical (e.g. closeness to China), the societal (e.g. problems of national unity), and the economic (economic underdevelopment).

Similarly in the study of Cambodia's foreign policy,<sup>174</sup> variables of the "national" component such as historical feuds with both Thailand and Vietnam, geographical contiguity to these two "traditional enemies" and Cambodia's search for security are brought to account for its brand of neutrality. Though all the above interpretations are at least partly valid since the different variables listed (e.g. ideology, traditional policies, personal idiosyncracies, domestic determinants...) are all relevant to the foreign policy-making process, the question about the relative importance of each component in different circumstances remains unanswered.

Indeed, some theorists of international relations have grappled with the problem.<sup>175</sup> Thus Rosenau, for instance, has based his "Pre-Theory" of Foreign Policy on five sets of variables: the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic sets of variables. He then goes a step further to assess the relative influence of the variables by ranking them according to three criteria: size of the country (large versus small), state of the economy (developed versus underdeveloped) and type of political system (open versus closed).<sup>176</sup> Table 1(L) summarizes both Rosenau's foreign policy variables as well as their rankings :

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TABLE 1 (1) : AN ADAPTED SUMMARY OF ROSENAU'S FOREIGN POLICY VARIABLES

Geography and physical resources	Large Country				Small Country			
	Developed		Underdeveloped		Developed		Underdeveloped	
State of the economy	Open		Closed		Open		Closed	
States of the policy	Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed
Rankings of the variables	Role	Role	Idiosyncratic	Idiosyncratic	Role	Role	Idiosyncratic	Idiosyncratic
	Societal	Idiosyncratic	Role	Role	Systemic	Systemic	Systemic	Systemic
	Governmental	Governmental	Societal	Governmental	Societal	Idiosyncratic	Role	Role
	Systemic	Systemic	Systemic	Systemic	Governmental	Governmental	Societal	Governmental
	Idiosyncratic	Societal	Governmental	Societal	Idiosyncratic	Societal	Governmental	Societal
Illustrative examples	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	India	China	Holland	Czechoslovakia	Kenya	Chana

Source : Bahgat Korany; Social change, Chrisma and International Behaviour:

Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy-making in the Third World (sijthoff. Leiden, 1976), p. 92.

We notice that in the category of states that interest us here (that is, the developing) Rosenau's table hypothesizes that geography and physical resources, the state of the economy and the state of the policy are the most important in all circumstances, for they occupy the first place whether the developing state is large or small, an open or closed polity. However, a few pages later in the same article he attenuates his hypothesis by saying that "the potency of an idiosyncratic factor is assumed to be greater in less developed economies" than in developed ones because there are "few of the restraints which bureaucracy and large scale organization impose in more developed economies"<sup>177</sup>

But Rosenau's hypothesis remains untested. This is only logical since historical information has not been processed to provide systematic, comparative analysis of foreign policies in different developing states. Suggesting untested hypotheses<sup>178</sup> is the stage at which Holsti, too, stops. He remarks very realistically that :

making foreign policy decisions and formation of goals and objectives involve complex processes in which values, attitudes, and image mediate perceptions of reality provided by various sources of information. The resulting images or definitions of the situation form the reality and expectations upon which decisions are formulated. The components of any definition of a situation will vary with conditions in the system, internal socio-economic and political structure, degree of urgency in a situation, and political roles of policy-makers, but most definitions of a situation, include estimations of capabilities, domestic reactions, and national role. How important each component may be in a given situation is difficult to predict...<sup>179</sup>

In other words, in the absence of data-based studies, the primacy of a certain component in the actor's foreign policy-making process remains an empirical question. Thus at this stage we re-emphasize the multivariate character of the proposed "economic situation - international role" linkage model of the developing state by showing in matrix form the complementarity of the multi-level components in this linkage. Analytically, therefore, the economic determinants of the

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foreign policy of the developing state will be divided into internal or domestic variables, that is, within the state's boundaries; and external variables, that is, in its regional subsystem or the global system. Moreover, these economic determinants of foreign policy can be general to all or the majority of developing states or particular to one or a limited group of them. The external/internal and general/particular dimensions will give us the following combinations of the economic determinants:

1. general external (e.g. the global systemic setting);
2. general internal (e.g. common structural characteristics of developing states)
3. particular external (e.g. some regional issues); and
4. particular internal (e.g. need to reward an internal economic interest).

In addition to the multivariate emphasis, these combinations :

1. provide a scheme for incorporating and classifying in a manageable form the varieties of the economic determinants of foreign policy in the developing state observed and described in the literature.<sup>180</sup>
2. Consequently they do not limit the foreign policy behaviour of a developing state to prescriptions of a given position (e.g. equidistance) that are supposed to apply to all developing states in all circumstances. Nor does it identify the characteristic foreign policy behaviour with the policy of a particular developing state. These combinations thus indicate that the choice and practice of foreign policy is a function of (a) a combination of different economic determinants in different developing states; and/or (b) a varied combination of the same economic determinants,<sup>181</sup>
3. allow us to treat the "economic-situation-international role" linkage in the foreign policy of the developing state as a determinant of an individual actor's foreign policy behaviour (e.g. of Cameroon, Ghana, Egypt, Indonesia, etc) and as a determinant of the international orientation of a group of actors

.../...

(that is of an international subsystem). Thus, in part one of our study where the general economic determinants are emphasized, our purpose is to present the international orientation of the developing states foreign policies accruing from their structural asymmetry in the international system. Inversely, in parts two and three of our study where the particular economic determinants are emphasized, our purpose is to present the behavioural specificities of the individual developing state's foreign policy that tend to prevail.

#### 1.6 : THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The above discussion on the nature and scope of our research is geared towards ~~two~~ main objectives. The first is to locate and explain some of the main methodological and conceptual weaknesses that have characterized theory-building in foreign policy studies of the developing state. The second objective is to analyze some of the substantive empirical issues which appear central to the understanding of the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state.

##### (A) CONCEPTUAL-METHODOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

Conceptually, therefore, this study aims at avoiding the pitfalls of earlier studies on the foreign policy of the developing state which dichotomize and polarize analyses into domestic and external compartments or which compartmentalize the study of economic development and foreign policy into their economic, political and socio-cultural relations. Such studies which suffer from an excessive and partial focus of attention on the behavioural dimension of action without due regard for its motivational basis also isolate the actions from the ideals that motivate the developing state in its foreign policy. This study on the contrary treats the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state in its totality as the nation's reaction to its external environment.

This reaction has involved successive reorganizations of both the domestic and external relations in time. In the process, economic relations have more than any factor affected its foreign policy orientation.

Secondly, most foreign policy studies (as we saw in the Literature Review above) of the developing state also assume that the state acts as the one and only entity in transactions with other states. Such a conception is not convincing because it neglects those transactions which are not conducted at the intergovernmental level. The inflow of foreign private investment through foreign firms operating in the country and their export of profits abroad constitute equally important aspects of external relations. Infact, in the developing state, the role of foreign firms in the domestic economy is critical for its general orientation towards the external environment and its flexibility in external transactions.

As a result of colonialism the structure of power and influence in a developing state includes foreign enterprises, which participate in the process of extracting resources, allocating values and coordinating goal-directed efforts.<sup>182</sup> They donot only bargain with the state but also bargain within the state. Similarly, the moving forces of contemporary world politics and the dynamics of the international market for goods and services encourage the involvement of the advanced countries in the internal processes of the developing state.<sup>183</sup> For example, the favourable receipts from the sale of Cameroon's raw materials and their effects on income distribution in the nation, depend, largely on the willingness of the wealthy states to pay certain prices for these products. Despite the proliferation of models and methods in the analysis of the foreign policy of the developing state, the gap between theory and reality has remained wide.

The conviction that we need to move beyond the debate on methodologies to substantive empirical research on the developing state's behaviour is our purpose. This dissatisfaction with the existing trends is due to the latter's

excessive concentration on the system as a whole in which the specific character of the developing state is buried in a mass of generalizations and its traditional historical methods of surveying rather than analyzing the developing state's foreign policy in concrete economic material terms. In this vein, this study aims at demonstrating the irrelevance of studying the foreign policy of the developing state without placing the analytical variables squarely within the context of their socio-economic and institutional realities in time and in space. Infact, to ignore the socio-economic basis of the foreign policy of the developing state or to ignore economic factors in the analysis of the problems the developing state faces in the international system would do a great disservice to analysis.

This study has undertaken therefore to overcome this conceptual and empirical lacunae in foreign policy studies of the developing state by setting out simply and clearly the arguments through which a comprehensive study of the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state can be attained. Thus, throughout this study, we shall emphasize on the linkages between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state. The aim of such an enterprise would be to understand how and why things are in an attempt to account for the powerless situation in which the developing state finds itself in the international system.

(B) SUBSTANTIVE - EMPIRICAL OBJECTIVES

Substantively therefore, one of the purposes of this study is to analyze the phenomena of international stratification and atimia<sup>184</sup> that characterize the foreign relations of the developing state in terms of its economic status, power status and prestige status. The problem of human inequality, of social stratification - to use a concept of sociological theory-continues to be an essential question in international relations today, but its terms of reference have been widened and transformed. Nevertheless, inequalities

among social classes continues to be the basis of inequalities among nations. In the past, the problem of inequality among social classes within a nation occupied the attention of the academic world but now, political leaders and many scholars have pointed out that the problem of inequality among nations is a matter of major concern and analysis.

(C) STRATIFICATION OF CLASSES AND NATIONS

Nations and classes have become major symbols of identification,<sup>185</sup> with nations seeming to have superseded classes in symbolic attraction. As Lagos has said "many workers of industrialized countries do not recognize the bond of their common interests in an international movement but have acknowledged primarily the bond of the nation to which they belong".<sup>186</sup> To be sure, a radical movement that obliterates local, regional and even many national antagonisms is developing today, but it is not the labour movement of the industrialized countries as Karl Marx envisaged it. It is rather "an international protest movement against those countries in the Western Civilization in which industrialization has bestowed major benefits on the working mass".<sup>187</sup> Bernard Barber in his study of social stratification has pointed that the conflicts of classes operate as a dividing force within a nation; on the contrary, "nationalism has been an important source of solidarity among classes of the modern world. Inspired by nationalism, the lower and upper classes of a modern society may set aside their differences of class interest and cooperate to keep the society and the stratification system intact against some external enemy".<sup>188</sup>

But on the contrary, even if inspired by an equalitarian ideology, a utopian social revolution were to suppress the economic aspects of class inequality and to redistribute the wealth of a developing nation on an equal basis, the standard of living would still be extremely low in comparison with that of the industrialized state. As many studies have demonstrated, the causes of this underdevelopment are both internal and external but with the external causes

predominating the internal ones.<sup>189</sup> Within this framework is situated the instrumentation used by the developing state to solve its problems of development. In essential terms, this instrumentation consists in the acquisition of external financial and technological resources for promoting national development. But in the course of such acquisition a relationship of dependency has been created between the domestic and external environments of the developing state.

Indeed, according to Gustavo Lagos, such a situation has been characterized not only by a relationship of subordination and dependency but also by a structure of superordination and subordination. In his words :

a relationship of subordination and dependence of the underdeveloped areas has been created with respect to those that are developed, a structures of superordination and subordination that is typical of a system of social stratification. In this structure it is the nation, not the social class, that emerges as an adequate channel to promote the improvement of the living standards. The experience of industrialized countries shows, furthermore, that contrary to one of the basic components of Marxist theory, the workers in the lowest social classes have successfully obtained an appreciable measure of the fruits of socio-economic development and have achieved an adequate standard of living.<sup>190</sup>

Eventhough, one can argue contrary to Lagos, that it the social classes acting in the name of the nation which emerge as important elements in this structure, one can nevertheless, concord with him that the nation appears as the unity in which a solidarity of movement among the classes is usually established; as a prerequisite to the movement towards international solidarity and national development.<sup>191</sup> The above discussion helps to illuminate the idea that the basic problem of inequality (or asymmetry) in international relations is expressed much more in terms of nations than in terms of classes. As Bendix has pointed out, the class difference in developing states have remained subordinate to the more decisive conflict between these states and the international system.<sup>192</sup>

(D) FORMAL AND REAL STATUS

The above discussion suggests that there exists a difference between the real status of a developing state and its formal status. If we assume that the nations of the world constitute a great social system composed of different interacting groups, and that these national groups occupy positions within the social system, then these positions which can be ranked in terms of economic status, power and prestige constitute the status of the nation. Again, if each nation occupies various positions in the three patterns, then we can speak of the status of the developing state in terms of its economic stature, of its power or of its prestige. The relative positions of these three ratings may very well not coincide.<sup>193</sup> Thus, it would seem that the real status of the developing state is determined by the complex that results from the distinct positions of previously mentioned ratings which constitute its status set.<sup>194</sup>

Sociological theory has established that every system of social stratification is the product of the interaction of social differentiation and social evaluation.<sup>195</sup> Consequently, the social system of international stratification would be the result of the differences between the different nations appraised in terms of the prevailing values. These values are precisely those of economic stature, power and prestige. The great distances that now separate the developing countries from the more advanced nations have been created through the growing differentiation of economic stature and power so as to present repercussion in the pattern of prestige. Differences have always existed among nations that have been characterized by the predominance of one over another. Hence historians speak of a period of Spanish predominance, of a period of French predominance and a period of English predominance in modern times.<sup>196</sup>

The principal characteristic of the period before the 20th century was the absence of a necessary relationship between the economic stature of a nation and that nation's position in the pattern of international power.

This explains why a nation as small as Sweden was able to acquire the rank of great power in the 17th century and how in the epoch of the greatest splendor of spanish preponderance, Emperor Charles V was forced to turn to the House of Fugger to finance his military undertakings.<sup>197</sup> Thus when the coercive dimensions in the power of a nation began to depend more and more on its economic stature and were allied with technological advancement, the process of differentiation between nations that distinguishes the actual system of international stratification was initiated. This period began with the English Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. From this point on, we are able to observe that the economic development of a nation as a succession of forward and backward integration and growth stages, serves to large degree as a prerequisite to its participation in international power politics.

(E) ECONOMIC STATUS

Now we can identify some of the most salient elements in the global social system constituted by nations as a stratified system of economic and power statuses. The elements of the economic status are composed among others of (a) the degree of economic and technological development measured by the placement of the nation in terms of the degree of integration of its productive and distributive processes and the strength of such integration vis-a-vis other economies in the global system. In other words, the degree of economic development of a nation depends on the extent to which its interaction in the actual international system is capable of autocentric development (b) its economic strength measured by the degree of its self-reliance (c) the degree of its socio-political development measured by the average standard of living. It is the combination of these elements among others which determines the economic status of a nation.

(F) POWER STATUS

Other factors being equal, the components of the national power status would include (a) the degree of

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technological development, (b) the degree of economic development, (c) the degree of socio-political development. These factors have made for the fact that stratification of power standards are even greater than the stratification of economic standards. The first factor automatically excludes all developing countries from participating in the world balance of power in its military aspect, and the second only reinforces this exclusion.

Up to this point, we have analyzed international stratification in terms of economic and power statuses. But in order to analyze the third factor - prestige - we must refer, beforehand, to the objective and subjective aspects of stratification. On discussing the components of status on the level of power and economics, we determined the objective aspects of stratification - those elements that give greater economic stature to a nation or greater power to a nation, in agreement with external indexes. But as we pointed out previously, status is always a product of social evaluation of certain differences between individuals or groups; the status is created by the opinions that establish the relative positions of these differences.<sup>198</sup> This is the subjective aspect of stratification. If the values, in agreement with which the social evaluation is produced, coincide with the factors that produce the differences, we have a coincidence of the image of the nation and what the nation is in reality. It is highly improbable that a total coincidence of the image of the nation and what the nation is in reality occurs but since in our age wealth and power are the prevailing values in the world, one would be able to expect, at least, a high correlation. This correlation will be greater when the amount of information acquired by the groups or individuals who evaluate the differences is greater.

### (G) PRESTIGE STATUS

Prestige is the image that one has of an individual or group, when this image is associated with a positive evaluation of the qualities of the individual or group.

Prestige exists when the image is imbued with social esteem, honour, or admiration. "Prestige is a sentiment in the minds of men that is expressed in interpersonal (intergroup) interaction: deference behaviour is demanded by one party and granted by the other. Obviously, it can occur when there are values shared by both parties that define the criteria of superiority".<sup>199</sup>

W. Lloyd Warner who has made extensive studies of prestige of individuals and families in the United States has suggested that the prestige hierarchy represents the synthesis of all other stratification variables.<sup>200</sup> This includes possessions, interaction patterns, occupational activities, and value orientations. It would seem that these same criteria can be applied, in large part, to the system of international stratification. In this light, prestige would be determined by two factors:- (a) by the synthesis of the status of the nation on the levels of power and economy; and (b) the grade of accord between the international conduct of the nation and the value orientations of the international system. With reference to the first factor, our hypothesis is that the prestige of a nation will be greater as its economic and power status increase. The difficulty of access to such status, and the capacities necessary for a nation to develop in the economic, scientific and technological patterns in order to achieve it will constitute the source of prestige. In the international system, the real status is not ascribed but rather acquired. In a large measure, it is the capacities associated with the acquisition of status as economically developed nation or a nation with great power, that confer prestige in the international system.

With reference to the second factor, our hypothesis is that the value orientations of an international system play an important role with respect to prestige. Power and economic strength are main values in the international system, but in addition there exists, at least in the Western World, other value orientations determined by political systems - national independence, self-determination and equal rights

of nations among others - are the value orientations of the actual international system which have an important influence in the determination of a nation's prestige. The developing state can, therefore, achieve a certain status on the prestige level through the coordination of its conduct with the value orientations, but in the long-run "high social prestige if it is to persist over time, must have an institutional basis<sup>201</sup> Coincidentally, on the international scene these bases are the institutions that make it possible for a nation to achieve a high status on the levels of power and economics.

International stratification, in terms of economic status, power and prestige was produced, at the same time that the ideology of "equalitarianism" was holding sway in the field of international relations.<sup>202</sup> The distinctive trait of this ideology is the affirmation that all states, from the moment they are constituted as such and from the moment they acquire independence, are free, sovereign and equal. Sovereignty, as we saw above, implies that each nation has the supreme authority to manage its external and internal affairs to the exclusion of all authority from any other nation, "insofar as it is not limited by treaty or... common... international law".<sup>203</sup> All nations have the obligation to respect that independence or sovereignty and, in consequence, cannot interfere in its internal or external politics; "equality... is nothing but a synonym for sovereignty, pointing to a particular aspect of sovereignty. If all nations have supreme authority within their territories none can be sub-ordinated to any other in the exercise of that authority"<sup>204</sup> Out of "the principle of equality a fundamental rule of international law is derived which is responsible for decentralization of the legislative and, in a certain measure, of the law-enforcing function - the rule of unanimity. It signifies that with reference to the legislative function, all nations are equal, regardless, of their size, population and power among others"<sup>205</sup>

The ideology of equalitarianism was one of the basic principles of Wilsonian thought. "An evident principle" he

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said, introducing his famous Fourteen Points in January, 1918, "runs through all the programme I have outlined. It is the principle of justice for all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak".<sup>206</sup> The ideology of equalitarianism has always been the basic principle of international law and it inspired the system of the League of Nations. The charter of the United Nations did not give full recognition to the principle because the veto power of some Great Powers was established. This situation was explained as a consequence of the fact that the Great Powers had an additional function—the maintenance of peace and security.

This ideology is also in perfect agreement with the thinking of the classical economists for whom the differences of economic stature among nations seemed unimportant. As Triffin pointed out while interpreting classical economic thought, "they would also point out... that if each nation state acted rationally and embraced free trade, little or no damage could be done by the existence of separate political sovereignties and that the size of nations would be irrelevant to their economic prosperity".<sup>207</sup> The concept of formal status of a nation emerges from this ideology. In this light, all nations have the same formal status, their positions, their rights, and duties are not influenced by size, population, wealth, historical age, military power or political power.

But in opposition to the formal status of a nation, the real status is found. While the first is derived from the equalitarian ideology, we have seen that the second is derived from the position that a nation occupies in the system of international stratification in its three basic variables of economic stature, power, and prestige. In agreement with the first concept that all nations are equal, the structure of the stratified international system determines relationships of superordination and subordination among nations.

Before the actual system of international stratification was established, when all nations were "underdeveloped," the differences between nations still existed, but they were less accentuated. There existed in that period less distances between the formal status of the nation and its real status, but now the fact that only a few nations have increased their real status to a considerable extent has meant a degradation of real status (atimia) of the rest.

#### (H) ATIMIA AS A CONSEQUENCE OF STRATIFICATION

Let us use a Greek word, atimia, which signifies the loss or deterioration of status, to designate this situation, and let us call the evolution or social change that ends in a state of atimia, the atimic process. Atimia has manifested itself in various forms. Always, its essential characteristic is the lowering of status, but this lowering can acquire total or partial characteristics.<sup>208</sup> Total atimia occurs when a nation has not been able to develop the necessary capabilities to reach economic and technological maturity. This incapability impedes its social development and maintains the economic stature- measured in terms of Gross National Product - on its lowest level. Atimia is manifested here in the three elements that constitute the economic status of a nation. As a consequence, the nation sees itself impeded in reaching a status on the power level, requiring as a basic condition technological and scientific maturity and high economic development. Partial atimia is produced when the nation, in spite of having acquired technological, scientific and economic maturity as well as advanced socio-political development, has not had the necessary economic stature, measured in terms of its Gross National Product, to participate in the technological race which actually could be interpreted as the creation of the maximum expression of military power. As typical cases of partial atimia we may point out France and England. Although the atimia is evidenced in this case in the power status, its economic implication is also clear since the lack of sufficient economic stature limits other capabilities of the nation.

The most notorious indicator of total atimia is the lack of socio-economic development that is expressed by low standards of living. The most notorious indicator of partial atimia is the incapacity for technological leadership. Total or partial atimia is also manifested in the pattern of prestige of the nation because prestige needs institutional bases. Total atimia implies the lack of institutional bases of Prestige linked to economic and technological maturity and to socio-political development while in the case of partial atimia institutional bases that permit a technological leadership are lacking. In this light, one can assert that underdevelopment, dependency and atimia constitute a general definition of the situation of the developing state in the international system.

The highly stratified international system that we have been trying to demonstrate has created interactions of a peculiar nature among the nations that have experienced the atimia process - or its consequences - and those that have achieved a high status in economy and power. This peculiarity expressed in the contradiction between the formal status and the real status of the developing state, has tended to accentuate national and group consciousnesses of its state of underdevelopment. In agreement with the ideology of equalitarianism, the developing state knows that it has "equal rights, equal duties and equal capacity to exercise these rights and equal duties" along with the nations of high economic status or power. The developing state also knows that its rights do not depend on its power. But next to this ideological world, the developing state finds also the realities of power, of economic stature and of prestige, all built into a complex degradation of status that is characterized by relationships of subordination and superordination.

In this context, the developing state has arrived at a general definition of its international situation characterized by its status as a consequence of the atimia process. Thus, we can say that while the developed state that suffered

the atimia process became the lower class as a consequence of its atimia, the developing state was born as a "proletarian" into the low class. Within this general definition of the situation, the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state could be conceived as a system of actions geared towards the elevation of the real status of the nation. Since the real status is composed of economic, power and prestige variables, self-reliant development becomes a relative process orchestrated by the developing state in response to its atimia. Similarly, the nationalistic policies associated with self-reliant development could be understood in terms of foreign policy as the promotion of national interests in a world of sovereign states. Thus, the rise in real status appears to the developing state as the foreign policy interpretation of the international dimensions of its national interest. With foreign policy considered as a system of actions meant to achieve certain advantages in international relations such as the defence of state sovereignty and national independence as well as the articulation of other national interests<sup>209</sup> in an attempt to legitimize and justify the state's existence vis-a-vis other members of the international community, self-reliant development appears to the developing state as a reaction (against atimia or its consequences) aimed at enhancing the real status of the nation in a highly stratified world that is dominated by values of wealth, power and prestige.<sup>210</sup>

#### 1.7 : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Apart from providing the solid foundations from which sound policy-making in the developing state can be made the central importance of this study lies in the methodological and empirical advantages of the "dependency" approach" it provides. In their enthusiasm for cumulation and the establishment of general laws and propositions, many social scientists - especially those who employ advanced quantitative techniques - have tended to overlook the contribution of case-studies to theory-building. One of the main methodological advantages of this study is its

emphasis on the role that the case-study approach can still perform by being complementary to the systematic correlational analyses aiming at general laws. In other words the nomothetic-idiographic dilemma might prove to be a fake one, since the case-study approach can perform three important functions in social science theory-building:-

(i) the case-study can stimulate hypotheses about possible regular correlations. Indeed, most of the hypotheses tested at the moment in general correlational studies are originally generated in case-study materials.

(ii) A case-study can test in general depth inference suggested in general correlational studies. In this case repeated case-studies can provide a solid basis for the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis and/or suggest important refinements.

(iii) In the correlation between two variables, a case-study approach could then go a step further to investigate the precise causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables. For all these significant functions that the case-study approach can perform, it is important to emphasize that both case-studies and general correlational studies.

... are critical to the development of scientific knowledge either for its own sake or as reliable advice to the policy makers; neither one alone is satisfactory. Some scholars may prefer to work solely with one approach or the other. One may be better suited for a particular person's temperament, or he may have such a comparative advantage in the skills of one approach over the other that it is not productive for him to attempt both. Other analysts will find it easier to shift back and may enjoy doing so. In any case, a recognition of the basic symbiosis between the two is essential to the long-run health of the research process<sup>211</sup>

#### (A) ECONOMIC FACTORS

Thus, this approach based on dialectical analyses, assumes that material conditions particularly the economic system are the decisive formative influences on the foreign



policy of the developing state, and as such constitute the essential point of departure for discovering the dynamics (laws of motion) of a state's external orientation and/or behaviour. This approach is by no means claiming to have discovered the laws of motions of the foreign policy of the developing state but it tries to clarify some problems, to show how one might profitably proceed in their study and why. **Such** an orientation devotes a great deal of attention to the economic system but this is not on account of any narrow interest in economics (economic determinism). It is instead because of the pervasive influence of the economic system in society. In fact, this approach essentially rejects the idea of specialized disciplines, such as economics, political science, sociology, philosophy, etc, in favour of a composite social science<sup>212</sup> using material conditions as its focal point and proceeding dialectically. Here it seems appropriate to briefly explain what the approach is and why it is desirable to use it. This can only be done by showing its characteristics.

First, the economic development approach to foreign policy gives primacy to material conditions, particularly economic factors in the explanation of foreign policy. The justification for giving economic factors such primacy should become clearer as the study progresses but a brief discussion should do more good than harm in illuminating the significance of this study. To begin with, the economic need is man's most fundamental need. Unless man is able to meet this need, he cannot exist in the first place. Man must eat before he can do anything else:- before he can worship, pursue culture or become an economist. When an individual achieves a level of economic well-being such that he can take the basic economic necessities (particularly his daily food) for granted, the urgency of the economic need loses its edge. Nevertheless, the primacy remains. The fact that one is not constantly preoccupied with, and motivated by, economic needs, shows that the needs are being met but does not show that they are not of primary importance.

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Just as the economic need is man's primary need, so is economic activity man's primary activity. The primacy of work (that is, economic productivity) is the corollary of the primacy of economic need. Man is first and foremost a worker or producer. It is by man's productive activity that he is able to obtain the economic means which he needs to sustain life. In short, man must eat to live but he must work in order to eat. Thus productive activity is the pre-condition for all other activities. This fact is amply reflected in popular consciousness; for people invariably identify themselves in terms of their economic role. "I am a farmer", "John is an Engineer". It is true that man does not live by bread alone but it is a more fundamental truth that man cannot live without bread.

The implication of this approach for the policy maker in diplomacy and development is that he must pay particular attention to the economic system of the developing state and use it as the point of departure for studying the state's foreign policy. Once we understand what the material assets and constraints of the developing state are, how the state produces goods and services to meet its needs, how the goods and services are distributed, and what types of social relations arise from the organization of production, we have come a long way to understanding the culture of that society, its laws, its religious system, its political system and even its modes of thought. Thus, anyone who makes an empirical study of historical societies including our contemporary societies,<sup>213</sup> will find the following :

(1) Those from the economically privileged groups tend to be better educated, "more cultured", to have higher social status, to be more "successful" professionally and politically. This means that economic inequality is extremely important, tending to reproduce itself endlessly in a series of other inequalities between individuals and among nations.

(2) Those individuals or nations which are economically privileged tend to be interested in preserving the existing

social order; and those which are disadvantaged by the social order, particularly its distribution of wealth, have a strong interest in changing the social order, particularly its distribution of wealth; for example, the quest for a New International Order. In this way, the economic structures at the national and international levels set the general trend of political interest and political alignments.<sup>214</sup>

(3) In so far as there is deep economic inequality in the global society, that global society cannot have political democracy because political power will tend to polarize around economic power. Also in this society because a high degree of economic inequality exists, it tends necessarily to be repressive. This repression arises from the need to curb the inevitable demand of the have-nots for redistribution. We see here economic conditions not only setting the tone of international and national politics but also defining the role of coercion in the global and national society.<sup>215</sup>

(4) The morality and values of this world society tend to support the preservation of the existing division of labour and distribution of wealth in that society. The autonomy of morality and social values is more apparent than real. Contemporary morality condemns theft. But we forget that theft as a moral value is something created and dependent on a particular economic condition. Where there is no scarcity and no private property, the idea of theft would not arise.

This approach in terms of policy-making in diplomacy shows the importance of economic conditions in understanding not only the global system but particularly in understanding the foreign policy of the developing state in the system, that is, its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour. As we shall see, economic conditions help us to better understand why the colonizing powers came to Africa; why they established the particular types of political systems that they did, how the nationalist movements arose, etc. By taking cognizance of the economic factors we are able to improve on the traditional treatment of problems of nation-building in the

in the developing state. For example, in the case of tribalism, traditional treatments<sup>216</sup> have failed to grasp it fully because they regarded it merely as a form of consciousness and failed to situate this consciousness in material conditions. Thus they fail to take advantage of the obvious and important fact that tribalism flourishes mainly because it is useful, especially in the economic sense. It provides access to "important" people for villagers and the unemployed seeking jobs in the cities; it fills (to a considerable extent) the gap left by the lack of a social security system in most of Africa, and it serves the economic and political interest of the African elites by promoting solidaristicities across class lines. Our failure to take account of the economic underpinnings of tribalism has also been detrimental to the effort to solve the "problem of tribalism". Attempts to reduce tribalism have suffered from not confronting the issue of making the tribal identity less useful economically<sup>217</sup>

(B) DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF REALITY

In this light a major significance of this approach is its particular emphasis on the dynamic character of reality. By refusing to conceive the different aspects of the foreign policy of the developing state as simple identities or discrete elements or as being static, our approach encourages us to think of the world in terms continuity and relatedness and with a keen awareness that this continuity is essentially very complex, and also problematic. Above all, it treats, the world as something which is full of movement and dynamism, the movement and dynamism being provided by the contradictions which pervade existence. Our study demonstrates that the problems of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state cannot be understood by thinking in terms of simple harmonies and irreconcilable contrasts. Our study encourages us to recognize that the realities of underdevelopment which are seemingly united and harmonious are prone to contradiction and that a better understanding of

these contradictions can only be grasped through dialectical thinking.

One of the main weaknesses of mainstream "Northern" (in the North/South sense) social science is its discouragement of dialectical thinking, a weakness that has spilled over into development studies.<sup>218</sup> This discouragement of dialectical thinking is related to the ideological commitment of "Northern" social science to the justification and preservation of the existing social order. With this kind of commitment mainstream "Northern" social science has developed an inbuilt bias in favour of categories such as mechanical and organic solidarity—(Emile Durkheim),<sup>219</sup> traditional and bureaucratic authority—(Max Weber),<sup>220</sup> Universalism and particularism—(Parsons and Marx)<sup>221</sup> Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft—(Tonnies)<sup>222</sup> and democratic and totalitarian political systems) which are discrete and in sharp contrast, suggestive of good and bad. The categories connoting good are associated with the prevailing "Northern" societies of North America, Eastern and Western Europe being justified:

The need to justify them as good, traps such social science into drawing a very sharp distinction between the preferred categories and others. Furthermore, the penchant for justification, traps (Northern) social science into fixing the categories rigidly and minimising the possibilities of change. This is because if the possibility of the preferred category changing for the better is allowed, it would be admitted (that) the preferred category is imperfect.<sup>223</sup>

In this way, we have come to have social science of discrete, sharply contrasting and rigidly fixed categories and entities, a science which has come to be inadequate for understanding the complex problems of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state where change is ubiquitous.

The deficiencies of this social science came out very clearly in the study of "non-Northern" societies, especially, the less economically advanced ones now designated as "underdeveloped countries". Confronted with the study of these societies it becomes impossible to conceal the fact

that the bulk of "Northern" social science is tendentially geared to the study of order rather than change. The attempt to deal with this is instructive. The methodology and theories of change which were devised to meet this challenge amounted essentially to introducing intermediary categories between the old categories connoting the preferred state of being, and the others. Examples of such thinking are Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth and Organski's Stages of Political Development and other theories of modernization which have been very influential in development studies.<sup>224</sup> Thus, stringing together a series of categories called "stages of development" and stating what form of social engineering might be needed to realize a particular stage does not constitute a theory of change. This device does not teach us anything about social change but merely reveals further the ideological bias of "Northern" social science. Indeed what the procedure in question is really drawing attention to is that the "Northern" societies are the peak of social evolution and that in so far as other societies need to change the real question is how far they can be like the "North". As if to ~~stress~~ stress this ideological bias and the fundamental lack of interest change, those developmental approaches hardly raise the question as to how the "Northern" societies as the preferred categories might change. These are the problems facing the student of development in a situation where change is ubiquitous.

(c) POLICY-MAKING PAYOFFS

Another distinctive feature of this study is that it encourages the policy maker to take account systematically of the interaction of the different elements of social life especially the economic structure, social structure, political structures and the belief system. Our study, therefore, assumes that there is a causal relationship between all these social structures.<sup>225</sup> Indeed, it has an implicit theory of the relationship of these structures and of all aspects of social life. According to this theory it is the economic factor which is the most decisive of all these elements and largely determines the character of the others in shaping the foreign policy of the developing state.

Thus, if knowledge of the economic system is available, the general character of the social system, political system, belief system, etc, in terms of the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the relevant society can be reasonably conjectured.<sup>226</sup> That is not to say that the economic structure is autonomous and strictly determines the others. All social structures are interdependent and interact in complex ways. Each one of them affects the character of every other one and is in turn affected by it. But our study assumes that it is the economic factor which provides the axis around which all these actions and reactions of the various elements of foreign policy take place while at the same time imparting a certain orderliness to the various interactions.

These points are illustrated in the course of the development of our study. For instance, in the early chapters of Part Two we concentrate on the material conditions of the developing state by describing and analyzing the colonial penetration of Cameroon and delineating the economic "systems" established in Cameroon by the colonizing powers. Once we grasp the structure and dynamics of the colonial economy, we immediately begin to move away from economic factors - merely by following the dynamic of the economic system. Thus by following the dynamics of the economic system, we see how it leads to the transformation of existing social structures and how it leads to the emergence of existing social structures, particularly the national elite whose interest soon put it in opposition to the colonial system. From then on, we move into the politics of the nationalist movement and the overthrow of the colonial political system and attainment of independence. But the economic system which generated these changes itself not overthrown. So we have indigenous leaders who are in political offices but with little economic base. This contradiction between economic power and political power becomes a source of further interesting developments with serious consequences upon external relations.

The new rulers, therefore, try to use the only tool they have, political power, to create an economic base in order

to consolidate their political power. At this point, we see how the political is influencing and even transforming the economic and social structures. Because of this, we examine the structure of the post-colonial economy and the efforts made to achieve economic development in terms of their consequences on the orientation of the state's external relations. But the failure of economic development creates political conditions which seem poised to transform the economic system and the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the state fundamentally. Under this logic the study examines the foreign policy implications of the "Planned Liberalism" project of society in Cameroon. In this way our study allows us to focus attention on material conditions while moving systematically and in an orderly manner between the different elements of the social system and delineating the relations between them as well as the logic of their metamorphosis.

(D) INTER-SECTORIAL AND INTER-DISCIPLINARY PAYOFFS

It remains to add that the connectedness of the economic structure, social structure, belief structure and political system demands an interdisciplinary approach to the foreign policy analysis of the developing state. If society in the developing state is so interconnected, it cannot be studied in any depth without drawing on each of the specialized social science disciplines used for studying the various aspects of Man and Society. But it will not suffice to draw on them in a haphazard and eclectic manner or to assume that this type of interdisciplinary approach requires the simultaneous application of the specialized disciplines. What our study attempts to demonstrate is the forging of an operational model - the Foreign Policy Dependency Model - that is an integrated social science approach to foreign policy analysis. Therefore, the attempt to introduce a model suited for the study of change rather than order, and conducive to making analyses of foreign policy and economic development in the developing state more dynamic only depicts the weaknesses of the existing theories and models.

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Most of these issues are discussed in the conceptual framework and methodology which form the object of chapter two.

1.8 : CONCLUSION

In attempting to demonstrate in what ways economic development constitutes one of the primary determinants of the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state, we have argued, from the review of literature on Third World foreign policies that in analyzing the foreign policy of the developing state such as Cameroon the crucial research question to raise is not whether it is "pro-west" or "pro-East", "aligned" or "non-aligned", eventhough these question might be, at times, necessary to comprehend some aspects of the foreign policy. Similarly, the distinguishing features of the foreign policy of the developing state cannot be meaningfully discussed in terms of whether they are conservative, moderate or progressive, radical or dynamic. It is therefore much more useful to investigate and discover whether the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the state reflects the problems and orientation of the internal needs and demands of socio-economic development; whether foreign policy is coherent and consistent and yet flexible enough to respond to changing internal and external economic circumstances or whether it merely consists of ad\_hoc and uncoordinated reponses to external stimuli and the demands of of powerful foreign pressure groups. In other words, is the foreign policy strategy intergrated into the overall national strategy of economic development?

One way of obtaining reliable and useful answers to these questions is by a systematic and detailed analysis of the entire socio-economic system with a view to identifying the most important variables that influence the foreign policy processes and outcomes. It is analytically unhelpful to assume a\_priori that the foreign policy of the developing state is merely the product of either the state's domestic political structure, the personality characteristics of its chief exective or policy elites or the international political

system - indeed all of them are mixed up in complex ways in its economic development process.

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16. Graham T. Allison; Essence of Decision (Boston, Little Brown & c°, 1971); and George Modelski; A Theory of Foreign Policy (London, Pall Mall and New York, Praeger, 1962)
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19. Ibid
20. Modelski; A Theory of Foreign Policy, p. 34
21. S. Rosen & J. Kurth (eds); Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism (Lexington MA, D.C. Heath & C°, 1974)
22. R. Barry Farrel(ed); Approaches to comparative and International Politic (Evanston, North Western University Press, 1966), p. 213. A similar trend of analysis could be found in Okwidiba Nnoli; Self-reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania (New York, Nok Publishers, 1978).
23. K. J. Holsti; International Politics: A Frame work for Analysis, (Englewood cliffs, New Jersey, 1983) pp. 145-151
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25. I. William Zartman; "Decision-Making Among African Governments in Inter-African Affairs" in M.E. Doro and M.N. stultz(eds); Governing in Black Africa: Perspectives on New States (Englewood cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall 1970), pp. 130 and 143. Also see Roy E. Jones; Analysing Foreign Policy: An Introduction to Some Conceptual Problems (London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 11-18
26. Jones; Analysing Foreign Policy, pp. 19-24.
27. C. Clapham; Foreign Policy Making in Developing states (Farnborough Hants, Saxon House, 1977), pp. 142-182 and M. Clarke; "Foreign Policy Implementation, Problems and Approaches", in British Journal of International studies, Vol. 5, N° 2 (1979) pp. 112-128 and Richard C Snyder et al; Foreign Policy Making (New York, The Free Press, 1962)
28. Joseph Frankel; National Interest (London, Pall Mall, 1970), chapter one
29. Snyder et al; Foreign Policy Making, pp. 15-48. Also see K.J. Holsti; International Politics, chapter 4; E.S. Northedge (ed); The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London, Faber & Faber, 1974).
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34. ibid, pp. 64-67
35. ibid
36. W.W. Rostow; The stages of Economic Growth, pp. 101-136
37. A.F.K. Organski; The stages of Political Development (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968).
38. G. Lovell Field; Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West (New York, Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1968).
39. V.I. Lenin; Selected Works: Volume I (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975), pp. 642-726.
40. Nazli choucri and Robert North; Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (Boston, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1975), chapters 1,2 and 3, especially pp. 26-43.
41. David A. Baldwin; Economic Development and American Foreign Policy (Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p.1. Also see Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller; Global Reach: The Power of Multinational Corporations (New York. Simon and Schuster Press, 1974), pp. 123-148
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43. For a detailed analysis of economic exploitation and domination through dependency and interdependence see James D. Cockcroft et al; Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy (New York, Doubleday and C° 1972)
44. Joan M. Nelson; Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (Now York, The Mcmillan company, 1968), p. 1.
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46. Cockcroft et al; Dependence and Underdevelopment, pp. 71-111.
47. ibid, pp. 115-149 and 152-163
48. Robert A. Dahl; Who Governs? (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1961).

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50. Richard J. Trethewey; "International Economics and Politics: A Theoretical Framework" in Rober A. Rouer (ed); The Interction of Economics and Foreign Policy (Charlottesville, The University of Virginia Press, 1975), pp. 1-24

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52. The Foreign policy themes of most of the African states reflect the decolonization principle adopted in the charter of the Organisation of African Unity. See Doudou Thiam; The Foreign Policy of African States (New York, Praeger, 1965).

53. Choucri and North; Nations in Conflict, pp. 14-25

54. David E. Apter; "Political Systems and Developmental Change" in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner; The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York, The Free Press, 1970), pp. 151-171.

55. Jean-Marie Gankou; L'Investissement dans les Pays en Developpement: Le cas du Cameroun (Paris, Economica, 1985), pp. 46-53. A similar exercise has been done by Gaston Happi; Structure de l'Economic Camerounaise et Evolution Monétaire (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Universite de Paris I, 1967) pp. 76-80.

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58. Joseph LaPalombara; "Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholarstic View" in Rober T. Holt and John E. Turner(ed); The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York, The Free Press, 1970) pp. 123-149

59. ibid.

60. Hans Morgenthau; Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, Alfred Konpf, 1985), pp. 126-166.

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61. François Perroux; L'Economie des Jeunes Nations: Tome 1: Industrialization et Groupement des Nations (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 120-132

62. Kenneth Arrow; "Mathematical Models in Social Sciences" in May Brodbeck(ed); Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences (New York, The Mcmillan Press 1968) pp.635-640.

63. Claude Ake; Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London, Zed Press, 1978), pp. 25- 60

64. Henry Kissinger; "Domestic structure and Foreign Policy "in James N. Rosenau(ed); International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, The Free Press, 1969), pp. 199-206.

65. A.F.K. Organski; World Politics, (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1958) pp. 18-28

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68. ibid, pp. 60-74.

69. James Rosenau; "The Concept of Intervention" in Journal of International Affairs, vol. XXII (1968), pp. 165-177.

70. Kenneth Waltz; "Theory of International Relations" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby(eds); Handbook of Political science (Reading, Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1975) pp.VII, 1-2.

71. Upto to the end of the Seventies, only very few systematic studies were in print. A representative sample includes Jorge I. Dominguez, "Mice that Do Not Roar: Some Aspect of International Politics in the World's Peripheries" in International organization, vol XXV (spring 1971), pp. 175-208; Robert Keohane ; "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small states in International Politics" in International Organization: vol. XXIII (spring 1969), pp. 291-311; Franklin B Weinstein; "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia" in World Politics vol. XXIV (April 1972), pp. 356-381. A less frequently cited but useful essay is Joel Migdal; "Internal structure and External Behavior; Explaining Foreign Plicicies of Third World states" in International Relations, vol. IV (May 1974), pp. 510-527. For a quantitative oriented approach, see Patrick McGowan, "The Pattern of African Diplomacy: A Quantitative comparison" in Journal of Asian and African studies, vol; IV (July 1969), pp. 202-221. At the time of its publication, I. William Zartman; International Relations in New African (Englewood cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1966) constituted a good introduction to the area.

72. Bahgat Korany; "The Take-off of Third World studies? The case of Foreign Policy", pp. 465-487. Also see James N. Rosenau; "Restlessness, change, and Foreign, policy Analysis" in Rosenau(ed); In Search of Global Patterns (New York. The Free Press, 1976)

73. Elbaki Hermassi; The Third World Reassessed (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980) and Edward said; Orientalism (New York, Vintage Books, 1979).

74. A good (though somewhat limited) initial set of data to measure international behaviour for some Third World countries has materialized with the establishment of Edward Azar's conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), first at the University of North Carolina, and now at the University of Maryland.

75. Adda B. Bozeman; Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960); George Modelski; "Kautilya; Foreign Policy and International Systems in the Ancient Hindu World" in American Political Science Review, vol. LVIII (September 1964) pp. 549-560

76. James N. Rosenau; "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (ed); Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston III: North Western University Press, 1968), pp. 27-93.

77. James N. Rosenau (ed); Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York The Free Press, 1969).

78. Bernard C. Cohen and Scott A. Harris; "Foreign Policy" Greenstein and Polsby; op. cit., (fn 1) VI, pp. 381-437.

79. Roseau; "The National Interest", International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. XI (New York, Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), pp. 34-40

80. See, for instance, Charles F. Herman; "Foreign Policy Behaviour: That Which is to Be Explained" in Maurice A. East et al (eds); Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1978-, pp. 25-47

81. Randolph C. Kent; "Foreign Policy Analysis: Search for coherence in a Multifaceted Field" in Randolph C. Kent and Gynnar P. Nielson (eds); The Study and Teaching of International Relations (London, Frances Pinters, 1980) pp. 90-111

82. Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein; "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XIII (March 1969), pp. 75-102; Brecher; The Foreign Policy System of Israel (London Oxford University Press, 1972); Brecher; Decision in Israel's Foreign Policy (London, Oxford University Press, 1974); Brecher; Crisis Decision-making: Israel 1867 and 1973 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980).

83. James N. Rosenau; The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York, Free Press, 1971); Rosenau; The Study of Political Adaptation (London, Frances Pinters, 1981); Rosenau; The study of Global Interdependence (London, Pinter, 1980)

84. Richard C Snyder et al; Foreign Policy Decision-making; Graham T. Allison; Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Little, Brown C<sup>o</sup> 1972); Kjell Goldmann; "The Foreign sources of Foreign Policy: Causes; conditions or Inputs?" in European Journal of Political Research, vol. IV (september 1976), pp. 291-310.

85. Though external and global-systemic variables are by definition, located in the actor's world environment, there is still a critical distinction: "at any one moment the number of external data points is equal to the number of units in the system... whereas there exists only one systemic data point at any given moment in time", see J.E. Harf et al; "Systemic and External Attributes in Foreign Policy Analysis" in James N. Rosenau (ed); Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, (New York, Wiley, Halsted Division, 1974) pp. 143-161.

86. R. Jervis; Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976) and for a discussion of trends in the literature concerning the influence of psychological variables in the type of societies that interest us here, see Bahgat Korany; Social Change; charisma and International Behaviour (Leiden, sigjthoff, 1979), pp. 88-90.

87. We are not, of course, disputing the relevance of psychological variables in Third World Politics. Our questioning is related to the degree of influence, at what level, in what type of situation, and the demonstration of their causal impact. The position we advocate is that individual psychological variables are most useful as intervening variables, as active synthesizers of the myriad factors working on foreign policy. They can be compared to a chemical agent that activates and transforms the different inputs and donot negate their influence. See D.R. Kinder & J.A. Weiss; "In lieu of Rationality; Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision making" in Journal of conflict Resolution, vol. XXII, N<sup>o</sup> 4 (1978), PP. 707-735.



88. Christopher Clapham(ed); Foreign Policy Making in the Developing states: A comparative Approach (London, Saxon House, 1977); Neil R. Richardson; Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1978); Robert L. Rothstein; The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing countries in the International System (New York, Columbia University Press, 1977); Peter Willetts; The Non-aligned movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London, Frances Pinter Ltd, 1978).

89. Samir Amin; L'Accumulation à l'Echelle Mondiale (Paris, Anthropos, 1970); Amin; Le Développement Inégalé (Paris, minuit, 1973).

90. Clapham, in his chapter on Africa in his edited volume, qualifies George Shepherd Jr; Nonaligned Black Africa (Lexington, Mass. Heath, 1970) as "the best study of Non-alignment in the African context" (p.105). Even those who would not go as far as Clapham in judging Shepherd's book will be puzzled to find that Willetts - whose study concentrates on Africa - does not cite the work either in the bibliography or in the footnotes.

91. J. David Singer; "Theorists and Empiricists: The two culture Problem in International Politics" in James N. Rosenau et al(eds); The Analysis of International Politics (New York, The Free Press, 1972), pp. 80-94.

92. Willetts's expertise in measurement techniques has permitted him to overcome this problem of validity.

93. Robert Kaufman et al; "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency" in Comparative Politics, vol. VII (April 1975), pp. 303-330. Other points of discord in dependency analysis have been emphasized recently by James A. Caporaso; "Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development studies" in International Organization, vol. XXXIV (Autumn, 1980), pp. 605-628 and Tony Smith; "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited" in International Organization, vol. XXXV(Autumn 1981), pp. 755-762.

94. Fernando H. Cardoso, "The consumption of Dependency Theory in United states" in Latin American Research Review vol. XII (Autumn 1977) pp. 7-25.

95. Indeed, if a country is "bi-dependent", its bargaining power and manoeuvrability may increase, but its own basic structural situation as a dependent country does not change. Moreover, its bargaining power may diminish if its mentors choose to collaborate against it.

96. Steven Jackson et al; "An Assessment of Empirical Research on Dependencia" in Latin American Research Review, vol. XIV (March 1979) pp. 7-29; Bahgat Korany, "Dépendence Financière et comportement International" in Revue Française de Science Politique vol. XXVIII (December 1978) pp.1067-1092.

97. Incrementalism is a basic feature of decision-making in large bureaucracies of many different political systems. See R. Axelrod(ed); The structure of Decision: The cognitive Maps of Political Elites(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976).

98. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin; "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implications" in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman(eds); Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972) pp. 40-79. One of the rare attempts to apply this approach to a developing country is that of Herman M. Weil; "Can Bureaucracies Be Rational Actors? Foreign Policy Decision-making in North Vietnam" in International studies Quarterly, vol. XIX (December 1975).

99. Publications on Foreign Ministries are few and of uneven quality. The most notable are Maurice A. East; "Foreign Policy-making in small states: Some Theoretical Observations Based on the study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs" in Policy Sciences, vol. IV (December 1973), pp. 491-509. A.H.M. Kirk-greene; "Diplomacy and Diplomats: The formation of Foreign service cadres in Black Africa" in K. Ingham(ed); Foreign Relations of African states (London, Butter worth, 1974) pp. 279-322; Marvin H. Ott; "Foreign Policy Formulation in Malaysia" in Asian Survey, vol. XII (March 1972), pp. 225-242; P.J. Boyce; Foreign Affairs of New states (New York, st Martin's Press, 1977) especially chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9; and Elmer Plischke; Micro states in World Politics (Washington D.C. American Enterprise Institute, 1977) especially chapter 4; Joseph Mbenoh Wuakoh; The Domestic structure and Foreign Policy in the Developing State: The Cameroonian Experience, 1960-1982(Nsukka, M. Sc. Thesis, University of Nigeria, 1986).

100. See H. Jeffrey Leonard; "Multinational Corporations and Politics in Developing countries" in World Politics Vol. XXXII (April 1980), pp. 454-483.

101. Bernard Asso; Le chef d'Etat Africain; l'Expérience des Etats Africains de succession Française (Paris, Albatros, 1976); Thomas V. DiBaco(ed); Presidential Power in Latin American Politics (New York, Praeger, 1977); Richard Moulin; Le Présidentielisme et la classification de Regimes Politiques (Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et Jurisprudence, 1978); Peter Pyne; "Presidential Caesarism in Latin America Myth or Reality?" in Comparative Politics, vol. IX (April 1977) pp. 281-305.

102. Sproutand Sprout; "The Dilemma of Rising Demand and Insufficient Resources" in World Politics, vol. XX (July 1968) pp. 660-694.

103. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New York, Yale University Press, 1968)

104. The presence of "importing" of external resources is one of the basic variables in the conceptualization of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state as elaborated, for instance, by Guillermo A. O'Donnell; Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley; Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973); and O'Donnell; "Reflections on the Patterns of change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian state" in Latin American Research Review vol. XII (Winter 1978) pp. 3-38.

105. Andrew Kamarck; "Economic Determinants" in Vernon Mckay(ed) African Diplomacy (New York, Praeger, 1966).

106. ibid, pp. 55-67

107. ibid

108. ibid

109. Feliks Gross; Foreign Policy Analysis (New York Philosophical Library, 1954) pp. 31-37.

110. See Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom; International Relations: A Handbook of current Theory, pp. 7-45

111. ibid, pp. 121-151

112. Quincy Wright; The study of War (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1942) pp. 717-793

113. Light and Groom; International Relations: A Handbook of current Theory, pp. 113-120

114. Alvin Gouldner; The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York, Equinox Books, 1971).

115. Max Weber; "Protestantism and capitalism" in J.E.T. Eldridge(ed); Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality (New York, Charles Scribner's & sons, 1971)

116. Talcott Parsons; The structures of social Action (New York, The Free Press, 1961). Also see Parsons; "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science: An Interpretation of Max Weber's contribution" in International social Science Journal, vol. 17 (1965), pp. 46-63.

117. Arnold Brecht; Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth century Political Thought (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 186-189

118. ibid p. 188

119. ibid

120. Light and Groom; International Relations; A Handbook of current Theory; pp. 90-99

121. Patrick McGowan and Howard Shapiro; The Comparative study of Foreign Policy(Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1973) pp. 107)116.

122. J. Bandyopadhyaya; "The making of Foreign Policy: A Tentative subsystem Model for South Asia" in South Asian studies (July 1968) pp. 107-108, 125

123. R. Bunker; "Linkages and Foreign Policy of Peru: 1958-1966" in Western Political Quarterly, vol. 22(1969), pp. 280-297, 77, 108, 155.

124. R.T. Rummel; "some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behaviour", in World Politics, vol. 21 (1969) PP 226-241.

125. D.W. Moore, Governmental and Societal Influences on Foreign Policy: A Partial Examination of Rosenau's Tation Model (Columbus, Ph D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1970), pp. 94-223.

126. S.A. Salmore and C.F. Herman; "The Effect of size, Development and Accountability of Foreign Policy" in Peace Research Society Papers, vol. 14(1969), pp. 15-30

127. Karl Marx; "A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in Karl Marx; Selected Works, vol I (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969) pp. 502-507

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132. V.I. Lenin; Imperialism: The Highest stage of Capitalism (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975).

133. Gabriel Kolko; The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston, Beacon Press, 1969)

134. ibid, P. 81

135. Paul Baran and P. Sweezy; Monopoly capital (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 198. Also see Paul Baran; The Political Economy of Growth (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1957).

136. H. Magdoff; The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, Modern Reader, 1969), p. 240.

137. Salvador Giner, Sociology (London, Martin Robinson, 1972) pp. 264-287

138. Percy cohen; Modern social Theory (London, Heine-mann, 1968) pp. 174-236

139. According to Weber, "an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized view points into a unified analytical construct"; It thus seeks perfection of a logical and not a moral order, to stress what is characteristic, distinctive or "typical". Such generic terms as christianity, Islam, Feudalism, capitalism, democracy nation-state, industrial society are ideal-types which-in their conceptual purity - rarely exist in reality. These ideal - types, in themselves are neither absolutely true nor absolutely false, but simply-like any other analytical tool-useful or useless. For a succinct discussion of Weber's methodology, especially the ideal-type, see for instance, Raymond Aron; Main Current in sociological Thought (London, Penguin 1965), Vol. II, pp. 185-259, but especially 202-210; Ronald Fletcher; The Making of sociology: A study of sociological Theory (London, Nelson's University Paperbacks, 1972), vol. II, pp. 411-439; Julien Freud; The Sociology of Max Weber (London, vintage Books, 1969) pp. 59-70.

140. Giner; Sociology, p. 264.

141. Cohen; Modern social Theory, pp. 174-208

142. Peter Worsley The Third World (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), pp. 21-31.

143. A masterly treatment of these issues and problems is given in Robert L. Rothstein; The weak in the World of the Strong, pp. 102-276

144. Cohen; Modern Social Theory, pp. 13-14

145. David Singer; "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in World Politics vol. XIV (1961), pp. 77-92.

146. This is the position adopted by Holsti in his International Politics, pp. 16-17, "Which Level-of-analysis (international system, national actor or individual policy maker) should we employ as the most useful perspective from which to explain or understand politics among nations?" Holsti asked. After stating that "each makes a contribution, but each fails to account for certain aspects of reality that must be considered" Holsti reached the conclusion that "therefore, all three levels of analysis will be employed at different times, depending upon the type of problem which must be analysed".

147. Singer; "The level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", pp. 77-92. The exact number of levels-of analysis one can use in international relations is not yet accepted by everyone. Singer talks about two levels: the intra-national (domestic) and the extra-national (international). North et al. favour six Levels of analysis rang  
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from the individual to the supra-national; and Galtung goes even further. Helge Hveem; "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of International Position" in Co-operation and conflict, vol. VII (1972), pp. 65-89. For the merits of adopting three levels of analysis, see Holsti, International Politics, pp. 15-17

148. For a discussion of the "frame of reference" in the field of foreign policy analysis, see Snyder et al; Foreign Policy Decision-making, pp. 26-35

149. Robert Bales; Interaction Process Analysis (Reading, Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1951).

150. This is the subtitle David Easton; The Political System (New York Knopf, 1953)

151. ibid, pp. 192-193

152. ibid, pp. 198-199

153. Hveem, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of International Position"

154. Snyder et al; Foreign policy Decision-making, pp. 26-35

155. See chapter Two of this study.

156. As expressed by Gordon Allport; "Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and social causation" in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds); Toward a General Theory of Action (New York, Harper & Row, 1962). pp. 465-488

157. Easton; The Political System, chapter 6

158. Allport; "Prejudice: A Problem of Psychological and social causation," pp. 465-488.

159. ibid, p. 466

160. Easton; The Political System, p. 152

161. ibid, P. 194

162. ibid, p. 196.

163. Cohen; Modern Social Theory, pp. 13-15

164. Holsti; International Politics, p. 157

165. D. Cartwright(ed); Kurt Lewin's Field Theory in Social Science (new York, Harper and Row, 1951), especially chapter 10

166. Fred Greenstein; Personality and Politics (Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 7. Also see J. Nettl, and Roland Robertson; International Systems and the Modernization of Societies (London, Faber, 1968), p. 78

167. ibid.

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168. For an elaboration of the actor's "definition of the situation" concept, see for instance, Michael Banton; Roles: An Introduction to the study of Social Relations (London Tavistock Republications, 1965) pp. 135-137; Joseph Frankel; The Making of Foreign Policy. An Analysis of Decision-Making (London, Oxford University Press 1967, pp. 183-185; Holsti; International Politics, pp. 155-191

169. Holsti; International Politics, pp. 184-185

170. ibid

171. Scott Thompson; Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 415-421.

172. Zartman; International Relations in the New Africa, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 54.

173. William Johnstone; Burma's Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1963).

174. Roger Smith; Cambodia's Foreign Policy, (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1969).

175. See, for instance, Richard Rosecrance; Action and Reaction in International Politics; International Systems in Perspective (Boston, Little, Brown, 1963). Also see Morton Kaplan; System and Process in International Politics (New York Wiley, 1964) pp. 54-75.

176. James Rosenau; "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Barry Farrell(ed); Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 27-93

177. ibid

178. Holsti; International Politics, p. 186

179. ibid p. 187

180. Holt and Turner; The Political Basis of Economic Development, pp. 1

181. ibid pp: 24-28

182. Gustavo Lagos; International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 128-160.

183. ibid, p. 128-130

184. ibid, p. 3.

185. Bernard Barber; Social Stratification (New York Harcourt Bruce 1 C<sup>9</sup> 1957), p. 259. In the same light, E.H. Carr "Socialization of Nationalism" in Ivo D. Duchek(ed); Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 60 ff.

186. Lagos; International Stratification, p. 6
187. *ibid*, p. 6. Also see Talcott Parsons; "Social Classes and class conflict in the light of Recent sociological Theory" in Talcott Parsons; Essays in Sociological Theory (New York, The Free Press, 1954) pp. 323-335, Karl Deutsch; "The Growth of Nations; Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and social Integration" in World Politics, vol. v51953), pp. 168-195.
188. Karl Deutsch; Nationalism and social communication (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1953); Reinhard Bendix; "Social Stratification and Political Power" in Reinhard Bendix and and seymour Martin Lipset(eds); class, status, and Power (New York, The Free Press, 1953).
189. Tamas Szentes; The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, pp. 11-68
190. Lagos; International Stratification and Underdevelopment, p. 6.
191. Harold D. Lasswell; "Nations and Classes: The Symbols of Identification" in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz(eds): Reader in Public Opinion and Communication (New York, The Free Press, 1953), pp. 28-43.
192. Bendix; "Social Stratification and Political Power" in Bendix and Lipset(eds); class, status and Power, p. 598. For a similar analysis see Reinhold Niebuhr; "Power and ideology in National and International Affairs" in William T.R. Fox (ed); Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. pp. 144 ff. However for the study of the concept of "international system" see Morton A. Kaplan; system and Process in International Politics (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1957); Stanley Hoffmann(ed); contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1960), Klaus Knorr and sidney verba(eds); The International system: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, Princeton, University Press, 1961); World Politics, Special Issue, XIV(1961). James N Rosenau(ed); International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York, The Free Press, 1969); Also see especially Talcott Parson; "Order and Cornmunity in the International social system" in James N. Rosenau(ed); International Politics and Foreign Policy(New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 120-121. For a treatment of Interactions among nations as a great social system in a general textbook of sociology see William F. Ogburn and Mexer F. Nimkoff; sociology, 3rd edition (Boston, Houghton Mifflin C<sup>o</sup> 1958) pp. 525 ff.
193. We are following Robert K. Merton here. According to him "the status set referes to the complex of distinct positions assigned to individuals both within and among social systems". See Robert K. Merton; Social Theory and Social Structure, Revised Edition (New York; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), p. 380.



194. ibid. pp. 380 ff
195. Barber; Social Stratification (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co 1957) p. 2
196. See "Peuples et Civilisations" collection published under the direction of Louis Halpen and Philippe Sagnac-Henri Hauser; La Prépondérance Espagnole (1559-1660), 3rd Edition (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), vol. IX; Philippe Sagnac and A. de Saint-Leger; La Prépondérance Française: Louis XIV (1661-1715) (Paris, F. Alcan, 1935), vol. X; Pierre Muret with the collaboration of Philippe Sagnac; La Prépondérance Anglaise (1915-1963) 2nd Edition (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1942), vol. XI.
197. Henri Hauser; La Prépondérance Espagnole, 1559-1660, p. 171. Also see Nicholas John Spykman; American Strategy in World Politics (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co 1942), p. 61
198. Joseph A. Kahl; The American class structures (New York, Rinehart and Co 1959), p. 19 and Bendix and Lipset; class, status and power, pp. 11 ff
199. Kahl; The American class structure, p. 19 and Bendix and Lipset; class, status and Power, p. 11
200. Kahl, The American class structure, pp. 21-25
201. Bendix and Lipset; class, status and Power, p. 11
202. We employ the concept of ideology in the sense defined by Mannheim in ideology and Utopia and which Haas has synthesized: "Ideology postulates belief in a set of symbols which, even though may be "false" objectively, still characterize the total myth system of social groups and are essential to the spiritual cohesion of a ruling group which would lose its sense of control if it were conscious of the "real" state of affairs". See Ernst Haas; "The Balance of Power; concept; Prescription or propaganda" in David S Mclellan; William C. Olson and Fred A. Sondermann (eds); Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 224.
203. Hans J. Morgenthau; Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, p. 315. A similar analysis has been made by Richard C Snyder & Edgars. Furniss; American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles and Programs (New York Rinehart and Co, 1954), p. 761;
204. Morgenthau; Politics Among Nations, p. 315
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206. Cited by Elie Kedourie; Nationalism (London, Hutchinson & Co, 1960) p. 730.

207. R. Triffin; "The size of the Nation and its vulnerability" in Austin Robinson(ed); The Economic consequences of the Nations (New York, st. Martin's Press, 1960), p. 248
208. Lagos; International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 24-30 Also see T.H. Marshall "The Nature of class conflicts" in Bendix and Lipset; Class, Status and Power, pp. 84 ff
209. Joseph Frankel; National Interest (London, Pall Mall, 1970), pp. 52-62; Also see James N. Rosenau; "The National Interest" in The International Encyclopedia of the social sciences, vol. XI (New York, Mcmillan & The Free Press, 1968), pp. 34-40.
210. Lagos; International stratification and Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 24-30
211. But of course "all these uses of case studies... assume further correlational analyses at a later state. Without iteratively shifting back and forth without later correlational analysis upon the hypotheses suggested, or supported by the case studies, one is only a little better off than without any case studies at all". Bruce Russett; "International Behaviour Research" in Michael Haas and Henry Kariel (ed); Approaches to the study of Political Science (scranton, chandler publishing C<sup>o</sup> 1970), pp. 425-444.
212. Claude Ake; A Political Economy of Africa (London, Longman, 1981), pp. 1-29
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214. Bendix and Lipset; Class, status and Power, pp. 11 ff. Also see Ralph Miliband; The state in the capitalist Society (London, Longman, 1969), pp. 179-264.
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## CHAPTER TWO

### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

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#### 2.1 : INTRODUCTION:

The study of Third World foreign policies is just beginning to attract the interest of scholars and students. This fact is underscored by the lack of relevant texts on the subject and by the absence of debate on the theoretical framework for the study of Third World foreign policies. On the other hand, numerous studies have been conducted on various aspects of the foreign policies of the developed states. As a result, most studies of the foreign policy of the developing state have simply reproduced the efforts carried out within the context of the developed state. However, these studies have given us a clear insight into the intricate and complex, often secretive world of foreign policy including its organizational structure and behavioural pattern. While such studies have been carried out within definite theoretical frameworks, whether explicitly stated or not, few systematic attempts have been made to identify and analyze the relationship between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state.

There are two broad theoretical schools for explaining international economic relations. One is based on the interdependence paradigm which is a derivative of neo-classical economics. The other is the dependency school which, as Caporaso defines it "seeks to explore the process of integration of the periphery (i.e. Third World countries) into the international capitalist system and to assess the implications of development".<sup>1</sup> Frederick Cooper<sup>2</sup> identifies a third school - the Marxist theorists - but it has much in common with the dependency school as both proceed from a structuralist paradigm, stressing structures of production, exchange relationships, international capital and class formation and class conflicts. Indeed, dependency can be seen as an "expansion of Marx's interpretation of history, an extension of his method and central ideas to a problem which

on a world scale, was still in embryo at his death".<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on and criticize these two theoretical approaches in the way they are employed in the study of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state with a view to laying the basis for the development of an alternative conceptual framework for our problem of research-which seeks to avoid their basic pitfalls while synthesizing their payoffs in a Dependency-Linkage matrix. Thus, after assessing and operationalizing this matrix in the study of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, this chapter concludes by formulating working hypotheses which will guide our investigations through out the rest of the study. In this perspective, this chapter elaborates on the methodological and conceptual principles followed in our investigations, their potential payoffs as well as the research problems to be encountered and the solutions to be adopted. This elaboration is carried out through the examination of (1) the inter-dependence paradigm; (2) the dependency paradigm (3) criticism of Dependency school (4) North-South dialogue (5) Dependency-Linkage matrix (6) Hypotheses (7) methodology and (8) conclusion.

## 2.2 : INTERDEPENDENCE PARADIGM AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE DEVELOPING STATE

Interdependence studies dominance relationships between states that differ in size but not in the level of socio-economic development, as well as the consequences of this dominant relationships on behavioural patterns in bargaining.

The Interdependence school is so-called because it derives from the conventional textbook economics based on the teachings of classical Western theorist from Ricardo to Keynes. This school emphasizes both the free-market economy and the comparative advantage as well as the advantages of external trade. Many disciples of this school see the development of international economic relations in terms of evolution, of a movement of "individual productive units from meagre self-sufficiency" to "prosperous interdependence as producers... integrated into a national network of markets, information flows, and social institutions".<sup>4</sup> In this perspective the interdependence orientation seeks to probe and explore the symmetries among nation-states. This approach which often

proceeds from a "liberal" paradigm, focuses on individual actors and their goals while analyzing power in decisional terms.<sup>5</sup> With the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis, individual actors are usually considered in interdependence analysis to be internally integrated states which confront the external environment as units. Interdependence therefore can be meaningfully discussed using any combination of states at the dyadic level. Thus, the interdependence theory is easily linked to statistical modes of analysis.

Furthermore, eventhough the interaction of politics and economics is an old theme in the study of international relations, interdependence scholars have divorced politics from economics and have isolated them in analysis and theory- if not in the reality of international relations. Therefore, the theory of interdependence based on the theoretical heritage of modern Western academe and rooted in the tradition of liberalism rejects the age-old concept of a unified political and economic order and replaces it by two separate orders.

First of all the theory of interdependence argues that an economic system exists based on the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services and that these economic processes operate under natural laws. Furthermore, it maintains that a harmony of interests operates best and to the benefit of all when political authorities interfere least with its automatic operation. Economic activity is seen by them to be the preserve of private enterprise, not of government. Secondly, the theory of interdependence holds that the political system consists of power, influence, and public decision-making. Politics unlike economics does not obey natural laws and harmony. Politics is unavoidable and government is necessary for essential services - defence, law and order. But for students of interdependence, government and politics should not interfere with the natural economic order. Thus for them, in the international system the hope for peace and hamony is for politics to be isolated from economics, for the natural processes of free trade to operate among nations bringing not only prosperity but also peace to all.

Indeed, the interdependence school which is mainly of American origin is based on two main ideas. First of all, that there is not only a geographical fragmentation of the international system but that there is also a functional fragmentation and specialization of the system into vertical subsystems of which the political (diplomatico-strategic) subsystem is only an example. That to each form of power (commercial, monetary, energetic... etc) corresponds a subsystem with its own specific configuration. That apart from the political (diplomatico-strategic) subsystem, other subsystems do not involve the recourse to force which has no meaning in terms of exchange and development. Thus, with the exception of the political (diplomatico-strategic) game, most of the games in international relations are not zero-sum games hence the interdependence of economic variables gives each actor (player) the chance of favouring the growth of other players. The central idea of this model, therefore, is that the outcomes of interactions among parties in international relations are not determined by the rapport of military forces but by the nature of the structure of each game, the distribution of power in the system and other factors such as the relative importance of each game for each actor, the ability of forming coalitions and the mastery of the agenda. This model presents an image which submerges the sovereignties of states in favour of collective solutions. In consequence, the order presented by this model leads to the establishment of a world society whose processes resemble those of the internal political society; a worldview similar to that of Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations but economically.

At this point, we now understand that the theory of interdependence is based economically on the notion of growth, that is the increase in time of the production of goods and services in a given economic system. This theory analyzes the phenomenon of underdevelopment in terms of deficiencies in factors of production - capital, technology, labour and entrepreneurship. These deficiencies, in the light of the theory constitute the obstacles which must be removed before

development can take place. The theory of interdependence highlights a unilinear evolutionism, valid at all times and everywhere. According to this scheme, the developing countries have necessarily to undergo the same stages of development which the developed countries underwent by going through "stages of growth". To the apostles of this school, the only way to development is through capitalism.<sup>6</sup>

In the ultimate analysis the purpose of the theory of interdependence is to demonstrate which goods a country should export and import according to its own specific factor endowment. The aim is to show that, on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis and all things being equal, all countries will be better off by opening up their national economies to international transactions than by closing them to such transactions. By opening up their economies, countries will find themselves in a situation where part of the domestic output is exported, and part of the domestic demand is satisfied by imported goods. As a result, the amount of goods which the two partners will be in a position to consume, will be greater than would be the case in a closed economy. Such a situation is obtained if each country specializes in the production of goods in which it has a relative cost advantage, resulting from a particular factor of production endowment. The original formulation of this theory by David Richardo has since been modernized and refined by a number of scholars, most prominent among whom are Heckscher, Ohlin, Samuelson and Lerner.

These authors have reformulated the theory of international trade along the following lines. Each country must specialize in the production and export of those goods which use more intensively the relatively more abundant factor. This means that, ultimately, the initial factor endowment plays a crucial role in the international specialization of each country in a particular type of production. This theory results in the justification and rationalization of a particular type of international division of labour.



According to the theory (as expressed in the Hersher-Ohlin-Samuelson formulation), trade will be most likely between unlike economies, and the gains from trade will be greatest where conditions are most dissimilar. Therefore, trade will be greatest, and the gains largest, between the North and South where factor endowments and, consequently, costs of production differ most. It follows that the advanced countries will export capital-intensive goods to the developing nations, which, in return, will export labour-intensive goods to them.

A new more elaborate type of international division of labour is envisaged by Raymond Vernon, in his formulation of the "product life cycle" model.<sup>7</sup> This model can be seen as a more dynamic reformulation of the neo-classical theory of international trade. According to this model, each product in its development, goes through three successive stages:- new product, maturing product and standardized product. New products and processes are first launched in the United States of America as a result of the high per capita income, the relative availability of productive factors, and the high proportion of research and development activities. As the product goes through the maturing and standardization stages the location of production shifts to take advantage of lower labour costs in different areas, first in the United states itself, then in other, less industrialized countries and in neighbouring and more distant underdeveloped countries. Indeed, he concludes, "at an advanced stage in the standardization of some products the LDCS may offer competitive advantages as a production location ... the low cost of labour may be the initial attraction drawing the investor to less-developed areas."<sup>8</sup> Thus, according to the logic of the "product cycle" model, all production has a tendency to move from the developed centre towards the underdeveloped periphery. The developing countries will thus become the main producers of the goods, which have reached the standardization stage, as their production would have been progressively abandoned first by the United states, then by the other industrialized countries.

The brief summary of the neo-classical theory of international development should now be seen in the light of the ideology of interdependence's key concepts "complementarity" and "interdependence." The meaning of these concepts becomes clear when seen in the perspective of the neo-classical theory. By "complementarity", it is meant that each group of countries must continue to limit itself to the type of production that the international division of labour has assigned to it. The developing countries must continue to produce and export agricultural and mineral raw materials and labour-intensive, standardized manufactured goods, while developed countries will carry on with the production of the more sophisticated manufactured goods from their heavy, and technologically advanced, industries. The meaning of "interdependence" in this situation, hardly needs belabouring. As each group of countries, remains strictly specialized in a particular type of production, it necessarily needs to import from the other, the goods which it does not produce itself. More significantly, "interdependence" appears suspect, as an ideological justification for the perpetuation of dependency in a changing international environment. To most Third World scholars<sup>9</sup>, it seems to be a divisive manoeuvre by "Northern" countries, alarmed at the disruptive potential of "Commodity power" after the OPEC increase in the price of oil, designed to co-opt Southern countries into vertical type relationships (to the detriment of South-South links), the vertical control of which would remain firmly in their own hands. Vayrinen has given an explanation of the concept of "Interdependence" along the following lines:

...The concept of interdependence is regarded as an ideological weapon which strives for the consolidation of the common front of capitalist countries against the Third World and for coercing them to a compromise with imperialism by appealing to the "common destiny" of the bourgeoisie of the Third World and of the leading capitalist Countries.<sup>10</sup>

However, immediate problems are raised by our discussion of the interdependence paradigm so far. First of all, interdependence has a dyadic (actor) focus and secondly interdependence is also an issue-specific concept with "net" property.

.../...

In other words, interdependence issues are highly factorable and can be expressed sector by sector as well as aggregately across sectors.<sup>11</sup> At this point the question that comes to mind is to know the structural conditions for the existence of interdependence.

It was a principle of mercantilism that to increase its power and decrease its vulnerability, a state should minimize the ratio of foreign transactions to domestic economic activity and distribute its foreign transactions as uniformly as possible over as many partners as possible. Concentration on foreign trade, either as a source of supply or as a market outlet, was to be avoided since it created modes of dependency and influence.

Interdependence, thus, implies approximate equality of vulnerability or mutual dependency. But is this how interdependence has been conceived in the literature on international relations? The major preoccupation of scholars has not been to develop a theory of interdependence, but rather to describe the extent of interdependence. The debate has revolved around the question whether or not interdependence between the industrial countries has increased during the twentieth century.<sup>12</sup> The argument was launched by Deutsch and Eckstein<sup>13</sup> and subsequent work by Karl W. Deutsch purported to demonstrate that the ratio of intersocietal transactions to internal transactions has actually declined among EEC countries.<sup>14</sup> Waltz<sup>15</sup> argued the same point. Cooper<sup>16</sup>, Morse<sup>17</sup>, and Rosecrance and Stein<sup>18</sup> have presented data to emphasize the opposite point, that interdependence has grown dramatically. Most recently Rosecrance and his colleagues<sup>19</sup> have demonstrated that interdependence has actually followed a cyclical history since the late nineteenth century. This is not the place to discuss the relative merits of the various bodies of data and the measuring techniques used to establish the degrees of interdependence. The critical issue, after all, is not the rate of transaction growth or the similarity in economic behaviour between nations, but their consequences.

The question has been largely evaded with most authors seeming to imply that greater transaction levels lead to greater impact and sensitivity, and presumably, to an increased need for policy coordination. Unlike the dependency theorists, who outline the consequences of economic exchange in terms of exploitation and hierarchy in the system, the works on interdependency-as-transaction demonstrate little concern for the effects of interdependence on the structure of the international system, on the distribution of capabilities (hierarchy), or on the distribution of benefits from all the transactions. If the dependency theorists can be faulted for assuming a fixed outcome from international exchange (exploitation), most of the literature on interdependence can be criticized for ignoring the question of outcomes altogether.

Studies by Waltz, Morse, Haas, Scott, Keohane and Nye have dealt in different ways with this shortcoming. Waltz' well-known essay, "The myth of National interdependence" is really a foray into the question of vulnerability and dependency. He argues that large industrial powers are neither dependent nor vulnerable and introduces the important notion that a hallmark of dependency is the high cost of establishing alternative markets and sources of supply. In his words "the low cost of disentanglement is a measure of low dependence"<sup>20</sup>. Dependency - and presumably interdependence is more than just sensitivity to transactions; what matters is when the transaction patterns are seriously disturbed. Outcomes in bargaining will reflect degrees of vulnerability. Waltz thus implies that an international hierarchy of vulnerability perpetuates a hierarchy of diplomatic influence. He also emphasizes the rhetorical aspects of the common usage of interdependence and adds that "the world interdependence" subtly obscures the inequalities of national capabilities, pleasingly points to a reciprocal dependency, and strongly suggests that all states are playing the same game<sup>21</sup>. Here Waltz is more realistic than those who believe that the consequences of increased transactions are more or less equal to all parties.

Hass is among the first to relate increased interdependence both to the consequences in the system and to certain policy options of state actors.<sup>22</sup> Rejecting the conventional wisdom that increased interdependence creates more stability and a greater likelihood for peace, he argues that greater interconnectedness can predict neither conflict nor cooperation. It does predict system change, however, as problems become more complex, strategies designed to cope with them will appear increasingly inadequate; yet desires to deal with them will involve increased intervention by states and international organizations in each other's affairs. Hass suggests that "the kinds of systems change associated with rising interdependence do imply a tendency towards strengthening weaker actors against strong states as the web of relationships increases perceived sensitivities; vulnerability and opportunity costs for the stronger".<sup>23</sup> The remainder of Hass' analysis focuses on the conditions under which state actors may be willing to establish regimes and particularly forms adapted to organizational problem-solving. But he is concerned with the consequences of interdependence as well as its origins. And in contrast to dependency theorists who predict increased hierarchy from greater interdependence between the centre and periphery, Haas forecasts the opposite.

Andrew Scott's recent essay on interdependence also concentrates on the consequences rather than quantities.<sup>24</sup> His analysis explicitly employs a systems perspective and, here, he is concerned primarily with the problem of the unanticipated consequences of national (and international) decisions and actions for the system, and the system's capacity to regulate or control those consequences. Given the vastly increased flow of transactions, what are some of the problems that arise? Among others, Scott lists the following as particularly important:-

1. Undirected and partially directed processes produce surprises and inadvertent consequences;
2. Inadvertent consequences are becoming more common and more important.

.../...

3. As the international system becomes more elaborate, the number of system and structural requisites increases;
4. International problems will become broader in scope and more closely linked;
5. As the number of requisites and problems increases, the international system will become increasingly fragile and the costs of keeping the system operating will escalate sharply.

Scott also suggests that actors in the system will find it increasingly difficult to control events and pursue their interests effectively. Although he does not elaborate on the forecast, he suggests that the major powers may be particularly vulnerable to impotence as they try to deal with a "continuing flow of system-generated crises".<sup>25</sup> Like Haas, then, Scott also suggests decreasing hierarchy in the international system as far as the ability to influence other actors or solve international problems are concerned. While Haas' and Scott's analyses are speculative rather than data-based, they have taken an important step in directing our attention away from description of transaction flows. To map transactions is an important descriptive enterprise, but from the perspective of international relations theory, it is important to know as well how changes in patterns of interaction whether linear or cyclical affect other processes and structures in the international system.

Morse is among the first to focus attention explicitly on the consequences of interdependence on policymaking. If the fact of interdependence has been well established, what difference does it make to how governments conduct their mutual affairs? Does interdependence in one issue-area spill over into bargaining in other issue-areas. Does the fact of interdependence create any imperatives for specific types of diplomatic/economic policy? Morse does not supply answers to all these questions, but his analysis clearly shifts attention to a variety of dependent variables at the national and systems levels. Indeed, to Morse, interdependence is really an intervening variable between basic socio-economic trends

and diplomatic bargaining. Its sources are found in increased sensitivity of industrial societies to external phenomena, exacerbated by technological changes, and in the efforts on the part of governments to lower barriers to international exchanges. Taken together, these factors have increased mutually contingent behaviour, or interdependence. In turn, interdependence has increased (A) the incompatibility of governments' foreign policy objectives; and (B) the frequency of international crises between industrial states; it has decreased (i) government latitude of choice in both domestic and foreign policies, (ii) government control over trans-national activities, and (iii) the number of instrumentalities (e.g. tax and fiscal policies) available to cope with domestic economic problems. Morse does not demonstrate empirically that all these variables are linked in the way specified nor does he explore the question of the relationship between the distribution of capabilities or vulnerabilities to bargaining outcomes. In two brief case studies, however, he shows how governments in interdependent relationships can manipulate crises to maximize their national advantage. How this diverges from diplomacy in a non-interdependent situation is not entirely clear, but Morse is on the verge of saying that interdependence creates a new type of international politics and bargaining.

There is a level-of-analysis problem in this work, however, like Scott, Morse implies that there has been an increase of interdependence in the system which has given rise to certain systemic consequences such as an increased number of diplomatic crises between industrial states. But we do not know how variations in interdependence between specific pairs of states affect bargaining between those particular states. Like dependency theorists, attribution of certain characteristics equally throughout the system precludes statements about particular situations. We may legitimately make claims for the prevalence of dependency or interdependence as nodal characteristics of the international system, but we must not commit the ecological fallacy and argue that those characteristics determine the nature of

relations between any given pair of states. Thus while Morse is aware of distributional problems, he does not really explore them, and cannot explore them unless he establishes empirically that interdependence exists in any bargaining group.

Keohane and Nye's Power and interdependence<sup>27</sup> also concentrates on dependent variables, that is, on the consequences of interdependence. It is not concerned with measuring transaction flows, nor does it assume as do dependency theorists (dependency-as-vulnerability researchers, and many traditional international relations scholars) that disparities in economic capabilities or vulnerability necessarily lead to inequitable bargaining outcomes, much less to permanent international hierarchy. Outcomes are an empirical problem but the question is how interdependence affects bargaining styles and distribution of rewards.

From the above discussion, the implications for the developing state become clear. Since the developed states are characterized by "prosperious interdependent producers integrated into a national network", the task in the developing state is to recreate the socio-economic factors that brought about development in the West. There was a broad consensus that certain deficiencies accounted for economic backwardness in the developing states. Notable among these deficiencies are inadequate savings and capital formation, inadequate infrastructures, lack of entrepreneurial skills and technical know-how, lack of diversity in the economy and lack of achievement motivation due to what Kussum Nair called "limited aspirations".<sup>28</sup> The last factor has now been discredited as Africans are now recognized as highly motivated economically and highly responsive to changes in the economic market.<sup>29</sup> Interdependence scholars argued that the removal of these deficiencies would be enough to assure development. Foreign technical assistance and foreign private investments were seen as a partial, if critical, solution to the problem of inadequate savings, lack of capital and lack of entrepreneurial skills and technical know-how. Economic planning was seen as a



partial solution to integrating and diversifying the economy and as a means of inculcating achievement motivation.

Experts were not agreed, however, on what were the best policies and strategies of economic development planning to employ.<sup>30</sup> W. Arthur Lewis<sup>31</sup> stressed on export-led growth because of its foreign exchange earnings and multiplier effect. He was supported by those who, like Theodore Schultz<sup>32</sup> urged the transformation of traditional agriculture. A debate ensued on the nature of transformation as to whether commercial farmers or the peasants should receive encouragement to increase the scale of their operations. Other experts stressed industrialization, precipitating arguments over whether the modern industrial sector should draw resources from the backward sectors or whether priority should rather go to rural self-sufficiency and "cottage industries"; and finally whether the urban informal sector should be favoured over the rural or the modern industrial sectors.

Given these arrays of policies and strategies of development, it is not surprising that planning in the developing states in the decade of the 1960s was disastrous. Apart from the confusion of the varieties, development strategies and policies failed more fundamentally because they were based on false assumptions. In the first place, the explanation of underdevelopment was tautological in a dual sense. As Slaughter Ake correctly observes:

On analysis, it is soon clear that the things offered ... as causes of underdevelopment were in fact symptoms of underdevelopment. Moreover, the explanation is highly biased in that it suggests that development presupposes capitalism. In so far as capital accumulation, commodity exchange, acquisitive drive and skills have an organic unity in a distinctive capitalist mode of production, the explanation is a tautology in a second sense, because it amounts to suggesting that a society is not developed because it does not have the characteristics of a developed society<sup>33</sup>

In the second place, the explanation begs the question of why identified deficiencies in the Third World developmental process are prevalent only in the Third World and nowhere else. Certainly it is not by sheer coincidence that such

differentials exist between the Third World and the rest of the World particularly the industrialized part of it. Thus the interdependence theory of international relations is not particularly well suited to developing state. This is partly because it was developed to explain international relations in the industrialized world, partly because much of the data needed to make it applicable to the developing state is simply not available and partly because of the uniqueness and complexity of the Third World case. It is because of these inadequacies of the interdependence school and the empirical failings of the policies it inspired that academicians have turned attention to alternative explanations and strategies.

### 2.3: DEPENDENCY PARADIGM AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE DEVELOPING STATE

The dependency school focuses on the historical origins and the subsequent "development of underdevelopment".<sup>34</sup> Sometimes it is referred to as "a world systems theory" because of its basic tenent that all contemporary societies are integrated into a single world economic system, the capitalist system; and no contemporary socio-economic formation can be understood except as a part of this one world-system.<sup>35</sup> Originally a Latin American preserve, seeking to explain why the goal of autonomous capitalist development eluded policy-makers despite the existence of a substantial indigenous bourgeoisie,<sup>36</sup> dependency theory is now embraced by increasing numbers of Africanist writers, notably Immanuel Wallerstein; E.A. Aplyers, Peter C. W. Gutkind and Steve Langdon for the West, Walter Rodney, H. Brewster and N. Girvan for the Afro-Caribbean; and Samir Amin (Egyptian), Claude Ake (Nigerian) and Tchundjang Pouémi (Cameroonian). Nevertheless, there is no single body of thought that can be accurately described as "dependency theory". Instead various theories stress the key notion that some countries (or economies) are conditioned in their development by their dependency on other countries (economies) and that this dependency is structural and deeper than the dominance relationship between societies that differ in size but not in the level of socio-economic development. Thus the relationship between Cameroon and France could be and usually is, described as dependent, but that between


Denmark and West Germany would not be so described. Dependency is different from dominance. This is not simply a question of multinational capital and ownership-it is their structural dimension that is crucial.

As the first stage of a research project under the direction of Bruce Russett, Raymond D. Duvall and others attempted a synthetic interpretation of dependency theory, a full reporting and justification of which is given elsewhere and hence is not reconstructed here.<sup>37</sup> They assumed that sixteen substantive concepts-not including a particular concept of dependency-constitute the theoretical core of dependency literature. Those concepts can usefully be grouped into four general types to permit a simplified representation of the basic character of the body of theory as we interpret it. This simple representation is given in Figure 2(1) below. For each of the four groups represented in Figure 2(1) there are several particular substantive concepts. Examples of which are: (1) the extent of financial and technological penetration of the peripheral country as a primary aspect of capitalist economic and state imperialism; (2) the product diversity of the export sector as an aspect of the export enclave syndrome; (3) the extent of structural integration among the economic sectors as a feature of constrained and distorted economic development; and (4) the degree of coercive authoritarianism of the peripheral state as an important concept within the group labeled socio-political distortions.

Nevertheless, the term dependency as used today refers to at least three distinct epistemological frames of reference:- (1) It is used by a group of scholars as a "wholistic" descriptive analysis of historical processes of transformation of certain societies. Their emphasis is generally on qualitative structural analysis which distinguishes not only these societies from others but also between the major historical phases in the socio-economic evolution of these peripheral countries, for example, colonial dependency, finance-industrial dependency and the new dependency based on multinational corporate investment. (2) For rigorous empiricists committed to precise measurements of concepts, dependency refers to a "property" of countries, for example, trade dependency which is a favourite object of study in this frame of reference would refer to the extent of (potential) external control of a peripheral country through its trade. The emphasis here is on the stable quantitative differences (or dominance) than on the structural qualitative differences (or domination). (3) Finally in the analytical tradition of theorists steeped in the notions of purposeful systems, choice, and goal-directed behaviour, dependency would refer to an aspect or property of the relationships between such systems pursuing their separate goals. The emphasis here is neither on the stable quantitative differences (or dominance) nor is it on the comprehensive-wholistic

structural-qualitative differences, but on behavioural aspects of these relationships.

FIGURE 2(1): A SIMPLIFIED REPRESENTATION OF THE CONCERNS OF DEPENDENCY THEORY



Source: Raymond D. Duvall; "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Towards Precision of concept and Argument" in International Organization, vol. 32, N° 1 (1978) p. 70

The basic arguments that are offered in the dependency literature are arguments about the various causal or conditional relations among these sixteen core concepts, relations both within and between the four groups. Those within the groups are not represented in Figure 2 (1), but those between the groups of any real importance in the literature are represented by arrows in the figure. Each has a particular role in the overall literature referred to as dependency theory. Relations designated as of type A - those explaining or accounting for the several conceptual features of the export enclave syndrome - are largely taken or accepted as providing an historical background by theorists, and are not regarded as phenomena about which to theorize except to the extent that the features of the export enclave syndrome are weakened or reduced in a particular country.<sup>38</sup> Type B relations were the primary concern of Prebisch and ECLA scholars in partial reaction to whom the dependency theorists developed their early arguments.<sup>39</sup> These, then, can be viewed as basically pre-dependency

concerns; unfortunately, they tend overwhelmingly to be the focus of alledged efforts systematically to test dependency theory. Relations of type C were an important part of the reaction offered by dependentist as to ECLA arguments - constraints on and structural distortions of economic development according to the dependency literature, cannot be fundamentally and appreciably affected by alteration of the export enclave syndrome alone; rather the extent and forms of capitalist imperialist relations are determinative.

An early part of dependency theory, type C, relations continue today to be a central feature of that body of literature.<sup>40</sup> Type D relations are most generally associated with that variety of the literature attributable to A.G. Frank, Samir Amin and their colleagues.<sup>41</sup> As such they are not irrelevant to the dependency tradition but neither are they central to it. The reason, one would believe that neither type B nor type D relations are emphasized in dependency theory is that, consistent with what was said above about type A relations, features of the export enclave syndrome are largely accepted as historical givens, and hence, are variable contextual constraints more than theoretical "operators". Type E relations are the primary concern of contemporary dependency theory. They are an outgrowth and direct extension of the original concern with type C relations into the sphere of social political configurations and practices.<sup>42</sup> Finally, in completing the cycle, relations of type F have not yet been much discussed but they are now emerging as an important foci of attention in the dependency literature as concern grows for the ways in which political and governmental processes in peripheral countries can affect the structure of imperialist relations that condition and constrain them.<sup>43</sup>

According to this interpretation if a fruitful understanding of dependency theory is to occur, test models must develop terms primarily of type C and type E relations, using type B and type D relations to define relevant contextual constraints and type A relations to account for changes in those contextual features, thus; as far as this study is concerned, our test models should concentrate on the

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explanation of the structure and performance of the peripheral economy in terms of the extent and forms of capitalist penetration of it in the context of its changing export enclave syndrome and especially the explanation of the structure and performance of the peripheral state in terms of capitalist penetration and economic structure and processes. But before such models can be developed appropriately two additional features of dependency theory must be addressed, the issues of "history" and "context", which are clearly related to one another. However, it must be emphasized that the general notion of dependency subsumes several different theories including (i) dependencia which originated in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s and insists on the development of under development (ii) the centre-periphery analysis and (iii) the world-system analysis. But despite this typology which is based on the level of analysis and focus, the different theories could be further divided in the structuralist variant and the neo-marxist variant.

One must remark that a certain confusion has often been made with regards to the distinction between dependency in the structuralist and neo-Marxist theories of development.<sup>44</sup> While these two set of theories demonstrate a number of similarities at the analytic level, they, however, greatly differ in terms of their philosophical underpinnings and policy prescriptions. This justifies a separate treatment of these theories, which will be presented in turn.

Unlike, the neo-marxists, the structuralists analyze international economic relations between "centre" and "periphery" countries in terms of imperialism, dominance and dependency. According to two leading structuralist authors, Johan Galtung and Prebisch,<sup>45</sup> imperialism should be analyzed in terms of a structural relationship between the centre and periphery nations. Galtung defines imperialism as " ... a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interests and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest or conflict of interest".<sup>46</sup> As he sees it, the structural power of

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imperialism takes three main forms :-

1. "exploitation" (when one country gets much more out of the exchange than does the other).
2. "fragmentation" (contact with the outside world would be vertical, towards the centre, rather than horizontal, among the periphery countries);
3. "penetration" (of the dominant country into the countries to be dominated, through subversion).

A situation of imperialism, or dominance is characterized by a conjunction of all three factors in the relations between centre and periphery countries, The two basic mechanisms of imperialism are "vertical interaction" and "feudal interaction". If the "vertical interaction" relation is the major factor behind inequality, the "feudal interaction" structure is the factor that maintains and reinforces this inequality by protecting it. The economic consequences of this structure are two fold :

1. "Concentration on trade partners" (i.e. high levels of import concentration as well as export concentration in the periphery;
2. "Commodity concentration" (i.e. the tendency for periphery nations to have only one or very few primary products to export;

The combined effect of these two consequences is a dependency of the periphery on the centre.<sup>47</sup> This dependency which is basically an asymmetric relationship, can itself take two different forms :

dominant dependence, which represents the need of superior units to accumulate value from subordinate ones in order to meet their own aims...; and dominated dependency which is the periphery's position of being subordinated to and penetrated by the interests of other units controlling and accumulating value from it.<sup>48</sup>

Dependency thus defined is a main feature of the neo-colonial situation. Neo-colonialism is also characterized by less direct and identifiable types of control and dominance, as compared to the colonial period: "The control is less concrete: it is not physical presence, but a link; and this link takes the shape of international organizations."<sup>49</sup>

It is nevertheless, precisely in the analysis of the EEC's relationship of vertical interaction with 18 Associated states that one of Galtung's major works is based.<sup>50</sup>

It is basically, in their definition and conception of imperialism and dependency that the structuralist and Neo-Marxist theories differ most. We have seen above that the structuralists define imperialism fairly loosely, in terms of harmonious and conflicting relationships within a fragmented international system. Furthermore, while the neo-marxists give precedence to the economic explanatory variables in their analysis of imperialism, the structuralists are of the opinion that, "in order to talk about imperialisms, not only economic inequality but also political, military, communication, and cultural inequality should be distributed in an inegalitarian way with the periphery at the disadvantage".<sup>51</sup> In other words, the structuralists reject any simple causal relationship between the economic factor and imperialism. Galtung clarifies the point when he states that, "belief in a simple causal chain is dangerous because it is accompanied by the belief that imperialism can be dispensed with forever if the primary element in the chain is abolished, e.g. private capitalism."<sup>52</sup> It is this position that Galtung has adopted in his assessment of Lome I in which he considers this convention as much more "egalitarian" than was the case with the preceding Yaounde Conventions :

.... it looks as if exploitation is being reduced because the trade arrangements will facilitate the export of industrialized goods from ACP countries to EC; fragmentation is being reduced as evidenced by the joint negotiations; and marginalization of the rest of the world is also being reduced because of the possibility of concluding a favourable or more favourable agreements.<sup>53</sup>

This line of reasoning leads this author to assert that the Lome Convention Constitutes "a good basis for further development of local capitalism".<sup>54</sup> This potential for local capitalist development, leading to a presumably decreasing dependency of the periphery on the centre, is acknowledged by another author, Antola, who asserts that "at the same time as



the capitalist sector in the associated countries develops, the possibility of controlling the social and political development in a country by the community becomes weaker".<sup>55</sup>

It is on this point that the structuralist and Neo-Marxist theories are at variance. While the former consider the possibility of a reduction of dependency through the development of local capitalism, the latter, as we shall see now, are of the opinion that the maintenance of a capitalist structure can only lead to increased dependency and underdevelopment.

Karl Marx and Rosa Luexmburg, while still reasoning within the classical framework, based their analysis on a radically different premise. While the neo-classicals present the opening up of the national economy as an alternative, Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg posit that the development of foreign trade and the existence of a world market are conditions inherent in the development of the capitalist mode of production itself, from its inception. The nature of capitalism is such that it is inexorably led to develop its capitalist relations with the rest of the world. Karl Marx had called attention to this characteristic feature of the capitalist mode of production :

... the expansion of foreign trade, although the basis of the capitalist mode of production in its infancy, has become its own product, however, with the further progress of the capitalist mode of production, through the innate necessity of this mode of production, its need for an ever expanding market.<sup>56</sup>

This central role of the world market in the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production is based on the following economic analysis. It allows the realization of part of the surplus value embodied in the growing quantity of goods produced by the capitalist system. This last aspect is central to Rosa Luxemburg's theory of imperialism. According to this author, the new markets which capitalism needs, to realize this surplus value cannot be found within the capitalist system itself, but rather outside it. It can only be the consumers (peasants, craftsmen) of the non-capitalist, underdeveloped countries. In this way, the imperialist powers are

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led to increasingly compete overseas for access to new territories.<sup>57</sup>

Lenin gave a definition of imperialism which embodies five essential features :

imperialism is capitalism in the stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been completed.<sup>58</sup>

Thus , the transformation of competition into monopoly is central to Lenin's theory of imperialism. Furthermore, finance capital is seen by Lenin as the dominant form of capital in the era of imperialism. But more importantly for our purpose, the export of goods becomes predominant under modern capitalism. By exporting capital abroad to the "backward countries", the capitalists can increase their profits due to the particular conditions prevailing in these countries. "In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce; the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap".<sup>59</sup> In other words, for Lenin as for Rosa Luxemburg, the capitalist system needs to expand into the underdeveloped countries in order to maintain and develop itself, thus progressively and inexorably drawing these countries within its ambit in the process. It should be noted at this juncture that both Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin were aware of the phenomenon actually referred to as "neo-colonialism", and described it in unequivocal terms. For instance, both writers evoke the undisputed sway of financial power over what Lenin referred to as the "semi-colonial states". Thus, according to Lenin, "finance capital is .... such a decisive force in all economic and international relations, that it is capable of subordinating to itself even states enjoying complete political independence".<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, Rosa Luxemburg asserts that "foreign loans ... are yet the surest ties by which the old capitalist states maintain their influence, exercise financial control and exert pressure on customs, foreign and commercial policy of the young capitalist

Such a situation, these authors argue is inherent in the capitalist system itself. Thus while some authors are of the opinion that possibilities for autonomous capitalist development still exist in the periphery countries,<sup>64</sup> others advocate the complete withdrawal of these countries from the world capitalist system.<sup>65</sup> The latter see such a withdrawal as a prerequisite to the autonomous, self-centred, independent development of the periphery countries. However, all the "dependentistas" agree that ideally, the underdeveloped countries should aim at attaining a state of relative political autonomy and economic independence. Thus, the periphery states should create conditions which will enable them to maximize their control over the national economy and to pursue the development strategy of their choice. This, in essence, is the meaning of "economic independence ... namely, control over economic decision-making and the national economy, the establishment of a firm industrial structure, leading to a self-generating and self-sustaining growth and a diversification of external economic contacts consistent with the nation's economic interest".<sup>66</sup>

The neo-marxist view of the political economy of Third world external relations examines these relations, therefore, within the context of this school's analysis of international economic relations and the resulting contemporary international division of labour. Typically, the neo-marxist theory views the centre countries as producers of manufactured goods while the periphery countries are analysed as being essentially raw material producers and exporters. It is within the logic of the capitalist system that this type of division is maintained. But, as the process of monopoly concentration and "internationalization" of capital gains momentum, new types of international division of labour appear. But this time, the multinational corporation (MNC) has superseded the state as the main actor from the centre in international economic relations. According to this new international division of labour, labour-intensive, low-technology types of light manufacturing and even some heavy industries are 'abandoned' to the periphery countries, while the more capital-intensive,

high-technology and research-intensive types of industries remain the exclusive preserve of the more advanced centre countries. At this stage, it would seem more useful to look at the conditions for the existence of dependency in order to clarify certain assertions made above and to delineate certain theoretical assumptions.

The concept of dependency has a straight forward interpretation—"net reliance on each other." "As such, the concept suggests three conceptually clear-cut, if operationally difficult, conditions for its existence: size of the reliance relationship, importance of the good on which one relies, and the ease, availability, and cost of the replacement alternatives.

One of the difficulties of exploring the dependency model of international relations is that numerous definitions of the concept of dependency exists (at least implicitly), many with radically different implications for theory.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, one of the assumption, here, in arguing for the distinctions, offered below is that the generic term, "dependency" serves little useful analytic purpose. From the literature on dependency, one can abstract two predominant usages - : dependency as the absence of actor autonomy and dependency as a highly asymmetric form of interdependence. With respect to the former usage, one frequently hears of dependency as reflecting nonautonomous developmental possibilities (especially in the Latin American literature), as the lack of true independence from foreign or transnational influences or as the presence of a series of related domestic, external and transnational characteristics. These domestic and transnational features are sometimes referred to as "structural distortions", a term referring to the numerous ways that the local economy is structured to meet the needs of the foreign sector.

Thus, the lack of integration of various parts of the domestic economy due to the strong linkages between portions of the economy and foreign economies, the marginal status of displaced domestic groups, the growing gap between elites and

masses in the dependent country, are all examples of such distortions. When dependency is used in this sense, the meaning is clearly one that is distant from our more conventional usage of that term in which dependency is taken to signal some form of external reliance. Although additional complications could be introduced for the purpose of this study we rest with dependency as involving the absence of autonomy, particularly, but not solely, with respect to developmental goals.

While there are substantial disagreements within the school as well as significant differences of emphasis, modifications and refinements of interpreted positions, the following simplified basic tenets of the school can generally be agreed upon :

1. Developing states are dependent on the capitalist world of technology, capital, finance and monetary systems, and for trade. This is because the capitalist world has a virtual monopoly over the "means of production".
2. Dependency and monopoly mean control and exploitation. "All countries named as underdeveloped in the world are exploited by others and the underdevelopment with which the world is now pre-occupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonial exploration".<sup>86</sup>
3. This dependency relationship is the product of the incorporation of the developing states into the capitalist system. Incorporation started way back in the seventeenth century and was completed, in three or four stages, or by the opening decade of the twentieth century.<sup>69</sup>
4. Incorporation resulted, under the aegis of imperialism and colonialism, in the disarticulation of transport as roads and railways were build not for the integration of the colonial country's economy, but to facilitate exportation of raw materials to the capitalist core-Europe - and to bring manufactures from the capitalist core - the developing world (colonial territories). Incorporation also resulted in the disarticulation of export commodities; developing states

acquiring a monocultural economy or relying on a few export commodities for foreign exchange and development funds. Similar in consequence of the imports of manufactures from the core to the periphery, incorporation resulted in the disarticulation of the manufacturing sector of the African states. Incorporation also encouraged monopolistic tendencies, ultimately leading to the emergence of multinational corporations with headquarters at the core whose dominance and control of disarticulation and monopolistic tendencies led to the segmentation of the economy of the periphery. This is reflected in the fact that there is little or no interconnection among the productive sectors while the economies of the periphery became orientated towards the core, developed technological inequalities vis-a-vis the core and came under greater institutional control of the multinationals.<sup>70</sup>

According to dependency scholars underdevelopment was and still is generated by the exploitations attendant upon the incorporation of developing states into the world capitalist system via imperialism and colonialism. It can only be understood as an aspect of imperialism past, present and future. This explains why the political Kingdom which Kwame Nkrumah thought would lead to economic freedom and development has proved to be a pious hope. For him, the "essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside".<sup>71</sup> Neo-colonialism is an intrinsic aspect of dependency theory. But dependency goes beyond neo-colonialism to show how class formation and consciousness are shaped by the incorporation of a segment of the periphery into the global capitalist economy.

The nature of incorporation of African states' economy into the global capitalist system results in new class formation, class consciousness and class struggles. To the wealthy classes which had survived from the colonial times or which were created under colonialism, a new class is added. This is the petit-bourgeoisie and the educated salary earners created by new economic activities-overseas trade, commerce,

teaching, mining, cash crop production, public service. In time these become the national bourgeoisie who resist colonialism and inherit state power at independence. They are, however, a derived middle class because they do not own the means of production, but are rather "comprador elements" - the intermediaries between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the local economy. There is yet another class. It comprises the relatively recent class of urban factory workers under colonialism as well as those such as peasants and craftsmen engaged in traditional occupations. Together, these might be labelled the proletarian class. In marxist terms, a dual contradiction and dual class struggle arise from this class structure. On the one hand the contradiction between the metropolitan international bourgeoisie who own the means of production and the comprador national bourgeoisie results in a class struggle as the latter seeks to overthrow the former and acquire for itself control over the means of production. This aspect of the struggle was reflected symbolically in the struggle for independence and, since then, in the struggle for what is now termed a New International Economic Order (NIEO). On the other hand there is a contradiction and struggle within each peripheral country - the national bourgeoisie and governing class - the segment of the population most integrated into the world economy - is pitched against the national proletariat, the urban workers and peasants who are only marginally integrated if they are integrated at all into the global economy.

The class structures and class struggles attendant upon incorporation make developing states, like alcoholics and drug addicts, literally "hooked", to borrow Tony Smith's analogy. "They cannot exist without their dependency, but they also cannot exist with it."<sup>72</sup> They cannot develop with their dependency because their vertical link into the global system inhibits their industrialization beyond limited import-substitution industries. The economy is largely relegated to the less dynamic forms of growth associated with agriculture and extractive industries. But they cannot do without their extractive industries. But they also cannot do without their dependent status because the national bourgeoisie and

the proletariat of their countries makes it impossible to mobilize the latter for a revolution against international bourgeoisie. "Economic stagnation and desperate poverty deprive the governing classes of the Third World of the chance of maintaining even a veneer of legitimacy: Only their vertical links with the bourgeoisie of the capitalist core sustain what little legitimacy they have."<sup>73</sup> This explains the importance of economic and military aid, the penchant for allowing foreign military bases and foreign troops in developing states and the frequent military intervention by the core states in order to maintain puppet regimes in power. There are sanctions (what Richard Olson calls "Invisible blockade")<sup>74</sup> brought against any governing class which chooses to transgress to the basic rules of the game. The core states simply agree among themselves on a policy to bring the recalcitrant peripheral governing class to order. The subtle economic weapons at their disposal include "declines in investment, either in new funds or for expansion; delays in the delivery of spare parts and in other areas of trade; snags in licensing or other technology transfers; dwindling bilateral and multilateral loans and grants, refusal to refinance existing debts; drying up or outright elimination of credit lines."<sup>75</sup> Ghana, in the last years of Nkrumah's rule (1963-65) and under Busia (1968-71) faced some of these sanctions which, in each case, led to military coups against the regime.<sup>76</sup> The Third World governing classes, as Tony Smith correctly paraphrases the dependency position have

Structured their domestic rule on a formal coalition of interests favourable to the international connection .... The basic needs of the international order must therefore be respected if this system is to continue to provide services that the local elites needs in order to perpetuate their rule in their turn. Thus despite the fact that the governing classes of the periphery are in a struggle against the governing classes of the capitalist core, the interest of the two classes coincide in some respects, and the two classes are, in effect, in alliance. In the course of time a symbiotic or patron-client relationship has developed, in which they system has created its servants whose needs dictate that its survival be ensured whatever the short-term conflicts of interest might be.<sup>77</sup>



In sum, as Ake put it, the ruling classes in the developing states are an integral part of the structure of imperialism and the syndrome of neo-colonial exploitation.<sup>78</sup>

Therefore, one way of expressing the developing states poverty and underdevelopment relative to the rests of the world is to say that the developing states are at the bottom of the international economic order. Ali Mazrui,<sup>79</sup> has likened the international economic system to a caste system in which heredity (race), rigid and permanent separation (geographical, social and physical factors), and a division of labour (primary producers versus secondary and tertiary producers) produce a hierarchy determining ranks and status. The white race, generally concentrated in the northern hemisphere, by a hierarchical division of labour continues along the path of industrial and post - industrial development. They may be termed the upper caste. The black race in Africa is by contrast, "the hewers of wood and drawers of water" in the hierarchical division of labour. Economic and technological disabilities condemn Africans to a permanent position as the lower caste. One might add a middle caste-the "yellow" races of Asia and Latin America. Without necessarily accepting the implicit assumption of economic and technological disabilities based on race and the implied fatalism of a permanent lower caste position with no hope for upward mobility, Mazrui's analogy is basically a valid description of Africa's contemporary place in the international economic system.

Until quite recently, the dependency theorists were unanimous in their assessment of the developmental implications of the incorporation of the periphery into the capitalist core as all agreed that there cannot be development in the peripheral capitalist states. But the implicit counsel of despair in this verdict together with the evidence that some countries that were once peripheral capitalist states have developed successfully and that "as a general rule the countries most integrated into the world economy have tended to grow more quickly over a longer period than those that are not",<sup>80</sup> have all led to a division between the orthodox dependency scholars

(especially those of the neo-marxist variety)<sup>81</sup> and those who (like this author) now see possibilities, albeit limited, of development in some but by no means all peripheral capitalist states. This group is made up of most centre-periphery and world-systems analyses scholars of the structuralist variety)<sup>82</sup>. The specific question which should logically follow - which kind of countries, and under what conditions, can develop? - is hardly ever asked. Rather attention is focused on the more practical and general issues of what to *do* in order to liquidate dependency and achieve development. On this question there appears to be a consensus - there must be reorientation of production. Generally a reorientation of production is deemed to involve two inter-related ideas, namely self-reliance and socialism.

Self-reliance is defined as a deliberate process or strategy for ending dependency and promoting development. Biersteker<sup>83</sup> has shown it to have three analytically distinct components. The first is a partial disengagement of the economy from its traditional pattern of relations with the international system. This is accomplished primarily by a policy which reduces the proportion of trade, investment and monetary/technical assistance and transactions with the capitalist core, while attaining self-sufficiency in basic needs such as food, clothing, energy and national defence. The second component of self-reliance is the restructuring of the pattern of relationships with the international system. This is done partly through, "collective self-reliance", that is, through increased trade, investment, monetary/technical transactions, and the development of politico-economic cooperative institutions and relations with other Third World countries. It is partly achievable through deliberate fiscal, monetary and income policies that alter consumer values and consumption patterns, engender decentralization for maximum mass participation, and restructures the existing domestic class relations. The third and final component of self-reliance is reassociation with the international system on changed basis. Clearly, self-reliance does not mean autarchy, that is, exercising one's absolute sovereignty in such a way as to cut off all

intercourse, trade, borrowing of capital, skill and technology with the rest of the world, in short isolationism par excellence. But it does not mean using simpler home-made technology to manufacture purely for the domestic market or the markets of other underdeveloped countries.<sup>84</sup> It is a strategy which requires mass markets for less sophisticated goods. Such markets can only be recreated by a radical redistribution of purchasing power which in turn requires a different kind of political leadership. In short it implies radical social changes at the periphery.

It is in its call for radical redistribution of purchasing power that self-reliance can be seen as the other side of the socialist coin. Socialism not merely aims to redistribute purchasing power radically, it revolutionizes the social relations of production by placing ownership of the means of production in the hands of the workers and thus ending exploitative relations of production: The internal linkages of Africa's incorporation into the global capitalist system provide the dynamics which result in socialism. Ake argues that :

The global struggle will exacerbate and radicalize the major contradiction in the relations of production of the African nations, the contradiction between the African bourgeoisie and the African proletariat, and by so doing hasten and effect its resolution in the form of a socialist revolution. By maintaining dependence, which lies behind Africa's underdevelopment, the African bourgeoisie deepens and radicalizes the contradictions in existing relations of production and hence promotes its own revolutionary liquidation.<sup>85</sup>

Self-reliance through socialism, therefore, is seen as a solution to dependency and underdevelopment.

#### 2.4 : CRITICISMS OF THE DEPENDENCY PARADIGM

The dependency paradigm is widely acclaimed for its contribution to our understanding of the mechanism of poverty and underdevelopment as well as its consequences on the external relations of the developing state. It alerts us to the complexity and intensity of the interaction between the centre and the periphery of the global capitalist system, the impact

on the internal dynamic of change and development in the periphery and, thus the nature of its politics. It clearly reveals how external factors shape domestic segmentation in the structure of production and block broad social transformation and economic development. However, despite the acknowledged contribution to our understanding of the mechanisms of poverty and underdevelopment, the dependency school has been criticized on several grounds.

First it has been criticized for its circular reasoning (the chicken or egg argument) and what Gerald Helleiner has termed "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness".<sup>86</sup> The circular reasoning argument is based on the problematic question of explaining the relationship between underdevelopment and material base for development. Are African states dependent because of their small size, their extreme poverty, their limited power in international markets and international resource organizations or vice versa? In other words are they dependent because they are underdeveloped or are they underdeveloped because they are dependent? Jinadu has rightly observed that "while it is argued that it is the paucity of capital that makes capitalist penetration and hence underdevelopment possible, it is also usually argued that paucity of capital is due to capitalist penetration and underdevelopment" and it is not clear whether "neo-colonial dependence results in underdevelopment or underdevelopment ... leads to neo-colonial dependence".<sup>87</sup> A related problem is whether dependency as a structural phenomenon and as a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence "adds anything to one's understanding of the Third World's essential dilemma of poverty and powerlessness." As Helleiner puts the case, "if dependency is defined as a state in which developmental experience is substantially affected by developments in the metropolises of the international (capitalist) economy, then it is little more than a synonym for "development" ... and calling upon developing states to reduce their "dependence amounts, then, to advising them to give up their poverty and/or powerlessness".<sup>88</sup> But even more fundamental is the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". For example, underdevelopment.

is seen to proceed with a certain inevitability unless and until state power becomes vested in an "independent" class or group. But when one a "progressive" or independent government comes to power, the advice about breaking dependency no longer seem as pernicious and can be permitted, provided the regime shows an "attitude of mind" reflective of its wish to be self-reliant. Thus the concept of an "independent regime" and what constitutes "breaking dependency" becomes subjective. Tanzania, for example, whose dependency on exports and foreign finance is as great today as it was before its declaration of socialism and self-reliance as a policy-goal in 1967 is thus seen to be less dependent than, say, the Ivory Coast, a country equally dependent but whose leaders have not self-consciously proclaimed a self-reliant policy.<sup>89</sup>

Closely related to this argument is the criticism that dependency is too theoretical and abstract<sup>90</sup> while some of its theoretically logical conclusions are empirically unsubstantiated and of dubious validity. In particular it ignores praxis (the unity of theory and practice) it exaggerates the "all-pervasive and self-perpetuating character" of the core capitalist power with respect to the periphery, reducing virtually everything that happens in the developing state to a capitalist conspiracy. It thus ignores the relative autonomy of the peripheral state as well as the integrity, specificity and particularity of its local history which is independent of its membership in the global whole.<sup>91</sup> Because of these failings, a product of proclivity to "totalize" in order to see the tyranny of the totality over the parts, dependency theory is almost totally irrelevant to the critical question of how a particular developing state might go about liquidating its underdevelopment. Dependency does no more than indicate what global obstacles must be overcome in order to obliterate underdevelopment. But how? This leads us to the final criticism of the dependency theory - its advocacy of a revolutionary break with the global capitalist system.

One aspect of the revolutionary break, self-reliance, is a logical impossibility and a call for suicide if it means autarchy. Fortunately it does not. But its definition as selective disengagement is a contradiction in terms, self-

defeating and practically impossible of attainment. This is in part because of the very structural constraints of the international system which the theory identifies and in part because of the nature and weakness of the national bourgeoisie, the only class capable technically and culturally of gaining and exercising power in the foreseeable future. Biersteker and Ojo<sup>92</sup> have discussed the elusiveness of self-reliance in the Tanzanian and Nigerian experiences. If anything, selective self-reliance appears to deepen dependency and incidentally underdevelopment, providing a mere cloak for dividing spheres of interest between the national bourgeoisie and the metropolitan capitalists without coming to open conflict. Indigenization, an aspect of selective disengagement, has for instance, merely expanded the size of the respective national bourgeoisies in the countries practising it while rationalizing the relationship between this bourgeois class and its patron, international capitalism, in a manner that tempers the inherent conflict between them. As Ake observes in respect of Nigeria's indigenization :

The (indigenization) decree limits the chances of conflict by a clearer demarcation of spheres. It reserves a sphere of influence for Nigeria's marginal capitalists, and international capitalism is to refrain from interfering in this sphere. Such restraint is clearly necessary to contrain the potentially dangerous economic nationalism of the petty bourgeoisie (Indigenization) integrates the Nigerian bourgeoisie with international capitalism by involving them in business partnerships to a greater degree than ever before<sup>93</sup>

In any case drastic reduction or elimination of foreign aid, technical assistance, engineering and management contracts (which a truly self-reliant strategy calls for) would cause a sharp drop in living standards precipitating a revolution against the bourgeoisie. Undrestandably the latter refuses to commit suicide. Immanuel Wallerstein's conclusion, in an early theoretical discourse is inescapable; self-reliant development is a "myth"<sup>94</sup>

There are similar difficulties with the other strand of the revolutionary break or radical reorientation of production-socialism. It has been said that a socialist revolution is

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not logically deducible from dependency theory itself or from its view of the inherent capacity of capitalism to bring about a transformation of the economy.<sup>95</sup> The one exception—Claude Ake's Revolutionary Pressures in Africa — which attempts a theoretical link between dependency and socialist revolutionary situation contains logical inconsistencies. For, to the extent that the national bourgeoisie is structurally linked to the powerful international bourgeoisie, and to the extent that the global system is an indivisible whole, the national proletarian revolution will be impossible. The logic of the structure alliance points, rather, to a global socialist revolution in which proletarians of all nations unite against the combined forces of a national/international bourgeoisie. This is why Wallerstein observed that true socialism when it occurs, will be world-wide.<sup>98</sup> But he adds that this is not possible for at least a century or two, a reality with which the erstwhile communist International — which also aimed at a global socialist revolution — has had to come to terms. But even if a national proletarian revolution were logically deducible from the dependency theory, there would still be the question of its practical feasibility. The hostility of the international bourgeoisie, who would naturally oppose such a challenge to the existing structure, is only one aspect of the problem. Dependency theorists themselves acknowledge that the international structure has so locked Third World countries into the capitalist system that nothing appears capable of changing it.<sup>97</sup>

More basic is the question of the revolutionary consciousness and potential of the national proletariat. Hyden has argued that there are no social forces to carry through socialist transformation.<sup>98</sup> Peasants cannot do the job. Other writers, such as Langdon, Leys and Martin<sup>99</sup> do not believe that the urban proletariat has much revolutionary potential either. This probably explains why attempts at socialist transformation have failed in many countries. Where there has been some initial successes these countries have had a leadership that has been nurtured in a colonial

revolutionary struggle that is not replicable else where on the continent. And the ability even of this leadership to follow a socialist revolution through to the end is becoming increasingly doubtful. Some countries, like Tanzania, have succeeded in socializing distribution but not production while others have merely brought about state capitalism which is dubbed "socialism". But the fundamental problem for most developing states is that there is often little or nothing to socialize and insufficient honest, efficient and nationalistic technicians and administrators to make socialism economic. Hence one cannot socialize poverty. Frederick Cooper has observed that "little capital formation can come from a peasantry that is both poor and uncaptured,"<sup>100</sup> while René Domont and Jean François Bayart wonder how there can be socialism in the face of corruption, opulence and reliance on foreign skill and technology.<sup>101</sup> Another way of stating the case in Marxist terms is to say that the existing capitalist mode of production and, therefore, forces of production have not developed to the state where it is possible to talk concretely of their being ripe for transformation.

Given the foregoing arguments, Colin Leys' verdict appears inescapable: "it would be dogmatic and mechanical to assert that neo-colonialism and underdevelopment must inevitably lead to revolutionary change as a result of inevitable social and economic crisis".<sup>102</sup> Indeed, Ake himself, in his more recent A Political Economy of Africa, has soft-pedalled on revolutionary socialist change. He now argues that, "the state of productive forces in Africa threatens to turn socialism into a caricature even with the best intentions... We must avoid the common error of seeing socialist revolution as the panacea for the problems of Africa, including underdevelopment."<sup>103</sup> The path to socialist transformation is strewn with numerous obstacles, not the least of which is the power of the state which is weak in relation to states of the capitalist core, but which is strong relative to the domestic society. Ake concludes that "the present state of economic stagnation will continue, deepening class contradictions and causing governmental instability but not necessarily sparking



off (socialist) revolution in the foreseeable future... Facism—that is the reality staring us in the face in much of Africa".<sup>104</sup>

There appears to be a consensus that neither domestic nor international capital can, separately or conjointly, bring about a capitalist transformation in the developing state. The present governing classes are incapable of engineering such a fundamental transformation, for to do so would amount to political suicide, nor will the international structure permit such a transformation. In lieu of such changes African leaders often adopt such radical slogans to which they pay lip-service to appease the masses, but eschew real changes in the structure of production. In the end, as Leys puts it, what happens is that "a new industrial enclave is established in the economy," but without any tendency to set in motions chain reaction of investment and employment which will eventually make it burst out of the enclave and transform the economy as a whole. On the contrary the society (is) "locked into" its subordinate role in the international capitalist system by new means".<sup>105</sup> Indeed empirical studies, notably of Kenya and the Ivory Coast, have shown that despite the existence of local classes of accumulating capitalists, capitalist transformation has proved elusive. "These capitalists merely reproduce multinational dependent industrialization with its limited spread effects and linkages (while) structural relationships within the economy generate foreign exchange crises as investment accelerates and chokes off on-going capital accumulation".<sup>106</sup> There also appears to be an emerging consensus that despite the general implications of dependency theory for development there can be pockets of development, but it will be a dependent, as opposed to independent or self-reliant, development. Langdon's empirical studies<sup>107</sup> have shown increasing numbers of a local class of accumulating capitalists capable of bringing about multinational dependent industrialization. Immanuel Wallerstein<sup>108</sup> for his part has argued that transformation is marginally possible under limited conditions which are available to a few peripheral states at different times but not to all peripheral states at the same time.

The pockets of development may be seen as products of two factors: hierarchy of capitalist interests, and product life cycle. The first argues that in the Third World in general and Africa in particular the core capitalist states have varying interests in the various regions depending on the strategic and economic values of the areas. The greater the value, the higher the core state's interest in preventing the growth of strong politico-economic systems independent of capitalist hegemony. In Africa, Southern Africa is clearly the most important region, followed by countries and regions that have strategic mineral resources such as Zaire and Nigeria, or which are strategically situated such as Kenya and the Horn of Africa. Such priority regions have larger quantities of resources, particularly capital and technology, transferred to them, and such transfers are enough to permit modest dependent capitalist development. They are, so to speak, "allowed to develop" but their development is by invitation only. A second and closely related factor explaining pockets of development in Africa and the Third World is what is termed the product life cycle theory. According to this theory, a product is at first produced at the metropole and sold there. Later it is produced at the centre (metropole) but sold at the periphery. Later still, when its technology has become routinized, the uncertainties are small and savings from cheap labour are immense, the product is produced at the periphery and sold there. Savings from labour are immense because wages are kept low, and additional profits are made in the inflated prices of parts which must be imported from abroad and in the inflated costs of the accompanying technology in the form of technical experts, patents, etc. Because of the imported inputs the production lacks the multiplier effect, the forward and backward linkages that spur self-reliant development. It is this kind of dependent development that has taken place in Brazil, and which is beginning to occur in pockets in Africa. <sup>109</sup>

The preceding propositions have far-reaching implications for development strategies and foreign policies of developing states. Interm of foreign policy, African states find

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themselves in a situation where they have constantly to pressure the capitalist core to transfer larger quantities of resources to the Third World to spur development there. Basically this is what the so-called North-South dialogue over a New International Economic Order (NIEO) is all about.

## 2:5 : NORTH - SOUTH DIALOGUE

North-South dialogue is a term that has gained currency since the early 1970s to describe the discussions, negotiations and confrontations between the underdeveloped countries (south) and the industrialized World (North) over the former's demand for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Although NIEO is itself a new term which came into existence during the sixth special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, its essential concerns have deeper roots within and outside the United Nations fora. It is, in a sense, a formal comprehensive and systematic articulation of those fears, desires and demands of the underdeveloped countries (in respect of their place in the global economic system) which have increasingly come to the fore since the realization that political independence did not necessarily bring with it economic development. NIEO seeks the restructuring of international trade with a view to shifting the terms of trade in favour of the Third World countries. It seeks to promote processing and manufacturing in the Third World and to secure a guaranteed market for some of the products. Above all NIEO seeks the transference of real resources to the Third World via indexing, technical assistance and technology transfer. The strategy employed for the realization of the goals of NIEO is multifarious. There is, first, pure dialogue in the form of exchange of views and proposals and issuing communiqués at summit conferences such as occurred in Cancun, Mexico in 1981. Secondly, there are strict negotiations of the conference type of diplomacy. This is the kind of diplomacy characteristic of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where the Group of 77 - the underdeveloped countries-confront and reach agreements with the industrialized countries on favourable economic packages.<sup>110</sup> It is the kind of diplomatic negotiations involved in the

EEC agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, known as the Lomé Conventions.<sup>111</sup> The agreements established a scheme for stabilizing the underdeveloped countries' export earnings (Stabex), similar scheme for mineral product earnings (the so-called "son of stabex") and a foreign aid package.

A third strategy is the type characteristic of trade unionist activism, leading labour unions and the management to engage in collective bargaining over better working conditions and better production returns. Elements of this are found in UNCTAD where the Group of 77 can be said to engage in collective bargaining with the industrialized capitalist core which owns the means of production and may thus be seen as the "management" or the employer. But the trade union strategy goes beyond collective bargaining to outright confrontations where the underdeveloped countries use the threat of withholding their natural resources as weapons to extract political and economic concessions from the industrialized core. This is the strategy of OPEC. It is the strategy being urged upon other international resource organizations such as the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), the International Tin Council (ITC), the Association of Iron-ore Exporting Countries (AIOEC), the International Bauxite Association (IBA) and the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UBEC). However, several difficulties stand in the way and the success of OPEC has not been easy to reproduce.<sup>112</sup> The Non-Aligned Movement has, since the 1970s, shifted its concerns and strategy from keeping out of military alliances and ideological issues and securing as much foreign aid as possible. Now the Movement consciously utilizes its natural resources and its increasing organizational size to extract economic concessions or, as in its support of African Liberation movements, as a political lever.<sup>113</sup> There is, finally, the strategy of collective self-reliance in the North-South Dialogue over NIEO. This is the so-called South-South linkage involving increased trade, aid and, where possible, economic cooperation and integration among underdeveloped countries.

The achievements of the North-South dialogue have been little more than window-dressing. It could hardly be otherwise, given the nature of interests involved. The North is unlikely to yield more than marginally to the South partly because its nationalism and racism "are unlikely to tolerate what must look like a reckless generosity towards real or potential enemies" and partly because its imperialist competitions "lead to immense expenditure on armaments", leaving a mere pittance to be transferred to the South.<sup>114</sup> And yet the South lacks the power to force the hands of the North because it lacks productive resources or the instruments of labour. Even the vaunted OPEC depends entirely on the North's technology to drill oil in the first place. And since the North has a monopoly on this technology it is "able to redeem the petrodollars and to pass on the burden of OPEC's price hike to the (South) countries as import inflation".<sup>115</sup> There is, in addition, a conflict of nationalisms in the South which the North exploits in a divide-and-rule fashion to further weaken Southern power. Immediate national self-interests often conflict with long-term group interests, resulting in conflicting stands and policies over specific economic and political issues. Apart from its implications for foreign policy, the dependency analysis of the developing state's place in the global economy here also has practical and theoretical implications for realistic development strategies. The analysis suggests that in the foreseeable future only modest reform is possible in the developing state. As we have noted, neither the international capitalists nor the national bourgeoisie wants to see radical transformations in which obviously, they would have much to lose. This is why, as Ake has argued, both sides have elevated the concept of development into an ideology with the slogan "partnership in development". This ideology creates the illusion of an identity of interest in change which masks their objective interest in the status quo.<sup>116</sup> But because of economic pressures from the masses, some changes would have to be made.

How much change or reform is possible depends largely on the national bourgeoisie, on the organization of the state

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and on the skill and sophistication with which the national bourgeoisie uses the state to overcome political and technical problems involved in achieving development<sup>117</sup>. In this context, the relative autonomy of the developing state gives the leadership considerable leeway even within the constraints of dependency. Accordingly, law, for example could be harnessed to change behaviour for, after all "any social formation is at bottom a product of the way people behave and development must involve change in behaviour"<sup>118</sup>. Alternatively bureaucratic changes and policy shifts could be employed to foster a better redistribution of domestic resources, to ameliorate the harsh lives of some peasants and urban workers, or to curtail the privileges of foreign and local capitalists; in short to reduce mass poverty. Such reforms of a redistributive kind are perhaps the best that are realistically feasible, given the pessimistic outlook of the dependency perspective with its unenviable choices that it leaves the developing countries. If transforming the capitalist mode of production is not as yet practicable, we should then perhaps welcome its reform in the direction of redistribution. The alternative to this would be total paralysis, if not decay.<sup>119</sup> If reform of a redistributive kind is the best that is realistically feasible then theories of dependency, in addition to analyzing general causes and prescribing general and unrealistic solutions of underdevelopment, must also engage in finding ways of overcoming particular instances of underdevelopment in order to bring about immediate and practical development. Such a theory would entail combining the perspectives of the dependency school with the insights of the neo-classical theorists of the interdependence school - to continue their views on alternative rural development strategies, industrial policy choices, ways of shaping redistribution so as to reach specific groups, and what the alternatives are to reliance on foreign capital, technology and markets. Such a synthesis of elements of the two perspectives was the direction Langdon and others urged the Africanists that gathered at the 1981 Conference of the African studies Association in Bloomington, Indiana, USA, to pursue.<sup>120</sup> It is as yet too early to see what theoretical progress has been or can be made in this direction and what its implications

will be for political practice. As a contribution towards such progress, we shall now turn to the dependency-Linkage model which constitutes the conceptual framework of our study.

## 2.6 : THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING STATE

The dependency theory appears to be more appropriate for our study. This conclusion has been reached because given our problem of research, dependency analysis appears to be of those models which emphasizes economic factors as being decisive in shaping the kind of relationship and/or behaviour (and as such foreign policy) a developing state might have in its external environment. Secondly dependency analysis contrary to the liberal theory better attempts to explain the reasons for the continued state of material underdevelopment in which the developing state finds itself inspite of years of formal and informal political and economic relations with the centre countries. Thirdly, the dependency model analyzes the problems involved in our research problem from the developing state's perspective and in terms of the developing state's needs and interests. Hence, the model approximates the value orientation of the indigenous peoples and it is thereby more suitable for our purpose. Yet it is important to note that this theory too has many serious limitations which have been pointed out above .

Among these limitations, we pointed out that the most important relates to prescription. Dependency theory is not precise (specific) on how best the peripheral states could remedy their perennial situation of underdevelopment and how these states can achieve their real national objectives. In an attempt to overcome these shortcomings, this study, demonstrates in what follows that dependency, contrary to the claims of rigorous empiricists, can be subject to empirical test and measurement and that its prescriptive capacity can be ameliorated through its integration into the linkage theory as proposed by James N. Rosenau<sup>121</sup>.

However, in order to adapt dependency theory to the study of the foreign policy of the developing state, it could

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easily be integrated into the linkage theory. In this context, it could be assumed that the overlap of the economic system and foreign policy system in the developing state embraces the analysis of those situations in which the recurrent sequences of behaviour that originate in the internal environment and are reacted in the international environment constitute a reflex reaction to the developmental direction of the economic system which is decisively determined by the dependency of the developing state on its external environment. This conception of the relationship between economic development and foreign policy implies that because of these recurrent sequences of behaviour that originate from one and terminate on the other side of the boundary between the economic system and foreign policy system, there is an interpenetration between the domestic and external environments of the developing state.

Thus according to the dependency-Linkage Matrix (which constitutes the conceptual framework of our study) the purpose of conceptualizing and studying a nation's actions is basically that of identifying points of convergence between economic policies (domestic and external) and foreign policy behaviour and the nature and scope of the phenomena that lie within the area of Linkage. From a political economy perspective, it amounts to the fact that foreign policy behaviour can be, considered as an instrument of exchange - a point of view which has been articulately defended by Richardson et al.<sup>122</sup> This political component of the exchange can be regarded as behavioural "compliance" on the part of the dependencies - that is behaviour that accedes to the wishes of others.<sup>123</sup> In the present context, the proposition of interests holds that dependencies exhibit foreign policy compliance with the preferences of dominant countries<sup>124</sup>

Since the boundary is crossed by processes of perception and emulation as well as by direct interaction, allowance is made for continuous and intermittent sequences. Hence the use of linkage in the way James N. Rosenau has defined it, that is, "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates



in one system and is reacted to in another".<sup>125</sup> In order to distinguish between the initial and terminal states of an economic system-foreign policy linkage we shall refer to the former as an input and to the latter as an output. Each of these, in turn will be classified in terms of whether they occur in the developing state's national system or its external environment (i.e. the international system). Thus, foreign policy outputs are defined as those sequences of behaviour that are a product of the economic system of the developing state and that either culminate in or are sustained by its environment, whereas environmental inputs are considered to be behavioural patterns that start in the external environment of the developing state's national system and that are either sustained or terminated within its economic system. On the other hand national system outputs are those behavioural sequences within the system to which economic inputs give rise.<sup>126</sup>

Conceptual clarity here also requires distinguishing outputs and inputs in terms of their purposefulness. Some outputs conventionally called foreign policy are designed to bring about responses in other systems. These we shall call either direct policy output or direct environmental outputs depending on whether the intentional behaviour was designated by a national system for its environment or vice-versa.<sup>127</sup> Yet there are a host of other patterns of behaviour within the national system or its environment that are not designed to evoke boundary-crossing responses but that nevertheless do so through perceptual or emulative processes. Inter-African conflicts that provoke economic reactions within the national system exemplify outputs of this latter kind, which we shall either call indirect systems outputs or indirect environmental outputs depending on the locus of their origin. A similar line of reasoning results in four types of inputs and the corresponding labels of direct systems inputs, indirect systems inputs, direct environmental inputs and indirect environmental inputs.<sup>128</sup>

Another important stage in the elaboration of our economic development-foreign policy dependency model concerns the way in which outputs and inputs are linked together. Three basic types of linkage processes are identified - the penetrative, the reactive and the emulative. A Penetrative Process occurs when members of one economic system serve as participants in the foreign policy processes of another. That is, they share with those in the penetrated system the authority to allocate its foreign policy values. The activities of transnational economic bodies are perhaps the most clear cut example of a penetrative process. Such transnational bodies include among others foreign aid missions, the staffs of international organizations, the representatives of private multinational corporations, workers of some humanitarian transnational bodies, and a variety of other actors which establish linkages through such a process.<sup>129</sup>

A reactive process is the contrary of a penetrative process. It is brought into being by recurrent and similar boundary-crossing reactions rather than by the sharing of authority. The actors who initiate the outputs do not participate in the allocative activities of those who experience the inputs but the behaviour of the latter is nevertheless a response to the behaviour undertaken by the former. Such reactive processes are probably the most frequent form of linkage, since they arise out of a combination of both direct and indirect outputs to their corresponding inputs. Recurrent reactions to a foreign aid programme illustrate a reactive process involving direct outputs and inputs, whereas the execution of a project in Cameroon corresponding to electoral trends in France exemplifies a reactive process stemming from indirect outputs and inputs.<sup>130</sup>

The third type of linkage process is a special form of the reactive type. An emulative process is established when the input is not only a response to the output but takes essentially the same form as the output. It corresponds to the so-called "diffusion" or "demonstration" effect whereby economic activities in one country are perceived and emulated

in another. The postwar spread of colonial violence, nationalism and aspirations to rapid industrialization and development are but the more striking instances of linkages established through emulative processes. Since the emulated behaviour is ordinarily undertaken independent of those who emulate it, emulative processes usually link only indirect outputs and inputs.<sup>131</sup>

Several aspects of this model require emphasis and elaboration. In the first place, it should be noted that most of our terminology has been deliberately chosen from dependency and systems theories.<sup>132</sup> Thus in order to stay out of the conceptual constraints of both theories we have proposed fully employed definitions and terminology that are identified with both structural theory and economics. Thus the concept of linkages formed out of outputs and inputs appears not only neutral and easily grasped but suitable for foreign policy and economic development analyses. Furthermore, the concept is explanatory with respect to the question of whether the growing overlap of the domestic and external environments in the developing state represents a subtle process of integration with the contemporary global system or that of domination and confrontation. The developing state is becoming more and more dependent on its environment in the sense that what transpires at home unfolds differently abroad and in most cases, to the detriment of the home system. However, this dependency may or may not always be detrimental. The so-called "New Industrialized countries (NICs) are a case in point. Hence, in order to avoid the ambiguous evaluations that have often been implicit in the notions of interdependence and dependency, we have opted within the scope of this model for the less elegant but more neutral and englobing model of asymmetrical linkages.<sup>133</sup>

One advantage of giving such a scope to our model is that it neither denies nor exaggerates the relevance of national boundaries (domestic economic development) in the outcomes of foreign policy in the developing state. While it is tempting to categorically assert that the dependency of

the developing state has fused its domestic and external environments, it is also tempting to isolate both environments in analyses and not to study the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of their linkages. Many political communities in the developed world still occur solely within the boundaries of a single national system and cannot be understood without reference to the existence and character of the boundaries.

If transnational politics are a long way from supplanting national politics in the developed world, then the Third World may, on the contrary be passing through a paradoxical stage in which the linkages between domestic and external environments are becoming more central to its daily survival. In affirming the existence of the domestic and external environmental linkage in the developing state, however, it is easy to obscure the sequential nature of many behavioural patterns that cross over both environments. Such "sequences" often go unrecognized because the existence of boundaries leads the analyst to treat their initial phase as a foreign policy action that comes to a halt once it crosses into the environment of the initiating national system. Consequently the responses of foreign policy action to the economic development process (and vice-versa) are viewed as new and separate sequences of behaviour rather than as the new phase of the same sequence. The concept of national - international linkages would help to inhibit undue segmentation of behavioural sequences and provide a context for the analysis of the foreign policy of the developing state in which the importance economic development is acknowledged.

Another aspect of the scope of this model requiring emphasis is the concept of recurrent behaviour. Outputs, inputs and linkages that they form are conceived to be single events. Theory would hardly be possible if individual actions or discrete occasions served as analytic units. Rather in order to move beyond the case method to productive theorizing, outputs, inputs and linkages are conceptualized to be events which recur with sufficient frequency to form a pattern. To be sure, any discrete event can, at some level of generalization be regarded as an instance of a more encompassing

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pattern but we do not preclude examining any event with a view to determining whether it is a case of what we have classified as a foreign policy-economic development linkage. If such a determination cannot be made. In other words, it is the recurrence and not the occurrence of events that serves as our focus. Such a situation may lead us to the notion of fused linkage<sup>134</sup> which arises out of the possibility that certain outputs and inputs continuously reinforce each other and are thus best viewed as forming a reciprocal relationship. In other words, a fused linkage is one in which the patterned sequence of behaviour does not terminate with the input. Stated in positive terms, a fused linkage is conceived to be a sequence in which an output fosters an input then in turn fosters an output in such a way that they cannot meaningfully be analyzed separately.<sup>135</sup>

If we shift to the language of statistical models of the structural equation form, we can represent the above kinds of arguments by models of the following forms :

MODEL (1)  $Y_t = \alpha_0 X_t + \alpha_1 X_{t-1} + \alpha_2 X_{t-2} + \dots + \alpha_n X_{t-n} + \mu_t$  where

$Y_t$  is the current value of some conditioned economic feature of the peripheral country affecting its foreign policy.

$X_t, \dots, X_{t-n}$  are the current and past values of the conditioning economic phenomenon ;

$\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_n$  are the parameter values which represent the determining effects on Y of each of the X's and

$\mu_t$  is an error term representing the imperfect character of the conditioning relationship.

An obvious feature of MODEL (1) is that the longer the continuous period of time during which the peripheral country has been exposed to X (e.g. some form of capitalist penetration) and the greater the degree to which the peripheral country is exposed to X at each point in time during that period, the greater (or lesser) will be the contemporary value of the peripheral economic feature affecting its foreign policy orientation/behaviour (e.g. the product concentration

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of the export sector) that is conditioned by X.

This same feature can be alternatively represented by :

$$\text{MODEL (2) } Y_t = \gamma_0 X_t + \gamma_1 (X_t + X_{t-1}) + \gamma_2 (X_t + X_{t-1} + X_{t-2}) + \dots + \gamma_\infty (X_t + X_{t-1} + \dots + X_{t-\infty}) + \mu_t$$

which when multiplied out, and with terms combined becomes :

$$\text{MODEL (3) } Y_t = (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + \dots + \gamma_\infty) X_t + (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + \dots + \gamma_\infty) X_{t-1} + \dots + \gamma_\infty X_{t-\infty} + \mu_t$$

MODEL (3) is exactly equivalent to MODEL (1) if :

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_0 &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + \dots + \gamma_\infty \\ \alpha_1 &= \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + \dots + \gamma_\infty \\ \alpha_2 &= \gamma_2 + \dots + \gamma_\infty \\ &\vdots \\ \alpha_\infty &= \gamma_\infty \end{aligned}$$

This means that if the Y's are all positive (or all negative), which seems to be implied by the verbal theory, then  $\alpha_0 > \alpha_1 > \alpha_2 > \dots > \alpha_\infty$  which means that the current value of Y is a function of current and past values of X with the past having a progressively diminishing impact. Alternatively and equivalently, the total impact of Y of any change in X is parcelled out over time with the strongest impact occurring relatively contemporaneously and progressively diminishing impacts occurring thereafter.

In general, one cannot test MODEL (1) directly because precise data for X far back into history are frequently not available; nor could one generate efficient estimates of the structural parameters even if one did have the data. However, we can transform MODEL (1) into an equivalent model for which estimation by way of available data is possible if we make the assumption that the progressive decline of the over time is governed by, or at least can be reasonably approximated by a regular declining functional form. The simplest assumption, attributable to Koyck<sup>136</sup> is one of a simple geometric decline, viz:

$$\text{MODEL (4) } w_t = (1 - \lambda) \lambda^t, \text{ and } w_1 = \alpha_1 / \sum_1^\infty \alpha_1$$

The parameter, then, describes the shape of the time-function, or historical process, by which X affects Y. It indicates how quickly the peripheral country "forgets" or overcomes its past.

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Given an assumption as that of MODEL (4), MODEL (1) becomes, after lagging, multiplication and rearrangement of the terms :

$$\text{MODEL (5)} \quad Y_t = \lambda Y_{t-1} + \alpha^* (1 - \lambda) X_t + \mu_t - \lambda \mu_{t-1}.$$

The estimation of MODEL (5), in which the error term is now generated by a first-order moving average process, provides precise information about the nature of the historical process through which X conditions Y but requires data for only two points in time. Because of that, a test model such as (5) is far preferable to static and simple short-term change models for guiding a rigorous empirical test of economic development and foreign policy linkages in the developing state.

The theory is all "historical" in a second sense which is the historical uniqueness argument of the contextual specificity of causal relations. An acceptance of this kind of historicist epistemology has led some dependency theorists to reject explicitly the notion of theory in favour of (descriptive) "concrete analysis of situations of dependency."<sup>139</sup> If one wants to "empiricize" economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, the extreme form of this epistemology must be rejected. But because the logic of an historicist epistemology is basic to the arguments that constitute economic development and foreign policy literature it is important that the rigorous empiricist incorporates in his model test the notion that context affects causal or conditional relations. To effect this requirement it is necessary to interpret the verbal historicist arguments in terms of the important context-defining variables that are implied in the contextually-specific analysis. These context variables, Z, can then be incorporated in the test model as variables which affect or condition the causal or conditional relation between X and Y.

The relevant variables can be incorporated in the test either by using them as typological criteria - referent countries could be grouped into sets that are homogeneous on the context variables - or by specifying them in the general

structural equation model as "state" variables that interact with the causal variables in determining Y. In general, the latter option is preferable because of the difficulty of achieving homogeneous sets of sufficiently large size for systematic analysis. But the preferred option leads to complex functional forms for representing the contextual interaction effects. Nevertheless, the representation must capture the notion that in such-and-such a context the effect of X on Y is different in a particular way from its effect in another context. Adequate test models must include complex interaction terms. The simple linear models that have allegedly been used upto date to test economic development and foreign policy cannot provide adequate tests because they necessarily ignore the importance of context in that body of theory.

Few scholars have attempted to put these various considerations into effect in developing a comprehensive and an adequate test model of dependency for the study of the political economy of the developing state's foreign policy. The full model of such attempts is reported in the results of the research project carried out by Raymond D. Duvall et al, under the direction of Professor Bruce Russett.<sup>140</sup> Here, only one of the twelve equations that constitute the full model is presented in order to give exemplary substance to the foregoing conceptual justification of economic development and foreign policy linkages in the developing state. The twelve model equations are for the twelve concepts in the last three of the four groups represented in Figure 2 (1) above. There are no equations for the four concepts in the group labeled capitalist economic and state imperialism - that is we ignore relations of type F and assume that capitalist imperialism is explained by phenomena within and outside of the dependency model.

The example that is used is for one of the concepts in the fourth group in Figure 2 (1) above - the degree of economic development and foreign policy linkage of the peripheral state.<sup>141</sup> The concern of theorists here is with the apparent growth in a number of peripheral countries of a statist



class interest that largely develops out of a bourgeois control of the state but expands beyond that to a point where new class interests come to the fore. This is the emergence of a "state bourgeoisie" out of the "national bourgeoisie". These statist class interests remain closely tied to the national bourgeoisie and to international capital but they come to have their own basis in the apparatus of the state - in the control of the means of allocation of resources and coercion. As the state bourgeoisie emerges as a politically dominant force and loses its class ties to the aristocracy and the national bourgeoisie, it responds in especially repressive fashion to manifest conflict in the society, generally acting to suppress labour and peasant class interests and to involve the state more deeply in the management and regulation of the peripheral economy. The issue, then is an understanding and explanation of the emergence, and in some societies the dominance of these statist class interests.

No single source in the dependency or Linkage literature provides complete and explicit explanation of the extent of these statist class interests in economic development and foreign policy linkages of the peripheral state.<sup>142</sup> Thus, the development of a test model equation must be based on a creative interpretation and synthesis of diverse arguments. Our understanding of the various theoretical arguments is that the emergence and development of class interests in economic development and foreign policy linkages in the developing state is due to two distinct historical processes. The first of these is the process of conflict, especially class conflict, in society. Where conflict is intense, pervasive, and historically longlived, the coercive apparatus of the state is strengthened and its governmental importance is increased. These political adjustments to conflict can and do occur fairly quickly. However, attention cannot be directed solely to short-term changes in conflict because the development of statist interests in economic development and foreign policy linkages in the developing state is not in general a reversible process. This means that short-term declines in conflict are irrelevant neither in stimulating nor in weakening

the development of the state coercion in the economy.

Hence only the positive levels of conflict are relevant, not the direction of change in them. But recent values of conflict are clearly most relevant so the time process should be one of rapid forgetting and recent sharp increases in conflict should, then, have the greatest impact. However, this impact is not argued to be uniform for all peripheral societies. Rather, the nature of the relationship is itself, argued to be affected by the context provided by the particular peripheral society. In particular, the contemporary growth of state interests in economic development and foreign policy in response to past and present conflict is greatest where the state is currently, actively and deeply involved in economic affairs such as in most African countries. In such situations, statist interests are particularly concerned with the control of destabilizing economic and political conflicts. This means that there is an interaction between current state involvement in the economy and the historical process of conflict in determining economic development and foreign policy linkages in the developing state. Thus, in formal terms,

MODEL (6)  $Y_t = f\{Z_{t-1} (\sum_1^{\infty} \alpha_i X_{t-i})\}$  where:

$Y_t$  is current economic development and foreign policy linkages of the peripheral state,

$Z_{t-1}$  is the immediately past value of the context variable, the extent of state involvement in the economy,

$X_{t-i}$  is the level of conflict in the society between economic development/foreign policy at time  $t-i$  back in history.

$f$  represents some unspecified functional form;

$\alpha_i$  is the impact parameter of conflict at  $t-i$  on current economic development and foreign policy linkages.

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The second process that affects economic development and foreign policy linkages is the aid process, the extent to which the peripheral regime is and has been externally supported. If this process of external support is extensive, that is, has been carried on for a long period of time, and is concentrated on a particular external source, then the state apparatus of the recipient peripheral state is appreciably strengthened, its traditional class ties and basis of support are weakened, and its political interests are made more homogeneous and similar to those of its dominant external source of support. All this adds up to a probable increase in the economic development/foreign policy linkages. Thus, in formal terms,

MODEL (7)  $Y_t = g \left\{ \sum_i \beta_i X_{2,t-i}, Z_{2,t-i} \right\}$  where

$Y_t$  is the current economic development and foreign policy linkages of the peripheral state,

$X_{2,t-i}$  is the extent of external support for the regime at time  $t-i$  back into history,

$Z_{2,t-i}$  is the context variable, that is, the extent to which external support at time  $t-i$  was concentrated on a single external source.

$\beta_i$  is the impact parameter of external support at time  $t-i$  on current economic development and foreign policy linkages.

$g$  represents some unspecified function form.

If we combine MODELS (6) and (7) and make some simplifying assumptions about  $f$  and  $g$ , and adopt the logic of MODEL (4) we can generate a precise test model for economic development and foreign policy linkages of the peripheral state. For  $f$  and  $g$  we assume independent direct linear processes for which errors are random because this is the simplest formulation, and nothing more precise is implied in both literatures. Thus, we model the verbal theory as :

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MODEL (8)  $Y_t = \theta Z_{t-1} (\sum_i \alpha_i X_{t-1}) + \sum_i \beta_i Z_{t-1} X_{2,t-1} + \mu_t$  where elements are defined for MODEL (6) and (7).

$\theta$  is the context parameter for the effect that governmental involvement in the economy has on the causal relationship between economic development and foreign policy

$\mu_t$  is the current extent of random error.

After lagging, multiplication, and rearrangement of terms MODEL (9) becomes our precise test model of our economic development and foreign policy linkages in the developing state.

MODEL (9)  $Y_t = \theta_1 Z_{1,t-1} X_{1,t-1} + \theta_2 Z_{1,t-1} X_{1,t-2} + \theta_3 Z_{2,t-1} X_{2,t-1} + \theta_4 Z_{2,t-2} X_{2,t-2} + \theta_5 Y_{t-1} + \theta_6 Y_{t-2} + \epsilon$  elements are defined

above and

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_1 &= \alpha^* \theta - \alpha^* \theta \lambda, \\ \theta_2 &= \alpha^* \theta \lambda \tau - \alpha^* \theta \tau, \quad [\theta_2 < 0] \\ \theta_3 &= \beta^* - \beta^* \tau, \\ \theta_4 &= \beta^* \tau \lambda - \beta^* \tau, \quad [\theta_4 < 0] \\ \theta_5 &= \lambda + \tau, \\ \theta_6 &= -\lambda \tau, \quad [\theta_6 < 0] \\ \epsilon &= \mu_t - \theta_5 \mu_{t-1} - \theta_6 \mu_{t-2}, \text{ a second order moving average process} \end{aligned}$$

and  $\lambda$  is the time-process parameter for the impacts of past and present economic development on foreign policy (also equivalent to  $\lambda$  in MODEL (4) but probably different from  $\lambda$  in MODEL (9) because the paths of the two causal processes are apt to be different).

By estimating  $\theta_1$  through  $\theta_6$  in MODEL (9) and by using the above equations that define  $\theta_1$  through  $\theta_6$ , we estimate theoretically relevant parameter,  $\alpha^* \theta, \beta^*, \lambda$ , and  $\tau$ , which indicate the extent and temporal-historical form of the impact of the two causal processes economic development and foreign policy the developing state.

We are far ahead of, for instance, the power paradigm's univariable "explanation" of the Interdependency school of thought in the explanation of foreign policy. In addition to the multivariate emphasis, the dependency-linkage matrix

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has the following advantages. In this way, the "dependency" linkage has a structuralist penchant and insists on the necessity of probing beneath the surface manifestations of human motivations to identify the economic structure that would guide foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore this dependency Linkage model tries to avoid treating the present reality of the foreign policy of the developing state as a fossilised determination and rather conceives this reality as something which is in process, something which has become, and will pas away. This is all the more necessary because we do not understand society until we can account for how it came to be what it is, until we can articulate its economic laws of motion.

The model relates dependency analyses to other analytical models and as such helps to develop linkages between them, thereby introducing precision into the concept of dependency - a component which helps to facilitate prescription. Infact, by precisising, dependency analysis, this adapted dependency model cômpeles attention to the dynamic insights of the socio-economic processes of the foreign policy of the developing state rather than the "static" approach of the bulk of interdependence literature. For instance, in interdependence literature the major concern is the problem of international stability and there is an obssessive preoccupation with an attempt to characterize this state of stability and to define its conditions. On balance, interdependence literature is conservative in the sense that it is heavily oriented towards the problem of how to maintain the existing international social, economic or political order. As such, the concerns of such literature are quite different from the concerns of a continent as Africa in a hurry to develop, and so less interested in how to maintain the existing international order than how to change it.

The adapted dependency - Linkage model used here is surely more suitable for the study of the foreign policies of transitional societies in Africa. It frees the mind from certain attitudes and tendencies which "Northern" social science has tended to inculcate, and which those who are

interested in understanding change and bringing it about, as many of us in Africa, can ill-afford to harbour. Among these unfortunate attitudes is the disposition to see consensus everywhere and to prefer it to conflict; a prejudice against disequilibrium and a negative attitude towards contradiction. Those who want to understand the process of change or who have vested interest in change cannot afford to harbour these attitudes of mind. This is because conflict and contradiction are the very vehicles of change and progress. In this study we will see how contradictions (of capitalism) gave impulse to the colonialization of Africa, how the contradictions are shaping the general course of economic development in Africa both internally and externally.

The second advantage of this adapted dependency-linkage model is the development perspective. That is it allows us to understand social phenomena in the context of their development. All too often the methods of traditional social science encourage a view of social phenomena as things which happen to be there, fully formed and with set characteristics - as something without a "natural history". But the method used here encourages the perception of social phenomena as elements of a continuum, or as moments of an unfolding process. It encourages their perception as things which begin, become, and pass away.

By putting social phenomena in the context of their development we are able to gain greater understanding of them. For one thing, we are able to understand not only how they came to be what they are, but also to make reasonable conjecture as to what they might become. The treatment of the problem of underdevelopment by students of interdependence sheds some light on this point. The general tendency among most of these students who have concerned themselves with the problem of underdevelopment is to reduce the problem to an aggregation of factors such as lack of entrepreneurial skills, lack of diversification of the economy. If it is the presence of these specific effects that causes underdevelopment, then the way to overcome underdevelopment is to remove them. It is easy to see that this conventional way of dealing with this

problem is not in the least promising. To begin with, the explanation of underdevelopment implicit in this treatment is really a tautology. On analysis, it is soon clear that the things offered by the approach of interdependence as causes of underdevelopment are in fact symptoms of underdevelopment. That is partly why the influence of the interdependence philosophy on development strategy in Africa has been so disastrous. If one looks at underdevelopment from the developmental perspective suggested by the dependency-Linkage matrix, one recognizes that it is not reducible to discrete elements but rather that it is a complex phenomenon whose constituent parts have an organic unity. One will also see that this phenomenon is deeply, rooted in the social, economic and political structures of the state, and that underdevelopment cannot be overcome without a profound transformation of economic, social and political structures.

The third advantage of this adapted dependency-Linkage model of international relations is its emphasis on a comprehensive view of society. The fact that this model emphasizes the relatedness of social phenomena, particularly the economic structure, the social structure, the political structure and the belief system, gives it great advantages as a tool for the study of society. In studying aspects of social life, or in explaining social problems, consciousness of this relatedness compels the student to take a more comprehensive view. The result is that his explanations are likely to have more depth. The fact that conventional social sciences have specialized disciplines for studying different aspects of social life - political science for the political system, sociology for the social system and economics for the economic system - unfortunately encourages a fragmentary and incomplete view of society, all the more so as the autonomous disciplines quickly create the illusion of the autonomy of these aspects of social life which each is trying to illuminate.

Worse, the systematic relation of the findings of research in each of the major disciplines of conventional social science is at best obscure and at worst confusing and contradictory, so that these disciplines cannot be said to provide particular perspectives which together add up to a

coherent body of knowledge which at any rate constitutes a useful tool for the study of social life. In these circumstances it has been very difficult for conventional social science to resist the temptation of artificially regarding those areas in which there is some fit between social science knowledge and the real world, as autonomous, and ignoring the general confusion. The adapted dependency model hopefully offers a better chance of a genuinely comprehensive view of society as well as coherent, cumulative knowledge about the developing state's foreign policy.

Another important advantage of this adapted dependency model is that it treats problems concretely rather than abstractly. In much of the conventional social science that prevails in African institutions of higher learning, there is an unfortunate tendency towards abstraction in the explanation of social phenomena. For instance, one explanation of the economic backwardness of developing countries which used to be very popular in mainstream conventional social science was something to the effect that people in the developing countries lacked a development mentality and an achievement motivation. But the concepts of achievement motivation and development mentality were very abstract, and imprecise as well. Attempts were made to qualify it by devising sets of questions by which attitude surveys could be conducted and scored to determine the extent to which achievement motivation and development mentality existed.<sup>143</sup> But despite the quantification, the concepts of achievement motivation and development mentality remained abstract because the questions devised to test its existence were themselves abstract and full of ambiguities.<sup>144</sup>

Nevertheless, the fact of quantification gave the illusion of a thoroughly scientific and empirically testable explanation. But of course it led nowhere. And it could have led anywhere even if the problems of quantification had not arisen. For there was a more fundamental failing namely, the fact that the problem of underdevelopment was being explained in terms of attitudes and left just there. The attitudes were treated as if they could be dissociated from actual historical circumstances and left floating in the air.

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Is it entirely accidental that one set of attitudes prevails in a particular society? If we say yes, then we have no explanation. If we say no, then the question arises, what accounts for the prevalence of particular attitudes? Apart from revealing the inadequacy of the explanation of underdevelopment in attitudinal terms, this question also suggests the necessity of going beyond attitudes to the material conditions which underlie them. Attitudes, beliefs, motivation and other forms of consciousness do not exist in vacuum, nor are they mere accidents. They reflect the history of a people. They are formed by concrete historical conditions. They cannot be understood or meaningfully discussed if they are dissociated from these historical conditions. They evolve over a long period in the course of man's interaction with his human and physical environments. That is why an explanation of underdevelopment in terms of lack of attitudes not linked to concrete material conditions explains very little.

Finally, one other advantage of relating the abstract to the concrete is that it helps to expose false assumptions and biases in explanation. The explanation under review illustrates the point. When the achievement motivation and development mentality are placed in historical context they are found to be the acquisitive drive of developed societies. And in so far as the acquisitive drive is particularly strong in the developed industrialized societies then the explanation is also a tautology, because it amounts to suggesting that a society is not developed because it does not have the characteristics of a developed society.

This is by no means an exhaustive treatment of the advantages of this adapted dependency-linkage model of international relations. It is merely an illustration of some of its analytic possibilities. Further treatment of the advantages of this model will be done implicitly in the course of the development of this study. For in the final analysis, the claims of this model cannot rest on a mere theoretical elaboration of its advantages. In the meantime it is necessary to discuss the main hypotheses to guide us in the course of our investigations.

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## 2.7 HYPOTHESES

Having demonstrated the ways in which our modified version of dependency-linkage theory will be used in the study of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, let us elaborate on the formulation of various propositions and hypotheses that will guide our investigations. It would be wise here to briefly explain the meaning of "proposition" and hypothesis". A proposition is a "theoretical statement which must be consistent not with observable reality but with the premises of the theory from which it is drawn."<sup>145</sup> A hypothesis, on the other hand, is a "reformulation of the idea or ideas contained in the proposition in such a way that they may be empirically tested."<sup>146</sup> Hence, the test of an hypothesis is whether it conforms to the observable evidence (in which case it is validated) or whether it does not (in which case it is rejected). A similar treatment cannot be given to a proposition. Concerning the question of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state what propositions can be derived? More importantly, perhaps, what hypotheses could be selected for further empirical verification?

In the light of the above precisions, this study puts forward the following proposition. That because of its material underdevelopment and economic dependency on the international capitalist system from colonial times, most of the external transactions of the developing state occur in the issue-area of economic exchange traditionally described as "low" politics. As such its foreign policy behaviour and/or orientation at any point in time is a reflection of the logic of its international economic relations which stem from and lead back to the logic of its economic production, distribution and consumption at the national level. Thus the level of economic development of the developing state affects its foreign policy format and the higher the level of economic development, the lower the economic and political dependency and the more independent the foreign output. The question now is to know whether this proposition is consistent with the premises of the dependency-linkage model.

It implies the explanation of the foreign policy of the developing state in terms of its underdevelopment and economic dependency on the international capitalist division of Labour. It further implies the explanation of how the position of the developing state in this asymmetrical division of Labour is correlated with its economic development and how its economic development affects its foreign policy behaviour. It would appear that the above proposition is in conformity with the main body of the dependency-Linkage matrix. A number of hypotheses drawn from the above proposition will now be formulated:

1. Because of the strong correlation between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, its pattern of diplomatic interaction and behaviour is determined by and geared towards economic development
2. Because economic development is both an independent and dependent variable in the developing state's international relations, its foreign policy capabilities and/or behaviour at any point in time are always a reflection of its domestic economic and social-political relations of production.
3. Because of the economic underdevelopment and dependency of the developing state not only is there a strong interpenetration between the domestic and external environments which renders the former vulnerable but makes that ability of the state to achieve its foreign policy objectives varies and diminishes with the given issue (or issue-area) as one moves from local to global issues.
4. That the level of economic development of the developing state more than any other factor, determines its real status in terms of power, prestige and influence on the international scene.

The remainder of the research will be largely dedicated to testing each of these hypotheses against the available evidence.

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However, it must be remarked that chapter three is designed to test hypothesis (1) while chapters four, five and six verify the empirical validity of hypothesis (2) and chapters seven and eight are designed to test hypothesis (3) Finally chapters nine and ten are intended to verify hypothesis (4) Nevertheless, before then, let us make a comment about the way we have gathered and organized our data in the following section dedicated to methodology.

## 2.8 : METHODOLOGY

The method of research used in our investigations falls within the comparative political economy framework and uses both the quantitative and qualitative methods of evaluation of data. Most of the data is drawn from government publications such as the National Gazette, publications of ministerial departments, National Year Books, Development Plans, Publications of international organizations, standard and collective textbooks, magazines, newspapers, journals and official speeches. However, it is worth observing here that the integration of the above data into main body of our study is done by the use of the deductive type of problem-solving technique.

First of all, the purpose of the deductive technique is to help us analyze data by moving from statements of evidence to statements of fact, that is, from premises to propositions. Since the deductive technique is one by which "people pass, mentally from a universal proposition to assertions about the particular"<sup>147</sup> This technique allows us to test and apply theories of a general, universal character to the analysis of the developing state. In other words, the deductive technique facilitates the application of already established principles in the solution of a specific research problem or in the proof of the validity of these rules empirically. For example, each chapter of our study begins by stating the general nature of the problem involved, its principal issues and its manifestations. It goes on to discuss the main policy goals and possible objectives connected with the problem in question, the role of politics and economics in illuminating the problem, and some possible policy alternatives and their likely

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consequences. In this perspective, it views the many economic, social and institutional problems of economic development and foreign policy as highly interrelated and requiring simultaneous and coordinated approaches to their solution both at the national and international levels. Since in the application of the deductive technique, specific cases have to be carefully, critically and objectively presented, cases of illustration are easily set forth but with each possessing a significant character in relation to the question under study. However, in each case this technique allows us to focus attention on common characteristics. This search for common characteristics facilitates the comparative study of the variables in the analysis of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state.

The methodological application of the dependency model to analyze the foreign policy of the developing state in a cross-cutting interdisciplinary approach which political scientists are constantly researching is the commitment of this study. We utilize these tools to describe, explain, and predict relationships between the economic development phenomena and foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour in the developing state. Implicit in our proposition is the idea that the nature of fundamental economic attributes of the developing state will affect its behaviour towards other powers. Since our theoretical model should be capable of being reducible to manageable numbers of defensible propositions and since the relationship must be operationally defined so that they can be testable and whenever possible falsified, the "methodology should not only be capable of ordering and managing the data in ways that will test the theory, but should also perform these functions according to procedures that are so defined and standardized that any number of investigations can apply them"<sup>148</sup>

The complexities of the international system gives rise to the problem that confronts a researcher about the choice of variables that are relevant, and those that are not, and what criteria exist for excluding some variables and examining others. If there exists such criteria, will

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not the selection of variables, measures, and methods of analysis, or the inclusion of certain data at the expense of others, bias the outcome? The answer is obviously Yes. What we have done in this study is to carefully examine and cautiously select the variables that describe and model the theory. What we tend to do is to advance our knowledge of the analysis that links interrelated proposition (economic development and foreign policy). In developing this linkage, we have tried to capture the relationships which do not just explain variances in foreign policy and economic development in a purely statistical way. Such an effort is constrained in three ways. There are theoretical constraints. There is for example, no single compelling theory that specifies even crudely, a comprehensive model of economic determinants of foreign policy. Therefore, the research process is purely straight forward. It does not depend on one level of analysis nor on one kind of data. There is an enormous body of quantitative and qualitative literature in this work that deals in no particular unified way with the many facets of quantitative methodological approach. In addition to the absence of theoretical convergence in the literature, there is a problem that characterizes the qualitative work—that of ambiguity and circumlocution in style that makes the extraction of testable hypotheses difficult, and at times, impossible. However, we have tried the best we could to explain what we could not quantify, and what we quantify, we still gave the explanation and rationalization.

However, Scholars<sup>149</sup> in international politics and foreign policy are often pre-occupied with the development of empirical theory consisting of a set of interrelated propositions consisting of the above variables in order to explain how, why and when states in the international system are likely to act or interact. For the most part those who seek this kind of theory are relatively unconcerned with the potential for actual application of their work in any quantitative manner.<sup>150</sup> Others are concerned primarily with the policy implications of theoretical work, and in some cases with the development of solutions to specific policy problems.<sup>151</sup> Given the remarkable amount of skepticism, hostility, and

apathy still prevalent among scholars of world politics regarding the possibility (and/or desirability) of a scientific discipline, we conceive of this methodology as a demonstration. It is intended to demonstrate that political scientists can use vigorous, quantitative methods to examine important theoretical questions in the field of foreign policy. However, it should be stressed that even if operational and quantitative procedures are relevant to the central problem of our study, they remain extremely complex and elusive. Nevertheless, an enormous amount of time has been devoted to the study of foreign policy as a dependent variable by the behaviouralists and empiricists. James Rosenau<sup>152</sup> tried to explain the foreign policy of the United States and other middle range powers by grouping together in clusters, a diverse set of variables he labelled systematic, governmental, societal and individual. John W. Eley and John H. Peterson<sup>153</sup> classified economic assistance, military assistance and diplomatic personnel as dependent variables. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris<sup>154</sup> associated dependent variables with the degree of administrative efficiency, the extent of leadership commitment to economic development, and the extent of political stability. This is what Copson<sup>155</sup> termed conflict and Deutsch<sup>156</sup> called war. In this study we shall attempt to follow their methodological precedents but follow them with the understanding that while their respective researches were basically cross-political attempts, we take as a point of departure the specificity of our inquiry to explain the actions and non-actions of the developing state in the international system using the Cameroonian experience 1960-1982. In this case, the first step in the transition from a general theoretical statement to an operation model would consist in the identification of the variables to be explained. Only after the relevant variables have been identified and their relative potency assessed through quantitative and/or qualitative analyses would it be possible to fashion a coherent body of empirical generalization. Thus we have chosen as variables the objectives of Cameroon's foreign policy: (1) Pan Africanism (2) Nonalignment and military relations (3) diplomatic personnel (4) the United Nations votes. Our choice for this variables is guided by the

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following criteria. First, they variables are capable of empirical delineation. That is, they fall within the realm of empirical verification as pragmatic foreign policy outputs, and their relevance and implication have interconnectedness with the international system. Secondly, they define the foreign policy postulate of Cameroon in relation to the economic development, and have consequent political significance. Thirdly their themes have currency and universality among the foreign policy theme of other developing states. For example, the support for Pan-Africanism and liberation demands more than financial and military support. It includes logistics, and accessibility of the territorial land mass to the conflict area which Cameroon is incapable of providing, but the Front Line states like Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia have tactical and strategic advantages for overt and covert military incursion. In order for this to affect Cameroon's foreign policy objectives on Pan-African liberation, Cameroon's actions should have congruency with the foreign policy of the Front line states on that specific objective. However, the struggle for the liberation of Africa from the vestiges of colonialism and racism is a major foreign policy theme of the OAU.

Most of the quantitative studies to date that we have come across in the area of foreign policy research, have overlooked models that incorporate linear, additive and hierarchical relationship.<sup>157</sup> Exclusive reliance on models of this kind is overtly restrictive, since theories we wish to test and the real processes we seek to capture are clearly not linear, additive and hierarchical in cause and effect. The final observations bear on the methodological constraints that affect this research. Given our unwillingness to rely exclusively on any single line of theorizing, one of the major methodological concerns is to proceed in a way that allows rigorous and systematic investigation of hypotheses that have theoretical merit without "denigrating into a gross fishing operation, posing as empirical research".<sup>158</sup> In this perspective the specific relationship that concerns us can be explained in the form of equations that are expected to fit empirical data. The statistical measures employed to determine



the extent to which an equation fits empirical data includes; "R<sup>2</sup>" - the amount of variance in the dependent variables accounted for by the independent variables, the magnitude of both the unstandardized and standardized beta or path coefficients; the significance of the individual coefficients as indicated by the "t" statistics; the statistical significance of the equation as a whole, as indicated by the "F" ratio for the qualitative regression. Thus the dependency model employed in this study is based on relations between two key concepts - foreign policy and economic development.

Operationally, a number of indicators of economic development (the independent variable) in the areas of trade, aid, investment and money have been developed by various authors.<sup>159</sup> For purpose of our analysis, the following indices and retained.

(a) Trade<sup>160</sup>

- trade composition index ;
- partner composition index (ratio between the proportion of exports going to the most important partner);
- Commodity concentration index (ratio between the proportion of exports consisting of the three most important commodities relative to the total exports).

(b) Aid:

- total foreign aid received as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP):
- ratio of net official external reserves to imports;
- degree of indebtedness (external public debt as percentage of GNP, debt service as percentage of GNP, etc);
- Ratio of foreign to national managerial capacity (especially in terms of teachers, managers, technicians and advisers).

(c) Investment:<sup>161</sup>

- total foreign investment as percentage of GNP;
- foreign investment from each country as percentage of total foreign investment;
- share of each economic activity in key sectors controlled by foreign majority-owned firms;
- degree of technological dependency (ratio of technological imports to total imports);
- ratio of foreign to national .../...

patents registered and the concentration of foreign patents by countries of origin).

(d) Politics:

- Vertical and horizontal elite consciousness and involvement (the extent to which this consciousness and involvement goes beyond political leaders and state bureaucrats in order to broaden the base of the elites involved in national development, to promote contact among these leaders and to achieve favourable orientations towards national integration and self-reliance as well as the way opinion leaders articulate groups such as political parties, trade unions, associations, professional organizations, etc.;
- Programmes aimed at the creation and development of a political system capable of inducing national integration and development;
- The interaction between current state involvement in the economy and the historical process of conflict in determining coercive authoritarianism;
- the political-military aid process (the extent to which the peripheral regime is (and has been) externally supported;
- The conflict potential of the political system;
- Mutual responsiveness resulting from compatible value systems (size of political units, rate of political transactions between the regions, extent of pluralism, extent of elite complementarity, purpose and powers of the government, decision-making style and the adaptability of government).

Operationally, we shall define foreign policy, (or dependent variable) in terms of :

1. PAN-AFRICANISM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Support for Pan-africanism and national Liberation struggle, that is the total amounts of funds and efforts that Cameroon has committed to the liberation of Africa from colonialism, regional organizations (OAU, UDEAC, Basin

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Commission, etc). Cameroon's support for the national liberation struggle in Africa takes many forms. Support by mandatory financial contributions through the OAU is one form. Indirect bilateral support through a surrogate is also another. For the purpose of lucidity, we define our support in terms of the direct and indirect total value of the support that Cameroon committed to Pan-Africanism and the liberation of Africa. Symbolically we define it in a system of simultaneous equation - the: <sup>162</sup>

$$Y = a + B_1 X_1 + B_2 X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 2.1$$

where Y = support for national liberation

X<sub>1</sub> = balance of payment

X<sub>2</sub> = foreign reserve

u = stochastic disturbance

The above equation states that changes in the exogenous variables over times will affect changes in the endogenous variable. Equation 2.1 was estimated with two other indicators - gross national product and crude petroleum. We predict that R<sup>2</sup>, the amount of variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the independent variables will be significant, the path coefficient for the individual independent variable will be positive. We therefore, hypothesize that there is a close relationship between the level of economic performance and the support for Pan-Africanism and the national liberation struggle in Africa.

2. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Diplomatic relationships among states in the international system centre around the establishment of diplomatic missions and consular offices, followed by the exchanges of diplomatic personnel and consuls who protect and safeguard the interests of their respective nations. The ability to influence the decision making processes of other international actors is the capability to communicate desires to the official decision makers of these actors. Although there are other direct and indirect channels through which communications could pass from one national actor to another national actor (or actors) but for simplicity reasons we chose the formal

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diplomatic channels.

For instance, the Cameroon's permanent representative at the United Nations in New York, communicates the subjects of Cameroon's foreign policy (on the decolonization of Africa) almost every year to other national actors. This bulk of diplomatic and informational communication of a routine non-crisis nature is carried on through regularized diplomatic channels through the personnel of Cameroon's foreign service assigned to the embassies, consular offices and other international organizations. The degree and magnitude of any national actor to Cameroon is indicated by the numerical strength of the Cameroon diplomatic personnel attached to such actors. Cameroon has more diplomatic and consular personnel in France, Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union respectively than any other single nation in the world. The reasons are; 1) the largest volume of Cameroon's exports go to the France, Europe and United States, 2) European and United States' investments in Cameroon amount to about \$1.5 billion, 3) the Western Countries have the technology that Cameroon admires and duplicates, 4) the Western countries having taken over after World War II as the metropole of world capitalism of which Cameroon is only a satellite have become in modern times the critical intersection that directs not only the traffic of the world commodity trade, but the centre for the political and diplomatic crises-cross flows or information.

For France, the relationship has moved from colonial-imperial status to client-patron in traffic belonging to the same relic of the old colonial past (the Francophonie). It is not only a historical deposition that Cameroon trades more with France bilaterally than with any other country, but that in about 38 years of French colonialism in Cameroon the former has reproduced itself culturally, politically and economically. The ties between the two nations are conceivably more than a diplomatic love affair but what has come to be regarded as common shared experience in language, education, legal system, and government. It becomes inevitable that Cameroon has more diplomatic personnel in France, and of course in Europe than any other single nation.

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The numeric strength of the diplomatic personnel (as a dependent variable) is a function (over time) of the level of economic development and growth, and the level of political consciousness. An illustration of this is still the Cameroonian experience

The incremental increase in the numeric strength of the diplomatic personnel between 1960 and 1982 reflects a corresponding increase in Cameroons exports and capital inflow.

Increase in the volume of exports, we presume, increases the numeric strength of the economic attaché attached to the embassy that deals with trade treaties and foreign investment. Capital inflow will be sensitive positively to the increase in diplomatic staffs. Mathematically, we state that :

$$Y = a + B_1 X_1 + B_2 X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 2.2$$

- where Y = diplomatic personnel
- X<sub>1</sub> = exports
- X<sub>2</sub> = Capital inflow
- u = Stochastic disturbances

We estimate it for France, Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. If the hypothesis has merit then the regression of exports and capital inflow on diplomatic personnel should have a significant positive parameter estimate. This would indicate that the conjunction of exports and capital inflow has an impact on foreign policy.

(3) NON-ALIGNMENT AND MILITARY POSTURE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Military posture comprises military assistance and military expenditure. It constituted an important component of Cameroon's foreign policy in the 1970's. Military posture includes the capital outlay expended for the development, maintenance employment, and deployment of military forces for deterrence and defense or for aggressive purposes. The deployment of troops is a foreign policy not only to influence events in those areas but to influence the outcome of events geopolitically. It is also meant to generate the perception of military capability in the politectonic conflict zone

(Southern Africa).

The national bases of military power evidently remain significant, for they determine the ability of countries to deter military action by other states. The holding of American nationals in Iran as hostages provides a classic example of this kind of deterrence. The United States has the military capability to run over Iran in order to liberate their nationals at the risk of five American lives or more. While the safety of the hostages might deter such military moves, the greatest deterrence of all is the balance of terror presented by the Soviet Union which shares a common border with Iran.

The power can be seen then to reside in the capabilities that permit the power wielder to make effective threats of deterrence. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned the United States of utilizing any military venture as a justifiable means of solving the conflict between Iran and itself. And and United States' perception of the Soviets' compatible military strength, and calculated interference for reasons of national interest dampens the Americans' resolve to attempt conflict resolution by military power.

What we are saying here in effect is that military expenditure per se does not represent a deterrence in relations among nations, but the putative and actualized military power depicted in the military posture is undoubtedly a deterrence to other nations. Klaus Knorr<sup>163</sup> shows how military strength can be perceived or mobilized as a powerful instrument of foreign policy. One method he contends is through war.

Clauswitz<sup>164</sup> and David Ziegler<sup>165</sup> contribute to Konrr's assertion. The second method Knorr posits, is by way of military threats, and the third is through the anticipation or anxiety of other states that the nation involved may resort to its military strength if a serious conflict of interest arises.

Serious conflict of interest have arisen between Cameroon and Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon, and Cameroon vis-a-vis Congo, but none of them erupted into war because each of

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them knows the incomparable power weights (economic and military) in relation to their respective countries. Military posture then is a strategy for action on the part of Cameroon designed to influence events within and beyond the continent.

We have stated above that there is a close relationship between military expenditures of state and the GNP. We have shown also that the ratio of a state's GNP goes to the production of military posture. We now posit that when a foreign threat, civil war or need to support national liberation movements of decolonization induces a government to expand its military posture, it is basically a continuation of foreign policy by some other means.

We therefore define military posture as the total value of military assistance that a state gives to the foreign countries plus the total value of its military expenditures.

Symbolically we represent it thus :

$$Y = a + B_1 X_1 + B_2 X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 2.3$$

where Y = Military posture

X<sub>1</sub> = gross national posture

X<sub>2</sub> = foreign reserves

u = disturbance variable

A large GNP indicates a national ability to support a large military effort. It is therefore a major determinant of economic military potential. Foreign reserves of a state affect the foreign deployment, acquisition and use of military forces. For example, the large scale military intervention of the United states in Vietnam occasioned sizable outlays of foreign exchange for supporting goods and services purchased abroad. Thus a strong position of international liquidity is an asset that is part of the military potential of an emerging power. We anticipate that the regression coefficient in the above equation will be highly significant to confirm our hypothesis.

(4): UNITED NATIONS VOTES AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The voting patterns of every nation on issues in the United Nations reflect the foreign policy posture of the

individual nations on those issues. If the United States, the United Kingdom and France voted in identical patterns on most Third World issues, then the expression of their respective votes was the expression of their respective foreign policy postures on those issues.

In the 1960-1982 period, Cameroon tended to vote more in agreement with France and the United States and less with the Soviet Union despite the fact that the latter supported the decolonization of Africa long before Cameroon had independence, Cameroon at the time was dependent on the United States' and other Western nations' economic support.

The Index of Agreement<sup>166</sup> (i.e: Cameroon voting in agreement) with France and the United States was determined or influenced by the latter's aid, grants, and loans. Cameroon's Index of Agreement with each of the superpowers from 1960-1982 inversely corresponded with the level of economic development. Neither the pattern of the United States' votes nor that of the Soviet Union was changing. Since the United Nations is the foremost international forum that all independent countries are represented, there are more independent African countries geopolitically represented in that forum than any other geopolitical representation. We believe that Cameroon's Index of Agreement with each of the superpowers on African items in particular and the Third World issues in general would delineate 1) the extent to which Cameroon affects African diplomacy and World Politics at the United Nations, 2) the changing patterns of Cameroon's votes with respect to the changes in the level of economic development and, 3) the level of Cameroon's interaction in the world forum.

Because GNP is one of the measures of national power in international relations and foreign policy, it is interesting to discern its relationship with the United Nations activity. GNP is closely related to interaction because it is an important factor in the determination of national assessments for the UN budgets. United Nations financial support and GNP of nations is an important evidence of the significance of



interaction data.<sup>167</sup> More controversial items such as the Palestinian Question, the call for the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afganistan, and self determination for Zimbabwe would tend to generate a higher rate of interaction. We define the United Nations votes as Comeroon's Index of Agreement with the United States and with the Soviet Union. Mathematically we represent it as follows :

$$Y = A + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + u \dots\dots\dots 2.4$$

where Y = Index of Agreement with the United States  
X<sub>1</sub> = Gross National Product  
X<sub>2</sub> = Capital Inflow  
X<sub>3</sub> = Petroleum

Equation 2.4 is also estimated for export and income per capita. We anticipate that the R2 with respect to the Index of Agreement with the United States will be high or positive.

$$Y = A + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 2.5$$

where Y = Index of Agreement with the Soviet Union  
X<sub>1</sub> = Petroleum  
X<sub>2</sub> = Gross National Product

Equation 2.5 was also estimated for income per capital and foreign reserve. We expect that the R2 will be low or negative

The independent economic variables (gross national product, gross national product per capita, foreign reserves, balance of payments, foreign trade, foreign aid, foreign investments, capital inflow, capital outflow, export, import) will be positively correlated with the dependent foreign policy variables (support for Panafricanism and the national liberation struggle, diplomatic personnel, nonalignment and military posture, and the United Nations votes). Index of Agreement with the United States will be positively correlated with the economic indicators.

The following are the definitions of the symbols we shall use in the systems of our equations: (SEE CHAPTER TEN).

<u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
NL23	Support for the National Liberation Struggle. ....

MILP	Military Posture
DPLI	Diplomatic Personnel with the United States
DPL1	Diplomatic Personnel with France and Europe
DPL3	Diplomatic Personnel with the Soviet Union
UNV4S	Index Agreement with the United States
UNVSS	Index Agreement with the Soviet Union
GNP	Gross National Product
GgNP	Gross National Product per Capital
EXPT	Export
IMPT	Import
KPL1	Capital Inflow
PKLO	Capital Outflow
FRS	Foreign Reserves
BYPT	Balance of Payment
FAID	Foreign Aid
TACE	Trade With African Countries
DDI	Period I (196-1969)
DD2	Period II (1970-1982)
MSGR	Messages Received
MSGS	Messages Dispatched
GDP	Gross Domestic Product.

The analysis of these indicators should help us answer the primary question addressed by this investigation - that is the responsiveness of foreign policy to economic development in the developing state.

## 2.9 : CONCLUSION

The whole of this chapter has tried to address itself to some specific methodological-conceptual deficiencies and weaknesses in the analysis of economic development and foreign policy in the developing state. The dependency-Linkage model proposed here is based on considerations of:

- (a) the asymmetry of relations between the North and the South in the international system - how the position of the "Underdogs" is correlated with their perception of the international system and how this perception affects their foreign policy orientation and behaviours;

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- (b) how socio-economic variables that constitute the essence of the developing state being "developing or less developed" (e.g problems of social change, national integration and development) affect their foreign policy orientation and international behaviour;
- (c) The complementarity of different levels-of analysis (the intra-national (domestic and the extra-national (international), since the empirical dichotomy of intra-international political and economic processes is increasingly questioned . In other words the movement from one level of analysis to the other has been ensured not to affect the unity of the whole. In this vein, the model takes as its focus of conceptualization the economic perspective and situation of the developing states.

However, in applying this conceptual framework, the fundamental assumption is that for a developing state because the foreign policy system and the domestic political economy constitute, by and large, open systems, there is a particularly strong interpenetration of the external and domestic environments and elements. This interpenetration of environments and elements in the developing state has a "bland common denominator" which finds expression in the developing state's external reliance on other actors as well as in the process of its integration in the "state of nature" global system and the structural distortions resulting therefrom. In a sense our dependency-Linkage model of international relations has predominantly focused on relational inequalities among international actors and the consequences of the vulnerabilities of such members of the global system (resulting from these relational inequalities) on their foreign policies. But before we apply this conceptual framework to study economic relations and foreign policy in Parts Two and Three of our research, let us first of all examine the principles and objectives of foreign policy in the developing state in the light of its economic development using the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982.

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et al; Dynamics of Global crisis (London, Macmillan, 1982); Amin; La Déconnexion: Pour Sortir du Système Mondial (Paris Editions La Découverte, 1985).

42. F.H. Cardoso; "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" in Alfred Stepan(ed); Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 142 - 176; Anibal Quijano Obregan; Nationalism and capitalism in Peru: A study in Neo-Imperialism (New York, Monthly review Press, 1971); Osvaldo Sunkel, "The crisis of the Nation-state in Latin America: challenge and Response" in Latin American Perspective, vol. 3, N°2 (spring 1976), pp. 100-116. Elizabeth Dore and John Weeks; "The Intensification of the Assault against the Working class in "Revolutionary" Peru" in Latin American Perspectives, vol. 3, N°2 (spring 1976), pp; 55-88, Theotonio Dos Santos; "The Crisis of contemporary capitalism" in Latin American Perspectives, vol. 3, N° 2 (spring), pp. 84-99; Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London, Zed Press 1978); Ake; A Political Economy of Africa (London, Longman, 1981).

43. Theodore Maran; Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974), F.H. Cardoso; in Latin American Perspective, vol 3, N° 2 (spring 1976), pp.

44. There are exceptions of some importance. One often reads in dependencia theory of the cultural dependency of the Ivory Coast on France or of the technological dependency of Brazil and Mexico. In such instances, the term dependency is a variable property of countries and is a concept in the theory. We ignore such usages at this point because we want here to emphasize the primary implication of the distinct epistemological tradition of dependencia theory, namely that in an orientation to knowledge that is wholistic and particularistic, the clear determination of general referential context is very meaningful. In fact it is of primary importance, because otherwise any knowledge of particular wholes is entirely arbitrary and unique. The primary importance of dependency, then, is to refer to the general context that is delimited. For details on this point, see Raymond Duvall; "Dependence and Dependencia Theory...", pp. 68-78. Furthermore, we speak of dependency theory as "currently constituted" because we believe that the basic perspective, the orientation to knowledge, and even the set of questions that have marked it persist as very important, especially, but increasingly less so, among Third World Scientists. There is some sentiment today that dependency theory is dead, at least among Latin Americans. That position is only tenable by defining very restrictively the set of questions that characterize dependency theory. Because somewhat different questions (e.g. the role and character of the peripheral capitalist state) attract more attention today is not to say that dependency theory has been increased. Such a misleading representation is offered or implied in Robert R. Kaufman, Harry I. Chernotsky, and Daniel S. Geller; "A preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency" in Comparative Politics, vol. 7, N° 3 (April 1975),

pp. 303-330; David Ray; "The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: The Basic Fallacies" in Journal of Inter American studies and World Affairs, vol. 15 (February 1973), pp. 4-20; Christopher Chase-Dunn; "The Effects of International Economic Dependency on Development and Inequality: A cross-National Study" in American Sociological Review, vol. 40 (December 1975), pp. 720-738; Patrick J. McGowan; "Economic Dependence and Economic Performance in Black Africa" in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 14 (March 1976), pp. 25-40.

45. Johan Galtung; "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" in Journal of Peace Research, N° 2 (1971), pp. 81-117; Raul Prebisch; Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America (New York, United Nations, 1963); Economic Commission for Latin America; Development Problems in Latin America (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1970). Also see G. Myrdal; Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London, Methuen, 1965), Hans W. Singer; International Development: Growth and Change (New York, McGraw-Hill 1964); I Wallerstein; The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979); Wallerstein; The Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1984).

46. Galtung; "A structural Theory of Imperialism", p. 81 Also see Galtung; The European Community; A Superpower in the making (London, Allen & Unwin, 1973) pp. 38-47.

47. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", pp. 85-90. Also see Helge Hveem; "The Global Dominance System" in Journal of Peace Research, vol. X N° 4 (1973), pp. 321ff. Also see James Caporaso; "Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence, and Exploitation" in Steven Rosen and James Kurth (eds); Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism, pp. 87-114. Nevertheless, the problem is now: the common logical error because dependency theory is concerned with the notion of dependency, whenever one talks about, measures or analyzes some particular aspect, form or dimension of dependency, one is thereby reflecting on dependency theory. That is simply not true. For example see F.H. Cardoso; "The consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States" in Latin American Research Review, vol. 12, N° 3 (1977); Frantisek Charvat, Jaroslav Kucera and Miroslav Soukup; "Toward the system Theory of Dependence: Further General Theoretical Remarks" in Hayward R. Alker, Jr, Karl Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel (eds); Mathematical Approaches to Politics (San Francisco, Jossey Bass, 1973) pp. 263-286; Hayward R. Alker, Jr; "On Political Capabilities in a schedule sense: Measuring Power, Integration and Development" in Hayward R. Alker, Jr, Karl Deutsch and Antoine H. Stoetzel (eds); Mathematical Approaches to Politics (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1973) pp. 307-373; Richard M. Emerson; "Power-Dependence Relations" in American sociological Review, Vol. 27, N° 1 (February, 1962), pp. 31-41. Thomas Baumgartner, Walter Buckley, and Tom R. Burns; "Rational Control: The Human Structuring of Cooperation and conflict" in Journal of conflict Resolution, vol. 19 (1975), pp. 417-440.

48. Galtung; "A structural Theory of Imperialism", p.

49. ibid
50. Johan Galtung; "The Lomé convention and Neo-Capitalism" in The African Review, vol. VI, N° 1 (1976) pp. 36-37
51. ibid, pp. 37-38
52. ibid, pp. 39-4
53. ibid, p. 37
54. ibid, pp. 37-38
55. Antola; "The European Community and Africa: A Neo-Colonial Model of Development" in Peace and the Sciences (Vienna), N° 4 (December, 1976), p. 29
56. Karl Marx; Capital (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976), Book III, vol. III, p. 237.
57. Rosa Luxemburg; l'Accumulation du Capital (Paris, Maspero, 1976), vol. II, pp. 148-153.
58. Vladimir I Lenin; Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow, International Publishers, 1970), p. 89
59. ibid, p. 63
60. ibid, p. 81.
61. Luxemburg; l'Accumulation du Capital, p. 95
62. Samir Amin; Accumulation on a World Scale, vol. 1 (Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1971); F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto; Dependency and Development in Latin America (Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1978); Theotonio Dos Santos; "The Structure of Dependence" in American Economic Review, vol. LX, N° 2 (May 1970), pp. 321-236 and Andre G. Frank; Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (London, Macmillan, 1978).
63. Dos Santos; "The Structure of Dependence", p. 231.
64. For such views, see F.H. Cardoso; "Dependency and Development in Latin America" in New Left Review, N° 74 (July-August 1972), pp. 83-85; Bill Warren; "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization" in New Left Review n° 81(1973), pp. 3-44
65. See for instance, Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, vol. II, Frank; Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment; Ake; Revolutionary Pressures in Africa.
66. Justinian Rweyemanu; Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 16
67. James A Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global system: A Structural and Behavioural Analysis" in International Organization, vol. 32, N° 1 (Winter 1978), pp. 13-43. It is the confounding of these two senses of dependency-one that appears in our ordinary language and one that is more explicitly theory laden - that Lall tries to deal with in his article; "Is Dependence a Useful concept in Analyzing Development?"

Similarly, Alker, Jr makes this conceptual linkages explicit. He focuses his attention on the Dahl-Harsanyi conception of power and in doing so introduces the concept of dependency as the direct opposite of power, equivalent to powerlessness. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr et al; op. cit., pp. 308 and 311. For the analysis of the Dahl-Haranyi Conception of power, see John C. Harsanyi; "Measurement of social Power, Opportunity cost, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games" in J. David Singer (ed); Human Behaviour and Internationan Politics (Chicago III, Rand McNally & C°, 1965), pp. 378-385 and John C. Harsanyi "Measurement of social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power situations" Roderick A. Bell, David Edwards and R. Harrison Wagner (eds); Political Power (New York, Free Press, 1969); Christopher Chase-Dunn; "The Effects of International Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross-National Study" in American Sociological Review, vol. 40 (December 1975); Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz; "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework" in American Political Science Review, vol. 57 (1963).

68. Walter Rodney; How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1974), pp. 21-22.

69. I Wallerstein; The Capitalist World Economy; Wallerstein; The Politics of the World Economy; Samir Amin; "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and contemporary Forms" in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 10, N° 4 (1972), pp. 503-524; Rodney; How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.

70. Ake; A Political Economy of Africa; Celso Furtado; Development and Underdevelopment (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967); Havelock Brewster; "Economic Dependence: A Quantitative Interpretation" in Social and Economic Studies, vol. 22, N° 1 (March 1973), pp. 81-104, N. Girvan; "The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Comparison" in Social and Economic Studies, vol. 22, N° 1 (March, 1973), pp. 106-132.

71. Kwame Nkrumah; Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York International Publishers, 1966).

72. Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The case of Dependency Theory" in World Politics, vol. 31, N° 2 (1979), p. 249.

73. Ake; Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, p. 30

74. Richard S. Olson; "Economic coercion in World Politics with a Focus on North-South Relations", in World Politics, vol. 31, N° 4 (1979)

75. ibid

76. Willard Scott Thompson; Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969); Ronald T. Libby; "External Cooptation of Less Developed country's Policy-making: The case of Ghana" in World Politics, vol. 29 (1976).

77. Smith; "The Underdevelopment of Development

Literature", p. 251.

78. Ake; Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, p. 65
79. Ali Mazrui; Africa's International Relations, (London, Heinemann, 1977) pp. 4-13.
80. Smith; "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature", p. 250.
81. See footnote 41 above.
82. See I. Wallerstein; "Dependence in an inter-dependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the capitalist World Economy" in African studies Review, vol. 17 (1974); Wallerstein; "The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy" in Peter C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds): The Political Economy of contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1976); Wallerstein; "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System" in Comparative Studies in Society and History; vol. 16 (1974).
83. Thomas J. Biersteker; "Self-reliance in Theory and Practice in Tanzanian Trade Relations" in International Organization, vol. 34 N° 2 (1980).
84. Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya, pp. 16-17.
85. Ake; Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, pp. 25 and 55
86. Gerald K. Helleiner; "Aid and Dependence in Africa: Issues for Recipients", in Thomas Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds); The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development (New York, Africana Publishing company, 1979), p. 224.
87. Adele Jinadu, "A Review Essay of Revolutionary Pressures in Africa" in Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, vol. 19, N° 2 (1977) p. 78
88. Helleiner, "Aid and Dependence in Africa", p. 223.
89. Ibid, pp. 233-236.
90. Robert Martin; "The Use of state Power to overcome Underdevelopment" in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 18, N° 2 (1980).
91. Smith; "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature" pp. 249-255
92. Bierstaker; "self-reliance in Theory and Practice in Tanzanian Trade Relations"; Olatunde J.B. Ojo; "Self-reliance as a Development Strategy" in Claude Ake(ed); A Political Economy of Contemporary Nigeria (London, Longman, 1983).
93. Ake; Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, p. 49.
94. Wallerstein; "Dependence in an Inter-dependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the capitalist World Economy" in African Studies Review, VOL. 17(1974).
95. Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 20

96. Wallerstein; "Dependence in an Inter-dependent World ..." pp. 221-230

97. Dos Santos; "The Structure of Dependence", pp. 231-236.

98. G. Hyden; Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London, Heinemann, 1980).

99. Steven W. Langdon; "A commentary on Africa and the World Economy; Theoretical Perspectives and Present Trends" Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of Africa studies Association (October, 1981) at Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.; Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya; Martin; "The use of state Power to overcome Underdevelopment".

100. Cooper; "Africa and the World Economy", p. 8

101. René Dumont; False Start in Africa (New York, Praeger, 1969); Dumont; Socialisms and Development (London, André Deutsch, 1973); Jean-François Bayart; l'Etat en Afrique: La Politique du Ventre (Paris, Fayard, 1989). Also see Pierre Pean; l'Argent Noir: Corruption et Sous-Développement (Paris Fayard, 1988)

102. Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 274.

103. Ake; A political Economy of Africa, p. 188

104. ibid, p. 180

105. Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya, p. 18

106. Langdon; "A commentary on Africa and the World Economy ....", p. 9.

107. ibid,

108. Wallerstein; "Dependence in an Inter-dépendent World ...", pp. 221-230.

109. Peter Evans; Dependent Development (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979). However it must be noted that several European and students of Africa, at least, have made substantial contributions to the literature on "peripheral capitalism" with exactly the same concern as the Latin American scholars who are universally recognized as the dependentistas. For example, see Dieter Senghaas; "Multinational Corporations and the Third World: On the Problem of the Further Integration of Peripheries into the Given Structure of the International Economic system" in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 12, N°4 (1975), pp. 257-274; Eva senghaas - Knobloch; "The Internationalization of capital and the Process of Underdevelopment: The case of Black Africa", in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 12, N° 4 (1975) pp. 275-292; Samir Amin; Accumulation on a World Scale; Ernest Mandal; Late Capitalism (London, NLB, 1975); Walter Rodney; How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.

110. John Mandeleley; "The Third World Pressures at Nairobi: The Political Economic significance of UNCTAD IV" in Round Table, vol. 264 (1976). Also see Branislav Gosdiv; UNCTAD .../...

Conflict and confrontation: The Third World's Quest for an Equitable Economic order through the United Nations (Leiden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1972); Zalmay Haquani; UNCTAD for a New Economic Order (New York; UNCTAD/UN, 1978) and Garvet Fitzgerald; Unequal Partner; North-South Dialogue: A Balance sheet on the Eve of UNCTADV (New York UN/UNCTAD, 1979).

111. Isebill Gruhn; "The Lomé convention: Inching towards Interdependence" in International Organization, vol. 30, N° 2 (1976).

112. Richard E. Bissell; "African Power in International Resource Organizations" in The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 17, N° 1 (1979); Zuhary Mikdashi; The International Politics of Natural Resources (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1976).

113. Mazrui; Africa's International Relations, pp. 5-6 and 21.

114. Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, p. 185

115. ibid, pp. 24-25

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117. Robert B. Seidman; The state, Law and Development (New York, st Martin, 1978); Smith; "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature"; Cooper; "Africa and the World Economy"; Cardoso and Faletto; Dependency and Development in Latin America, pp. 18-25; F.H. Cardoso; "Teoria de la Dependencia" "0 Analysis de situaciones concretas de Dependencia" (The Theory of Dependencia: An Analysis of concrete situations, Dependencia) in Revista Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política, vol. 1 (December 1970), pp. 404 -416; Dieter Senghaas; "Introduction" to a Special Issue, "Overcoming Underdevelopment" in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 12, N°4 (1975), pp 249-250 and Raymond D. Duvall; "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of concept and Argument" in International Organization, vol. 32, N° 1 (Winter 1978), pp. 51-78.

118. Seidman; The state, Law and Development, p. 318

119. Langdon; "A commentary on Africa and the World Economy ...".

120. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association (October, 1981) at Bloomington, Indiana, USA.

121. James N. Rosenau (ed); Linkage Politics: Essays on the convergence of National and International Systems (New York, The Free Press, 1969); Rosenau (ed); International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York, The Free Press, 1969); Rosenau; The study of Political Adaptation (London, Pinter, 1980); Resenau et al; World Politics: An Introduction (New York The Free Press, 1976).

122. N. R. Richardson and C.W. Kegley, Jr; "Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy compliance" in International .../...

Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, N° 2 (June 1980), pp. 190-198. The study explores the possibility that, in their foreign policy behaviour, dependencies offer support to the foreign policy objectives of a dominant state. "They may be reluctant to offer this support, but they may feel compelled to do so because the dominant state has asymmetric control over the costs and benefits (Long - as well as short - run) to be derived from trade relations. This means that the foreign policy behaviour of dependencies is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country"

123. Also see Cart Wright and Zander (eds); Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (New York. Harper & Row, 1968). and H.C. Kelman; "compliance, Identification, and Internationalization: Three Processes of Attitude change" in Journal of conflict Resolution, vol. 2 (1970), pp 51-60

124. Richard and Kegley, Jr; "Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy compliance", pp. 190-102.

125. James N. Rosenau; "Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World" in James N. Rosenau (ed); Linkage Politics (New York, The Free Press, 1969) pp. 2-3. Also see J. Hartmann; "Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy: The case of Tanzania" in The African Review, vol. 7, N° 3 and 4 (1977), pp. 70-91.

126. Rosenau; "Introduction; Political science in a shrinking World", pp. 4-6 Also see Rosenau; Of Boundaries and Bridges; A Report on a Conference on the Interdependencies of National and International Political System (Princeton, Center of International studies, Research Monograph, n° 27; 1967), pp. 11-62.

127. James N. Rosenau; "Towards the study of National-International Linkages" in James N. Rosenau(ed); Linkage Politics, pp. 44-63. For an attempt to identify those types of foreign policy issues that are indistinguishable from domestic issues in so far as the general operation of political systems is concerned see James N. Rosenau; "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area" in James N. Rosenau (ed); Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, Free Press, 1967), pp. 11-50 and James N. Rosenau; "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell(ed); Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston III, North Western University Press, 1966) pp. 27-92.

128. J. David singer, "The Global System and Its subsystem: A Developmental view" in James Rosenau(ed) Linkage Politics, pp. 21-41. Also see Rosenau; "Towards the study of National-International LINKAGES", pp. 44-63 and Douglas A. Chalmers; "Developing on the Periphery; External Factors in Latin American Politics" in James N. Rosenau(ed); Linkage Politics, pp. 67-93.

129. James N. Rosenau; "Towards the study of National - International Politics, pp. 46-56. The term "environment" has special meanings for students of international Politics (of Harold and Margerat Sprout; The Ecological Perspective on



Human Affairs (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965). In this discussion it is employed in the more general systems theory sense with which students of comparative politics are familiar. It is conceived as an analytic entity consisting of all the human and nonhuman phenomena that exist external to a polity, irrespective of whether their existence is perceived by the actors of the polity. Our use also posits the environment as having external and internal dimensions with the "external environment" referring to the human and non-human phenomena located external to the geographical space of the society. Since we shall be mainly concerned with the external environment, however, we shall simply simplify matters by referring to it as the "environment" while always using the proper designation when we have the occasion to mention the internal environment: Furthermore, as a result of this formulation the external environment of a polity is conceived to be the equivalent to the same phenomena as comprise any international system of which the polity is a component part. Thus we shall be using the notions of environment and international system interchangeably, depending on whether we wish to refer to the phenomena in the context, respectively, of a single polity or of the interaction of two or more polities. Also see James N. Rosenau, "The concept of Intervention" in Journal of International Affairs, vol. XXII (1968), pp. 165-177

130. James N. Rosenau; "Towards the study of National-International Linkages" p. 46-48. Also see Michael O'Leary; "Linkages between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations" in James N. Rosenau (ed); Linkage Politics, pp. 324-346 and James N. Rosenau; The study of Political Adaptation (London, Frances Pinter, 1980).

131. James N. Rosenau, "Toward the study of National-International Linkages" pp. 48-49 and Rosenau; The study of Political Adaptation, pp. 52-92

132. Joseph Mbenoh Wuakoh; A Systems Analysis of the Middle Eastern Crisis, 1948-1973: A Study in the Application of International Relations Theory (Yaounde, IRIC, Maîtrise Thesis, 1987), pp. 1-84. Also see the analysis of the same concept made throughout L. Cantori and S.C. Spiegel; The International Politics of Regions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970) especially their "Introduction".

133. Robert Kaufman et al; "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency" in Comparative Politics, vol. VII (Paril 1975), pp. 303-330; James A. Caporaso; "Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development studies" in International Organization, vol. XXXIV (Autumn 1980), pp. 605-628, and Tony Smith; "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited" in International Organization, vol. XXXV (Autumn 1981), pp. 755-762.

134. Rosenau; "Toward the study of National-International Linkages", pp.44-63. An interesting example of fused Linkages in a developing state may be found in A stephan(ed); Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, Futures (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1973).

135. ibid

136. Leendert M. Koyck; Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis (Amsterdam, North Holland, 1954). What we present here is a standard formulation for what are called distributed-lag models. These are masterfully summarized in Zvi Griliches; "Distributed Lags: A survey" in Econometrica vol. 35, N° 1 (Jan. 1967), pp. 16-49.

137. Model (1) can be written as :

$$Y = \alpha^* [W_0 X_t + W_1 X_{t-1} + W_2 X_{t-2} + \dots + W_n X_{t-n}] + \mu_t$$

where  $\sum_i W_i = 1$ .

The  $\alpha^*$  term appears in subsequent formulations in this section and it is used in a fashion consistent with this rewriting of model (I). In the subsequent formulations, we assume that  $W_0 = 0$ . That is, we assume that these are no instantaneous impacts of X on Y.

138. Fernando H. Cardoso; "Teoria de la Dependencia '0 Analisis de situaciones concretas de Dependencia?".

139. Raymond D. Duvall; A Formal Model of "Dependencia" Theory: Structure and Measurement (New Haven; Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1977)

140. ibid, pp. 121-203. The need for such explanations is stated clearly by F.H. Cardoso; "Some New Mistaken Theses on Latin American Development and Dependency" Latin American Perspective, vol. 3, N° 2 (spring 1976). A similar line of argument could be found in Leys; Underdevelopment in Kenya, pp. 207- 212 and Ralph Miliband; The state in Capitalist society: An Analysis of the Western system of Power (New York, Basic Books, 1969).

141. A number of works provide important arguments to be modeled. In particular, see Guillermo A. O'Donnell; Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973); Julio Cotler; "The New Model of Political Domination in Peru" in Abraham Lowenthal (ed); The Peruvian Experiment (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1975); Quijano Obregon; "Imperialism and International Relations in Latin America" in Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen (eds); Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1974); F.H. Cardoso; "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" and Abraham Lowenthal; "Armies and Politics in Latin America" in World Politics, vol. 27, N°1 (October 1974), pp. 107-130

142. Also see Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and dependency Theory: Notes Toward Precision and Argument" in International Organization. N° 32, N°1 (Winter 1978), pp. 72-78.

143. See Anthony G. Hopkins; An Economic History of West Africa (London, Longman, 1973), pp. 16-88

144. Claude Ake; Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development (Ibadan University Press 1975), pp. 16-72.

145. Maria J. Falco; Truth and Meaning in Political Science: An Introduction to Political Inquiry (Columbus, Ohio, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co 1973) p. 46

146. ibid; p. 47

147. ibid, p. 48

148. A. L. Kalleberg; "Concept Formulation in Normative and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconstruction in Political Theory" in American Political Science Review, vol. XLIII. N°1 (1969). p. 28. Also see M. B. Nicholson; The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour: A Defense of Empiricism in Social Science (London, Frances Pinter, 1983) pp. 16-48 and G. Almond and S.J. Genco; "Clouds, clocks and the study of Politics" in World Politics, vol. XXIX, n° 4(1977), pp. 489-522;

149. ibid

150. ibid

151. K. W. Deutsch; "On Political Theory and Political Action" in American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, N°1 (1971), pp. 11-27. Also see John R. Karlik; "Economic Factors Influencing Foreign Policy" in Robert A. Bauer(ed); The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy (Virginia, Virginia University Press, 1975); John P. Hardt; "Soviet Commercial Relations and Political Change" in Robert A. Bauer(ed); The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy, pp. 23-84; Young C. Kim; "The Interaction of Economics and Japanese Foreign Policy" in Robert A. Bauer (ed) The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy", pp. 130-161; D.A. Zinnes and J. Wilkenfeld; "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations" in W. Harrieder (ed); Comparative Foreign Policy (New York, David McKay. 1971) pp. 167-213; Douglas A Hibbs, Jr; Mass Political Violence: A cross-National Causal Analysis (New York, Wiley and sons, 1973); and Robert North and Nazli Choucri; Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (Boston, M.I.T. Press, 1975) chapters, 1, 2 and 3.

152. James N. Rosenau; "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R.B. Farrell (ed); Approaches to comparative and International Politics (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1966). Also see Joseph La Palombara; "Parsimony and Empiricism in comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholastic view" in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner(ed); The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York, The Free Press, 1970), pp. 123-149; Richard J. Tretheway; "International Economics and Politics: A Theoretical Framework" in Robert A. Bauer(ed); The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy (Charlottesville; The University of Virginia Press, 1975), pp. 1-24

153. John W. Eley and John H. Peterson, "Economic Interest and American Foreign Policy Allocations, 1960-1969" in Patrick McGowan; Sage International Year book of Foreign Policy studies (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 161-187.

154. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris; Society Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore. The John Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 76-81; John V. Gillespie and Dinna A. Zinnes; Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1971) and R.J. Rummel; The Dimension of Nations (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1972).

155. Raymond W. Copson; "Foreign Policy Conflict Among African States, 1964-1969" in Patrick McGowan(ed); Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, pp. 189-219.

156. Karl W. Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas; "The steps to War: A Survey of system Levels, Decision stages and Research Results" in Patrick McGowan (ed); Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, pp. 275-333

157. The behavioralists and the empiricists such as J. David Singer, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Heinz Fulau; Hayward Alker, Rudolph J. Rummel, Melvin small, Dina A. Zinnes, Ole R. Holsti, Robert North, Richard Brody, and others are constantly applying interdisciplinary research tools to explain interactions of political, economic, cultural, psychological and sociological phenomena.

158. Asikpo J. Essien-Ibok; Economic Determinants of Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Quantitative Methodological Approach (Washington, D.C., Ph. D. Dissertation, Howard University, 1980) p. 52.

159. These are Johan Galtung's "vertical trade variable" and "feudal trade variable" respectively; see Johan Galtung; "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", pp. 101-103; R.H. Green; "Political Independence and the National Economy: An Essay on the Political Economy of Decolonization" in G. Allen and R.W. Johnson(eds); African Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 289-290; M.R. Singer; Weak States in a World of Powers (New York, The free Press, 1972), pp. 222-223; and B. Stallings; Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America (London, Sage Publications, 1972), p. 7

160. According to Galtung; "A structural Theory of Imperialism" p. 102, the trade composition index is based on the following formula:

$$\frac{(a + d) - (c + c)}{a + d + (b + c)} \text{ where}$$

- a). is the value of raw materials imported
- b) is the value of raw materials exported
- c) is the value of processed goods imported
- d) is the value of processed goods exported

161. Some of the indexes for aid and investment are taken from R.H. Green; "Political independence and National Economy", pp. 288-291; and M.R. Singer; Weak States in a World of Powers, P. 223.

162. All the X's and Y's in the equations in this study  
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are computed on first differences. For similar computations see Essen-BOOK; Economic Determinants of Nigeria's Foreign Policy; pp, 261-283.

163. Klaus Knorr; The Power of Nations (New York, Basic Books, 1975); Knorr; Military Power and Potential (London, Heath, 1971); Knorr; Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (New York, Basic Books, 1973)

164. Carl von Clausewitz; On War (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 2 and 23

165. David W. Ziegler; War, Peace and International Politics (Boston, Little, Brown and C°, 1977)

166. This is in reference to the formula developed by Arend Lijphart for calculating an index of agreement:

$$IA = \frac{f + 1/29}{t} \times 100 \quad \text{where}$$

"t" equals the total number of votes under consideration;  
"f" equals the number of votes on which Cameroon and the United States (or Soviet Union) are in full agreement, and "g" equals the number of votes on which they disagree in part. See Arend Lijphart; "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A critical proposal", in American Political Science Review, vol. LVIII, N° 4 (December 1963), pp. 902-917

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## CHAPTER THREE

### PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE DEVELOPING

#### STATE : CAMEROON EXPERIENCE 1960-1982

##### 3.1: INTRODUCTION

In chapter Two we put forward the hypothesis that "because of the strong correlation between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, its pattern of diplomatic interaction and behaviour is determined by and geared towards economic development". The aim of this chapter is to verify this hypothesis through an examination of the main principles and objectives of the foreign policy of the developing state from the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982.

Some aspects of international politics and foreign policy can be accounted for by reference to systemic conditions.<sup>1</sup> But states do not just react or adjust to limitations imposed by the external environment. Nation-states have needs and purposes many of which they can achieve or meet only by influencing the behaviour of other states. A large portion of foreign policy making is, to be sure, concerned with the day-to-day problem solving as issues arise at home and abroad. Foreign policy makers are normally concerned with immediate, mundane matters of narrow scope. However, "most governments also have some objective that they are attempting to achieve through the ordering of various actions that reflect needs and purposes."<sup>2</sup> The objectives may be very specific, relating to a particular problem or may be general. In this context foreign policy has been defined as a "co-ordinated strategy with which institutionally designated decision-makers seek to manipulate the international environment"<sup>3</sup> in order to achieve certain national objectives. This definition is suggestive because it insists not only on the interpenetration of national and international systems, but also on the fact that decisions are usually made on behalf of the state concerned by the incumbents of policy making positions.

Indeed, the primary task of all framers of foreign policy is to articulate the country's national interest and to relate them to those of other nations within the international system. Sometimes the term "national interest" has been used as a device for analyzing nations' objectives. There has developed, in fact, a prolonged scholarly debate on the meaning of this concept, but little agreement has arisen.<sup>4</sup> The vagueness of the concept is its main shortcoming. As Paul seabury has noted:

The idea of national interests may refer to some ideal set of purposes which a nation...should seek to realize in the conduct of its foreign relations. Wanting a better word, we might call this a normative, civic concept of national interest... A second meaning of equal importance might be called descriptive. In this sense the national interest may be regarded as those purposes which the nation, through its leadership, appears to pursue persistently through time. When we speak of national interest in the descriptive sense, we move out of the metaphysical into the realms of facts... It might similarly be said that the national interest is what foreign policy-makers say it is. A third definition of national interest might make the meaning of national interest somewhat clearer. The American national interest has often been an area for conflict among individuals and groups whose conception of it... have differed widely. Disagreement about policy and action may arise even among men who are essentially in agreement about the general aims of their country in the world. But policy disagreements are usually due to differences among policy-makers about conceptions both of what the United States is and what its role in world politics, even its mission should be.<sup>5</sup>

Eventhough there may be some immutable national interests such as self-preservation, to which everyone will agree, no one can claim with certainty that any other specific goal or set of goals is in the national interest. However, efficient pursuit of foreign policy goals presupposes the existence of sound and widely accepted general principles on which to base an overall foreign policy.

As far as this study is concerned, we will avoid the term national interest (because of its ambiguity) and substitute it with the concept of objective, which is essentially an "image" of a future state of affairs and future set of conditions that governments through individual policy makers

aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing or sustaining the behaviour of other states.<sup>6</sup> The future state of affairs may refer to concrete conditions or to values or to a combination of the two. Some objectives remain constant over centuries and directly involve the lives and welfare of all members of a national society. Others change almost daily and concern only a handful of citizens, for example, to protect a small industry from foreign competition. These are private interests translated into public policy. Even if we use the term objective to describe the great variety of collective interests and values that operate in foreign policy, we should not assume that policy makers spend all their time carefully formulating logical and coherent sets of collective or private goals to pursue systematically through the rational ordering of means to ends. Some policy makers, of course, spend time and resources to define the ultimate goals of their actions and consistently follow them up.

If some governments operate to fulfil a series of logically consistent goals, many more do not seem to be working towards the achievement of any specific objective, or, at best, seem to improvise policies to meet specific domestic or external crises or commitments. This is not surprising for most transactions between governments are routine and unplanned and serve primarily the interests and needs of a few individuals. In other words, governments have no real policies but only respond to the initiative of others. They are concerned with solving problems as they arise, not with defining long-range objectives and formulating the means to achieve them. As Paul Seabury points out again:

All too often policy is the product of random, haphazard, or even irrational forces and events, Equally often it is the result of dead-locked judgements, an uneasy compromise formula. Often what appears on the surface as a nation's settled course of inability to act. It may be no policy at all but simply a drift with events. Sometimes foreign policies are the products of statement's passive compliance with strong domestic political pressure and thus products of contending political forces within the nation itself. Finally, policy may be due to statesmen's abdication of choice and rational judgement in the face of ruthless and strong external pressures.



Nevertheless, when using the concept of objective, we should bear in mind that governments often pursue incompatible objectives simultaneously. It is the task of policy makers to rank and choose among conflicting objectives and determine which are feasible within a specific set of circumstances.

In this context, it must be remarked that although principles are sometimes held without much regard to changes in the international environment, and although expediency may compel policy makers to adopt a position out of harmony with accepted principles, the prevalence and constant resort to these principles in the conduct of foreign policy suggest that they perform important functions in foreign policy formulation and execution.<sup>8</sup> Shared by the policy makers and the mass public, they provide a sound basis on which widely accepted policies can be formulated. They also shape and limit a state's foreign policy objectives. Principles are inextricably fused with the objectives of foreign policy and a change in objectives usually leads to a change in principles. This close link between principles and objectives of foreign policy is recognized and is one of the basic tenets of the realist's approach to international relations. The main function of this chapter, therefore, is to outline and analyze the general principles and objectives that the Cameroon government regarded as the bases of its foreign policy between 1960 and 1982. In this chapter we shall review some of the key factors that have contributed to shaping Cameroon's foreign policy. These foreign policy objectives (premises) were a combination of the perceptions of the foreign policy elite and the domestic structures of the Cameroonian society

The official Cameroonian foreign policy objectives were nonalignment in East-West cleavage, Pan-Africanism, the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, anticolonialism and anti-racialism, national self-reliance and rapid economic development, and the promotion and defense of world peace. Cameroon's foreign policy objectives served a dual function. On the one hand they defined "positive" national goals deemed essential for enhancing the national interests.

In serving this function Cameroon's foreign policy objectives were simply a list of national goals. On the other hand Cameroon's foreign policy objectives were more than national goals in the sense that they also served as the ideological and practical premises which propelled the effort to accomplish these national goals.

(A) PRINCIPLES OF CAMEROON'S FOREIGN POLICY

The aim of this section is to analyze the ideological bases of Cameroon's foreign policy. International politics, like domestic politics is significantly influenced by a body of ideas, doctrines, beliefs and values sometimes referred to as an ideology or principles. Indeed, no state can do without an ideology or principles. Even when it has no well-defined national principles on which its international policies are based, it is unlikely to avoid the influence of existing doctrines and ideas. An ideology may rest upon generally accepted truths, but is likely to contain substantial myth.<sup>9</sup> In the process of framing foreign policy, such a system of beliefs and ideas performs important functions.

First, it establishes the intellectual framework through which foreign policy actors observe the domestic and international political scenes. It also permits the identification of an official enemy either in terms of a nation or set of nations or in terms of a series of systemic processes such as racialism, colonialism, etc. Secondly, it makes for legitimate policy choices and provides satisfactory answers to the political and psychological needs of society. While they may sometimes be too abstract and complicated to be fully understood by the masses, their slogans and symbols can be easily grasped and widely disseminated. In its third function, ideology not only establishes long-range foreign policy goals, but "it becomes the values to be defended in foreign policy, as indeed, in domestic politics".<sup>10</sup> It may serve as a rationalization for action, but it helps to indicate possibilities for state action. Fourthly it establishes evaluative criteria for judging and assessing a state's international behaviour. In most cases policy makers do not like to be told that their foreign policy assumptions are wrong, or that the images upon which their actions are based

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are not consonant with reality. Finally, for the developing state in search of its identity and for people in search of unity and material well-being, ideology can serve "both as a lifebuoy of stability in a maelstrom of change and as a chart that promises safe arrival at the desired goal".<sup>11</sup> Because of these functions, no foreign policy analyst can safely ignore the importance and significance of ideology in foreign policy formulation and execution. This section does not pretend to be an exhaustive examination of the complex interrelationship between ideology and Cameroon's foreign policy since independence. Such a study would not only presuppose the existence of a well developed national ideology but would require a psycho-analysis of the hidden, private or even subconscious motives and intentions of the foreign policy elite of Cameroon. This section is therefore a modest attempt to analyze some of the dominant African ideas and doctrines that to some extent influenced the architects of foreign policy in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982.

### 3.2 : AFRICAN NATIONALISM AND ANTI-COLONIALISM

Pan-Africanism was an important condition which incorporated a national goal as well as a basic premise of Cameroon's foreign policy. Pan-Africanist movement first began as a black response to the global white dominance system. The humiliating experiences of slavery and colonialism gave birth to the movement of black solidarity geared to "rediscovering" black culture and civilization in the long historical past. The Pan-Africanist movement began in the Black Diaspora of the Western Hemisphere in the early twentieth century under the leadership of such eminent blacks as W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore.<sup>12</sup> Pan Africanism was later transported to Africa where it aided enormously in the decolonization movements of the 1950's and 1960's. With the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, Pan-Africanism underwent a fundamental change. Pan-Africanism began to emphasize not only the racial solidarity of blacks but also the geographical unity of the African continent. Pan-Africanism in its continental form forges solidarity between the sub-Saharan African blacks and the north African Arabs.

In post-independence Cameroon Pan-Africanism, as a liberating and unifying ideology, was incorporated as a basic

tenet and objective of Cameroon's foreign policy. Pan-Africanism, since Cameroon's independence in 1960, served as the ideological justification for aiding liberation movements in South Africa, and also for the collective effort of blacks Africans to solve their economic, political and cultural problems. Anti-racialism and anti-colonialism was the third foreign policy objective of Cameroon. The national struggle against racism and colonialism which dates back to the pre-independence period did not cease after Cameroon became independent because racism and colonialism are still serious problems of this present age. The incorporation of the anti-colonialist and anti-racialist struggle was a major national objective as well as a basic national ideology developed from Cameroon's humiliating experience as a former French and British colonial possession. This colonial experience contributed to keeping the momentum of the struggle alive in post-independence Cameroon. Cameroon's major area of interest in the anti-colonialist and anti-racialist struggle was always Africa, especially Southern Africa. In Southern Africa, a group of White Minority regimes dominated their numerically superior black population. Cameroon substantially aided the various liberation movements in sub Saharan Africa. Cameroon repeatedly insisted that its national survival was at stake until all vestiges of racism and colonialism were eradicated in Africa.

Pan-Africanism of African unity has featured prominently in Cameroon's foreign policy calculations because Cameroon's geographical location in Africa, its historical connection with the continent, its population and wealth inevitably place Cameroon in a prominent position in this region of the globe. Pan-Africanism which is one of the basic tenets of Cameroon's foreign policy is an ambiguous concept because of its various meanings. All Mazrui, an African political scientist, has listed five different dimensions of Pan-Africanism.

First is the sub-Saharan variety. This is the form that emphasizes the unity and solidarity of black peoples in sub-Saharan Africa. The second type is the trans-Saharan version. This variant stresses the unity between the sub-Saharan blacks and the north African Arabs and Berbers. Third, trans-Atlantic

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variety seeks to forge solidarity between the peoples of Black diaspora in the New World and the peoples of Africa. . The fourth type which is also trans-Atlantic in nature stresses the unity of black peoples of Africa and the Americans to the exclusion of the Arabs of North Africa. This version is strictly determined by racial affinity. The final level of Pan-Africanism is the West Hemispheric variant. It emphasizes the solidarity of blacks in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>13</sup>

Pan-Africanism in its various forms, seeks to correct the injustices and inequalities of history. The Trans-Saharan variant, i.e. the black-Arab solidarity type, was born out of a common experience of colonialism. The global type that emphasizes black solidarity is an attempt to rectify the stigma of slavery and black degradation. The general objective of Pan-Africanism in its economic, political, and socio-cultural dimensions is to transform a position of weakness into one of power through collective action. Pan-Africanism attempts to project the dignity and the "African Personality"<sup>14</sup> of the African.

Cameroon's approach to Pan-African unity during the Ahidjo administration was gradual and functional. The foreign policy of Cameroon advocated respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states. The emphasis was that unity among African states was to be forged through loose associations in political, economic and social spheres. The Cameroonian functional approach contrasted fundamentally with Ghana's radical position which stressed the formation of a "United States of Africa" with a common African military high command, economic entity and continental government. Cameroon's African policy was passive. Despite Cameroon's increased involvement in Pan-African affairs, Cameroon continued to advocate a strong defense of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Here is a clash between nationalism and continental internationalism. Cameroon's foreign policy during this period addressed itself to the conflict between its national interest and African interests.

Possibly, the most ubiquitous principle that has shaped the foreign policy of most African states is nationalism.

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In original form, nationalism is not only "a strong loyalty and attachment to the nation and to its political organization"<sup>15</sup> but is also an attempt to make the boundaries of the state and those of the nation coincide.<sup>16</sup> Since the end of World War II, this ideological movement has become the strongest political force in the continent. It has for instance, threatened both to terminate all colonial and white minority rule in Africa and to sweep away the residual western influences in the continent. However, African nationalism differs greatly from 19th century European nationalism. First, unlike Europe where nationalism meant predominantly the right of national self-determination, in Africa it is essentially a desire for racial equality and personal emancipation. This egalitarian aspect of African nationalism has been very well stated by Basil Davidson:

Nationalism in Africa today is primarily a claim for equality of status and of right, for personal dignity, self-respect, full participation in the things of the material world as well as in the things of the spirit; a consistent effort to rescue Africans from their condition of acquired inferiority to which they have been relegated through the years.<sup>17</sup>

There is a second reason why the European-derived framework is no longer relevant to contemporary African nationalism. In 19th century Europe, the reference group for nationalism was an existent nation, hence nationhood was accepted as the legitimizing principle. In contrast, the reference group for African nationalism is territorially defined. The African states themselves, because of their ethnic and cultural diversities cannot avail themselves of nationhood as a legitimizing principle. Moreover, the independent African states emerged as a result of the disintegration of the European colonial system in most parts of the continent. The national societies, through the nationalist movements which sprang from them won independence and took over the political and administrative framework as defined by the existing colonial boundaries. Thus, in a sense, most African states were antecedent to the nation. The artificial colonial boundaries have brought together diverse cultural and ethnic groups into a new set of ill-defined relationships. These facts were very well

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known to President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic when he declared at the 1963 African summit conference:

It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the boundaries of African nations on the pretext of racial, religious or linguistic criteria... should we take (these) criteria for settling our boundaries, many states in Africa would be blotted from the map<sup>18</sup>

Another conspicuous theme in African nationalism which helps to distinguish it from European nationalism is its great concern with black-white relations.<sup>19</sup> Apart from the fact that African nationalism originated from Europe, its first exponents were American and West Indian Blacks who were fully aware of the subordinate role of the black man in Western Societies and who themselves were victims of racism and apartheid. "The Problem of the twentieth century", declared W.E.B. Dubois at the first Pan-African Congress of 1900, "is the problem of the colour line - the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the island of the sea."<sup>20</sup> The Western blacks were later joined and were eventually swamped at the Pan-African Congresses by indigenous African intellectuals, most of whom had been exposed to racial discrimination and other unpleasant experiences during their studies in Europe and America. Besides, colonialism with its emphasis on white supremacy has had the same destructive effect upon the Africans as slavery and racial discrimination have had upon American and West Indian blacks. Not the least factor in this respect has been the racist regimes in Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies which remained, for the independent African states, living symbol of past exploitation and present grievances. With this brief examination of the main differences between African nationalism and 19th century European nationalist movements in mind, we can now proceed to consider two aspects of African nationalism - micro-nationalism and macro-nationalism. As we shall see, these two aspects of nationalism have conflicting effects on both the foreign policy postures of African states and inter-state relations in Africa. Furthermore, these two aspects of nationalism have determined "Africa's" response to an inheritance of dependency and underdevelopment (which) can now be divided

essentially into two contemporary types, reflective of the traditional choice between collaboration and confrontation—those countries and classes in favour of further incorporation into the Western system and those in favour of disengagement from it."<sup>21</sup> While the former emphasizes a conservative, legitimist and functional approach to intra-African Unity, the latter if consistently pursued, would lead the new states to embark upon militant Pan-Africanism and a revisionist approach to existing African boundaries. Of particular concern will be those domestic factors and forces that led independent African states to adopt micro-and macro-nationalism or political independence and Pan-Africanism as linked goals.

Micro-nationalism tends to think of the new African states in terms of the existing colonial boundaries and the corresponding territorial apportionments. It emphasizes such things as the inviolability of national boundaries, legal equality of all states and non-interference in the international affairs of other states. In short, it wants the new independent African states to stay just as they are within their inherited boundaries. It is important to note that although African boundaries were drawn with little regard to national entities<sup>22</sup> or the facts of economics and human geography, all the new African states have tended to accept in principle the colonial boundaries in conformity with the provisions of Article III (3) of the OAU charter. Thus, the colonial political structures and boundaries, despite their artificiality and arbitrary nature, constitute the necessary conditions for the formation of politically and economically integrated nations. In assessing the reactions of the African states to the territories and boundaries bequeathed to them by the colonial powers, it is essential to take into account first, certain domestic pressures which have apparently exercised a moderating influence, restraining their policy makers from advocating a militant Pan-Africanism or adopting a radical and revisionist approach to inter-African relations; and second, the perceptions, psychology and idiosyncracies of the national leadership groups. Here we shall focus only on the first aspect of the problem; the second aspect with

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special reference to Cameroon will be reserved for part two of this study.

In both francophone and anglophone Africa, political independence took place along the administrative lines of the colonial semi-states. The break-up of the old federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa at a time when the notion of African unity was being enthusiastically received and when "balkanization" had become a term of reproach is instructive in bringing to light the centrifugal forces that were, and still are, at work in Africa. The same phenomena could be found in Anglophone Africa. In each attempt for unification the desire to safeguard domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty created tension and disunity. Because of the individualistic manner in which the African states achieved political independence their self-image and identity have become associated with their inherited colonial frontiers. Once independent, a government develops vested interests and the people gradually become aware of their oneness and ties of mutual responsibilities. Thus, regardless of the size or economic viability, African states have now claimed the right to self-determination for their inherited territories.

Micro-nationalism is also a product of the political realities of the post-colonial situation. Because of the low degree of national cohesion and political consensus, the great poverty of the new states with their import-export colonial economic structures, and the preponderance of rural life. African politics is essentially concerned with domestic issues. The state leadership group, for instance, must justify their claims to authority by legitimizing their own position, embarking on rapid economic development and uniting their people in a feeling of nationhood. Moreover, the fragility of most African political systems, the delicate balancing of ethnic interests in each African state, and the vulnerability of some political systems to external incitement for secession have led the majority of African states to the realization that they have a mutual interests in establishing respect for the existing national boundaries. Claude Welch, after a systematic analysis of the various attempts at

political unification, has this to say about the problem:

Since independence, leaders of most African states have realized that a wholesale redrawing of frontiers (though possibly justified on economic, ethnic, geographic or other grounds) could open a Pandora's box of difficulties. Accordingly, African heads of state have tended to accept the status quo which, if not perfect, is less contentious than most adjustments<sup>23</sup>

Elsewhere he has declared emphatically that "the consolidation of independence and Africa's economic and social reconstruction... will likely precede the attainment of political union"<sup>24</sup> of African States. Infact, the creation of a United and prosperous nation within the territorial boundries inheted from colonialism is the fundamental task confronting every African leader.

There is another side to the advocacy of the Status quo, namely that even micro-nationalism with its emphasis on the right of self-determination and anti-colonialism, carried to its logical conclusion, could have implied a rejection of colonial boundaries. This point is very well expressed by saadia Touval when he declared that "for those who wished to abolish the entire colonial legacy, a logical corollary would have been to reject also the colonial borders."<sup>25</sup> However, most African interpretations of the right of self-determination differed markedly from those interpretations based on the European-derived framework. As already stated, since the reference group of European nationalism was an existent nation, nationhood was accepted as the legitimizing principle. On the contrary, the African interpretation of the right of self-determination has always emphasized the fact that the principle is applicable to the colonial territory as a whole, within the inherited borders. In other words, the principle has relavance only where foreign domination or external aggression is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is secession by dissident ethnic or cultural groups.<sup>26</sup> Thus, paradoxically domestic political instability and related economic and social pressures have compelled the African states not only to become champions of micro-nationalism but also to embark on a new interpretation of self-determination, their radical-nationalist and anti-colonial positions notwithstanding.<sup>27</sup>

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In the African context, macro-nationalism is generally referred to as Pan-Africanism. Here the reference group for nationalism is not only "scattered and diffuse", but is defined in continental terms. Although African nationalism is in many ways introspective, there are forces working in the opposite direction-towards intra-African cooperation and supranational political unity. Broadly speaking, Pan-Africanism is more a converging set of aspirations than a clearly worked out doctrine. It has roots deep in the historical contacts and the socio-cultural similarities among African peoples and is based on the sense of racial affinity (blackism) that sharing a common colour gives, though the shades of colour show a wide range. Based on a common resentment of the slave trade and colonial past, its primary concern is to develop an African state system that can save the continent from the ever-increasing dangers of neo-colonialism and its major instrument, balkanization. Culturally, it stems from the desire of people whose culture was spurned to re-assert that culture and to develop in way proper to themselves. Pan-Africanism is, in this sense, a form of protest and resistance movement whose, five cardinal principles are (i) the termination of all colonial and white minority rule in Africa: (ii) the creation of suprastate political unification, be it regional or continental in scope; (iii) the consolidation of Africa's political independence and the elimination of any form of imperialism and neo-colonialism on the African continent; (iv) the development and projection of the African personality; and (v) a policy of independence or positive neutrality in the East-West conflict.

The arguments generally advanced in favour of African unity can be roughly divided into three categories-economic, political and cultural. Although the relative importance attached to each of these categories varies from one African country to another and from one era to the next, each of them deserves some elucidation. In terms of the economic arguments for pan-Africanism it has been said that colonialism not only created micro-states in Africa and established rigid patterns of import-export economies, but the artificial and arbitrary colonial boundaries have created obstacles to the

normal flow of economic activities.<sup>28</sup> The independent African states are also too small, weak and poor to be able to develop individually. The neo-colonialist forces control their economies and make a mockery of their economic policies. To solve some of these economic problems and create favourable conditions for the promotion of African economic development, the African states must form a supranational political union, or at least a customs union or common market. Such a political or economic union will (i) enable African countries with small internal markets to achieve economies of scale from larger industrial units producing for the amalgamated market; (ii) further specialization between individual members, in some cases exploiting different national resources and other advantages of the federating units; (iii) allow for the existence of more and, hopefully, competing industries thereby enhancing efficiency; and (iv) increase Africa's bargaining power. The amalgamated market would also be more diversified in structure and therefore less vulnerable to external fluctuations.<sup>29</sup>

The political arguments for unification are equally many and compelling. Apart from keeping Africa out of cold war conflicts, continental political unification would save the continent from all dangers and threats of imperialism and neocolonialism. It would also rid the continent of all vestiges of racism and white domination. The desire that Africans should take their political destiny in their own hands is forcefully expressed in the belief that a pan-African army under a joint high command could defend Africa against continuing aggression. Not the least impetus for political union has been the notion that a United States of Africa with more than 250million people would not only play a dominant role in international politics and exert a strong influence on the destiny of the world; but would help to liberate people of African descent living overseas from racial prejudices and other shortcomings of Western societies.<sup>30</sup> Another important theme in Pan-Africanism is the development and projection of the African personality. Centuries of exploitation, deprivation and contempt, it is often said, make it impossible for Africans and people of African descent to develop their personalities fully. .../...

To allow the black man, therefore, to continue to go with the squalid superficialities of white culture is to deprive him permanently of his dignity and self-respect, not only is the black man constantly humiliated and dehumanized in white societies, but the colonial system based as it was on white supremacy was maintained by a racial ideology which defined the black as inferior. To stop once and for all the cultural and political ascendancy of the whites over the blacks, Africa, in the words of Aime Cesaire, must re-personalize herself, move out from under the shadow of Europe and show the world that she too is an integral and inseparable part of humanity's achievement and endeavour.<sup>31</sup> The doctrine of African personality is thus a psychological response to the social and cultural conditions of the post-colonial situation and a weapon in the struggle for equality of status and of rights, for personal dignity and social redemption. It rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism, and stands for racial co-existence on the basis of absolute equality and respect for all mankind. As an instrument of Africa's cultural renaissance, it constantly calls attention to Africa's artistic and scholastic achievements, and denies the familiar European proposition that all in Africa was primitive, savage and chaotic before the coming of Europeans.

Notwithstanding the emotional support for Pan-Africanism or the seeming plausibility of some of the economic, political and cultural arguments for unification, there are grounds for scepticism. In the first place, the economic infrastructure for continental political union is largely absent. There is also the problem of ensuring equitable distribution of costs and benefits in any political or economic union. Because of various historical, natural and geographical reasons, members of a political or economic union are in most cases, not able to exploit the associational opportunities to the same degree. Eventhough they may all be better off than without the union, they certainly do not share the benefits in an equitable manner. This is likely to generate inter-group rivalries and tensions. Third, apart from the competitive and dependent nature of African economies, the key sectors, of the economies are heavily influenced or controlled by foreign

interests. Besides, African countries belong to different currency and preferential zones. The political ambitions of the various African leaders as well as the personal and ideological differences between them constitute another bottleneck in the unification process. Once independent, a country usually develop a particular national orientation that makes complete surrender of sovereignty to a supranational political union very unlikely. Independence also brought with it politicians, administrators and other leadership groups whose powers and prosperity largely depend on the preservation of the status quo.

Closely connected with these problems is the fact that the African continent is inhabited not only by black Africans but also by the Arabs of the North, and in the South by a small but militarily formidable set of whites. Although black Africans and the Arabs share many common experiences and problems which lead them to respond to the imperatives of the post-colonial situation in similar ways, individually they face the world from their unique positions. Furthermore, despite the notion of an underlying African cultural unity, negritude seeks to be to the blacks what Pan-Arabism is to the Arabs. Above all, for the Pan-African movement to achieve its desired goal, it would entail the emergence of a continental mass party and a common ideology more elaborate and inclusive than the present radical-nationalist position.<sup>32</sup> Not only are these lacking at the moment, but even pressure groups expressing Pan-African ideals are not well organized. Because of these and other related problems, Pan-African unity as a principle of African states' foreign policies has remained an empty slogan whose emotional impact, though great, has yet to be matched by major, concrete achievements.<sup>32</sup>

### 3.3 : NON-ALIGNMENT

Cameroon's foreign policy objectives (premises) derived from certain concrete historical experiences of the country. The policy of nonalignment, for instance, was a pragmatic device to enhance the national interest by attempting to be neutral in East-West conflict. Cameroon, like many developing countries, felt that by remaining nanaligned in the East-West struggle it would be in a better position to receive needed

material assistance for national development from the competing blocs. Thus by remaining neutral and avoiding entanglement in the costly East-West cleavage Cameroonian leaders expected to channel their limited national resources into the more meaningful modernization effort. The burden of underdevelopment and the country's rush to industrialization acted as compelling factors pushing Cameroon towards, nonalignment. During the 1960-1982 period, the Cameroonian government was vigorously anti-communist and initially rejected establishing contacts with the socialist bloc. The inability to finance all the national development projects through domestic and Western sources partly forced Cameroon to turn to the socialist countries for economic and technical assistance. Thus the anticipated communist bloc role in national development contributed to Cameroon's nonalignment policy, at least verbally. However, certain historical forces limited adherence to a genuine policy of nonalignment. The strong economic, politico-ideological and cultural ties between Cameroon and the Western bloc tended to impede any attempt to achieve a balance in Cameroon's foreign policy of nonalignment.

Nonalignment is the policy by certain nation-states, especially the Third World, in world politics which seeks freedom of action and refusal to join either of the two major global bloc in their competition. Nonalignment arose out of the conditions of world war II. With the end of the war began the era of the cold war between the two former allies—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Any treatment of the phenomenon of nonalignment needs necessarily to begin with the emergence of the cold war. However, considerations shall be given to certain major features of the contemporary international political environment.

First, the twentieth century witnessed the "shrinking" of the world and an unprecedented increase in contacts among people. The interdependent nature of the various global units became more obvious. Second, the rise in interdependence has dissolved substantially the "walls" that had supposedly shielded national units from external penetration. In effect, the dichotomy that had existed between the national and the international systems became more academic than real.

The output of one system readily transforms itself into the input of the other, and vice versa.

Third, interdependence has many dimensions. It involves benefits and costs. Greater contacts among nations contribute to better understanding, but they also increase antagonisms. Fourth, the twentieth century is an epoch of many social upheavals. In this period a new social system, socialism, came into existence and led to a fierce competition between it and capitalism for the domination of the world.

In addition to the struggle between capitalism and communism there arose the movement for decolonization. "Coloured" people in various parts of the globe began to protest white dominance in the international system. Inherited inequalities and injustices began to be challenged. Fifth, alliances among nations, especially the Great Powers became more fluid. The World War I alignment departed radically from that of World II. After World War II, international alignment among the great Powers, also, underwent a fundamental change. The Great Powers which had been the protectors of peace and stability became the dominant forces of disruption and instability. Seventh, social developments in various corners of the globe, especially the developing regions, took a chaotic turn as revolutionary ideas and events developed, shaking old-established social institutions. Therefore, nonalignment developed mainly as a result of the loss of political and moral authority of the major global powers, and the fear among the global poor that the Great Powers were now incapable of guaranteeing peace and stability.<sup>34</sup>

The Bandung Conference of 1955 was the first meeting of the nonaligned movement. Bandung was followed by subsequent nonaligned conferences in Belgrade, Cairo, Algiers, etc. Nonalignment initially began as a very loosely-defined concept but over the years developed into a more coherent form.

Nonalignment is neither neutral nor isolationist in world affairs, and does not constitute a third global bloc. Nonalignment rejects the idea that developing regions must inevitably fall into either of the great international blocs.



The nonaligned nations look upon the capitalist and socialist blocs as sources of economic and technical aid for their national development without ties. Friendly relations are, therefore, sought with both blocs, while the freedom to criticize the actions of the blocs is insisted upon. Above all, nonalignment rejects participation in military alliances with the contending blocs.<sup>35</sup>

A basic premise of Cameroon foreign policy was nonalignment in East-West cleavages. Ahmadou Ahidjo defined the position of his country on the East-West struggle in the following words:

We consider it wrong for the Cameroon Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs... The freedom of action will be an essential feature of our policy... Our policies will be founded on interest and will be consistent with the moral and democratic principles on which our constitution is based.<sup>36</sup>

Although Cameroon's foreign policy was ideologically (rhetorically) nonaligned in practice it was always pro-western. During the Ahidjo administration, there was much gap between the professed official foreign policy of nonalignment and the reality of alignment with the capitalist bloc. The rhetoric of nonalignment, in effect became a device to assuage domestic and international critics of Ahidjo's foreign policy. Hostility towards the communist bloc was very prevalent, despite official Cameroonian pronouncements of neutrality and friendship towards the two major global camps.

Ahidjo did not mince words in his rejection of the communist system. He insisted that;

We have, in effect, deliberately chosen planned Liberalism as a method of development. If the planning reflects our wish - after all a legitimate one - to use rationally the available resources, to limit the role of chance in the economic enterprise and consciously orient development towards calculated and previously determined objectives, on the other hand, we are convinced that Liberalism remains the decisive factor in progress. We are convinced of it because we do not believe in the effectiveness of constraints in economic matters... As a result, our plans remain essentially indicative so as to permit the free play of the spirit of enterprise which, in reality is only another form of .../...

the creative spirit and therefore requires the freedom to expand. This freedom is not only evident in our doctrine of planned Liberalism and the text which protect private property but has also been made manifestly Liberal which simultaneously guarantees the security (of assuring the profitability of their capital). The private sector will remain for a long time to come the leading one in industry (that is obvious) and this is why the government can hardly be tired of studying even more methods of attracting foreign investment.... The type of industrialization which conforms to the present situation of Cameroon is a selective industrialization favouring investments.<sup>37</sup>

The speech typified the contradiction between the official pronouncement of nonaligned foreign policy and the reality of the anti-communist sentiment characteristic of Ahidjo's government. Cameroon's non-adherence to a "genuinely" nonaligned foreign policy was mainly the result of its historical links with the West, the pro-capitalist orientation of its leadership, and the structural dependency on the Western countries in the economic, politico-~~ideological~~ and cultural spheres.

It is, however, possible for a state to pass through a similar colonial experience as Cameroon did and still maintain a nonaligned foreign policy. Ghana, during the early years of Nkrumah's rule before he fell out with the West, pursued a comparatively more nonaligned foreign policy even though Ghana's colonial experience was basically similar to the Cameroon. The attitude of the Ghanaian leadership, especially Nkrumah's personality, mainly accounted for this. If then Ahidjo's government was virulently anti-communists how can it be postulated that nonalignment affected Cameroon's foreign policy? Nonalignment is an ideal-type objective pursued by its adherents. Nonalignment is also a relative concept because its adherents have different interpretations of what it means. To Cameroon nonalignment meant cordial relations with the Eastern and Western blocs but a more special relationship in the latter. Although the general orientation of Cameroon's foreign policy during the Ahidjo administration was pro-Western there were few instances in which nonalignment shaped some major Cameroonian foreign policy positions. The renunciation of the OCAM Treaty in 1971 was, for example, partly justified and influenced by a general domestic outcry for nonalignment in the

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East-West cleavage. Also Ahidjo's lifting of the bans on the circulation of Marxist literature in Cameroon was shaped by an attempt to maintain some semblance of nonalignment. Furthermore, Ahidjo's reversal of the Cameroonain policy of rejecting communist aid and communist overtures to establishing diplomatic relationship during the early years of independence with USSR and later with China were partly due to attempts to implement the policy of nonalignment.

Despite these examples, Cameroon was in general aligned with the West during the Ahidjo administration. Anglin's<sup>38</sup> contention that Nigeria during its first Republic was politically nonaligned and economically aligned with the West holds good for Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration eventhough the distinction that Anglin made between the economic and political forms of nonalignment is unreal. Politics and economics are but two sides of the same coin. In the international system, as in the national sub-system, politics and economics are very often if not always, inextricably linked. Political decisions very often affect and/or reflect economic matters and vice versa. It is, therefore, rather simplistic for Anglin to compartmentalize politics and economics, and to expect a genuinely independent political nonalignment, while at the same time economic dependency persisted.

Is it really possible for a developing state to have a "truly" nonaligned foreign policy given their historical development? The ideal-type of nonalignment should entail an all-encompassing neutrality on the part of a nonaligned state in East-West competition. Non-alignment must thus exist in the realms of politics, ideology, military, economics and culture. In reality, however, a genuine nonalignment is difficult to achieve because of the historical evolution of most new nations under the domination of capitalist colonial imperialism and/or neo-imperialism. Also, Soviet imperialism and/or occupation in certain developing nations such as Cuba and Afghanistan impedes the realization of genuine nonalignment by these countries. The struggle towards nonalignment, like efforts to achieve other ideal-types such as democracy and freedom, is a continuous process which is very often, if not

always in the process of becoming: More than likely, the ideal-type is never reached.

However, the measure of success towards an ideal-type is the amount of effort put into achieving it as well as the degree to which the gap between the ideal-type and reality is being narrowed. Cameroon, especially during the Ahidjo administration failed to show much commitment towards achieving non-alignment. A serious effort by Cameroon towards this goal should have included a determined attempt to begin the process of rapidly dismantling the existing structure of dependency on the West.

A genuine policy of nonalignment in East-West cleavage was thus, difficult to be accomplished by Cameroon without several drastic changes within its social system. The existing structures of dependency on the West in the economic, politico-ideological and cultural realms had to be dismantled in order to achieve a more balanced form of nonalignment. Also, the perception and/or the colonial mentality" of the Cameroonian ruling elite had to be radically altered. Until these changes took place, the official Cameroonian declaration of nonalignment policy continued to diverge markedly from the reality of a pro-Western policy.

As we saw above, if the Pandora's box of boundary re-demarcation is not to be opened, African states have to continue as the "administrative units established under colonialism which frequently bore little relation to the distribution of ethnic or linguistic groupings or even to the logic of geography".<sup>39</sup> Consequently this achievement of "juridical recognition far in advance of their capacities to perform as states is the salient fact to hold in mind when analyzing the foreign policy of a new nation. For, frequently policy is recruited to the state-building task - or is intimately affected by the immensity of that task".<sup>40</sup> In this context there is a linkage between nonalignment and African nationalism. Not only is non-alignment a derivative of the idea of Pan-Africanism, but it is also an extension of African nationalism to the international level. It is seen as part of the general assertion of an "African personality" in world affairs. Non-alignment is

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also a function of bipolarity and an indirect by-product of the cold war. This has led some commentators to regard non-alignment merely as a profitable short-term machiavellian strategy employed by the African states to enjoy the best of both sides in the current East-West conflict.<sup>41</sup> However non-alignment as a technique or basis for the conduct of foreign relations implies more lofty ideas than a mere selfish, diplomatic manoeuvring of playing one major power against another. Even though nonalignment cannot be explained by bipolarity alone, it also cannot be explained without bipolarity.

Perhaps the greatest trouble about nonalignment as the foundation of a state's international behaviour is the confusion about its meaning and implications. Like Pan-Africanism, nonalignment suffers both from a lack of clear and precise definition and the emotions which attend its various interpretations. For a while there was common agreement among the independent African states on the advantage of nonalignment, the same degree of unanimity has not been reached on what should be the style and content of a non-aligned foreign policy.

Traditionally there has been confusion over the differences among such terms as neutrality, neutralism and nonalignment. In one sense, they all signify the same type of foreign policy orientation, where a state will not commit its military capabilities and sometimes, its diplomatic support to the purpose of another state. Unwillingness to commit military capabilities to others' purposes is the hallmark of nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy, but there are some variations in the circumstances by which a state adopts a nonaligned policy. It is here that neutrality and neutralism have distinct meanings. Neutrality refers to the legal status of a state during armed hostilities. Under the international laws of neutrality, a nonbelligerent in wartime has certain rights and obligations not extended to the belligerents.<sup>42</sup> These rules state, for example, that a neutral may not permit the use of the territory as a base for military assistance to the belligerents, and may enjoy free passage of its nonmilitary goods on the open seas and under certain conditions, through belligerent blockades. A neutralized state is one that must

observe these rules during armed conflict but that, during peace, must also refrain from making military alliances with other states. The major difference between a neutralized state and a nonaligned state is that the former has achieved its position by virtue of the actions of others, whereas the latter chooses its orientation by itself and has no guarantees that its position will be honoured by others.

Thus the most common form of nonalignment today is found among those states that, on their own initiative and without guarantee of other states, refuse to commit themselves militarily to the goals and objectives of the major powers. Eventhough they lend diplomatic support to blocs or bloc leaders on particular issues, they refrain from siding diplomatically with any bloc on all issues. Their roles are independent in the system as a whole although within regions they may be allied militarily ideologically and economically. The nonaligned developing state similarly avoids formal commitments to blocs, but they show a greater inclination to distrust the major western powers, criticize publicly the actions of any state, and give vocal support to bloc action when they are deemed in their own interests. In the present international context, nonalignment strategies are mostly confined to military matters. On other issues, nations that consider themselves do, infact, create temporary diplomatic coalitions. They have certain common interests, such as supporting anticolonial movements and organizing attempts to obtain better terms of trade from industrialized nations. In international trade conferences and on some issues in the United Nations, the nonaligned states combine to increase their influence vis-a-vis the industrialized nations and bloc leaders. The group of 77, composed of about 115 developing states has acted as a reasonably unified diplomatic coalition at a number of international conferences, but most of its members claim to be nonaligned. Nonalignment thus appears more as an orientation towards East-West bloc conflicts than as a true strategy towards all issues in the system or in regions.

Nonlignment, it is often argued by its practitioners, also increases the diplomatic influence of those who adopt it

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as a foreign policy strategy. They suggest that through alliances, nations give up freedom of action and lose the opportunity to formulate their policies in terms of their own needs. In too many instances, an alliance forces weak states to sacrifice their own interests for the needs of the great powers, and when tensions turn into crises, the small alliance partners are usually unable to affect the outcomes, even though these may have serious consequences on their interests. As independent states, however, nonaligned nations have room to manoeuvre and may be able to influence the actions and behaviour of both blocs.<sup>43</sup>

Nonalignment orientations can be linked to a number of domestic considerations and pressures. Some developing states adopted this orientation as a means of obtaining maximum economic concessions from both blocs, recognizing that to make permanent military arrangements with one bloc would close off the other as a possible source of supply market and foreign aid. Given the strong commitment of the developing states to achieve adequate economic growth rates fast as possible, few can afford to restrict their international trade to any one area of the world. Much less can they afford to restrict their sources of economic aid. Some nonaligned governments feel that because of the political implications of aid agreements, the more sources of aid that are available, the more the nation can effectively counter threats to cut off aid by the donors. To be nonaligned is to maximize opportunities to meet domestic economic needs, while minimizing dependencies. Again nonalignment may be explained by perceptions of external threats as well as by domestic economic and political variables. Nations have traditionally sought to maintain their independence and territorial integrity by withdrawing or avoiding involvement in conflict areas. In the present international context, however, the fear is not much of a direct threat to independence except perhaps by way of "neocolonialism" as it is of great concern that bloc conflicts will spill over into nonaligned areas or that regional conflicts in the developing world will attract a great power intervention. The nonaligned states have had few concrete interest in the outcome of great cold-war crises, such as Berlin, Hungary or Vietnam. They have always expressed a fear, however, that such confrontations could escalate into

nuclear warfare, which would eventually engulf them. This is because, for these states, the primary concern is not neutralism but nationalism to build viable and integrated states, consolidate their political independence, and develop economically. While acknowledging the need for outside help and support in their economic development processes, they are, nevertheless, determined to discard the age-old shackles that have tied them politically and economically to the West.

### 3.4 : SOVEREIGNTY

If one of the aims of adopting nonalignment as a foreign policy principle of the developing state is to safeguard the independence of the state it means that sovereignty is an important principle that must be considered in the analysis of its external relations. Thus during the historical development of human society, sovereignty appeared alongside the emergence of the state as a socio-political phenomenon and an attribute of the state. The definitions which have been given to this concept have, for a long time now, converged in a mutual assessment - sovereignty means the independence and supremacy of the state.<sup>44</sup> More precise specifications and comments on the content of the two elements making up sovereignty often complete the definitions given for it. There are many diverse opinions on the extent and legitimacy of the right to sovereignty. Thus, for the ancient states with their institution of slavery, the independence and supremacy of power mainly meant the continuous struggle for preserving the state's existence and for extending its domination. Towards the end of the era of slavery, some religious-philosophical doctrines predominantly mystical-emerged, asserting that the essence of sovereign power was a divine right.

Some of these doctrines have kept alive down to our time in order to demonstrate the superior origin of sovereign power and absolute monarchs in states which are backwards from the viewpoint of their socio-political system. The juridical justification of sovereignty, the appearance and definition of this notion and its theoretical grounding, took place during the feudal period, more precisely during its latter part. J. Bodin (Les Six Livres de la République) in the 16th century  
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and Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century are considered in the question of sovereignty as the theorists of feudal absolutism. Jean Bodin held sovereignty to be an expression of the state's political power, exerted by the King. Hobbes considered that the monarch must exercise unlimited powers, being entitled to use the state's force as he thinks fit.<sup>45</sup> Examining sovereignty from a new angle—that of the people's right to control the actions and deeds of sovereign power—began as early as the 17th century, through Grotius. According to Grotius sovereign power is unique and indivisible, its main feature being independence.<sup>46</sup> That sovereign power in the state must only be vested in the king who will be guided in governing activity by the principles of natural law, is the central theme of De Jure Belli Ac Pacis

A century later, the French writers and philosophers, of the enlightenment lent new substance to the theory of sovereignty. Their writings proceed from the fundamental conception of the sovereignty of the people and nation, by which they understood the entire population settled on the state's territory, irrespective of social classes or other differences. The main promoter of the new ideas was Rousseau who (in his Le contrat social, 1762) asserted that the only legitimate sovereign is the people, while the state is the result of a revocable contract concluded between the people and those who exert power in the state. According to Rousseau, the unlimited development of private property and the privileges the ruling classes arrogated to themselves had distorted the initial content of the contract.<sup>47</sup>

The origin of sovereignty was a cardinal preoccupation of numerous philosophers and jurists in the 18th and 19th centuries. The delegation of power by the people and the necessity to separate the attributes of state power (Montesquieu), the state as a factor of progress and as the initiator of its own reform (Kant), the state as the achiever of higher stages of freedom (Hegel), the existence of the state as an outcome of the people's will and wishes, and the negation of the divine origin of power in the monarchical state (L. Feuerbach) - these are extremely significant theses on the

origin of the state and sovereignty, put forward by philosophers who preceded the French revolution and - subsequently - in German classical philosophy. Mention could be made of the theories of some German jurists (A. Lasson, Zorn, E. Kaufmann)<sup>48</sup> who uphold that sovereignty embodies force and the right of the strongest. Moreover, Jullinek considers that the supremacy of the state is absolute to an extent that the state could at any time ignore the principles acknowledged in international law. However, some of these ideas have been preserved and found in various forms nowadays in the treatment of sovereignty by some contemporary philosophers and jurists.

Marx and Engels elaborated their political ideas on the state and sovereignty mainly on the consideration sovereignty as an essential attribute of the state when, on the one hand, the latter may be taken for an "independent state" in relation to the rest of the world and on the other hand, when sovereignty can be expressed as the sovereignty of the people.<sup>49</sup> But, "the people's sovereignty" is only an abstraction if one fails to identify the class which represents the people at a certain period of the development of the state. Therefore, sovereignty has a class content, and the class supposed to embody the people is the one which possesses sufficient power to ensure the progress of the nation as a whole. The interests of this class must embody national interests, the class thus becoming the representative of the nation.<sup>50</sup> While at a certain stage in the development of social life, the role of this leading class could be fulfilled by the bourgeoisie, in the subsequent periods the proletariat has represented the main rising force; which had to take over this role. Through abolishing the exploitation of man by man, the abolition of the exploitation of some nations by other nations must also be achieved. Such changes are not possible, however, in the organization of the bourgeois state which - according to Marxian conception - should be abolished and replaced by a state of another type. In the conditions of setting up the soviet state, Lenin linked the right to independence to the nation's right to self-determination.<sup>51</sup> Thus, the sovereignty of a socialist state represents the peoples' sovereign right to determine their own fate by themselves, to ensure the development necessary to the state's power, to ensure the exercise

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of the right to independence in relationships with other states.

Actually, as stated above, two essential elements of the notion remain dominant: - the supremacy of power within the country, the state's independence outside. The rest is made up of specifications - undoubtedly important - which are the fruits of personal investigations and convictions of all those who have studied and defined sovereignty. Thus, state sovereignty is the unique, full and indivisible supremacy of state power within the limits of the territorial frontiers and the independence of this power, in relation to any other power, which is expressed in the state's exclusive and inalienable right to lay down and carry out its home and foreign policy independently, to discharge its functions, to implement the practical measures for organizing its social life at home and its foreign relations on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of other states, for the norms and principles of international law accepted out of its own free will.<sup>52</sup> The features of sovereignty are (a) exclusive state power in discharging the functions specific to the state; (b) indivisibility - that is full freedom of choice in using the whole set of prerogatives of state power; (c) in-alienability - which means the impossibility of ceding state power either to some foreign power or to some international body.<sup>53</sup>

Therefore, supremacy of power and independence are the two features to be found in nearly all definitions of sovereignty. The matter is not as simple as this would suggest because an important problem is that of the extent of sovereignty, of the absolute or limited nature of sovereignty. The proponents of limited sovereignty, without denying the existence of the latter as such, maintain that in present-day conditions of international relations sovereignty is limited. Therefore, the state itself can allegedly give up certain prerogatives of sovereignty, accepting that these attributes should be exerted by a supra-national organization. For instance, accepting the promulgation within such an organization, by a majority vote, of some juridical norms binding upon the territory of the member states appears a self-limitation of sovereignty, as it were, on the part of those states.

Thus sovereignty is alleged to appear as "vulnerable," limited - as regards its domestic nature - by the existence of a certain system, of a certain national law, of some problems specific to the state which exerts it and, which being confronted with such realities, is prevented from fully exercising it.<sup>54</sup> The conditions in which state power is exercised on an internal plane cannot, however, be considered a limitation of the state's supremacy of its sovereignty. It is but natural and necessary that the state, while pursuing its aims, should reckon with the act in harmony with the existing conditions peculiar to each state. This does not mean the limitation of the state's sovereignty on an internal plane. Nor can inter-state relationships limit the attributes of sovereignty on an external plane, they can only determine the behaviour of the state in specific cases and situations. One cannot consider as a limitation of sovereignty the adoption by a state, in one situation or another, of some attitude, of some political or economic standpoint. The cases of sovereignty enumerated as such for inter-state relations in the past<sup>55</sup> are inconceivable in the relations between modern states.

Sovereignty and independence are compelling realities of our time, which can be neither generalized absolutely nor limitedly. Concessions made by the states to each other as part of international cooperation must have one supreme quality: that of being decided upon freely without any coercion. Collaboration among states and nations means no constraint upon sovereignty, but the latter's assertion within the broad framework of world relationships. As has been observed:-

Sovereignty and independence are no abstractions, fetishes or dogmas without effect on the plane of international relations, but on the contrary, they are actually juridical-political instruments, whose positive content lies in the contribution they make to developing cooperation in conditions of equality, to the normal unfolding of inter-state relations.<sup>56</sup>

Sovereignty is a permanent quality of states. At the same time, it might be said that it is a strong and viable quality of states in our times. The relations between states rely on mutual respect for sovereignty and on international legality. The observance of international law by the states means neither

the latter's subordination to some external will situated above the state's nor the states losing the attributes of their independence. On the contrary, this observance may ensure the development of harmonious relations between states. During the current period and for a long time henceforth, state sovereignty will be maintained as a powerful guiding principle of international life. Reciprocity, equal rights and cooperation in their turn remain the most important principles governing international relations among sovereign states in the sense of internal supremacy and independence of action. Therefore, sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible. It belongs to the state and cannot be ceded; being exerted in a domain of vital importance, concerning, as it does, the basic conditions for social and economic development.

As far as the developing state, such as Cameroon is concerned, it is possible to assume that sovereignty has been doubly enlarged. It has materially opened towards economics with every developing state knowing that political liberation, despite its euphoria is not enough to guarantee complete independence, and that the recuperation of total sovereignty goes through economic and cultural independence. In the second place sovereignty has been enlarged geographically to englobe the international dimension of the national economy - this is translated by the incapacity of a single state to satisfy its own wants alone and the consequent formation of regional organizations such as the European Community (EEC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Union Douniere et Economique et l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), etc. It is, therefore, the economic development component which has made sovereignty to regain its bases and the role which corresponds to the attachment given to it by all rich and poor, old and new. In terms of national economic development, sovereignty must adapt itself to the fundamental diversity of situation to which it is susceptible to be applied. It represents the aptitude of each state to accomplish its development, master its destiny, play its role to the maximum of its capacity in the international community. Sovereignty is not a useless abstraction. Contemporary international relations has taught us that sovereignty has remained at the

heart of many important international problems. But as Charles Chaumont has stressed, sovereignty is not a static concept, it is a continuous creation; "it is the Law of people at their stage of realization."<sup>57</sup>

As far as the developing state is concerned, the law of people was naturally first concretized politically and today it is continuing to be concretized economically.<sup>58</sup> As such sovereignty, conceived and enlarged to extrapolitical dimensions allows our analysis (to go beyond the formalism of the classical approaches) to englobe the essential realities of the developing state in contemporary international life, especially the phenomena of domination which had been ignored and evacuated from classical international relations theory. Sovereignty becomes an evolutionary and fragile process in the sense that it can be put in question at any time. Far from being an immediate and definitive conquest it evolves through stages which allow for the developing state to organize itself into one state - that is first of all formerly (or politically) sovereign and then really (economically) independent. This link between economic development and sovereignty has been squarely summed up by Maurice Flory in his Droit International du Développement

Sovereignty was upto the present day, essentially not to say exclusively, founded on political power. A Sovereign state meant a politically sovereign state... The decolonized states thought of having regained their independence and full sovereignty after having done away with the colonial administration (but) the responsibilities of power did not waste time in teaching them that sovereignty had dimensions other than the political and that in order to satisfy the imperatives of independence, one had to take them into consideration.

The exigences of development have transformed the notion of equality and have equally modified that of sovereignty. International law has been forced to open towards the new problems which have contributed to change its traditional basis. The introduction of the finality of development in international law has put in question the territorial sovereignty of the state. The economic dimension of sovereignty does not concord well with state frontiers and the effects produced... In some sectors, the elaboration of transnational economic regulations has most often not taken cognizance of the state or has simply just ignored them. The problems posed by multinationals have neither been dominated nor resolved by the state or the international

Community. One can multiple examples to show that the state is often overtaken by the dimension and complexity of economic problems.<sup>59</sup>

In this way sovereignty guarantees the supreme authority of the state to manage its internal and external affairs.

A major objective (premise) of Cameroon's foreign policy, therefore, was the defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Sovereignty means as we saw above the absence of a higher authority above the nation-state in the international system. There were two distinct interpretations of sovereignty in Cameroon's foreign policy. First, sovereignty, is conceived of as a legal concept describing the absolute authority of the nation - state but is not synonymous with independence. According to this conception a nation-state can be sovereign and at the same time have its independence constrained. Some illustrations will help to clarify this interpretation. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Tanzanian intervention in the political process of Uganda constrained the independence of Afghanistan and Uganda respectively without affecting their sovereign status. Sovereignty as a legal concept is an inalienable prerogative of every nation-state which cannot be affected by occupation or other forms of constraints. Simply stated, sovereignty and independence are not interchangeable in meaning. The second interpretation of sovereignty is that which defines sovereignty as independence Cameroon conceived of her sovereignty as synonymous with her independence. Constraints upon Cameroon's independence were very often perceived by its foreign policy elite as tantamount to encroachment on its sovereignty. The territorial integrity of Cameroon was deemed as a fundamental attribute of its sovereign status.

Since we are dealing with Cameroon in this research we shall adopt Cameroon's definition of sovereignty which means independence. The defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, though a major national objective also served as a basic premise of Cameroon's foreign policy. The defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity served, for example, as part of the premise upon which hostility towards

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the white minority regimes of Southern Africa was justified. The argument was that as long as any part of Africa was still under white rule the independence of Cameroon was at stake. Hence it was believed to be essential for the Cameroon's national survival to support efforts to liquidate the white rule in Africa.

In this way sovereignty guarantees the supreme authority of the state to manage its internal and external affairs.

**(B) OBJECTIVES OF CAMEROON'S FOREIGN POLICY**

The principal objective of Cameroon's foreign policy, indeed that of any country, is to promote and protect the country's national interests and values in its interaction with the outside world and relationships with specific countries in the international system. Given the wide range of objectives that exist, their classification depends on (i) the value placed on the objective or the extent to which policy makers commit themselves and their countries resources to achieving a particular objective; (ii) the kinds of demands the objective imposes on the states in the system.<sup>60</sup> From these we can construct categories of objectives such as the following: (i) "core" values and interests to which governments and nations commit their very existence and that must be preserved or extended at all times and the achievement of these values or interests may or may not impose demands on others. "Core" values and interests can be described as those kinds of goals for which most people are willing to make ultimate sacrifices. They usually emanate from the basic principles of foreign policy and become articles of faith that a society accepts uncritically.<sup>61</sup> "Core" interests and values are most frequently related to the self-preservation of a political unit. These are short-range objectives, because other goals obviously cannot be achieved unless the political units pursuing them maintain their own existence.

The exact definition of a "Core" value or interest in any given country depends on the attitudes of those who make policy. There are, for example, many different interpretation of self-preservation. Some disagree over definitions of self-



that is, what constitutes an integrated polity. Others will disagree equally on what policies contribute best to preservation. Nevertheless, most policy makers in our era assume that the most essential objective of any foreign policy is to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the home territory and to perpetuate a particular political, social and economic system based on that territory.

Middle range goals usually impose demands on several other states (commitments to their achievement are serious and, some times limits are usually placed on them). Since there is such a variety of middle-range objectives it would be useful to divide this category into three further types. The first type would include such attempts of governments to meet the economic development demands and needs through international action. Social welfare and economic development as a primary goal of all governments in our era cannot be achieved through self-help, as most states have only limited resources, administrative services and technical skills. International cooperation and interdependence mean that to satisfy domestic needs and aspirations, states have to interact with each other. Trade, foreign aid, access to communications facilities, sources of supply and foreign markets are for most states necessary for increasing social welfare. Hence, the primary commitment of many modern governments must be to pursue those courses of action that have the highest impact on domestic economic and welfare needs and expectations.

The second type of middle range objective is to increase a state's prestige in the system. In the past this was done primarily through diplomatic ceremonial and displays of military capabilities, but increasingly in our era, prestige is measured by levels of industrial development and scientific and technological skills. In addition to responding to domestic pressures for higher living standards political elites in the developing state who are acutely sensitive to their material poverty may undertake massive development programmes primarily to raise international prestige. Development has become one of the the great national goals of our times and is sought with almost as much commitment or resources

as the securing of some "core" values and interests. A third category of middle-range objectives would include the many different forms of self-extension or imperialism. Some states make demands for neighbouring territory even if the territory does not satisfy any important security requirements or ethnic unity. Territorial expansion becomes an end in itself, whether or not it fulfills any strategic, economic, or social needs. Others do not occupy foreign territory, but seek advantages, including access to raw materials, markets, and trade routes that they cannot achieve through ordinary trade or diplomacy. Ideological self-extension is prevalent in many forms where agents of a state undertake to promote its own socioeconomic and political values abroad. However, this category is not a feature of Cameroon's foreign policy objectives.

Long-range goals are those plans, dreams and visions concerning the ultimate political or ideological organization of the international system, rules governing relations in that system, and the role of specific nations within it. The difference between middle-range and long-range goals relates not only to different time elements inherent in them but there is also a significant difference in scope. In pressing for middle-range goals, states make particular demands against particular states while in pursuing long-range goals, states normally make universal demands, for their purpose is no less than to reconstruct an entire international system according to a universally applicable plan or vision. For example Cameroon's quest for a New International Economic Order, World Peace and Justice.

### 3.5: THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTERGRITY OF THE STATE

National sovereignty in international Law is a concept signifying the absence of a higher legal authority than that of the state.<sup>62</sup> As the concept of national sovereignty is used in regard to Cameroon's foreign policy, however, it means not only legal independence but also de facto independence of action in international affairs.<sup>63</sup> Cameroon's insistence on preserving its sovereignty (independence) and territorial integrity fundamentally shaped its foreign policy towards the

political and economic integration of African states. During the 1960-1982 period, for example, the Ahidjo administration vigorously opposed Nkrumah's advocacy for the full integration of all African states under a single continental government. Cameroon, in contrast, supported a functional approach to African Unity so as to preserve its sovereignty. African states were deeply divided as a result of this ideological struggle between the unitary and functional approaches to Pan-Africanism. In the end, Cameroon's functional approach to African unity was accepted by most African States.

The defense of the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the state are therefore in the Cameroonian context considered as the "Core" interests of the state's foreign policy. There is no doubt that the national consensus which has emerged in support of these interest reflects and underscores the specific definition, interpretation, elaboration or amplification of these objectives and interests which in most cases have always been the prerogative and responsibility of the government of the day. The safeguard of the independence of the state in the Cameroonian conception implies an important idea.

In the first instance, it implies the legal equality of states. In this sense sovereignty becomes the supremacy of the state in its internal and external affairs. The attractiveness of this principle to Cameroon should not be seen simply in the situational context of the de facto asymmetry in the structure of global interdependence which makes small developing states like Cameroon in the "periphery" highly susceptible to control, domination and coercion by the powerful and industrialized states at the "centre" of the global system, a situation which naturally makes the small and less powerful states the greatest defenders of the legal equality of the states. Cameroon's veneration for the principle of legal equality was also a function of her belief and conviction that a well-ordered and peaceful community at both the universal and regional levels requires mutual and reciprocal respect for the views and interests of all the national actors. Thus, from President Ahidjo to President Biya, Cameroon always made

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it clear in her foreign policy pronouncements and actions that in spite of her comparative advantage of size, population and resources over many countries in central Africa she would neither seek to dominate other countries nor carry out aggressive military action against them. Although Cameroon is indisputably prominent in Central Africa, successive Cameroonian leaders have been very careful to draw a distinction between "domination" and "leadership" preferring to play a leadership but not an imperial role. But quite obviously Cameroon has not interpreted the concept of legal equality of states to mean equal capacity of states for duties and responsibilities in the international system. This explains perhaps, why, for instance, Cameroon has shouldered a disproportionately large financial burden of the annual budget of the Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC),

Closely related to the objective of legal equality is that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. With the advantage of hindsight, it would seem that the commitment of the Cameroonian governments to this idea has sometimes in the past sanctioned what in effect amounts to a restrictive interpretation of the country's national interests and definition of her effective security boundaries. In support of this principle of non-interference by Cameroon in the domestic affairs of other states, particularly in the internal affairs of her neighbours that are comparatively less powerful, there has always been the argument that Cameroon must be demonstrably and transparently seen to be consciously making a distinction between "domination" and "leadership" in her international behaviour in central Africa. In terms of economic development, the need to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the state corresponded to the adoption of measures of indigenization, import substitution industrialization strategy, etc.

### 3.6 : INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND WORLD PEACE

The promotion and defense of world peace represented another objective as well as factor which shaped Cameroon's foreign policy. The great revolution in the fields of science and technology has contributed fundamentally to the evolution of the global community. The resulting interdependence among

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nation-states has meant that domestic issues often take on an international dimension. The fact of interdependence has thus, tended to magnify and transform several domestic upheavals into international conflicts. Therefore, the promotion and defense of world peace was one of Cameroon's foreign policy objectives (premise). Interdependence in world politics has made global peace a major concern of most nation-states. For a country like Cameroon which is underdeveloped and in a rush to modernize, global peace becomes an important ingredient for achieving certain national objectives.

Cameroon's foreign policy, especially towards sub-saharan Africa, in many ways sought to encourage international peace. Cameroon's efforts contributed to the resolving of differences and disputes among African states. Examples include Cameroon's intervention in the Nigerian-Biafran war, dispute between Congo (Brazzaville) and Zaire, the Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya border disputes, conflicts among the three Angolan liberation movements, and the Zairean and Katangese conflict in the Shaba province, to mention but these few.

An important assumption of Cameroon's foreign policy is that world peace, especially peace in Africa, is important for the realization of Cameroon's efforts at modernization. Even in Southern Africa where Cameroon rejected the status quo, that is the continued white domination of blacks, Cameroon very often supported a peaceful rather than a military solution in resolving black-white conflicts. Cameroon supported the Anglo-American plan in Rhodesia which called for a peaceful solution.

In the Cameroonian context, international cooperation is not only a middle-range interest but could also be conceived as a set of strategies and tactics pursued by the state which aimed at rendering international relations more intimate in one or more aspects (due to permanent mechanisms) without putting into question the independence of the state.<sup>64</sup> The Cameroonian conception of international cooperation insists upon the pacific co-existence of and respect for the identity of national political, economic, and socio-cultural systems especially in bilateral cooperation. This insistence on the independence of the state in international cooperation stems

from the fact that under many diverse forms and for a long period of its history, a developing state like Cameroon underwent colonial domination. From this moment a policy of international cooperation taking into consideration the interests of the "liberated" populations has to have the objective (1) of eliminating the effects of domination in all the domains of interaction (2) of transforming the structures inherited from the precolonial and colonial past since these structures are an obstacle to progress (3) of creating the foundations of a new state in which all the citizens would have the real possibility of participating in the different domains of national activity and in the functioning of the institutions and decision-making.<sup>65</sup> Thus, we cannot talk about bilateral cooperation except each partner finds an advantage in establishing cooperation links in respect of each other's independence. In this vein, cooperation does need to have the aim of making the Third World States the perpetually assisted. Without this, cooperation becomes a great perversion in which aid or assistance is conceived as a charity made to the poor.

Cameroon's insistence on multilateral cooperation explains not only her enthusiastic and instinctive search for membership in key international organizations at both the global and regional levels but also in her support for and leadership in the establishment of some regional organizations. Believing that international organizations provide numerous opportunities for multilateral negotiations and collaboration among states and could be used to monitor many types of economic and political exchanges between individual states seeking to influence the formulation of community values in the image of specific national preferences, Cameroon has sought membership in the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies, the Group of 77, Nonaligned movement.<sup>66</sup> The Cameroon government also promoted the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), as well as the creation of a number of specialized River Basin Commissions in West Africa.<sup>67</sup> It is against this background of Cameroon's conception and perception of the crucial role international organizations

play in moderating the international political game, particularly in providing a forum for the small states to be heard and in collectively legitimizing their foreign policy aspirations, that Cameroon has invested much time, energy and resources, to support and secure the continuing existence and vitality of the U.N. the OUA and UDEAC to mention only a few. Multilateralism has not, however, been viewed as an alternative to bilateralism but as a supplement to it, which explains why commitment to multilateralism has been accompanied by a rapid and continuing expansion in the network of Cameroon's bilateral diplomatic relations with many individual states in the international system.

### 3.7 : NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-RELIANCE

The objective of national self-reliance and rapid economic development was another major factor affecting Cameroon's foreign policy. In the attempt to secure foreign economic and technical assistance, Cameroon's efforts to foster regional economic cooperation was mainly the result of the national policy of achieving national development and self-reliance.

The lucrative economic partnership between some influential Cameroonians and their foreign economic allies limited the actualization of national self-reliance. Several of these Cameroonians had monopoly rights as sole distributors of foreign goods while others were middlemen who helped foreign companies secure government contracts. Some of these Cameroonians responded negatively to efforts to achieve rapid economic development and national self-reliance. A Commercial form of domestic capitalism thus continued and impeded the development of a sophisticated national manufacturing sector. The result of this stultifying of a major national objective was the continued perpetuation of a neo-colonial structure of economic dependency on the Western bloc.

Attainment of national self-reliance was an important foreign policy objective of Cameroon. It was also a major premise which shaped Cameroon's external relations. President Ahmadou Ahidjo during a major foreign policy address pointed to the relationship between economic independence and

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successful diplomacy, saying :

Political sovereignty which is not based on economic sovereignty resembles a house without a substructure... Politics and economics are complementary and there can be no question of separating them. But the latter aspect becomes more and more preoccupying because it determines the future of the nation. Socialism and Communism? Once more when the great men. Such as those I have already cited (Marx, Engels et al) advocated these solutions, their countries and Europe found themselves in a situation in which the conditions of life were not the same as ours today. Socialism, Communism and nationalization in Cameroon? Do they want us to nationalize the FAO and SCOA? In that case we would find ourselves faced with the following delimita: Should the state take charge of the commerce of the shops? In which case is it certain that we shall have the technicians needed to run them...? In reality whatever the solutions visualized we are an underdeveloped country. And whatever may be the doctrine or formulae chosen, nothing can change this situation of our country lacking sufficient capital, a country lacking sufficient technicians. Since the situation exists, we must face it headon, seek the most rational solutions, the most valid ones for solving our problems. As for us, we sincerely believe that these solutions still consist in encouraging free enterprise... no nation can effectively pursue a dynamic and independent foreign policy with a weak and dependent economy.<sup>68</sup>

The attempt to achieve national self-reliance and rapid economic development partly contributed to a re-assessment of Cameroon's early foreign policy of rejecting aid from communist countries. Since the national development plans could not be achieved through contributions from the domestic sector and the developed capitalist countries, Cameroon began to send economic missions to the communist bloc.

Beginning from 1961 a series of trade agreements were signed with the communist countries. Cameroon's exports to the Eastern bloc which amounted to about 6.67 billion francs 1975<sup>69</sup> increased to 85 billion francs in 1980<sup>70</sup> as a result of the change in Cameroon's foreign economic policy towards these countries. In 1975, total imports from the Soviet Bloc were 11.68 million francs.<sup>71</sup> The emphasis on national self-reliance and rapid economic development contributed to the hawkish Cameroonian stance with regard to raw material prices in international Organizations. There seemed to have been consensus among the Cameroon's foreign policy elite that



the country had to obtain the highest possible prices for its raw materials in the international markets. Raw material revenue it must be remembered, provided the bulk of the capital for financing national development. An important decree, the Indegenization Deree of 1976 was passed by the Cameroon government to aid in national economic independence. This decree affected Cameroon's foreign economic relations through a redistribution of economic power between Cameroon and foreign companies. Cameroon became able to officially control some sectors of its domestic economy previously under foreign domination. Also, the goal of national self-reliance and rapid economic development partly provided the basis for the Cameroon's interest in African economic cooperation as exemplified by the creation of UDEAC, CBC, OCAM, Lagos Plan of Action (1980), etc. Cameroon's participation in the formation of the Tchad Basin Commission (CBC) and the River Niger Commission was based on the assumption that it would enhance national self-reliance and rapid economic development.

The perception of many Cameroonian policy makers was that national self-reliance and rapid economic development could indeed be attained only through increasing economic relationship with foreign companies. All the national development plans provided for extensive foreign investment in the Cameroonian economy as indispensable for Cameroon's industrialization.

The perception of the Cameroonian leadership that national self-reliance and rapid economic development needed to be sought through foreign investment and trade, thus, affected the orientation of Cameroon's foreign policy, especially foreign economic relations.

From independence, various economic missions were sent overseas to urge foreign multinational companies to invest in Cameroon. Several incentives, such as low taxes and guarantees against nationalization were given to foreign companies to encourage them to invest in Cameroon.

National self-reliant development, in this perspective became one of the main foreign policy objectives of Cameroon.

However, it must be remarked that self-reliance (collective and national) is another system of ideas which inspired the independent African states in their present phase of national development and reconstruction. Although it is not always easy to list the many varieties of development doctrines and strategies that have emerged over the last three decades in Africa as well as the leading issues which divide the various development schools, the various theories, sentiments or even mere slogans bearing the nomenclature "development" have had an impact all over contemporary Africa. Almost all African leaders have openly come out in favour of development and have attempted to adapt it to African realities and conditions. This fact is well-known outside Africa. From independence Cameroon chose "Planned Liberalism" as its development policy.

The term "Planned Liberalism" is used here in its broadest sense and is defined as the political and economic theory that while allowing the development of individual initiative aims at or advocates public ownership and control of all, or the principal means of production, distribution and exchange. Planned Liberalism in this sense was seen not only as an instrument of economic development but also as a means of national liberation and social transformation. Its essence laid in its emphasis on economic, social and political change as well as changes in human attitudes and orientation. Indeed, Planned Liberalism also implied a form of humanism and a vision of a just and egalitarian society in which each member enjoyed both political and economic freedom and equality. The main goals of Planned Liberalism were freedom, equality and fellowship.<sup>72</sup> The general awareness that political equality without economic and social equality is nothing but a delusion provided a great deal of the emotional drive behind planned liberalism.

Prompted by the evils and shortcomings of the 19th century industrial revolution and capitalist economic system as well as the evils of Eastern socialism; Planned Liberalism aimed at providing political democracy with a just economic and social base, and organizing social relations harmoniously. In short, planned liberalism in all its variables and contextual

manifestations was based on the common ideals of humanism and social justice.<sup>73</sup> The task of maximizing equality in world society becomes the foreign policy corollary of planned liberalism since its philosophy is aimed at abolishing economic inequalities.

In general terms, therefore, national development has remained one of the primary objectives of the developing state in general and Cameroon in particular since independence. The result is that Cameroon's foreign policy has been conditioned by considerations of and geared towards, national development.<sup>74</sup> However, two major economic factors inevitably affect the capability of a state to pursue its stated goals in foreign policy.-

a) the ability of the economy to mobilize and deploy its productive forces;

b) the degree of external dependency of the economy

These two factors epitomize the fact that the level of the economic development of a state is a measure of its self-reliant strategy.<sup>75</sup> In this case, economic development (within the framework of Cameroon's foreign policy objectives) refers to the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the material and human conditions as well as the dissemination of knowledge and technology within the state.<sup>76</sup> Economic development is therefore a broader concept than economic growth which refers to quantitative changes in production. Development is concerned not only with changes in the output of goods and services but with the structural and functional transformation of society as a whole. As such it considers transformation in the composition of output and the allocation of output as determining in the process. In other words it includes not only a material and non-material increase in production but also a concordant transformation in the social, political and cultural standards leading to higher standards of well-being.<sup>77</sup>

The interpretation of the economic development underpinnings of foreign policy involves the appreciation of the extent to which a government uses its external interactions to increase the domestic self-reliant capacity of the state on the one hand, as well as the assessment of the extent to which the

government uses domestic economic **development** to increase the independence and sovereignty of the state in its external transactions.<sup>78</sup> Thus, we can provisionally assert that the responsiveness of economic development to foreign policy in the developing state is strong and deep-rooted because economic development is both a foreign policy objective and determinant. Hence, the influence of economic development upon foreign policy can be assessed from the transformations in its inter-related components:- the economic system and structures, socio-political institutions, skill and technical expertise, and the international posture. Economic strength and capability as an instrument of political power and foreign policy can, therefore, be measured by the quantity and quality of human and natural endowments, national production capacity and the extent to which citizens are actually in control by themselves of the means of production and distribution.

As we mentioned above, one of the major economic factors that affects the capability of a state to pursue its stated goals in foreign policy is the degree of the external dependency of the national economy. If external dependency implies the lack of self-reliance which in turn characterizes underdevelopment, then such a situation justifies the economic dependency of the developing state on the outside and at the same time characterizes the nature of its economic development. But what is economic dependency? Just as the ambiguity that surrounds the definition of economic development itself, the concept of dependency constitutes a bone of contention in international development literature.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, within the framework of our study economic dependency would operationally be conceived to mean a situation in which the position of an economy and its relations to other economies in the international system and the articulation of its internal structure are incapable of autocentric development. In this case, the state mainly "consumes what it does not produce and produces what it does not consume."<sup>80</sup> This means that economic dependency is a characteristic of underdeveloped economies or a form of development without self-reliance.

However, the concept of economic dependency should not be confused with the of interdependence which simply implies

the mutual reliance of integrated and self-reliant societies on one another. Interdependent economies are not only self-reliant and integrated but can constantly generate and mobilize resources capable of running an independent and sovereign foreign policy; can induce a productive and distributive economy which is both self-generating and self-perpetuating without outside constraints.<sup>81</sup> In terms of external relations, interdependence relates to symmetrical relations while dependency relates to asymmetrical relations. That is why in international relations sovereign states have constantly struggled to avoid dependency by creating a strong economic development base (power base) in an attempt to utilize such a base as a political leverage for action in their external environment. In this perspective the conception of foreign policy as a means of protecting and advancing the domestic (self-reliance) interests of a nation-state in its relationship with the outside world leads naturally to the view that foreign policy is an integral part of the national comprehensive development planning and that its formulation and implementation are conceived to be consistent with and seen to reinforce other domestic public policies for national socio-economic development. Conceived as such, the economic development task of foreign policy becomes that of consolidating the domestic socio-economic and political development in relation to external processes, systems of thought, values and practices in the action and reaction, "give and take" processes that characterize international politics.

But existing studies<sup>82</sup> of foreign policy have created a dilemma over the notions of dependency and interdependence in the study of the developing state. As important concepts in the study of contemporary international relations, these two notions have been taken together to imply that a relationship of interests exists in inter-state relations such that if one state's position changes, others will be affected by that change.<sup>83</sup> How this interdependence operates and affects states differ radically from one state to another. The difference is structural, in the sense that it can be directly related to the economic structure of the nation. For instance, the economies of Western European countries and that of the United States

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of America are economically interdependent and this has in turn consolidated their political ties and interests. As a consequence, although their foreign policies may diverge in terms of tactics and short-term goals, they are not contradictory in their long-term aims. The same is true of the socialist bloc countries and the Soviet Union.<sup>84</sup> On the one hand, the notion of interdependence differs when we analyze the relationship between the socialist bloc and capitalist bloc. Here, the notion of interdependence is qualitatively different from that operating within the capitalist or socialist bloc, because it is not based on integration and economic interdependence but on the concept of co-existence.<sup>85</sup>

Although co-existence has been made possible because the economies of the socialist bloc have been structured to be self-sufficient and independent of Western economic structures, nevertheless, it also implies a notion of interdependence in the sense that one of the blocs cannot outbid the other without bringing about serious repercussions in the international system which in the thermonuclear age could mean self-abnegation and suicide. Thus if a clash of interest should occur between the two blocs, a confrontation as opposed to intervention<sup>86</sup> can be expected.

The notion of interdependence between the Third World countries and the international community differs from that between the socialist and capitalist blocs or for that matter, existing between socialist or capitalist countries. Here, the relationship is that of economic dependency of the periphery on the capitalist and socialist countries. The significance of this model of international relations is that the periphery countries being in a dependent position are unable to have an effective foreign policy in terms of influence (power status), economic status and prestige, while the opposite is true of advanced countries. Where influence does occur, it operates under the umbrella of metropolitan influence and interests.<sup>87</sup>

The contention here is that in the context of Third World economic development, economic dependency forms one of the major linkages between their domestic and international politics. Unlike the advanced countries whose foreign policies are

determined by domestic political and economic factors, the foreign policies of Third World countries are influenced to a great extent, by external factors because of their economic dependency on the centre. Therefore, should a developing state attempt to bring its own domestic interest into the foreground, it will clash with the centre's interests.<sup>88</sup>

Furthermore, while the foreign policies of the advanced countries can afford to be consolidated and uniform (that is, their external political and economic interests are coordinated and integrated into their domestic environment) those of the developing states are divergent between their reliance on foreign resources and export markets of advanced countries and their more immediate economic and political considerations as well as long-term goals with neighbours. This dichotomy between long-term and short-term interests creates conflicts and negative feedbacks and these, in turn, are aggravated by the competitive nature of alliances with competing major powers.<sup>89</sup>

Against this background, the minimum basic foreign policy objective of Cameroon in terms of national development included the maintenance of national economic welfare and stability as well as the freedom to make major domestic decisions. In terms of realpolitik a state achieves this by relying on its power when it is sufficient or allying itself with a more powerful state when it is not. In the contemporary international community, however, small states such as Cameroon cannot realistically employ either of these means. Their low power capability in terms of national development limits their ability to achieve self-sufficiency in this respect. On the other hand, the discrepancy between their strength and that of the big powers with whom any meaningful alliance should be concluded is so great that, although security may be guaranteed, the price for it in terms of the loss of freedom to make major domestic decisions is likely to be too costly for the benefits acquired. The nature of the present international environment favours a total control of the small by the big powers in which the latter do not allow the former the latitude to adopt a form of socioeconomic organization which they may prefer.<sup>90</sup> Alliances which do not jeopardize independence are

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possible only between states of the same order of magnitude of power or those bound together by significant identical or complementary interests. In terms of national development Cameroon's foreign policy objectives were largely incompatible with those of the major powers.<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, it is increasingly evident that under certain conditions specific national interests vitally require a moral appeal for their achievement. There is no doubt that force is an aspect of power and is relevant as pressure. However, it must be credible to its victims in order to generate power. This is increasingly dependent on ideas. Changes in the international environment have caused some shift from physical to psychological force as an instrument of foreign policy. These changes are: (1) the intense conflict of ideology which has characterized the world community since 1949; (2) the conditions of the use of force which are the outcome of the nuclear stalemate, and the use of guerrilla warfare which depends more on the revolutionary consciousness of the population than on material resources of power; (3) the spread of the legitimacy of the nation-state which has reduced the incidence of interstate wars in which major powers fight one another on opposite sides of a conflicting current in a state; and (4) the general interdependence which has increased interstate communication and reinforced the use of propaganda in diplomacy.

Interstate politics of informal access and control have developed to take account of these changes. A correct perception of other nations' goals and handicaps, as well as the limits within which manoeuvre is possible, is necessary for the new politics and has become a partial substitute for material power, from the use of force to the use of propaganda, argument and other nonmilitary means of influence. As the importance of force declines, power increasingly becomes the art of subtly making one state see the world the way another sees it and making it behave according to that vision.<sup>92</sup> On the continuum from coercion to persuasion a shift in the direction of the latter is obvious. This is a favourable development for the poor and weak states. They can only influence world



politics through the adroit manipulation of the commonly accepted principles of justice and humanity. Maximization of influence is the hallmark of political success. Policies which are not a reflection of the power position of a state are unrealistic. Therefore only a moral foreign policy is realistic for such states as Cameroon. They suffer a permanent power disadvantage in the sense that none of them can hope to dominate world politics and impose its views on others. As a result, they are not likely to fall victim to the corruption of their ideas by consideration of national interests consequent on the attainment of a big power status.

In general, the underprivileged of any community tend to serve as its conscience by their emphasis on peace and justice rather than interest as the guiding principle of action; they tend to speak for the whole of mankind. Their ideas are therefore, more universalistic and absolute than those of the privileged and dominant groups. Since the citizens of most states think in more universalistic terms when the interests of their states are not directly involved in an international dispute, and very few inter-state crises directly involve the interests of most states at the same time, the underprivileged states tend to become an influential segment of world opinion. They must depend on such opinion for the achievement of whatever influence they can in world politics. Although world opinion does not achieve very much in diplomacy it is generally accepted to have some influence.<sup>93</sup> And it is the only realistic instrument at the disposal of the small powers, particularly in their relations with the major powers. In another respect, since informal access and control succeed best in situations of domestic conflicts, division and instability, the cohesiveness of the national society of a poor state becomes a cardinal factor in the new politics.<sup>94</sup> The weak nations are unable to maintain cohesion by force, out of necessity at least, they must use persuasion. But they are unable to use material rewards as a means of persuasion because of their pervasive poverty. Their only alternative is the implementation of tenets of justice in domestic and external relations. Only then can each insure a

meaningfully integrated national society, prevent the deleterious effects of informal access, and fully mobilize its human and material resources for the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

Thus the national development guidelines of Cameroon's foreign policy were potentially useful for successful diplomacy. However, this conclusion is only valid when success is thought of in the short run. It does not apply to the pursuit of long-term national interest, particularly when these are in conflict with the vital interests of the major powers. World Opinion yields very insignificant short-term benefits during a clash of interests.<sup>95</sup> It may create a favourable climate beneficial to future policies, but sole dependence on it can only give rise to a chain of short-run diplomatic frustrations. Herein lies the major weakness of the national development guidelines. Their confinement to the level of philosophy and ethic far removed from that of strategy and tactics rendered them silent on the nature of the operative forces of world politics, namely the configuration of power and interest. President Ahidjo failed to reconcile his ethical principles with the fact that to a good degree, morality is always and everywhere an instrument which serves the interests of the dominant group in a community as a whole. The group imposes its values about life on the rest of society because it possesses superior resources. International morality is by and large the outcome of the successful attempt by the dominant states to organize the world society according to their own values. Many of the absolute truths which are supposed to be of universal validity are to a large extent reflections of the national policies of the status quo countries and their challengers. More appropriately, they are particular interpretations of the national interest at a particular time. The fact that national interest did not come into direct and immediate conflict with the vested interest of the big powers, provided ways and means of avoiding a clash with the major powers and of diluting the deleterious effects of such a conflict on Cameroonian life. This had to be preceded by a clear and unambiguous definition of the national interests in as concrete

terms as possible, and a delineation of the areas of incompatibility of interests as well as how to avoid any possible antagonism in these areas. The emphasis on philosophy had to be supplemented by another on strategy and tactics. The initial guidelines which sufficed for successful pursuit of short-term interests needed to be supplemented by others more relevant for the pursuit of long-term goals.

Also there is the fact that the initial guidelines neglected the vital role of the economic base of power for successful diplomacy. Their emphasis was on the reorganization of international affairs as a means of wielding influence in world politics. However, the economic base of national power is the critical factor in world diplomatic influence. Foreign policy objectives enjoy every meagre respect in the absence of an effective domestic economic and technological strength. Consequently, additional guidelines for diplomacy needed also to embody a programme for the structural economic transformation and development of the country—the most effective way of increasing national power. Again, since the interests of the poor states are largely compatible, (because of their colonial legacy) relative to the major powers these supplementary guidelines must also embody a programme for Third World economic and political unity, particularly before, during and after major negotiations with the advanced countries. Only under such conditions could the country achieve a high proportion of those of its basic objectives which did not contradict the most vital interests of the major powers. The neglect of these factors and the lack of direction with regard to the pursuit of long-term goals led to the sacrifice of the country's interests in terms of independence.

### 3.8 : ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ANTI-RACIALISM

Cameroon's anti-colonialism and anti-racialist stance in international politics developed naturally from the centrality of African affairs in its foreign policy calculations. The degradation of Africans and people of African descent has no comparable precedent in modern times. Race is an important factor in international politics and trans-national alignment.

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Ali Mazrui has argued that the international system betrays a caste and class characteristic. Africa is both at the lowest rungs of the international caste and class hierarchies.<sup>96</sup> T.J. LeMelle and George W. Shepherd, Jr. maintained that "in a racially stratified system, stratification is a function of racial stratification and the boundaries of the two are highly coterminous."<sup>97</sup>

Race has both centripetal and centrifugal dimensions. As a centripetal force race draws together various racial groups under the assumed superiority of the dominant racial group. Race serves in this context as the basis for establishing and guaranteeing dominance and subordinate relations through subjection and/or pseudo-assimilation. In the contemporary world race has functioned as a centripetal force and was instrumental in establishing the white global dominance system. The rise of non-white nationalism, and the movement for decolonization in the mid-twentieth century is an illustration of race as a centrifugal force. Racial conflict has become more pronounced and race has failed to serve as an adequate regulatory mechanism. In effect, race has become a major destabilizing agent in international politics.

The Pan-African Movement, formed after black African resistance failed to curb white intrusion into Africa, is probably the best-documented transnational racial grouping organized to counter white dominance.<sup>98</sup>

Out of Cameroon's colonial experience arose the basis for its post-independence anti-racial and anti-colonial foreign policy. The anti-racial and anti-colonial struggle became not only a major premise of Cameroon's foreign policy, but also an important national objective.

The focus of the Cameroonian anti-racial and anti-colonial struggle became traditionally centred on Africa, especially the white-dominated states of Southern Africa. Although Cameroon advocated respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states, it rejected the rights of Southern African white regimes as to this principle. Cameroon maintained the illegality of these white regimes on the ground that their African citizens were being denied their rights to self-determination. Cameroon had two different interpretations of self-

### 3.9 : EVALUATION

Thus far, we have tried to sketch the basic principles and objectives which guided the post-colonial Cameroonian foreign policy. Although stated in general terms they nevertheless reveal Cameroon's position in African and world affairs. The important questions to ask here are: (1) Were these foreign policy postures in accordance with Cameroon's national interests and aspirations? (2) Assuming that some of the objectives adopted were situationally irrelevant to the needs of the country, did they sufficiently reflect all the environmental opportunities that were available to the Cameroonian policy makers? To what extent were they shaped by the domestic pressures, by the contingencies of the internal system, and by the personal idiosyncracies of the foreign policy elite? A nation's international behaviour can be viewed from two perspectives: the viewpoint of the sideline observer who tries to observe, analyze, describe, explain or predict the actor's behaviour and evaluate its performance. Harold and Margaret Sprout, who have stressed the merit of drawing such a distinction between an objective situation and a perceived state of affairs, have described the former as the operational environment and the latter as the psychological environment.<sup>100</sup>

In this chapter the focus is largely on the operational environment and the task is to assess the soundness of Cameroon's foreign policy postures since independence in terms of their relevance to the needs of the country given the environmental opportunities and limitations. A systematic treatment of the psychological environment will have to deal with such factors as psychological traits, historical tradition, political values and socio-cultural predispositions which generally constitute the basis for choosing among alternatives of means and ends. Although we shall be discussing some of these factors in passing, they are obviously beyond the scope of this chapter and will therefore be reserved for subsequent chapters.

At first glance, Cameroon's international postures would seem to fall in line with the foreign policy positions of other African states. Because of their common background of a national struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, the new African states share certain foreign policy objectives.

determination in its African policy. On the one hand, self-determination was invoked in support of non-white people within nations controlled by a white minority in Southern Africa, and in the former Portuguese colonial territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In these cases self-determination was legal and ought to be supported by all African nationalists. Cameroon thus provided various financial assistance to African liberation movements. On the other hand, self-determination was interpreted to be illegitimate if advocated by African ethnic groups against their governments, even when justified. The Cameroonian position was that interference in the domestic affairs of such non-white African countries would be a clear violation of their sovereign prerogatives. For example, Cameroon's position over the Nigeria-Bifran war, 1966-1970.

Other major factors that have contributed to shaping Cameroon's foreign policy include the perceptions of its foreign policy elite, and the domestic structure of the Cameroon's society. In many underdeveloped countries, such as Cameroon which lack an elaborate network of old and established foreign policy institutions, the role of personality in foreign policy formulation is often more important than in the developed nations. Also, the general illiteracy of the masses of the underdeveloped societies contributes to the high importance of their leadership groups in foreign policy matters.

Henry Kissinger maintained that the domestic structure of a nation-state affects its foreign policy in three essential ways. First, it determines the quantity of total social efforts or resources which is devoted to foreign policy. Second, it serves as the model by which the actions of other states are evaluated. Third, it is crucial in the elaboration of positive goals.<sup>99</sup>

We shall see how Cameroon's foreign policy was affected by its domestic, political, economic and social structures. Also the impact of the other foreign policy factors on Cameroon's external relations will be expatiated later.

such as anti-colonialism. Pan-Africanism, non-alignment in their extra-African relations and the promotion of rapid economic development. However, despite the general consensus among these states on the need to adopt certain policy objectives, the same degree of unanimity has not been reached on the methods by which the objectives could be adequately achieved. Thus, Cameroon's undertones of a pro-West orientation, her relative restraint and moderation, and her cautious and functional approach to African Unity stand out in sharp contrast to the dynamic neutralism and militant Pan-Africanism of the so-called revolutionary states such as Guinea, Egypt or Ghana. Furthermore, the widespread drive on the part of the ex-colonial states to assert their newly won political independence and to develop an African state system has frequently found itself blocked or frustrated by the social, cultural and economic realities of the post-colonial period. In most cases, day-to-day foreign policy has to be conducted against a domestic background of a rather fragile political system and serious limitations imposed by an economy that is both underdeveloped and heavily dependent on the Western economic system.

Granted that Cameroon's domestic processes and foreign policy are largely conditioned by the post-colonial situation, and granted that the domestic political and economic structures not only determine the amount of the social effort which can be devoted to foreign policy, but also set limits to possibilities of foreign policy, a few valid criticisms can still be laid equally at the door of the Ahidjo administration. After all, President Ahidjo and his colleagues may will be judged not so much by what they accomplished as by what they could have accomplished given the resources and opportunities which they inherited.

In the first place, there were too many moral and ethical underpinnings in the government's foreign policy thinking. Rarely did a major Cameroonian foreign policy statement fail to contain some allusion to such abstract phrases as inviolability of national boundaries, legal equality of all states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the need for international peace and morality. Despite the inter-group tensions and a remorseless struggle for power that

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characterized the domestic political process, international politics was frequently defined in moral and legitimist terms, while the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity were dogmatically viewed as substitutes for power politics. Even on such important questions as nonalignment, decolonization, and Pan-Africanism, Cameroon's positions were more moralistic than realistic. By defining its foreign policy objectives and methods in terms of world embracing moral principles, the Ahidjo government not only sometimes ignored the vital interests of Cameroon and Africa, but it also tended to assume the role of a "prestigious neutral" in situations demanding its serious involvement. It is not suggested here that a nation's foreign policy must always be based on pure calculation of advantage. In most instances of foreign relations, mutual advantage is not always obvious. This notwithstanding, persistent definition of a nation's foreign policy objectives in terms of universal moral principles does not indicate an efficient conduct of state affairs. The findings of a contemporary student of international relations are singularly appropriate:

The nature of the pursuance and achievement of (national) objectives and interests is itself neuter, it has no moral gender. To invest it with one, therefore only to blur our vision and obscure our aims.<sup>102</sup>

Moreover, Cameroon's dedication to these abstract moral principles portrayed her both as a "status quo" state and as a stooge of the West.

The second criticism made of the Ahidjo administration's foreign policy postures was their lack of consistency, imagination and dynamism. Apart from the fact that the government did not utilize all opportunities it had to project Cameroon's image abroad, no attempt was made by the government to develop a revolutionary and inclusive national ideology on which to base an overall foreign policy. As a result, post-independence Cameroonian foreign policy was not only lacking both in content and in consistency, but was characterized by ad hoc decision-making which tended at times to be contradictory and self-defeating. There is also the question of Cameroon's indecisiveness on a number of crucial international issues including those



affecting wider African interest. Indeed, one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of the Cameroon government's international orientation was its failure to speak out promptly and consistently on specific issues as they arose or to give adequate publicity to her position on various issues. According to Delancey, President Ahidjo could hardly take a decision without consulting the French government. Moreover, the government's failure to establish channels for a continuous dialogue with its critics at home and abroad,<sup>103</sup> resulted in crucial foreign policy decisions being made in what amounted to an information vacuum. Nor wonder, therefore, that in the end the regime not only helped to undermine Cameroon's influence and prestige, but it gradually divorced itself from the realities of its domestic and international environment.

The problem became even more complex when the government failed to invoke foreign policy postures as a means to reinforce its domestic position and to create and sustain nationalist sentiments. Even the government's foreign economic policy was characterized by a strong sense of morality and conservatism. Despite Cameroon's intermittent and half-hearted attempts to enlarge her relations with the Eastern bloc,<sup>104</sup> no realistic attempt was made to tackle the economic emancipation which had been promised with the advent of political independence. President Ahidjo, says one of the critic of his foreign policy, "was not just the type to pursue a vigorously assertive and radical foreign policy that could consolidate domestic loyalties to his government and bolster political integration and national unity. He would have made an excellent Tory Minister of Education from a Kent constituency."<sup>105</sup> Indeed, President Ahidjo's conservation, hesitant and moralistic approach to African and world affairs as well as his excessive loyalty to his "old Western friends" tended to preclude any attempt on his part to utilize foreign policy as an instrument of proclaiming Cameroon's independence and non-alignment.

It would, perhaps, be said in defence of President Ahidjo that excessive nationalism and unnecessary militancy would not only have alienated from his government a great many of the influential elites and other conservative elements

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but would have driven the country's tenuously united ethnic groups apart. It could further be argued that the coalition nature of Ahidjo's government imposed considerable limitations on his freedom of action. Consequently, his foreign policy postures were nothing but a wretched bundle of compromises obviously intended to placate all political groupings during the seminal years immediately before and after independence.<sup>106</sup> These arguments, however, fail to take into account two important factors. First because of the post-independence federal structure and the socio-political imbalance, and because of President Ahidjo's "conciliatory" nature, firmness and popularity, he was widely regarded as the only politician who could hold the country together. In fact, the President's growing authority and stature during the first few years of independence could be attributed to this factor. Indeed he acquired a mystique that placed him beyond extreme criticism. Direct criticism of the President could easily lead to political and social suicide within top political and social circles.<sup>107</sup>

Secondly, for a country that had recently freed herself from the stifling vestiges of colonialism and with a legacy of a civil war and ethnic diversity, radical and assertive foreign policy postures were needed both to provide satisfying answers to the political and psychological needs of the society, and to create national consciousness and thus national integration.<sup>108</sup> In other words, for a government that was unable to offer any immediate panacea to the pressing needs of the post-colonial situation, foreign policy should have been used as a mechanism to reaffirm the newly won political independence and sovereignty, and to create a spirit of dignity and mental emancipation that could replace the colonial past. We do not mean that the creators of the new nation's foreign policy should have been more interested in slogans and headlines than in the political realities of the post-colonial situation. Such an approach to international politics would be one of self-abnegation and would run the risk of political suicide. But neither should they have acted only on the basis of morality or reasonableness. Apart from the need to enlist the enthusiastic cooperation and support of the masses, an active foreign policy is required as an outlet for a nationalist

energy that is often frustrated at home.

Possibly, President Ahidjo's greatest weakness in his foreign policy postures was his inability to disengage Cameroon from the West. In retrospect, his government's so-called neutralist stance was nothing more than a smokescreen for adherence to a pro-West position. Despite President Ahidjo's vague promise that Cameroon under his leadership would not align herself as a matter of routine with any power bloc, he did not hesitate to warn the United Nations General Assembly of Cameroon's permanent commitment to the West: "We shall never forget our old (Western) friends"<sup>109</sup> Even those moves demonstrating Cameroon's independence of the West were made reluctantly and haltingly. Partly because of President Ahidjo's ethical interpretation of international politics, he and his colleagues found it difficult either to relate Cameroon's interests to the international system or to examine various international issues objectively and dispassionately. Perhaps the Cameroonian foreign policy elite did not know that in international politics, there is no permanent friend or permanent enemy. Rather issues usually determine the nature of alliance.<sup>110</sup> Even decisions to accept external economic assistance or to enter into trade agreements with foreign powers were often based on prejudice rather than on calculation of advantage.

One more aspect of Cameroon's international orientation that sparked off a barrage of criticisms was her cautious and functional approach to Pan-Africanism. Despite the Ahidjo government's deep interest in African affairs and despite President Ahidjo's strong feelings about colonialism, racism and the need to regulate the access of outside power to the African continent, Cameroon's African policy did not seem likely either to inspire national pride or to satisfy the psychological needs of the articulate strata of her population. "A policy which advocates functional co-operation instead of organic (political) union of Africa cannot inspire anybody"<sup>111</sup> Unlike the radical African states which had insisted on a supranational political Unity in Africa and were quite willing to use all means at their disposal to achieve it, the Ahidjo government not only treated the Pan-African Union as a

long-term evolutionary process which might ultimately grow out of prolonged contacts among the various African states, but also insisted on inviolability of boundaries and legal equality of all states. These principles place a high value on national independence and territorial integrity and emphasize the use of a functional rather than a political or revisionist approach to Cameroon's involvement in intra-African politics. It is hardly surprising therefore, that for Cameroon, economic and cultural cooperation was not only a necessary step to African Unity but was to be placed ahead of political Union. Even the government's support for nationalist and liberation movements in Africa was too hedged and sporadic to be taken seriously by anyone.<sup>112</sup>

In retrospect, the differences between the Ahidjo government and its critics were concerned less with substantive African issues than with the style and tone of diplomacy. Infact, at no time did President Ahidjo or any of his colleagues deny the efficacy of an African state system. Despite his pragmatism and dislike of slogans and emotionalism, he was always for close cooperation among African states. He even played an active role in the various attempts to form an intra-African organization. Perhaps it is more tenable to say that although both Cameroon and the radicals were primarily concerned with the problem of Pan-African solidarity, Cameroon unlike the radicals (who argued that without a supranational political unity, economic and cultural cooperation could be difficult to achieve) tended to believe that without functional co-operation and the necessary economic infrastructure, continental political union would be nothing but an illusion. Expressing the conflicting approaches to intra-african relations, Mahmud Takur has written that :

The makers of (Cameroon's) foreign policy believed that if the individual states developed economically they could establish effective centres of authority and legitimacy. Then with united peoples behind them, the governments could forge functional relations with their neighbours and create institutions that were required. Common services organizations, federations and other Unions could come later.<sup>113</sup>

On the contrary, he continued :

The radical states led by Nasser, Nkrumah and Nyerere were convinced that the African states which appeared

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as a result of the colonial "balkanization" were too weak and poor to be able to stand individually. The neo-colonialist forces would subvert their economies and politics and impose a new type of imperialism through the "regimes of surveillance" which they have installed. These would provide a convenient front behind which the metropolitan powers could hide and continue their exploitative ventures. To circumvent this threat, African states must form immediate political Unions which would be better able to stand up to the neo-colonialist forces and develop Africa for the benefit of its peoples.<sup>114</sup>

However, since "African diplomacy operates in a milieu of internal stress and strain",<sup>115</sup> the Ahidjo government's conception of Pan-Africanism must be evaluated in the light of the domestic pressures exerted on the political leadership. First because of her ethnic and cultural diversity, Cameroon could not help projecting into the building of her foreign policy, the same caution and verbal compromise that characterized her domestic politics. Second, a revisionist or radical foreign policy which advocated some alteration or removal of African national boundaries so as to create a supranational unity in Africa would, by tipping the balance of power against some tribal and cultural groupings, intensify tribal jealousies and inter-group tensions in Cameroon. Third, because of her leaders' pre-occupation with rapid economic development and political stability, ideological and aggressive policies that could detract from the task of achieving these goals were carefully avoided. Besides, Cameroon's turbulent post-independence political situation meant that her leaders were not as free to focus on foreign affairs as leaders of other states. In contrast to some of the radical African states, Cameroon's independence came with much bitterness and ill-feeling. But her leaders who finally came to power were less motivated either by an anti-European feeling or by an emotional need to take drastic steps to weaken residual Western influence in the continent.

Granted all the pragmatism and reasonableness in Cameroon's approach to Pan-Africanism, there are still some compelling reasons why Cameroon's post-independence foreign policy should have been more militant, more African, and more aware of the threat of neo-colonialism. During the conspicuous

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interim immediately preceeding and following political independence, there was no reason why the Ahidjo government should not have used foreign policy as a political rallying cry, designed to reinforce its domestic position, inspire national pride and enlist the enthusiastic cooperation and support of the African radical states. Besides, it is the style, emphasis or tone of a foreign policy, rather than its substance, that is usually crucial for the image of a government.

A new approach had to eschew an uncritical emphasis on either moral abstraction or the idea of an exclusive national self-interest as the motivating factors of foreign policy. States are not analogous to an individual with a moral conscience. Each is an embodiment of competing interests that are many times in conflict with one another and with moral values. On the other hand, however, such ideas as liberty equality and brotherhood common to the great world religions play a vital role in international politics. The union of these two factors must entail an intellectual framework which provides guidelines for action in the pursuit of long-term and short-term objectives. It had to maintain emphasis on justice when the national interest did not come into direct and immediate conflict with the vested interests of the big powers; had to provide ways and means of avoiding a clash with the major powers and of diluting the deleterious effects of such a conflict on Cameroonian life. This had to be preceded by a clear and unambiguous definition of the national interests in as concrete terms as possible and a delineation of the areas of incompatibility of interests as well as how to avoid them. Nevertheless, our hypothesis number one is confirmed.

After analysing the main objectives and principles of Cameroon's foreign policy, it would seem that in order to understand the trends of this foreign policy fully, one must cognizance of (a) the dynamic nature of foreign policy and (b) the "resource-gap" implications of the intricate interaction between the internal and external environments in which foreign policies function. After all, according to Northedge "the foreign policy of a country is the product of environmental factors - both internal and external to it."<sup>116</sup>

It is in this context of the "resource gap" implications of foreign policy in the developing state that Part Two of our study will attempt to examine the domestic socio-economic conditions that helped to determine and shape Cameroon's foreign policy, as a prelude to a better understanding of the role of socio-economic determinants in the foreign policy orientation of the developing state.

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