



Thèse

Présentée par

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**INSTITUT DES RELATIONS
INTERNATIONALES DU
CAMEROUN**

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING
STATE : THE CAMEROONIAN
EXPERIENCE, 1960 - 1982**

ACADEMIC YEAR 1989-90




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**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING STATE :
THE CAMEROONIAN EXPERIENCE, 1960 - 1982**

A Dissertation Submitted and Publicly Defended in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirements of a DOCTORATE
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PART TWO

Domestic Economic Relations as a Determinant of the Foreign Policy Orientation
and Behaviour of the Developing State : An Empirical and Comparative Study of
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CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIO-POLITICAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AS A DETERMINANT

OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE STATE SYSTEM.

4.1 : INTRODUCTION:

Part Two which is divided into chapters Four, Five, and Six constitutes a joint attempt to investigate the empirical validity of our second hypothesis we formulated in chapter Two according to which "because economic development is both an independent and dependent variable in the developing state's international relations, its foreign policy capabilities are at any point in time a reflection of its dependent domestic economic, and socio-political relations of production". In such an attempt we have divided our investigations into chapters Four and Five which examine the domestic socio-political relations and chapter six which examines the domestic economic relations. A state's level of involvement in various international issue-areas is, at least, one expression of its general orientation towards the rest of the World. By orientation we mean a state's general attitudes and commitments towards the external environment, its fundamental strategy, its domestic and external objectives and aspirations.¹ A nation's general strategy or orientation is seldom revealed in any one decision but results from a series of cumulative decisions made in an effort to adjust objective values and interests to conditions and characteristics of the domestic and external environments. By examining the socio-political relations of production (that is, the structure of economic power, influence and interactions) within the domestic polity, it is possible to identify the fundamental underpinnings of the state's foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour.

Therefore, a state's general foreign policy strategy can be linked to the nature of its socio-economic structure or formation. This socio-economic formation constitutes the inputs of the foreign policy capabilities. If we can provisionally define capability as any physical or mental object or quality available to the state as an instrument of

inducement to persuade, reward, threaten or punish,² then we can see that capabilities are the essential instruments of the national power base used primarily for achieving and defending other goals.

Throughout our study we have been arguing that the economic system or the mode of production is the material foundation of social life and as such of foreign policy in the developing state. It largely determines other aspects the foreign policy system particularly the legal system, the political system, the belief system and morality. Therefore, once the mode of production or the economic system is understood, we have a fairly good idea of the what the general character of the other aspects of the foreign policy system will look like. We have already given some indication of the dominant influence of the economic forces in our discussion in chapter one, but as will be shown in this chapter, the economic system is not entirely independent, but also subject to the influence of non-economic factors in determining the foreign policy orientation and behaviour of the developing state. These non-economic aspects of the foreign policy system that are dependent on the economic system are collectively called the superstructure.³ This is in contrast to the economic system which is called the substructure or infrastructure⁴. This infrastructure and superstructure together constitute the socio-economic structure or formation of the foreign policy system. Thus, the productive forces and socio-political relations of production are really two aspects of the same thing. The organic unity of productive forces and the socio-political relations of production constitute the object of this chapter.

The concept of socio-political relations of production implies that labour or production is usually socio-political. That is it (Labour) is done in cooperation or at any rate in association with others. Even in the very primitive stages of man's existence, which preceded the formation of full-fledged societies, there was cooperative labour among members of the same family. In modern times, when a complex division of labour has emerged, labour has become highly social. The production of a single object such as a clock may involve

.../...

scores of workers each contributing a specialized input. Indeed, the socialization and the politicization of labour and production have become important components of modern economic systems especially in the developing states. The social and political relations which people enter into in the course of production are called the socio-political relations of production or relations of production.⁵ The affinity between socio-political relations of production and the productive forces may be said to be aspects of the same process because a particular relation of production comes into being as a result of the forces of production being at a particular stage of development. The productive forces are clearly the more dynamic element and largely determine the relations of production. Nevertheless the relations of production are not simply passive and dependent. They also shape, or at least, influence, the productive forces since their configuration can either aid or hinder economic development. Since the mode of production or the economic system shapes the other aspects of social life, it means that a full understanding of the economic system itself-necessitates an analysis of the socio-political structure such as the societal structure and forces including social classes, ethnic composition, cultural and psychological factors at work in society; the state system including the government machinery of decision-making and the leadership which refers to the way in which state power is used by current office-holders and decision-makers as well as the situational and contingency factors.

The central role of the socio-political relations of production in an economic analysis of the foreign polity of the developing state comes out in conspicuous relief at this point because of the fact that economic development operates within a given a socio-cultural and political environment. The analysis of this environment of economic development therefore, appears indispensable and unavoidable because:

(1) Any estimate of the degree of a country's economic development based on purely economic factors, such as the per capita figures of its national production accounts) fails to take into consideration the complexity of its economic structure and as such ignores the socio-political environment of

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
production which constitutes one of the basic premises in assessing the nature of economic development.

(2) Of the inseparable and simultaneous linkage between the concepts of economic, cultural or political development. In so far as economic, cultural or political activities cannot be objectively detached from the community's social activities as a whole and studies in separate categories, the economic development process cannot be practically conceived as economic, cultural or political. It should always be borne in mind, however, that there is a methodological expediency in the concept of economic development as an interrelated economic, political and socio-cultural process. For the fact is that all societal processes are structurally correlated, and if it is true that they proceed on levels vested with relative autonomy - the economic, social, cultural and political levels - it is no less true that only by abstraction can any of these levels be conceived independently of the overall social process. Therefore, by analyzing the "socio-political environment" (of Cameroon's economic development) as a determinant of its foreign policy, this chapter also seeks to demonstrate that economic development is a total social process and the degree to which it determines foreign policy in the developing state is also shaped by the socio-political structure and the socio-political relations of production emanating therefrom.

Thus, in this chapter we recognize other elements of national power that are instrumental in the making of foreign policy in the developing state. We assume that these other elements of power are not independent of the economic potentialities that invigorate their potency and interaction in the national-international arena. We therefore, construct in this chapter a macrometric power weight conceptual framework in order to unfold the functional relationship of the economic determinants of the perceived power of the developing state. It will guide us to understand the combinations of the relative political weight of the developing state in the international system. For instance, a rapid rate of economic development indicates the presence of another property that tends to enhance the economic potential for producing military strength, and for exploiting it for dispatch.

This is what might be called an economic resilience of flexibility that promotes quick adjustments to new tasks of production. Cameroon may not have the required technology to concretely produce military weapons and hardwares, but she may have the economic capability that produces military strength. National power then is realistically described as a mixture of strategic, military, economic and potential strengths and weaknesses.⁶ It is determined in part by the military forces and military establishment of a military, but even more by the size and location of territory, the nature of the frontiers, the population, the raw material resources, the economic structure, the technological development, ethnic composition, the social cohesiveness, the stability of political process and decision-making, and finally the intangible quantity described as national spirit.⁷

MAP 4(1): CAMEROON'S MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS AND REGIONS



SOURCE: W.R. JOHNSON: *The Cameroon Federation*, (Princeton University Press, 1970) P. 43.

4.2 : THE STATE SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW


With independence gained, Ahidjo faced the problems of ruling this new state. Foremost among these was to devise a set of institutions for governance that would be acceptable to the Cameroon people. A second problem was to foster the development of a single Cameroon identity, to overcome the remaining ethnic loyalties, and to bridge the divisions between the northerners and southerners and, with reunification, the francophones and anglophones. This identity problem common to many African states, and the fear that the state might break apart before the process of nation building could occur, has often been the excuse or the cause for the construction of authoritarian political systems in Africa. Cameroon was to be no exception.

From independence until 1982 the country was ruled by one man, Ahmadou Ahidjo. During this time Ahidjo established a highly centralized political process in which almost all power and responsibility resided in one person, the President. He voluntarily turned over this office and some of the power to his constitutionally designated successor, the Prime Minister, Paul Biya, in 1982. Biya inherited the institutions, processes, and customs established by Ahidjo in his twenty-four years in power; that system has remained largely intact. President Biya may sincerely wish to move toward a more open, democratic political process, yet he has discovered that such movement is difficult and dangerous within the political environment inherited from Ahidjo and his colonial predecessors.

In spite of much vocal concern for the nation-building problem, most of Ahidjo's political effort and his greatest success were devoted to building the apparatus of a modern state. Consciously or not, he assumed that the nation would emerge overtime, after the construction of the state. Centralization, coalition building, and repression were the major tactics utilized by Ahidjo to concentrate political and economic power in his office and person.

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SOURCE: W. R. JOHNSON: *The Cameroon Federation*; (Princeton University Press, 1976) P. 43.

(A) CENTRALIZATION

Centralization had numerous aspects, including the development of a single political party, the concentration of administrative decision-making in one city-Yaoundé, the dissolution of the federation to form a unitary system of government, the use of the constitution to funnel authority to the president, the reconstruction of all autonomous organizations to make them subservient to the party or government, and the president's almost total control over nominations and appointments. This centralization gave the president tremendous power over most aspects of **politics**, from the international to the local, even village, level. To assume this authority and to push through the various alterations of the political structures that existed when he came to office, Ahidjo built a coalition of support from local leaders, the military, the bureaucracy, and urbanites. In the process of building and maintaining such support, he employed a variety of repressive tactics and stifled human rights.

The formation of a single party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU), was completed in 1966 after a two-step process of forging a single party in the francophone East Cameroon state and then merging this with the remaining parties of the anglophone West Cameroon state. Ahidjo had used the military, the courts, and his considerable control over patronage to bring the East Cameroon parties into his Union Camerounaise (UC). Some leaders were brought into the UC by the offer of positions in the government; for example the Mouvement d'Action Nationale entered the UC, and its leader, Charles Assale, became prime minister of East Cameroon. Such positions not only honoured the individuals concerned but also gave them access to sources of patronage with which to reward their supporters. The essence of the party was the cohesion of a few important people, each of whom brought in his/her loyalists to the party.⁸ But some leaders refused to be co-opted in this manner. Against one such group, the legalized wing of the Union of Cameroon Peoples, Ahidjo used the police. The January 1962 congress of the party was dispersed and the legal UPC was effectively destroyed. Other opposition leaders

.../...

banded together to form a Front National Unifié. These people were quickly arrested, convicted, and sent to prison for their "antigovernment" activities. Bayart argued that these arrests signalled "the real birth of the one-party regime ... in East Cameroon."⁹ Such tactics were combined with changes in the procedures of parliament that effectively eliminated non-UC parliamentarians from any effective role.

While these tactics were being used against the legal opposition, severe military repression destroyed the main remnants of the UPC still in revolt. In this situation the French were of special assistance to Ahidjo: They supplied military personnel and equipment not only for his effort to destroy the UPC but also for his project of building a Cameroon military and security force.

Multipartism continued within West Cameroon somewhat longer than in the East, although one party, the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), was clearly dominant in the West. In June 1966 Ahidjo called a meeting of the three parties in the West and obtained agreement to dissolve all parties (including the UC) and to join the new party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU). Again, this was an instance of leaders, rather than the masses, who simply followed their leaders, joining a party. Moreover, the new party was clearly dominated by elements from the French-speaking part of the country, particularly by members of the old Union Camerounaise.¹⁰

Centralization in Yaoundé was increased by the elimination of autonomous forms of organization. Previously independent organizations became subordinated to the political party through the party's women's, youth, and labour wings or through domination by or incorporation into government agencies-as had occurred with the anglophone cooperatives movement. Related to this were policies to destroy and limited autonomy enjoyed either by local governments (more a reality in anglophone Cameroon) or by traditional governments. In this manner Ahidjo destroyed "all competing sources of autonomy and legitimacy".¹¹

Even before the formation of the CNU, the number of labour unions in East Cameroon had dropped to two, but these continued as separate and independent until a few years after the formation of the CNU. At the first CNU party congress in 1969 demands were voiced that these unite, join with the anglophone unions, and form a single labor organization. Six months later this organization had become reality with the formation of the Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Cameroun (UNTC), its founding supervised and organized by the Political Bureau of the party. Throughout the various levels of the union's structure there were party and administration representatives. Subsequently, strikes occurred rarely in Cameroon and then only outside UNTC control; they were generally suppressed rapidly by government police or troops. The government view was that unions were to assist in the training of workers, to ensure their discipline and rates of production, and to see that they supported government policies. The government assumed that it was capable of representing the interests of the workers and that it would meet their needs as it defined them. This paternalistic concept rebounded in a sense to the popularity of a president who announced general wage increases from time to time and declared special holidays (with pay) as signs of his thoughtfulness and concern for the workers.

The UNTC had an appearance of independence in that it was not directly subordinated to the CNU, but the party's women's and youth groups did not enjoy this semblance of autonomy. These were integral components of the party. About 45 percent of total party membership was in the Women's Cameroon National Union (WCNU), and 23 percent in the Youth's Cameroon National Union (YCNU). This might give the impression that women played a major role in the total party structure, but this impression is not confirmed when one looks at the governing bodies of the party.

Another major step in the centralization of power in Yaoundé took place in 1972 when the federal system was abolished and the country became the United Republic of Cameroon. Federalism in Cameroon had from the start been a

rather weak example of the concept of a division of powers between central and regional government. Infacts, ne sepcific powers were reserved for the states by the constitution, though under Article 6 some were placed temporarily with the states. These powers were quickly assumed by the central government, most by 1963 according to Benjamin.¹² In the East there was little pretense or desire to maintain a true separate state government. And under the terms of the constitution and with the growing strength of the central government, there were not many realms in which the government of the West held sway. Frank Stark argued that from the start the federal system had little substance and that after reunification Ahidjo made federalism irrelevant to the West Cameroon elite. Stark and Bayart described how Ahidjo used patronage and awarded positions to those anglophones who favoured a strong central regime; those favoring a strong West Cameroon state found themselves without office.¹³

Ahidjo's control over the CNU enabled him to ensure the party's support for the ending of the federation. Procentralizers were appointed to the party hierarchy, and Ahidjo's ability to control the nomination of candidates for legislative elections allowed him to ensure that West Cameroon's representatives would favour his position. Through a series of changes in the constitution, Ahidjo became eligible to select the prime minister of West Cameroon and to allow the prime minister also to hold the post of vice president of the central government. He then arranged for Solomon T. Muna, a procentralist, to hold both positions. No one was left in a position to defend the existence of the state government.¹⁴ It is not clear who other than Ahidjo was involved in the decision to end the federation. But once the decision was made, action came rapidly and decisively. On May 7, the Political Bureau of the CNU met and Ahidjo announced that the federation was to end; the new day he spoke before the National Assembly (the legislature) and stated that a referendum on the matter was to be held. The government argued that maintaining separate governments in a relatively poor country was too expensive, that federalism fostered tribalism and regionalism, and that economic development was impeded by federalism. Underlying these factors was .../...

Ahidjo's desire to further concentrate power in his hands.¹⁵ The vote took place on May 20 and the results were announced May 29, about three weeks after the idea had first become public. Ninety-nine percent had voted in favor of dissolution of the federation.

Underpinning this political unity that Ahidjo built was a functional integration that proceeded rapidly, at least in part by design. One aspect of this integration was the development of a variety of policies that "harmonized" or unified the states in a network of common practices: The use of a single currency and common weights and measures was among the more mundane; common tariffs, labour legislation, and moves toward unitary procedures and practices were among the more complex. A second aspect of this integration was a variety of infrastructural projects that served to tie the two states together while weakening West Cameroon's ability to operate as a separate entity. Thus, new roads and railroads linked agricultural hinterlands of anglophone Cameroon and its main commercial centres to Douala in East Cameroon. This provided markets for the surplus food crops grown in the West and opened the port of Douala for the West's export crops. But a side effect of this was to alter the main axis of transport from north-south within West Cameroon to west-east between the two states. This, in turn, meant the demise of Victoria (now Limbe) and the closure of Tiko as ports for the import/export of goods for West Cameroon and their replacement by Douala. In fact, Douala also replaced Victoria as a commercial centre for much of West Cameroon. Similarly, the forced closedown of the West Cameroon Electricity Corporation (POWERCAM) and the expansion of the Société Nationale d'Electricité (SONEL), the francophone producer of electricity, into the anglophone state meant that West Cameroon became dependent upon an external supply of power, just as it had become dependent upon an external port.

With the federal system out of the way, Ahidjo was able to extend the highly centralized administrative structure established by the French to all parts of the country. Seven provinces were established, each headed by a governor. The

provinces were divided into départements, each headed by a préfet or senior divisional officer. These appointments were made by Ahidjo with the advice of the minister of territorial administration, under whose jurisdiction this hierarchy was placed. There was no role for the local population or for parliament to play in these appointments. Each administrative post was very powerful in the area allocated to it, and often in rural areas the préfet became a local tyrant. These officials, who answered ultimately to the president, derived their power and authority in the localities directly from this relationship. The representatives of other ministries, including police and security at each local level, reported not only to their supervisors within their ministry but also to this administrative appointee, whether préfet or governor, thus giving the president direct access to the activities of local-level bureaucracy.

The political party, the CNU, was organized on the same territorial basis, and administrative officials played significant roles in guiding and supervising party activities in each government administrative unit. Again this gave the president a direct link to the local-level activities of the party, which he also controlled from the top. These local-level representatives of the president also played a powerful role in the selection of officers for local government and of rulers ("chiefs," kings, or fons) in the traditional political institutions (the remnants more or less of precolonial governments) through the position of advisers to the president on appointments and party nominations.

This dual system of administration—the hierarchy of the territorial administration and that of each ministry—extended from its single center in Yaoundé, with each strand beginning at the president's office. Decisionmaking within these hierarchies was limited to the central office, and only the most minor actions could be taken at any local level, though the governors and préfets with their more direct ties to Yaoundé had slightly greater freedom to take action than the representatives of ministries. There were, nevertheless, significant delays in action when governors and préfets, facing urgent

.../...

situations, communicated with and awaited instructions from Yaoundé. Decisionmaking became even more centralized as Ahidjo opened and developed functional offices in the presidency for each of the ministerial organizations. The minister and his staff saw their prerogatives substantially reduced as they found it more and more necessary to clear decisions with the appropriate office at the presidency or even to await cues or directives from the office before attempting any initiatives.

Of course, such centralization in Yaoundé and in the president meant that Ahidjo and his team had extremely tight control over events everywhere in the country. But such centralization raised problems, the most obvious of which was the potential of simply overloading the president with a huge burden of decisions, some often very minor. For example, it is widely believed that the president approved or disapproved all Cameroon citizen's applications for visas to leave the country. Such a procedure of constant referral to the centre for decisions also has an extremely dampening effect on local initiative and independent thinking. Bureaucrats became very timid, not only afraid to contradict or oppose their immediate seniors, but also afraid to present ideas that might conflict with someone further up in the hierarchy. In a more general regard, Joseph noted that "the behavioral pattern of obsequiousness to one's superiors, and arbitrary domination of one's bureaucratic inferiors, is replicated throughout the system."¹⁶ To this must be added the usual inefficiencies caused by bureaucratic red tape, compounded in this instance by the need to go to the centre, to Yaoundé, to get anything done.

An additional factor leading to the concentration of power in the executive was the constitution and alterations made to it. Although the original constitution had given much power to the president, this power was increased with the new constitution written after the reunification of French and British territories. The president became both head of state and head of government as well as commander of the military. Etonga argued that, unlike the executive in other countries,

the Cameroon president shared none of this power; he was the executive.¹⁷ The vice president or prime minister, when such existed, depended totally on the president for whatever responsibilities he might wish to give. That the president could easily amend the constitution is indicated by his ability to change almost at will the office of vice president, prime minister or whatever designation was in use. The president proposed amendments and the legislature was subordinate to and dependent upon the president: it would always vote as he desired.

This obedient position of the legislature was in part a result of the constitution and in part a result of the nomination and legislative electoral process. Because there was no real separation of powers in the constitution, the President could play an important role in the legislative process through his ability to propose legislation and to delay or prevent the passage of legislation he did not like. Moreover, in many instances he had the power to legislate by decree without reference to the National Assembly and even could declare a state of emergency on his own and rule entirely by decree. The president, moreover, did not need to seek legislative approval of his appointments: He appointed his ministers, his governors, his judges alone, and they in turn were entirely dependent upon him and his favour if they were to remain in office. The National Assembly had no role to play in the process and could exert no pressure on it. Of course, this made the appointed judiciary subservient to presidential will.

It was through the electoral process that the legislature was made totally dependent upon the president. Elections were based on a single-list system, using the entire country as the electoral district, and with the party that got a majority of votes winning all of the seats. This served as a major impediment to any person or group wishing to establish a second political party; there was no hope that such a party could receive 51 percent of the national vote and thus no way that it would win any seats in the National Assembly. It was legal to form such a party, but of no use

under the circumstances that obtained.

Thus, if one was to be elected to the National Assembly one had to be a member of the CNU, but the nomination process in the CNU was dominated by the president of the party who, throughout almost the entire history of the party, was Ahidjo. This process changed slightly from election to election, but in essence party organizations at the local level sent forward to the CNU Central Committee the names and dossiers of several possible candidates. The préfet—a presidential appointee—also sent a report, as did the police. The Central Committee, headed and called into session by the president, then selected the candidate; nomination meant election. Thus, the members of the National Assembly were dependent upon Ahidjo's approval for election, and the National Assembly voted favorably on all legislation put forward by the president.

(B) COALITION-BUILDING

President Ahidjo had established a powerful structure for autocratic rule in Cameroon. How was he able to do this? Who supported him in effect, who allowed him to build this structure? How did Ahidjo put together a group of people strong enough to enable him to concentrate so much power in his office and person? A coalition based on a variety of local and regional leaders, the bureaucracy, and the military, as well as other elements of the petite bourgeoisie, urban, and a variety of northern-based elements was pulled together by several means, including the development of an extensive client-patron system, co-operation and buying off of opposition, force and the use of the state security apparatus, the control of appointments and nominations, the strategy of divide and rule, and the skillful use of ethnic balancing or ethnic arithmetic in the appointments process. Major elements of these techniques included, (1) presidential control of relatively great financial resources in a poor society and the government's role as the major provider of employment, contracts, and opportunity for economic development projects in the society, and (2) Ahidjo's ability to maintain the support of the French government and the business/commercial/industrial investors, mostly French, who dominated the modern elements of the economy of Cameroon .../...

Financial support from the French government was assured through the various accords negotiated with Ahidjo, accords that provided financial assistance to a wide range of governmental activities in the country. Private French investors were also an important source of funds for development projects. The major source of funds for Cameroonian governmental operations derived, of course, from its tax and customs revenues, by far the greatest input in all aspects of the economy. With the low level of income, there were and still are no large reserves of private capital or savings. Because of the more or less subsistence and agricultural nature of the economy, there was little industry, and only a small proportion of the population was in wage employment. Government, then was the major source of funding for all types of development projects-whether it be a new industry, road, or school. By the same reasoning, government was also the major source of employment in the country. Due to the extreme centralization of the government structures and processes, Yaoundé, and the office of the president in particular, became the key factor in the distribution of these scarce resources to individuals, communities, or regions. Add to this the president's ability to gain or deny passage of legislation that may favor the interests of individuals or groups, his ability to influence the granting of contracts to undertake most of the construction and development projects in the country, and his ability to see to it that occasional illegal activities were overlooked by the state security forces, and we begin to get an impression of how Ahidjo was able to gain support from a variety of leadership elements in the country.

Ahidjo used these resources to build a set of economic relationships tying his supporters to him and enabling him to create and hold together the political system. He was the big patron with a set of clients, each of whom was in turn a patron to another set of clients. This network of patron-client relationships extended from the presidency throughout the society. Ahidjo's power of nomination and appointment, unfettered by any sort of checks from other political

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institutions, were a key means to establish this network. Ministerial appointments, for example, provided a major opportunity for Ahidjo to reward influential people in society—or even to build influence for individuals—and to tie them to him. But this position also gave the minister the ability to reward many of his followers through the resources he controlled at the ministry. For years the minister of posts, telephone, and telegraph was an anglophone from Mamfe, Emmanuel Egbe Tabi. Rapidly, anglophones, filled positions throughout the ministry, even to the lower-level assignments at post office branches in francophone parts of the country. Many of the higher positions went not just to anglophones, but to persons specifically from the Mamfe area. Such appointees were thus indebted to the minister who secured for them the positions. They, in turn, assisted others in getting employment, extending the patrol-client net not only throughout the ministry but also from the president into the villages of anglophone Cameroon.

There was a danger in such a procedure that loyalties may attach, rather than to the president, to the minister, and because an autonomous source of power for him. Besides, there were not enough ministries to provide this sort of linkage to every part of the country and not enough wealth to open more ministries. Ahidjo's solution to these problems was to overhaul his cabinet frequently, moving ministers from one post to another and replacing the old with the new. Very few ministers remained at one post for long, the most significant exception being Minister of Defence, Sadou Daoudou, who remained in office from 1961 until 1980. Major cabinet shuffles took place frequently during most of Ahidjo's years in office, though from 1972 until 1978 only minor changes occurred.

The cabinet as a group was an arena for Ahidjo to play "ethnic arithmetic" or "ethnic balancing". There Ahidjo could grant posts to representatives of significant ethnic or regional groups and use the minister to tie these groups into his system. Although not all groups could be represented directly, many were represented in surrogate by ministers from

their province or from neighboring ethnic groups. Occasionally, new groups were added by the opening of a new ministry or by the replacement of a minister by one of different ethnic origin.

The National Assembly was another location for patronage appointments and the playing of ethnic arithmetic; this locale was separate from the cabinet, as ministers could not be members of the assembly. But beyond the numerous appointments Ahidjo could make to the cabinet and elsewhere in the system, he had a variety of other techniques to allow individuals to profit, even though they might not receive a lucrative appointment. Lesser-paid officials-as well as those in senior positions-often could turn their official position to private profit. Préfets, for example, frequently used government vehicles or the vehicles from cooperative organizations to carry cargo for their private business, or they used government employees, equipment, and supplies to construct private dwellings, which were then rented to the government at an exorbitant rate. For some associates of the president there were special loans from the banks, loans without interest or any expectation of repayment. Such "loans" apparently were used by many to finance trading ventures, often involving smuggling, especially between northern Cameroon and the northern parts of Nigeria as well as through the major port of Douala. This smuggling, like many other forms of corruption, was officially frowned upon, but there were few serious anticorruption efforts. However, the widespread existence of corrupt activities meant the Ahidjo could use selective enforcement against anyone suspected of anything the president did not like. Overall, the existence of smuggling and corruption provided a major avenue for the president to allow supporters to receive rewards.

Specific acts that may be seen as rewards to groups rather than patronage-rewards to individuals-were taken. For example, the Cameroon military was regularly allocated a large budget and was allowed to become, on a per capita basis, one of the largest in francophone Africa. The special rewards

for senior officers included being allowed to run private businesses while on active military duty and to use military equipment and personnel for these businesses. Ahidjo did take measures to keep control over the military, in part by frequently transferring officers so that it was difficult for them to develop strong enough bonds with their troops to undertake a coup, in part by having no central command structure and keeping the country divided into separately commanded districts. Divide and rule was a popular Ahidjo tactic. The military was further restrained by the maintenance of three separate military establishments under two ministries. There was the regular military-army, navy, air force-but there were also the gendarmes, with similar training and equipment. A special unit of the gendarmes, the Republican Gaurd, was established in 1966 to protect the president. The men in this unit, drawn almost exclusively from Ahidjo's hometown, received extraordinary benefits relative to other military personnel. Ahidjo commanded each of these units, and in effect he had three armies to use against each other should any of them attempt a takeover. In addition there was a fourth establishment, National Security, which handled most of the usual police functions as well as internal intelligence matters. However, this latter group was not really competitive militarily with the other three.¹⁸

Special efforts were also made to appease and maintain support among the civil servants or bureaucrats. They received excellent pay compared to the average income of the Cameroon citizen, as well as numerous "perks" such as free housing. The policy of "Cameroonization", the process of replacing foreign nationals, mostly French in the civil service with Cameroon citizens may be seen as a national necessity, but it also opened numerous positions for Cameroonians and allowed their rapid advancement in the bureaucracy. Many bureaucrats took part in private businesses, often aided, purposely or not, by government lending agencies set up ostensibly to assist rural dwellers in agricultural pursuits. FONADER, Fonds National de Développement Rural, was established in 1973 as a means of channeling loans to farmers. But much

of its funds in fact went to urban dwellers, usually bureaucrats, party officials, or businessmen. These urban dwellers were literate and could fill out the forms required, were knowledgeable and thus knew of the existence of the funds, how to tap them, and what person to see to get action, and lived in Yaoundé or other major urban centre where decisions were made.

Another general benefit given to those in the bureaucracy or in business and having sufficient funds to exploit the opportunity was provided through the various provisions of the land tenure law, especially as it was established in 1974 and 1976; Among the various paragraphs and conditions of the law, there was the possibility of obtaining a temporary grant of title to land that was "unoccupied or unexploited." Under their various traditional land laws that exist in Cameroon, and as a result of the relatively low population density and the agricultural practices of the country, much land either was not under use or was at least not under use at the moment. The law stated, in essence, that if an individual could present a plan to develop and utilize such land and if he or she had the funds to undertake such exploitation, that person could gain temporary title of the land. Small grants of land were given by the minister of lands, larger grants by the president. Such grants could be considered rewards in many cases-another source of patronage. At the end of five years, permanent title was given if the development plan had actually taken place. Like the FONADER loans, the real benefits of this act accrued to those with education and knowledge enough to fill out the forms and follow the procedures, but in addition it required some financial backing to implement the development plan. Frequently, the financing came via a FONADER loan. This was an opportunity for upper-level civil servants to become, in effect, landed bureaucrats; several established medium-sized plantations for either food or export crops by this means.¹⁹ In many respects this policy was similar in effect, and perhaps in purpose, to French and British colonial policies aimed at establishing a landed class to rule the colony or to support colonial rule .

Although urban conditions in most Cameroon cities looked difficult, the government has spent large sums of money to provide and maintain services for those living in established middle-class and upper-class neighborhoods, that is, for civil servants, larger-scale businesspeople, and the foreign commercial and diplomatic group. Such efforts were concentrated on Douala and Yaoundé, but the government also made development efforts in smaller cities, especially to prepare for CNU congresses and agricultural fairs. Such occasions provided the excuse for a general sprucing up and development of the designated cities. One purpose was to provide adequate amenities so that such smaller cities will serve as attractions for migrants and relieve the urbanization pressure on Douala and Yaoundé. But such development also served to make life better for civil servants and local elites resident in such cities.

This was one example of government's attempts to placate urban dwellers at the expense of those in rural areas. Of course, urban dwellers presented a more frightening potential for violence and disorder-hence government's desire to ensure their support. Because most of the more powerful of the country's population lived in the urban areas, government had to cater for their needs. The government followed a policy of keeping food prices low in urban areas, even though this might have discouraged farmers from growing such crops and even though it was meant low income for farmers. Cameroon was less stringent in this regard than some African states.²⁰ Meanwhile, Ahidjo regularly announced pay raises for urban workers, giving them substantially higher incomes than most farmers. From time to time he added spice to these announcements by declaring special holidays, again providing rewards for urban workers but having little benefit for farmers.

Ahidjo also provided special economic rewards for the northern portions of the country, especially for his home district. Arguing that the economic, educational, and general development of the North lagged far behind the rest of the country, he followed a policy of catch-up development that

saw a disproportionate amount of government investment in the region. From the national point of view this may have been a wise policy, but undertaken by a northern president, it occasioned much complaint from southerners, who could easily point to areas of the South equally undeveloped and who felt it unfair that income generated in the South was spent in the North.

(C) REPRESSION

Ultimately, in spite of the variety of incentives for cooperation and agreement used by Ahidjo, the stability of the regime was based on the widespread use of repression and the suppression of human rights: Opposition parties might be legal in the constitution, but as we have pointed out, it was impossible to establish a second party. Beyond the difficulties of the electoral law, there was the widespread belief that individuals who attempted to establish such a party would be arrested, tortured, or possibly disappear. Some of the repressive tactics used were legitimized, according to the government, under the state of emergency declared as part of the offensive against the UPC, but the government went far beyond whatever the UPC situation justified. Force, whether legitimized by the laws or not, was a major factor in Ahidjo's effort to build a national political system and it maintained that system.

It is difficult, probably impossible, to give any accurate measure of repression. How frequently were people imprisoned for their political views? How many secret police and informers were there? Such questions are not answered in government reports and budgets. But certain results are clear. The Cameroon population widely believed that government spies were omnipresent and that the government made widespread use of torture and imprisonment to destroy any potential opposition. Students of Faculties at the University of Yaounde would often warn visiting professors that certain students of faculties were actually informers. Friends would stop conversations in cafes or bars, noting that it was not wise to discuss certain topics in public. Were there really spies

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in class or at the next table in the cafe? In one respect, it did not matter. The people were afraid to speak freely.

In addition to policy and gendarmes the government had two special units to carry out internal intelligence and security efforts: the SEDOC (Service de Documentation), which served as a political police force and apparently was responsible for the network of informers, both inside and outside Cameroon; and the BMM (Brigades Mixtes Mobiles); which was reportedly responsible for the imprisonment and interrogation-torture of those considered suspicious by SEDOC.²¹ In a general sense, these organizations teamed up with the regular police and gendarmerie units to impose a climate of fear and insecurity because of the frequent illegal or nonlegal and unpredictable use of such tactics. Whereas SEDOC and the BMM were responsible for surveillance and response to anyone whose motivations were political, the gendarmes and policy were responsible for the general public. Suspects in criminal cases were often tortured, even for instances of petty theft or political deviation, and frequently the gendarmes would force entire villages or neighbourhoods out into the streets while homes were searched and the personal identity cards (required of everyone) (tax receipts, and party cards were checked. Disturbances that arose, as in clashes between farmers and grazers in Bamenda or in student strikes at the university) were met with shows of overwhelming force and heavy doses of violence.

In addition to their violence, the security forces were also infamous for their corruption. Bribes or illegal extractions of money even at a very small scale were a common result of contact with police and gendarmes. The fact that this was so widespread and well known suggests that the government, as a way of rewarding the security forces for their loyalty, tended to overlook such practices.

Other aspects of human rights were also violated. Freedom of the press was severely curtailed by a law of pre-sales censorship. Editors had to present a copy of each

edition to the préfet for approval before putting the issue on sale. Objectionable items, as determined by the whims of the préfet, had to be removed before the issue could go on sale. This often meant that newspapers appeared with large blank areas where articles had been removed from the type just before the final run. Sometimes whole issues were confiscated, a costly burden for most Cameroon private newspapers, entities that ran on very low budgets and with profit margins so narrow that the loss of a few days' sales could destroy the paper. Editors who persisted in publishing items not liked by the government-often articles critical of particular situations or persons but not necessarily in opposition to the Ahidjo regime-found themselves arrested without charge or detained for several days at a time for questioning. The effects on the economic life of the newspaper and the personal life of the editor were often disastrous. Some newspapers simply gave up, some printed only noncontroversial information, and very few-such as the Cameroon Outlook-struggled on. The major press in the country, Cameroon Tribune, was government owned and presented no problems for the censors. Foreign publications such as Jeune Afrique or West Africa were checked at the port of entry and were frequently not allowed to go on sale.

Radio broadcasting was owned by the government, but listeners could, of course, pick up foreign stations to get news about Cameroon. But by forcing the public to rely on the Gabonese radio, the British Broadcasting Corporation(BBC), and the Voice of America (VOA) for reports on internal news, the government frequently harmed its own interests. The government developed a great fear of the people's hearing "bad" news of any kind about the country. Train wrecks or disturbances in some rural areas could not be printed or broadcast. In such situations, however, rumours always flew, exaggeration occurred, and the foreign press and radio picked up the story, often at the exaggerated level. Once they made their broadcast, the government came out with a milder version of what happened, possibly even a correct version. But at this point no one was willing to believe the government version. The government lost more respect, and the story made

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its way around the country in spite of government wishes.

The political process established by Ahidjo was more solidly based and changing or reforming that process without releasing revolutionary expectations was very difficult. It was a frequent phenomenon to meet with Cameroonians who seriously desired a more democratic society, who even criticized the slowness with which Biya moved in that direction, but who also criticized Biya for his lack of resoluteness, his inability to take charge, and his weakness in facing opposition. People became accustomed to Ahidjo's style of rule and the superficial tranquility of society that accompanied such authoritarian power. Whereas the conscious mind called for democracy, the subtle, ingrained expectations yearned for direction, guidance, control and calm. The Ahidjo era left a very powerful inheritance for Cameroon's future.

4.3 : THE STATE SYSTEM AS A SOCIAL CLASS AND AN ETHNIC GROUP

The works of Ngayap and Bayart²² on the state in post-colonial Cameroon only corroborate the conclusions of many social scientists about the state system in Africa in particular and the Third World in general. Thus, over the past twenty years, Africanist social scientists have developed an impressive body of literature which demonstrates conclusively that ethnic groups are neither primordial nor immutable. To the earlier pioneering work of Mercier, Vansina and Southall, we may add the more recent studies of Young and Schildkrout.²³ Many now believe that "boundaries of the ethnic categories change over time as new categories emerge, and other disappear, merging into larger, more inclusive units."²⁴ In this current and on going study of the peoples of the Central African forest, Vansina has applied the same logic of historical change to both segmentary lineage systems and clans, noting that changes in Commercial or political relations from group to group carry along with them modifications in the structure and constitution of clans if not even the appearance of clans where none existed."²⁵ In addition, scholars agree that individuals do not view ethnic identities as mutually exclusive. Depending on the context of the moment, people may "migrate" from the cultural identity to a second or even a third.²⁶ Ethnicity, in other words, is a protean, contextual and intermittent phenomenon.

Similarly, although a less well established and more contentious proposition, observers are starting to recognize as Robert Cohen argues that "the fluidity of class relationships is the dominant motif".²⁷ Samoff, although he would probably disagree with the thrust of this argument, also sees classes influx with ambiguous and changing boundaries.²⁸ A recent work on the Ivory Coast makes the same point and notes the "remarkable fluidity of the ruling class".²⁹ In the same way, a study of Nigerian factory workers indicates that their class identities may well vary depending on the context of the moment. Phrasing his argument in terms of rural-urban continuum, Peace observes that "while in the context of Agege the migrant factory workers are underprivileged, in the context of the home-town setting they are seen as privileged young men by virtue of their having received some education."³⁰ Bienen also sees class in situational terms, as a product of specific contexts.³¹ Leo makes a related point regarding Kenya where "peasant and capitalist classes (are) thoroughly interpenetrated with many an individual merging the two class identities in his or her person."³² Schatzberg has summarized this perspective in propositional form :

- (1) Social classes are constantly changing in response to differing socio-political contexts.
- (2) The individual actor can, and does belong to differing class alliances at the same time
- (3) The degree of class identity will vary depending upon the geographic, social, political, and economic junctures of the moment in question.³³

Class, like ethnicity, is contextually fluid in the developing state. The identity, composition, and boundaries of social class often vary according to the contexts of the moment.

Class and ethnicity co-exist and interact. Which phenomenon may be most salient to political actors at any given time depends probably on the context. Mitchell's classic study of social relations on the Copperbelt, The Kalela Dance, underscored this fundamental point almost a generation ago.

The evidence we have from Northern Rhodesia is that in certain situations Africans ignore either class differences or tribal differences (or both and the in other situations these

differences become significant. I have presented evidence to show that in opposition to the Europeans, Africans ignore both their "class" and tribal differences. Inside a tribal association such as those found in Southern Rhodesia I would expect oppositions to be phrased in terms of "class" differences. I would expect the dissension within a teachers' or clerks' association to be phrased in terms of tribalism. The same people who stand together in one situation may be bitterly opposed in another.³⁴

More recently, several authors have underlined the same contextual subtleties. In probing investigation of the Ethiopian Revolution, Keller argues that the salience of class and ethnic identities, "in explaining political behaviour is highly contingent on the nature of the stakes involved and the existing political climate at a given point in time. At one time and under certain circumstances, clan identities or the new ethnicity might provide the basis for action, at another, a sense of national identity or social class interest might spark conflict and change.³⁵ Moreover, all these factors could conceivably operate simultaneously, a point Scott makes explicitly in reference to a Malaysian village. There, as in Cameroon," the messy reality of multiple identities will continue to be the experience out of which social relations are conducted."³⁶

Added to the contextual interactions of class and ethnicity within the political system is a third and perhaps an equally important factor—the state. Like ethnicity and social class, we may understand the state as a contextual phenomenon constant flux as it forms, consolidates, and — in some cases, disintegrates. Here we shall discuss the state as a contextual, fluid, and intermittent factor in the economic and political dynamics of sub-saharan Africa. But for the moment however, let us merely note that all three phenomena interact and intersect but are discrete only on the analytical plane. To unravel their interactions in practice or to provide precise weightings of their importance is extra-ordinarily difficult. Reality is, after all, messy. Nonetheless, previous work on the contextual nature of ethnicity and applications of a contextual approach to the political dynamics of social class formation might help us to fruitfully apply such a perspective to the state in post-colonial Cameroon.

In his study of neo-colonialism in Kenya, Leys remarked wistfully, "of all the real deficiencies of underdevelopment theory the most troublesome ... was the substantial absence of a systematic theory of the state or of the nature of politics in conditions of underdevelopment."³⁷ Since then numerous scholars, particularly those working within a broadly defined Marxian paradigm, have responded to Leys' lament by trying to furnish a more coherent theoretical notion of the state in Africa.³⁸ Thus far much of the debate has concentrated on whether the postcolonial state is "overdependent", on the role of the state in facilitating or impeding indigenous capital accumulation and on whether the state enjoys autonomy vis-à-vis either domestic or foreign capital. Some of these questions are of general interest, others are not. To comprehend more fully the nature of the state system in Cameroon and much of Africa. We need to approach the question in a slightly different way. Marx's classic description of the French peasantry is a convenient and opposite starting point.

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their cultural formation from those of the other classes and bring them into conflict with those classes, they form a class. In so far as these small peasant proprietors are merely connected on a local basis, and the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community, national links or a political organization, they do not form a class.³⁹

Here is the basis of Marx's distinction between a class-in-itself and a class-for-itself. The dividing line between the two concepts of class hinges on the existence of an organization capable of representing the interests of a class. Put in another way, the transition from one type of class to the other presumably occurs when, for example, peasants organize and create a political organizational arm to engage in the class struggle on their behalf. In post-colonial Cameroon, the state (or more precisely its various institutional arms and manifestations) is almost always such a class organization. Moreover if we treat the state as a class organization, some important contradictions are resolved satisfactorily.

Many have noted that the formation of social class and class consciousness generally occurs more rapidly at the top of the social hierarchy than at the bottom and that such class formation depends more on the control of the state than on the ownership of the means of production. Cameroon like many African states became independent in the 1960s without significant indigenous bourgeoisies. Ownership of the major means of production was, in almost every case, located in the former colonial metropole because until the final phase of colonial domination, discouragement of productive domestic bourgeoisies was often an explicit premise of colonial policy. Since there were only restricted opportunities for capital accumulation under foreign domination, those who inherited the levers of state power first consolidated their rule and then moved to transform their political power into economic wealth. Thus, in an examination of social stratification in Guinea-Conakry, Rivière argues that in Africa, we should reverse the standard Marxian formula that "those who govern do so because they are rich", to read, "those who are rich are so because they govern".⁴⁰ The same pattern is present where Michael Cohen believes "public authority precedes the acquisition of property" and government officials have used their positions in the state, "to create both property and the rules for its use."⁴¹ If Cohen is correct, (and there is increasing evidence that he is) then Campbell's thesis that a rural bourgeoisie of indigenous plantation owners is dominant is called into question.⁴² After carefully investigating the composition of the elite, an Ivorian scholar notes that, if anything, one public sector was disproportionately represented when compared to the private sector and most politicians were civil servants before entering the plantation economy.⁴³ In addition, Berry demonstrates that social differentiation in Western Nigeria is due more to "differential access to the state (and foreign capital and markets)... than ... differential access to local labour".⁴⁴ Or, as Lonsdale puts it "ready access to state institutions is therefore literally what makes classes dominant"⁴⁵

In pre-revolutionary Ethiopia, Markaki's found political and administrative action primarily responsible for prompting rural class formation whereas in urban areas class formation

was a consequence of formal education and political recruitment.⁴⁶ Similarly after investigating process of class formation among the proletariat of Lubumbashi, Zaire, in the early 1970s, Mwabila discovered that, although workers did not constitute a class-for-itself, they could nonetheless perceive the "existence of class consciousness in the superior social layers, structured around class interests and developing in the wake of political authority".⁴⁷ Mwabila's conclusions are consistent with Schatzberg's evaluation of social class formation in Lisala.⁴⁸ In general terms, then, many social scientists would probably agree with Balandier's observation that a "new class" - those who manage the contemporary state and who have been, by and large, the main beneficiaries of the transition to political independence - has emerged.⁴⁹ Put simply, those who took over the levers of state command after independence have developed class consciousness much more rapidly than those at lower levels of the social hierarchy because the state itself provided all the organization. Marx spoke about as those at society's upper levels in the shape of the institutionalized state. Thus those at society's upper levels did not need to constitute an organization to represent their class interests and potentially engage in a class struggle because the state was more than adequate for the purpose. It was already there waiting for them.

But there was certainly no requirement that class rather than ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other set of interests dominated the state's agenda at independence.⁵⁰ African leaders who wished to use the state to insure the dominance of a particular ethnic group found its organization perfectly capable of adapting to that objective as well (as in Rwanda and Burundi). Moreover, skilled politicians could often accommodate such disparate agendas simultaneously. In retrospect, however, and regardless of the agenda emphasized, the consequences of policy were usually consistent with the interests of the newly dominant group of politicians and bureaucrats. Furthermore, in many cases they consciously used their political power, and the state, to create for themselves the economic wealth denied them under colonial rule. This conception of the state as a class organization in waiting enables

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us to understand why the politico-commercial bourgeoisies have developed class consciousness and implemented appropriate class action more rapidly and effectively than those who did not inherit political power.

Coupled with this emphasis on the state as an organization particularly susceptible to class domination, we must also consider the organizational difficulties encountered at lower levels of the socio-political hierarchy. Many have tried to explain the lack of class-based organizations, solidarity, and by extension, consciousness among society's dispossessed by focusing on ethnicity and the existence of patron-client links which often follow the ethnic lines. In his work on pre-evolutionary Ethiopia, Markaki argues that the "persistence of traditional norms that emphasize kinship, and of social mechanisms that promote vertical integration, diminishes social distance and inhibits the growth of class consciousness."⁵¹ Mwabila's later study of Lumumbash's workers found essentially the same phenomenon. Thus, in Cameroon

survival led them to depend less on their own organizational initiatives and, concomitantly, to seek solace in their individual ethnic networks. This became a marked trend from 1972 as better-off members of each relevant ethnic groups associated themselves with the power of the state to better preserve their own interests in the first instance, and those of their ethnic group and native region, in the second. As workers sought survival and refuge in their ethnic enclaves, horizontal solidarity lessened and ethnic consciousness rose.⁵² In the same vein, Bertrand's study of Congo-Brazzaville indicates a "lineage society" whose numerous personal and familial relationships offer young members of the urban proletariat a bulwark against the rigours of urban misery.⁵³ Here, as in Cameroon and other African countries, this results, in continued reliance on ethnic networks which, in many instances, vitiate urban-based class identities.

In a sensitive investigation of the interactions between sex, ethnic and class consciousness in Western Kenya standt-like others who studied Kenya - finds that ethnic consciousness tends to obscure class consciousness. A state

which divides people and goods geographically may subsume class and gender consciousness and thus, at least, either weaken these two other possible foci of political and social identity or at least, drives them entirely underground.⁵⁴ Closely related, and in some cases overlapping the ethnic dimension is the existence of patron-client distributive networks. Saul, among others, has noted that these networks "tend to preempt the possible crystallization of alternative modes of (class) consciousness... which could see the African masses moving in the direction of consciousness of themselves as exploited peasants and workers vis-à-vis the "baronial" class as a whole".⁵⁵ Students of politics in Kenya have studied such phenomena extensively, and one anthology characterized Kenya's political system as patron-client capitalism.⁵⁶ Senegalese politics also demonstrated a clear tendency towards this form of organization, especially where the powerful Mouride brotherhood is concerned.⁵⁷ Cameroon, 1960-1982, too had its share of political clientelism. As Bayart and Nyayap⁵⁸ have shown that many of President Ahidjo's closest cronies intervened on many occasions on behalf of villagers in their home collectivities. The distribution of largesse through such "big men" was by no means unusual and certainly made people more conscious of their specific links to those with power, wealth and influence. Often-times these ties are ethnic, but even if not, political clientelage - as a vertical form of solidarity - cuts across horizontal identities such as social class and can thus reduce their salience.⁵⁹

The effective emasculation of Labour unions and experiments in communalism usually through a process of co-optation, also impeded the evolution of class-based consciousness at lower ends of the social hierarchy. In 1966, the political parties unified, and then absorbed the numerous Cameroonian labour unions. The syndicates thus yielded their independence as organizations of political opposition and became a single organ that supported government policy in all matters. The national syndicate's elite sat on the Committees of the Union National Camerounaise (UNC) under the Ahidjo administration at all levels. They could thus participate, at least to some

extent, in the decision-making process and communicate relevant decisions to the membership through Union representatives in all enterprises. But the flow of communication within the Union was invariably from the top down rather than bottom up, and the Union became more closely associated with the interests of the state than with those of the workers. In this regard, the Cameroonian Trade Union bore striking resemblance to those in Eastern Europe, with the obvious exception of Poland's solidarity.⁶⁰ The Cameroonian experience was not unusual. In East Africa a similar pattern ensued, and trade Unions, once defenders of workers' rights and interests, eventually became obidient pillars of the regimes. When East African labour leaders used their organizations to confront governments on behalf of their memberships, politicians interpreted this as both a political threat and a violation of trust. Neither Kenyatta nor Nyerere hesitated to dissolve confrontational unions, dismiss their leaders, and create new and more pliant unions in their place. Trade Unions were thus no longer organizational tools in the hands of the workers, they were tools of governance in the hands of the state.⁶¹

The suppression of autonomous Unions and experiments in Communalism should come as no surprise. States in Africa are insecure-politically, economically, socially - and their leaders perceive any organization they cannot control as a direct threat. The state thus forbids and suppresses any organization which does not fall within the state-party's prescribed framework. In effect, state - parties seek to occupy the available political space, thus precluding the creation and emergence of potentially competing political and organizational foci from below. Speaking about Union Nationale Camerounaise (UNC), Bayart expresses this point well.

It is possible that one of its principal functions is essentially negative; to inhibit eventual counter power to prevent there being "something else" to guarantee the politically monolithic nature of the regime. Thus could be explained that one speaks so much of the UNC without it ever doing anything-an excessive formulation which nevertheless expresses one of the most astonishing paradoxes of the Cameroonian political system, and which summarizes the researcher's confusion which confronted with the reality, at the same time omnipresent and ungraspable of the single party⁶²

The UNC, thus tried to fill all available political space, and the state's coercive arms moved expeditiously against anybody with the temerity to establish organizations outside the officially approved scheme of things.

The state is also indeed a class organization in the waiting, and its presence goes a long way towards explaining why class consciousness emerged most emphatically in the upper reaches of the social hierarchy. The state, therefore, is most certainly not the neutral arena of competition which American political scientists immersed in pluralist Western Liberal ideology liked to discern. In recent years, the perversion of the state in Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Tchad, Equatorial Guinea, Zaire, Guinea-Conakry and Ghana has convinced some who still view African politics through the prism of a Western Liberal perspective that the state is neither neutral nor benign. Young, for example, has argued that "the state is not necessarily a neutral and benevolent purveyor of development" and, in relation to Toure's Guinea, Nkrumah's Ghana and Keita's Mali, "the ideological leadership failed to ponder the class nature of the state itself and the latent conflict of interests between the state and the rural population, indigenous commercial groups and others not part of the nascent politico-bureaucratic bourgeoisie."⁶³ From the related, but not identical, public choice perspective Bates affirms that "through the public management of economic resources, the bureaucracies help to institutionalize structure of relative advantage—a structure within which they themselves occupy positions of privilege and power"⁶⁴

In addition to viewing the state in Cameroon and most of Africa as a tool, some Western observers also perceive it as an arena. At base both notions spring from a liberal, pluralist worldview. Pluralists see the state as an arena for the dramas of distributional politics; developmentalists find the state as an instrument to provide the greatest good for the greatest number, at least, in theory. These are not necessarily incompatible with the argument that the state in Cameroon, 1960-1982 and Africa often operated as an organization of class. Of necessity, however, if the state is viewed as an implement under these circumstances, we need to consider who controls it

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and for what purposes. If used as a class-based organization, its rulers may well employ it in ways many liberal theorists deplore. In this light it will be a tool in the hands of the politico-commercial bourgeoisie and used mostly to further the interests of this class. But here one must exercise great caution. The state in Cameroon as elsewhere in Africa, enjoys a measure of relative autonomy and often develops independent institutional interests which may or may not conform to those of the dominant politico-commercial bourgeoisie.

Under no circumstances should we assume that the state will always, inevitably, and simple-mindedly do the bidding of the politico-commercial bourgeoisie nor should we make the improbable assumption that this class speaks with a single voice. Greenberg and Springborg have empirically demonstrated this proposition in both South Africa and Egypt.⁶⁵ And as Bates has argued that "politicians want power. And they use the instruments of the state to secure and retain it by manipulating the economy to political advantage"⁶⁶ Moreover, the suppression of the trade union in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration is certainly a relevant example of the state exerting its autonomous power. Even the most totalitarian state is not a monolithic entity but rather, a collection of organized repositories of administrative, coercive, economic, ethnic, political,.... and ideological power. In consequence, however the centralized state appears on paper, its various organizational components often have lives - not to mention interests, ideologies, traditions, procedures, and practices - of their own resulting in both independent action and a struggle for dominance within the state⁶⁷.

The proposition might not sound so bizarre if one considers specific cases. In Nigeria there have been major shifts in the contours of the playing arena since independence in 1960. Parliamentary rule and a three - and then four-state structure gave way to military rule and twelve - and then nineteen-state structure. In 1979 the soldiers relinquished power to a civilian presidential and federal regime modeled on American lines. This state structure tried to prevent the ethnic tensions responsible for dissolving the polity of the First Republic from recurring. Political parties had to

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establish offices and a reasonably effective presence in thirteen of the nineteen federal states before the national government would recognize their constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, to be elected on the first ballot, a presidential candidate had to obtain the highest number of votes and "not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two thirds of all the states in the Federation"⁶⁸ a constitutional provision that became crucial in the summer of 1979 as chief Awolowo unsuccessfully challenged the election of President Shagari on these grounds. Shagari served his first term and won reelection to a second in a bitterly contested election in 1983. But at the end of the year the army again intervened and terminated the second civilian republic.⁶⁹ This is not to argue that these changes have necessarily been successful at reducing the ease of politicizing ethnicity,⁷⁰ but merely to suggest that there have been substantial permutations in both the rules of the game and the shape of the arena.

In Cameroon the state also changed dramatically. Although at independence the new state inherited a highly decentralized system of rule with a federal and parliamentary overlay, the rapid politicization of ethnicity induced "centralized fragmentation" in political and administrative structures. Two federated states were created out of the British and French colonial systems in Cameroon but each major ethnic group sought to have its own political bailiwick. After President Ahidjo achieved unification in 1972, he gradually rearranged the structure of the state. He abolished the federated states and consolidated the ethnic groups into seven provinces and progressively depoliticized them by depriving them of any legislative powers and through the consolidation of state-party rule which had begun in 1966. Throughout the 1970s, the trend towards centralization continued in several policy areas as the state tried to increase its control throughout society. But on the ascension of President Biya to power in 1982, there were once again initiatives to decentralize certain aspects of the administrative power as provinces were increased to ten and Governors of these provinces were given greater powers.⁷¹

Thus depending on the situation, sections of the state in Cameroon acting with their own specific interests in view,

members of the politico-commercial bourgeoisie, or the two forces acting in concert may have effected such transformations. These changes aid some and hurt others, for they either opened up or closed off life and mobility chances depending on the shape of the state at any given time.⁷² In this sense the state, like class and ethnicity, is a contextual variable, and the process of state formation is part of the triple helix. The triple helix is also the social field in which political actors elaborate and implement strategies of access and dominance.

4.4: THE STATE SYSTEM AND STRATEGIES OF ACCESS AND DOMINANCE

Access to, and dominance of, the state was absolutely crucial not only in Cameroon, but also in much of sub-saharan Africa, for, as already indicated, political power usually preceded economic power. Contrary to Marx's expectations, therefore, relations of power rather than production appeared to determine class relations. Sklar has advanced this thesis in a compelling theoretical argument and stressed the importance of control over the means of consumption and compulsion.⁷³

Chazan's fine study of Ghana supports this position and notes that, "differences between the top and the bottom of the socioeconomic pyramid have been dictated primarily by access to state power and the control of economic exchange (as opposed to production)".⁷⁴ The importance of the state in achieving such control is evident. Most contemporary African states are lineal descendants of the colonial conquest states imposed during European rule. The apparatus of the state thus evolved from necessities of instituting and maintaining foreign control in a hostile environment. The colonial state was fashioned to maintain law and order. Domination and not, development, was the watchword of the day.⁷⁵ In addition to its role as gendarme, the colonial state (in conjunction with interested sections of metropolitan capital) shaped the contours of the colonial economy, determined access to resources and thus had a direct say in deciding who would enjoy opportunities to develop wealth.⁷⁶ Because foreign interests controlled the most productive sectors of the local economies, in many cases the colonial state limited opportunities for indigenous capital accumulation and suppressed, or at least discouraged severely, competition from nascent African capitalists.

When independence arrived, most economies remained firmly under the control of external interests. In general, therefore, the only avenue open to Africans wishing to accumulate wealth and better their positions in life was through advancement in the state structure. Control of the state apparatus was a way to acquire substantial economic leverage.⁷⁷

Access to the state remained crucial and its control provides the means to extract resources from the mass of the population - honestly, in the form of taxes, budgetary allocations, and pricing policies; and dishonestly, through corruption, graft, and extortion. Kitching's history of economic change in Kenya masterfully describes how local African elites flocked to Local Native Councils and used the resources of the state institutions to improve their own economic standing - a pattern that remained.⁷⁸ Similarly, and on the Seamer side of the equation, a recent study of political graft and the spoils system in Zambia concludes that the state is a resource in itself. Those with high-level access to the Zambian state receive not only their salaries, but also subsidized housing, medical allowances, and small loans for automobiles and refrigerators. In addition, larger loans are available for those seeking venture capital to enter business or farming. To be sure, the state extracted this wealth from workers, peasants, and miners who produced it, and there is no reason to assume that this transfer of resources was painless.⁷⁹ Certainly, in Cameroon the transfer of wealth from farmers and peasants to the state was often vicious and oppressive.⁸⁰

Dominance of the state is also important for it enables political leaders to renegotiate the terms of access to African resources granted to multinational corporation (MNC). Langdon's thoughtful study of the multinational corporation in Kenya's political economy discerns the emergence of a "comfortable symbiosis" between those who control the state and representative of the MNC sector.⁸¹

The benefit of symbiosis are shared: in the form of resources for the state, which helps the dominant African class which is dependent on the state for capital accumulation; in the form of direct resources for that class, through high salaries, directorships, shareholding, partnerships, subcontracting opportunities and, the evidence suggests, some illicit favours,
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and in the form of bargaining advantages and market privileges for the multinationals (SIC), based on the informal political influence symbiosis generates. For the M.N.C. sector, the crucial reality is that symbiosis keeps it relatively unconstrained by government regulation.⁸²

These observations concerning Kenya could be replicated almost verbatim and applied to many African countries. With only slight changes they would certainly hold true for Cameroon. One must emphasize, however, that a facile application of crude dependency theory is usually unwarranted. Most states are certainly dependent but nevertheless considerable latitude and room exist for manoeuvre within the broad structural constraints the international system imposes. The Ahidjo and Arap Moïse are not puppets on a string, their position and that of the states they represent is more akin to one of dependent autonomy.⁸³ It is crucial to note that the state provides the means to elaborate this "comfortable symbiosis", and the dominant politico-commercial bourgeoisie thus uses its control of the structures of the state to extract resources from the international system. But here, too, we should not assume that this process is "neutral" or without costs. The costs to the state depending on the particular context, might well be a form of indenture to international capital in the form of skyrocketing indebtedness or the imposition of personnel from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to set the state's finances aright, or a currency devaluation which in most cases burdens the poor most heavily. Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration was a very good example of a state whose leaders mortgaged its economic future to continue their comfortable symbiosis with external sources of wealth.

The economic history of colonial rule and the subsequent emergence of a politico-commercial bourgeoisie firmly rooted in state power does not necessarily preclude the parallel development of an indigenous and economically productive bourgeoisie which owns and controls the means of production, but it does not make this outcome more difficult to achieve and less probable. Leys and Swainson now argue that such a bourgeoisie exists in Kenya - a position Langdon and Kaplinsky debate vigorously.⁸⁴

The broad outlines of a similar debate are also taking shape over the nature of the bourgeoisie in Cameroon.

Some authors,⁸⁵ have found that there is, at least in parts of the country, a small number of substantial business owners who form a commercial middle class that is becoming a sector of the dominant class. These individuals do not hold political office and are relatively independent of political influence. These authors are doubtlessly correct concerning the rise of an independent class of entrepreneurs without significant attachment to, or contact with, the state - a phenomenon certainly not limited to Cameroon.⁸⁶ Moreover, there may well be an inverse relationship between the health of the state and the existence of this class of independent business men. As the state declines, independent entrepreneurial figures who operate beyond the state's reach (in what this analysis now calls the second or informal economy) emerge to fill the void. Although the aggregate economic weight of such informal networks can be considerable, their activities most often emphasize the provision of needed commodities and essential services, such as food and transportation, when the state can no longer furnish them. Second economies permit survival but do not usually stimulate creative and wealth producing industrial investments. In any event, in both Kenya and Cameroon this sort of bourgeoisie remains small and relatively unimportant politically.

Furthermore, even should an economically productive bourgeoisie spring forth from the second economy, a close alliance with those who control the state is certainly in its long-term interests. For if this bourgeoisie fails to do so, the state may review licenses, quotas, taxes and other regulatory measures to its detriment.⁸⁷ Thus given the inverse relationship between the state and the second economy, one would strongly suspect that if now weak states such as Cameroon are eventually revitalized, they will move to bring their burgeoning informal sectors under tight government control. We should not necessarily assume that a weak state is a prerequisite for the existence of a second economy. Strong states, the Soviet Union, for example, may well tolerate such informal networks if the governments are either unable or unwilling to provide certain economic services.

Ethnicity, like Class, has to be considered in any attempt to treat complex strategies of access and domination.

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It has long been known that states may shape ethnicity. Southall convincingly demonstrates that Luhya ethnicity in Kenya emerged during the colonial period and was "closely linked to the colonial administrative framework, being in effect based upon and in part suggested by the administrative and territorial framework of North Kavirondo District."⁸⁸ In other words, colonial administrative imperatives coincided with the needs of people to coalesce around wider bases of identity to mobilize politically in a more efficacious quest for resources. This is an example of the formation of ethnic groups from the bottom up, based largely on administrative boundaries and using them as a convenience. States could also create ethnicity from the top, down. Brett's Seminal study of East Africa shows that the British, guided by their policy of indirect rule, often fabricated ethnic groups so that they could then delegate administrative authority to their newly named "chiefs". Furthermore, the colonial power had to maintain the resulting "traditionalism" because it was a major source of the regime's political and social control.⁸⁹ The colonial state, then, provided both an arena and an implement for the creation, consolidation, and politicization of ethnicity. This was especially true in Cameroon where the colonial state allowed the formation of political parties and elitist cultural organizations constructed around ethnic identities.

Ethnicity may also arise in opposition to the state, especially when a group feels excluded from benefits the state has to offer and relatively disadvantaged. In Ethiopia the emperor's social policy dealt with the national (ethnic) question by subjecting most of the population to Amharization.⁹⁰ Voluminous rhetoric notwithstanding, the state did little to provide those who rejected Amharization with social services or occasions to improve their lives. This association of the state with a single ethnic group, the Amhara, eventually provoked a reaction from the Oromo who succeeded in coalescing support from oromo in all regions and social classes in a cultural organization - Mecha Tuloma. The goal of this unit was to promote oromo identify and to ameliorate their position in relation to the Amhara (an Amharalized who completely dominated the state. The oromo movement successfully politicized ethnicity

and precipitated an extended period of armed struggle pitting oromo guerrillas against the Ethiopian state during the 1960s. Needless to say, other group (Somalis, Tigrean, Eritreans) also felt excluded from and threatened by, an exclusively Amharaized state and reacted with equal violence.⁹¹

For those who already control the state, maintenance of power often becomes a full-time task accomplished through several different, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, strategies. These include (but are not limited to) a policy of alliance and co-operation of ethnic and regional leaders, repression and coercion, and ideological obfuscation.⁹² Cameroon's Ahmadou Ahidjo was a master of ethnic co-optation. After the death of long time opposition leader Um Nyobe, Ahidjo brought the Bassa into his conservative coalition by cleverly negotiating the co-optation of Mayi Matip. Once inside the regime alliance, Ahidjo progressively isolated the erstwhile Bassa spokesman, thus neutralizing him politically. More generally, however, Ahidjo shrewdly associated the country's ethnic leaders with his regime, and these "barons" supervised life in their native communities on the president's behalf. Ambitious politicians also knew that credibility as ethnic barons enhanced possibilities for success; some aspiring cabinet members actively created, or recreated, ethnicities to promote their own political advancement. The result, until the attempted coup of April 1984, was a regime of remarkable political durability.⁹³

In this situation, then, the regime brought ethnic leaders such as Mayi Matip, or others whom it hoped will "represent" ethnic or regional sentiments, into the state to share its rewards. This argument does not preclude Sklar's hypothesis that ethnicity tends to result from the politicization of demands in the interests of the new men of power or aspirant bourgeoisies.⁹⁴ It merely notes that shrewd rulers sought to ally the class interests of the potential ethnic mobilizers to their own by granting access to the state, thus decapitating and demobilizing potential ethnic trouble spots.⁹⁵ Markakis is therefore correct to argue that "ethnicity is a factor whose weight serves, more often than not, to bulwark class and factorial privilege, rather than comprehensive ethnic

goals.⁹⁶ Had Haile Selassie pursued this strategy of co-optation and alliance, one wonders how historians would have written the story of Ethiopia's last fifteen years.

None of this excludes the possibility that, at times, those controlling the state will find it prudent to manipulate ethnicity in ways which affect both leaders and masses. Educational and occupational living quotas can be potent political tools when the state consciously deploys them. Excluded groups may come to identify themselves as disadvantaged ethnic minorities and perceive the state arena in ethnic rather than class terms. One result of this configuration would be ethnic resentment, and probably conflict, over access to the state and its rewards. In Cameroon the most ordinary folk, and many educated individuals as well believed that an inner circle of rulers from the North under the Ahidjo administration (1960-1982) dominated the state. Popular expressions such as "Nazareth", Bethlehem" and "holy land" in daily conversation were used to describe the President's home town-Garoua. Although this perception of a regime is far too simplistic, people nevertheless thought that their lives were miserable and that they had nothing because the state poured its resources into this one region.⁹⁷ Batumike's observation in terms of Zaire speaks to this perception and this observation might probably meet with unqualified agreement in Cameroon:

And to top off everything, the gap being dug each day between the province of Equateur (Mobutu's region of origin, called Jerusalem) and the other provinces of Zaire is most pregnant. The Province of Equateur, principally the modern city of Gbadolite, empties the others of their wealth. The others live with a penury of food while tons of meat, potatoes and other vegetables from Kivu are sent each week in military cargoes to Gbadolite. The province of Equateur consists of the most beautiful cities in the Republic, roads freshly redone (without holes, like everywhere else in Zaire) factories (which work, unfortunately, at a loss), brand new hospitals, decent housing.⁹⁸

To be sure, this image of a flourishing, economically vibrant Equateur is on the majority of issues incorrect.

But Zaireans like Cameroonians need to know that villagers living in the President's home province live in the same lamentable squalor induced by politico-economic structures inherited from colonialism which rulers manipulate consciously to produce a desired result - wealth for the few at the expense of the many. Because of this widespread but erroneous image, opposition to the state could assume an ethnic (and given the state's culturally plural composition in Africa) fragmented visage.

Those who control the state can orchestrate ethnicity, but this does not mean that ethnicity lacks analytic independence as an explanatory variable. Although ethnic antagonism and conflict may come to the fore as part of an overall strategy of state dominance, as part of a strategy of upward mobility, or as a basis of intraclass competition for scarce resources, the distinct possibility exists nonetheless that things will fall apart. Politicized ethnicity might well be ideology as Leys suggests,⁹⁹ but it is an ideology fraught with meaning and importance for most of us. If ethnic manipulations get out of hand or if those who dominate the state lose control, it is possible that a violent ethnic tide will sweep away the state and its rulers, from this perspective the task of statecraft is to keep ethnicity at bay. Repression and state-induced violence is one way to insure that this does not happen, and many African leaders willingly unleash their armed forces on internal "enemies". In addition, most African states have political police apparatuses that provide information concerning trouble spots and troublemakers. Moreover, while the Amin, Bokassa, and Macias Nguemas will employ terror to remain in power. In one sense a resort to these methods indicates that statecraft has already failed and the wool is being progressively lifted from people's eyes. Coercion of this sort seems to gain prominence as political legitimacy erodes, but this was certainly not true in Cameroon (1960-1982).

State-induced repressive violence and fear are not the only means of channelling ethnic sentiments. In Cameroon ethnicity pervaded every aspect of social life. Nevertheless, Cameroon - like so many African states - tried to drive ethnicity underground, and the only area of Cameroonian political life where it found overt expression was sports, most particularly soccer.

Soccer teams were openly and proudly vaunted as "our sons" or the "son of the soil". Most major ethnic groups had their own teams whose backers passionately followed its fortunes, and violent altercations between partisans of rival teams occurred periodically. When, in 1970, an administrative fiat of the Minister of sport reduced the number of teams, the outcry was such that Ahidjo had to intervene personally to quash the measure. In this case, therefore, the state channelled overt ethnic sentiment into the safety valve of soccer. This, too, is a method of state control and manipulation of ethnic identity.¹⁰⁰ Yet another means of maintaining control of the state is through the propagation of ideologies. Dominance is most easily achieved and most effectively implemented when people accept and internalized the state's ideological myth. Given the artificial and culturally plural nature of most African countries, it is not surprising that African leaders almost universally embrace ideologies of nationalism and nation-building. Briefly put, those who control the state incessantly preach that the main task of all citizens is to build the nation. In addition, and as a corollary, national leaders regard any subnational identity, including ethnicity, as a threat to national-building and thus illegitimate. There is, then, an explicitly articulated hostility towards any subnational identification, even though much research has shown that ordinary citizens perceive no conflict whatever between their national and ethnic identities. Chazan reports that Ghanaian youth sees little or no conflict or contradiction between their local, ethnic or state identities - a finding Kofele-Kale supports with respect to Cameroon.¹⁰¹

The Cameroonian state did not permit open discussion of ethnic identity and outlawed ethnic political associations. Other states have also banned the overt expression of ethnicity. As early as 1970 Central African Republic passed a law prohibiting the use of ethnic terms, Sierra Leone banned all mention of ethnic identities in official documents since 1968; and; during the Acheampong regime, Ghanaian leaders banished the word "tribe" from government documents because they believed its use would detract from national unity. They also discouraged the use of ethnic group names as surnames and advocated

an end to the practice of ethnically distinctive facial markings.¹⁰² The second Nigerian Republic's constitutional changes represented an effort to render overt ethnicity obsolete, or at least less than legitimate, thus institutionalizing the idea of "one Nigeria". Similarly, shortly after seizing Power in 1969, Somalia's Said Barre abolished clan identity by legislative ukase.¹⁰³ But this subnational identity, like many others proved particularly resistant to legalistic extirpation. Ingenious Somalis simply began referring to their "ex-clan" rather than to their clan. Furthermore, while Barre adeptly balances clans in distributing offices, it remains an indictable offense to acknowledge this publicly.¹⁰⁴ This is not to say that the state is unaware of ethnicity far from it when the state desires to employ ethnicity for its own purposes through for example, occupational or educational quotas, it usually does so on a geographic or regional basis.¹⁰⁵ There are thus times when paradoxically, the state will wish to use ethnicity and suppress it simultaneously.

The appeal to nationalism and nation-building is merely one means of camouflaging the politico-commercial bourgeoisie's specific interests behind a broader and more widely accepted symbolic construct. While discussing education and its role in the process of class formation and reproduction in Tanzania, Samoff remarks that classes seek, "to fashion the institutions of the state to reflect their interests. Day-to-day management is much simpler when these institutions themselves screen out challenges and cloak their decisions favouring the ruling class "with the legitimacy of apparently universal norms".¹⁰⁶ Abner cohen's study of the Creole state elite in Sierra Leone convincingly elaborates this interplay of particularistic interests and universal norms. Creoles, a small and particularistic elite, have legitimized their status by assuming universalistic tasks - in this case, by manning the institutions of the Sierra Leone state. Over the last generation Creoles have transformed themselves from an ethnic minority group into a state elite that guards, "the authority structure of the state by upholding the independence of the judiciary, the neutrality of the civil service, free opposition, free expression, and free competition between rival political groups."¹⁰⁷ Since Creoles dominate the judiciary and professional civil service, it

is difficult to distinguish between their universally legitimate tasks as state officials and any private interests they may have. In upholding the sanctity and "neutrality" of the state, they are, in fact, furthering their own interests and insuring their continued dominance. Furthermore, aspects of the Creole culture thoroughly pervade the national symbols which form the state as a symbolic construct. Thus should one attack, or merely question, certain symbols perpetuating Creole dominance of the state, one would also be attacking the idea of the Sierra Leone nation.¹⁰⁸

Other ideological motives legitimize, or at least make slightly more palatable, some nastier aspects of political life in Cameroon and in many African countries. One image which recurs in several locations is that of the father of the family. The Cameroonian President enjoyed casting himself as the father of the large Cameroonian family. Since a family can have but one father and his word and decisions are supreme, by definition there was room for neither competition nor dissent. "Father" is not an elective office, and children do not question their father's wisdom for they know he has their best interests at heart what ever he decides. President Ahidjo and other members of the politico-commercial bourgeoisie consciously adopted these metaphors. Hardly unique to Cameroon, the same paternal imagery appears in other African Countries. In the wake of an abortive coup in 1964, the late Léon Mba once said, "I have been called the father of the Gabonese Country, now this father is reflecting in order to define what he must do in favour of his family, in favour of his sons-certain of whom have gone astray: All that I can tell you is that he will decide as a father with firmness, but with justice".¹⁰⁹ Political leaders can thus portray stern measures taken against segments of the population as paternal discipline rather than political repression.

The same images permeate political discourse else where, most notably in Ivory Coast, Togo and the Central African Republic. Houphouët, Eyadema, and Bokassa have also enjoyed the role of the self-styled father of a large national family.¹¹⁰ In Cameroon, Bayart reminds us, that this type of paternal discourse has roots in both precolonial and colonial patterns of

political dominance and subservience, but today masks a new political subjugation. In his words, "in the eyes of the social elite, Cameroonians are children and virtually fools" - children as long as they obey and, failing that, commit only small errors; fools when their "childishness leads them to join the maquis or engage in violence against the regime of their "parents."¹¹¹ Leys observed a related phenomenon in Kenya. While Kenyatta was alive he would receive delegations from districts and ethnic groups which would arrive with gifts and declarations of loyalty at the ready. This "court system" re-emphasized the ethnic aspect of Kenyan politics, reinforced the president's distributional powers (or at least called attention to them), and enabled Kenyatta to assume the mantle of the father of the nation for all to see.¹¹² This type of court system goes hand in hand with the development of a paternal ideology and with the centralization and

personalization of power-both with widespread trends. In Cameroon, as in other regimes, the state was not only centralized, but personalized, and presidentialized as well.¹¹³ Thus in Cameroon no less than in Kenya, Zaire, Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, Togo, Gabon, to name but these few, the power of the state flowed from the presidency where the father of the national family held court.¹¹⁴

Vansina reminds us that one task of ideology is to maintain political quiescence by masked subordination, and presumably exploitation, to preclude revolt. In this regard, the lineage ideology of precolonial Equatorial Africa based on Kinship and thus perceived as "natural" was particularly effective.¹¹⁵ This insight helps to explain the broad appeal of the images of father and family as important elements of contemporary state ideology. A second task is to help erect and consolidate an economically privileged class. Before the colonial era, lineage ideology justified why some had more authority and wealth than others. Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, the youth, believed they would one day become elders and therefore gain access to political authority and economic advantage. But many youths never scaled the social ladder for elders changed genealogies as part of the struggle for power and dominance.¹¹⁶ If those who control the

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state can successfully foster a belief in upward mobility, for one's children even if not for oneself, there are powerful psychological incentives for going along with the system.¹¹⁷ These ideologies, regardless of the variant, preserve access to the state's rewards by maintaining some combination of political quiescence, social submissiveness, passive resignation, or popular acceptance of the prevailing political situation. As such, they are class actions and closure mechanisms to insure increased access to life and mobility chances for some, while systematically restricting them for others.¹¹⁸

However people join together in a nation because they share common purposes over and above their individual goals in life. Not every one in a nation needs to agree on all of those broader purposes but there is a general direction or trend discernible in every community whether or not it is clearly articulated. In international affairs the common purpose ought to include a strategy for dealing with other nations in ways they protect and enhance one's own goals. A nation may either be efficient or inept in carrying out its policies, depending on the strength of the political will of the people as expressed in their national decision making (the political leadership). National will may be unified and enthusiastic in support of a particular strategy or it may be sluggish and uncertain. It was sluggish and uncertain in Cameroon during the 1960s.¹¹⁹ Certain divisive cultural and psychological factors could be cited in order to make this point. The leadership during the Federal era had to deal with the political system that was fluid, devoid of political cohesiveness and therefore very vulnerable. Not only was the ethnic make-up in Cameroon multiplurasitic (more than 250 cultural groups who owed their allegiance first to their ethnic group and second to the state) but this ethnic multipluralism was further divided between the Anglophones and Francophones.¹²⁰ The engineering of the political system to articulate these values became the objective of the political actions of the leadership and such actions were manifested in such a concepts as "balanced development" in the Planned Liberalism philosophy. When Ahidjo emerged as the national leader, he was confronted with a state with many nations. The will to lead was there, but the logical impossibility of generating national consciousness in order to

move the nation predicated in the creation of the unitary state in 1972 which did not solve the main problems of national consciousness.

4.5: THE STATE SYSTEM AS A COLONIAL ANTI-FACT

The international relations of the developing state have been said to be state dominant.¹²¹ Although the Third World system is state-dominant, the question arises as to the autonomy of the state itself or at least those who act in the name of the state. It has been argued that in the developing state social classes (other than ethnic) are not well formed, that domestic business groups and trade unions are very weak and that other domestic groups with foreign policy concerns are small. The result is that the state in the Third World is economically a more independent actor than it is elsewhere in the World. This is why individual leaders make a particularly strong impact on the formulation and articulation of foreign policy in the developing state. Change in leadership can be consequential for economic development and foreign policy - the overthrow of Nkrumah and Obote, for example, had immediate and drastic impacts on the foreign policy and economic development of Ghana and Uganda in the late 1960s and early 1970s respectively. According to this view,¹²² African leaders use foreign policy to manipulate domestic socio-economic groups and opinion. The preferred view as argued earlier in this chapter is that there is a relation of interdependence between the state, the economic structure and the social groups in the developing state. But this relationship of interdependence is unbalanced with those acting in the name of the state being economically and therefore politically stronger than other socio-economic groups or at least appearing to be stronger than other socio-economic groups. Therefore, providing the relationship between the state system and the other social groups brings out clearly the social and political forces that influence not only the operations of the economy but also the orientation and parameters of foreign policy itself.

By fixing the economic boundaries of the state, the colonial power laid down the framework in which after independence, the development of the domestic economy and the internal

economic processes could start. In consequence, the colonial powers determined the size and capability of the national economy and in this way gave birth to the structural and institutional framework of diplomacy. Again the nature of the domestic economic relations of the colonial system in Cameroon influenced the nation's post-colonial attitude towards the external environment and the norms, values and ideas which guided its international behaviour. An adequate explanation of the nature and development of Cameroon's foreign policy should therefore be preceded by a correct understanding of the precolonial and colonial heritage. Thus, this section briefly examines the structure and the function of the colonial economic system which evolved the post-colonial foreign policy economic inputs and outputs.

It is in this sense that the scope of analysis in this chapter embraces economic dependency as one of the main linkages between the economic system and foreign policy in the developing state. Thus, to accept the explanation (as many liberal studies on the developing state have done)¹²³ that the external dependency of the developing state is merely an inevitable response to a changing international scene is to overlook the subtle operation of latent linkage processes involving interaction between transformations in the legitimacy attached to certain goals and forms of domestic socio-economic actions on the one hand and the transformations in the structure and functioning of the international system on the other. Moreover, such an argument lacks the capacity to explain the manifest and latent economic linkages that originate in the economic system and culminate in the foreign policy behaviour as well as those which flow in the opposite direction. In the second place, such an argument only points to the fact that the negative feedback of the external relations of the developing state is not due to its economic dependency but to the developing state's late reception of modern techniques of development - the so-called "falling back" arguments of development,¹²⁴ various internal obstacles and impediments within the developing state or the developing state's position in the "stages of growth"¹²⁵

Such theories are ahistorical and leave the question unresolved as to why similar hindering factors were not at work

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in the case of the now developed states and how factors of such different nature and origin came together only in the case of the developing state. They disregard the essential differences between the present state of underdevelopment of the developing state and the earlier scene of development of the now developed states as well as the basically different internal and international conditions of Third World internal development and the diverging and disqualifying effects of the contemporary world economic processes. All what is enunciated here is that these theories provide an answer to the question as to why certain countries rather than others play a leading role in the development of the world economy and how the roles of the dominant (colonisers) and the dominated (colonized) are allotted to various countries.

That colonialism has been one of the major root causes of the underdevelopment of the developing state is a paramount consideration in the study of the domestic economic system and the foreign policy of the developing state. The relationship between colonialism and dependency has been made by Tamas Szentes:

The relations of dependence are rooted in the system of imperialism. They came into being or became general, on the basis of the early conquests, and built into a system when in the last third of the 19th century classical capitalism turned into monopoly capitalism and finance capital of the advanced countries, divided the whole world into spheres of interest. One sided dependence gained its most extreme form in the colonial system which meant complete administrative, military, legal, economic and political dependence...

The collapse of the colonial system brought about the disappearance of the most extreme forms of dependence. Legally independent and sovereign countries have come into existence in the territories liberated from the yoke of colonialism. But this in itself has not yet put an end to the relations of dependence. On the one hand, the economic and social structure itself, transformed according to the above-mentioned functions, provides now to a certain extent the basis for and the possibilities of maintaining the relations of dependence and the above-mentioned functions, and even produce objectively new ties of dependence, which on the other hand, the advanced countries, the monopolies, taking advantage of these possibilities, are introducing new forms and new methods of reorganizing and strengthening the relations of dependence (neo-colonialism)¹²⁶

Thus, from the moment that colonialism (and neo-colonialism) took place, it becomes methodologically and theoretically misleading to examine and evaluate the economic development foundations of foreign policy in an ex-colonial state solely on the basis of internal factors or to attribute its internal development and lack of influence in world affairs to any stages of growth or power factor endowments.

In this perspective, the state system in the developing state is the main feature of the colonial socio-political relations of production because it appears to contain not only the dialectics of oppression but also the strongest impulse towards economic inertia, dependency and disarticulation. The state system is also full of contradictions inherited from colonialism. These contradictions arose from the existence of several precapitalistic modes of production at different stages of "decompositions" of the traditional sector, of the increasing differentiation within the ruling elite, the process of proletarianization", the opposition between the capitalist mode of production of export commodities and the primitive, traditional mode of production as well as the lack of asymmetry between political and economic power. The implications of these contradictions in the socio-cultural and political environment of production for foreign policy are easy to discern. The contradictions in the social relations production within the state system in the Third World tend to diminish the degree of national cohesion and unity within the nation. This in consequence diminishes the independence and efficiency of the national leadership in dealing with foreign policy decision-making. These contradictions also facilitate the participation of alien bodies in national activities. However, the discussion of the state system in the Third World as a volcano of socio-economic and political contradictions in this section has three main aims.

1). to show that the state in the Third World is both a socio-economic organization particularly susceptible to domination by a social class and a contextual phenomenon-one in which the phenomena of class and ethnicity interact in a variety of complex ways. "Perhaps the most enduring weakness

of African studies" Lonsdale has argued, "is that we have not yet devised the means of analyzing societies, doubly divided by community and class, which do not seem grossly biased towards the explanation of one division alone!"¹²⁷ This is true, but the state will be included here only in quest of conceptual integration. To be sure, the three phenomena-state, class, ethnicity-are not precisely the same. But nevertheless, on the structural plane, and especially in terms of their basic fluidity, these three social forces share striking similarities.

2). In the second place we shall explore some of the interactions between these three forces by examining strategies of access and dominance. Rather than conceiving social dynamics as a dialectic of class and tribe¹²⁸ (to use one analyst's lapidary phrase) it would seem better to view them as a "triple-stranded helix"¹²⁹ of state, class and ethnicity. In this case the social class and the state compose the context in which ethnicity becomes economically and politically salient. Similarly, the context, in which the social class comes to the fore might will be a combination of ethnicity and the state. So too for the state, considerations of social class factors on the one hand, and ethnic factors on the other have probably conditioned the process of state formation as a factor in the socio-economic dynamics.

3). Finally, one of our aims will be to provide a pan-African setting for the analysis of the post-colonial Cameroonian state and the dialectics of its economic and political underpinnings as a foreign policy determinant.

As we mentioned above, the colonial economic system was ridden with contradictions which had repercussions on its stability. "The contradictions of the colonial system subverted and changed it. But what was changed was only an aspect of its superstructure - the political system - while the economic structure of the colonial system remained essentially unchanged."¹³⁰ Thus the contradictions of the colonial economic system led to the transformation of the existing social structures and the emergence of the African political elite whose interests soon put it in opposition to the colonial system.

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The politics of the nationalist movement and the over throw of the colonial political system did not generate equivalent changes in the economic system. The failure to overthrow the colonial economic system left the post-colonial inheritors of political power with little economic base. This contradiction between economic power and political power became the central feature of the post-colonial state as the new rulers tried to use the only tool they have (political power) to create an economic base in order to consolidate their political power. In this struggle, the state (political power) influenced and even transformed the economic and social structures through the use of complex alliance systems. Therefore, the nature of the nationalist struggle in Cameroon determined the character of post-colonial political and state system.

Soon after the conclusion of World War II, the new elements in the Cameroonian population came into conflict with the French colonial administration and the rather larger number of French planters, "Commerçants" (merchants) and other settlers in the colony.¹³¹ This new Cameroonian elite was not homogeneous in its attitudes towards France, its colonialism and capitalism, though there was widespread feeling that the colonial relationship must in some way be changed. The French colonial administration was thus able in some degree to respond positively to the elements of the elite most favourable to French interests in Cameroon and negatively to those elements most inimical to French interests.¹³² The best organized and the most outspoken of these Cameroonian expression of interests was the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) founded in 1948 by a trade Union leader, Ruben Um Nyobe, with some support from Cameroon's trade Union movement and the French Communist Party. The UPC had two major goals-true independence from France and the reunification of Cameroon which had been divided into the British and French sections after World War I. The latter goal was closely related to the first as reunification was used as an alternative to remaining within the French Union-a proposal by France to unite France and its colonies. Support for the UPC within Cameroon came from the rather small working class, the urban areas, wherein were concentrated the unemployed, the students and two ethnic group-the Bassa and the Bamileke.¹³³

The UPC was not only the first Cameroonian political party to call for independence and a break with France, but it also stood for a reordering of the domestic society in favour of the peasant and the worker. It came to stand for a more neutralist position in international affairs, which would have meant a rather clean break with French economic, cultural and political ties, and approached a socialist vision of the society it wished to build.¹³⁴

French authorities were not yet willing to accept independence as a goal and the UPC was thus subjected to a variety of harassments to prevent its growth.¹³⁵ In 1954, a new French High Commissioner (Governor) - Roland Pre- was assigned to Cameroon, and he took immediate and strong steps to place controls over the activities of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). Within a few months of Pre's arrival, the UPC leadership had in part gone into exile (first in British Cameroon and later into various "radical" African states) and in part gone within Cameroon to lead a campaign of violence against the French administration. Whether the UPC decided to go underground or was forced to do so by Pre's actions is subject to debate,¹³⁶ but the effect was that the administration could ban the organization from legal political activity and make it unable to participate in elections. Police and military force could be used to destroy the party apparatus and eliminate its leadership. In the meantime, the administration put together parties and leaders more amenable to French interests and desires.¹³⁷ What followed was a bloody and destructive battle in Southern Cameroon that eventually decimated and destroyed the UPC while other Cameroonian parties and leaders accepted and modified UPC goals and became the recipients of independence.¹³⁸

The december 1956 elections were a key event in this process, for the government that came to power from this election was instrumental in negotiating independence from France.¹³⁹ Yet the UPC could not participate in the elections and thus the party was not represented. The major winners were the Union Camerounaise, a group of northern ethnic and patron parties under the leadership of Ahmadou Ahidjo and the Democrates, representing the central and Southern regions under the

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leadership of Andre-Marie Mbida.¹⁴⁰ Mbida became Prime Minister, but his government fell from power within a few months, because he failed to comprehend public attitudes on key questions - independence, reunification and amnesty for UPC.¹⁴¹ Mbida had put together a coalition government, but as the unpopularity of his policies became clear, Ahidjo's Union Camerounaise withdrew support. The government fell in February 1958, and it became Ahidjo's turn to organize the government. He stayed at the head of government until 1982.¹⁴²

Once in office, Ahidjo made demands on the French for immediate independence and reunification of the two trust territories.¹⁴³ The Union Camerounaise had a nationalist orientation, but it was less inclined towards radically changing the domestic political and economic situation than the leaders of the UPC. Unlike the independence plank of the UPC, Ahidjo was able to assure the French of continued close cooperation between the two countries and that French investments would be safe in an independent Cameroon. No public mention was made concerning a series of agreements he made with France in late 1959 providing for widespread cooperation between the two countries in economic, cultural, political and military affairs.¹⁴⁴ This came at the same time that changes in attitude occurred in France. Charles de Gaulle had come to power; he offered flexibility to the African states in determining the type of relation that might exist between them and France.¹⁴⁵

By 1959, Cameroonian politicians had so eloquently and incessantly articulated their ambition for independence and reunification that the United Nations decided to lift the trusteeship or "guardianship" of France and Britain over the territories. This trusteeship had been intended to "provided the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstance of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned!"¹⁴⁶ Meanwhile, it is significant to emphasize (as Professor M.Z. Njeuma has done) that "there existed a slight and subtle difference between the movements for unification in the two (French and British) Cameroons. In the British sector it was

conceived not as a means to an end, that is, a weapon to achieve independence and sever relations with the colonial powers. It was an ideal and an end in itself. On the other hand, in the French sector, it was in the short-run a means to an end. It was a weapon to rally the masses against colonialism, to get independence and dictate terms on which French and British presence was to continue".¹⁴⁷ Professor Njeuma's assessment of the reunification movement in French Cameroon in the above passage is restricted to the UPC conception. The moderate and the conservative "nationalist" groups had a different conception of it which coincided with the conception of the "Franco-African community" proposed by de Gaulle.¹⁴⁸

The struggle for independence and reunification posed critical foreign policy questions for the inheritors of power from the withdrawing French colons. The struggle was critical to foreign policy options in the post-independence period since it invoked in the average Cameroonian a feeling of "the reconquest, by (Cameroonian) people of their dignity and freedom, of the power to determine their affairs freely, in other words, the reconquest of the right to be masters of their own destiny"¹⁴⁹ These views about independence and reunification emanating from the nationalist struggle, at least, necessarily evoked questions about the colonial alliances for Cameroon's future external economic, cultural, diplomatic and military relations. For instance, was the independent and reunified Cameroon to throw its lot with the Franco-African Community, the British commowealth or neither of them? What was to become of the extensive albeit unofficial external relations with the major socialist countries cultivated by UPC nationalists? The cultural link which was very instrumental in the reinforcement of structural economic dependency had sunk deep in the fabric of the Cameroonain society. Infact the late Professor Fonlon was not overstating the impact of Franco-British cultures in his insistence on the fact that:

in this country, the elite especially, has become imbued with these outside cultures (French and English) that this emotional attachment is not to be taken for granted. There is a real danger that called upon, in the general interest to part with an element of foreign culture in which we have bred, some of us would take up arms in a blind and head strong crusade, in the
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wrong headed belief that the surrender of such a use or institution is a defeat and humiliation.¹⁵⁰

Thus, we can understand from the foregoing analysis that in its impact on foreign policy, the nature of the nationalist struggle in Cameroon directly affected the character of the post-colonial state and its definition of the national interests of the country in foreign policy

Thus in the process whereby Cameroon became an independent country, the French colonial administration played a critical role in determining who would be the recipients of power in the independent state. Put differently the French were able to determine who would not be the recipients. By foreigning out the UPC - the radical party that called for a strong break with France, a true nonaligned foreign policy and a socialist political and economic system - the French were able to negotiate a very favourable (from their view point) decolonization between them and the new government. Furthermore they were able to put in place a government that was amenable to the type of economic system, especially a capitalist system, that had been established during the years of colonial rule. And it is assumed that through the various agreements of cooperation signed by France and the Ahidjo Administration, France remained in a position to strongly influence Cameroon's domestic and foreign policy to come. French troops remained to continue the war against the UPC and to help build a Cameroonian army. Large numbers of Frenchmen remained in influential positions in the Cameroonian government and such related agencies. And the French commercial interest remained preponderant in business, industry, trade and other sectors of the economy. In this respect, the boundaries around Cameroonian foreign policy were established by the decolonization process. A moderate government was in place, and its development policy was oriented along a capitalist path. The government was heavily indebted to France for its establishment and maintenance, and the government was thoroughly tied into a network of relations with France. Thus circumscribed, the element of choice for Cameroon was essentially how to loosen the French hold and broaden the sources of investment and trade necessary for Cameroon's development without losing the desired investment and commerce with France in the interim.¹⁵¹

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From the foregoing discussion, it becomes necessary at this point to examine the nature of the post colonial state system that was set up in Cameroon to exercise the above element of choice. In other words, what was the nature of the state in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration, what were its limits and what was the relationship between the state and the civil society?

4.6 : THE STATE AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY

Scholars have long laboured to provide answers to the above questions. Others have already reviewed the rapidly expanding body of theoretical and empirical literature on this subject.¹⁵² This section of our study presents our own views on the state in Cameroon and in Africa. Suffice it to say here that even the subtle and sophisticated thinkers such as Gramsci and Poulantz have used the term "state" inconsistently.¹⁵³ In consequence there is an important dispute over what the state exactly is or is not. In general, however, there are two major lines of response to the definitional problem - one stresses the concrete institutions and organizations, while the second emphasizes theoretical and ideological considerations. Gramsci was similarly inconsistent in his attempts to delineate the notion of civil society.¹⁵⁴ This is a crucial matter if one is to arrive at a workable definition of the state and posit a relationship between it and the civil society. However, for the most part our analyses here will focus on concrete organizational aspects of the state and be guided by the definitions of skocpol - "states as administrative and coercive organizations"¹⁵⁵ and Giddens, who maintains that the "state is best seen as a set of collectivities concerned with the institutionalized organization of economic and political power."¹⁵⁶ Although these definitions cover a significant portion of what the state was in Cameroon, there was more to it than that. No state can govern through coercion alone. There were usually ideological mechanisms to induce people to internalize the state's normative and behavioural rules. Sometimes explicitly articulated ideologies accomplish this and in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration this was called Planned Liberalism, but myth, metaphor and the symbolic dimension of politics also contributed. We thus need a definition that accommodates both

the concrete organizational aspects of the state and its symbolic and metaphorical character. In consequence throughout this section that state will be defined as a congeries of organized repositories of administrative, coercive and ideological power subject to, and engaged in an on going process of power accumulation characterized by uneven ascension and uneven decline. This section analytically examines the sinews of state power in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982.

Jean François Bayart and Pierre Flambeau Ngayap.¹⁵⁷ have demonstrated in their works that the state in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration was a combination of ethnic and class alliances. In their various works both of them demonstrate that the state system set up by President Ahidjo in Cameroon was a complicated coalition made up of diverse factions of ministers, parliamentarians, army commanders, traditional chiefs, high ranking civil servants, businessmen, private counsellors... etc. Furthermore, they have demonstrated in various ways that such a coalition was characterized by "a struggle for space" between the different component groups. On the one hand, the interests and resources of these groups were not identical because of the opposition between the old and new elites; and the differences in wealth and competence. On the one hand, ethnic cohabitations were difficult. Perhaps most frequently seen as a dialectical interplay between social forces favouring centralization and those promoting decentralization, these ethnic cohabitations and the ensuing struggle for space was a long-term historical process that antedated independence.¹⁵⁸

What kind of politics could be founded on an economic and social system of the kind operated by President Ahidjo which embraced every sector of national life but which deliberately changed little of the French colonial system they inherited? Of course, it could be argued that it would have been too early to contemplate changing the political structure soon after independence. But in the end (1982) even the most ardent defenders of the system came to realize that the system had become dysfunctional especially with regard to the imperatives of a self-contained, endogenous development.

As the works of Pierre Flambeau Ngayap and Jean François Bayart have demonstrated, the harmony of interest between foreign capital, the local auxiliary bourgeoisie and the various politically powerful petty-bourgeois strata was a real one, yet their interests also conflicted and a government based on an alliance between them had to be capable of arbitrating between them. It had also to be strong enough to master the tensions and conflicts generated among the mass of people by the process of underdevelopment, including those which were expressed in regional terms. But being strong in this sense meant that the government was heavily dependent on the civil service, police and armed forces, and on the personal popularity of President Ahidjo. This dependency could be offset by making concessions first to one element in the ruling alliance and then to another and also when necessary to elements outside it; this, however, involved a succession of some what contradictory measures and had evident limits in both domestic and foreign policies.¹⁵⁹

There is a great deal in this situation which recalls Marx's analysis of French politics in 1850 (in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)¹⁶⁰ and it is worth considering why. The basic contradiction in Louis Napoleon's situation, Marx saw, was that the government, the state apparatus, was independent of any single class, yet in practice it could not do without class support, and could not prevent its policies fostering the interests of certain classes, even if it wished to. Yet this enhanced the political power of these classes, and so undermined its own independence of action; therefore it also worked constantly to counteract the political power of the classes whose economic power it was simultaneously building up:

As the executive authority which has made itself an independent power, Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard the "bourgeois order". But the strength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew. The cause must accordingly be kept alive; but the effect, where it manifests

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itself, must be done away with. put this cannot pass off without slight confusions of cause and effect, since in their interaction both lose their distinguishing features. New decrees that obliterate the border line. As against the bourgeoisie, Bonaparte looks on himself, at the same time, as the representative of the peasants and of the people in general, who want to make the lower classes of the people happy within the frame work of the bourgeois society. New decrees that cheat the "True socialists" of their state craft in advance... This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused grouping about which he seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another¹⁶¹.

Of course the parallel with Cameroon is not exact. The "middle class" whose interests the Ahidjo government wished to defend, yet whose power it had theoretically broken, was largely a foreign one. As will be shown in chapter seven, its real economic and political power lay abroad. The foreign middle class had to be done with great circumspection, if new foreign capital was not to be frightened away, that is, this middle class had to be only ritually "humiliated", while practically wooed. Hence the development of a rhetoric of economic nationalism to complement the earlier political nationalism (Planned Liberalism) of the ruling elite, coupled in practice with the elaboration of a system of partnership with foreign capital ("new decrees that obliterate the border line such as the investment code, which actually implied a steady expansion of foreign ownership of modern productive assets in Cameroon, and thus of the political power of foreign capital. The populist rhetoric of Bonapartist government was even more pronounced in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration than it had been in France ("African Socialism, rural development, balanced development", and so on), but in very similar fashion the political power of the peasants and urban workers was progressively curtailed and neutralized.

As is well known, Marx also considered that a small holding peasantry constituted a natural basis for centralized, authoritarian government :

By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole surface of the land. Hence it also permits also uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this uniform mass... Finally, it produces an unemployed surplus population

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for which there is no place either on the land or in the towns, and which accordingly reaches out for state offices as a sort of respectable alms, and provokes the creation of state posts¹⁶²

This expansion of the bureaucracy was not only an answer to the problem of unemployment, it also provided a power base for the regime, which would help it to stay in power without relying too closely on any particular class or group of classes:

And an enormous bureaucracy, well-gallooned and well-fed is the "idée Napoléonienne" which is most congenial of all to the second Bonaparte. How could it be otherwise, seeing that alongside the actual classes of society he is forced to create an artificial caste, for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter question.¹⁶³

And so it is no accident that Marx's discussion of the situation in France in 1850 is so full of clues to the situation in most sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. In spite of obvious fundamental differences the two situations have something fundamental in common a complex and fluid class structure corresponding to the still incompletely evolved interrelationship of the capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production.

Yet it is remarkable how seldom Marx's analysis has been applied to Africa.¹⁶⁴ Perhaps this is due once again to a slightly uncritical acceptance of Fanon's ideas. Fanon focused his attention primarily on the educated strata who were brought into being under colonialism and who inherited state power at independence. The essence of this "bourgeoisie of the civil service" according to Fanon, is that it is weak, financially and therefore politically. It therefore sets about using the state machinery to make itself rich by inserting itself as a sort of commission agent into the foreign-dominated commercial system. There are never quite enough spoils to go round, and the weakness of the new would-be bourgeoisie reveals itself in all sorts of conflicts, which constantly threaten to engulf the rest of society as individuals seek to enlist ethnic and regional support on behalf of their interests. To avoid this the "national bourgeoisie" discovers the need for "a popular leader to whom will fall the dual role of stabilizing the regime and of perpetuating

the domination of the bourgeoisie".¹⁶⁵ His strength in this role is necessarily in inverse proportion to that of representative or popular government. The institutions of the state are progressively reduced to those of the President and his circle. The party becomes a mere shell, and actually an implement of coercion. The leading posts in the bureaucracy are entrusted to men from the leader's tribe sometimes directly from his own family. Parliament becomes little more than an adjunct of the Presidency where a legislative veneer is fitted over the wishes of the autocracy in return for high salaries and some licence to ventilate popular sentiments (though not of course, sentiments critical of the President). Parliamentary elections are reduced merely to a choice between individuals, all of whom are pledged to support the President and his government; elections "circulate the elite", contribute to the mystification of the voters, and thus help to preserve the elite's freedom to go on enriching itself without interference below.

Although Fanon's analysis is much more plausible than most conventional interpretations we should not be carried away by it. What it really does is to explain "strong man" governments in post-colonial Africa in terms of the needs of the local petty-bourgeoisie and would-be bourgeoisie (who tend to be conflated with the civil service in Fanon's writing) for such a style of government.¹⁶⁶ This leaves a lot unexplained. For one thing, it does not explain why some such leaders survive while others are displaced. The picture Fanon paints is one of antagonistic contradiction between the "national bourgeoisie", under the protection of the leader, and the exploited masses (primarily peasants), leading in due course to revolutionary confrontation. This has some validity, but in a rather abstract and certainly long-run sense. Since Fanon wrote, the course of African politics has clearly indicated the need for more detailed and more complex models. Secondly, it is like the prevailing bourgeois analyses in one respect. Thus in spite of Fanon's obsession with colonialism, his discussion of post-colonial politics omits the neo-colonial factor almost entirely. Foreign capital figures only as an unanalyzed exploiting presence which can be turned to the

selfish advantage of the "national bourgeoisie". Its evolving interests and institutional forms are left out of account, which is certainly Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Third, and not least important is Fanon's conception of the relation between the leader and the "national bourgeoisie" itself. The leader is seen as a mere agent of the self-enriching bourgeoisie, "the general president of that company of profiteers impatient for their returns."¹⁶⁷

By contrast, Marx's analysis of Bonapartism starts out from the essential fact that in this situation the leader is not the agent of any one class, but enjoys a measure of independence. Marx sees this independence as in the long run rather illusory, partly because the leader cannot in reality be "the patriarchal benefactor of all classes" as he would like, and finds that he "cannot give to one class without taking from another", but even more because the development of the capitalist mode of production was steadily eroding the position of the pre-capitalistic classes in France, so that balancing act of Bonapartism would eventually be bound to give way to the solid weight of bourgeois domination. In conditions of underdevelopment, however, only the first of these two limiting conditions (the impossibility of benefiting all classes alike) necessarily operates, and the independence of the government therefore even seems more significant. What was for Marx a purely transitional and relatively short-term phenomenon became, in some circumstances (the 1960s and 1970s), a generic form of government at the capitalist periphery; and the content of Bonapartist rule reflects the complexity of the contradictions involved, as well as the increasing difficulty of integrating them and of relying on class hegemony rather than force. In other words, Fanon's account in post-colonial Africa is without illusions; what he describes is a lot closer to reality than accounts which presume that the political institutions of bourgeois society - parliament, cabinet, even the popular party - have much bearing on what is going on. On the other hand his model was formulated in 1961, before the complexity of the emerging social and class structure of the African states and the changing role of international private capital were as they were under Ahidjo. The analysis of the Cameroonian state

system, 1960-1982 takes these things into account and also considers the significance of the use actually made by the Ahidjo administration of the measure of autonomy which they enjoyed.

4.7 : THE STATE SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY

During the colonial period, capitalist penetration was followed by the imposition of the colonial political super-structure. Thus the evolution of Cameroon into statehood was to consolidate these administrative boundaries into political boundaries within which distinct political organizations were to develop. With approximately two hundred and fifty ethnic groups spread over the entire territory, it is not difficult to understand why conflict organizations (to use Professor Nordlinger's Category) sprang up along the ethnic dividing lines. The colonial constitutional evolution itself tended to have contributed in no small measure to "ethnicization" of politics as the British and the French colonial administrations sought to divide and rule. Thus, the setting up of colonial administrative structures as well as the mandate and trusteeship systems established not only the structural and the institutional framework within which political competition was to take place but indeed dictated the pattern of the competition. The tenuousness of this structure coupled with the regionalization of political parties have made the analysis of post-independence Cameroonian politics susceptible to the distributionist analysis in comparative politics.¹⁶⁸ Hence such analytically obfuscating concepts as communalism, tribalism, ethnicity have been employed in the analysis of the Cameroonian state system, as is the case with many new states.¹⁶⁹ Thus, Johnson in his analysis of the Cameroonian state asserts that political action in Ahidjo administration was determined by the quest for the integration of diverse ethnic identities (tribal ideology) rather than a quest for the integration of class consciousness.¹⁷⁰

On the contrary, by 1960, the Cameroonian state was characterized by many contradictions ranging from ethnic through class factors. In this perspective, Cameroon's future evolution was to be to a considerable extent determined, in

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in the sense that Marx conceived of the evolution of human society when he declared that "men make their own history, but they do not ^{make} it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."¹⁷¹ For by this date the dominant mode of production was decisively capitalist, eventhough primitive modes of production existed symbiotically, albeit, in the rural areas. The determinant social formation was therefore capitalist, eventhough interspersed with feudal formations in the North and "primitive" social formations in the south. Thus, contrary to the prevailing view on social formations in contemporary Africa, although classes had developed in most African societies that experienced colonial rule (similar in characteristics to the classes that emerged during the formative stages of European capitalism) their uniqueness as causal variables was attenuated by the ethnic factors and other conditions. Instead, in precolonial Africa, classes existed, for social classes "are not a given with which certain societies are blessed and which other, more retarded societies lack. Social classes describe relations between producers and those in control of their production".¹⁷²

One of the overt manifestations of political independence is a country's involvement through its institutionally designated leaders, in the global system of states. This involvement is achieved through a country's foreign policy defined as "a coordinated strategy with which institutionally designated decision makers seek to manipulate the international environment in pursuit of certain objectives through moralizing principles to guide their pursuit".¹⁷³ In Conventional analysis the foreign policy of a country is the result of the interplay of the domestic and international environment within which states must operate. What goals or objectives are identified as national goals depends, according to this view, upon the structure of the domestic political process,¹⁷⁴ the nature of the society - whether it is a "consociational" or a "conglomerate" society¹⁷⁵ - and upon the international constellation of forces or, what in the literature, is called the international environment. A third, but less important variable is the idiosyncratic variable according to which

actions of individual statesmen are influenced considerably by their perception of the objective domestic and international environments. The conclusions from such methodological assumptions are obvious. Foreign policy is by and large an extension of the domestic political process. National goals and objectives are selected in the national interest-itself a most elusive concept - and are modified, at times dropped, as the realities of the international environment - political and economic - delimit what is theoretically realiable and what can be achieved in the concrete situation within which statesmen operate. The theoretical inadequacies of this approach have been outlined in chapter two. Suffice it to say that as far as the developing state is concerned, it lacks methodological rigour and hence obfuscate rather than explain the phenomena it treats.

Most analyses¹⁷⁶ of the foreign policy of Cameroon have followed this tradition. Thus most studies of Cameroon's foreign policy in focusing on the so-called domestic origins (determinants), ignore salient factors: One of them was the ethno-cultural factor emanating from the tenuous political structure negotiated in 1961 between British and French Cameroons, in 1966 between the ethnic-based political parties and in 1972 between the various federal structures. In the specific Cameroonian context, not only did the less developed and conservative elements hold a "political veto" over the more developed and radical ones in the state system but the northern preponderance over the rest was a potential major source of conflict which was reflected in the conservative posture of Cameroon's foreign policy, a posture incommensurable with her resources-material and human-since these are major variables in the foreign policy equation.

A second factor was the differential incorporation of the different ethnic and cultural regions into the modernization process of the state system - what within our analytical framework we would see as differential incorporation into the evolving capitalist system. There was also the problem of the dual personality presented by each regional unit where, instead of being an ethnic or linguistic unit, each consisted of all the ethnic and class contradictions at

the national level. In the final analysis, political parties were nothing else but a wretched and non-intergrated juxtaposition of regionally or ethnically based class interests. Thus the unique clustering of ethnic groups on a dominant class minority basis within the state system, the excessive political power and autonomy enjoyed by the ruling elite and the uneven character of the economic and political development of the various regions, social classes as well as the various ethnic groups were significant elements in the background of the formulation of national interests and the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of Cameroon 1960-1982.

A third factor was the preponderance of economic factors in foreign policy. The structure and nature of a country's economy as well as its external and financial relationships are important in both its domestic politics and its foreign policy behaviour. However the economic factors are both "national" and class in nature. They are related to the domestic economy only through the class interests that animate them. Thus, for Cameroon, it was not only the fact that Cameroon's economy was tied to the economy of its former colonial master (France) that dictated the foreign economic policy of its leaders but also the class interests that animated these relations. Therefore, it was not only the pursuit of national interests that influenced the policy-makers in the formulation of those economic policies but also the pursuit of class and personal interests. Thus, the "myth" about the domestic determinants of Cameroon's foreign policy, according to which domestic variables combined with external constraints to produce what emerged as Cameroon's foreign policy, 1960-1982, deals with its form rather than the essence. Cameroon's foreign policy is divested of its ethno-class dynamics and endowed with a quality independent of the contradictions in its ethnic and class structure. The result has been an analysis that confuses cause with effect and mistakes one for another. While one cannot deny the importance of these domestic as well external "determinants", it would be preposterous to assign them the degree of determinate quality as conventionally done.

As pointed out earlier, Cameroon's class formation was a function of colonialism and secondly, of the critical role assumed by the state after formal independence was proclaimed. At independence, the class structure, like the ethnic structure, consisted of the petty bourgeoisie - those who as in many African states "led the independence struggle and came to control the state apparatus, thus becoming a ruling class albeit in a subordinate place to the international bourgeoisie".¹⁷⁷ Of course, this class included elements from the remnants of feudal social formations in parts of the Northern and Western Regions and primarily of the lower stratum of the intelligentsia - teachers, lawyers, doctors, civil servants and petty traders. Next to the petty bourgeoisie in rank was the commercial bourgeoisie - small in size but sufficiently articulate in their support of the nationalists. They were closely followed by the proletariat and their closest ally - the Lumpen-proletariat, the army of unemployed - many of them unemployable - primary school graduates who had deserted the villages for the towns in search of the "new life" promised by the nationalists during the mobilization phase of the independence struggle. At the bottom rung of the ladder peasants who constituted the largest single and homogeneous class. Thus, by the time colonialism was abruptly terminated, the French and British had groomed a stratum of the Lumpen bourgeoisie to take over from the erstwhile colonial administrators. In fact, the last few years of the colonial masters were spent in training some of these successors to the "throne" to ensure that Cameroon was "safe for democracy". As Basil Davidson noted, "more or less consciously, the British and the French were eager to hand their power to elites who would keep the African world safe for capitalism, above all their own capitalism".¹⁷⁸ As in most French former colonies, the French were correct in their judgement as to the "safety" of Cameroon for Western capitalism. In no area of Cameroon's post independence politics was this more demonstrated than in the foreign policy posture of the Ahidjo administration, 1960-1982.

As we saw in chapter Three, Cameroon (1960-1982) opted for nonalignment, the consolidation of African Unity,

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anti-colonialism and national development in foreign policy. As can be inferred, Cameroon was to pursue an independent policy in its interaction with the global political system. But as we will see in chapter Ten, no sooner were these principles of action enunciated however, than the regime found itself embroiled in internal wranglings over the specific application of these principles. This was due primarily to the secondary contradictions of the alliance of the Lumpen bourgeoisie in power. The alliance was a marriage of convenience in the face of a common enemy - the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) - which began to suffer serious setbacks within the first months of independence as the contradictions within the coalition began to unfold and the struggle for the control of the state machinery became more intense.¹⁷⁹ We could thus contend that these struggles produced the incoherence that characterized the foreign policy postures of the Ahidjo administration on international issues. That is why in chapter three we referred to the Ahidjo administration's foreign policy postures as nothing but a wretched bundle of compromises obviously intended to placate all political groupings within the peripheral state system. It is our contention here that it was through these that the Ahidjo regime in spite of their occasional "anti-imperialist policies" ensured, Cameroon's integration into global capitalism. We shall argue in the chapters that follow that the major foreign policy postures were constantly formulated to progressively consolidate the peripheral capitalist mode of production and its attendant social and political order.

Thus a network of alliance developed between many foreign bodies and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The result was a non-antagonistic struggle within the bureaucracy for the control of those structures of state power that facilitated enhanced opportunities for the accumulation of wealth. Indeed Mbenoh has argued that the increased involvement of the state, under the Ahidjo administration, in the development of peripheral capitalism produced such intense struggle within the military and the bureaucracy that (with the departure of President Ahidjo) it led to the military coup in 1984 that threatened the stability of the Biya administration. As Mbenoh puts it, "the tendency towards monopoly of power and advantage within

the state led to suspicion and hostility from the out-groups of civil servants and military officials who were not privy to decision".¹⁸⁰ Whether or not the 1984 coup was the product of the struggle with the military-bureaucratic alliance needs further empirical research. What is obvious, however, is that by its active participation in the economy which required it to move against fragments of foreign capital, the Ahidjo administration opened up the Pandora's box for greater demands on it in the interest of the commercial bourgeoisie as well as providing the opportunities for fragments of the lumpen bourgeoisie including the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, to establish its economic base through share-holding in the indigenized businesses. Most of the class ethnic struggles that characterized Cameroonian politics (1960-1982) were non-antagonistic. This is because they occurred as a result of secondary contradictions within classes and ethnic groups. They were struggles concerned primarily with the "manner of disposal" of the surplus value, rather than with changing the system. It is true that the control of the state was the objective of the various fractions of the ruling bourgeoisie but the purpose for such control was to ensure that each fraction of the ruling bourgeoisie received what it considered its fair share of the surplus. While these nonantagonistic struggles were going on the proletariat failed (or was prevented from) to mobilize in opposition to the ruling class. It is instructive to note that the proletariat failed to join in this struggle. This is because as Shivji puts it, in non-revolutionary situation much of the class struggle is latent and even unidentifiable as such at any particular moment. Talking about class struggle at such times is really registering the fact of class ex-post-facto".¹⁸¹

4.8 : CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that Marxian class model cannot apply to most of contemporary Africa. But this is not to deny the existence of antagonistic classes either, as the theories of social and cultural pluralism claim. True, the social structure of most African societies today presents a "fairly complex Keleidoscope", and Cameroon

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(1960-1982) was no exception. However, we contend that in so far as the historical incorporation of Africa and its pre-capitalist systems into the evolving capitalist mode of production produced a "complex system of ethno-class relations" our understanding of these societies can only come through an analysis of the political struggle between these ethno-class alliances within the state system. This is because "the separate individuals form a class only in so far as they have to carry on a common battle against another class, other wise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors."¹⁸² Thus, a social class as a category cannot but remain "a theoretical concept" until it is actualized in the political struggle within the state system. In other words, we conceive of class in this study not in the pluralist interpretation of the ownership of the means of production but in the broader sense of an individual's class position as a function of the social relations of production; that is, relations of man to man within the production system. In essence this is to make an important distinction between the direct producers of surplus value and those who control the disposal of this surplus which may or may not include the juridical ownership of that means of production. We argue that it is this relation of production that constitutes the class dynamics and that class struggle is its political manifestation. It is a political struggle because it involves "the instruments of political power of one class over another",¹⁸³ in this case the state apparatus .

Thus the ethno-class struggle in Cameroon (1960-1982) manifested itself most dramatically in the contest for the control of the state apparatus most especially in a dependent relationship within the global capitalist system. As Lewis Lorwin puts it, "since the power of the ruling class is always concentrated in the organization of the state, the oppressed class must aim directly against the mechanism of the state. Every class struggle is thus a political struggle which in its objectives aims at the abolition of the existing social order and the establishment of a new social system".¹⁸⁴ This is because of all the organizations within a given society only the state possesses the instrumentalities of coercion and

who ever controls it certainly controls his destiny. An added reason for this in the developing states is the crucial role of the state as "the factor of cohesion of a social formation and the factor of reproduction of the conditions of production of a system that itself determines the domination of one class over the other".¹⁸⁵ Thus the state, while claiming a certain degree of autonomy in its actions, remains the protector of the economically and socially dominant class. The central contention here is that the general international (foreign policy) posture of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon and the specific policies pursued to articulate this posture were the product of the internal class and ethnic contradictions. Thus, in discussing the class structure of most post-colonial states, one cannot ignore the historical circumstances that produced it. For as Magubane rightly points out "the analysis of the distinctive features of Africa's integration in the World (capitalist) economy is fundamental for the study and specific features of its class structure".¹⁸⁶ The colonial state produced its own class structure but, "the historical specificity of imperialism in Africa lays in the fact that although it integrates Africa within the World capitalist economy, it did not create in Africa a wholly capitalist social milieu".¹⁸⁷ As for Cameroon (1960-1982), this means there was no "national bourgeoisie" because it lacked an objective economic base.¹⁸⁸ It was therefore to create this economic base which they lacked that made the control of the state coercive apparatus their primary objective in the ethno-class struggles that characterized the Ahidjo administration's Cameroon

Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration remained a valuable price for Western capitalism. The French and British, by inculcating in their successor, the bourgeois values of freedom-especially political Freedom - succeeded in making Cameroon safe not so much for democracy as for peripheral capitalism. The neo-colonial state that emerged with independence, through its bureaucracy acted at the behest of the international bourgeoisie using fragments of the ruling class, thus validating Poulantza's thesis that "the capitalist state best serves the interests of the capitalist class only when the members of this class do not participate directly in the state

apparatus, that is to say when the ruling class is not the politically governing class".¹⁸⁹ Cameroon (1960-1982) did not have a capitalist class, but the ruling class ceased to be the politically governing class. The bureaucracy, which we regard as a fragment of the ruling class constitutes a "specific social category" because they function according to specific internal unity. As Poulantzas puts it:

Their class origin - class situation - recedes into the background in relation to that which unifies them - their class position; that is to say, the fact that they belong precisely to the state apparatus and that they have as their objective function the actualization of the role of the state. This in turn means that the bureaucracy as a specific and relatively "united" social category is the "servant" of the ruling class, not by reason of its class origin...or by reason of its personal relations with the ruling class but by reason of the fact that its internal unity derives from its actualization of the objective role of the state. The totality of this role itself coincides with the interests of the ruling class¹⁹⁰

This raises the vital question of the relation autonomy of the state from fragments of the hegemonic class. In the specific situation of Cameroon (1960-1982) the military was subordinated to the state component of the hegemonic class understandably because this fraction monopolized the state instruments of coercion. It was the subordination of the military to the state that facilitated the military - bureaucratic alliance in the formulation of Cameroon's foreign policy, whose primary objective remained making Cameroon safe for peripheral capitalism.

Furthermore from the foregoing analysis of the state system as an important component of the socio-political setting of foreign policy in the developing state, we noticed that within the foreign policy system of the developing state and because most aspects of the structural variables are not fully developed, the attitudinal variables assume great prominence as determinants of foreign policy. These structural variables refer to the power and communication structures of the developing state. The power structure refers to the relationship between the groups and agencies which have control over foreign policy decisions. These include ministers and their

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officials, governmental agencies, legislative bodies, military personnel and agencies, economic interest groups and various pressure groups. The communication structure refers to the networks of links between not only those groups responsible for gathering and interpreting information but also those which control the nerve centre of the communication network and between the nation and other states. These include diplomatic missions, trade offices, the national and foreign news agencies, the mass media of communication and administrative units within the "home ministries" and governmental agencies charged with collecting, collating and interpreting information needed for policy formulation and with communicating the government's policies to other actors.

It was also noticed that in the developing state the pattern of relations between the different agencies responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation is unsettled and unstable. In order countries like Britain and France, the configuration of the power structure is clear in the sense that for the most part, the line of authority relations is well defined, understood and accepted and the set of rules guiding the behaviour of ministers and officials are well-known and strongly internalized. In contrast the developing state is characterized by frequent disputes over jurisdictional lines, violation of conventional rules of official behaviour and attempts to win public sympathy in disputes over the right of functions and funds. In this struggles for power and prestige, the personality characteristics of the individual officials (especially that of the head of state) assume great significance as the major variable determining both the outcome of the struggle and the nature of the policy output.

The developing state also lacks adequate structures for gathering information about the external environment. Compared with the industrialized states, the developing state have few diplomatic missions and fewer foreign service personnel. In addition most developed countries maintain a high skilled professional corps of men specialized in secret intelligence gathering. Such intelligence agencies - the C.I.A. the K.G.B. the M.I.G. etc - provide highly useful and

strategic information especially about the external environment. The developing state lacks such efficient intelligence units. Consequently the developing state operates in an information vacuum. In foreign policy formulation, therefore, the most important component of the belief system of the developing state's decision makers is not their cognitive orientation, that is the level of their specific knowledge of events, issues and actors. Their cognitive orientation is low since it is primarily a function of the amount and quality of information available to the decision makers. Generally, where the cognitive aspect of the perceptive system, is weak, the affective dimension may assume great importance in determining how the policy makers interpret events and issues. The affective dimension refers to the level of emotional commitment with which decision makers view events or actors - in other words, how decision-makers feel, as against what they know about an actor or an event. Often, it is the product of the past experience of policy makers - an experience which is not, however stored as specific knowledge or memory, but which, nonetheless, subfuses the subconscious mind of the policy makers or the psyche of the nation. The anti-communist policies of President Ahidjo exemplify the tendency of policy makers in the developing state to rely on their affective orientation for policy formation. It should be noted that where the affective orientation plays an important role in the interpretation of events, it reinforces the significance of attitudinal variables in determining foreign policy

A third component of a policy maker's perceptive system is the evaluative aspect. It is the philosophical or ethical dimension, the decision maker's conception of the good life, that is, of what is right or wrong. It concerns such concepts as justice, respect for human dignity and human equality, and such problems as the proper relationship between the individual and community, the citizen and the state. For some decision makers in the developing states, for example, Nyerere (Tanzania), the philosophical dimension of the belief system is clearly thought out, coherently presented and, as far possible, consistently applied in the interpretation of stimuli

from both the external and the internal environments. For others-for instance, the Ahidjo administration - the philosophical dimension existed at the intuitive level only and since no attempt was made to remove the inconsistencies between the different strands of thought, wherever it was applied, it led to inconsistencies in the interpretation of stimuli.

The evaluative dimension of the belief system acts as a sort of filter through which the information gathered about events and actors are sifted to evaluate their importance and relevance. The ethnical dimension of the belief system helps policy makers to evaluate, in the light of their notion of right and wrong, the importance of these reasons and respond accordingly to the stimuli. The evaluative component of the belief system also performs an integrative function. It enables the policy maker to make sense of and thereby organize and integrate, new information received with memories of old patterns of behaviour, and by so doing minimize his cognitive dissonance. Suppose a policy maker had in the past consistently applied the principle of non-intervention in reacting to coups d'etat in other states. If a new coup d'etat brings to power a regime that violates all the fundamental values which the policy maker holds sacred, he may violate the non-intervention principle without suffering cognitive dissonance. If that happens the evaluative dimension of his belief system is coherent and stable. On the other hand a policy maker lacking strong evaluative orientation is likely to continue to rely on the legalistic principle of non-interference as a guide to his response to all changes of government in other states. Yet he will still be unable to maintain cognitive consonance.

The evaluative dimension of the policy maker's intellectual world also performs an explanatory function for the foreign policy analyst. It shows that what on face value seems irrational and inconsistent on the part of an actor may, in fact, be quite consistent behaviour and also rational when viewed within the framework of the philosophical guidelines of that actor. Thus it should be stressed that the developing state is by definition one whose foreign policy is determined less by structural than by attitudinal variables, one which

therefore operates in a relative information vacuum, and in consequence, whose external actions are based more on the affective orientation of its policy makers than on either their evaluative or their cognitive orientation. Perhaps it is mainly because of the characteristics of this socio-political setting of the foreign policy of the developing state that some students of foreign policy analysis are attracting attention to economic development as a determinant of its foreign policy. At this point it becomes evidently clear that because economic development is both an independent and dependent variable in the developing state's international relations, its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour at any point in time are always a reflection of its domestic economic and socio-political relations of production and capabilities - within the state system. This therefore largely validates our initial hypothesis at the beginning of this chapter.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIO-POLITICAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AS A DETERMINANT OF FOREIGN POLICY : THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS.

5.1 : INTRODUCTION :

In chapter Four above we have not only identified the state in Cameroon in particular and Africa in general as a congeries of organized repositories of ethnic, class, coercive, administrative and ideological power subject to and engaged in, an ongoing process of power accumulation characterized by uneven ascension and uneven decline, but have pointed out that society in Africa is state-dominant. The state in Cameroon (1960-1982) was the main actor not only in domestic but also in international relations. Hopkins and Mansback have defined an international actor as "a relatively autonomous unit that exercises influence on the behaviour of other autonomous actors. The key word is autonomy, the ability to behave in ways that have consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted entirely by reference to other actors or authorities".¹ Until recently states alone were thought to have this quality because they possess sovereignty - that is, legal independence without accountability to any higher authority. They were therefore, regarded as the fundamental actors in international politics. Accordingly international politics was largely analyzed in terms of relations among states. Indeed, the very notion of international politics (foreign policy) assumes that the state is the fundamental actor.

Since the second World War, many theorists have challenged this state-centric view of international politics. The complex arguments the state-centric view can be reduced to four. First, the concept of state has become too ambiguous to serve as a useful frame on which to base the analysis of international politics. It has been argued that the traditional attributes of states are meaningless in the contemporary world because many entities that call themselves states and are recognized as such do not possess the attributes of states. Many so-called states, especially the "new states" in Africa are said to have a fluid rather than a stable, permanent

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population, lack a viable and effective central government and to be so dependent on powerful foreign states as to compromise their sovereignty.² The second argument against the state - centric view of international politics is that states are not hard-shelled, impermeable units within which political and economic activities are confined and human security and welfare assured. Rather, in our nuclear age with its revolutionary developments in communication, transportation technology, commerce and industry, the territorial state is increasingly "penetrated" by other states. In addition, it has declined and become obsolescent and ineffective in terms of achieving human security and welfare. In consequence there has been a dramatic increase in the number of human activities promoting welfare and security which cut across state lines. Thus there has been an expansion of the roles of non-state activities which cannot be thought of as wholly dependent on, or subsidiary to, state initiatives. Even such organizations as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which are composed of states, sometimes operate as semi-autonomous entities in international relations. All these developments have in turn resulted in the fractionalization of human loyalty. Nationalism is currently at a low ebb, as it is competing with internationalism and supranationalism which can be seen in the various moves for political unification and in the growth of transnational non-governmental entities such as the multinational corporations. It is unrealistic therefore to base analysis of international policy solely on an entity-the state-which appears to be in such decline.³

The third line of argument against the state-centric views is that by focusing on states we lose sight of human beings for whom and through whom the state plays the game of international politics. The state is reified and assumed to be capable, like human beings, of thinking and acting, of having desire and preferences and of choosing goals and means. State "interests" become elevated above those of its citizens who are often asked to make sacrifices in the "interests" of the state. If we attribute human qualities to the state, and regard it as an actor in its own right we run the risk

.../...

of making the state into a monster which accords its own interests primacy over those of human individuals. As a result, international politics becomes "dehumanized".⁴ The fourth and final argument is that historically non-state entities such as banks, trading companies, religious movements and institutions all played an important role in world politics before the modern nation-state came into existence. And today similar entities are more important than many states. For example; it could be said that the American Telephone and Telegraph company (ATT) whose profit of 5 000 million dollars in 1980 was larger than the GNP of many African states, plays a more prominent and effective economic role in international politics than the poorer African states. Indeed a study in 1968 showed that nearly ninety multinational corporations had sales volumes that exceeded the GNP of 57 states and that surpassed the expenditures of 86 of the 126 central governments then existing in the world. The awesome power, combined with their mode of operation, enables the corporations to restrict the effective choices of those who act in the name of the state.⁵

In the light of these arguments against the state-centric or state-as-actor view of international politics, it has been suggested that we should regard as actors all individuals (whether private or official), groups, and other non-state entities which independently enter into transactions and relationships that are political in quality or have political consequences but at the same time are international in scope. Thus international organizations and institutions, multinational corporations as international actors provided activities which are both international and to some degree political in character. Some proponents of this "mixed actor" view have identified and classified actors by the scope of their constituencies (ie. what constitutes the entity) and by the type of tasks they perform in the political system. Five types of actors have been identified, viz, (1) inter-state governmental organizations e.g. the U.N. and the OAU, (2) inter-state non-governmental organizations e.g. the Central African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Mines; (3) intra-state governmental institutions e.g. the Office National
.../...

de Commercialization des Produits de Base (ONCPB) of Cameroon (4) intra-state non-governmental organizations e.g. the Cameroon Chamber of Commerce, (5) certain powerful individuals acting as individuals rather as spokesmen or representatives of larger social unit, e.g. Soppo Priso, Fotso. Each type of actor can also be classified according to one or more of the following tasks which it performs in the polity:- physical protection, economic development and regulation, social welfare and provision of group status.⁶ This "mixed actor" system is said to be more reflective of the real world of international politics where "several qualitatively different types of actor interact in the absence of any settled pattern of dominance - submission (or hierarchical) relationships".⁷ Relationships can at one level; involve two or more representatives of the same type of actor between themselves producing as many different patterns of political relationships as there are types of actors. At another level two or more different types of actors may be involved and this would result in an even greater number of patterns of political relationships.

The arguments against the "state-as-actor are, however not entirely convincing and the alternative mixed actor concept is in many ways misleading and irrelevant to foreign policy analysis. The argument that the "new states" are in some sense incomplete states does not stand up to critical examination. It is an example of Western ethnocentrism (and racism) which disparages or dismisses as unreal anything that does not conform totally to Western ideas and conceptions. Thus if African states do not exhibit to the same degree the attributes of Western states, then these new states must be seen as a "perversion" of the Western ideal. More importantly, this line of argument is vulnerable empirically. Many states especially those in Africa, maybe "inchoate, economically absurd, administratively ramshackle and impotent", to borrow Stanley Hoffman's phrase. But, as Hoffman says, they are nevertheless "dangerous in international politics" as the bloody wars in the Horn of Africa, Vietnam and else where in the Third World remind us. They "remain the basic units in spite of all remonstrations and exhortations... They go on

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Faute de mieux despite their obsolescence, indeed their very existence is a formidable obstacle to their replacement".⁸

Oran Young, a proponent of the mixed actor view, himself admits that "states and nation-states are still remarkably resilient:

As experience even with such relatively successful ventures as the European Communities makes clear, the modern state cannot be superceded with ease even under comparatively favourable circumstances. And in many other parts of the world (particularly in Africa, one might add), there is every evidence that the state is only now coming to its own as the dominant form of political organization. Every nationalism, with its thrust towards the idea of nation-states, is still a potent and rising political force in many areas of the world... perhaps because of... imperial activities of various great powers.⁹

The argument about the demise or obsolescence of the state is a dangerous one which could be employed to endanger the "new states" in Africa. For if we accept this argument we inevitably undermine the basis of such time-honoured principles as state sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs. Such a development could lead to an unrestrained use of force by the powerful against the weak.


The possibility of the state - as - actor view being a dehumanizing influence in international politics is a very remote one. For to talk of the state-as-actor is not to attribute human quality of thought and action to an abstract entity. Of course only human beings think, choose between alternatives and act on behalf of the state. States-as-actors, then, is no more than a way of referring to those human beings who authoritatively speak and act in the name of the state concerned. The particular predispositions of these decision-makers will be essential variables in their dealings with similar authorities in other states. Their personal value preferences, temperament and rationality will be important in deciding the "state interests", the priorities among those interests and level of energy and available resources to be devoted to the pursuit of these interests. Thus state-as-actor does not preclude human actors and human interests from the analysis. Rather it calls for an understanding of international politics both in terms of "the behaviour of states as

organized bodies of men, (and of human beings upon whose psychological reactions the behavior credited to states ultimately rests"¹⁰ For in the final analysis, "state interests are indeed human interests" as perceived by the decision-makers and "a sufficient number of men (still) identify themselves with their state or nation to justify and render possible governmental action in the name of state interests."¹¹ There are of course, serious phenomenological (and therefore methodological) issues that arise once we accept authoritative decision-makers as surrogates for the state. Is the behaviour of decision-makers on behalf of the state motivated by objective factors or by the decision-makers perception of the objective factors, or both? Can the individual's perception of objective factors be measured in an accurate and systematic fashion? For a group of decision-makers it is possible to identify some sort of corporate perception? But these issues will arise equally in the mixed actor model, since, that model also deals with integral social units even if of a different character and with different attributes to those of states.

Finally, it is true historically states are late-comers into international politics. But their rise has transformed the nature of international politics and has eclipsed the dominant role which non-state actors previously played. And while it is possible that the state may be replaced by some other entity as the principal actor in international politics that possibility belongs to the future and, therefore, to the realm of speculation. As yet the state has not been superceded anywhere in the world, and supernational developments (e.g. the European Economic Community (EEC) have counterparts in micro-national movements everywhere, including the United Kingdom. The arguments advanced in favour of the alternative mixed actor view of international relations have serious weaknesses. Firstly, while the mixed actor view may reflect the complexity of the real world of international politics by distinguishing patterns of relations involving the same type of actors and those involving different types of actors, the mixed actor model is itself too complicated to serve as a useful tool of analysis. If, for example, we take the

five types of actors which have been identified in terms of scope of constituency and the four categories of tasks which each type performs in a political system, we would have twenty functional specific types of actors as shown in Figure 5 (1) below. These possible combinations of relations for these twenty types of actor is statistically in thousands. Thus the types of actors and the possible combination of relationships among them become too unwieldy to be encompassed by anyone theory of international politics. And the relative importance of these relationships becomes impossible to systematize and analyze except on an ad hoc basis

FIGURE 5 (1): A MODEL OF STATES-AS-ACTORS



Source : Adapted from Ivo D. Duchacek; Nations and Men (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970) P. 43


Secondly, the attempt to be comprehensive disguises the fact that the state is still "the significant unit of political action" and is going to remain so for many years to come and that "strategies of action and commitment of resources... continue to be decided at the national level".¹² Only states and inter-state governmental agencies are endowed with an international legal status which enables them to participate in high politics and to resolve issues of war and peace. Intra-state and inter-state non-governmental

organization and groups are not members of, and do not participate in, such international fora as the UN, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement except as observers. They cannot appeal to international tribunals except through the instrumentalities of states and only after local legal procedures have been exhausted. Thus, for instance, a French company operating in Cameroon cannot sue the Cameroonian government in an international court until it has gone through the hierarchy of Cameroonian courts up to the Supreme Court without obtaining satisfaction. But even then the case could go to an international tribunal only if the French government takes it up as its own. On account of these short comings of the mixed actor, it is hardly surprising that most texts which claim that there are actors other than states nevertheless proceed to analyze international politics exclusively in terms of nation and state.

Because of the short comings of the mixed actor conception of international politics we adopt the state-as-actor in this study. We view states (or rather those individuals and agencies acting authoritatively in the name of the state) as the only actors. This is not only because only states have autonomy expressed in terms of the capacity to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within a geographical space but also because this world view integrates our dependency linkage conceptual model as shown in Figure 5 (2) below. All the other units which the mixed actor proponents regard as actors are in this context regarded as part of the milieu in which states operate. They are, therefore, influencers rather than actors in their own right¹³ The Sprouts have suggested that inter-governmental organizations should be treated as structures of the international system. Thus the UN could be viewed as the structure of the global system and the OAU could be seen as the structure of the African subordinate system. These inter-governmental organizations (and indeed other non-governmental ones) are elements of the milieu within which unfold the interactions and inter-relationships of the legally sovereign communities called states. As elements of the milieu these structures, and other elements such as multinational corporations exercise a more or less constraining influence on even the most powerful legally sovereign

governments".¹⁴ But this quality or ability does not make them international actors in the strictest sense of it. There are two main considerations for sticking to the state-as-actor view. One is the advantage of its conceptual simplicity and the other is conformity with the legal (and practical) reality. In this background this chapter addresses itself to the analysis of the domestic foreign policy process in the developing state using the Cameroonian experience, 1960-1982.

FIGURE 5(2): VARIABLES OF THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL



Source: Korany, Social change, Charisma and International Behaviour, p. 57

5.2 : THE CONSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES

Because of underdevelopment the most striking feature of the presidency in Africa is its tremendous powers in both the external and internal relations of the state. Its formal powers exceed those of its American prototype - not in nature, but in extent. The formal powers in both cases partake of the same nature, in the sense that the President in America and in Africa is the executive, and as such wields the executive power of the state as a personal ruler. Yet the mere vesting of executive power affords no conclusive indication of its actual extent, nor of its reality. Its extent has to be judged in relation to the entire constitutional system in which the presidency operates; that is to say, in the context of the restraints which the constitution imposes upon power, viewed in that context, African presidentialism differs quite markedly from its American counterpart, so markedly indeed that the somewhat pejorative qualification "African" has been applied to it. Professor Carl Friedrich has observed that "it is part of the major perversion which accompanies the adaptation of American constitutional ideas in foreign lands that where one of the major institutions of American constitutionalism, such as the presidency, has been reproduced, federalism and the judicial protection of human rights have not been".¹⁵ The "Africanness" of the presidency in African states refers to the fact that it is largely free from such limiting constitutional devices, particularly those of a rigid separation of powers and federalism. It is the universal absence of such restraint mechanisms that is implied in the qualifying word "African". A feature of the presidency in Africa is what has been called "democratic centralism". From its inception in Ghana in 1960, centralism in the organization of governmental powers, in the administration of government and in the organization of politics has come to characterize every presidential regime in Africa. Furthermore, one is deeply struck by the way in which almost every step in Ghana's post independence constitutional development has been closely followed, almost in its precise sequence, in many of the other African countries.

Every kind of separation or division in governmental authority is rejected. Starting with the abolition of the separation of the Head of state from the Head of Government and the diffusion of executive powers among cabinet members, the whole apparatus of power has been concentrated in the executive. The legislature is subordinated to the executive; bicameralism, and federalism or regionalism by unitarism. The judiciary is subordinated to the executive as regards appointment, and sometimes even as regards dismissal too. All this is but a foundation for the emergence of that political monolith, the one-party, which itself finally consummates the personalization of rule - i.e. the centralization, within the single party, of all powers in the hands of the leader. In many cases the constitution still guarantees individual rights. The whole concept of "checks and balances", is large abandoned. Julius Nyerere's comments in this regards summarize the situations; "our constitution differs from the American system in that it avoids any blurring of the lines of responsibility, and enables the executive to function without being checked at every turn. For we recognize that the system of "checks and balances" is an admirable way of applying the brakes to social change. Our need is not for brakes - our lack of trained manpower and capital resources, and even our climate act too effectively already. We need accelerators, powerful enough to overcome the inertia bred of poverty, and the resistances which are inherent in all societies."¹⁶ Thus, for example, the power of the President to appoint ministers, judges and other public servants and to enter into treaties with foreign countries is not limited as in America, by the necessity of obtaining the approval of the legislature. The departure from the system inherited at independence is even more marked. The President just became the sole authority for the appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of members of the civil and police services.¹⁷

Thus at independence, the moderate-conservative ruling coalition in Cameroon and their constitutional advisers gave enormous powers to the Head of state in the executive field.¹⁸ The march 1960 constitution made the President of the Republic, the Head of State, Head of Government (Art. 8(1)), Commander-
.../...

in-chief of the Armed Forces (Art. 12(10)) and (11), i.e. instituting paramount authority in the President. In fact by virtue of the dispositions of Part III. Arts. 8-22 and especially by the provisions of Article 12(1) (2) 19, this constitution gave the Presidency what Professor Victor T. Levine has described as "a hybrid which combines the attributes of a British-style Governor-General, a Fifth (French) Republic President and an American Chief Executive. This new type of presidency does not appear to have parallels in present or past constitutional practice".²⁰ This description appears to emphasize a non-existent originality and the resourcefulness of the Cameroonian constitutional experts. It overlooks the definite preference expressed by President Ahidjo and maintained at the Foumban Constitutional conference for a powerful executive rather than a ceremonial Head of State.²¹

The fact that the President was elected by direct popular vote enabled Ahidjo to lay emphasis on the role of his office as a symbol of the unity of the nation, and to stress the reciprocal bond created between the President and the people through the ballot box. It also, by the same token, gave the President a source of legitimacy which equalled that of the National Assembly. The constitutional requirement that the President and the Vice-President came from different states reflected one of the "federal" aspects of the constitution. It ensured that each of the federated states participated in the executive branch of the federal government. But at the same time, it secured Ahidjo's position as President, and it made it certain that, for the foreseeable future, the dominant role in Government was to be accorded to a President from East Cameroon and this took place in 1972 with unification and the appointment of a Prime Minister who in reality acted as the Vice-President.²²

In the executive sphere, the President was virtually supreme, reflecting most clearly his position as head of state as well as head of government and head of the army. As one of the two repositories of federal authority - the other being the National Assembly - he was responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the Federal Republic, and was

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not accountable to the legislature for his actions. Apart from his purely formal functions - such as representing the federation in all public activities or accrediting foreign representatives - he exercised the prerogative of clemency and had extensive treaty making powers. It was he alone who concluded such treaties, which only needed ratification if they concerned the matters defined as falling within the province of the National Assembly by Article 24. Given the wide range of matters that fell outside this area, this provision considerably increased the capacity of the President to act on his own accord, without any need to consult either the federal legislature or the authorities of either of the federated states. So long as he did not step beyond the limits of the federal competence in making any such treaty, his actions required no prior authorization or subsequent approval .¹³

This means, therefore, that in his capacity as chief Executive, the President not only carried out the terms of the legislation enacted in the National Assembly but was also empowered to "establish, organize and direct all administrative services where necessary for his task (and others that might have arisen as a result of actions of the state governments). He made all appointments to the federal civil service and the military posts. He was also given the specific authority to "ensure the internal and external security of the federal republic" the national assembly's role in such matters was much more restricted. More over in addition to the compendium of power and control over the affairs of the nation, the President was accorded plenary powers to deal with a state of emergency or state of siege (state of special Emergency) in terms of article 15 of the constitution. This was a provision which was derived from a very similar article in the constitution of the Fifth French Republic in which there was no restriction on the power of the President to declare a state of Emergency. There was no restriction on the President's power to declare a state of emergency; the only limitation on his right to act was that he had to be able to cite a federal law as the source of any decree which he issued.²⁴ The measure was clearly designed to enable the President to more swiftly, and outside the ordinary

constitutional apparatus, in dealing with the UPC insurrection and its aftermath.

A state of special Emergency (état d'exception) had only to be declared by the President when certain specified, (though very broadly defined) situations were deemed to exist where a serious peril threatened the "integrity of the nation".²⁵ Before making the declaration, the President had to consult (but need not have the consent of) of Prime Ministers of the federated states. Once a state of special emergency was declared, the President could take all such measures as he deemed necessary without any limitation, except that he had to inform, "the nation" by means of a "message". The constitution provided that in a state of special emergency the National Assembly automatically remained convened, but, in view of the wide powers conferred on the President, it was difficult to see what it could do to restrain him in the circumstances.

The successive Cameroonian constitutions piled up more executive and extraordinary powers on the President. This claim was instantiated by the 1972 constitution instituting a unitary state which conferred sweeping powers on the President. Article (4) of the 1972 constitution conferred the right to negotiate and ratify treaties on the Head of State. Though Article (2) stipulated that certain treaties had to be submitted for approval to the National Assembly before ratification or through a national referendum under Article 30(2b); this provision was in reality diluted by Article 2(1) which empowered the President of the Republic to legislate by way of ordinance. Indeed, Article 2(1) of the 1972 constitution enabled the President of the Republic to use concurrent legislative powers with the national assembly. Perhaps it was because of these absolute constitutional powers that the Cameroonian constitutionalist Professor Joseph Owona, shared Professor Levine's view of a "hybrid" presidency by stating that the "Head of State remains the indisputable Head of Government"²⁵

The revision of the constitution in 1975 raised more doubts about the categorization of the powers of the President. For instance, Article 9 empowered the President to be the

sole guarantor of the domestic and external security of the state. He promulgated law and was responsible for their execution, thereby exercising regulatory powers. Given such "authoritarian presidentialism",²⁶ and the institutionalization of "emergency laws" in Cameroon, no one doubts why the Ministry of External Relations was merely a dormant and inactive but necessary decorative outpost of the civil cabinet of the Presidency.²⁷ In the words of Mentan:

The "Pulaku code" constitutionalism could only lead to highly personalized rule with policies depicting the idiosyncracies, preferences and dislikes of the feudal overlord. The opinions of the national assembly, cabinet colleagues and the public cannot easily have causal impact on foreign policy decisions unless they coincide with those of the "imperial President" and his politico - military support base - the French.²⁸

It is not surprising therefore, that the constitution has been judged in terms of its contributions to "machiavellian presidentism" rather than for its effort at national unity. Like Mentan, another observer undoubtedly exaggerated this tendency when he dismissed the constitution as adding just "another irresponsible monocephalous executive to the ranks of African Officialdom"²⁹. But the phrase does not focus attention on several significant characteristics of the Cameroon constitutions such as the President's claim to sovereignty on a basis which is at least equal to that of the National Assembly, his dominance over state institutions, and the fact that he could not be called upon to account for a large measure of his acts to the legislature or any other authority, except the electorate every five years. A somewhat less severe, but equally pointed assessment of the Cameroonian Presidency is contained in Gonidec's judgement that "in reality, the constitution and legislation construct a constitutional regime characterized by a tendency to reinforce the position of the chief Executive, that is to say, the tendency towards a monarchy (la monarchie)".³⁰ It is, nevertheless, only fair to point out that the President was in the last resort, theoretically subject to restraint, and even removal in terms of the constitution, which provided a procedure for impeachment for acts of high treason done in the course of his duties. From the foregoing analysis, we

can asset, therefore, that with Ahidjo having established himself constitutionally as the dominant leader; having forced and instituted his own popularity and having rendered his rule unchallenged, the distinction between his personal views and state policies completely disappeared.

In terms of foreign policy, the basis of the President's power was the constitution. The Constitution of March 4, 1960 gave him the sole authority to accredit ambassadors and extra-ordinary envoys to foreign countries and in turn to receive such international functionaries accredited to Cameroon. The Constitution made it such that the President collaborated with Parliament in matters dealing with treaty-making. The President was empowered to negotiate treaties and then put them before Parliament for ratification. The constitutional role of the President in international relations set by March 1960 constitution remained invariably the same throughout the several political transformations that occurred in Cameroon after 1960. The 1972 constitution establishing the United Republic did not alter that role.³¹ These constitutional provisions on the role of the President in foreign affairs were of extreme significance. Parliament in effect had control in foreign policy only over treaty-making and even there, following the 1972 constitution, the type of treaty in which the legislature could intervene was greatly limited. Thus, except in matters of treaty the Cameroonian President had a free hand in foreign affairs.

In this perspective, the President could be qualified as the main initiator, decision-maker and coordinator of Cameroon's foreign policy. As the initiator of Cameroon's foreign policy, the President devised the doctrinal foundations of the country's foreign policy. As the chief decision maker in Cameroon's foreign policy, the President was constitutionally responsible to the people and as such decided on all major foreign policy issues. The president as the co-ordinator of the country's foreign policy appointed the Foreign Minister and the technical ministers who dealt with foreign policy issues. Constitutionally, the absence of any controls on foreign policy-making made the President the key institution in foreign policy. .../...

But the constitution was only one of the sources of presidential power, though no doubt a supremely important one. The reality of power depended on other factors besides its formal structure as defined in the constitution. Two such factors of overwhelming importance were the character of the individual President and the circumstances of the country including social and political forces, conditions and events.³² It may be said that the circumstances of Cameroon favoured an authoritarian presidency. To begin with, there was the relative impotence of extra-constitutional sanctions against the abuse of power. The social values of the advanced democracies enshrine a national ethic which defines the limits of permissible action by wielders of power. This national ethic is sanctioned in deeply entrenched conventions operating as part of the rules of the game of politics. Thus, although an action may well be within the powers of the President under the constitution, still he cannot do it if it violates the moral sense of the nation, for he would risk calling down upon himself the wrath of public censure. The force of public opinion is sufficiently developed to act as a watchdog of the nation's ethic, and no action that seriously violates this ethic can escape public condemnation. More than any constitutional restraints, perhaps, it is the ethic of the nation, its sense of right and wrong, and the capacity of the people to defend it, which provides the ultimate bulwark against tyranny.

Africa is yet to develop a strong moral sense in public affairs. Standards of public morality were not deeply rooted, nor were they effectively articulated and enforced, partly because the instruments of public opinion were controlled by the very people to be checked. Because of this, an African President could get away with a lot of things which an American President dare not venture. The traditional African attitude towards power was not of much assistance either. Tradition inculcated in the people a certain amount of deference towards authority. The chief's authority was sanctioned in religion, and it was a sacrilege to flout it, except in case of blatant and systematic oppression when the whole community might rise in revolt to destool, banish or even kill a tyrannical chief. Thus while customary sanctions

against extreme cases of abuse of power existed, there was also considerable toleration of arbitrariness by the chief. This attitude towards authority tended to be transferred to the modern political leader. The vast majority of the population, which of course was still illiterate and custom-bound, was not disposed to question the leader's authority, and indeed disapproved those who were inclined to do so.

In a sense, therefore, the presidency in Africa was regarded by many in the light of the attitudes inculcated in them towards chiefly authority, and its power as the projection of chiefly authority into the national sphere. The President, in effect, was the chief of the new nation, and as such entitled to the authority and respect due by tradition to a chief. This did not rest entirely on attitudes carried over from tradition. In places there was indeed a conscious attempt to implant the attitude in the minds of the people, for example, publicly investing the President with the attributes of a chief. Thus, when he attended public rallies in Ghana, Nkrumah used to assume the style of a chief. He sat upon a "chiefly throne under a resplendent umbrella, symbol of traditional rule" and he took chiefly titles meaningful to all major tribal units in Ghana: Osagyefo, Kata, Manton, Kasapieko, Wufeno, etc.³³ His opening of parliament was also done in chiefly style. His approach was "heralded by the beating of "fantomforom" (traditional drums). He was received by eight linguists representing the various regions and each carrying a distinctive stick. A Libation was poured and the President then entered the chamber to sound the "Mmenson" (the seven traditional horns).³⁴ Though this was explicable in part by Nkrumah's irredentist aspiration for the revival of the African cultural heritage, the political significance was obvious. It was intended to harness to the presidency the authority and the legitimacy which it conferred. By aligning the presidency with the institution of chieftaincy in the public imagination, it was hoped to inspire public acceptance of the office and respect for its authority.

Similarly relevant to the reality of presidential power in Africa was the African's conception of authority.

.../...

Authority in African traditional society was conceived as being personal, permanent, mystical and pervasive. The chief was a personal ruler, and his office was held for life, which pervaded all the other relations in the community, for he was both legislator, executive, judge, priest, medium father, etc. These characteristics were reflected in the modern African presidency. The African President, as we have seen was both the executive and the chief legislator. The office tended to be an inheritance, which must be rendered secure by the liquidation of open and organized opposition. William Tubman of Liberia died in office after twenty-eight years as President. Kenyatta of Kenya also died in office. Kamuzu Banda has himself installed as life President of Malawi, as had Bokassa of the Central African Republic before his overthrow by the military. Other African Presidents, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Mobutu of Zaire, Boigny of the Ivory Coast, rejected offers of a life presidency, just as Banda did for some time before finally succumbing to the pressure and temptation. But all said they would stay in office for as long as the people wanted them, which given the indefinite eligibility for re-election, meant in effect for life, the only difference being that every five years or so they had to submit themselves to the ritual of an election. A life President, or one who held office for twenty years, was a different kind of functionary from one who was limited to a maximum of two terms of four years each. His authority was bound to be greater, for after twenty years in office he was apt to become an institution himself, attracting loyalties of a personal nature. His authority tended to be all-pervading. The mysticism of religion in which the authority of the chief was sanctified was also sought to be transferred to the presidency.

The Presidency in Africa was indeed clothed with considerable amount of mystique which bestowed upon it an authority transcending that of an ordinary Head of state. This mystical quality derived from the achievement of the first generation of African Presidents as leaders of the nationalist movements which over-threw colonialism and established the new state. The leader incarnated the spirit of that struggle and the aspirations of those engaged in it. The realization

of those aspiration elevated him to the status of a deliverer, a messiah. The struggle against colonialism was in large measure a struggle to redeem the personality of the African from the indignities and degradations inflicted upon it by colonialism. The perpetuation of the inferiority of the African was central to the philosophy and technique of colonialism, and any one who was able to challenge the myth of white superiority was considered a man of extraordinary qualities, and success in overthrowing it was a feat of miraculous proportions. All the awe and mystique associated with the white man was now transferred to the leader. The reality was brought home to the people by the spectacle of the leader occupying the former colonial governor's official residence, that symbol of the glory and glamour of empire. The President thus incarnated power, indeed he was power himself and Africans admired and respected a man of power. And so it was that the African President was revered.

An attribute of mystique was charisma. No leader around whom such a fantastic myth was built up could fail to arouse a charismatic appeal among the people. This, by and large, was the basis of the so-called charismatic authority of the first generation of African leaders. It was due largely to their role in the nationalist movement, to the fervour and spontaneous popular enthusiasm which the movement generated. When the movement lost its fervour after having achieved its goal, the charisma remained, but was now sustained largely by manipulation and by the prestige of office. Unlike George Washington, who retired from the presidency after two terms against the exhortations of his countrymen and continued to be idolized in retirement, the office was indispensable to the charisma of African leaders, and the possibility of its loss aroused the fear of oblivion. Undeniably some, like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, did possess a genuine charismatic appeal based partly on the myth of their achievement in the nationalist movement, and partly on personal charm and selfless, dedicated statemanship. Yet, whatever its basis, the charisma of these leaders inspired tremendous personal loyalty among the population, which not only enhanced their authority and prestige, but also enabled the new state to win legitimacy. The charisma and mystique engendered the belief that

the leader was a kind of demi-god specially commissioned by providence to deliver the people first from colonialism and then from the evils of poverty, ignorance and disease - a belief that providence endowed him with extra ordinary power to divine what was good for the community, so that when he so divined what should be done, there arose an implied obligation on the part of all to obey. Obedience was enjoined because the leader ordered it.

An authority based on this kind of charisma needed constant nurture, since the myth on which it was based was liable to evaporate if exposed to public contact. The cult of personality was resorted to for the necessary nurture. A cult of infallibility and incorruptibility was accordingly built up around the leader. His name and activities were kept tirelessly in the public view. His image was glorified in songs praising his achievements, in posters showing his photograph, in institutions and streets named after him, and in statues of him erected in the most conspicuous centres of the city. His head was engraved on postage stamps, coins and currency notes. The burden of mistakes or harsh decisions was made to fall upon lieutenants in order to create the feeling among the disaffected that the leader could not personally have permitted their plights to go unaddressed. These factors - tradition, mystique and charisma were the sources which were not easily accessible to a President in America and Europe. It has been said of the American presidency that its essential dimension today is how to "generate sufficient authority for Presidential action to match with the needs of the nation."³⁵ No modern American President, with the possible exception of Franklin D. Roosevelt, was able to harness to the Presidency a deep widely felt loyalty based upon charisma. This means that the authority of the American presidency in modern times has in no way been comparable to that of its counterpart in Africa.

The circumstance of underdevelopment was yet another source of presidential power in Africa. It is usual for Americans to classify their Presidents as either "strong" or "weak". The strong President, writes Hirschfield, is one "who regards government as the appropriate instrument for

achieving progressive change in society and the presidency as the vital generating force in government. His principal concern is not the administration of an inherited office, but the use of that office to bring about change in ... society."³⁶ Every African President was a strong President in this sense for the condition of underdevelopment prevailing on the continent made imperative an interventionist policy. Just as the economic depression of the early 1930s called forth Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal" measure, which was perhaps the highest point presidential power ever attained in peace time in America, so also did the poverty of African societies aggregate power to the presidency. Given this poverty, and the illiteracy which contributed to it, the challenge and burden of development rested first and foremost upon the state, since it alone had anything like the type of resources needed for development programmes in industry, commerce and agriculture. The nationalist struggle was an on-going struggle. Its political objective having been won, the next phase was in the economic field. The economic dependency of the developing state upon the old colonial business interests had to be brought to an end by state intervention. Although all African Presidents ranked as strong Presidents in this sense, some were stronger than others. While some were content with establishing new industries, commercial enterprises, agricultural schemes, and other nation-building schemes, leaving private enterprise virtually a free hand, others notably Tanzania, embarked upon a thorough-going nationalization of the principal means of production and distribution.³⁷

Nation-building was an objective to which all were committed. But it was a task that called for total mobilization of the nation if any impact was to be made upon it. An African President was therefore necessarily cast in the role of popular leader. This again made him a "strong" President in another sense of the American conception of the term. In this second sense, American presidents have been rated as strong or weak according to their ability to mobilize the nation. "The greatest Presidents have all ranked high on this scale, whatever their skills as administrators or legislative managers. All have made themselves national

symbols; in so doing they have given substance and purpose to the nation itself".³⁸ But the popular leadership required of an African President was of a much more personal and spiritual kind, for he was at once leader, guide and teacher. The leader of a predominantly illiterate, poverty stricken community had not only to lead, but to guide as well. He had to provide the light so that people could see the road to the ultimate destination of prosperity and progress. He could be likened to one who led a blind man. The leader of a blind man had to establish an intimate personal identification with him. So it was with the leader of a developing state. Having got the people on the difficult road to development it was his duty "to propose, to explain and to persuade",³⁹ to preach to them the need for hard work, for self reliance and for integrity in order to maximize national productivity. Preaching was to be accompanied by example. For example, the leader working with the farmers in the field. There must be among the leadership a complete identification with the masses. Hence the title Nwalimu (teacher) given to President Nyerere. No other African President more devotedly discharged this teaching role. Reading his speeches and writings one is deeply impressed by the fervour and dedication with which he went about trying to inform and to educate his countrymen on the needs and requirements of nation-building.⁴⁰

Not the least of an African President's leadership role was that of a showman. Whatever progress was achieved needed to be advertized to the people in order to keep up national morale and enthusiasm. The president had therefore to preside over the opening of completed public projects, to launch shows that advertised the national effort, like agricultural and commercial shows and trade fairs. All this was part of the total mobilization of the nation. It gave the presidential power in Africa a reality that was usually lacking in developed countries. "The inadequacy of the American presidency in providing this kind of leadership is a source of disillusionment among Americans".⁴¹ But the inadequacy results, not from the personal ability of American President, but from the nature of the American society as compared with the African.

The African President's role of popular leadership was, of course, greatly facilitated by the virtual state monopoly of the media of mass information, perhaps the most crucial source of power in modern government.

The radio and television were always state owned as were the most influential news papers, and a large part of the news items in all three media was taken up by news about the President, his speeches and other activities. The President was always in the news, perhaps inevitably so, since, as has been explained, the functions of government in Africa was all-pervading. Either he was laying the foundation stone of, or opening a new factory, a new school or new hospital or he was touring different parts of the country, or receiving a foreign envoy or signing a new decree. His being constantly in the news immensely enhanced his legitimacy and authority. But the monopoly of the information media was significant also in determining popular consent in government. Who ever had it, was put in a position where he could mobilize public opinion and the nation in support of himself and his policies and actions. Such a person could set away even with murder; for murder could be made to wear the appearance of a virtue or be represented as serving the best interests of the nation.

There is yet another respect in which the poverty of African states was a source of power for the president. In a developing state where there was mass unemployment, where the state was the principal employer of labour and almost the sole provider of social amenities and where a personal ambition for power and wealth and influence rather than principle determined political affiliations and alliances, power to dispense patronage was a very potent weapon in the hands of the President, enabling him to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people at various levels of society. Water installed in one area, industry sited in another, a school or hospital built in yet another could capture for the president the support and loyalty of the inhabitants of those areas. Scholarships, roads, government contracts, jobs, etc - all these

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were sources of power in Africa. Moreover, loyalty of the type secured by patronage could often border on subservience. It produced an attitude of dependency, a willingness to accept without question the wishes and dictates of the person dispensing the patronage. Patronage was therefore one of the crucial means by which African leaders secured the subordination of the legislature, the bureaucracy, the police and even the army.

Then there was the fact of the newness of the state, the heterogeneity of its society and the tensions of modernization. The new state required a legitimizing force. The problem of legitimacy was peculiar to the new state, and was complicated by three main factors. As an artificial creation of colonialism, the state in Africa had no roots in the traditions or thoughts of the people. Their attitude towards it was that it was an instrument of colonialism meant for the subjugation and exploitation of Africans. To the subject people, therefore, the state was not "ours" but "theirs", the colonialists' state. Such an attitude had to be eradicated if the state was to be able to fulfil its purpose. And this required the fostering among the people of a feeling of identity with the state. The second complicating factor was that the concept of the state was a mere abstraction totally incomprehensible to the simple mind of the peasant. It needed therefore some visible, physical object to symbolize it in the eyes of the people, and no other object could be more readily comprehensible for this purpose than the personality of the President. The President thus assumed a symbolic role as the embodiment of the state. There was here a close parallel with the monarchical device of making the king the personification of the state, though the conception and the implications were different. Third was the fact that the state in Africa had an artificial and heterogeneous social composition, embracing a large variety of people of different origin, culture, language and character. This heterogeneous collection needed to be integrated into a unity, infused with a sense of common destiny and common national aspirations. It was the role of the President as leader to serve as the focal point of unity around which this heterogeneous mass could be knit together.

This integrating role of an African President involved the exercise of power - power to prevent the inevitable cleavages of tribalism from destroying the state. Tribal conflicts created a condition of instability, which was accentuated by the tensions of rapid change from a traditional to a modern economy. In this way, the state of affairs was comparable to a state of emergency (and a state of emergency, even in the most advanced democracies, demands actions of an authoritarian type to preserve the peace and integrity of the state). The experience of the United States illustrates the great potency of a situation of emergency as a source of presidential power, for it is during such periods that the presidency has attained its zenith of power, as is "illustrated by Lincoln's "dictatorial" regime during the civil war, by Wilson's highly-centralized World War administration and by Franklin Roosevelt's executive-dominated government during the emergencies of domestic depression and global conflict".⁴² Thus the preservation of the state against insecurity inherent in tribal cleavages and tensions of rapid social change were perhaps the greatest source of presidential power in Africa. Ethnicity, as we saw above operated in other ways to put greater power in the hands of the President. For in the clash of interest between various ethnic groups and their leaders, the African President became a kind of counterpoise holding the balance of power in the state.

Finally came the personality of the individual president. For, as Vile has pointed out, "while circumstance, and particularly crisis situations can make vast authority available to the Presidents, yet they cannot by themselves guarantee an appropriate presidential response.... Only he can make the decision to use it".⁴³ It is difficult to assess the part played by personality in the development of presidential power in Africa, since most presidents responded in much the same way to basically similar situations. We have earlier remarked on the striking manner in which political responses in the presidential regimes followed the pattern set by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Most African Presidents could fairly be described as moderate, ~~not~~-too-assertive personalities - Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Mobutu of Zaire, Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of

Tanzania, Senegal of Senegal to name but these few. Yet their methods could fairly be described as authoritarian and interventionist. Could it be then that circumstances alone forced that posture upon them? As regards the policy of "statism" an affirmative answer must be returned to the questions. Development through state action and participation was, as has been explained, an inevitable response to the economic poverty of the African societies and to their economic domination by foreign interests, and no President, however moderate, could remain passive and leave development entirely to individual enterprise.

However, the authoritarian style of the African Presidents cannot be explained solely in terms of the pressure of circumstances. Personal ambition for power, and the wealth and prestige that went with it, were also decisively important. Of course, a personal love of power had always been a prime motive in politics everywhere, but in the developing state, power carried very high stakes indeed, and the stakes were of a special significance because of the general poverty of the society. In a society where money, jobs and social amenities were scarce, the ability to dispense them was eagerly sought after and, once achieved, was not easily relinquished. Again it might be argued that it was the circumstance of underdevelopment that gave the natural ambition for power and its inordinate proportions in Africa, and that it was really nothing in-born in the African leaders. This is an argument of convenience. It would be a poor reflection on the moral character of the African to say that the general poverty of the society and the opportunity to dispense patronage in every case disposed him to authoritarian methods to keep himself in power. The authoritarianism of the African Presidents in domestic and foreign affairs must in part be attributed to their personalities and in part to problems of economic underdevelopment.

Thus despite the formal limitations on executive power, the constitutional and extra-constitutional sources of executive authority in Cameroon (1960-1982) pointed to the dominance and not the monopoly of decision-making on the part of the President in foreign affairs. Moreover, the

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Cameroonian constitution failed to spell out comprehensively the goals, and priorities of foreign policy. The logical and perhaps inevitable direction of this was that the President dominated the process of decision-making and the definition of the goals and objectives of foreign policy in his own perception of national interests. But was the President, in reality, the only decision-maker in foreign policy?

5.3 : THE FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY

Although the purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of the elements of the internal environment on the foreign policy of Cameroon, an understanding of the principal instrument for implementing the policies is also crucial. After all, the acid test of the strategy and tactics in foreign policy is whether it produces efficiency and effectiveness in the nation's foreign relations. As we saw above, the relations of a country with other countries constitute one of the vital and crucial functions of modern government with which a President must inevitably be involved, though the extent of his involvement will vary according to whether or not he is his own minister of foreign affairs. In Cameroon from independence, it was usual and convenient for the foreign affairs portfolio to be assigned to a minister. But such an assignment did not minimize the President's involvement. The conduct of foreign affairs required a close and constant liaison between the minister and the President to an extent that made the former's autonomy much less than that of the other ministers. Furthermore, that were aspects of foreign relations that were inextricably bound up with the President's headship of the state, and for which he had direct personal responsibility. His position as head of state was expressly affirmed and recognized in the constitution, unlike in the United States. The significance of this position lay in the nature of the state as a mere legal abstraction, which therefore needed a human person to act as its alter ego in its relations with other states. The President as Head of State was thus cast in the role of representative. He represented the state in the totality of its international relations. As such a representative, he was its sole channel of communication with other states.

Certain of the functions implied in this position were of a personal kind. These were usually performed by the President in person or at least required his personal authority, namely the reception and accreditation of diplomatic agents (ambassadors, high commissioners, consuls etc), the making of war, peace, treaties and alliances; and the cession or acquisition of territory or jurisdiction. The critical nature of these powers hardly needed any emphasis. Even the reception of accreditation of diplomatic agents was not always a ceremonial or formal act, as it may sometimes raise considerations of policy regarding recognition. Critical policy issues were also implicated in war, peace, treaties, alliances and the cession or acquisition of territory or jurisdiction. And, since policy was involved, the decision was usually that of the cabinet, as in other matters, of foreign policy. In all the African countries the power to declare war was similarly qualified by the necessity for approval by the national assembly within a prescribed time. This qualification must be taken to relate to a formal declaration of war, and not to the making of war generally. For a country may be at war without a formal declaration, such as when it is attacked by another country and is obliged to defend itself. Of these powers, those that featured prominently in the foreign relations of Cameroon and other African countries were the reception and accreditation of diplomatic agents and the making of treaties or other agreements. In this way, the President became involved in the foreign policy bureaucracy.

The foreign policy system of Cameroon like that of most developing states included as shown in Figure 5 (2) above, a wide range of structures and actors of which the Foreign Ministry and its officials formed only a part -- sometimes, a not too significant part. It included not only a number of ministries and governmental departments, but also parastatal organizations, local branches of multinational companies, foreign missions and international organizations. In this way, the foreign policy of a developing state is not just what the foreign ministry does. Nor does it consist of only consciously or deliberately "made" decisions; it is also an

amalgam of actions taken, sometimes on an ad hoc and non-deliberate basis, by different ministries or governmental agencies which perform functions touching on external relations.

In Cameroon, ministerial responsibility for the management of external affairs was highly decentralized. In 1960, when the country achieved sovereign status, apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now known as Ministry of External Relations), which was given the responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, many other ministries or arms of the bureaucracy were allocated functions which had to do with external relations.⁴⁴ In this way, the Ministry of Finance was given responsibility for the formulation of policies on financial aid from foreign countries, the preparation of federal applications for external technical assistance and the management of relations with international monetary fund, the international Finance Corporation, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. etc.⁴⁵ The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning was charged with responsibility for the "coordination and presentation" to foreign countries and international organizations, of applications for technical assistance and for managing Cameroon's relations with the Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.) and other economic organizations.⁴⁷ While the Foreign Ministry was given the responsibility for giving political clearance to foreign scholarship awards and for accepting them on behalf of the government, it was the Ministry of National Education that was entrusted with task of coordinating and distributing foreign scholarship awards and other kinds of foreign aid for education in Cameroon. The Ministry of National Education was also given the task of managing Cameroon's relations with the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O). The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was made responsible for external trade and industrial development both of which involved sending economic missions abroad for the dual purposes of expanding trade links with, and attracting private foreign investment capital and public loans from, other states.

The functions and activities of two other Ministries also touched on external relations. The activities of the Ministry of Labour affected Cameroon's foreign relations because it represented Cameroon in the meetings of the international labour Organization and the external relations of the country in social affairs. The Ministry of Youth and Sports was also in charge of external sporting events where moves were often initiated by the delegates of Black African states to isolate the representatives of the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. As for the Ministry of Information and Culture, its activities had effects on the conduct of Cameroon's foreign policy because it was, initially, given the responsibility for external publicity (and it is still responsible for the publicity of government's internal and external policies within the country, including dissemination of information regarding Cameroon's role and image in the international community). With regard to those aspects of Cameroon's foreign policy designed to maintain the political stability of the state and preserve the security of its boundaries, several governmental agencies other than the foreign service also perform vital functions. For instance, Direction de la Documentation (DirDoc) since its establishment has been charged with the collection and collation of information which would form the basis for the adoption of measures to prevent or counter external subversion. Such measures were worked out by the special Branch of the Police in collaboration with another arm of the Cameroonian Police which acted as the local branch of the international criminal police organization (INTERPOL). The Ministry of Armed Forces in collaboration with these other bodies, also gathered security and military intelligence from external sources and the Ministry of Armed Forces, in particular, initiated policies relating to bilateral and multilateral military pacts and organizations.

This pattern of distribution of ministerial bureaucratic responsibility for the management of external relations remained unchanged under the Biya administration. Thus under Biya, Cameroon's policies towards, and participation in intra-African multilateral economic institutions, such as the Chad Basin Commission, Central African Economic and Customs Union (UNDEAC) etc are initiated and implemented by the

Ministry of Plan and Regional Development. But, although the activities of some of these organization - for instance, BEAC - concern the expansion of inter-state commerce, another Ministry - Trade - in fact shares with the Foreign Ministry, the responsibility for the administration of the country's foreign (bilateral and multilateral) trade relations. Today it is the Ministry of Trade that acts as the chief adviser to the government, and as the primary initiator of policies on most external trade matters including Cameroon's relations with such multilateral international institutions and organizations such as the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), the General Agreement on Tariff and and Trade (G.A.T.T.) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C - T.A.D.).

Even parastatals in Cameroon performed functions which related to the management of external relations. For example, Cameroon's relations with multinational companies engaged in the exploration and drilling of petroleum were conducted through the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures (SNH). In the same way the National Produce Marketing Board (O.N.C.P.B.) was incharge of the marketing of Cameroon's primary products such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, rubber, etc. The activities of these parastatals have double implications for the effectiveness of Cameroon's foreign policy. First, the nature of the relationship which they establish and maintain with foreign-owned companies operating in Cameroon helped to determine Cameroon's relations with the home states of the multinational companies. Secondly, their success in diversifying the national economy and in helping the Cameroon government to establish greater national control over the national economy ultimately determined the strength of Cameroon's power base and consequently the effectiveness of her foreign policy. This is because the performance of these parastatals determined Cameroon's ability to diversify the economy as a whole, while the increased revenues from their activities financed the necessary infrastructure for self-sustaining economic development and based on a sound and a strong economy, a more dynamic foreign policy could be conducted. Thus, the general managers of some of these parastatals could, in a sense, be

said to be as important as the minister of External Relations, within the foreign policy-making machinery.

Such a wide decentralization of powers and functions relating to the management of external relations made it practically impossible for the Head of State, whose time and attention was usually divided between external affairs and the more preoccuping domestic issues to exercise any effective, let alone absolute, control over the conduct of foreign relations. Indeed, in the Cameroon case, foreign policy decisions were taken by the chief official advisers - who increasingly usurped the role of the ministers - whose departments performed functions involving external relations. As a Nigerian Government publication has stated:

A minister has responsibility for making decisions and subjects for which he has been assigned responsibility, but in doing so, he makes them with the knowledge that they are such as would, without doubt, have the support of his colleagues.⁴⁷

Accordingly, under the Ahidjo administration, foreign policy decisions were made by individual ministers who were careful to ensure that their decisions would receive the approval and support of the President in particular and the cabinet in general. Over all, of course, there is little doubt that the general tone of Cameroon's foreign policy during this administration bore the stamp of the personality of the President. But there is evidence to show that specific policies reflected the views and personalities of the Minister directly in charge. In summary it may therefore be stressed that the foreign policy process in Cameroon - as in many other developing countries - involved many minister and ministries, civil servants and extra-bureaucratic advisers. It is not true, as has sometimes been suggested, that foreign policy making in a developing country is essentially the preserve of the Head of State and/or government. In practice, although ultimately the views of the Chief Executive were usually decisive, the views and interplay of views and attitudes of ministers, civil servants and unofficial advisers were often as important as those of the President.

Nevertheless, after independence, there was a rapid expansion of the size and function of the foreign policy bureaucracy, coupled with a simultaneous shift in administrative personnel from expatriates to citizens, and a move from colonial rule by the civil service to ministerial form of government. Bacharch and Baratz made the same observation when they wrote that "all these factors created uncertainties in the nature, scope and source of bureaucratic power and authority and in the criteria for assessing role functions, intra-agency and interagency communication, and vertical and horizontal mobility".⁴⁸ The consequent struggle for the allocation of power within the bureaucracy also contributed to the fragility and inefficiency of the foreign policy system. Again there is little need to emphasize that an efficient and speedy, transmission of information about external conditions is indispensable for successful diplomacy but in the developing state such as Cameroon, this is the "goal rather than the reality of the nation's bureaucratic situation".⁴⁹ Furthermore, attempts to expand, consolidate and strengthen the civil service at all levels hampered by the inadequacy of human and financial resources, and extreme corruption. Thus, to state that states use official and unofficial channel to obtain vital information about external conditions; that official channels include spying and other forms of external intelligence activities and that these cost huge sums of money and need highly trained personnel amounts to reiterating the obvious but the peculiarity of the developing state is the inadequacy of material and human resources that impair the fuller use of these methods. Again, foreign missions and embassies constitute significant sources of information. Thus in modern diplomatic experience, therefore, a major role of the diplomat is to use his familiarity with his host country to acquire and interpret data, and make reliable assessments and prediction's about the responses of his host government towards his home government's policies.⁵⁰

Cameroonian missions abroad grew very slowly from 1960. These missions numbered only about five in 1960, shortly after independence.⁵¹ The bulk of Cameroonian foreign relations was still being catered for by French diplomatic and consular missions. In 1963 Cameroon maintained about thirteen

full missions abroad which represented the country in about nineteen countries and international organizations.⁵² Cameroon's earliest embassies and missions, were in France, Swizerland, United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Liberia, Tunisia, Ivory Coast, the United Nations, Belgium, Central African Republic, United States and Congo.⁵³ In 1972 Cameroon had sixteen missions and seven consulates abroad although she had official diplomatic relations with some thirty two countries. As early as 1960 Cameroon applied a system of multiple representation in her diplomatic representation, a system that permitted her to maintain relations with several countries at comparatively reduced costs. Through the system the Government maintained a few active diplomatic posts from where periodic missions arose. Some of the secondary posts were without resident employees while some had a handful of staff, headed by junior diplomatic officers - the chargés d'affaires. The following table is a summary of the growth of Cameroonian diplomatic and consular posts in selected years beginning with 1963

TABLE 5 (1) : THE GROWTH OF CAMEROONIAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS ABROAD, 1963-1980

| YEAR | N°. of Embassies with Resident Ambassadors | N°. of Consulates including Honorary Consulates |
|------|--|---|
| 1963 | 13 | 7 |
| 1964 | 16 | 9 |
| 1968 | 15 | 9 |
| 1970 | 12 | 9 |
| 1971 | 16 | 7 |
| 1973 | 18 | 7 |
| 1975 | 24 | 6 |
| 1980 | 23 | 4 |

SOURCE : National Year Book. See Volumes from 1963-1980, National Archives, Yaounde. Volumes before 1963 are not available.

Table 5 (1) above does not represent all the countries with which Cameroon had diplomatic relations. It represents only the number of countries in which Cameroon had resident missions with at least a head of mission with the rank of

charge d'affaires. In 1968, for example, Cameroon had diplomatic relations with twenty eight countries but maintained embassies only in fifteen of them. The rest were taken care of through the multiple system described above. Also in 1975 we had diplomatic relations with thirty-nine countries though as table 5 (1) indicates, we had only twenty-four missions with full diplomatic staff.⁵⁴ The largest embassies were located in Paris. London, Washington, Ottawa, Moscow, Peking and Brussels, a reflection of the importance which the country attached to relations with the Western Countries.

In general, the absence of an experienced diplomatic staff stepped in discipline and tradition, and the shortage of finance and personnel coupled with the corruption of the administrative machinery, hampered the efficiency and the effectiveness of Cameroon's diplomatic apparatus. For example the Ministry of foreign Affairs opened in 1960 with less than one hundred civil servants. Although the number had increased to over five hundred in 1970 and over one thousand in 1980; it remained insufficient in relation to the desired task. Even when the size of the ministry of foreign Affairs had grown to over one thousand in 1980, there was almost a negligible number of career diplomats in this number. Most of them were civil administrators. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself, the different departments had the following number of career diplomats in 1978:- the department of African - Asian Affairs which handled the affairs of over one hundred states, had fifteen; the department of administrative and cultural affairs had eight; the department of international organizations had ten; the department of European-American and Oceanic Affairs had twelve-five; the department of Protocol had twelve and as late as April 1980, at least forty-two existing posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not filled.⁵⁵

The amount of work expected of each section was reflected by that of one of the Diplomatic sections of the Ministry (i.e. the Departments of European, American and Oceanic Affairs, of African-Asian Affairs and of International Organizations). This section had to deal with Western Europe, Eastern Europe and USSR, the American continent, Africa and Asia as well as

international organization; and the coordination of the twenty-eight missions abroad.⁵⁶ In 1966 less than ten years after independence, Nkrumah's Ghana and Senghor's Senegal had twenty-four and twenty-nine missions abroad respectively. However, after Nkrumah, the Ghanaian new military authorities were forced by economic considerations to reduce the number of their diplomatic missions abroad. Similarly, in 1980 following the scarcity of foreign exchange Senegal at a stroke closed down 15 of her 33 diplomatic missions abroad. Lucas Nkwentamo has made the point when he wrote that :

For most of the period between 1963 and 1980 there were more missions in Yaounde than Cameroon had abroad. All countries in which Cameroon had resident missions were represented in Yaounde, but Cameroon was not represented in all countries which had missions in Yaounde. In 1980, for example, while there were thirty full diplomatic missions in Yaounde with resident Ambassadors Cameroon had merely seventeen such missions abroad, though the multiple representation system permitted her to maintain relations with many more other countries. What is true about the diplomatic missions is also true of our consular representation.⁵⁷

Such a situation becomes more conspicuous when compared to that of the United States which in 1970 employed 270 embassies, legations and consulates overseas and a total staff of more than 27.000 people processing an average of 31.000 messages or about a million words a day.⁵⁸ The pervasive economic poverty of the nation limited staff development. Cameroon could not afford to engage her meagre resources in external affairs at the expense of vital projects at home. At the time of independence only about half of the senior and middle grade posts in the civil service either in West Cameroon or East Cameroon was held by Cameroonians. In 1965 only about 49 percent of the officers of high and middle rank of the entire Federal public service out of a total of 12.452 were Cameroonians; 14.180 out of 24.702 (57.4 percent) in 1969, and 32.186 out of 33.742 (95.38 percent), in 1980.⁵⁹ Diplomatic personnel could only expand at a rate in step with economic growth.

Before the reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970, diplomacy accounted for 4 percent of the Government's

annual recurrent expenditure or approximately 21.65 percent of the gross national product (GNP).⁵⁹ Ever since the costs have been increasing with the expansion of the diplomatic apparatus. Thus, while in 1962/63 expenditure on foreign affairs was 16.668.600 F CFA, the 1968/69 expenditure was 27.530.000 F CFA. While the budget of the 1976/77 fiscal year stood at 1.280.000.000 F CFA over the 1962/63 expenditure. However, tables 5 (2) below demonstrates clearly the point.⁶⁰

TABLE 5 (2): THE GROWTH OF THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 000 FRs CFA.

| Year | Total National Budget | % Growth | Budget of Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Budget of Foreign Affairs as % of National Budget | % Growth of Budget of Foreign Affairs |
|---------|-----------------------|----------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1963/64 | 16,668,600 | - | 519,300 | 31 | - |
| 1964/65 | 17,186,100 | 3.1 | 567,000 | 3.8 | 9.2 |
| 1965/66 | 24,561,000 | 42 | 612,080 | 2.4 | 7.9 |
| 1966/67 | 25,015,500 | 1.8 | 577,904 | 2.3 | -5.5 |
| 1967/68 | 26,180,000 | 4.6 | 605,000 | 2.3 | 4.6 |
| 1968/68 | 27,530,000 | 5.1 | 626,000 | 2.2 | 3.4 |
| 1969/70 | - | - | 647,000 | - | 3.3 |
| 1970/71 | 38,500,000 | - | 712,000 | 1.8 | 10.0 |
| 1971/72 | 45,300,000 | 17.6 | 809,000 | 1.7 | 13.6 |
| 1972/73 | 66,853,000 | 47.5 | 897,427 | 1.3 | 5.4 |
| 1973/74 | 74,500,000 | 11.5 | 966,226 | 1.3 | 7.6 |
| 1974/75 | 84,000,000 | 12.7 | 1,053,162 | 1.3 | 8.9 |
| 1975/76 | 100,000,000 | 19 | 1,286,148 | 1.3 | 12.1 |
| 1976/77 | 128,000,000 | 28 | 1,490,717 | 1.2 | 15.9 |
| 1977/78 | 137,000,000 | 7.03 | 1,642,305 | 1.2 | 10.1 |
| 1978/79 | 165,245,000 | 20.6 | 1,913,064 | 1.2 | 16.4 |
| 1979/80 | 186,600,000 | 12.9 | 2,049,943 | 1.1 | 7.2 |
| 1981/81 | 246,000,000 | 12.9 | 2,300,119 | .93 | 12 |

SOURCE: Evolution et Structure des différents chapitres Budgetaires, 1972/73 to 1980/81, Direction of Budget, Ministry of Finance, Yaounde.

Despite the increase in real terms registered over the years, growth percentage of the Ministry's budget did not keep pace with the percentage increase of the national budget. For most .../...

of the period the growth percentage of the budget of the Foreign Ministry was inferior to the percentage growth of the national budget. For example, in the 1976/77 financial year while the percentage growth of the budget of Foreign Affairs was only 15.9 percent over the 1975/76 fiscal year, that of the national budget was 28 percent.⁶¹ This trend was maintained for most of the period. Most of the increases in the national budget realized between 1960 and 1981 went in favour of National Education, Armed Forces, Presidential Services and National development programmes.⁶² The increase in expenditure, however, did not ameliorate manpower development even though the bulk of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used for personnel emoluments. The growth of staff of the Foreign Ministry was limited by costs involved in maintaining large staff in some of the most expensive capitals of the world. The second explanation relates to the organizational set up of the central administration of the Foreign Ministry. In the third place, the growth in the number of personnel in the Foreign ministry was limited by the important role placed by the Technical Ministries in Foreign Affairs. Their growing role in foreign affairs entailed a corresponding diminution of the Foreign Ministry in the country's international economic and technical relations which constituted one of the country's largest aspects of external relations. Such relations came under the exclusive control of the ministries of Trade, Planning and Finance since 1970.⁶³

The wide dispersion of powers and functions relating to the management of external relations which is characteristic of the developing state usually has serious implications for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. In some cases, the high decentralization of functions may constitute a hindrance to changes of old or initiation of new policies. For instance, where some sections of the machinery for foreign policy formulation and implementation are either more conservative or under greater external and internal political pressure than others, the attitudes of the more conservative arms or the ones under greater pressure may help to delay or in fact prevent the implementation of radical

or even moderate changes initiated by the relatively more progressive or pressure free arms of the policy making machinery. This was evident in 1963, in relations between Nigeria and Ghana "when the foreign ministry officials desired normalization of Nigeria-Ghana relations and white officials of the Federal Intelligence Committee (F.I.C.) wanted Ghana to be isolated. The views of the F.I.C. happened to have carried greater weight than those of the Foreign Ministry. In consequence, the Nigeria-Ghana discord continued.⁶⁴

Sometimes too, policy changes already introduced by one arm of the policy-making machinery may be distorted by actions taken by other governmental agencies which are not necessarily or explicitly opposed to those policy changes. For example under the Ahidjo administration, the actions of the security police who sometimes harassed those travelling to or from communist countries tended to give the impression that this administration was opposed to communist countries when this was not the case.

In very few cases, however, the consequences of the wide dispersion of functions may be salutary. For example, such a decentralization of functions may help to reduce the vulnerability of a developing state to external pressure and manipulation. Where one arm of the policy making machinery comes under persistent external pressure (reinforced by pressure from sympathetic domestic groups) for a change of policy that is not indubitably in the overall interest of the country, another arm, being relatively free from such pressures, would carry on relations between the country and a foreign state on the basis of an existing policy irrespective of non-explicit changes in the attitudes of other arms of the bureaucracy. This seems to have happened, for instance, in the case of Cameroon's relations with Israel and the Arab Countries between 1966 and 1973. The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs carried on relations between Cameroon and Israel in the area of technical co-operation despite the subtle change in the Cameroon Government's (and in particular the Foreign Ministry's attitude) towards Israel - a change from warm friendship to lukewarmness and then to hostility, as a result of both domestic and external events and pressures.

.../...

This explains, at least in part, why despite the obvious strain in relations between Cameroon and Israel during this period, Cameroon continued to receive Israeli technical assistance.

A more serious consequence of the decentralization of powers for the management of external relations is that it might lead to overlapping of functions and, consequently, especially in the absence of effective coordinating administrative units - to jurisdictional disputes and rivalries among the different parts of the machinery for foreign policy making and implementation. Such disputes if reflected in the conduct of foreign relations might give the operational level of the foreign policy of a state the appearance of incoherence and confusion, as divergent views are held and sometimes publicly expressed by different arms of the government. It becomes difficult to know exactly what the country's policy is on a particular issue.

5.4 : INTEREST AND PRESSURE GROUPS

In most organized polities, there is usually a built-in influence system - a term used as a synonym for interest or pressure group policies. Influence may take the form of demand on or support for government policies.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, it provides the basis of interaction between the ruler and the citizens particularly the citizens who have basic interests to project. Viewed from a broad perspective, the policy influence system serves variously as a barometer, a mirror, and pillar for the decision makers. What is the relevance of influencers or interest groups in governments? The remarkable insight of Coplin perhaps provides a succinct answer to that question:

The decision maker needs policy influencers because they are a course of support for his regime. In both democratic and autocratic states, the leaders depend to a large extent on the willingness of the members of society to provide support. Whether this support takes the form of loyalty of the army, the financial backing of businessmen, the electoral support of the people, or the willingness of the people not to take up arms against their governments, it is vital to the decision maker because it makes

.../...

his stay in office more certain and provides him with the resources to carry out his policies.⁶⁶

Coplin indicates that the policy influencer also makes demands on the policy maker, which, if not satisfied in one way or another may lead to a partial or total withdrawal of support.⁶⁷ The decision maker may choose to respond to these demands or ignore them. The important assumption here is that groups formed on the basis of shared values or attitudes exist in every state, and they make demands and attempt to influence policy decisions through various means. In this perspective, pressure groups could be defined as "organized groupings of parts of the population which might be or might not be part of the government apparatus and which seek to influence that government's policy towards the groups objectives".⁶⁸ Pressure groups are issue-oriented and only want to influence the exercise of power on specific issues in their own direction. Pressure groups, thus defined, may be sub-divided into two categories; interest groups, whose primary purpose is to influence the government with a view to achieving advantages for their members for at least for some of them;⁶⁹ e.g. the National Union of Students (NUS); and promotional groups, whose primary motive is to secure the achievement of a share cause without necessarily expecting benefit for their members as a distinct groups,⁷⁰ an example being Amnesty International. In respect of promotional groups perhaps their major reward lies in the psychological gratification derived from a cause achieved.⁷¹


It should, be emphasized that pressure groups especially our "interest" subcategory, are "pressure" groups only in so far as their activities are intended to influence government activities. These organizations do several other things for their members, which can only remotely be expected to influence government policies. However, the basis of support of pressure groups is also important but there may be in the form of human and material resources. Human resources include such things as the density of support, and personalities involved. "Materials" may include such things as the availability of funds to finance activities or cooperation with members of the mass media in order to publicize the group's

activities. Pressure groups adopt several strategies - they exchange information with other bodies in the domestic scene and as such constitute an important source of information for the mass media. They also negotiate with officials, as well as try to persuade them to adopt their policy objectives. A group may also resort to propagandist activities. Alternatively, the strategy may take the form of semi-direct or "sit-ins". However, the type of policy could influence pressure group activity. In domestic politics, the role of pressure groups is sometimes an integral part of the policy making and execution processes in liberal democratic states. In the field of foreign affairs, if an issue is routine, pressure groups may find it relatively easy to influence policy. But in controversial issues where the government has to take a definite stand and where it (the government) could be subjected to countervailing pressures, it may be difficult for any group to achieve much.

Moreover, the immediate interests of the ordinary citizens may not be involved and pressure groups may not therefore be able to attract large support. However, if they do, it is assumed here that policy makers initially assume that a readjustment of policy management is all that is needed. However, if oppositional activities should be more widespread, vocal and persistent the government would to reappraise the net advantage of the policy to the country vis-a-vis the likely dislocation that oppositional activities could cause in the domestic scene. Once it becomes apparent that further continuation of the policy may be too divisive important policy concessions may be given which may result in the total change of policy. However some pressure groups operate specifically to build a continuing line of policy that could actually contribute to the general climate of opinion in which policy makers define, decide and execute policies; with the aim that in the long-run through the processes of socialization, policy makers (being part of the environment) would absorb some of the policy aspirations of these groups. Thus the control assumption in this section (the influence system) of our study is that in the developing state, foreign policy making, is generally the function of an official bureaucratic structure

located in the centre of the governmental apparatus of the country. This bureaucratic structure operates within a domestic and an international environment. This being so, its policy making is constrained by the interactions with these environments. By and large a policy decision is an output of these interactions. This process is demonstrated in figure 5 (3) below :

FIGURE 5 (3): THE NATURE OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DECISION-MAKING CENTRE AND THE PUBLIC



SOURCE : Mbenoh; The Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy, P. 36.

According to Figure 5(3) above:

- C = International environment which in concrete terms consists of other governments, international organization and companies.
- B = The domestic environment. The structures there which are external to the bureaucratic centre include Parliament, mass media, pressure groups, etc.
- A = The bureaucratic centre which indeed means the entire governmental executive structure, AHQ represents the headquarters while $A_I - A_N$ are the ministries and departments.

- \longleftrightarrow Flows of international communications from or to the bureaucratic centre.
 - \longleftrightarrow Flows of domestic communication from or to the centre.
 - \dashrightarrow Communications within the bureaucratic centre.
- .../...

In Figure.5 (3) box AA is the bureaucratic structure comprising AHW, which is the headquarters of the structure and, $A^2 - A_N$, which are the other elements of the structure. The broken lines show that there are interactions within the centre itself and that its decision making is by and large done collectively by all the parts of the structure, eventhough each element may have a special function, for example A^2 may be specifically responsible for foreign affairs. Box B represents the domestic environment-the immediate environment of the bureaucratic centre. Members of the Centre are usually recruited from B. The cross lines show the direction of interactions between the centre and its domestic environment. The interactions are always double-directional because as the domestic environments generates pressures on the centre, as also the centre reacts to contain or even control the type and direction of pressures generated, box C represents the international environment. In this environment we have other governments, international organizations, peoples of other countries and bi-national or multi-national companies. The unbroken lines show that the external environments exerts pressures on the bureaucratic centre as the centre in turn tries to exert pressure on that environment.

Although Cameroon is relatively a young nation which has undergone the twists and traumas of its changing political systems, it is clear that the policy makers (1960-1982) were subject to varying influences from diverse sigments within the society. In the following perspectives on the past and present, the range of the types of interest groups that emerged over the years and the degree of their impact on Cameroon's foreign policy will become visible. Cameroon at independence was characterized as a "constitutional demoncracy." In the public perception of a liberal democracy, it is logical that interest groups should naturally be prominent in the policy process and vociferous in their demands on policy makers.⁷² Although it has been observed that President Ahidjo essentially conducted his own foreign policy,⁷³ a number of interest groups attempted to exert some influence on the foreign policy stances of government. These groups ranged from political groups (parties) who were very critical of Cameroon's apparent

pro - Western orientation to intellectuals, students, labour organizations and professional groups, notably the press. Their interests and demands were as varied in scope as in intensity. In the political realm for example, the most groups were the political parties. However before 1966 the attitudes taken by the political parties towards foreign policy had their roots in the different regions of the Federation and their methods of influencing foreign policy were also conditioned by the country's federal structure.⁷⁴ But from 1966 onwards with the establishment of a unified party structure, the the Cameroon National Union Party became an important foreign policy institution in Cameroon. It was regarded as the institution that set basic norms and principles from which Cameroon's entire foreign policy considerations emanated. To the extent that this is true then the party in Cameroon played a fundamental role in international relations similar to the role of the party in Communist countries. In these countries the party's politburo had a heavy hand on governmental business including, of course, foreign policy. The Central committee in the Communist Countries was an important organ for the control of government policy.⁷⁵

(A) THE PARTY

The Cameroon National Union Party later to become the Cameroon's People Democratic Movement (CPDM) under the Biya administration, (1985) was considered an important foreign policy institution because its charter provided the guidelines for the country's external relations. The years between 1960 and 1966 were years of great political rivalries in Cameroon. Despite the fact that the numerous political parties played little or no role in the determination of the country's foreign policy, their activities helped to shape the foreign policy decision-making process. A number of reasons explain this phenomenon. First, domestic politics established their primacy over all other factors affecting Cameroon's foreign policy between 1960 and 1966. The positions taken by the government and the Opposition (UPC), and other groups, were motivated largely by the desire to maintain or gain domestic political power and influence, at the expense of other groups. Second, groups involved in foreign policy issues in Cameroon formed

but a tiny segment of the country's population. This situation is not peculiar to Cameroon.

In any society where the overwhelming majority of the people are not literate and where only a fraction of eligible men and women vote even in national elections, foreign policy issues tend to be very remote. However, the opposition and activist groups in the country tried to involve the wider literate public in foreign policy issues. The government hardly bothered to seek endorsements of its policies from the general public; it attended instead to the parliamentary majority and reacted to those opposition groups' criticisms which were capable of damaging its standing in the eyes of the national elite and the more sophisticated public. Finally, the domestic political situation was highly related to the hierarchy of issues which developed in Cameroon's foreign relations. Some issues generated very high while others generated medium and low domestic controversies. Because those foreign policy issues that easily translated into a domestic political struggle generated the most heated controversies, foreign policy issues and debate in the pre - 1966 Cameroon often reactivated the basic domestic political struggle between the radicals and conservatives in the country .

What role then has the party played in Cameroon's foreign policy since 1966? It has been stated that at the basis of Cameroon's foreign policy there was a collection of some coherent doctrines , ideas, and motions which determined the country's international behaviour and reactions to external situations.⁷⁶ According to the charter of the party which was often been described as "the point of reference of the foreign policy of Cameroon",⁷⁷ the doctrines of the party constituted the values of the Cameroonian society and that it was from the charter of the party - the expression of Cameroonian aspirations and values - that the main doctrines of the country's foreign policy emanated. The party's role in foreign affairs was expressed in a pamphlet published in Yaounde by the party's secretariat in 1975.

According to the document :

.../...

It is from the charter of the C.N.U. - the culminating and crystallizing point of the aspirations, and an instrument of the expression of the system of values, of the Cameroonian people - that the doctrine of Cameroon's foreign policy emanates. It is inscribed within the context of the system developed from the independence period which took into consideration the actual and future place Cameroon aspired to occupy in the international community. That is to say, the set of elements which constitute the reference points of Cameroon's foreign policy are an element, a milestone of the whole which is in turn, constituted by the general doctrine of the Cameroon National Union whose objective is the regroupment of all Cameroonian citizens without exception. It is in this context that charter - the basic document of the C.N.U. party specifies (while remaining fidel to its spirit) - the directives of the international actions of Cameroon which have permanently to conform with the people's aspirations and in harmony with domestic policy.⁷⁸

Several directives, and ideas were expressed in charter of the party which were supposed to guide the executive branch of government dealing directly with foreign policy. Two main principles of Cameroon's foreign policy were stated by the party. First of all that Cameroon's foreign policy was to be directed towards the consolidation of national independence and national Unity. Related to the idea of national Unity was the directive that Cameroon's foreign policy should act as an instrument of economic and social development. Secondly, it was stated in the party's charter that because of the inter-dependence that existed between all peoples of the world, the foreign policy of Cameroon should be geared towards international solidarity of all peoples and all nations.⁷⁹

In this perspective, the party recommended nonalignment as the best approach to the realization of the country's foreign policy objectives. In its charter, the party stated that nonalignment was the best means for Cameroon to contribute to the development of peaceful international relations. Non-alignment as understood by the party did not prevent the making of allowance for special affinities due to geography and history. As a bilingual and mult-cultural society, it was the vocation of Cameroon to have ties of friendship and cooperation with all countries subject only to respect for her sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimate interests.⁸⁰

Finally the party also recognized the liberation of Africa and Cameroon's attachment to the principles of the organization of African Unity as fundamental concerns of the country's foreign policy.

But how did the party practically influence foreign policy in Cameroon? The party did not impose upon the government. However, since those in the party hierarchy were generally the same people in the state hierarchy, one can therefore, say that the state and the party in Cameroon were so closely linked so much so that one could hardly separate one from the other. Moreover, since the head of state was also the head of the party, the party leadership used its position as head of state to push the ideals of the party within the state system. Secondly, it has been asserted that the party was the supreme organ of state power and in that imposed its charter upon the government. As we mentioned above, in the Soviet Union the party has a central directing role in foreign policy and all other governmental institutions are subservient to it. Indeed, the decision making process in foreign affairs takes place in the context of the politburo of the communist party of the Soviet Union, which wields the actual power in the area of foreign policy. The role of the party in the Soviet System is strengthened by the foreign policy bureaucracy which belongs to the inner circle of the Communist Party.⁸¹

This was definitely not the case in Cameroon where the party was not supreme but dominant. Foreign policy decisions in Cameroon did not originate from the central committee of the party as it is the case in the Soviet Union. Just as the party chief in the Soviet Union is in position to decide upon all the main foreign policy decisions so was the Cameroonian Head of State as head of the party at the centre of all foreign policy decisions. The role of the party in foreign affairs is best described by Charles Assale:

The party does not intervene directly in foreign affairs. It is the government that conducts foreign affairs and the party's role is only to give guidelines to the government. The party in no way

imposes its foreign policy charter upon the government but it however benefits from the fact that the Head of State is also the head of the party and receives his investiture from the Central Committee and is in a way forced to take party lines in foreign affairs ... Beyond that state the party does not play any other role and the formulation and implementation of foreign policy becomes a purely executive function. The party's charter on foreign affairs is therefore merely a collection of ideas and instructions drawn up by the party and meant to provide the cornerstone of Cameroon's foreign policy but which the government can reject with impunity.⁸²

In Cameroon, therefore, the party was beyond all doubts an important political institution which had an interest in foreign affairs but did not participate directly in the formulation and execution of foreign policy as it is the case of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

(B) PARLIAMENT

In the political realm, the role of parliament (especially the foreign affairs commission) cannot be neglected. Parliamentary institutions exist in almost every country and almost everywhere parliaments are assigned some role in foreign affairs. While in most countries, the bulk of parliamentary or legislative debates are on matters of domestic interests, they, nevertheless, play some role in influencing foreign policy. The role of parliament varies from country to country and according to the political system. Its role in foreign affairs, as well as internal policy is generally determined by the interplay of constitutional and political elements such as the political climate, the strength of the political parties, and the character of the leading personalities involved in parliamentary debates.⁸³ The party system influences the role of parliament as a foreign policy institution. In a multi-party state, where liberty of action exists it is possible that parliamentarians vote with all discretion and all independence. In such systems the discussion of foreign policy will not be uncommon and the rejection of foreign policy bills will be commonplace. Foreign policy bills tabled before parliament are often

.../...

subject to scrupulous scrutiny by parliamentarians who because of the multiplicity of power centres have no fear of government sanctions against them.

Conversely in a single party state no fundamental difference will exist between the government and the legislature. In unitary party systems in which parliamentarians owe their mandate to the government leadership, bills are hardly debated; they fear that frequent criticism and opposition of the government will cause them their renomination into parliament. This is usually an important constraint on parliaments in many countries especially in the third world countries. In these countries the governments dominate the legislative apparatus and one can not talk of the legislature as a veritable foreign affairs institution. Where legislatures are very independent of governments they play an important role in the foreign policy. This is the case of developed economies such as Britain, France and the United states. Where legislative power is so great that the executive has to reckon with parliamentary controls. In the United States the role of congress is paramount because the executive needs two-thirds majority of congressional approval of most foreign relations undertakings.⁸⁴ Parliamentary control may take the forms of simple examination of bills, advice or the questioning of executive authorities.

In Cameroon although the National Assembly had a constitutional role to fulfil, there was nothing that could be said about parliament in matters of foreign affairs. According to Articles 39 and 40 of the 1960 constitution and Article 20 of the 1972 constitution, the Head of State had the Sole right to negotiate treaties and accords with foreign powers. The role of parliament was to examine them and give the government the authority to ratify them. The Cameroonian legislature did not discuss general foreign policy issues as say the Nigerian legislature could do. In the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the legislature was given the constitutional authority to discuss any aspect of the foreign relations of the Republic.⁸⁵ In Cameroon, the President sent foreign policy bills to parliament for that body to give it accord

for ratification. When these bills arrived parliament, a group of parliamentary leaders met to discuss the "acceptability" of the bills before they were forwarded to the Foreign Relations Commission, generally composed of thirty members. The bills discussed before this commission were then brought before a plenary session of parliament for a final decision to be taken. Foreign affairs bills hardly ever had problems in having parliamentary approval in Cameroon. Once a foreign affairs bill was tabled before parliament, it was unlikely that it would be rejected. Such bills were debated for formality sake and approved unanimously at the level of the commission and at the level of the full session of parliament.⁸⁶ This would suggest that parliamentarians treated foreign affairs bills with some degree of mildness because they believed that foreign relations were largely an executive function. Despite this parliamentary softness towards foreign affairs, parliamentary approval of government bills could not be taken for granted for bills dealing with internal problems. In 1980 a government bill related to commercial activities in Cameroon was rejected and returned to the President on grounds that it was incompatible with the country's commercial policy.⁸⁷ From the above discussion of the role of parliament in foreign affairs, we may indicate four important factors that determined the role of parliament in international relations in Cameroon. These included (a) the nature of the political system (b) the background of parliamentarians (c) constitutional factors and (d) the personality of the chief executive.

(c) MASS MEDIA

An important force in the foreign policy influence system of Cameroon was the mass media. For definitional purposes, the mass media would cover the press, radio and television.⁸⁸ Academic studies of the role of the news media in politics have in general been limited to the area of voting behaviour. Very few have been concerned with foreign policy, and these have been generally concerned with case studies of "big issues".⁸⁹ Routine policy issues have been neglected. Reports of earlier studies have vacillated between the notion of the news media as an omnipotent

purveyor of opinion in society⁹⁰ and lately of the news media as having very negligible effects. Early scholars asserted that :

The motive, conscious and unconscious, of the writers and the Press, is to reproduce as far as possible in the city, the conditions of life in the village... the gossip and public opinion as the main sources of social control.⁹¹

According to such writers, mass communicators were capable of transferring their conceptions (either for good or evil) directly to the audience who, on the basis of these conceptions, responded in the desired conception. Indeed, the mind of the receiver was considered "blank" and every message was pictured as a direct and powerful stimulus to action. Thus, there was thought to exist a direct causal relationship between the transmitted message and certain human activities; schematically, this could be represented as $M \longrightarrow R$ (M = message; R = Response).

This view of the news media rests on a view of modern society as :

made up of masses... of segregated, isolated individuals, interdependent in all sorts of specialized ways, but nevertheless, lacking in any central unifying value or purpose, with individuals who are only loosely bound together.⁹²

However in recent years, scholarship has benefitted from other studies which have focused on the restraints placed on mass communication. The social situation in which the mass media operates has been reappraised. One of such studies is that of J. Hale, who argues that the impact of communications is fixed by the limits of their audiences and by the selection made by such audiences, and that the individual is not isolated and exposed to the whims of communications as was previously asserted. He argues further that the message, instead of striking the isolated individual - if it strikes him at all - reaches the individual living in a network of personal relationships, and that they latter modify the message of the news media.⁹³ While some of these studies do not deny the existence of a mass audience, they insist that

audience consists of many small audiences and that these small audiences mediate between the individual and the news media, thereby modifying the effect of the latter. Professors Browne and Scott introduce a set of the intervening variables that operate between the news media and the masses. These include, the degree of exposure, the medium through which the material is transmitted, the content of the communication, the predisposition of the listener which aids him in selecting that part of the communication which is relevant to his need, and interpersonal relations.⁹⁴ Thus, the schema is no longer $M \rightarrow R$, but instead becomes :

$M \dots X_1 \dots X_2 \dots X_n \rightarrow R$ where M = message; $X_1 \dots X_n$ = intervening variables and R = Response. It should, however, be added that writers like Righter, and Hale, while not repudiating the above findings, have modified them. For example, they argue that some people seek information in support of existing beliefs and that a good number of others are prepared to listen to opposing views.⁹⁵ On television, in particular, they maintain that its ability to present views as they happen tends to give it an advantage over other media.

On the media as a whole, one would agree with Ithiel de Sola Pool that :

all of us depend upon it for much of the large stock of acts and images which we need to deal with the complexities of life. But what we do with the information and images is something the media do not control⁹⁶

Neither researchers nor foreign policy-makers are sure about what the audience does with the information which it receives from news media. This uncertainty is itself, in our view, of political significance. It will be our next duty to sketch briefly how the news media define their role in policy making, the reactions of policy makers and the implication of the media's role on foreign policy. Bernard Cohen argues that few people - researchers, foreign policy makers, and journalists - have direct experience of the whole range of international affairs, the totality of the external world. The world of foreign policy, largely reaches us via the news media.⁹⁷

And for most of the non-official foreign policy audience, the "map" of the world is drawn by the communication. In most polities, the reporter, being part of the society as well as a professional communicator, sees himself in the dual role of a neutral reporter of foreign events, "and a participant".⁹⁸ The reasoning behind this is that people in the news media see themselves not as neutral conveyors of news but as the "watch dogs" of the nation's interest.⁹⁹ This self-assumed role is sometimes justified by continued readiness of the people to pay for media services. From the above it can be argued that members of the news media see their communication role not only in terms of just providing information but also of prescribing policy solutions. The available evidence also points to the fact that official policy-makers too think that the news media reports can be used to gain support for certain policies and also, by implication, to do the reverse. One of Cohen's respondents said that "competent journalists help to persuade the American people and the Congress",¹⁰⁰ while in Britain in 1939, Chamberlain also said :


It is necessary once more to urge the press to exercise the utmost restraint at a time when it is quite possible for a few thoughtless words in a paper... to wreck the whole of the efforts which are being made by the Government to obtain a satisfactory solution.¹⁰¹

It follows from the above statements that while policy makers fear the influence which press reports have on their policies, news writers see themselves as participants in foreign policy since official policy makers and executives also concede this role to them.

But what are the mechanics of this role and how true is it of the developing state. This "mirror" that the media hold up by which their readers/viewers can see the world, is not solely fashioned by the media, the policy makers also contribute to it. For example, the President of the Republic may announce a foreign policy stance in a bid to organize support. The President in doing so knows that the information will be read, heard and provides the opportunity of inter-elite communication as well as spot lighting possible

new problem areas or ideas in foreign affairs for policy makers. In the developing state since policy makers believe that the effect of media messages on the grassroots is lamost near omnipotence, they are prone to give out less information about the performances of their foreign affairs functions and such a situation often leads to media "distorted" information. This practice can affect management strategies. Furthermore, in some respects, news media serve as alternative and supplementary sources of information for policy makers. For example, official dispatches from diplomats overseas contain items extracted from local media reports as well as briefings by journalists from the diplomats home countries. Policy makers and other official participants believe that the news media influence public opinion, media messages therefore serve as "barometers" for officials to measure the "ebb" and "flow" of opinion on policy matters. This being so, it would be a reasonable proposition that a persistent, coherent and vocal media message is of consequence to policy making and policy execution. This is especially true because "public opinion" is a sacred concept in every state and every public person wants public opinion to be on his side.

Finally, it is not possible to measure accurately how the news media compare with other structures in shaping the flow of information relevant to decisions in the foreign policy area. But we can deduce from the example of former participants in the field of foreign policy making and from the promience of the news media in the life of politicians that there is a widely held conviction that having the press on one's side helps to create an impression of how the "political wind" is blowing. This, to a great extent, is capable of shaping the attitudes, expectations and the predispositions of the people in the decision-making structure. Against this background, the most abvious source of information about the external environment is the news media broadly conceived to include newspapers, radio, television and magazines.¹⁰² Apart from the dissemination of news, the media affect information in several ways:



- i) it gives the general scope of news, as official information is generally specialized;
- ii) it makes analyses of some news items and so aids the policy maker's interpretation by providing comparisons;
- iii) it provides the decision-maker with a measure of the importance of event through the space allotted to news items and their position and prominence in the media.¹⁰³

The media in Cameroon and most developing states is largely underdeveloped and cannot therefore carry out these functions effectively. At independence, "La Presse du Cameroon" successor to the "l'Eveil du Cameroun" which was founded by French settlers in 1928, but which was finally folded in 1974, was replaced by "Cameroon Tribune"; the two West Cameroon newspapers published in Victoria, Cameroon Times and Cameroon Outlook; the Protestant newspaper, La semaine Camerounaise which collapsed in 1970 as well as the catholic Paper, l'Effort Camerounais and the Radio constituted the significant components of the media and virtually all of them supported government policies or as in the case of Cameroon Outlook, avoided severe criticism of them.

Such a state controlled media had many advantages in a country like Cameroon. It helped to create unity in a nation whose colonial heritage emphasized diversity and encouraged the forces of disintegration. It also helped to mobilize the people behind their government. Since the Cameroonian political man was not yet fully oriented towards class or nation he was primarily motivated by primordial and parochial concerns. A state controlled media tended to divert attention away from parochial issues and focused it on national ones, and consequently it aided the transfer of loyalty to the nation.

Finally, the mass illiteracy of the population could be exploited by unscrupulous agencies to sow the seeds of discord and confusion in the country.

However this was prevented by the government's control of information 104. However this control frustrated the initiatives of national planners. First, it limited the value of the media in assisting policy makers to make realistic assessments of external events than official data would have permitted. "A controlled media is incapacitated in providing an independent interpretation of events realistic enough to act as a useful comparison for decision-makers"¹⁰⁵ In addition foreign news content in Cameroonian newspapers was sketchy, crisis-oriented and lacking in any serious analyses. Foreign affairs column was nonexistent, and no single columnist emphasized foreign affairs. The external information content of the press was low and the press was unable to improve the quality of the data about world events. Secondly, the state control of the press limited its role in shaping public opinion on foreign policy matters. If the vast majority of the populations of the so-called the very literate societies are usually unknowledgeable, uninterested and apathetic on issues of foreign policy,¹⁰⁶ then this should, therefore, be more so in Cameroon, where the level of illiteracy was still high and where detailed information about world events was scarcer. Under these circumstances, there was minimal access to enough critical information to develop attitudes and views contrary to those of the government and as such public opinion was made to play a supporting function. The result was a reduction in the influence of group factors in foreign policy.¹⁰⁷

The Cameroonian Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture influenced government economic policies. This group believed in self-reliant centred economic policies. Indeed, their basic foreign policy position can be viewed as self preservative, seeking to influence government decisions on imports that could not only hinder the growth of their infant industries but also decrease their projected profits. The efficacy of this group in influencing foreign economic policy is unclear, but because their belief and interests were generally shared by the government (the national interest of self reliance as a condition for development) the policy decisions on foreign economic issues appeared to reflect their views.

There was therefore a conspicuous absence of influential pressure groups on foreign affairs in Cameroon. In the absence of any concrete vested interests in the external environment on the part of these various groups, their attitude towards foreign affairs lacked specificity, clarity, and commitment to concrete interest. Their pressure on foreign policy was, therefore, weak (or even nonexistent). With the weakness of the institutions and tradition, the inadequacy of the sources of information on external conditions, the absence of group pressures on foreign policy with few experts at home and few embassies abroad and with little public interest in foreign affairs, something became commonplace about foreign policy in Cameroon as well as most developing states, namely, foreign policy became the unfettered preserve of the leader and his friends. The result was a highly personalized foreign policy as witnessed from the conspicuously prominent role which the president of the Republic assumed in the external relations of the state.

5.5 : MILITARY FACTORS

There is a close relationship between the Gross National Product (GNP) and military expenditures of states. Klaus Knorr has shown how in 1970 the states ranking first in economic output, in descending order of magnitude - the United State, the Soviet Union, Japan West Germany, France, the United Kindgom, China, Italy, Canada and India related their military expenditures to their GNP. Together they produced 79 percent of World Gross National Products and accounted for 87 percent of world military expenditures. All economically developed countries small and large produce 83 percent of world military spending. The United states and the Soviet Union together contributed nearly 50 percent of total World production and 70 percent of world military outlays.¹⁰⁸ Because the Gross National Product reflects the size of population and stage of economic development, some countries with large population (e.g. China and India) produce large Gross National Products and large military expenditures, even though they are economically underdeveloped or developing while other countries of moderate population like France and

and West Germany rank high in Gross National Product and military outlays because they are economically developed and rich. Over time, national economic bases of military strength change directly with the rate of economic development and the expansion of industries and services vital to arms production. Britain's military pre-eminence during the first half of the nineteenth century resulted from her lead in industrialization. By the beginning of the twentieth century other Western Societies especially the United States emerged from the World War II as the greatest military power and this was made possible by her enormous economic, industrial and technological superiority.¹⁰⁹ Realizing then that the ultimate determinant of national economic power in conflict basically lies in its military capability - putative, actualized threat or deterrence, - we assume that

$$P_p = C + E + M \quad \text{where}$$


P_p = Perceived economic power
 C = Critical mass (population and size)
 E = Economic capability
 M = Military capability

Graphs 5(1) through 5(4) below indicate the evolution of Cameroon's military expenditures relative to the growth in Gross National Product. Military expenditure expressed as percentage of the Gross National Product in 1966 was about 4.69 percent.¹¹⁰ The war against the UPC rebellion during this period was responsible for this rate. In 1975 it was 1.25 percent. The crushing of the rebellion in 1970/1971 was responsible for this. However in 1979 it was about 6 percent. The peace time increase in the military expenditure from 1979 was about 600 percent of the 1970/1971 figure. One explanation for this is the oil boom Cameroon stated experiencing from 1977/1978.¹¹¹

The basic aims of national security, defence and self-preservation were one of the priorities of Cameroon's foreign policy.¹¹² The military resources of the country at independence were abysmally low. The Cameroonian armed forces consisted primarily of the "officer" cadres, performing a ceremonial role and could at best play only a limited role in either the strategic defence or security of the nation.

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
GRAPH 5(1) MILITARY EXPENDITURE/GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(IN PERCENTAGES)



- Sources: 1. Compiled from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1966-1975, p.42
2. Ruth Loper Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, Washington, D.C. 1978 p.
3. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-1980, London: Adlard & Son Ltd., Bartholomew Press, 1979, p. 52

Perhaps, the low level of military resources of the nation could be found in the threat perception of the leadership. Usually, defence and security planning are based on threat perception and the nature of possible military threats. It would appear that there was almost an absence of a strong perception of external threat to Cameroon's security . If this possibility existed that anyone may threaten, it would seem that the Franco-Cameroonian defence pact signed in 1959 would have guaranteed Cameroon some immunity from possible threats. This paternalistic attitude of France towards Cameroon was concretized by the 1960 Franco-Cameroonian Accords which provided for the military assistance and training of the Cameroonian army after independence.¹¹³ The vulnerability of the Cameroonian defence apparatus necessitated the expansion of the military establishment. .../...

GRAPH 5(2) MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN CONSTANT 1970 U.S. MILLION DOLLARS



Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, p. 43


The arduous but successful prosecution of the UPC rebellion required a redefinition of Cameroon's military capability needs. In providing the armed establishment with the capacity to deal not only with internal but also external threat, it was necessary to include several means to cope with the problem. Thus according to Rubin:

Initial military aid from France of five million dollars in terms of the accords of 1960 produced an efficient force, under Cameroonian command (though with French officers, aids and technical personnel who played a substantial role in the earlier period of military activity). It was well equipped and arms for eight infantry battalions and four platoons of armoured cars. Once the rebellion had been put down, Ahidjo was left with a considerable instrument of force under his control, (shaped by the insurrection but available, after it had been quelled) to underpin the government. In 1966, the army still had four battalions in service, with two more planned. It also had an armoured squadron and a company of parachute troops. In all the army numbered somewhat more than 2,000 officers and men, and it had some 500 vehicles at its

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disposal. In addition the federal forces consisted of between two and three times that number of volunteer "Civil Guard" regiments in the various regions. There were also rather more than 3.000 gendarmes (including 15 companies and 132 brigades in the Gendarmerie Territoriale and a Mobile Gendarmerie of 5 squadrons and 21 platoons). Little attempt was made to obscure the size or the importance of the armed forces; they were in evidence in camps outside most major cities; and were often to be seen on manoeuvres in the doubt intended as a reminder that they were at the disposal of the government, and could be used whenever necessary.¹¹⁴


GRAPH 5 (3) : SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THOUSANDS



Sources: 1). World Military Expenditures, p.48
2). Ruth Loger Sivard, op. cit., p.76

Defence expenditures also increased from 17 billion francs CFA in 1968 to more than 76 billion in 1982 an astronomical increase of about 400 percent.¹¹⁵ Partly prompted by its new found strength and its concern for the security of the nation against the U.P.C. rebellion Cameroon extended its military establishment in the 1960s. But these were not in anyway indicative of Cameroon's defence capability.

GRAPH 5(4) : MILITARY EXPENDITURE/SIZE OF ARMED FORCES.



SOURCE: World Military Expenditures. p. 46.

This raises the question of defence planning to meet the security needs of Cameroon and especially to support its foreign policy. The primary, vital questions of all defence planning are:- who might threaten the peace and security of the nation? What would be the purpose of the threat? In what form could the threat be executed? The Libyan military presence and involvement in Chad and the affront to Cameroon's security and territorial integrity in 1966 by the U.P.C. rebels operating from Congo offer the clearest answers to the above questions. One of the deficiencies in Cameroon's foreign policy was the absence of a well-articulated defence policy. Of course even if the possibility of an external attack did not exist, security for the country should be assured. The need to strengthen the combat effectiveness of Cameroon's army did not need to be overstressed when one imagines the leading role that Cameroon was supposed to play in Central Africa. As far as this sub-region was concerned Cameroon remained a paper tiger with neither paratroopers nor other facilities to "toughen up" the army. Unless .../...

these shortcomings were rectified, Cameroon could not be able to play the role of a leading power in the Central African Sub-region. Moreover, Cameroon's weak defence could make it more difficult to pursue a strong domestic programme of economic nationalism because she could be open to military blackmail by even a third rate European power.

Defence capability assumes that international coercion is not declining. The accelerating military expenditures of governments at the global level is an indication that governments place a premium on self-preservation and expect interventions even from their neighbours. In the case of Cameroon its defence capability remained low relative to other "middle powers" in Africa.¹¹⁶ The Military Balance, 1981-1982 has produced a detailed study establishing the relative military capability ranking of selected countries in Africa. In its view, these countries represent the major geographical regions in Africa, having a wide range of military strategic defence requirements, and importantly, they represent the large cluster of "lesser" or "emerging" powers.¹¹⁷ The results of the analysis confirms the low level of Cameroon's military capability. Cameroon's armed forces consisting basically of the army, the Navy and the Air Force, could with a long range defence planning not become a potentially formidable force with an army of approximately 70,000 and a navy of only 7,000. But the army was characterized by its profound lack of modern military equipment to meet the needs of external threats.¹¹⁸ The army was equipped with only a limited number of light tanks and armoured cars and personnel carriers. The Cameroonian army did not possess medium or heavy tanks of the T-54, T-55 and T-62 varieties that were in the arsenals of several North African Countries.¹¹⁹ At a glance, it may be noted that Cameroon's armed forces strength in terms of size (AFT), its relative military capability especially in terms of quality (RCM) and scores in terms of potential was expectedly low. This deficiency indicated an urgent need to accelerate its (RCM) faster than most of the powerful states of the world. Indeed, the realities of international politics required that Cameroon re-examined its military preparedness, for foreign policy cannot be successful

without the attributes capable of protecting national interest.

Moreover, from the late 1970s and particularly from the early 1980s, there has cropped up some debate on the cost-benefit of Africa's large military expenditures with a focus on the need for balancing defence spending with the needs of a healthy economy and specifically on whether the national economy, in the predicament in which it had been since 1982, can support a large and well-equipped armed force which admittedly and undoubtedly is required for the conduct of an effective and dynamic foreign policy. The following remarks on Nigeria captures the balance of opinion in that debate on Africa.

Foreign policy objectives must be brought into balance with the resource capabilities of Nigeria. To set objectives or to assume a certain foreign policy posture first and then strain resources and distort domestic priorities in order to meet their concomitant in terms of military capability is to set the cart before the horse.¹²⁰

Ideally, defence policy must flow from foreign policy but it must be inherently bankrupt foreign policy if it is not made to internalize and take cognizance of the reality of the country's defence capability at the time it is being formulated. Foreign policy and defence policy must be viewed, therefore, as integral aspects of national development policy and should be harmonized with the general or overall policy measures designed to stimulate faster development of the country's potentials. The issue of, as well as the debate on, whether African states should go nuclear in their armament and defence profiles underscores and reflects the perceived linkage which Africa foreign policy elites see between their defence policies and foreign policies, particularly in relation to South Africa which has acquired nuclear capability. Against the background of this generally perceived linkage between foreign and defence policies, it is not however, difficult to understand why, for instance, in Cameroon membership of the National Defence Council created as a statutory body to advise the President on matters relating

to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cameroon should include the Minister of External Relations. It has been well stated that "no credible defence plan and strategy can be properly developed without thorough briefs on the foreign policies of other states and on the nature of the world international environment"¹²¹ However while acknowledging that military power is no longer in itself a solid guarantee of influence and authority in global politics, the armed forces of a state can still be effective even when not militarily engaged.


5.6 : IDIOSYNCRATIC FACTORS

According to Akinyemi, "constitutional provisions form the skeleton - they are bare bones. It is the personality of people running the system that puts the flesh on the skeleton giving us the recognizable form"¹²² The crucial importance of personality and psychological factors as a determinant of foreign policy appears to be succinctly articulated by Akinyemi. What Jervis calls the "idiosyncratic variable"¹²³ should not be underplayed in any analysis of the external behaviour of the developing state especially in view of the previous assertion in this chapter that foreign policy was largely determined by the executive almost to the exclusion of other relevant groups. Also implicit in this observation is the possibility that the personality of the leaders (especially the executive) had a substantial bearing on the policies formulated. Thus, the policies of the Ahidjo administration can be explained by examining the personality traits of the leaders. In the words of G.D. Paige:

Political leadership consists in the interaction of personality, role organisation, task, value and setting as expressed in the behaviour of salient individuals who contribute to variance in the political system (however defined) and in four dimensions of human behaviour (power, affect, instrumentality and association)¹²⁴

It must be pointed out, however, that this is not intended to explain the course of the foreign policy of the developing state exclusively in terms of personalities. It must be noted that the personality cannot be divorced from all the

FIGURE 5(4) : DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF PAIGE'S POLITICAL PERSONALITY FRAMEWORK



Source: Glenn D. Paige: Political Leadership: Readings for an Emerging Field: Part II (New York, The Free Press, 1972) p. 71

other variables examined so far in this chapter. The external environment of the decision maker is no less an important factor of policy formulation. The role of idiosyncratic factors as foreign policy determinants have been also articulately outlined by Idang:

A nation's international behaviour is profoundly affected or determined by the perceptions, attitudes and value preferences of the various participants in the decision-making process. Put differently, foreign policy like domestic policy, is a direct manifestation of the dominant attitude and perceptions of the society. Even the environmental factors, as Harold and Margaret sprout have aptly pointed out, "become related to policy decisions only to the extent and in the manner that they are perceived and taken into account in the decision making process". Moreover, the growing personalization of political power in most post-colonial states means that the motivations and personality characteristics of the key leadership groups are important domestic deternimants of foreign policy. Once it is accepted that foreign policy decisions are vitally affected and conditioned by the psychology and idiosyncracy of the relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process, then the key issue here involves the nature of these psychological and idiosyncratic variables and their relationship with overt external behaviour¹²⁵

Therefore in this section of our study, an attempt will be made to infer the general perceptions and attitudes at the

basis of Cameroon's foreign policy from independence to 1982.

A nation's foreign policy elite usually consists of constitutionally designated individuals "who determine the political destiny of the nation"¹²⁶ and set foreign policy goals. It was often difficult for a side line observer to identify correctly the individual members of this powerful group in Cameroon. However, the weight of evidence at our disposal seems to indicate that since independence the membership of this group was always been made up of the President, a handful of powerful ministers and top bureaucrats with the President always dominating. The keynote of this foreign policy elite was diversity. Apart from the transactional nature of government and the inter-ethnic sub-elite divisions, there were also the experiential and cultural differences of its members. That such diversity found itself pointed together in a single decision making elite was something of an historical accident.

Nevertheless the differences in perception, attitudes and strategy were less discernible than one would assume. Many students of post-independence Cameroonian foreign policy have attributed this minimum cleavage within the diversified Cameroonian foreign policy elite to three important factors.¹²⁷ There was first of all, the general pragmatism of members of the elite. For example, as a result of the unification of the political parties in Cameroon in 1966, many politicians constantly found themselves torn between going along with their dominant Northern counterparts (who, though conservative and pro-West, were in the ascendancy) and retaining their influential positions, or sticking to their radicalism and militant assertiveness and abdicating power for the time being. It was difficult, indeed, to find any politician who could afford to snap his fingers at the Cameroon National Union (CNU) without risking an immediate and drastic decline in his income and power.

An important factor was the conciliatory nature and the general psychological makeup of President Ahidjo. A calm and moderate but firm man, with a "knack of compromise",

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his personality was "more calculated to placate than to provoke"¹²⁸ These personal qualities of President Ahidjo might have made it easier for the disappointed and disillusioned elite to reach a working compromise. There was also the vanity and love of publicity and the limelight of some politicians which made them value their political jobs more than any other thing. To these three factors many be added the common desire of the Cameroon National Union party to exclude the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) from the corridors of power. The consistent desire of the UPC for the termination of what it called "French imperialism and neocolonialism" in Cameroon undoubtedly incensed the barons of the Ahidjo administration. As a result of this common hostility towards UPC, the other politicians found it easier to swallow Ahidjo's conservatism, while holding the coalition of these different factions together became "one of the hallmarks of the Ahidjo administration".¹²⁹ Consequently, most of Cameroon's foreign policy postures were not only vague and untenable, but tended at times to impose limitations on the government's foreign policy thinking.

In terms of foreign policy attitudes and perceptions President Ahidjo who is widely regarded as the leader and accredited spokesman of this inner group, had on various occasions expressed not only his government's foreign policy postures but also appeared to be the politician sub-culture of the Cameroonian foreign foreign policy elite. Apart from his emphasis on honesty, reasonableness and practicability, he seemed to have regarded all types of radicalism and militancy as unacceptable. He also seemed to have been captivated by the principles of international law which were not only European oriented, but by emphasizing such things as the legal equality of all states and the inviolability of national boundaries, worked generally in favour of the status quo. For him and some of his colleagues, the Western powers, particularly France, were Cameroon's best friends, if not allies, and their leaders more reliable and trust-worthy than those from the Eastern bloc. Because of this tendency of President Ahidjo to carry over the old intimacy of the colonial mentality into post-independence Cameroon's foreign relations, his

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Ahidjo was born on August 24 1924 in Garoua, today's provincial capital of the Northern Province. Recounting what Ahidjo must have said (probably in one of his rare interviews), Paul Bory states that "being born of a Peuhl family, young Ahidjo was brought up in the moslem religion. He, therefore, started at a fairly early age, to attend the koranic school of his Districts then headed by Mallam Oumarou. In 1932 he entered the Garoua regional school".¹³¹ From 1938, Ahidjo spent three years in Yaounde at the higher Primary school and on January 1, 1942, he was absorbed into public service and was sent to work in Douala for a six-month training course. From 1942 to 1953, he served as a radio operator in the towns of Yaounde, Bertoua, Ngaoundere, Mokolo and Garoua. According to one author, "even without much information about his personality, one realizes that Ahidjo was a reserved and calculative person who advanced in both school and career through friendly connections."¹³² Thus, in 1947, he was elected with the help of the French to the House of Representatives (ARCAM). In 1952, he was re-elected but at this time, it was called the territorial Assembly of Cameroon (ATCAM). In 1953 he was elected as advisor to the French House of Representatives.

One of his first meetings in Paris was between him and the then representative from Senegal Leopold Sedar Senghor—a man Ahidjo would later take as a model and would literally emulate in the execution of his leadership roles.¹³³ Another model for Ahidjo and one who would instill in him an everlasting image of role playing would be de Gaulle¹³⁴ Once Ahidjo got to know the man, he fell in love with his ideas, ideas that Ahidjo used later to govern Cameroon. De Gaulle was a monarch, an absolute President. Policies whether foreign or domestic, were his policies. This is true when one looks at his concept of historical mission.¹³⁵ De Gaulle claimed that he was the leader predestined to be responsible for the fate of France. That he derived the moral right to speak on behalf of France from this supernatural mission; only his legal right to do so was founded on his power as president of the republic. He saw himself as being much more than a statesman to whom only chance and his own talent had

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given the opportunity to formulate national policies. He was what he was owing to a supernatural call, but not because the French people or their representatives vested in him the powers of government. In brief, he claimed to be the "incarnation of immortal France"¹³⁶ Ahidjo learned all these traits of De Gaulle and later ruled Cameroon in just the same manner. He learned from De Gaulle and saw his leadership role just as he did. He learned to be charismatic like his model De Gaulle who was " a man who, together with his followers, believed that he had been called upon by God or by history or destiny in any event by a super national force to carry out great feats for the benefit of his nation. His vocation was independent of the will of other men"¹³⁷ Other traits of De Gaulle were that he had self control, he preferred surprises and he bore grudges. These are the same traits that Ahidjo possessed as president.

From the foregoing statements, it is obvious that President Ahidjo brought much parliamentary and administrative experience to his high office, although not directly in the field of foreign affairs. Indeed, it was a measure of his calibre and ability that there was almost a universal confidence in his capacity to lead Cameroon during the critical years immediately before and after independence. Apart from his Commanding personality and his conciliatory nature, President Ahidjo was one of the foremost advocates of Cameroonian Unity. He was a man who passionately strove for the material advancement of his people, but was without illusion about the means necessary for its attainment¹³⁸

Upon his personal attributes and talents, however, President Ahidjo also had the fire and venom of an autocratic and charismatic leader. As a devout muslim and feudal aristocrat, he was by nature moderate and conservative. It is perhaps worthy of note that it was his conservatism and unsociability which prevented him from being exposed either to indignities and other short-comings of European societies or to Pan-African sentiments during his years of counsellor in the French parliament. As such, he was less motivated by an anti-European outlook and a radical nationalist ideology.

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As head of an unorganized coalition government which came to power in 1958 with the help of the French, he also lacked an independent source of power. Although his psychological makeup enabled him to harmonize the disparate groups in the country, the difficulty of leading a coalition government that was based on little or no common party programme under the mounting pressures of the UPC rebellion coupled with public discontent and indignation could not be over-estimated

It would be misleading, however, to explain President Ahidjo's political behaviour solely in terms of psychological and idiosyncratic variables. After all, political behaviour is not the product of one, but many and often conflicting factors and forces. Thus, a full understanding of President Ahidjo foreign policy attitudes and perceptions would require an examination of the domestic and international contexts of Cameroon's foreign policy. In the first place, an average individual is highly sensitized to the sub-group in the society of which he is a member. While there are some situations that afford considerable scope for personality to affect behaviour, nevertheless, certain types of behaviour are usually called for by particular group norms or the values and sentiments of the social class to which one belongs. In this sense, President Ahidjo's conservatism and pro-West tendencies may be seen as a reflection of the attitudinal and perceptual orientation of the Northern elite of which he was a member.

There are a number of reasons why the Northern elite should be predominantly conservative and more inclined to pro-West positions. Because of French colonial policy in the Northern Cameroon, colonialism was less of a traumatic experience for the Northerners than for the Southerners. In the words of Fage, the Northerners were "less humiliated and unrooted by the colonial experience".¹³⁹ Consequently, they retained, along with their calm self confidence, some conservative and pro-European tendencies. The islamic religion which has much influence upon most Northern political leaders also emphasizes "a superb aristocratic bearing - a poise of attitude which the 19th century European pro-consuls in Africa understood and found to their liking."¹⁴⁰ In addition, the

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old Fulani Empire which included much of Northern Cameroon was in feudalism. Furthermore, few of the Northern leaders have ever been victims of white racism and apartheid. Even those who went abroad for education or otherwise were less exposed to racial discrimination and other human indignities partly because of their lack of interest in the social life around them due to their muslim upbringing and partly because of the short duration of their stay overseas.¹⁴¹ In response, most members of the Northern elite had less of an emotional need to be aggressive and anti-Western. On the other hand, the Southern elite, most of whom had been exposed to racial discrimination and Pan-African sentiments during their studies abroad (with the exception of UPC members) demonstrated little or no inclination to radicalism and militant assertiveness because of their great desire to share political power and the spoils of office with their Northern Colleagues. Even their demand for Pan-Africanism was too halfhearted and inconsistent to be taken seriously by anyone.

There is another reason for the Northern elite's inclination to conservatism and pro-West postures. Apart from the mutual resentment created by the socio-political imbalance in post-independence Cameroon, there was the mutual distrust and suspicion that existed between the Northerners and Southerners. Partly because of this North-South distrust and partly because of the Northerners' great feeling of insecurity in an economically Southern-dominated Cameroon, many Northern leaders came to regard France (and other Western powers) as allies who could help them maintain an indefinite political control of the country. It is, perhaps, a plausible guess that President Ahidjo's unwillingness to relinquish his personal control of the Ministries of Economy and Armed Forces derived largely from this feeling of insecurity on the part of the Northern elite.¹⁴² It seems plausible also to relate President Ahidjo's views of international politics to the experience of exclusion from external relations during the colonial era. This exclusion seemed to have produced a widespread misunderstanding of the basic dynamics of international relations and a wrong conception of the operation of the international system.¹⁴³ Many of these fantasies and

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unrealistic views about international politics survived independence and became operative assumptions. At the same time the negligible experience which President Ahidjo and his colleagues had of international relations meant that they were ill - prepared either to relate domestic interests to foreign policy or to establish expectations as to what the international system could provide. The experience of exclusion from foreign relations before independence had a further effect on President Ahidjo's foreign policy thinking. It made him and his colleagues accept very readily the conservative French view of the role to be played by Cameroon in World affairs. As one observer has succinctly put it, the Cameroonian policy makers had no alternative but to take what the French gave them.¹⁴⁴ If they had a broader frame of reference they may have been able to look at things differently. However, the idiosyncracies of leadership cannot be considered in a vacuum either. Despite the weaknesses and strengths of the characters of the leaders, it is important to take cognizance of the fact that they operate within specific environments and at different time periods.

5.7 : SOCIAL CHANGE

Few authors have focused on the process of social change as a determinant of the foreign policy orientation and behaviour of the developing state. Such a weakness can hardly be understood since experience has shown that the "phenomenon of social change constitutes one of the basic pscho-societal variations" of the developing state. It is the variable that summarizes the prismatic political and economic system of these states, for it is linked to other domestic variables and its treatment will shed light on the others too. For instance, one cannot treat the problem of the prismatic political system without considering the process of social change. And one cannot deal with the latter without treating the effect of the "colonial intrusion" which disturbed these societies. Moreover, the process of social change and the resultant prismatic political system are both affected by the rate of economic development and it in turn affects it. Lastly, one cannot deal with the political system in rapidly changing societies without mentioning their "search for

.../...

identity". Three basic arguments conflate to justify such a situation: (1) the process of social change (as the process of social persistence) is a characteristic of these societies (2) this process of social change implies conflict between the persistent and the "becoming" which on occasions leads to a state of "social disorganization",¹⁴⁵ (3) that the process of social disorganization and conflict is singularly acute in the developing state. These three basic arguments make the adoption of non-alignment the functional response to the psycho-societal situation of the developing state.

In terms of social change and social disorganization, it must be remarked that the colonial intrusion then, has resulted in imported political and economic institutions as well as foreign attitudes and ideas. These two effects have injected (into the developing state) elements of instability which they have never experienced before. Consequently, it is impossible for most of these societies - should they so desire - to return (purely and simply) to their own former varieties of social organization. It is this "falling between two stools" which some students of Comparative politics and Political development have labelled the "transitional process",¹⁴⁶ and which a prominent authority in the field has described in a very telling way:

Old forms of belief and social practices endowed with sanctity are often dismissed with cruelty and carelessness by those in positions of power. A cheerful confrontation of the future may easily, be replaced by deep-rooted despair. For many, modernization is like hurtling through a tunnel at frightening speed without knowing what waits at the other end. Fear creates serious political problems. Hence, it is not surprising that in modernizing societies the mode fluctuates between an exciting sense of new freedom and hope in the future and a fearful cynical or opportunistic view.¹⁴⁷

This social disorganization can be dealt with at both the individual (elite) level and the societal level (with the process, of socialization constituting a link between the two levels).¹⁴⁸ For in the developing state, the so-called national "culture paradigm" that is supposed to be transferred to the individual during the socialization process is not free

from inconsistencies. Naturally, these inconsistencies and incompatibilities in the "national" culture paradigm would affect the individual's sense of identity and his learning roles to be played in social groups and institutions. Of course, Western societies themselves face seemingly similar problems of alienation, anomies and identity-crisis but the dimension of the problem is quite different in the developing state. For in Western societies, whatever the inconsistencies and the conflicting roles in the culture paradigm may be, they are still "parts of a single culture, share a common history and have developed organically within the same social system"¹⁴⁹ This is different from the situation of the developing state, which (generally) contains "two sets of paradigms, roles, values and standards":- one is indigenous, familiar and deep-rooted and the other alien, imported and, in many cases, half assimilated.¹⁵⁰

But this state of affairs would not only affect the individual's sense of identity but also the group's and social cohesion generally, since the culture paradigm is supposed to be the "directive system which guides people on how to perceive, feel, interpret, think and perform in the desired ways - that Nelson called "cue sets".¹⁵¹ The instability of these cue sets - due to the heterogeneity and inconsistency in the culture paradigm - pushes the developing state towards the inconsistency - instability and of Nelson's scale. The results of this "situation" for the developing state is clear since.

Societies which tend towards the inconsistent-unstable-incongruous end of the scale are bound to suffer from crises of identity, excessively conflicted motivations and attitudes within individual and groups, ambivalent behaviour, apathy, and depersonalization.¹⁵²

This problem of (diffuse) identification is felt almost in daily life by the individual in the developing state since he is participating

in a growing number of contrasting and often conflicting old and new social units on the one hand, the traditional extended family, village, tribe, caste and sect; and on the other hand, the modern nuclear family, productive enterprise, trade
.../...

Union, political party, social clubs and
atomized urban mass,¹⁵³

The members of the new elite groups (e.g. political leader, government administrators; entrepreneurs, managers, professionals and intellectuals) are the most severely affected by these conflicting cues and roles included in the "national" culture paradigm.

A look at an "ideal-type" process of personality formation and role-determination of the developing states elites would illustrate severe effects.¹⁵⁴

(a) most of them have been born and have grown up in some variant of extended family, even though they have spent a big part of their lives in the town rather than in the countryside. Affective personalized kinship relationship were characteristic of their social context, and the individual is accustomed to the warmth and emotional security provided by the extended family and the various lineage affiliations.

(b) through school education (especially in the pre-independence period) or study abroad they have been exposed to another culture paradigm which contests for their loyalty. Moreover, they support their nuclear families through various activities in the "modern sector" with its impersonal institutions based on (Western) legal concepts. They have come to feel that the achievement of a high standard of living and upward social mobility depend on their performance in this "modern sector" and on their effort to advance these Western-based institutions. Moreover, the new authorities they work under were the colonial head or are the Western educated indigenous elite who direct the new impersonal institutions of society.

(c) consequently, inconsistencies are bound to arise in their value orientations between, for instance, the "exclusive tribal or caste brotherhood" and the "imported religious and political concepts". Thus because they have been habituated as children to recognize, "without question the authority and example of the traditional head of the household (father, maternal uncle, older brother or cousin)

and of the other elders of the village, tribe, caste or sect with which their family is traditionally affiliated, they continue as adults.

to acknowledge, or to feel uncomfortable in denying the traditional family obligations of mutual sharing of output or income, of defending and advancing relatives' interests and of according these claims a priority that overrides even their own self interest. They are expected to provide jobs for relations regardless of their employment qualification and to divert often substantial portions of their own earnings or capital... to help parents, brothers, uncles, cousins and other relatives to live better, to start a business, to send their children to school, to pay their taxes and fines, and in other ways to share freely with anyone who falls within the degrees of kinship recognized by custom.¹⁵⁵

(d) in many cases, individuals are incapable of handling these conflicts without passing through different degrees of tension. Although very few studies on the psychiatric disorders that can result from this value conflict and role strain have been conducted in the field, the little evidence at hand indicates.

a high percentage of the particular kinds of psychiatric illness that could be expected in such circumstances: psychosomatic headaches and gastrointestinal symptoms, neuroses of the anxiety and depressive types, and schizophrenic psychoses.¹⁵⁶

But most people try to meet this value-conflict and role-strain by trying to compartmentarize their lives, and where they fail to do so they accustom themselves to live with social ambiguities and inner conflict. Thus examples are not rare of

Asian cabinet ministers who consult astrologers before making important decisions; African presidents and prime ministers who use witchcraft to protect themselves and defeat their rivals; high government officials and managing directors of private companies who propitiate local spirits and deities when modern bridges, power plants and factories are dedicated - these and many similar phenomena... are ways of relieving the anxieties and accepting the ambiguities of living simultaneously in two worlds.¹⁵⁷

However, in either comparatmentazation of lives of living with

.../...

inner conflict, a psychic effort is required, and a personal and social price has to be paid for the search of identity.

There are many empirical findings on the psychic dimension of social change and value conflict. One of the first and most well-known field studies - at least in English - about the developing state is Lucian Pye's Burma's Search for Identity.¹⁵⁸ Pye investigates primarily the related search for both individual and collective identity by analysing the attitudes of various members of Bruma's intellectual and political elite towards Burmese politics and society. The 79 interviews (34 with administrative officials, 27 with politicians and 18 with "observers and critics of the political scene as journalists, educators and businessmen") put in evidence the value conflict and role strain ensuing from the malintegrated culture paradigm based on primary socialization in "indigenous traditons" and their secondary acculturation to "alien" (i.e. colonial or generally Western) values. Since these findings are "suggestive of comparable effects of similar processes at work in other formerly colonial countries", the implication is that the empirically-based "sketches" are generalizable to other developing states and thus justify some comment. Two representatives of conflict-torn elite are interviewed and analyzed: - the administrator and the politician. The administrators are those who "first realized that they were at home neither with their own people now the British".¹⁵⁹ They were the first to be in close contact with the British colonial authorities, to be acculturated to their values and thus became "a group who had some deep and disturbing questions about what they really wanted to be. This close contact with the imported colonial culture had as a result the psychic isolation of being deprived from belonging to either of the two creative communities (the indigenous and the alien) and brought into question their identity."¹⁶⁰

The other sample of the elite—the politician—faces the same problem of the search for identity. Though the politician's social origins are far less homogenous than the administrators, the problem is still there, for as a member of the political elite confessed:

.../...

I don't care much for being with Burmese who studied abroad or with those who graduated from Rangoon University. When I listen to them I find I have little to say and I begin to wish that I were back with the village type of Burman. I must also confess that when I am with the villagers, I can feel just as left out¹⁶¹

This explains perhaps the uncomfortable position of some Burmese politicians which causes them to vascillate between opposite images of themselves. At times they think of themselves as legitimate members of the modern or Westernized community, and at other times they see themselves as pure Burmese, as this significant quotation reveals:

I have never given any thought to what it mean to be a Burmese . I must have filled in countless forms in which I called myself a "Burmese Buddhist," but it did not have much meaning... In my second year at the University, I met this young Englishman who was very keen on learning all about Burma. He had read more about Burmese history than I had, and he knew much more than I did about the old days of the Burmese kings. I remember telling some of my friends at the University some of the things he had taught me about Burmese history, and they all said that it was foolish to think about such things for we should be looking to the future and to a modern Burma which would be much better. My English friend was most interested in learning about Burmeses customs. He was always asking me questions about why the Burmese do all the things they do. Sometimes I didn't know, sometimes I just couldn't explain it to him.

The one day, I still remember very clearly, he got quite angry with me, when I could not answer his questions and only laugh at the customs he wanted to know more about. He said "Don't you know anything about your own beliefs; what kind of a Burmeses are you?" The question really bothered me. You can't imagine how awful it was:¹⁶²

Another type of politician would change this intermediary position between two worlds into an advantage by transorming this inner conflict of values into a sense of freedom to choose among alternative models for the future of his country. He tends to believe that it is possible to select the best ways from both the old and the new and this fashion ensures that the Burmese (i.e. independent) way will remain the best way. In this case, it can be argued that the

.../...

developing state's foreign policy orientation/behaviour projects in the international system the actor's search for an independent identity. In addition, the insistence in many developing states on an indigenous form of self-reliant development (e.g. Planned liberalism, communal Liberalism, African Socialism... etc) is a part of the same search for an independent identity. This "search for identity" argument would be more strongly supported if the interview-based findings drawn from Burma's case are confirmed by empirical research about other states and thus the generalizability assumption of the identity problems in the newly independent developing state would be justified. The "checking process" would be even more reliable if findings were arrived at by "indigenous" social scientists who confront lesser linguistic barriers and cultural bias in the conduct of their research.

We can check the findings of the Burma study by considering the field work on problems of Sudanese identity or national character.¹⁶³ These problems we are told are not only specific to the Sudan but also to other countries existing in the same situation. "Here too, then, there is implication of generalization. The interviews were conducted in the first part of 1959 by fourth year University students in Khartoum under the guidance of a Sudanese social psychologist working in the field.

But not only did well-known national academic "authorities" participate in the research project, but also the findings were published in eleven articles in Sudan's newspaper EL-Zamman in September-December 1959. Consequently, other sociologists and social psychologists had the possibility to evaluate the research project and/or contest the findings. All these factors are bound to lessen bias in the findings and increase confidence in their reliability.¹⁶⁴ Though many of the questions dealt with in the study are interesting, the most relevant is the one concerned with the individual's early socialization process and his subsequent feelings towards the values inculcated into him in childhood. In the Sudan, the study tells us, the result of the socialization process is that: .../...

Individual self evaluation is not based on his talent and potential, but on his feeling of "belonging" to a group which protects him... The early socialization of the child has as a result the subordination of the "ego" to the group's identity and the individual's strict conformity of rigid traditions and group values which govern social behaviour.¹⁶⁵

Briefly, the group's approval is the prime objective of the individual's social behaviour, and the group's interest comes before his own, for he has an identity only through the group (whether it is a village, a tribe, an ethnic group, and extended family...). Once the individual moves to the town or abroad for work or education (as most of the elite do), he feels a certain "uprootedness, marginality and aggressiveness" and begins to reflect on his own identity. An internal conflict then starts to appear, for instance concerning some of the backbreaking social obligations to be performed towards the original group. Thus a

characteristic feature of the sudanese identity is this perennial conflict between personal identity and group values, where it is unlikely that the ego will have the upper hand. The result of this internal conflict between the "ego" and group demands, the "new" that the individual aspires to and the "old" that the group represents, leads to inhibition and inertia on the individual level.¹⁶⁶

At the societal level there might be "splits" or "discontinuities" in the national system that add to the racially or geographically based disintegrative aspects (e.g. the secession attempts in the South of the Sudan) and renders the problems of social change singularly acute in the developing state. This brings us to our third basic argument of the acuteness of the process of social disorganization and political strain:

The ideal type domestic "situational" component of the developing state is :

one exposed to modernity disruption socially from the traditional patterns of life; confronted with pressures to change their ways, economically, socially and politically; bombarded with new and "better" ways of producing economic goods and services; and frustrated by the modernization process of change, generally, and the failure of ... (the) government to satisfy... (the people's) everrising .../...

expectation, particularly.¹⁶⁷

As we have stated explicitly in our first basic argument, this "modernization process of change" is universal both in time and space. But there are two (interdependent) characteristics peculiar to the process in the developing state: (a) Because of increased communication in the global system and a "demonstration effect," the rate of change in the developing state is very fast. If we take Cyril Black's variable - "consolidation of modernizing leadership" and use the time length necessary for achievement as a measure of the rate of change, indeed this rate of change will be very fast in the developing state.¹⁶⁸ For instance, according to Black in England (Black's first modernizer) the "consolidation of modern leadership" stretched from 1964 to 1832, i.e. 183 years; and in the United States (Black's second modernizer) this process stretched from 1976 to 1863. i.e. 89 years. But for 13 countries which entered this phase of "consolidation of modernizing leadership" during the Napoleonic period, the average time-length was only 73 years. Among the developing states, Egypt took 30 years, India 28 and Indonesia 27. Nor are these states untypical examples, for 21 of the 26 states which began this "consolidation of modernizing leadership" during "the first quarter of the 20th century and had emerged by the 1960s the average was only 29 years".¹⁶⁹ Data collected by Karl Deutsch confirms this acceleration in the rate of social change, and he, infact, explicit that

during the 19th century the principal indicators of social mobilisation in modernising countries changed at about the rate of 0.1 percent per year, while in 20th century modernizing countries they change at about the rate of,1percent per year.¹⁷⁰

(b) simultaneously rather than sequentially, the developing state meets the "crises" of social change, national integration, centralization of authority, economic development, political participation, social welfare...

Thus given that this dislocating "modernization process of change" in the developing state is not only singularly rapid but also all-pervasive, should we not ask with

.../...

Riggs: "~~May~~ not some transitional conditions turn out to be relatively permanent rather than a temporary stage between a particular past and a predictable future state?"¹⁷¹ Deutsch's eight - indicator operationalization of this "modernization process of change" (Deutsch prefers calling it "social mobilization") confirms Riggs' doubts. For original images of "mobilization" imply, in fact two distinct images; (1) the stage of up-rooting from old habits, traditions, patterns of relationships and social commitments; and (2) the induction of these "uprooted" persons into alternative patterns of group membership, organization and Commitment. In this sense Mannheim suggested the image of.

Large numbers of people moving away from a life of local isolation, traditionalism and political apathy and moving into a different life of broader and deeper involvement in the vast complexities of modern life including potential and actual involvement in mass politics.¹⁷²

But this "demobilisation into" two-stage cycle cannot-in the case of societies - take place overnight as, it is relatively the case with the drafting of soldiers. In other words, until their remobilization into the new patterns of social commitment and roles, people stay demobilized and in that state of "ambivalence" and uncertainty-as we have seen from the findings on the individual's search for identity. This time lapse between "demobilization from" and remobilization into" is the period of full tension, frustration and conflict. This climate of social disorganization favours the disintegrative factors in the political system, especially if the volume of people's demands exceeds the capacity of the political system to satisfy them.¹⁷³

Though social theorists might differ in predicting and diagnosing the forms or consequences of political conflict, yet there seems to be consensus on this point. Once there is a gap between demands and the capacity of the political system cope with them, "rising expectations" turn into rising frustration leading to systemic strain and favouring political instability. And political system - and a newly born one especially - has a certain capacity (at least during a specified interval of time) to consider a certain volume of demands.

When demands exceed this empirically determinable unit, there is demand input overload.¹⁷⁴ In addition to its elaboration in Easton's "system theory".¹⁷⁵ The correlation between the "want/get" gap and political instability is supported by Daniel Lerner's theorem.¹⁷⁶

$$\frac{\text{Social satisfactions}}{\text{Social Expectations}} = \text{Systemic Frustration}$$

Moreover, the correlation has been empirically confirmed by the Feierabend's findings.¹⁷⁷ Recently it has been restated in a theoretical-empirical study:

The heightened drive for social and economic change and development was directly related to the increasing political instability and violence that characterized Africa, Asia and Latin America in the years after World War II.¹⁷⁸

Again, the "social change - rising demands - systemic strain" chain,¹⁷⁹ seems to be confirmed by "overwhelming" historical evidence from the experience of the West. Kornhauser states that "the rapid influx of large numbers of people into newly developing urban areas invites mass movements."¹⁸⁰ Moreover the Scandinavian experience shows that whenever "industrialization occurred rapidly introducing sharp discontinuities between the preindustrial and industrial situation, more rather than less, extremist working class movements emerged."¹⁸¹ In addition, "the combined rate of change on six of eight indicators of modernization (e.g. primary and post-primary education, rise in living standards, infant mortality, Urbanization, Literacy...). For 67 countries between 1933 and 1962 correlated with political instability in those countries between 1955 and 1961."¹⁸²

Perhaps economic development can solve this dilemma of rising demands/increasing political instability correlation in these rapidly changing societies today, since economic development is supposed to increase the capacity of the political subsystem to satisfy the rising level of expectations. Many economists do not think so, and in fact they emphasize the thesis of "Rapid Growth as a Destabilising Force"¹⁸³ at least beyond a certain subsistence level.¹⁸⁴ Rapid Economic Growth,

it is suggested gives rise to :

(a) an increased number of people whose traditional social grouping (family, class, caste) are disrupted, and thus increases "the number of individuals who are déclassés... and who are thus in circumstances conducive to revolutionary protest;"¹⁸⁵

(b) nouveaux riches who ask for the political power and social status corresponding to their new economic position;

(c) Alienation as a result of the increasing geographical mobility and upsetting of social ties (e.g. the lumpen proletariat) and thus favours the rise of violent political protest;

(d) additional sources of social tension and unrest by widening the gap between the rich and those whose standards of living is declining, in relative if not in absolute terms.

(e) popular discontent as a result of restrictions on consumption in order to promote investment;

(f) increase literacy, education, and exposure to mass media, resulting in rising aspirations that cannot be satisfied at once;

(g) conflict over distribution of investment and consumption which exacerbate ethnic and regional conflict;

(h) increased "capacities for group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy"

Thus historians, political scientists, psychologists and economists seem to confirm the plausibility of the "J-curve" proposition.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, this proposition provides the basis for a more comprehensive explanation of systemic strain and instability since it synthesizes the different hypotheses advanced in the literature (e.g. Plato and Aristotle versus De Tocqueville and Brinton) and also attempts to combine the individual psychological level with the collectivity sociological level. The analysis, based on this proposition however, has a shortcoming. It can typically emphasize the quality and content of the various demands. In other words a demand for better health conditions, better education,

.../...

higher salary can be equated with system-threatening demands such as for a change of government or ethnic autonomy which is a common menace given the linguistic ethnic fractionalization of these societies. Precisely, because of the prevalence of ethnic linguistic heterogeneity in the developing state secessionist movements and the demand for ethnic autonomy are some of the most serious threats to the integration, and indeed survival, of the national system. Coupled with the index of ethnic linguistic fractionalization in the developing state the analysis then points out the primary of the task of societal integration, how to build and/or consolidate a coherent system out of the multiplicity of fragmented societies that characterize the domestic situation of the developing state. One of the propositions of Prof. Claude Ake's Theory of Political Integration is that the integrative cultural homogeneity and value-consensus can be effected through the forging of a "mature political culture" which in turn can be created through "social communication" among the various parts of the fragmented social system.¹⁸⁷ The social communication process would take place with the acceleration of the process of social change or mobilization which entails "the breaking down of physical barriers between the people and facilitating a greater flow goods and services between the different parts of the country, educating the masses, developing urban centres and the mass media".¹⁸⁸


But we have seen that this massive transformation of social relationship and individual values is disruptive and can lead to disintegrative political movements. Thus, we face a paradox. For to increase its political integration the new state must undertake social mobilization. Yet social mobilization is essentially disruptive of the political order in the short run. The threats of disruption are even increased when "political malintegration" coincides with "societal malintegration."¹⁸⁹ That is when political cleavages coincided with ethnic cleavages. In this case, conflicts become additive rather than crisis-crossing and a bureaucratic conflict in the civil service for instance, can precipitate a generalized civil strife.¹⁹⁰ This "polities of retribalization" is the serious danger in "plural" societies.¹⁹¹

Briefly, the problem of societal and political integration in the developing state is reduced to two interrelation parts of a basic question. If social change or modernization is inevitable, rapid and all-pervasive in the developing state, what kind of policy can enable the political system to neutralize and/or reduce the disintegrative short-run effects of this process? In other words, what are the factors favouring the minimum of political stability necessary to contain or balance the disruptive effects of social mobilization?

The different conceptual approaches to political integration agree that the political system undertaking social mobilization maximizes its capacity to carry out the process while keeping the society together by either the use of maximum force systemic control (i.e. coercion) or by increasing the bases of consensus and legitimacy (e.g. make the spirit of citizenship predominate over "pimordial attachments")¹⁹² This is based on the equation of the developmental framework as :

$$C + F + L,$$

where C (control) is held constant and F (force) and L (Legitimacy) are interdependent variables inversely proportional to one another.¹⁹³ Thus at the time of independence for instance, legitimacy of "national government" is not usually in question, as the following Figure 5(5) shows



where t_0 is time of independence.

At t_0 $C = L$, $F = 0$

(Realistically "0" can never be reached.)

.../...

But since legitimacy and consensus are not constant once the "colonial enemy" of the "national front" has disappeared and the further in time the "historical day" of independence, the more disintegrative elements (political and societal) tend to strain the system. This prevalence of domestic conflict threatening the very survival of the system - explains why in the above figure the curve of legitimacy and consensus tends to decline and that of force to rise. Yet a look at the size of internal security forces in some developing states, (as a measure of the capability of state authorities to impose themselves by force) indicates that the agents of the political system cannot maintain the system by mere coercion-even if they wanted to. To the extent, then, that the governments, these "modernizing" societies work to maintain viable political system, and to the extent that force or coercion is not capable by itself to control permanently the system these governments have only one alternative. The alternative is to reinforce the other basic of societal consensus and systemic control - legitimacy. Yet there is another paradox. For we have seen that at this stage in the "political development" of these newly-independent and rapid changing systems, the symbols of legitimacy (e.g. strong political institutions, "rules of the game", spirit of citizenship rather than "primordial attachments") are not yet firmly established. This might explain the prevalence of another phenomenon in the developing states-personalized and/or charismatic,¹⁹³ political leadership which tries to act as the rallying point and a symbol of consensus in the emerging political system.

The influence of charismatic leadership on societal integration can be seen from this more than two century old statement of Montesquieu that "at the birth of societies, it is the leaders of the common-wealth who create the institutions, afterwards it is the institutions that shape leaders."¹⁹⁴ Americans pride themselves of having "a government of laws and not of men" and "People's Democracies" look forward to a stateless society, in the emerging political systems of developing states it is suggested that "wise and firm leadership alone can make the difference between steady progress and early ruin". This "survival" and integrative function of

charismatic leadership in the developing state explains the renewed interest in Max Weber's analysis of political authority and its application to the emerging political system. Weber exposed his theory of charisma in the following way:

The term "charisma" shall be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged or presumed. Charismatic men... to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person. The legitimacy of charismatic rule... rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelations and hero worship.¹⁹⁵

Weber gave this definition in his treatment of the three types of political authority (traditional, charismatic and legal rational) one of which is necessary to hold the political system together. And

Since Weber's threefold distinction among types of legitimate authority is meant to be exhaustive, one may infer that the more the charismatic element is more prominent, the weaker the traditional and rational legal elements. This is the chief reason why Weber's concept is so widely applicable in situations of decolonization, where both traditional and rational-legal elements of authority are suddenly dissolved and the entire weight of legitimacy may come to rest on a single leader and his personal reputation.¹⁹⁶

In other words, charismatic leadership itself is a function of a certain domestic situation, for this is "a need for personal leadership at times of rapid and fundamental transition such as the birth of a new state" or the emergence of a political system.¹⁹⁷ The reason is simple. If systemic control based on legitimacy and consensus is to be achieved in times of rapid and all pervasive social change, man must be tied to the political system either by his devotion to the institutions or to the leader. And since the institutions are in flux and the legitimacy of the government or the state itself is in question, the need is greater to achieve consensus on persons.

At moments when the entire order of political institutions is to be changed-as in the attainment of independence or generally the founding of a new state-the entire burden of legitimacy¹⁹⁸ is on the person of the leader in the transition

Thus the overall consensus and legitimacy necessary of systemic viability can be maintained if an increase in legitimacy of and consensus around, rulers compensates for the loss of legitimacy of institutions and vice-versa. And Robert Rucker confirms that charisma is just part of the "situation" of the new state whereas some psychologists insist that charisma arises in situations in which people - as Erickson suggested - become "charisma hungry"¹⁹⁹ But a "great man theory of history" should not be exaggerated and the consensual integrative function of charismatic leadership should not be over emphasized. After all the overthrowing of such charismatic leaders as Nkrumah and Sukarno are empirical indicators of the insufficiency of personalized systemic control. These examples indicate that the charismatic personality in the emerging political system is not enough by itself. Charismatic leadership's contribution to systemic maintenance depends on whether the leader's policies are perceived by the followers as responding to the "general situation" of the developing state or not. In other words,

The followers' attitude... (empirically rather than by definition) is influenced not so much by specific personal qualities common to all charismatic leaders, but rather by the magnitude and improbability of the results he obtains. No results, no belief and no belief, no charisma.²⁰⁰

And here lies our contention that the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour of the developing state is also a function of the specific psycho-economic needs of the state.

5.8 : CONCLUSION

The central theme around which discussions in chapters four and five were woven was the question of the state in post-colonial Cameroon - its organization interse, its character, the relation between the state and the foreign policy process and the direction this relation took between 1960 and 1982. We argued that to comprehend the state in its varied aspects and relationships in the foreign policy process amounts to comprehending the politics or process of social formation since the state was characterized as a "table of contents" of social contradictions or the

organization of the ruling class.²⁰¹ However, it was noted that the central element in the dominant ideological formation in Cameroon in particular and in post-independence Africa was, what we called, the ideology of developmentalism which in Cameroon corresponded to Planned Liberalism. The argument of this ideology was simple. "We are economically backward and we need to develop and develop very fast. In this task of development, we cannot afford the luxury of politics!"²⁰² Therefore politics was relegated to the background while economics came to occupy the central place on the ideological terrain. The whole ideological discourse among the different factions of the ruling alliance was conducted within the framework of developmentalism. The fact that politics was displaced from the dominant ideological terrain did not of course mean that politics disappeared from real life. As a matter of fact, developmentalism was the ideological disguise under which the new post-independence ruling classes consolidated themselves and their alliances with their foreign supporters. Conversely, it was under this ideological rationalization that the independent politics of the masses was suppressed and ultimately co-opted. The organizational manifestation of the process of consolidation of the ruling class on the one hand and the suppression of mass politics on the other was the emergence of an authoritarian state as the organization of the ruling state. This went hand in hand with the "statization" of popular organizations such as trade unions, peasants' associations, professional bodies and so on.

Therefore, the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism in Cameroon, was marked by a change in the character of the state; forging of new alliances within and a realignment of relations with the international system. This process took place in the context of and within social struggles in the course of which the state was transformed from a despotic colonial state to an authoritarian neo-colonial one.²⁰³ During the years following independence there were intense struggles the unity of the alliance during colonialism was displaced and a new unity emerged. This new found unity of the ruling alliance may be said to be composed of two factions—the state sector and the sector (particularly

.../...

the private industrial and commercial bourgeoisie). The state bourgeoisie played a hegemonic role in the ruling bloc while the ruling party (UNC) which was the watershed between the two bourgeoisies played a supportive role. Therefore, the relationship between the state and private bourgeoisie was characterized by unity and struggle. Furthermore, this "Unity and Struggle" had profound expression at the level of the state. The transformation of the state took place at both the level of state power-its class and ethnic character- as well as in the re-organization of the state apparatuses. Indeed life in this two realms of the state became inseparable. The movement towards the one-party system of government and the liquidation of parliamentary controversy was part and parcel of the response of the ruling alliance in power to consolidate itself and stifle political opposition in the face of sharpening contradictions in the country resulting from its failure to deliver the goods of independence to the people.

To prevent the formation of local opposition and improve the responsiveness of government machinery, the ruling alliance response included the dissolution and incorporation of the militant trade union movements, curtailment of the autonomy of the giant co-operative movement, nullification of democratic rights incorporated in the constitution, vesting of enormous constitutional powers in the president, deprivation of parliament of the prerogative of the supreme organ of power and control over the policy of the state and enactment of legislation conferring on the chief executive wide discretionary powers over life and property. Law and legal machinery too ultimately reflected and reinforced the peculiar character of the ruling alliance. Its weakness and flabbiness as a bourgeoisie found expression in the lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary while its authoritarian character as a ruling class manifested itself in the lack of ideological notions of "rights" as a central element in legal ideology. Indeed law assumed a typically instrumentalist character while legal ideology had little role in the dominant ideological formation.²⁰⁴ In this neo-colonial situation both politics and legal ideology were

displaced from the ideological terrain by the ideology of developmentalism. Law became simply and without mediation the instrument of control and power and had very little "hegemonic" significance. Legislation was geared towards enabling the state and state organs to exert unquestionable power rather than about individual rights. And both as a matter of Law and practice the powers of the executive could not be or were rarely challenged in courts or if challenged stood little chance of success. This was due to a combination of factors such as the widely - worded law which left little room for judicial activism, timidity and mediocrity on the part of judges accompanied by loyalty borne out of pressures and expectation of favours from the executive.

The underlying element which has conditioned the above conditions and is shared in common by them, is the developing state's colonial experience. Colonialists created and nurtured most developing states as geopolitical entities. Colonial socio-economic and political institutions served as the basis upon which modernizing efforts were based. In this perspective the picture of the foreign policy process that emerges in the developing state is one characterized by the weakness of structural variables, the dominance of attitudinal variables and the openness of the foreign policy system. In this process, there is a wide gap between domestic economic needs and domestic economic resources and as such that of a wide gap between foreign policy objectives and foreign policy achievements.

Multiple cleavages (tribal, ethnic, regional, class) dominate many developing states. Since the state has frequently been created before the nation, citizen loyalties remain tied to narrow groups: There is only grudging identification with the new "nation," and the government itself has little legitimacy. Moreover, there is little underlying consensus about either values or procedures to tie the groups together. What do exist are mistrust, fear, and the dominance of a "constant pie" orientation that is the notion that what one group gets must be taken away from, or is a threat to, the other groups.

Mistrustful groups committed to providing for their own interests above all, compete for the control of the few resources the state does have. Everything is politicized for the control of the state is also control of the economic and social marketplace. The state determines who is to benefit not only from traditional sources of wealth (usually exporting and landholding), but also from whatever new economic structures are to be created. The struggle to control resources is also the struggle to control the whole internal order, for there are no autonomous realms; control the state or control nothing. The centrality of politics is thus a virtually universal proposition, for no other structures (except the military) are strong enough to contest the dominance of the machinery of state. Cleavages and conflict unmediated by an underlying consensus also impact a particular character to the political struggle: It is winner take all, for the losers have few alternative power structures to which they can retreat, and unsurprisingly, there is no perception on the part of either winners or losers of a loyal opposition. Distrust destroys the possibility of compromise, and conflicts merely reinforce one another—an economic or political conflict is also an ethnic or class or regional conflict.

There are political systems that combine conflict and poverty. The usual result is an unstable equilibrium. The winner at any particular time lacks the power to do much more than concentrate on survival. Weakness frequently leads to a stalemated situation, a "politics of accommodation" in which controversial issues are avoided and policies are designed specifically to benefit whichever groups join the accommodation. The government promises something to every group that has some power but as little as possible to those without power. As Genoud notes of Ghana there is no one strong enough, or perhaps committed enough, to speak for a national future. Even the emergence of a single, dominant leader, or an army takeover does not change the calculus very much, for the leader or the army may be strong enough to retain control of the government but not strong enough to risk the dislocations of structural change.

The most obvious effect of this kind of political system is that a concern for political stability always prevails over a concern for economic development. The ruling elites may disagree about many things, but they agree about the need for domestic order. Order takes priority over the creation of national wealth and policies aimed at preserving the regime in power—not creating the conditions for long-term prosperity. In part this means a good deal of spending on arms and on symbols of national unity. More significantly, short-term consumption strategies designed to reward supporters and bribe or pacify dissidents diminish the possibility of raising the domestic rate of investment. Developing countries can rarely escape a large degree of dependency on the international system, but policies such as these ensure that the dependency will be extremely debilitating.

Other effects are important but perhaps somewhat less apparent. The elites converge on the capital and struggle against each other for the control of the state. Their common interests are protection against rising mass demands and against any attempt at major change. A significant by-product of this is a bias against rural areas and towards the urban areas where the elites live and carry out their activities. This puts a slightly different perspective on some of the arguments about relations between the capital and local areas, for it is clear that the elite may want to limit, not enhance those ties, when more integration with local areas also implies more demands upon the center's scarce resources.

The style of foreign policy-making that the elites have developed in these circumstances suffers a double burden. In the first place the need to survive distorts the process of choice towards short-run projects and away from long-term accomplishments and a serious attempt to design and implement national development plans tends to fall into a pattern of avoidance; Activities are chosen because they are likely to incur fewer costs or threaten fewer interests and not because they have been evaluated in an objective framework. The results are apparent in efforts to call upon the international system to rescue the elites from the consequences of having to make costly domestic choices. Alternatively when

domestic pressures begin to rise inflationary financing can be used to try to create new resources quickly and cheaply. This is especially likely if the groups that bear the heaviest burden of rising prices (usually wage earners and agricultural interests) are also politically weak. (The rationale for inflation as a development policy rests on the doubtful notion that, if wages lag behind prices, inflation redistributes national income towards employers, who will then invest it wisely.) More aid, trade preferences, and inflationary financing all seem to share one characteristic - they are free goods in the short run. Finally, repression always remains an "easy" option, provided the army is under sufficient control.

Such governments pose formidable obstacles. Many of the military coups that have occurred reflect these conditions, for the military by itself rarely can do more than ensure its own rule. The military contempt for politicians in itself creates a predisposition to intervene that is usually activated when the government is overwhelmed by some crisis - for example, the fall in cocoa prices in Ghana - or when the government is imprudent enough to threaten military prerogatives in some manner. But if the army is a microcosm of the nation and mirrors national cleavages within its own ranks, the statement persists but within a new arena. And if the army represents only one national group against the others, there is no way it can unify the nation or establish any legitimacy for its rule. In addition the military usually lacks the knowledge and skills to devise effective development policies. One result has been the emergence of coalitions of expediency between the military and the civil service and the creation of an administrative state. The results thus far have not been encouraging, for the state continues to rest on force, and neither partner has seemed willing to risk the turbulence of structural transformations. Nevertheless this coalition of different kinds of expertise may become increasingly prominent.

This interpretation of the development process is useful for several purposes. It illustrates, for example why elite commitment to a national future or to some idea of the

national interest is so difficult and problematic. Perhaps also it is a useful reminder of why domestic security is so pervasive a concern for ruling elites and of why foreign policymaking so frequently is discontinuous and erratic. Finally, this sketch may also illustrate why there has been a growing sense of futility about the possibility of a meaningful reform strategy: What we are offered is something of an equivalent to the economist's notion of the "low-income equilibrium trap" but translated into political terms. Weak governments, compelled to expend most of their energies on ensuring their own survival, cannot establish priorities and implement goals (except as an exercise in ritual) that would begin the process of creating a developed society.

In these circumstances it seems that it is more useful to conceptualize the development process and foreign policy in terms of resource gaps or constraints. Since existing demands and available resources are rarely perfectly balanced, the central question for the government becomes how to deal with the gap between what its citizens want and what it can provide in response. This approach has two virtues. On the one hand it permits a more productive level of generalization because developing states - irrespective of other differences - confront the need to deal with the problem of "rising demands and insufficient resources". The development process is thus heavily influenced by basic resource constraints that narrow the foreign policy range of choice, no matter the intention or the ideology. On the other hand this approach also has the virtue of concentrating attention on specific tactics and strategies to reduce the gap; by contrast, sole emphasis on the "politics of accommodation" tends to foster an attitude of futility or a belief that only extreme solutions can make sense. What is crucial here is recognition of the fact that a resource constraint is not unalterable: As the key questions become practical, not metaphysical or theoretical, our hypothesis also becomes partially confirmed.

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
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CHAPTER SIX
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS A DETERMINANT
OF FOREIGN POLICY

6.1: INTRODUCTION:

As we mentioned above one of the major constraints on the foreign policy of the Developing State is its low level of domestic economic power. The economic forces at work and the economic structure of a country are important factors in both its domestic and foreign policies and as such are important determinants of the power base of a state. Thus the neglect of the critical value of domestic economic resources in generating national power may lead to an underestimation of the significant role domestic economic power plays in the external transactions of a state. In the absence of an overarching centre of authority and monopoly of force within the world community, states may be conceptualized as different centres of force desirous of maximizing their shares of the world's riches. Since states monopolize the instruments of coercion, each mobilizes power to indicate its ability to acquire the resources it wants (and more) unless a peaceful allocation is in its interests.

The configuration of power among states at any given time therefore influences the distribution of the benefits of international relations, with the more powerful receiving a large share than the others. An adequate explanation of such a situation may be achieved through an analysis of the economic forces at work within the states. The economic forces affecting the foreign policy of a state stem from (1) the structure and nature of the country's domestic economy and its external economic and financial relationships, (2) the objectives of the domestic economic policies and (3) the revolution of rising expectations¹.

In part one of our study we argued that the real status of a nation in the contemporary system of international stratification in terms of its power and prestige depends largely on its economic status. The analysis also showed that on the international scene the institutional basis of the real status of a nation in the patterns of prestige and power depends largely on the institutions which make it possible for a nation to achieve a high status in the pattern of economic development. It therefore becomes

possible in this case to assert that the economic status of a nation is the most basic element of its real status in the patterns of international stratification. In other words, if one makes a detailed analysis of the foreign policy system of a nation, one can easily arrive at the conclusion that all the basic determinants of foreign policy outputs directly or indirectly depend on the nation's degree of economic development. Logically economic development determines the means and capabilities (strategy and tactics) of a nation in dealing with its foreign policy problems. Indeed, the more of the resources at the disposal of a state, the greater are its potentials of influencing the developments in the international system in a direction favourable to itself. In common parlance, the more powerful a state is the greater is its capacity to influence other states, that is to say, the greater is its ability to achieve the objectives of its foreign policy.

If economic development can be equated to the economic performance of a state then it would appear that economic development constitutes one of the most significant national power base against which to measure the potential and actual capabilities of a state in terms of its foreign policy formulation and implementation. Thus, the specific power of nation state A over nation state B in foreign policy is to a large extent, a function of human and material capabilities (economic capabilities) of A as well as A's ability and willingness to employ these capabilities in order to control the behaviour of B. Economic development, therefore may be viewed from the standpoint of the attributes of statehood such as territory, population, economic structure, the government and the socio-economic culture (that is, the economic way of life and those shared values, beliefs and customs that give a sense of belonging to one group rather than to another). These constitute the bases of economic power and capabilities of the state and as such significantly affect the state's foreign policy and attitudes.

In this perspective, we begin this chapter with the assumption that:

(1) A nation bequeathed with a semi-colonial economic structure at the onset of independence, consciously or unconsciously, inherits the neo-colonial economic structure whose functions are by design intended to serve the status quo. Thus the institutional frameworks - political, military, economic and cultural - that Cameroon acquired as an independent package from its former colonial masters, without any modifications or adaptations, devoid of any positive changes or radical deviations to entrench Cameroon's

needs and aspirations, were still serving the colonial or quasi-colonial functions after independence, as they had before independence.

(2) The economic structure and functions, thus inherited by necessity, shaped the foreign policy of Cameroon. The Cameroonian acquisition of French colonial political structures and the unidirectional trade structure with its Western industrial capitalist system (with France as "Controller-General" of Commerce and Finance) implied that Cameroon developed foreign economic policies that favoured the West and perpetuated the status quo even at the expense of Cameroonian and African ideals.

(3) The foreign policy of Cameroon was, by virtue of its orientation, inconsistent and contradictory. For example, Cameroon could not pursue a dynamic foreign policy of economic development while its foreign economic policies were derivatives of French colonialism, and therefore, negative to developmental change.

Empirical examinations of the above three assumptions will set preconditions for the analysis of the evolution and development of Cameroon's foreign policy during the period under study. The essence of this analysis is to show that the 'dependent' economic forces at work, constantly impinged on the Cameroonian political system and thus affected its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour. The pursuit of national interest as defined in the vocabulary of economic development, conflicted with the competing national interest of other nations who were the main consumers of her raw materials. We now set about to unfold these assumptions under an indepth examination of (1) the domestic policy of Cameroon, 1960-1982 (2) the investment legislation and development (3) the geo-strategic capabilities (4) the production and structure of the primary sector (5) the production and structure of the secondary sector (6) the production and structure of the tertiary sector before examining the implications of such a structural orientation for national capabilities.

6.2 : THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY OF CAMEROON

In order to understand the structure of Cameroon's post-colonial economy, it would seem imperative that we locate the place that the country occupies in the world economy. Like most, if not all Third World States, Cameroon is located in the periphery thereby depending heavily on the central. In this perspective, it is assumed that the role assigned

to the peripheral states in the world economy has had negative effects on their development processes. Nevertheless, between 1960 and 1982 Cameroon's economic policy was marked by two imperatives. On the one hand the government encouraged maximum production through the exploitation of the country's natural resources and the creation of industries aimed at transforming these natural resources. On the other hand the government encouraged strict budgetary equilibria of the state in order to avoid monetary manipulations which could have detrimental effects on the economy.

Thus, the economic development of Cameroon from 1960 to 1982 was anchored on the following principles - planned liberalism, self-reliance and social justice. Before we study these principles, we should remark that during the decade preceding independence in 1960, Cameroon faced acute economic problems. Production was stagnant and private investment (foreign and domestic) was minimal because of political instability³. Between 1960 and 1982, the government's efforts to reinforce political unity resulted in an impressive reversal of the situation. President Ahidjo became the head of government and national party, a federation with British Cameroon was formed in 1961, a referendum gave birth to a United Republic of Cameroon in 1972, a national political party - the Cameroon National Union (CNU), with strong bases throughout the country, was established and the state embraced four relatively centrist and dirigistic political economic policies as the touchstones of economic development. Through these economic policies the government sought to increase the country's economic relations, increase effective government control over economic development and broaden Cameroonian ownership of the main productive sectors as well as create employment opportunities.

(A) PLANNED LIBERALISM

This philosophy which laid the foundation for the direction of economic activities determined the role of the state vis-a-vis private economic agents and vice versa and, therefore, the general socio-economic structure and frame of production operations. It equally defined rights and obligations as far as the regulation of socio-economic functions was concerned.

A mixed economy owes its existence to some kind of co-operation between private and state enterprises; thus, a mixed economy is "an economy

which contains elements of both private and state enterprise"⁴. It is not self-evident how far the division of labour implied in this co-operation went and, moreover, what the concrete areas of economic activities were to which the co-operation applied.

With regard to the intensity of the co-operation, there seems to be no unique theoretical answer to the question. Outgoing from the two ideal hypothetical states of affairs characterized by capitalism and socialism as extreme poles of a continuum; there is a wide range of possible combinations between capitalist and public elements. In terms of typology, the following categories or forms of co-operation are imaginable: absolute capitalism with no state economic activities at all; mixed economy with capitalism as a core element having public economic activities gravitating at its periphery; mixed economy with a strong and powerful state participation, and a relatively insignificant private sector and, lastly, the state of pure socialism with non-existent private economic elements. In reality, however, virtually all economies are to some extent mixed in that no socialist economy is without some degree of private enterprise, while capitalist economies invariably have some state-regulated industries⁵.

As far as the areas of private and public choice or the field, in which private and public economic activities are or should be effective, are concerned, again there appears to be no general agreement. It means that there is no general rule according to which the nature and the type of activities to be carried out by private business groups and the state can be determined unequivocally. In view of the fact the all economies are mixed, there seems to be no particular need for and merit in referring to an economy as mixed if such an economy had no specific characteristic to show or present that would distinguish it from other economies combining naturally private and public interests.

It is in the light of this argument that it becomes imperative to see in an economy defined officially as such, a system in which virtually all commanding heights of the national economy are centralized in the hands of the state, while socially, politically and strategically less sensitive areas of the same national economy are left to the free entrepreneurship⁶. According to this understanding of mixed economy, the more the commanding heights of the national economy are subjected to public management and control, the more the one tends towards a situation where socialist elements

are stronger than capitalist ones. In the same way, capitalist elements predominate and overshadow the national economy if sensitive aspects of the national economy happen to be under the control of private agents. It is this particular understanding that one is expected and supposed to apply to determine and define the nature of a mixed economy of the Cameroonian type that was enveloped in the economic doctrine of planned liberalism during the Ahidjo administration.

Planned liberalism as espoused by the Cameroon government had economic and political goals. On the one hand it promoted and encouraged private initiative in so far as it was the driving force behind progress, and on the other hand, assigned the task of mobilizing, coordinating and guiding these initiatives in an atmosphere of respect for the requirements of the general interest and national sovereignty. In other words, this doctrine gave a greater reliance on markets, especially international market forces, for guiding investment and output allocations in the country while at the same time the state possessed interventionist powers to form state or para-statal enterprises to safeguard the sovereignty of the nation. From another standpoint, this doctrine acted as a safety valve, limiting state enterprises to run the traditional public utilities which supported the directly productive sector. From a political viewpoint too, it regulated private enterprises (whether foreign or domestic) from attaining oligopolistic powers largely because unbridled economic liberalism may lead to economic imperialism, suffocate Cameroon's embryonic development as well as jeopardize national sovereignty. To regulate and control private enterprise under planned liberalism, the state could decide to enter into partnership with such interests or create a public or para-statal institution through which government could stimulate, control or direct the economy as a whole and safeguard the interest of the state.

Furthermore, the transfer of power at independence involved primarily a handing over the machinery of government. Since Cameroonian participation in the private modern sector was limited during the colonial period, it became obligatory for the state to satisfy both the aspirations of self-reliance and control over the social aspirations of self-reliance and the nation's economic destiny as well as improving the standards of the population. Since the mid-1960s the economy has experienced significant overall growth as depicted in Table 6(1) based on the projected growth rate of the GDP.

Table 6(1): TOTAL REAL ANNUAL GROWTH OF THE CAMEROON ECONOMY
(IN CONSTANT 1979 FRS CFA)

| P E R I O D | T O T A L |
|---------------------------------|-----------|
| 1966 - 67 | 1.8 |
| 1967 - 68 | 6.8 |
| 1968 - 69 | 5.0 |
| 1969 - 70 | 3.0 |
| 1970 - 71 | 3.8 |
| Average of 3rd Plan (1971-1976) | 4.0 |
| 1971 - 72 | - 0.4 |
| 1972 - 73 | 8.8 |
| 1973 - 74 | 11.2 |
| 1974 - 75 | - 1.7 |
| 1975 - 76 | 5.0 |
| Average of 3rd Plan (1971-1976) | 4.4 |
| 1976 - 77 | 8.0 |
| 1977 - 78 | 8.5 |
| 1978 - 79 | 8.1 |
| 1979 - 80 | 3.0 |
| 1980 - 81 | 1.6 |
| Average of 4th Plan (1976-1981) | 5.8 |
| 1981 - 82 | 4.8 |
| 1982 - 83 | 7.0 |
| 1983 - 84 | N.A |

Source: Ministry of Economy and Plan, Yaounde, 1984.

One universally recognized feature of structural economic change is that as countries develop, the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) and employment accounted for by agriculture tends to decline. The reason for this is that improved living standards entail an increasingly personal consumption of goods and services other than food, and this necessitates a concomitant rise in the production of human and other resources allocated to non-agricultural production. In 1960, 87.8 per cent

of the economically active Cameroonians were engaged in agriculture while by 1970 there had been a 17 per cent reduction, with approximately 70 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture. This notwithstanding, however, agriculture continued to provide the bulk of the GDP (some 35 percent) and employing a third of the population as demonstrated in Table 6(2) below.

Table 6(2): DISTRIBUTION OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)
BY SECTOR IN 1980 - CAMEROON

| SECTOR | Million F/CFA | % |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| Agriculture, Fisheries | 305 400 | 34.5 |
| Mines | 4 200 | 0.5 |
| Manufacturing Industries | 87 400 | 9.9 |
| Electricity, Water and Gas | 11 700 | 1.3 |
| Construction and Public Works | 46 600 | 5.3 |
| Commerce | 154 100 | 17.4 |
| Transport and communication | 65 900 | 7.4 |
| Public Services | 70 700 | 8.4 |
| Other Services | 139 200 | 15.7 |
| TOTAL | 885 200 | 100.0 |
| Custom Duty | 54 600 | |
| GDP at Market Prices | 939 800 | |

Source: Ministry of Economy and Plan, Yaounde, 1984.

The assumed relationship between industrialization and development led many developing countries to adopt negative policies towards agriculture, and thereby to transfer a disproportionate amount of government controlled investible resources into industry. But Cameroon unlike its neighbours placed agriculture in the forefront of development. This concept was captured in the self-reliant development doctrine espoused by the government in 1975⁷. Growth in the realm of agriculture during the period under study could be largely attributed to the efforts of private individuals (who are small-scale rather than plantational or industrial) and mostly subsistence-oriented farmers. However, the government acted as a catalyst in the self-reliant development approach by implementing

policies that did not penalize small holder farmers including a production policy which gave greater consideration to domestic demand, a policy of increased productivity and self-sufficiency in food while at the same time encouraging cash crop production by the constant increases in prices of these crops, especially during periods of world market commodity slumps. In addition, the government pursued a financial and monetary policy geared towards the mobilization of domestic savings, a trading policy based on the active promotion of selective exports and imports of capital and consumer goods, a policy of rigorous exploitation of natural resources, reorientation of industry and employment, a wage policy which followed the pace of development requirements and of objectives pursued through development, and an intensive research policy adapted and geared towards the realization of national objectives.

The principle of self-reliant development and the policies generated therefrom, had far reaching consequences. It cannot be overemphasized that Cameroon made private peasant production the main plank of agricultural development. Though the government tended to stay clear of direct state production in agriculture, there was no lack of public investment in infrastructure, research, marketing extension and credit facilities. Thus it has been noted worthily that agriculture received more than 30 per cent of total public investment in the third (1971-76) and fourth (1976-81) plan periods, while FONADER (NATIONAL FUND FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT) set up in 1973) was formed as a bank capable of handling deposits in order to improve its role as a "banker for peasants".⁸ From its creation, the government started shifting investment priorities and making loans available to rural small holder farmers. For example, the government supplied fertilizers to farmers at an import cost of 2.12 billion francs CFA in 1977-78 and almost 4.5 billion francs CFA in 1980-81.

Another dimension of planned liberalism was balanced development, simply put this doctrine upholds the idea that equal attention should be paid to the different sectors of activity in the economy, the regions, towns, countryside, men, women, adults and youths. Given Cameroon's economic, social, cultural, geographical, historical and linguistic diversity, it was felt that it would be unfair to concentrate development efforts in only one part or area of the country. This was because missionary and colonial penetration into the inland and northern areas of Cameroon was slow, difficult and often unsuccessful. For these reasons, many regions.

and rural areas in Cameroon remained comparatively impoverished. Consequently balanced development was an attempt by the government to redress regional inequalities by providing educational infrastructures and public amenities necessary for bridging the gap between the country and the town and also to eliminate the social and economic disparities between the different regions of the country. The government made considerable efforts to give concrete form to this principle in a number of ways. In recognizing the rural sector as carrying the bulk of the country's population (about 80 percent) as well as its ability to sustain agriculture, both peasant and commercial, adequate attention was given to this sector in the third and fourth five-year development plans. Steps were taken to ensure the implementation of various projects in rural areas such as establishing credit facilities, rationalization and marketing of food crop to meet increased urban demand.

Making the rural areas attractive to youths could stem the flow of unemployed from drifting into the towns and cities. Since the majority of the population depended for their livelihood on agriculture and a large percentage of export and thus of the GDP was accounted for by agricultural commodities and industries related to agriculture, jobs for the unemployed had to be generated in the rural sector. To this end, agricultural estates, pioneer villages, development areas and other rural projects were used to encourage the settlement of young people in rural areas. If emphasis was placed on agriculture, this was not necessarily to the detriment of industry. The secondary sector which concentrated on semi-manufactured, manufactured and petroleum products was also given full attention in the doctrine of balanced development through the government's industrialization policy. Measures were taken to attract industry to the various parts of the country in an attempt to ensure that the location of industries was not concentrated within a single town or region. Finally, the manifestation of the principle of balanced development was reflected in the education as a national priority devoting some 25 per cent of the national budget to this sector. Thus government schools and institutions of higher learning were built in all parts of the country.

One of the main components of planned liberalism was the doctrine of social justice through which the government "aims at redistributing equitably the fruits of development between the different group and giving each citizen an equal opportunity within the framework of national

solidarity"⁹. This concept implied distributive rather than commutative justice and carried with it the notion of reform. Thus if overall productivity in the economy was increasing, there was little justification for not distributing the national cake equitably for instance, policies designed to increase small holder productivity and income included hard decisions on exchange rates, tariff structures, formal sector wages (such as salary increases), retail price controls and agricultural producer prices. Infact since it made little sense to increase the purchasing power of rural incomes through such policy reforms if failures in the distributive systems conveying manufactured consumer goods to the hinterland subvent the use of increased incomes for increased purchases, the government increased efforts to improve physical transport infrastructure especially feeder roads and storage facilities and increased the operating efficiency of credit (FONADER), Marketing (MIDEVIV) and transport intermediaries.

6.3: INVESTMENT LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPMENT

It has been argued that the question of social and economic justice in the distribution of the fruits of economic progress are as important and as difficult in terms of regions as in terms of social classes. It is, indeed, in recognition of this vital problem, that Cameroon with its diverse culture, regional, ethnic, economic and linguistic background, between 1960 and 1982 adopted a liberalized approach to planning with a view to attaining self-reliant development, a balanced distribution of investment resources as well as the fruits of economic progress. Specifically, the Cameroonian experience in liberal planning began with the Second Five Year Economic and Social Development Plan (July 1966 to June 1971), and continued with the Third Five Year Plan (July 1971 to June 1976, Fourth Five Year Plan (1976 to 1980, and the Firth Five Year Plan (1981 to 1986).

Because of the importance placed by the Cameroon Government on the objectives of balanced and self-reliant development, it was essential that any policy instrument, institution or legislation created to implement these objectives be capable of making an effective and lasting contribution to the realization of these objectives. To this extent, the purpose of this section is to critically examine the National Investment Codes as instruments of balanced and self-reliant development with a

view to determine whether or not their provisions and actual application reflected the Cameroon Government's policy of maintaining equilibrium between ethnic groups and regions, and ensuring self-reliant development as a determinant of its foreign policy.

This basic hypothesis which will guide their analysis is that investment incentives which place greater emphasis on the external dimension of economic activities in any country could not redress the adverse effects of the economic and social disparities and the uneven development of the economic and administrative provinces/regions particularly as the pattern of industrial location is too great a political and social consequence to be subjected entirely to economic calculus.

On the basis of this postulate, therefore, an economic analysis of the provisions and application of the National Investment Codes is undertaken with a view to determining whether or not they originally reflected the national development objectives of balanced and self-reliant development in features and special provisions of the National Investment Codes will be undertaken with a view to determining the extent to which the objectives of balanced and 'self-reliant' development, as espoused by the Cameroon National Union Party were reflected therein.

This exercise is important because when Cameroon became independent in 1960, its economy was basically agricultural and there were only a few local industries which were set up in the 1950s. Resources from the predominantly agricultural sector could hardly guarantee meaningful industrialization and the achievement of balanced and self-reliant development objectives which the young Republic espoused. The government's preoccupation was, therefore, the mobilization of resources, both foreign and domestic, with a view to achieving industrialization and balanced sectoral and spatial development of the country. Since there was a tendency for emerging African States to experience economic difficulties immediately after independence as a result of the departure of foreign capital and manpower, the young government's principal concern after independence was the creation of favourable investment conditions in order to attract foreign private capital.

This first Cameroon Investment Code which was adopted by the National Assembly on June 27, 1960¹⁰ was, therefore, in response to

the country's urgent need for industrialization and rapid economic development and industrialization but at the same time, was determined to reduce the regional inequalities that had been allowed to develop during the colonial period as a result of the neglect of certain parts of the country, mostly the hinterland. The Government, therefore, opted for a policy of balanced sectoral and spatial development in order to reduce the sectoral and regional disparities inherited from the colonial era.

After more than twenty years of the existence of the first National Investment Code we may therefore ask whether it has achieved its objectives. Did the Code attract the much needed foreign capital or generate enough domestic savings to enable the government realize its objectives of self-reliant and balanced development? Since the Code was in existence for more than twenty years (1960 - 1983) unrevised, we may assume that it attracted substantial foreign investment. But did these investments conform to the national imperatives of balanced and self-reliant development that is, regionally and sectorally?

Since a new investment Code was adopted by the National Assembly in June 1984, we may therefore submit that the old code contained serious shortcomings or otherwise, had already outlived its usefulness. The preamble to the new code clearly points out the shortcomings of the old one, thus implying that the national objectives were not realized, at least, not to the extent that was envisaged. To this end therefore, we analyze the basic features of the old Code, its application and the record of investments approved under the code.

(A) BASIC FEATURES AND APPLICATION OF THE 1960 INVESTMENT CODE

Cameroon's post-independence investment code was adopted by National Assembly of East Cameroon on June 27, 1960, six months after it became independent from France. Since the former British Cameroons opted to join the French Cameroons in 1961, the code was also extended to cover the whole Federal territory by Law 64/LF/6 of April 6, 1964. The provisions of the Code were designed "to create investment incentives which would attract the required domestic and foreign private investments

within the framework of the major objectives of the Five Year Development Plan - namely, the maintenance of equilibrium of balance between the various sectors and regions of the national economy"¹¹. Since the code was meant to be one stone designed to kill two birds - that is, attract investment and at the same time achieve balanced development - its provisions were generally very liberal. There were four principal categories (schedules A, B, C, and D) corresponding to the order of priorities which the government wanted to emphasize and the nature of the investment. The basic guarantees were tax holidays and exemptions from duties for periods varying from ten to twenty five years for enterprises recently incorporated and whose nature was such as to foster national development.

With respect to Preferential Treatment A, companies which fell under this category were permitted duty free entry of the required raw materials and capital goods for a period of up to ten years and allowed reduced rates of, or exemption from indirect taxes (for example, the single tax on production) or finished products for a period of up to three years, including exemption from new taxes and changes in the rates of existing ones.

Under Preferential Treatment B, enterprises were eligible to obtain, in addition to the benefits under Preferential Treatment A, exemption for a period of up to five years from taxes on projects and in the case of mining and timber companies, from the payment of royalties. They were also eligible for many benefits from new tax laws that might be introduced during the first ten years of their operations.

Under Preferential Treatment C, large corporations could conclude agreements with the government under which they could receive all or part of the privileges of Preferential Treatment B. The agreement in each case would also define other government guarantees in the legal, economic and financial fields including the undertaking to assure stable conditions for financial transfers and the marketing of the enterprise's goods for a period of up to 25 years. The enterprise, in its turn, had to guarantee minimum social benefits, including housing.

Preferential Treatment D, was designed for undertakings whose investments were of particular importance to the long term development of the country. Such undertakings were guaranteed the benefits of

Preferential Treatment C as well as the guarantee that new taxes and tax rates would not apply to such enterprises for up to 25 years.

In order to determine whether the 1960 investment Code helped Cameroon achieve its objectives of economic development or not, we must analyze the statistics that are available. Between July 1960 and 30th June 1965, a total of 38 companies with capital investments to the value of 10.393.000.000 F/CFA were granted incentives under the Code and these companies were able to generate 8.000 new jobs. Table 6(3) gives a distribution of companies and investment capital approved by the National Investment Commission as of June 30, 1965.

Table 6(3): COMPANIES APPROVED UNDER THE INVESTMENT CODE
AS OF JUNE 30, 1965

| Sector of Economic Activity | Location of Firm | NO | Amount of Invest. Pro. | New Jobs |
|---|---|--------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Power-based Industries Minieral Products Industries | Littoral West Cameroon | 9 | 1.735.000.000 | 346 |
| Textile and Clothin Timber Industries | East, North and Littoral Centre South | 2 8 | 192.000.000 1.061.000.000 | 385 1.648 |
| Food Industries | West and Littoral | 5 | 3.400.000.000 | 1.875 |
| Miscellaneous industries | (X) | 14 | 3.965.000.000 | 3.795 |
| TOTAL | | 38 | 10.393.000.000 | 8.049 |

Source: Second Annual Report of the National Credit Council,
1964 - 1966, p. 107.

Within a period of five years Cameroon was able to attract investment capital to the tune of 10 billion F/CFA. By June 30, 1969, investment capital had reached approximately 38 billion F/CFA, represented by 133 companies which were able to generate 32.757 new jobs, (see Table 6(4) for the sectoral, regional and capital distribution of the undertakings).

At this point, we can argue that Cameroon was successfully attracting private investment capital for its development requirements. In fact by June 30, 1975 Cameroon was able to attract more than 84 billion F/CFA in private investment capital for its development needs. However, the

question which has often been asked is to what extent the investment Code of 1960 encouraged the placement of business undertakings in the less developed or backward regions of the country? Since two of the basic principles of development in post-independence Cameroon have been balanced and self-reliant development, it would be pertinent to examine the regional distribution of investments since the adoption of the old investment code in 1960. Table 6(5) gives a sectoral and regional distribution of industries as of June 30, 1975, together with the percentages represented by each sector of the economy and each region of the country.

Table 6(4): COMPANIES APPROVED UNDER THE INVESTMENT CODE AS OF JUNE 30, 1968

| SECTOR | LOCATION | VOLUME OF INVESTMENT |
|--|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Energy Industries | Littoral | 10.854.000.000 |
| Primary Products and Processing Industries | Littoral | 10.847.000.000 |
| Aluminum Production | West | |
| | Littoral | 9.827.000.000 |
| Forest Industries | Centre South | |
| | East, West | 3.000.000.000 |
| Textile and Shoe Production | Cameroon | |
| | West, Littoral and North | 2.710.000.000 |
| Chemical Industries | West & Littoral | 489.000.000 |
| TOTAL | | 37.927.000.000 |

Source: "Investment and Economic Development: Cameroon", Bulletin de l'Afrique Noire, Paris, July 1970. pp. 12 and 251-254

Table 6(5): SECTORAL AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES AS OF JUNE 30, 1975

| Sector/Region | Forest Indust. | Agro. Indust. | Manuf. Indust. | Basic Indust. | Reg. Total | Percentage |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|------------|------------|
| Littoral | 8 | 18 | 52 | 38 | 116 | 53.2 |
| Centre South | 38 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 57 | 26.1 |
| East | 15 | - | - | - | 15 | 6.8 |
| West | 3 | - | 1 | 3 | 7 | 3.3 |
| North | - | 4 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3.3 |
| South West | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 14 | 6.4 |
| North West | - | 2 | - | - | 2 | 0.9 |
| Sectoral Total | 64 | 32 | 67 | 55 | 218 | 100 |
| Percentage | 29.35 | 14.65 | 30.7 | 25.3 | | |

Source: Compiled from files of Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning, Yaounde.

It can be observed from Table 6(6) that more than half of the industries approved by the National Investment Commission were located in the Littoral Province, and more than a quarter of them in the Centre South Province. To this extent, the objective of balanced spatial development was far from being attained, though sectorially there was equilibrium, since industries were more or less evenly distributed among the four listed sectors. As of 30 June 1984 when the government decided to revise the investment code the situation had not been corrected, the gap had instead worsen between the different provinces (see Table 6(6)).

Table 6(6): DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES BY PROVINCES AT 30, JUNE 1984

| Province | NO OF UNDERTAKINGS | PERCENTAGE |
|------------|--------------------|------------|
| Centre | 103 | 23 |
| South | 5 | 1 |
| East | 3 | 0.6 |
| Littoral | 262 | 58 |
| South West | 19 | 4.2 |
| West | 20 | 4.4 |
| North West | 4 | 0.9 |
| North | 20 | 4.4 |
| Adamawa | 4 | 0.9 |
| Far North | 12 | 2.6 |
| TOTAL | 452 | 100 |

Source: Explanatory Statement of the Bill to institute the (new) Investment Code (1984), p. 4.

Inspite of the fact that the number of undertakings enjoying advantages offered by the investment code had more than doubled from 218 in 1978 to 452 in 1984, undertakings located in the East Province had fallen from 15 to 3 during the same period. On the other hand, those located in the Littoral Province rose from 116 in 1975 to 262 in 1984; an increase of 124,85%. Those located in the West rose from 7 in 1975 to 20 in 1984, an increase of 185,7%. Undertakings located in the North rose from 7 in 1975 to 36 in 1984, an increase of 414%¹². However high these percentages may seem, one has only to look at the percentage column above to be able to understand the lopsided location of industries in favour of the Littoral and Centre Province (58 and 23% respectively).

It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing analysis that the 1960 investment code was of little help in the accomplishment of the objective of reducing regional inequalities inherited from the colonial period or the attainment of 'balanced' and 'self-reliant' development. The authors of the 1984 Code have attributed a good number of reasons to this failure. We may only cite a few of them here, namely, the unnecessarily long and cumbersome procedures of approval, the lack of any clearly defined criteria for 'scheduling' business undertakings; not enough incentives given to small and medium-size undertakings and the Cameroonization of jobs; the period of tax breaks and exemptions for schedule 'C' and 'D' undertakings too long (20 to 25 years); and the absence of control mechanisms to enforce obligations entered into¹³. In particular, the location of many firms which benefited from the incentives provided under the old Investment Code including capital support from such financial institutions as the Cameroon Development Bank and National Investment Corporation, was not guided by any conscious or deliberate policy of achieving a rationally-distributed pattern of economic activities among the provinces.

Most unfortunate is the fact that the industrial location policy, if it existed at all,^{was} nothing but a process of persuasion addressed particularly to foreign investors. Such a policy of persuasion had no regional income distributive dimension because the active competitive inducement for investors in general to invest in any part of the country was determined in the final analysis by the future potential returns on private capital rather than the wide context of maintaining regional balance and achieving self-reliant development. As a consequence, therefore, only provinces which had all or some of such obvious local advantages as adequate transport system, power supply, export outlets, skilled labour and accessibility to raw materials attracted the lion's share of private investment under the 1960 investment code.

In order for Cameroon to achieve an equilibrium and diversification in the distribution of economic activities, a deliberate government policy on the dispersion of investments amongst the various provinces became indeed, necessary. Important as the influence of geography, labour supply and wages, access to markets and the availability of essential services in determining the location of economic activities the pattern of investment location has been of too great a political and social

consequence to be subjected entirely to economic calculus. For these reasons, a new National Investment Code was, therefore, an urgent necessity since the government never intended or wished to abandon its policies of 'balanced' and 'self-reliant' development.

However, as in many national goals the efforts to achieve self-reliance and rapid economic development were impeded by conflicting interests. The private interests of certain important Cameroonian citizens within the public bureaucracy and in the private sector often hindered the actualization of this goal. Some Cameroonians benefited from the existing economic structure based on importing manufactured products and exporting raw materials. These Cameroonians assumed the lucrative role of distributors (agents) of processed imported goods of mainly Western origin. Terisa Turner of the London School of Economics has aptly described this variance of capitalism as "commercial capitalism". A basic characteristic of "commercial capitalism" is a strong dependency on foreign industrial production for most of the locally consumed manufactured goods¹⁴. Very little indigenous production of manufactured consumer and durable goods took place in Cameroon. The rate of industrialization in Cameroon was slow. Between 1960 and 1975 the manufacturing industry in Cameroon rose slowly from five percent to eight percent of the total economy. The contribution of the Cameroon's manufacturing sector to foreign exchange earnings during this period averaged about two percent annually. The light industry producing such items as textiles, food products, beer and tobacco accounted for about half of the total value of the manufacturing sector in 1975¹⁵.

Commercial capitalism is fostered in Cameroon by the existence of a "commercial triad" and/or a "commercial dyad". A "commercial triad" is a triangular relationship involving the "statist comprador" (national public official), the local middleman from the national private sector and the businessman who represents the foreign multinational corporation. The triangular relationship works or is maintained by the existence of mutual interests among these three economic partners. A foreign businessman who comes to the country to sell his company's products hires a local citizen as a go-between with the state. If a contract is approved for the foreign businessman the state official is usually rewarded with a payment arranged by the local go-between 'middleman'. The local middleman is in turn paid for his contact effort. A "commercial dyad" exists when the national public

official deals directly with the foreign business representative, circumventing the local middleman. A "commercial dyad" is thus marked by a compatibility of economic interests between the "statist comprador" and the representative of a multinational corporation.

The following example illustrates the mechanism of the "commercial triad" and/or "commercial dyad". A United States Senate Subcommittee report on multinational corporations published in February 1976 revealed the bribing activities of some U.S. companies. Lockheed, the U.S. Government's largest aero-space and defense contractor, admitted spending \$22 million in kickbacks within the last five years in at least eight countries. Cameroon was among the eight countries and about \$3.6 million was paid out by Lockheed to secure a \$45 million contract¹⁶.

6.4: THE GEO-STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

Each economic system is set on a territory which is a unique combination of location, size, shape, climate and natural resources. Most economic transactions among nation-states entail significant even crucial geographic considerations. The Sprouts noted that international statecraft exhibits in all periods, more or less discernible patterns of coercion and submission, influence and deference; patterns reflected in political terms with strong geographic connotations¹⁷. Thus, geography, environed organisms, the psycho-milieu, technology, the operational milieu, and beliefs, all affect each other. "Substantial changes either in the environment or in the genetic make-up of the organisms involved are likely to start chain reactions that ramify throughout the entire "web-of-life" within the "biotic community". The interrelatedness of the ecological paradigm has grown increasingly with the mounting complexity of modern society resulting from expanding populations and advanced technology.

The Critical Mass¹⁸ (population and size) of a state is an important element of its national economic power. This perception is based on the amount of territory under a state's control and the number of people supported by that territory. While it may be hard to quantify, there does seem to be a kind of critical mass - which is a reflection of the population over the size of the territory - that a nation must ordinarily possess to

make itself felt in world affairs. However, in common perceptions, very large populations cause countries to be taken seriously by other nations. For example, China, weak in most regards other than population and strong Government, is treated as a great power almost universally. While the population itself cannot be viewed in isolation, the economic underpinning of the population and the size of the territory gives an added weight to the relevance of our critical mass assumption. The rationale behind this concept lies in the philosophical implication and interpretation of the development of the critical mass itself. The qualitative and quantitative production of this mass is related to the strategy and tactics of the economic development pursued by the state.

In this perspective, geo-politics or geostrategy has usually been conceived as an attempt to understand the national power in terms of the geography and economy of the state concerned¹⁹. Thus when we talk of territory geostrategically in the context of a territorial state we mean more than the mere expanse of land. We include both the expanse (geographical size and shape) as well as the location, climatic conditions and natural resources such as minerals. This geographical dimension has long been recognized as critical to the economic power capabilities of a state and, thus, to its foreign policy. "The geographical position of a nation is one of the principal factors conditioning its foreign policy"²⁰, once wrote the famous French Diplomat, Jules Cambon. Indeed, the whole field of geostrategy - the study of the relation of geography to politics and economics - is concerned with theories and hypotheses that explain or predict international political and economic patterns and relationships in terms of the configuration of the seas, oceans and lands, the topography of places, the climatic variations in time and space and the distribution of mineral and other natural resources. The assumption is that these geographical factors are decisive in the development of military/naval/economic power, which in turn determines the global patterns of domination.

Whatever the approach and theories relating geography to the economic development and international politics of a nation, one thing is clear, the size, shape and location of a territorial state, its climatic conditions and natural endowments can be great economic assets to the state because they constitute key variables which set a limit to human achievement and thus determine the global pattern of power distribution²¹. But

they can also be a liability. A geographically large state, completely landlocked, with a hot, dry climate and few mineral resources (e.g. Mali or Burkina Faso) is, other things being equal, more handicapped in terms of the cost and rate of economic development, and therefore, in terms of what it can do internationally than an equally large state, with ready access to the sea, a warm and wet climate and abundant natural resources (e.g. Zaire or Nigeria). But then Burkina Faso may be relatively safe from attack by covetous states - because there is little to covet - than the larger, better endowed Zaire. It is no accident that since independence in 1960 Zaire has been subjected to Euro-American interventions.

In this perspective, scholars²² concerned with the interaction between man and his environment have tended to stress the importance of environmental factors as determinants or at least conditioners of political and economic behaviours. Environment not only limits human conduct but also provides opportunities. Of particular importance are climatic and geographical factors. These theorists assume that uneven distribution of resources and differences in geographic and climatic endowments affect the potential power of a nation. The size of the country influences the availability of natural resources and climate affects the mobilization of human resources necessary for exploiting these natural resources. Variations in these factors may crucially affect the structure of economic and political systems, even influencing their ability to survive under stress. If economic and political behaviour is affected by the environment, then man has the capacity to alter his political or economic behaviour by altering or manipulating his environment.

However, human and nonhuman environmental factors affect human activities in only two respects. First, they can influence human decisions only if human beings perceive them. Second, environmental factors can limit the human individual performance²³. The Sprouts regards geographic science as "concerned with the arrangement of things on the face of the earth, and with the association of things that give character to particular places"²⁴. Thus geography affects all human and nonhuman, tangible and intangible phenomena that "exhibit areal dimensions and variations upon or in relation to the earth's surface"²⁵.

It is increasingly difficult to "isolate and classify political events as merely domestic matters or foreign affairs, or as political,

sociological or economic"²⁶. Infact, the complexity of interrelatedness "within and between national communities, and the increasing irrelevance of the time-honoured distinction between domestic and international questions, constitute major datum points in the ecological perspective on international politics"²⁷. The focal point for empirical analysis in our study is the "linkage" between economic development and foreign policy. In their study of man-milieu relationships, the Sprouts have drawn four major conclusions²⁸. First, the ecological perspective and frame of reference provide a fruitful approach to the analysis of foreign policy and the estimation of a state's capabilities. Second, it helps to distinguish analytically between the relation of environmental factors to policy decisions and to the operational results of decisions. In the Sprouts' judgement, much of the factors in international politics stem from the failure to make this distinction explicit. Third, the ecological approach is a useful complement to the study of both the foreign policy and the international capabilities of states. The Sprouts' paradigm entails the examination of such limiting conditions as the level of available technology, cognition of essential factors, and the ratio of available resources to commitments²⁹. Finally, they see the ecological approach as broadening the study of international politics by integrating into it relevant theories and data from geography, sociology and other systems of learning.

Within the above perspective, the Republic of Cameroon is situated at the crossroads between central and West Africa. With a territory extending from the Atlantic Ocean (the Gulf of Guinea) to the Sahelian zone around lake Tchad, Cameroon is Bordered on the West by Nigeria, on the East by Tchad and the Central Africa Republic, on the South by Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo. In terms of surface area, Cameroon is a midium-sized country in Africa. With 475.442Km² Cameroon covers 1.6 percent of the total surface area of the continent and ranks twentieth among the non-insular states. Due to its geographical situation and configuration* (a rectangle/triangle extending horizontally for about eight hundred kilometres on the second degree of latitude above the equator from East to West and measuring about one thousand to two hundred kilometres vertically from South to North up to the thirteenth degree of latitude above the Equator) Cameroon benefits from a variety of climatic and rainfall regimes. The influence of a very diversified relief (from Kribi and Limbe to 4.070 metres at the summit of mount Cameroon) seriously affects

both the climate and vegetation. The mean temperatures are situated between 19°C and 20°C in the mountainous zones of the West and Centre - West (Bafoussam and Dschang notably) with absolute minima of 8°C to 9°C and maxima rarely going beyond 31°C to 32°C but frequently attaining 26°C and 27°C in the littoral zone and between 28°C and 35°C in the North of the country³⁰. We can, therefore, note that Cameroon does not practically comprise any desert climatic type - that which shows that almost the quasitotality of her territory is used for agriculture, sylviculture or pastoral farming.

In terms of rainfall, the country can be divided from the South to the North into four Zones³¹: (a) The first zone comprises the totality of the Littoral and South West Provinces, as well as the major part (Western) of the Western and North-West Provinces. In this zone annual rainfall varies between 500 and 600 mm, with nodal points of 650 and 660 mm and rains for more than 220 days per year. (b) The second zone is constituted by a forest covering the Eastern, the South and Centre Provinces as well as the Eastern part of the Western and North-West Provinces. Annual total rainfalls vary from 160mm in the North West of Betaré-Oya to 250mm in the region of Bafia. However, the frequency of precipitations is not uniform in this zone³². (c) The third zone is constituted by herbeous plateaux and almost corresponds to the Adamawa Province. Here we notice two distinct seasons - a dry and a rainy season. Rainfall in this zone hardly goes above 150mm³³. (d) The fourth zone comprising the Savanna or Steppe vegetation is limited to the Northern and Extreme-North Provinces. Here, there are practically no rains between November and March. Annual rainfall is usually less than 10cm except in August when rainfall generally goes beyond 25cm³⁴.

The intrinsic character of the soils as well as the climate offer Cameroon some geo-economic possibilities, 85 percent of the surface area of the country is exploitable. For example in terms of primary production, only 50.000km² of land in Cameroon cannot support social exploitation (roads, railways, aerodromes, port installations, public or private buildings, urban equipment among others)³⁵. Such land is unexploitable because of its mountainous or rocky character and extreme desertification. Furthermore, because of its geographical situation, its diversity of relief, its climate and its rainfall, Cameroon has a rich hydrographic network. In

the Southern and Western regions of the country, the excess rainfall has given rise to numerous and regular river systems. The Northern zone of the country even though disfavoured in terms of precipitations has the rivers Lagone, Shari, the Benoue and its affluents which maintain a harmoniously distributed and appreciable hydrographic network. This rich hydrographic network endows Cameroon with the possibility of the abundant electricity under excellent and cheap economic conditions. Without electric energy, industrial development and transformation would be impossible. However, apart from industrial development, electricity also allows large portions of the population to benefit from electric light and to accede to household comfort. Energy constitutes an exceptional sector of stimulation for the secondary sector. It also favours the tertiary sector on which the industries depend and whose contribution to social development is important.

As for the human context, the April 1976 population census put the population of Cameroon at about 7.5 million inhabitants³⁶. Before this census, the demographic statistics were very uncertain. Infact in 1960 the population of the country was estimated at 3.650.000 or 4.200.000 or 4.700.000 inhabitants³⁷. The authors of the second five-year plan (1966/1971) retained the last figure. In 1965, the population of the two federated states was officially estimated at 5.100.000 inhabitants (out of which 1.050.000 inhabitants were West Cameroonians) - this was an anomaly because it is difficult to admit that between 1960 and 1965, annual demographic growth was only 1.5 per cent³⁸. But according to Gankou,

"after the corrections and readjustments due to the regional inquiries and interviews, the population of Cameroon was officially estimated at 6.500.000 inhabitants in December 1975. Unfortunately the past figures had served as the basis for calculating some economic indicators such as the per capita G.N.P."³⁹

Nevertheless, it might be asserted that structurally the population of Cameroon is extremely young. It presents the following characteristics:-

- (1) in terms of sex, women are more numerous than men. Women represent about 52.8 percent of the total population as against 47.2 percent for men⁴⁰
- (2) in terms of age,⁴¹ the principal age brackets could be evaluated as follows: (a) less than 5 years - 15.5 per cent, (b) less than 25 years - 57.5 per cent, (c) between 25 and 60 years - 37 years, (d) more than 60 years - 5.5 years. These figures demonstrate that in Cameroon like in other

life is Third World countries, the span of/much more reduced than in developed countries. Infact, only 1.4 per cent of the total population (or about 91000 inhabitants) appeared in 1975 to be more than 70 years old.

As for the territorial distribution of this population, one hardly finds a great homogeneity because of the diversity of climatic and vegatational zones. Niether the desertic steppe of the North nor the dense equatorial forest of the South is conducive to dense demographic regroupments such as one would find in the industrial zone of Douala or in the fertile soils of the West. The density of population in 1975 was estimated at 14 inhabitants per square kilometre a figure which varied considerably from province to province. For example it was more than 75 inhabitants in the West of the country, about 41 inhabitants in the whole Littoral, but dropped below 3 inhabitants per square kilometre in the forest zone of the East⁴². According to a 1972 Food and Agricultural Organization census, 81.75 percent of Cameroon's population lives in rural areas while 18.27 per cent lives in urban and semi-urban areas⁴³. However, according to the 1976 Population and Housing Census, the rate of ubanization is about 25 percent⁴⁴. As Tables 6(7), 6(8) and 6(9) below show, a large majority of the active population (those found within the 15-65 years age bracket) is involved in aconomic activities at the level of the primary or artisanal sectors. This active population comprises persons with an occupation (effectively employed) as well as the unemployed and those in search of employment.

Table 6(7): RATE OF ACTIVITY BETWEEN 15 AND 65 YEARS BY SEX AND SECTOR OF RESIDENCE (IN PERCENTAGES)

| Sector of Residence | The two sexes | Men | Women |
|---------------------|---------------|------|-------|
| Cameroon | 66,3 | 84,6 | 50,0 |
| Urban sector | 56,7 | 79,7 | 31,4 |
| Rural sector | 70,2 | 86,9 | 56,6 |

Source: According to the April 1976 Census - Bureau central du Recensement (Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale - Yaoundé).

Among the unemployed, we can distinguish those who have already worked before, those who have never worked before and those who are in

search of their first employment. According to the 1976 Population and Housing Census, the rate of activity or the proportion of active persons within the 15-65 years age bracket is 66.3 per cent - that is, about 2 persons out of 3 are active within this age bracket⁴⁵.

Table 6(8): RATE OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR OF RESIDENCE (IN PERCENTAGES)

| Active Population | Total | Urban Sector | Rural Sector |
|------------------------------|-------|--------------|--------------|
| Employed Active Population | 93,9 | 87,8 | 95,7 |
| Unemployed Active Population | 6,1 | 12,2 | 4,3 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |

Source: Bureau Central du Recensement.

However, the differences observed between the rates of activity between the rural sector (70.2 per cent) and the urban sector (56.7 per cent) is explained by the strong participation of women in agricultural activities. But the economic activities of women in the urban sector is low (about 31.4 per cent). Unemployment is very severe in towns. The unemployed population is largely made up of those who have never had an employment (72.6 per cent). The youths of less than 25 years represent two-third of the unemployed active population⁴⁶.

Table 6(9): THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE UNEMPLOYED POPULATION

| Age Group | Total | Urban sector | Rural sector |
|-----------------|-------|--------------|--------------|
| 6 to 14 years | 11,6 | 5,7 | 16,7 |
| 15 to 24 years | 55,5 | 61,0 | 50,8 |
| 25 years & more | 32,9 | 33,3 | 32,5 |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 100,0 |

Source: Bureau Central du Recensement.

From the above, it seems clear that economic activity in Cameroon is largely dominated by the primary sector. 79.4 percent of the active population is employed in the agricultural and affiliated activities. Then, follows

the developing secondary sector (6.7 per cent) and the relatively important tertiary sector (13.9 per cent). Table 6(10) below shows the distribution of the active population according to economic sectors. Thus the salaried

Table 6(10): THE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (IN PERCENTAGES)

| Sector of Economic Activity | Percentage |
|--------------------------------|------------|
| Primary Sector | |
| - Agriculture | |
| - Husbandry, Hunting & Fishing | 6,7 |
| Secondary Sector | |
| - Industry | 4,9 |
| - Building & Public Works | 1,8 |
| Tertiary Sector | 13,9 |
| - Transport & Communications | 1,4 |
| - Commerce | 4,2 |
| - Banks, Assurances | 0,3 |
| - Services | 8,0 |
| TOTAL | 100,0 |

Source: Jean-Marie Gankou, Echange et Développement: l'Economie Camerounaise (Paris, Economica, 1985). p. 18.

manpower comprises about 230.000 individuals out of which 20 per cent of these individuals perform administrative duties. In terms of employment, it must be remarked that independent workers represent the majority of the actively occupied population (64.2 per cent). This group is closely followed by the the non-renumerated workers (20 per cent)⁴⁷. These two groups make up 93.5 per cent of the active population in the rural areas. The mode of production in the rural areas does not favour salaries which on the contrary are relatively developed in towns due to the presence of industries and public works. Indeed, in Cameroon, there is a conspicuous absence of big land lords as one would find in Latin America or in the Ivory Coast. Moreover, most agricultural exports are the products of family holdings.

Geo-politically, therefore, Cameroon presents the general characteristics of what Harvey Leibenstein calls small size nations⁴⁸. Such characteristics include (1) a very high proportion of the population in

agriculture; (2) Absolute over-population in agriculture, that is, it would be possible to reduce the number of workers in agriculture and still obtain the same total output; (3) Evidence of considerable disguised unemployment and lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture; (4) Low per capita income and subsistence level of production; (5) Whatever savings do exist are usually achieved by the class whose values are usually not conducive to investment in industry or commerce; (6) Low savings for a large majority of people; (7) The primary industries, that is agriculture, forestry and mining dominate the economy; (8) The output in agriculture is usually low and consists mainly of primary raw materials with high elasticities; (9) Although there is low capital investment on land, there is simultaneously an uneconomic use of whatever capital exists due to the small size of holdings; (10) The level of agrarian techniques are exceedingly low and tools and equipment are limited and rudimentary in nature thereby resulting in low yields per acre; (11) The openings for modernized agricultural production for sale are limited by difficulties of transport and the absence of an efficient demand in the local market. Hence modernized agriculture is largely confined to production for sale in foreign markets; (12) Attempts made to get the highest per capital yields on land, usually lead to soil depletion because of crude technology. (13) The widespread prevalence of high indebtedness relative to assets and income; (14) The methods of production for the domestic market are usually old-fashioned and inefficient. (15) High fertility rate, usually above 40 per thousand. (16) High mortality rate and low expectation of life at birth; (17) Low hygiene, public health and sanitation; (18) A high degree of illiteracy; (19) Inferiority of women's status and position; (20) traditionally and tribally determined behaviour for a majority of the population.

However, it is commonly supposed that the larger the population the larger the manpower available to the state for economic mobilization. Thus population is equated with manpower which then is equated with political power conceived in terms of economic and military power. A more sophisticated view is that technological advancement is today the decisive factor in power relationship among states. Technological advancement of a state, however, is brought about by its men and women of genius, especially in the fields of science and technology. The incidence of such men and women is not racially or geographically determined. They appear at random

in the population of the world. It follows that the number of geniuses to be found in any state will, all things being equal, be directly proportional to the size of the population. In other words the larger the population, the larger the number of geniuses likely to be found, and as a result, the better for technological advancement and international power the state will be⁴⁹. This view, best articulated by the British scientist, B.K. Blount,⁵⁰ seems to have been embraced by many Third World Countries. This in part explains their opposition to birth control measures aimed at stemming what is now generally regarded as a population explosion. These countries feel that population control is the West's sinister method of preventing Blount's prediction from coming true. Blount had concluded from his analysis that the great centres of population in Afro-Asian countries like China and India and, in the case of Africa, Nigeria will become the leading nations of the world, eclipsing the less populated countries of Western Europe.

A large population is not always an advantage, however. For it can be argued that the quality is more important than the size of the population. A state with a large but poor quality manpower through being ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, diseased and uneducated, is always at a disadvantage in politico-military terms to a state with a small but high quality, and therefore, more efficient population. The case of Israel and the Arab States in the 1967 and 1973 wars is illustrative of the importance of quality as opposed to quantity. Furthermore, the larger the population the heavier the demands on food supply and other raw materials. Given the fact that in most parts of the Third World the population growth (average of 2.5 per cent annually) outpace the growth of the economy, these demands cannot be met, resulting in a further deterioration of the quality rather than in its improvement. A larger population in Afro-Asia, Frank Notestein has argued, "spells poverty and not power - except power to absorb suffering and punishment"⁵¹. High quality manpower depends on a high level of economic development. But the latter is much more difficult without the former. However, high quality manpower is difficult to achieve where there is a large population and a high rate of population growth. The level of economic development sets a limit on the capital resources that can be allocated to education and training which is essential to high quality manpower. The lower the level of development, the less the resources available and the fewer the children that are educated and trained. The

talents of the unlucky children are thus wasted, and in their adulthood become social liabilities rather than assets. From what has been said above, it is clear that geography and population have a direct bearing on a state's potential for economic development and as such determine its capability in achieving its foreign policy objectives.

Geography and population, therefore, are so prominent in the make-up of the territorial state that many "geo-political" thinkers have attempted the full explanation of foreign policy in terms of geographical influences. Needless to say, like any other explanation which attempts to reduce a complex reality to one single factor "geopolitics" cannot be accepted as an adequate theory even though the geographical element of power counts for much. Undoubtedly a certain correlation exists between the power of a state and the size of the state's territory and population. Although this correlation is not absolute, it is valid to the extent that no state with a small territory or small population can aspire to great power status. From the analysis of the site, location and topography as well as the climate and population of Cameroon it would appear that Cameroon belongs to the group of nations that Robert Keohane qualifies as "system-ineffectual" states which "can never acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system"⁵². But, however, there are some important differences between small developed states and small developing countries. For one thing, the problem of security which in the past was directly linked to geography has been transformed, not only because nuclear weapons have unique effects, but also because so few of the developing states have actually faced a security threat.

Geography has made security the dominant concern of small European States, for most are likely to be implicated in any great power war. Conversely small developing states might be sought as allies or supporters of the cold war antagonists but a major war is itself less likely because of nuclear weapons, and local wars are likely to be manageable unless they became part of the cold war struggle itself⁵³. Moreover the small European States also share the same political tradition and political language with the Great European powers. Their leaders came from the same social class and are committed to the same ideas about the necessary primary of foreign policy and they do not question the value of preserving the existing international system.

On the other hand, Western forms of government have been loosely imposed on completely different indigenous political traditions in the small developing states. The leaders of small developing states do not come from a single social class. Domestic politics is more important than foreign policy in the small developing states and there is little commitment to the preservation of an international system identified with imperialism and exploitation. However, as E.A.G. Robinson and others have demonstrated, the most important differences between the small developed states and the small developing states are economic⁵⁴. From what has been said above, it is clear that geo-strategic variables have a direct bearing on a state's potential for economic development.

6.5: THE PRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRIMARY SECTOR

As we mentioned above, the population of Cameroon was to a large extent rural. This, therefore, means that the Cameroonian economy was essentially based on the primary sector and especially on agriculture. Between 1960 and 1975, the revenues from the primary sector increased by 176 percent in current terms⁵⁵, but its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product in relative terms passed from 48 percent in 1960/1961 to 35.9 percent in 1973/1974⁵⁶. Up to 1980 Cameroon depended heavily on its agricultural sector foreign exchange earnings. About 80 percent of the population survived on agriculture and lived in the rural areas. In the early 1960s agriculture was dominated by the cultivation of cash crops but since the launching of the "Green Revolution", the cultivation of food crop in order to ensure food self-sufficiency also became an important national priority. Consequently, efforts were made by the government to encourage agricultural improvement in quantity and quality. In addition to the existence of numerous but less efficient farmers' cooperatives, the government decided to create many institutions to oversee the functioning of the agricultural sector. The government created SEMRY, for the development of rice in Yagoua, Société pour le Développement du Coton (SODECOTON) for the development of cotton production, (MIDEVIV) for food-stuff production and Fonds National Pour le Développement Rural (FONADER) the farmers bank. These institutions came to add to the already existing Cameroon Development Corporation (C.D.C) in existence in the British Cameroons for the cultivation of cash crop such as rubber, tea, palm oil and bananas.

Nevertheless, traditional exploitations represented the greatest part of the cultivated surface area. Modern exploitations (Rubber, Sugar canes, Bananas, Palm produce, Cocoa, Coffee...) represented only 5 to 7 per cent of the total cultivated surface area. All types of foodstuffs and cash crops were grown in Cameroon. In Southern Cameroon, cocoyams, cassava, plantains, bananas, potatoes and yams constituted the basic foods while in Northern Cameroon we had millet and sorgho. Table 6(11) shows the various types of food crops grown in Cameroon from 1970 - 1971 to 1982 - 1983.

Table 6(11): CROP PRODUCTION, 1970/1971 To 1982/1983.

| Year | 71/72 | 72/73 | 74/75 | 76/77 | 77/78 | 79/80 | 80/81 | 82/83 |
|--------------|-------|-------|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | | | <u>A: FOOD CROPS</u> | | | | | |
| Sorgho | 399,8 | 338,8 | 325,0 | 380,0 | 326,2 | 1414,1 | 440,6 | 496,0 |
| Waoundzou | 11,3 | 13,4 | 21,1 | 18,5 | - | - | - | - |
| Maize | 276,9 | 319,1 | 341,0 | 395,0 | 477,4 | 408,7 | 413,7 | 420,7 |
| Rice | 13,7 | 12,1 | 15,0 | 25,0 | 73,9 | 37,9 | 45,5 | 56,2 |
| Cassava | 729,7 | 821,7 | 880,0 | 930,0 | 1113,1 | 642,9 | 642,0 | 651,0 |
| Potatoes | 115,2 | 145,7 | 168,0 | 117,5 | - | - | - | - |
| Arish pota. | 28,6 | 45,8 | 56,0 | 58,0 | - | - | - | - |
| Plantains | 958,8 | 997,0 | 1060,0 | 1210,0 | 2401,6 | 2406,4 | 2388,2 | 1453,2 |
| Macabo | 615,0 | 635,0 | 697,0 | 740,0 | 7939,7 | 792,2 | 775,9 | 824,1 |
| Yams | 300,0 | 355,0 | 395,0 | 408,0 | 863,8 | 425,3 | 421,2 | 527,1 |
| Beans | 75,5 | 77,8 | 82,0 | 100,0 | 140,2 | 17,2 | 22,7 | 64,7 |
| Sesame | 5,0 | 5,7 | 5,6 | 8,5 | - | - | - | - |
| | | | <u>B: EXPORT CROPS</u> | | | | | |
| Groundnuts | 177,7 | 180,6 | 145,0 | 150,00 | - | - | - | - |
| cocoa | 11,6 | 106,8 | 117,7 | 85,0 | 107,0 | 123,2 | 117,0 | 130,4 |
| Arabica Cof. | 25,6 | 31,3 | 32,3 | 19,0 | 20,8 | 28,3 | 25,2 | 30,0 |
| Robusta Cof. | 53,9 | 62,8 | 67,4 | 62,5 | 65,6 | 72,8 | 86,9 | 75,0 |
| Cotton | 38,4 | 45,3 | 40,0 | 47,7 | 40,6 | 80,3 | 84,2 | 87,1 |
| Palm Prod. | 8,3 | 9,6 | 10,5 | 13,4 | 8,7 | 13,4 | 9,6 | 10,1 |
| Sugar cane | 91,5 | 74,7 | 173,0 | 180,0 | 249,0 | 651,1 | 715,9 | 740,2 |
| Tabacco | 4,3 | 3,5 | 3,7 | 3,9 | 2,9 | 1,9 | 1,9 | 1,9 |
| | | | <u>C: OTHER CROPS</u> | | | | | |
| Fruits | 750,0 | 800,0 | 845,0 | 890,0 | - | - | - | - |
| Bananas | 93,5 | 95,8 | 104,0 | 170,0 | 1365,2 | 748,0 | 602,8 | 627-1 |
| Pinapple | 5,6 | 6,3 | 7,0 | 7,5 | - | - | - | - |
| Others | 650,7 | 697,9 | 734,0 | 712,5 | - | - | - | - |
| Tomatoes | 70,0 | 72,0 | 74,0 | 75,9 | - | - | - | - |
| Onions | 4,2 | 6,5 | 7,1 | 7,5 | - | - | - | - |
| Others | 166,3 | 184,9 | 194,8 | 199,2 | - | - | - | - |

Source: Ministère de l'Agriculture, Direction des Produits de Base, Caisse de Stabilisation.

Nevertheless, the 36 percent occupied by the primary sector in the gross domestic product was less representative of the effective role played by the agricultural and forestry sectors at all the stages of the evolution of the national economy between 1960 and 1982⁵⁷. Despite the regression of its contribution in relative terms, agriculture remained the basis of national development. Nevertheless, the growth rate of the primary sector was situated at less a satisfactory level because of a number of factors: (1) 80 percent of agricultural exploitation was carried out by small traditional farmers; (2) the diversified structure of the rural economy; (3) rural exodus; (4) bad climatic conditions (aridity); (5) the poor transport and evacuation systems; (6) the inefficiency of financial structures and the lack of intervention by the state to increase production.

Eventhough in terms of financing production the government adopted two strategies - direct financing through the specialized institutions set up for that purpose and indirect financing through the price policy to producers, the measures remained timid and inefficiently applied. In the local areas, such inefficiency in terms of food crops would be attributed to the lack of organization of the food crop market. In such conditions it became extremely difficult to have a coherent food crop policy.

Cash crops included coffee, cocoa, timber, cotton, groundnuts, bananas, rubber and tobacco. Sugar-cane was grown at Mbandjock by Société des Sucrerie du Cameroun (SOSUCAM) and its production stood at 22.000 tons in the World Market fluctuations. This was the case of cocoa whose production was estimated at 100.000 tons per year. Cocoa provided 40 per cent of the country's exports. Cameroon produced two varieties of coffee robusta (with an average production of 60.000 tons per year) and arabica (with average production of 30.000 tons per year). Banana exports passed from 93.541 tons in 1970 to 170.000 tons in 1977 with prices at production which doubled as shown in Table 6(11) and 6(12) above. The intensive cultivation of cotton which was luanché in 1972 quickly expanded in the former Northern Province of Cameroon. This provoked the creation of the Sciété Cotonniere Industrielle du Cameroun (CICAM). The production of cotton passed from 38.494 tons in 1970 to 47.700 tons in 1977. Units of agro-industrial production of palm produce were developed and upto 1982 the average production was about 70.000 tons per year. The so-called

Table 6(12): PRICES OF PRODUCTION BY CROP 1970/71 - 1976/77
(IN CFA FRs PER TON)

| CULTURES | 1971/72 | 1972/73 | 1974/75 | 1976/77 |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| FOOD CROPS | | | | |
| Sorgho | 19 000 | 20 000 | 25 000 | 34 000 |
| Waoundzou | 19 000 | 20 000 | 25 000 | 34 000 |
| Maize | 17 000 | 18 000 | 23 000 | 27 000 |
| Rice | 15 950 | 18 000 | 25 000 | 30 000 |
| Cassava | 7 000 | 8 400 | 11 000 | 13 500 |
| Potatoes | 11 000 | 13 000 | 15 000 | 17 000 |
| Arish Potatoes | 27 000 | 31 000 | 36 000 | 45 000 |
| Plantains | 10 000 | 11 5000 | 15 000 | 17 000 |
| Macabo | 9 000 | 10 000 | 15 000 | 18 000 |
| Yams | 14 000 | 16 000 | 25 000 | 29 000 |
| Beans | 35 000 | 27 000 | 29 000 | 34 000 |
| Sesame | 30 000 | 32 000 | 35 000 | 35 000 |
| EXPORT CROPS | | | | |
| Groundnuts | 30 000 | 33 000 | 40 000 | 45 000 |
| Cocoa | 82 000 | 88 000 | 110 900 | 141 000 |
| Arabica coffee | 144 000 | 175 000 | 200 000 | 250 000 |
| Robusta coffee | 125 000 | 125 000 | 135 000 | 195 000 |
| Cotton | 30 000 | 31 000 | 43 000 | 50 000 |
| Palm Produce | 32 000 | 30 000 | 26 000 | 25 000 |
| Sugar cane | 5 000 | 6 000 | 9 000 | 10 000 |
| Tobacco | 230 000 | 87 235 | 200 000 | 225 000 |
| OTHER CROPS | | | | |
| Fruits : | | | | |
| Banana | 9 000 | 11 000 | 15 000 | 17 000 |
| Pineapples | 32 000 | 34 000 | 38 000 | 45 000 |
| Others | 20 000 | 22 000 | 30 000 | 40 000 |
| Vegetables: | | | | |
| Tomatoes | 80 000 | 110 000 | 130 000 | 150 000 |
| Onions | 85 000 | 110 000 | 130 000 | 150 000 |
| Others | 60 000 | 65 000 | 120 000 | 130 000 |

Source: Caisse de Stabilisation, Direction des Produits de Base,
Ministère de l'Agriculture.

"Cape Tobacco" used for envelopping cigars was cultivated in the Eastern Province and towards Kribi. The Cameroonian production of about 4.500 tons in 1970 was entirely exported. Finally other products such as Kolanuts, Rubber, Tea and more were exported in small quantities as shown in Table 6(13).

Table 6(13): CROP PRODUCTION BY VALUE, 1970/71 TO 1976/77 (IN 10⁶ FRS CFA)

| CROPS | 1970/71 | 1972/73 | 1974/75 | 1975/76 |
|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| FOODS CROPS | 41 253 | 49 500 | 69 896 | 82 398 |
| Sorgho | 7 596 | 6 777 | 8 125 | 11 100 |
| Wacoundozu | 217 | 269 | 529 | 520 |
| maize | 4 709 | 5 745 | 7 843 | 9 500 |
| Rice | 219 | 220 | 375 | 578 |
| Cassava | 5 108 | 6 902 | 9 680 | 10 800 |
| Potatoès | 1 267 | 1 894 | 2 420 | 2 720 |
| Arish potatoes | 772 | 1 420 | 2 016 | 2 280 |
| Plantains | 9 588 | 11 466 | 15 900 | 18 560 |
| Macabo | 5 535 | 6 668 | 10 453 | 12 240 |
| Yams | 4 200 | 5 856 | 9 875 | 10 800 |
| Beans | 1 890 | 2 101 | 2 378 | 3 008 |
| Sesame | 151 | 182 | 200 | 292 |
| EXPORT CROPS | 27 896 | 31 169 | 38 558 | 34 404 |
| Groundnuts | 5 337 | 55 960 | 5 800 | 6 216 |
| Cocoa | 9 248 | 9 407 | 13 060 | 11 520 |
| Arabica Coffee | 3 690 | 5 568 | 6 457 | 3 408 |
| Robusta Coffee | 6 741 | 7 858 | 9 102 | 8 288 |
| Cotton | 1 154 | 1 404 | 1 722 | 2 226 |
| Palm Produce | 268 | 289 | 273 | 395 |
| Sugar cane | 458 | 374 | 1 385 | 1 584 |
| Tobacco | 1 000 | 309 | 705 | 867 |
| OTHERS CROPS | 29 975 | 37 269 | 51 937 | 61 588 |
| Fruits | 14 038 | 16 622 | 23 846 | 27 646 |
| Banana | 842 | 1 054 | 1 560 | 2 550 |
| Pineapples | 181 | 214 | 266 | 288 |
| Other fruits | 13 013 | 15 354 | 22 020 | 24 808 |
| Vegetables | 15 937 | 20 647 | 28 091 | 33 942 |
| Tomatoes | 5 600 | 7 920 | 9 620 | 10 500 |
| Onions | 357 | 715 | 932 | 978 |
| Other vegetables | 9 980 | 12 012 | 17 539 | 22 464 |
| TOTAL | 99 124 | 117 938 | 160 391 | 178 390 |

Source: Comptes Nationaux Cameroun (1978)

Production in fishing considerably improved in quantity from independence. Infact a fish industry was set up in Douala in 1969 for the treatment of lopsters which were exported to the United States.

Nevertheless maritime fishing, remained at an artisanal stage. As for continental fishing, it remained active only in the Northern part of the country along the Cameroonian shores of Lake Tchad and in the rivers Logone, Chari and Benoue. Animal husbandary remained extremely traditional. The cattle population was estimated at 2.5 million herds and the average output in meat of an Adamawa low standing at 150 Kilogrammes, that is about three times lower than the output of a "race" low selected and grown in a shorter time⁵⁸. However, one could count about 4.5 million goats and sheep, 350.000 pigs and about 8 million birds. Forest covers about one third of the surface areas of the country. Its exploitation developed rapidly after independence. By 1982 about 6 million hectares had come under exploitation with many varieties of wood being used locally or exported. Production stood at 75.000M³ in 1970 with half of it being exported to the Benelux countries, Germany, Italy, France⁵⁹. As far as the primary sector of the post-independence Cameroonian economy is concerned, the picture that came out was that of the co-existence of two heterogeneous sectors - the traditional sector corresponding to the subsistence economy and the modern sector corresponding to the large-scale capital intensive sector but with the subsistence sector dominating the modern sector.

6.6: THE PRODUCTION STRUCTURE OF THE SECONDARY SECTOR:

The secondary sector in Cameroon during the 1960 - 1982 period regrouped all the industries which were involved in transformation from the primary products to the final product. It included not only the manufacturing industries but also the extractive industries which could also be included in the primary sector. The secondary sector also included building industries and public works which from another perspective could have fallen under services such as electricity or water and sanitary services. Like in many developing states, one could distinguish two types of industries with different characteristics - the modern enterprises and the traditional enterprises. However, it should be mentioned that from 1960, the influence of modern enterprises increased considerably. Infact in 1965, the traditional sector was responsible for 47.1 percent of the total production in the secondary sector but in 1970, this percentage had fallen to 33.7 percent and in 1975 it had further fallen to 22.4 percent⁶⁰.

The modern secondary sector considered on its own underwent a net progression during the 1960 - 1982 period. In 1975, the whole secondary sector registered a net progress of + 320 percent. Moreover, within the gross domestic product, where the general secondary sector contributed 23.5 per cent, the modern secondary sector increased from 13.2 percent to 18.5 percent. Upto to independence, the industrial potential of Cameroon was extremely low. According to Gankou and Ndongko,⁶¹ a comparison of the pre-independence and post-independence periods shows that the level of post-independence Cameroonian industrialization was in net progression. Infact, by using the working capital of all the branches of economic activities to evaluate the industrial activity, Gankou revealed that the capital of the industrial sector globally increased by 66 percent in current francs between 1973 and 1975.⁶² But if one takes into consideration the cost of living, this rate reduces at least by a half. Table 6(14) below gives us a classification of the principal branches of industrial activity according to the average turnover calculated on the period 1973/75.

Table 6(14) CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES BY VOLUME OF INVESTMENTS
(IN BILLION OF F/CFA).

| INDUSTRIAL BRANCH | VOLUME OF INVESTMENT | PERCENTAGE |
|---------------------------|----------------------|------------|
| - Breweries and Tobacco | 12,880 | 24.4 |
| - Textiles and Confection | 8,426 | 15.9 |
| - Metalling | 6,265 | 11.9 |
| - Chemical | 5,520 | 10.5 |
| - Electricity and Water | 5,353 | 10.1 |
| - Food and Drinks | 4,786 | 9.0 |
| - Building Materials | 3,786 | 6.4 |
| - Shoes | 2,396 | 4.5 |
| - Transport Material | 1,381 | 2.6 |
| - Pulp and Paper | 897 | 1.7 |
| - Mining | 649 | 1.2 |
| - Wood and Furniture | 495 | 0.9 |
| - Other Industries | 347 | 0.7 |
| - Rubber Goods | 122 | 0.2 |
| Average Total Investment | 5,2881 | 100.000 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale Yaoundé.

According to Table 6(14) above, five categories of industries (alimentary and para-alimentary, metallic, textiles, chemical, electricity and water) represented 82 percent of the industrial turnover. Again as

Table 6(14) shows the alimentary and para-alimentary industries contributed more than 33.4 percent to the global industrial turnover. As in most developing states, these industries constituted the bulk of the industrial turnover because they were the first to be implanted. Even though, the Cameroonian economy remained predominantly agricultural, serious efforts were made in terms of industrialization after independence.

At independence, Cameroon's industrial capacity was extremely low comprising a few factories in the textile, chemical or para-chemical wood and building sectors. The alimentary or para-alimentary sector was the most important and comprised: (1) Five rice treating units with a capacity of 80.000 tons at Yagoua, Douala, Tonga, Nanga-Eboko and Ntui; (2) A cocoa treating factory (S.I.C.) Douala-Bassa; (butter and related products); (3) Four palm produce treating factories of 9.000 tons in former West Cameroon at Idenau, Bota-Victoria and Mpundu, and in the former East Cameroon at Dibombari; (4) Five groundnut oil, cotton oil and palm oil factories at Pitoa, Bertoua, Douala, Kele and Edea; (5) A small chocolate factory at Koutaba; (6) A dozen of bread factories; (7) A tea factory at Tole near Buea; (8) Three modern slaughtering factories at Maroua-Salak, Ngaoundere and Douala; (9) A giant brewery (Brasseries du Cameroun) fabricating about 210.000 hectalitres of beer, soft drinks and about 15.000 tons of alimentary ice; (10) A cigarette manufacturing factory (Bastos).

These constituted the main branches of Cameroon's industrial sector in 1959 - 1960. The influence of the June 1960 code of investment became determinant because the period 1961-1965 saw an exceptional expansion of this sector. Thus, during the 1961-1965 period numerous industries were set up in Douala because of the conditions which existed. Such as the proximity of markets, sources of raw materials, sources of power and the means of transport. In this vein, BATA set up a shoe factory and the manufacture of confectioneries increased and multiplied: two new perfume industries were created. PLASTICAM animated the plastic sector, SOCATRAL and ALUBASSA transformed aluminium products and Cameroon started producing matches. This situation explains why the contributions of industry to the gross domestic product passed from 11.5 to 24.9 percent in five years from 1970 - 1975. In 1959, if we exclude palm oil (traditionally considered as raw materials), Cameroon's export of transformed products

amounted to 1.8 billion F/CFA or 6.7 percent of total exports which amounted to 26.8 billion F/CFA.⁶³ These exports consisted of butter and cocoa products (1.116 Million F/CFA) and worked wood (580 million F/CFA) in the majority. Other exports were of negligible value - clothes amounted to 17 million F/CFA and Beer amounted to 16 million F/CFA to mention but these few. However, upto 1982 Cameroon's export of industrial products (by retaining the same categories which contributed to the calculations of 1959) attained 23.7 billion F/CFA or 23 percent of the global external sales. It has been generally agreed that industrialization constitutes the most important factor of growth and a necessary condition of development.⁶⁴ The industrial sector is that which par excellence, introduces multiplier effects into the other sectors of the economy. The evolution of the contributions of the secondary sector to the gross domestic product of Cameroon is illustrated in Table 6(15).

Table 6(15): EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTION IN THE SECONDARY SECTOR
(IN BILLIONS CFA FRCS)

| Year | Modern and Traditional Sector | % Relative to GNP | Modern Sector | % Relative to the GNP |
|---------|-------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 1965/66 | 39,0 | 25,4 | 23,3 | 13,7 |
| 1970/71 | 63,5 | 23,7 | 43,3 | 16,1 |
| 1975/76 | 138,4 | 23,9 | 89,9 | 15,5 |
| 1976/77 | 165,0 | 23,9 | 107,2 | 15,4 |

Source: Ministère de l'Economie et du Plan, Yaoundé.

From Table 6(15) it becomes clear that the industrial sector, for many years, experienced relative stagnation. Production in this sector only increased nominally but remained almost constant relative to the Gross Domestic Product. Such a situation was due to the existence of unadapted colonial structures which were no longer adapted to post-independence modern methods and techniques of management and production. In terms of the indicators of industrial activities, we should first of all consider the evolution of the industrial turnover and its value - added benefits. Including all taxes, the turnover of the industrial sector in Cameroon amounted to 54 billion F/CFA in 1959-1970, to 160 billion F/CFA in 1977/78.

This implied a growth rate of 24.5 percent per year in current francs. As for the value-added benefits, they represented 36.7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in constant terms. In 1976-1977, the contribution of the industrial sector fell to 18 percent of the Gross Domestic Production.

Table 6(16): EVOLUTION OF VALUE-ADDED BENEFITS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

| Year | 1965/66 | 1969/70 | 1972/73 | 1976/77 | 1977/78 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Value-added Current Terms | 27.1 | 36.4 | 46.4 | 87.7 | 103.2 |
| Value-added in real terms 1965/66 = 1000 | 27.1 | 23.1 | 24.5 | 29.9 | 32.1 |
| Evolution (1965/66)=100 | 100 | 85.2 | 90.4 | 110.3 | 118.4 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

As shown in Table 6(16) above the value-added benefits of the industrial sector only increase by 05 billion in 12 years or an average of 0.5 billion per year. Such an evolution is explained by the timid growth of some components of the value-added benefits of the secondary sector such as salarail mass, the gross formation of fixed capital, taxes, to mention but these few.⁶⁵

Table 6(17): DISTRIBUTION OF BRANCHES OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR BY VOLUME OF INVESTMENT IN 1977/78 (IN BILLION OF F/CFA)

| Branch of Activity | Volume of Investment | Percentage |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------|
| Food, Drinks, Tobacco | 56.2 | 35.0 |
| Textiles and Shoes | 27.5 | 17.2 |
| Metallurgy | 22.6 | 14.1 |
| Asembly and Repair of cars | 14.3 | 8.9 |
| Energy | 11.3 | 7.0 |
| Grains and Oil | 10.3 | 6.5 |
| Building Materials | 8.0 | 5.1 |
| Chemicals and Rubber | 3.6 | 2.2 |
| Wood and Ancillaries | 3.4 | 2.1 |
| Extractive Industries | 2.9 | 1.9 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

Table 6(17) gives us a classification of the principal industries in Cameroon according to their business turnover. This classification constitutes a criterion of comparison with the aim of differentiating the capacity of production of each branch.

A close examination of Table 6(17) above and 6(18) below demonstrates the relative importance of branches connected with "alimentary products, drinks and tobacco products" in the the industrial sector. In 1977/1978, the business turnover of these branches amounted to 56.2 billion francs CFA or 35 percent of the business turnover of the secondary sector.

Table 6(18): EVOLUTION OF THE FBCF OF THE SECONDARY SECTOR 1964-1983

| Period | FBCF (in billions of francs CFA) |
|---------|----------------------------------|
| 1964/65 | 9,2 |
| 1965/66 | 10,0 |
| 1966/67 | 14,3 |
| 1967/68 | 16,7 |
| 1968/69 | 21,5 |
| 1969/70 | 36,2 |
| 1970/71 | 36,4 |
| 1971/72 | 27,6 |
| 1972/73 | 46,7 |
| 1973/74 | 32,5 |
| 1974/75 | 38,8 |
| 1975/76 | 46,1 |
| 1976/77 | 71,3 |
| 1978/79 | 111,6 |
| 1980/81 | 370,1 |
| 1982/83 | 484,8 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

In terms of the level and evolution of investments, it could be said that while investments increased regularly in current francs between 1964/1965 and 1968/1969, those of the industrial enterprises increased hesitatingly during the same period. Between, 1970 and 1983, however, there was an ameliorated growth rate over the past period except for the 1973/74 fiscal year when this sector underwent serious degradation due to the worsening economic situation consequent upon the oil crisis of 1973. Table 6(19) and 6(20) below show the evolution of the fixed capital formation and the productive investments of the industrial sector.

Table 6(19): INVESTMENT TURNOVER.

| | 1965/66 | 1969/70 | 1972/73 | 1976/77 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Investments (Enterprise) in Current Terms | 10,0 | 36,2 | 46,7 | 71,3 |
| Investments in Real Terms (1965/66 = 100) | 10,0 | 11,1 | 18,2 | 14,8 |
| Rate of Real Marginal Productivity (VA) | 27,1 | 1,64 | 1,35 | 2,02 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

Table 6(20): OUTPUT OF INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS.

| | 1965/66 | 1969/70 | 1972/73 | 1976/77 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| - Business Investments in Current Terms | 10,0 | 36,2 | 46,7 | 71,3 |
| - Investments in Real Terms (1965/66 = 100) | 10,0 | 11,1 | 18,2 | 14,8 |
| - Rate of Real Marginal Productivity (VA) | 27,1 | 1,64 | 1,35 | 2,02 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

These tables demonstrate that in a general perspective global investments of the industrial sector slowed down between 1965/66 and 1978/79 - a slow down which could be partially explained by the high cost of imported equipment as shown in Table 6(19). The efficiency of productive investments decreased sensibly between 1965/66 and 1976/77. It passed from 2.71 per unit of investment to 2.02 or a fall in productivity of the order of 25 percent.

Finally if we consider the level of employment and revenue, we can first of all assert that one of the fundamental objectives of industrialization was to contribute efficiently to the absorption of unemployment. Table 6(21) provides statistics on the salarial mass per year of the 500 most important enterprises according to the industrial and commercial census carried out by the Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale du Cameroun. This table allows us to remark an average increase in number of the industrial population of 14 percent and in salaries of 41 percent per fiscal year.

Table 6(21): EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
1969/1970 TO 1977/1978

| Years | No. Employed | Salaries (in 10 ⁶ F) | Sal/NO. |
|---------|--------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| 1969/70 | 14244 | 6597 | 0,463 |
| 1970/71 | 16842 | 7810 | 0,463 |
| 1971/72 | 17998 | 8424 | 0,468 |
| 1972/73 | 17852 | 9449 | 0,529 |
| 1973/74 | 23504 | 11962 | 0,509 |
| 1974/75 | 24480 | 15575 | 0,636 |
| 1975/76 | 18534 | 20842 | 0,668 |
| 1976/77 | 29497 | 20842 | 0,707 |
| 1977/78 | 30661 | 27987 | 0,913 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

In 1976/77 the level of global employment in all the sectors was to the tune of 29.497 persons. This number increased to 30.661 for the 1977/78 fiscal year. This means that during the 1977/78 year 1164 employments were created and this represented a growth rate of four percent. During the same period, salaries went from 10.842 to 27987 million francs or an increase of 34 percent. Within the same perspective, the level of salary per head was 913.000F/CFA in 1977/78. The high level of the per head salary could be explained by the high salaries of the cadres (senior staff) of the enterprises. One must also remark that in a period of ten years (between 1965/66 and 1977/79) the industrial sector only absorbed 16.500 salaried workers - that which was negligible considering the increased rate of the active population during this period. Such a situation was explained by the high cost of job creation in this sector (some jobs were compensated 2 million francs per post)⁶⁶. Nevertheless, it could be said that the relative part contributed by the industrial sector represented only 10 percent of the distributed global salarial mass⁶⁷.

As we remarked above, the industrial sector in Cameroon at independence was very small but between 1960 and 1982, the industrial tissue became highly diversified. However, it would suffice here to look at the principal branches of the industrial activity.

(A) ALIMENTARY INDUSTRIES:

Before independence, this sector consisted of two important enterprises - those of tobacco and drinks - but by 1982, this number had swollen to 57 enterprises. The majority of these enterprises consisted of the import substitution category. This sector consisted of branches 04 to 07 of the industrial nomenclature of Cameroon. The structure of this branch of industries consisted of:

- (a) the "grain and flour works" group which used 23.3 percent of local inputs out of which 17.9 percent represented the industrial products of Cameroonian agriculture. The imported inputs accounted for about 57.5 percent of the production costs of this branch - a situation which demonstrated a high degree of external dependency.
- (b) the "cocoa and sugar transformation" group consumed 79.2 percent⁶⁸ of local inputs out of which 69 percent represented industrial products. Intermediary consumer goods imported represented only 7.9 percent of this branch. This was the branch that was most integrated in the national economy.
- (c) other alimentary industries consumed 36.8 percent of local inputs and 16.2 percent of imported inputs.
- (d) the "drinks and tobacco" group used 27.5 percent of local inputs and 17.1 percent of imported inputs.

This sector occupied the first place in the market of locally made products from the Cameroonian industry in terms of the business turnover. In 1969/70, its business turnover was evaluated at 19.719 million F/CFA which represented about 36.2 percent of the global business turnover of the secondary sector in 1977/78.⁶⁹ Its contribution to the value-added benefits of the secondary sector was important. From 7472 million F/CFA in 1969/70, its value-added benefits attained 33931 million F/CFA in 1977/78 - this implied a growth rate of about 21.3 percent. One could add that this growth rate was far greater than the growth rate of the value-added benefits of the secondary sector which was only 17.4 percent. In terms of employment, it is the sector which had the highest number of employed workers. This number went from 5747 individuals in 1969/1970 to more than 10300 persons in 1982/83. The

salaries which were distributed represented on the whole 31 percent of the value-added benefits. This salarial mass which was evaluated at 2348 million F/CFA in 1969/70 passed to 10175 million F/CFA in 1977/78 - that is an increase rate of 20.1 percent.⁷⁰ However, one must remark that the salarial mass contributed was directly linked to the number of persons employed. Thus, the amelioration of productivity in nine years from 1969/70 to 1977/78 was about 199 percent while for the same period the growth rate of the salarial mass was only 20.1 percent. This meant that the gains in productivity ameliorated the gross revenues of exploitation much more than the revenues of the workers.

Finally, this sector contributed 16035 millions F/CFA to the public treasury as taxes in 1977/1978.⁷¹ The rythm of progress of taxes contributed to the public treasury (+25.7 percent) was on the average higher than the rate of increase of the business turnover (13.1 percent) during the same period. This did not imply an overtaxation of this sector but merely reflected the change in the privileged regime which was accorded to the enterprises in this sector. Generally, this branch of industries was the most dynamic during the period analysed.

(a) TEXTTLE, CONFECTION AND SHOE INDUSTRIES

The existence of local raw materials (cotton and leather) as well as the rate of development of the internal market led the public authorities in Cameroon to promote a number of projects in this sector during the first four Five-Year-Plans.

Table 6(22): EXPORT OF TEXTILES IN TONS (IN MILLIONS CFA FRANCS)

| Year | Raw Cotton | Cotton Tissue | Synthetic Tissue |
|------|------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1970 | 36 154 | 79 (64,7) | - (-) |
| 1971 | 14 807 | 156 (95,7) | 26 (22,4) |
| 1972 | 12 560 | 501 (358,8) | 15 (28,8) |
| 1973 | 6 440 | 1 029 (752,1) | 68 (55,5) |
| 1974 | 5 790 | 1 810 (1776,1) | 97 (99) |
| 1975 | 9 075 | 1 280 (1264,3) | 48 (97) |
| 1982 | - | 3 271 (5285) | - |
| 1983 | - | 2 706 (5139) | - |

Source: Comptes Nationaux (Octobre 1984).

As shown in Table 6(22) the structure of production in these industries show that in 1976/77:

- 33.4 percent of their costs of production was constituted by local inputs of which 25.1 percent represented industrial products;
- 26.5 percent of the intermediary consumer products of this sector were imported.

The business turnover of this sector in 1969/70 amounted to 10321 million F/CFA. After stagnating between 1973/1974 at 14000 to 14500 million F/CFA, this sector started ameliorating in 1975 and attained its heights in 1977/78 with a business turnover of about 27.500 million F/CFA that which represented 17.1 percent of the global business turnover of the secondary sector for that year against 22.3 percent in 1970/71.⁷² This branch came second behind the alimentary industries, drinks and tobacco. The branch of industries made value-added benefits of 120.72 million of F/CFA in 1977/78 - that which represented an average growth rate of 9.5 percent per year or nearly half of the global growth rate of the secondary sector during the same period (17.4 percent). From the viewpoint of employment, this branch of industries came second to the alimentary sector by using about 27.4 percent of the total manpower of the secondary sector. The manpower passed from 2839 persons in 1973/74 to 8407 persons in 1977/78. Furthermore this sector distributed a salarial mass of 10175 million F/CFA in 1977/78 against 2348 million F/CFA in 1969/70 - that which represented an increase rate of about 14.5 percent. Finally, the contributions of these industries in taxes passed from 681 million F/CFA in 1969/70 to 1942 million F/CFA in 1977/78.⁷³

(b) WOOD INDUSTRIES

With more than 20 million hectares of forest, forest exploitation and wood transformation constituted one of the axis on which Cameroon anchored its development policy after independence. Eventhough the envisaged goals were not attained by 1982, nevertheless a few units of exploitation and transformation set up during this period had started the process. The analysis of the structure of production of wood industries for the year 1976/77 reveals that in forest exploitation about 35.1 percent of the costs of production was constituted by local inputs of

which 8.7 percent represented industrial products. The imported inputs accounted for 13.7 percent. Local inputs of the wood industry and carpentry represented about 42.9 percent of the cost of production of which 21.7 percent represented industrial products and 13.3 percent represented imported products. The business turnover of this branch passed from 956 million in 1969/70 to 3472 millions in 1977/78. Its contribution to the market of industrial products was about 2 percent.⁷⁴ The wood industries made value-added benefits of 1157 million francs CFA in 1977/78 or more than four times the level in 1969/70 (286 million F/CFA). Out of a total production of 1.300.000 million, about 1/3 was transformed locally. Wood constituted one of the principal products of Cameroon coming third in rank after cocoa and coffee if petrol was not included.

(c) FATS AND OIL INDUSTRIES

Between 1960 and 1982, the Government made considerable efforts to develop the structures of production that existed in the fats and oil industry before independence. This effort could be explained by the desire of the public authorities to satisfy the needs of households and industries. The business turnover of this sector was estimated at 10342 million F/CFA in 1977/78 as against 2798 million F/CFA in 1969/70. This represented a growth rate of 17.1 percent. This branch of industries made value-added benefits of 3972 million francs CFA in 1977/78 against 717 million F/CFA in 1969/70 - that which represented an average increase rate of 23.9 percent per year.⁷⁵ This branch employed a total manpower of 1374 persons in 1977/78 as against 479 persons in 1969/70. While the salaried mass distributed by this branch amounted to 271 million F/CFA in 1969/70, it reached 1272 million F/CFA in 1977/78. This group of industries contributed 641 million francs CFA to the public treasury in taxes in 1977/78 as against 104 million F/CFA contributed in 1969/70.

In terms of evolution, the "Fats and Oil" industries went through many stages in their development.⁷⁶ Before independence, one could count about 23 factories for palm oil treatment with a capacity of 75.000 tons for a quantity of palm oil of 14000 tons. These factories were found at Idenau, Mpundu, Ndian, Dibombari and Edea; an enterprise for transforming palm nuts; 2 cotton oil factories at Kaelé and Pitoa; 2 groundnut oil factories at Pitoa and Bertoua and 1 soap making industry at Douala.

In 1959, the following quantities were respectively produced by these factories; 10.000 to 11.000 tons of palm oil; 11.000 ton of palm kernel oil; 275 tons of cotton oil; 4000 tons of soap.

In 1963/64,⁷⁷ the level of production of these products had ameliorated as follows: 14.000 tons of palm nut oil; 2750 tons of palm kernel oil; 390 tons of cotton oil; 62 tons of groundnut oil; 6000 tons of soap.

Due to the increase in the soap making capacity of these industries which had passed from 10.000 tons to 22.000 tons, the 1982⁷⁸ production capacity was as follows: 47.700 tons of palm oil, 8404 tons of palm kernel oil, 26 119 tons of cotton oil, 15820 tons of groundnut oil.

(d) CHEMICAL, RUBBER AND PLASTIC INDUSTRIES

This branch of industries included enterprises manufacturing fertilizers, latex products, perfumes, gas, matches, paints, disinfectants, plastic articles, rubber product and many others. In 1959, this branch had only one enterprise - the SOCIETE CAMEROUNAISE D'OXYGENE ET D'ACETYLENE (CAMOA). But by 1962, the gamut of industries in this subbranch had been diversified and apart from CAMOA, one could note enterprises producing "Camel Water", diluants, anti-parasitical products and others. The level of production attained by these enterprises in 1963/64 is shown in Table 6(23) below.

Table 6(23): PRODUCTION IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

| | Quantity | Value (in millions F/CFA) |
|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| Eau de javel | 15.000 litre | 9 |
| Soaps | 36 tonnes | 5 |
| Candles | 30 tonnes | 4 |
| Diluants | 80.000 litres | 7 |
| Anti-parasitical Products | 22 tonnes | 15 |
| Parfumes | - | 140 |
| Gas | 200.000 m ³ | 94 |
| Latex Treatment | 9 830 tonnes | - |

Source: Comptes Nationaux du Cameroun.

To this gamut of products was added in 1970/71 matches (103.000.000 boxes) and paints (1700 tons).⁷⁹ This gamut would have been more important if the projects inscribed in the second Five-Year Plan (1966-1971) had been realized - (fertilizers, detergents). The rate of the consumption of plastic products (346 tons) in 1958 led to the inscription of the construction of a unit for the manufacture of plastic articles (PLASTICAM) in the first Five-Year Plan. In 1963/64, the level of production in this enterprise had attained 580 tons (banana protection bags, buckets, net and others). The rapid growth led to the creation of other units of production. By 1982, these industries were able to provide the local market with an assorted variety of products. But due to the wide variety of chemical products imported (fungicides, fertilisers, etc), these industries could not absorb the local demand.

The goods and services consumed by the chemical, rubber and plastic industries represented 27.8 percent of their costs of production out of which 20.8 percent represented industrial products. The imported inputs accounted for 33.7 percent in their costs of production. The business turnover of this sector attained 3627 million F/CFA in 1977/78 against 627 million in 1969/70 - that is an average annual growth rate of 24.5 percent. Value-added benefits to the secondary sector of these industries amounted to 1347 million F/CFA in 1977/78 as against 213 million F/CFA in 1969/70.⁸⁰ In terms of manpower, these industries employed 759 person in 1977/78. The same year, the industries distributed 648 million F/CFA in salaries as against 89 million F/CFA only in 1969/70. The volume of taxes contributed by these industries to the public treasury amounted to 293 million francs CFA in 1977/78.

(e) BUILDING INDUSTRIES

Upto 1964/65, the totality of construction materials was imported. The rapid expansion of the internal market and demand led to the implantation of a number of enterprises manufacturing construction materials. The objectives of the Third Five-Year Plan in this sector was geared towards increasing the capacity of production of the different local enterprises involved in this branch of industries, considering the increase rate of the building and public works branch.

Table 6(24): THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTION IN THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (IN MILLION OF F/CFA)

| Production | 1970 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1980 | 1983 |
|--|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Total Industrial Production | 61.4 | 68.9 | 72.9 | 85.6 | 104.4 | 172.9 | 331.1 | 867.3 |
| Production of the building and public works branch | 16.7 | 17.8 | 16.2 | 18.9 | 24.6 | 46.8 | 124.9 | 145.8 |
| Total percentage of Production | 27.2 | 25.8 | 22.2 | 22.1 | 23.7 | 27.1 | 37.7 | 16.8 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

As Table 6(24) shows the most important realization in this branch during the Third Five Year Plan was the increase in the capacity of production of the ciment factories at Bonaberi and Figuil. From the end of the Third Five Year Plan, (1971/76), the Cimenterie du Cameroun (CIMENCAM) raised its capacity of production to 300.000 tons of ciment per year. The Figuil factory increased its capacity of production from 26.000 tons in 1971 to 50.000 tons per year in 1975/76. This branch of industrial activity used 26,2 per cent of local inputs while 36,5 percent of the cost of production was constituted by imported inputs. With a business turnover of 7.990 million F/CFA in 1977/78, the building material group of industries occupied a relatively important place in the industrial sector of Cameroon. The high demand of products of this sector (orchestrated by the high rate of construction) explained the rate of its expansion which was about 31.5 percent between 1969/70 and 1977/78. The value-added benefits of this sector amounted to 2721 million F/CFA in 1977/78.⁸¹ In 1977/78, this branch of industries distributed a salarial mass of about 904 million F/CFA as against 106 million F/CFA in 1969/70. The volume of taxes contributed by this branch to the public treasury amounted to 637 millions F/CFA in 1977/78 as against 47 million F/CFA in 1969/70.

(f) METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY

The manufacture of aluminium by "Aluminium du Cameroun" company (ALUCAM) occupied an important place in the metallurgical industry. The installations of ALUCAM made since 1956 constituted one of the important industrial units of Cameroon and belonged to the Pechiney group in France. ALUCAM from its origin had a production capacity of 50.000 tons of aluminium. Outside the 1962 to 1965 period when conditions were exceptionally favourable (52.000 tons, 51559 and 51590 tons),⁸² this capacity was never attained between 1966 and 1982 because of the irregularities in the volume of water of river Sanaga which served the hydro-electric plant of Edea. The construction of the Mbakaou and Bamendjin dams helped to partially resolve the problem of energy. Upto 1958, ALUCAM exported aluminium bars and lingots. From 1958 to 1962, two units for transforming imported zinc into household utensils were implanted. From 1966, a unit with a capacity of 7.000 tons was set up for transforming lingot products.

Table 6(25): ALUMINIUM PRODUCTION

| Period | Aluminium (in tons) | Household Aluminium (in tons) | Zinc and roofing Equipment in Aluminium (in tons) |
|---------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| 1959/60 | 43.300 | 300 | - |
| 1963/64 | 52.000 | 325 | 1330 |
| 1964/65 | 51.590 | 380 | 1898 |
| 1967/68 | 49.000 | - | - |
| 1968/69 | 46.800 | - | - |
| 1969/70 | 52.600 | - | - |
| 1970/71 | 50.000 | 690 | 12000 |
| 1971/72 | 46.251 | - | 14828 |
| 1972/73 | 44.856 | - | 14745 |
| 1973/74 | 46.341 | - | 21075 |
| 1974/75 | 53.132 | - | 24500 |
| 1975/76 | 50.782 | - | 26069 |

Source: Ministère de l'Economie et du Plan, Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

Table 6(25) above shows the evolution of production in the aluminium industries. The analysis of the structure of production in this sector of the metallurgical industry shows that 43.7 percent of the costs of production were constituted by local inputs out of which 36.6 percent represented industrial products; imported inputs represented 44.8 percent.⁸³

The business turnover of this industry in 1977/78 stood at 22529 million F/CFAas against 6597 million F/CFA in 1969/70. Its contribution to the global turnover of the industrial sector passed from 12 percent in 1969/70 to 14 percent in 1977/78. The value-added benefits of this branch amounted to 3426 million F/CFA in 1977/78. It employed a manpower of 1126 persons in 1977/78 and it distributed 1730 million F/CFA in salaries. This branch of industries contributed 176 million in taxes in 1977/78 as against 78 million F/CFA in 1969/70. This represented an increased rate of 10.7 percent which was lower than the rate of increase of the business turnover.

In addition to the seven principal sectors of industrial activity analyzed above, one could add other sectors - reparation of vehicules, mechanical and electrical industries and extractive industries. However, one could distinguish two grand categories of industrial investments in terms of the origin of capital. There was on the one hand, public investments (public enterprises) and on the other hand, private investments. In this last category foreign private investments occupied an important place.⁸⁴

6.7: THE PRODUCTION STRUCTURE OF THE TERTIARY SECTOR

The tertiary sector covered all services from private through para-administrative to administrative services such as posts and telecommunications, hotel services, restauration and touristic services, transport services, beauty services; and others. The tertiary sector occupied the largest place within the gross Domestic Production of Cameroon. The relative part of its production within the Gross Domestic Production of Cameroon was 40.8 percent in 1960 when the country had no industries and the import of manufactured products. This rate fell to 36.5 percent in 1964/65 because of the rapid expansion of the secondary sector during the same period. This rate then rose to 37 percent in 1966 and to 38.8 percent in 1967 to 39.3 percent in 1968, to 41.7 percent in 1969 and to 41.9 percent in 1970 before stabilising at 40 percent between 1970/76.⁸⁵ However, according to the documents of the Direction de la Statistique du Cameroun,⁸⁶ production in the tertiary sector could be classified into four main branches:

- (a) transport, ancillary activities, and telecommunications.
- (b) lodging and credits - real estate companies, banks, insurances and other financial institutions.

- (c) commercial activities (internal and external),
- (d) other services (tourism, etc.).

The average production of each of these branches during the 1970/76 period is as shown in Table 6(26) below.

Table 6(26): THE AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION IN THE MAIN BRANCHES OF TERTIARY SECTOR (IN BILLION OF F/CFA)

| Branches | Production in 1978 | Average % | Production in 1983 | % |
|---|--------------------|-----------|--------------------|------|
| Transport and Telecommunication | 19.1 | 14.0 | 128.8 | 15 |
| Rents & Credits | 0.4 | 0.3 | 355.2 | 43.0 |
| Commerce | 10.5 | 77.0 | 310.7 | 38.0 |
| Other Services | 11.8 | 8.7 | 34.5 | 4.0 |
| Total Production of the tertiary sector | 136.3 | 100.0 | 791.7 | |

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

Table 6(26) shows that production of the credit and lodging establishments which were very insignificant (400 million F/CFA on the average) in relationship to other branches in 1978 had become considerably important in 1983. This was very normal because these institutions (banks and insurances) were not only supposed to canalize and distribute the savings of their clients but also supposed to transform the money they collected in the "means of production" put at the disposal of third parties - that is the credit creation capacity of banks.

Table 6(26) equally shows the importance of the commercial activities within the tertiary sector. Its production represented an average of 57.5 percent of the global tertiary production.⁸⁷ The commercial sector of Cameroon was very diverse. From the structure of the enterprises and their methods of management, the Department of National Accounts distinguished two sectors. Eventhough the industries of the commercial sector revealed many forms in terms of the structure of organisation of enterprises and methods of management, the Department of National Accounts (Yaounde) made

two distinctions between modern commercial industries and traditional commercial industries. Before 1959/60, traditional commerce accounted for more than 3/4 of total investments in the commercial sector but under the Ahidjo administration and with the invasion of the Cameroonian economy by foreign capital, traditional commerce declined as shown in Table 6(27) below.

Table 6(27): THE EVOLUTION OF THE VOLUME OF INVESTMENTS IN THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR BETWEEN 1970 & 1983 (IN BILLION OF F/CFA)

| Volume of Investments | 1970 1971 | 1971 1972 | 1972 1973 | 1973 1974 | 1974 1975 | 1975 1983 |
|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Traditional Trade | 42.1 | 42.0 | 46.0 | 53.0 | 57.3 | 124.3 |
| % of total Investments | 49.4 | 49.1 | 48.0 | 43.9 | 41.6 | 40.0 |
| Modern Trade | 43.1 | 43.5 | 49.7 | 67.8 | 80.4 | 186.4 |
| % of total Investments | 50.6 | 50.9 | 52.0 | 56.1 | 58.4 | 60.0 |
| Total volume of investments | 85.2 | 85.5 | 95.7 | 120.6 | 137.7 | 310.7 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

One would distinguish five categories of commercial enterprises in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration:-

- 1) At the apex of the hierarchy were the great commercial houses characterised by their power and flexibility and were generally linked to international multinational firms dominated by the French, English and Dutch. They were all managed from abroad and before the law of 14 May, 1976 forcing all commercial enterprises in Cameroon to have their head office in the country most of them had already had one in Douala. These groups are concessioners (wholesalers) who import and distribute international products, monopolising 92.8 percent of the import trade in 1978. They also ran big departmental and self-service stores in all varieties of goods including automobiles.
- 2) The second group of enterprises in this sector was constituted by big retail firms which were also foreign-based. However, there were a good number of Cameroonians in this category.

- 3) The third group was owned by Cameroonians and this group was characterised by low capital investments.
- 4) The fourth group comprised the commercial activities of all sorts.

However, it must be added that such parastatals as office Nationale de Commercialisation des Produits de Base (ONCPB), Société pour le Développement du Coton (SODECOTON), Société pour le Développement du Cacao (SODECOA) were expressly incharge of the exportation of raw materials from Cameroon, but the paradox is that the proportion of share capital holding in these companies gave foreign capital a predominant position. The same thing holds good for the Office Camerounaise de la Banane (export of Banana), the Cameroon Development Corporation and PALMOL which were extensions of UNILEVER. SAFCAM, CHOCOCAM, SIC-COCAO, CICAM, etc., were all Cameroonian establishments in which foreign capital dominated. Even the creation of la société National Camerounaise pour le Commerce, L'Industrie et le Développement: (SONAC , August 1975), and L'Office Commercial Camerounaise (OCC) and Le Bureau des Relations Commerciales (BURECOM July 1974) to counteract the activities of multinationals in the import/export sector did not amount to anything because most of these parastatals had a stake in foreign capital exploitation in Cameroon.

We have seen from our passing glimpse of the structure of the national economy in Cameroon in the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary sectors that it was confined to low technology inputs and highly elementary processing. In so far as import substitution was taken as the major tool of industrialization and diversification in the Planned Liberalism of the Ahidjo administration, the evidence shows that it was not a success.

6.8: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

Economic Performance is the acid test of the legitimacy of an economic system. While being concerned with the efficient resource allocation and the steady growth of aggregate output over time, economic performance focuses primarily on those economic, social and institutional mechanisms necessary to bring about rapid and large-scale improvements in levels of living for the masses of poor people. As such we shall be concerned in this section with the formulation of institutional and social

transformations that were taken by the Ahidjo Administration in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982. As we mentioned above, by contrasting the structures of African economies in their colonial and post-colonial phases there is an implicit assumption that the winning of political independence was a watershed in the history of Africa, and that it was a change which could reasonably be expected to have had a major, if not decisive, impact on the future development of African economies. This assumption is not unreasonable. The nationalist petit-bourgeoisie which fought for independence had insisted that political independence was the essential preliminary to a fundamental restructuring of the colonial economy, and many students of Africa seem to agree that the political hegemony of the colonizers was a critical factor in the underdevelopment of African social formations. As the case of Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration will demonstrate, the available evidence on the validity of this assumption is ambiguous. Profound changes in the structure of the economy never occurred, and even its growth rate was less than satisfactory.

However, efforts to reduce the disarticulation and dependency of the economy occurred but had only a marginal effect at best. Thus it will be argued that major reason for this meagre progress was found in the fact that the drive for economic development in the post-colonial era followed the line of least resistance, which was generally the least desirable from the viewpoint of social benefits, balanced development and the long-term maximization of development. In other words, by the time political independence came, the colonial economy had, so to speak, matured with its structure being firmly set and not being easily changed. The new government, therefore, no longer enjoyed the freedom of fabricating an economy from the start. The fully formed economy that it inherited imposed a certain logic and rigidity on the course of future development, and this logic was essentially one that favoured the persistence and even the reinforcement of the syndrome of disarticulation and dependency.

To begin with, peripheral enclave development continued, particularly in the sense that developmental activity and social amenities were being concentrated in a few urban centres. This was reflected in the ratio of urban to rural incomes. There were many socio-economic formations where a few urban centres became so economically and politically dominant that it could with some accuracy be described as city-states. Thus the petit-bourgeois

leadership of the African nationalist movement was more interested in inheritance than in revolution, and it was inevitable that its policies would locate development and amenities to the convenience of the dominant class. This has to be recognized in order to understand why it will be so difficult to deal with this aspect of economic performance in a dependency situation. Even when the government in office recognized the need to do something about the problem, it was restrained and sometimes discouraged by the prospect of impinging on the interests of the class in power. Thus economic development tended to follow the line of least resistance to the perpetuation of disarticulation and dependency, and in following this line of resistance it created economic conditions which made it even easier to rationalize more concentration of amenities and projects in the urban enclaves. In an attempt to partially contribute to the verification of our second hypothesis formulated in chapter Two, let us look at the problem of economic performance from a broader structural perspective - that is, in terms of socio-structural differentiation and socio-structural integration of the economy under the Ahidjo administration between 1960 and 1982.

Real capital formation from domestic resources requires investment and a commensurate increase in the value of real savings. In the absence of international trade and foreign borrowing, capital formation is only possible through abstinence from present consumption and when society produces a surplus of consumer goods sufficient to meet the needs of labour engaged in production capital. In a money exchange economy savings and investment may be undertaken by different groups and the process of capital formation is likely to require some form of finance and credit mechanism to "redistribute" resources from savers to investors. In fact, in the early stages of development savings may not be a major barrier to capital formation but rather the unwillingness or inability to invest. Thus, in the transition from the subsistence to the money economy, the main obstacle to capital formation may not be a shortage of saving but bottlenecks in the productive system which do not permit investment or make it risky. As far as domestic savings are concerned, the gross domestic savings in Cameroon passed from 25.5 billion francs CFA in 1965 to 47.5 billion francs CFA in 1972 and to 329 billion francs in 1980/81. In current terms this corresponded to an average value of 20.25 billion francs CFA per year. The distribution of the global savings varied according to different economic agents and from one year to another. From Table 6(28) below we can see that the households constituted ^{the} most sensitive group in terms of the quantitative evolution of savings.

Table 6(28): GROSS PER CAPITA EVOLUTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF SAVINGS (IN BILLIONS CFA FRANCS)

| Year | 1965 | 1967 | 1969 | 1971 | 1972 | 78/79 | 80/81 | 82/83 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Savings of Enterprises | 4,4 | 12,9 | 17,0 | 26,1 | 34,9 | - | - | - |
| Savings of Administration | 10,0 | 8,4 | 13,1 | 14,8 | 9,5 | 61,5 | 136,1 | 183,1 |
| Savings of Households | 11,1 | 10,8 | 3,7 | 3,1 | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 25,5 | 32,1 | 40,6 | 44,6 | 47,5 | 117,0 | 230,2 | 400,7 |

Source: Comptes nationaux du Cameroun (Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale) Yaoundé.

However, it must be said that in Cameroon, the determination of the participation of the households in the gross domestic savings was very difficult because of the existence of unofficial financial circuits.

The administrations and enterprises equally contributed substantially to the gross domestic savings. However, it should be mentioned that the savings attributed to the administrations and which were partially obtained by the budgeting of resources from compensation funds were, in reality, the product of the involuntary savings of rural households. During this period the government developed other means of collecting and canalizing less voluntary savings outside the savings of the enterprises, households and the administrations. These included the primary products stabilization funds, the social insurance fund and the national lottery, as shown by Table 6(29) below.

Table 6(29): THE EVOLUTION OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(IN BILLIONS CFA FRANCS)

| | 1964/56 | 66/67 | 68/69 | 70/71 | 72/73 | 74/75 | 76/77 | 78/79 | 80/81 | 81/83 |
|--------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| GFCF | 25,0 | 31,7 | 30,6 | 42,8 | 52,0 | 73,6 | 163,6 | 251,7 | 441,4 | 654,5 |
| ENTER. | 10,1 | 14,3 | 15,5 | 22,4 | 35,0 | 38,8 | 53,0 | 86,5 | 228,5 | 320,7 |
| ADMIN. | 8,5 | 10,9 | 7,9 | 13,1 | 9,5 | 26,3 | 35,9 | 55,0 | 81,3 | 127,4 |
| HH. | 6,4 | 6,5 | 7,2 | 7,3 | 7,5 | 8,5 | 74,6 | 110,2 | 131,6 | 206,4 |

Source: Comptes Nationaux du Cameroun.

The stabilization fund for any product had the objective of guaranteeing a certain price to producers no matter the international market situation for that product. Its working mechanism was based on the principle of compensation, with the fund making reserves in times of a world market boom and paying out in times of a slump. As Table 6(30) below shows, the price paid to producers were generally fixed at a level lower than the world market prices and the funds were rarely obliged to make readjustment allocations.

Table 6(30): EVOLUTION OF GUARANTEED PRICES TO COCOA FARMERS
(IN CFA FRANCS PER KILOGRAMME)

| Year | Grade I | Grade II | Out of Standard |
|-----------|---------|----------|-----------------|
| 1963/1964 | 75 | 73 | - |
| 1964/1965 | 85 | 80 | - |
| 1965/1966 | 55 | 45 | 20 |
| 1966/1967 | 65 | 55 | 20 |
| 1967/1968 | 65 | 55 | 20 |
| 1968/1969 | 70 | 70 | 65 |
| 1969/1970 | 85 | 85 | 70 |
| 1970/1971 | 85 | 85 | 70 |
| 1971/1972 | 90 | 75 | 65 |
| 1972/1973 | 90 | 75 | 65 |
| 1973/1974 | 100 | 80 | 65 |
| 1974/1975 | 120 | 100 | 75 |
| 1975/1976 | 130 | 120 | 90 |
| 1976/1977 | 150 | 150 | 90 |
| 1977/1978 | 220 | 220 | 90 |
| 1978/1979 | 260 | 260 | 90 |
| 1979/1980 | 290 | 290 | 100 |
| 1980/1981 | 300 | 300 | 100 |
| 1981/1982 | 330 | 330 | 100 |
| 1983/1984 | 370 | 370 | 130 |
| 1984/1985 | 410 | 410 | 250 |

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

Again Table 6(30) above shows the evolution of the savings of the stabilization funds of the main exports as well as their compensations. The 1971/72 deterioration was due to the rise in price paid to producers and the corresponding fall in world market prices. As Table 6(31) shows the constituted reserves were always in excess except in 1971/72.

Table 6(31): PEREQUATIONS OF STABILIZATION FUNDS FOR COFFEE, COCOA, COTTON AND GROUNDNUTS (IN MILLION FRANCS CFA)

| Year | (Cuts) | Reimbursements | Net Receipts |
|---------|--------|----------------|--------------|
| 1964/65 | 1 830 | 240 | 1 590 |
| 1965/66 | 640 | 20 | 620 |
| 1966/67 | 2 020 | 1 500 | 520 |
| 1967/68 | 5 210 | 1 950 | 3 260 |
| 1968/69 | 7 520 | 1 790 | 5 730 |
| 1969/70 | 12 023 | 2 122 | 9 901 |
| 1970/71 | 5 532 | 2 750 | 2 782 |
| 1971/72 | 2 489 | 4 580 | 2 091 |
| 1972/73 | 4 010 | 3 263 | 747 |
| 1973/74 | 14 037 | 2 108 | 11 929 |

Source: Thèse complémentaire de M. Bernard Contamin; L'Entreprise Publique au Cameroun (Université de Lyon II), Février 1975, p. 213.

This fall was in part due to the deficit in the stabilization fund for cocoa. However, it should be noted that the robusta coffee fund was never in deficit during the period 1964/75. Part of the reserves of the stabilization funds were used in the development of the national economy and in loans given out by FONADER. The National Social Insurance Fund was charged with the responsibility of collecting deposits for family allowances and pensions. The National Lottery of Cameroon was created in 1972 and by 1979 it had already acquired a working capital of 350 million F/CFA. Cameroon equally financed its development through taxation. Most of the credits in the state budget were of a fiscal nature and were constituted by direct and indirect taxes. Custom duties and other import and export taxes played a great role in budgetary revenue. Between 1965 and 1975, they constituted more than 62 percent of the state budget.

It remains in this section to consider one salient feature of the Cameroonian economy during the Ahidjo administration; namely, the social relations of production. This is the feature which appeared to contain the strongest impulse towards inertia, partly because it was so full of contradictions inherited from colonialism. The contradictions arose from the existence of several precapitalistic modes of production at different stages of "the decompositions"; of the advance of peripheral capitalism; of increasing differentiation within the capitalist ruling class; the

contradictions between western capital and indigenous capital; the process of proletarianisation, the opposition of the capitalist mode of production to the small commodity and primitive community modes of production and the lack of symmetry between political and economic power. The implications of the relations of production for the maintenance of the peripheral capitalist economy under the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon is more necessary here because it demonstrates the manner in which the Cameroonian society was exploited and the extent to which the participation of Western foreign capital in national development in Cameroon ushered not only in external dependency but also in inertia and disarticulation.

It shows how the indigenous ruling capitalist class were really the agents of western capital and by extension part of the structure of the neo-colonial exploitation of Cameroon. In so far as they fell into this role, they were unable to champion effectively those changes which could liberate the Cameroonian economy and the masses from their exploitative dependency and diversify her economy. As this section will demonstrate, it is this inability that accounted for the fact that the conflict of interests between indigenous capital and western foreign capital quite often resolved itself partly in an accommodation resting on the delimitation of spheres of influence and collaborative arrangements, example, the process of indigenisation as we have seen, was essentially interested not so much in economic nationalism but in the articulation and institutionalisation of this accommodation with its attendant effects of arresting any development with great potential for change and in this way aids the forces of inertia and disarticulation. Again, this topic illuminates how the indigenisation of Western capitalism in Cameroon during a period of relative stagnation caused a great deal of alienation between the elites of the administration and the masses. The Ahidjo administration therefore faced the dilemma that it was not able to stem the deepening contradictions or the mutual alienation of leaders and the masses in a manner compatible with the maintenance of existing relations of production. The administration simply in this case increased its reliance on western foreign capital and western governments for its survival. Such a situation did not allow the leadership to do very much by way of reducing external dependency, disarticulation and the impoverishment of the masses, because a serious effort to deal with these issues was bound to bring it into conflict with western capital.

Judging solely from the pronouncements of the Ahidjo administration, the observer might assume that here was a regime dedicated to the cause of social justice, especially regarding the two-thirds of the population which lived and worked the land and produced three-quarters of the value of the country's exports. The second Five-Year Plan (1965-70) was even baptised "the Peasant Plan" and the Third Five-Year Plan, in the words of Ahmadou Ahidjo himself, was:

...not merely the work of experts, the product of the cogitation of the few initiates of the most highly developed techniques of econometrics. It is the work of the whole Cameroon population The population of Cameroon has cooperated in establishing democratically the nation's aspirations and the means whereby these might be achieved.⁸⁸

Indeed, the Ahidjo administration put considerable effort into constructing a complex bureaucracy to meet the needs for "participation and dialogue" in the determination of the country's priorities and in the implementation of its plans. In addition to such bodies as the Zone d'Actions Prioritaires Intégrées, the Secteurs Expérimentaux de Modernisation, the Société Mutuelles de Développement Rural, the Comités d'Action Rurale and the Services Economiques Regionaux, there were also the more specialized Commissions Regionales de Planification each with its own specialised Commissions de Cohérence Spatiale as well as Commissions de Cohérence Financière and Commissions de Cohérence Sociale.⁸⁹ How could the Camerounian peasant not believe after all this that the government was firmly on his side? Nevertheless, let's look at the facts behind the rhetoric and bureaucratic scaffolding.

The most appropriate place to begin is by considering these vaunted plans. As shown in Tables 6(32) and 6(33) below, of the 32.3 billion francs CFA that should have been invested under "the Peasant Plan" in agriculture, only 43.5 percent of this total was actually realised. The corresponding percentage for industry was 61.2.⁹⁰ But more importantly it was in the drawing up of the Third Five-Year Plan (1971-76) that the Cameroonian populace was supposed to participate actively through these myriad committees. How do we account then for the fact that the vast majority of Cameroonian people engaged in agriculture decided to reduce the government's commitment to their sector, both absolutely and as a proportion of

total projected investments, from that of the Second Plan (32.3 billion to 25.5 billion, and 19.6 percent to 9.2 percent)? Our scepticism is even more aroused by noticing that tourism, which accounted for 2.2 percent of the Second Plan's projections had shot up to 20.5 percent of the Third Plan, that is more than twice as much as agriculture.⁹¹ Was that also a democratic decision of the people?

Table 6(32): DISTRIBUTION OF SHORT-TERM CREDITS, 1974-80
(IN BILLION CFA FRANCS)

| | 1974/75 | 75/76 | 76/77 | 77/78 | 78/79 | 79/80 | TOTAL |
|----------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Agriculture | 3.3 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 12.4 | 43.5 |
| Industry | 18.4 | 21.5 | 33.4 | 49.5 | 56.1 | 66.3 | 263.6 |
| Commerce & Distri. | 21.4 | 23.4 | 28.3 | 48.1 | 56.1 | 66.3 | 243.6 |
| Exports | 22.5 | 23.1 | 12.6 | 19.6 | 16.0 | 21.6 | 115.4 |
| Transport & Services | 6.2 | 8.9 | 10.3 | 16.8 | 11.8 | 19.1 | 73.1 |
| Private Individuals | - | - | - | 2.7 | 4.8 | 7.7 | 15.2 |
| Others | - | - | 11.8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 4.1 | 20.1 |
| Credit not Recorded | 10.3 | 13.1 | 24.8 | - | - | - | 48.2 |
| Total | 82.1 | 93.8 | 128.8 | 146.6 | 164.1 | 207.3 | 822.7 |

Source: Fifth Five-Year Plan, op. cit., p. 26.

The seriousness of this situation is only fully realised when it is seen that Cameroon agriculture was in a state of increasing crisis during the decade between 1972 and 1982. All observations indicated that agricultural productivity in Cameroon was in a steady state of decline.⁹² Robusta coffee suffered from the small scale of holdings, the low yield per hectare, inadequate methods of cultivation, pest infestation and overplanting; cocoa, once the leading earner of foreign exchange suffered from the advanced age of cocoa trees, regular loss of plants during heavy rains, and blackpod disease; bananas, of which 150.000 tons were exported in 1963 had dropped by 1969 to 67.000 tons because of the loss of Commonwealth preference for West Cameroon, the lack of attraction overseas for the main variety produced, and the inevitable plant disease; cotton, the wonder crop of the North, whose production had reached 91.300 tons in 1970 was ravaged by drought, falling to 27.760 tons by 1973/74, and showing a slight improvement to 40.040 in 1974/75.⁹³

Table 6(33) : DISTRIBUTION OF MEDIUM AND LONG TERM CREDITS 1974-1980
(IN BILLION CFA FRANCS)

| | 1974/75 | 75/76 | 76/77 | 77/78 | 78/79 | 79/80 | Total |
|------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Agriculture | 1.7 | - | 1.7 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 15.7 |
| Industry | 7.9 | - | 10.1 | 17.5 | 32.2 | 49.6 | 117.3 |
| Commerce and Distribution | - | - | - | 3.3 | 5.4 | 8.4 | 17.1 |
| Exports | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 2.2 |
| Services, etc. | 3.5 | - | 1.0 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 7.6 | 24.1 |
| Private Indivi. | - | - | - | 12.1 | 16.0 | 19.6 | 47.7 |
| Others | 3.9 | - | 11.6 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 20.1 |
| Total | 17.0 | N.A | 24.6 | 44.6 | 66.1 | 92.2 | 244.2 |

N.B: N.A. = Not Available

Source: Fifth Plan, p. 26.

No one will hold the government responsible for such natural calamities as heavy rainstorms and drought, but the fact remains that one of the main reasons for the backwardness of cash crop agriculture in Cameroon was low productivity owing to the inadequate methods of cultivation, inefficient protection against crop diseases, and the government's slow start in replacing aged coffee, cocoa, and rubber plants and in re-generating the palm groves.⁹⁴ By any reckoning, there should have been a decision to increase rather than a sharp decrease in government project expenditure in agriculture after 1970. But any amount of money would not have made any difference in a country with an administration which showed matchless ingenuity in establishing "overweight and inefficient" administrative structures but little capacity to translate bureaucratic commitment into agricultural improvement. In 1962, the government in a much heralded move launched the formation of cooperatives and credit associations to replace the middlemen in the cocoa trade. After a few years, about 95 percent of cocoa marketing was back in the hands of the Greeks and Lebanese, the government associations having completely failed through administrative inefficiency and gross corruption.⁹⁵ The funds provided by the government were simply treated as the private preserve of the responsible officials. Up to 1982, the basic problem that had motivated this ill-fated reform

still remained the disproportionate charges for transport and marketing imposed by the middlemen.⁹⁶

The reason why the Ahidjo administration placed so great a stress on the degree of democracy and participation inherent in the country's structure was perhaps because of its striking absence.

The example of Union des Cooperatives de Café Arabica de l'Ouest (UCCAO),⁹⁷ described as the largest agro-industrial undertaking in French black Africa, will suffice to confirm this neo-colonial situation of the masses under Ahidjo's administration. This association set up in 1960 to unite seven existing cooperatives, enjoyed the monopoly of purchase, treatment and marketing of Arabica coffee. All planters with more than 250 plants had to join the UCCAO, had to sell their coffee to it, had to carry their Carnet de Planteur in which all financial transactions were entered, and their financial contributions to UCCAO were regularly increased to keep pace with the increased size of their firms. Yet when one examines the operations of UCCAO, under the Ahidjo administration, one finds an authoritarian system reminiscent of the Société Indigènes de Prévoyance that was much criticised during the colonial period.* The ruling body of UCCAO was a cabal of government's delegates and the presidents of the seven cooperatives tended to be local chiefs. There was a scanty participation of the 45,000 members in the governing or supervising the work of the organization. Given the choice, as ILLY has pointed out, the majority of the peasants would have voted to liquidate UCCAO, however much it might have been praised for the increases registered in the production of Arabica coffee since its establishment.⁹⁸ Moreover, as in the industrial sector, the Arabica-producing peasants enjoyed meagre financial gains for the hard labour over the years.⁹⁹

A strong case could be made for the intention that the peasants of Cameroon were exploited, first, by the consumers of the developed world, secondly, by the Ahidjo administration and the cluster of classes which benefited from the State's action and policies, and finally by the largely foreign middlemen and export-import companies. The first and third points hardly need illustration, as they are intrinsic to the structure of economic relations we find throughout post-colonial Africa.¹⁰⁰ By the mid-1950s, cocoa had proven to be the wonder crop of Cameroon. In 1954 - 1955, cocoa

* See Richard A. Joseph: Radical Nationalism in Cameroon. The Social Origins of the U.P.C Rebellion (Oxford, Clarendon, 1977) pp. 213 - 218.

beans were being bought from the peasants in Ebolowa, the centre of the cocoa-growing area, for 180 francs CFA per kilogramme.¹⁰¹ Ten years later, in 1964-1965, the price paid for a kilogramme of cocoa was 75 francs, and by 1970 it had only risen to 85 francs CFA.¹⁰²

A similar story can be told for nearly all the other major cash crops of Cameroon. In 1964-1965, Robusta coffee (the variety produced by a variety of Cameroonian coffee growers) was bringing 127 francs per kilogramme. By 1970 this was down to 117 francs CFA. When the depreciation of the currency during this period is taken into account, Robusta growers underwent a 23 percent drop in their earnings per kilogramme produced. As the editors of Marches Tropicaux aptly remarked, "...we do not think that between 1964 and 1970 clients in the parisian bars noticed any particular drop in the price of an 'express'.¹⁰³

What is true of the coffee producers is even more startling for the cocoa growers. Anyone travelling through the formerly "rich" cocoa, growing areas of Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration would have found it difficult to believe that the inhabitants had behind them three to five decades of supplying the external world with cocoa. Where was the wealth they should have accumulated? As Michel Prouzet points out, "With the exception of a minority of well-off peasants, the totality of the peasantry only manages with difficulty to satisfy its most elementary needs until the next harvest".¹⁰⁴

One of the chief ways in which the peasantry was squeezed in Cameroon was through the government's regressive tax policy. In 1970-71, 91 percent of the government's budget was derived from duties imposed on imports and exports.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, because of the government's unwillingness to place heavy duties on luxury imports; it was the imports of mass use which had borne the brunt of customs duties, together with agricultural exports.¹⁰⁷ Unlike a country such as Tanzania which made a conscious attempt to reduce the rural-urban income gap, the Ahidjo administration persisted in a contrary policy, taking from the poor in order to leave the privileged largely unhindered. By the privileged class, here, one means expatriate owners of industrial and commercial enterprises, over-remunerated government officials, civil servants and professionals, and the European and African employees in the private sector. Thus, when one reads, therefore, that the

increase in Gross National Product (GNP) for 1963-1970 was 7.5 percent per annum, and one knows that the peasants who produced most of the wealth only achieved a 3 percent annual growth in their income, we recognize that much of the disparity between the two figures is attributable to the cut taken by the State and its agents (in addition to the Commercial Interests) from every franc that the peasant earned. Moreover, the same State and its agents stood ready to take a further cut from every franc that the peasant managed to spend from his meagre income through the taxes on mass consumer imports.

It is a truism that in every economic system that is not wholly stagnant, capital must be accumulated in some way. The point to ask about Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration is that since the peasantry was clearly not permitted to accumulate and dispose of surplus capital, what was done with the capital that was accumulated (or appropriated) from the gross earnings of its labour? In a recent essay, Joan Robinson made the following observation:

...the amount of savings in an economy is not determined in a rational manner by society at large; instead it is a function of the poor, between households and firms, and it is strongly influenced by the level and pattern of taxation.¹⁰⁷

In the case of Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo, we find that taxation system not only penalized those least able to pay, but that the pattern of income distribution conferred disproportionate benefits on the non-productive elements of society who also exhibited a high propensity to consume non-essential imports. The Cameroonian political elite was immortalized by René Dumont when he pointed out that a parliamentarian in Cameroon who undertook three month's of "work" annually, earned in two years of such "work" that which it would take a peasant 36 years of arduous toil to approximate.¹⁰⁸ Yet these deputies, however lavishly they were remunerated, only constituted a relatively small fraction of the ruling class in contemporary Cameroon. Just as R.A. Joseph has aptly said, "more significant absorbers of Cameroon's disposable wealth are to be found in the legions of time-servers on the government's payroll whether in administrative offices, parastatal bodies, party political branches, military barracks or higher educational institutions".¹⁰⁹

Therefore, the gap between the incomes of Cameroon's top civil servants under Ahidjo administration and those of the mass of the population was one of awesome dimensions. While the latter could count on earning at best 25.000 to 1.500.000 francs, it was also estimated that civil servants who numbered 50.000 and constituted 2.1 percent of the country's active population absorbed one-third of the national income (that is, not much below the 40 percent divided up among the 2.100.000 peasants or nearly 90 percent of the active population).¹¹⁰ For what services, it may be asked were the Cameroon people, providing such lavish gratuities? Very little, to judge from the conclusions of a cross-section of scholars who have asked this question over the past decade. Hugon and Mentan earlier described these administrative officers as being "parasitic" and in no sense a "reservoir of entrepreneurship" for the country.¹¹¹ Ferdinand Vincent complains that the civil servants did not see themselves as being "at the service of the nation"¹¹² and in similar vein, Cosmé Dikoume asserts that "in a general manner, the Cameroonian civil servants does not at all feel he is at the service of the public".¹¹³ Following Dikoume, it can be argued that strategies to expedite development in Cameroon, such as "decentralization" and "regionalization" contributed more to the advancement of the bureaucracy than the country's economy and the people's welfare.¹¹⁴ David Kom treats the issue of the bloated salaries of civil servants and the sprawling apparatus of the state as related aspects of the same problem:

The resources which should be put to use for the creation of a national industry, for the development of agriculture, for the organisation and extension of education and public health for culture, are three-quarters utilized to cover the operating expenses of the administration apparatus.¹¹⁵

The point to note about the Cameroonian bureaucracy is that its sternest critics were not necessarily left-wing writers. There was a realization even among supporters of Cameroon's capitalist strategy that the delaying practices of the country's civil service was an effective barrier to the implementing of planned investments by domestic and foreign concerns. The fact that the average Cameroonian civil servant did not feel he needed to "do" anything to earn his inflated salary meant that there was usually no sense of urgency in the way he processed routine paper-work. As a result of the constant blockages and corruption, foreign investors often gave up in frustration.¹¹⁶ The following portrait of the typical Cameroonian civil

servant under the Ahidjo administration, merits citing:

He views his title of civil servant only as a source of honour and security: he, therefore, demands of the citizen public respect and service... whether he works or not he has his guaranteed salary and his pension. The office is often for him the place where he reads the newspapers, where he meets his friends and relatives with whom he spends long hours in conversation, and where he often looks after his personal affairs, the progress of his bar and his taxis, the degree of completion of his building and his credit dossier with the Cameroon Development Bank; often, moreover, the majority leave during business hours to take up their personal affairs and the clients wait, resigned, paradoxically unperturbed. The "come back tomorrow", "I don't have the time", "Monsieur x... cannot be seen today" are expressions that are often heard.¹¹⁷

Therefore, in view of the absolute monopoly of political and economic power by the foreign elite under the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon; of the entrenchment of foreign capital interests and a local privileged" pseudo-bourgeoisie; and, finally, of the widening social inequalities among Cameroonians, there was no reason to have expected that Planned Liberalism and its "self-reliance" (développement autocentré) as strategies of an authentic and endogenous development, were sound policies based on good faith and commitment.

On the whole, the Ahidjo administration could claim to have been effective in protecting the real wages of that upper stratum of the urban population, fortunate to have had regular employment. Although wage levels of urban workers generally were below those of the more privileged public and private salaried employees, they - unlike the peasantry - generally saw their income keep pace with the growth in GNP.¹¹⁸

Yet it must be borne in mind that we are talking about a small fraction of the population of the major towns in Cameroon:

The ordinary visitor passing through the towns of Yaounde and Douala cannot help being struck by the contrast between the beautiful residential areas inhabited by the privileged minority and the miserable quarters where the rest of the population is thrown together in the most precarious circumstances, without water, without electricity, without sanitation.¹¹⁹

One of the tragedies of urban Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration

was the extremely high unemployment among the youths. Writers who praise the degree of educational development in Southern Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration, should bear in mind the fact that, because of the existing socio-economic system, the more education a Cameroon youth obtained, the more likely he was to remain unemployed for extended periods. Such individuals came to feel themselves too educated to qualify for the office work that existed.¹²⁰

However, from the foregoing analysis one can understand why the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon had to place much reliance on the production and export of crude oil from 1977 in order to rescue the economy from its miasma. Since the 1950s, several companies had actively prospected for oil and took pains to point that it was doing so only with the objective "of passing on all or part of its portfolio to Cameroonian savers".¹²¹ The government, indeed, proved more successful in diverting some of the profits of foreign industry to the indigenous bureaucratic elite (through share ownership) than it did in facilitating the entry of Cameroonians as entrepreneurs and managers into the industrial sector. Outside of the foreign owned and operated enterprises, the most significant undertakings were public corporations inherited from the colonial administrations (such as the CDC in anglophone Cameroon), parastatal organisations, such as the UCCAO or curious state-supported-foreign-monopolies, such as the CFDT in the North. With few exceptions, (for example, the Union Camerounaise de Brasseries with its all-Cameroonian board of directors), it was in the tertiary sector of the economy (that is, apart from agriculture) that significant ventures by Cameroonians could be found.¹²²

It is true as Richard A. Joseph has pointed, that "the Bamileke" phenomenon crops up in any study of Cameroon's history, politics or economy.¹²³ Here it would suffice to mention the fact that the inroads made so far, during the Ahidjo administration, in areas of transport, local commerce, cinemas, hotels and other venues of entertainment or services, were attributable in great part to the economic resourcefulness of the Bamileke people who originate from the highlands on the border between the former two Cameroons. Yet the considerable Bamileke initiative and resilience in economic dealings did not prevent Lebanese and Greek financiers from retaining control of agricultural transport in the country (but less of personal transport), and monopoly on gross import and export. Nor did

the Bamileke repeat the successes in the semi-industrial sector that they registered so decisively in the take-over of European coffee and Banana plantations in the West.¹²⁴ Yet, the economic advancement of the Bamileke people was a double-edged problem in Cameroon. Thanks largely to the Bamileke, the government could claim that more of the economy had gone into Cameroonian hands, however, marginal might have been the sectors in question. At the same time, the Bamileke represented the greatest political threat to the Ahidjo regime. Consequently, the rapid elimination of foreign intermediaries from the economy would have automatically meant a politically unacceptable increase in Bamileke control over transport, trading, small-scale industry and services.

While the approach used in this study on Cameroon's economy has been one of general assessment and critique, the impression should not be left that nothing good was done in this domain. Yet, commentators who use a different approach and try to tot-up the pluses and minuses during the Ahidjo years involved themselves in an even more unreal procedure. One might learn that the building of the fabulous Mont-Febe Palace Hotel on a hill overlooking Yaounde was a "great accomplishment" in the use of State funds,¹²⁵ but so also was the construction of the Anglo-French concorde natural gas in the country, especially in the Douala basin. The first oil trickled on steak in 1977. Yet, as the experience came to show, petroleum in Cameroon provided a new lease on the economic and financial life of the privileged elite, and for the masses it came to symbolize a "fool's gold" that promised far more than it could deliver. Despite the discovery of major pockets of easily exploitable oil, gas and other natural resources in Cameroon, the country did nothing more than a "limp along" under the strong arm of the Ahidjo administration, the self-indulgence of the military-bureaucratic elites, and the impotence of the rural and urban masses. However, under the Ahidjo administration, Cameroon expanded (which is, growth and not development) her economy slowly and spasmodically, following a strategy of reliance on foreign capital, foreign loans and foreign industrial management. The corollary of such a neo-colonial strategy as Planned Liberalism, however, was that the economy remained externally dependent; the industrial sector failed to break through the ceiling of semi-processing, and agriculture stagnated principally because of the meagre benefits that accrued to cultivators.¹²⁶

Economically, the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon was caught up in a trap, which was in part, the result of their own corruption and incompetence, and in part, the result of the deceit operated by the French "econometric" advisers when by 1982 it became apparent that the administration's prevailing economic policies were not working and new policies were necessary. One way out was an effort to restructure radically the domestic socio-economic structure, but this was clearly threatening and promised no immediate gains to elites whose aim was to make the greatest profits in the shortest possible time at the expense of the masses. The only other way out was to stumble forward and hope (or at least assert for public consumption) that the policies would ultimately produce the promised results. Thus, when other alternatives finally crumbled in November, 1982, Ahidjo finding himself caught in a dilemma, surprised the whole world by announcing his resignation. Therefore, as this chapter has so far demonstrated, the mechanism of external dependency in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration was a spontaneous exogenous mechanism built on the internal structure of the country, which in reality was a peripheral extension of the whole mechanism of the capitalist world economy itself, of which the internal characteristic was a structural economic disarticulation which was helmed on a political Planned Liberalism.

6. 8: CONCLUSION: DOMESTIC ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY

From the above discussion we can conclude that the structural orientation of the Cameroonian economy was guided by the economic philosophy of Planned Liberalism which inspired the various investment codes between 1960 and 1982. However, let us evaluate the contributions of this philosophy to the structural evolution of the national economy during this period. Neglecting local resource factors, the outward economic orientation of Planned Liberalism impelled Cameroon to look outside her territory for assistance and to modify national development goals to suit those of her foreign mentors. A situation which through self-reproduction assumed dynamics of its own and whose overall effect was a mutilation of the economic personality of the country and the effective transfer of the locus of its development from within to outside its borders. Concomitantly, it neglected the domestic socio-economic and political values of the society which were

directly relevant for the integration of the expected external goods and services. Planned Liberalism in this way only helped to benefit external transactions which were crucial to national development. Under these circumstances, the inevitable dead-end was nothing less than the dependency of the national economy in the short or long term.

Since Planned Liberalism, in the ultimate analysis, consisted in the opening of the country to foreign capital seeking investment while according this capital heavy advantages without seriously controlling its nature, origin, destination and opportunity, Jean Marie Gankou is right in remarking that this type of Liberalism involved serious risks and inconveniences.¹²⁷ For example, foreign capital was geared towards the creation of production units susceptible to competition with the pre-existing local units which might have been useful and profitable to the development of the country.

In this way "such capital inhibited, because of its importance, relatively weak local initiative which was perfectly adapted to the needs of the country".¹²⁸ Planned Liberalism was not only a conservative economic philosophy but "a curious camouflage of "direct" colonial economic dependency fabricated in France and exported to Cameroon for mass consumption".¹²⁹

Planned Liberalism also favoured the investment of external capital without controlling the transfer of salaries and benefits of "physical or moral persons once the latter have satisfied their legal obligations". In this way Ahidjo openly assured his countrymen that:

Industrialization implied the procuring of important sums of capital and to attract this capital, it is necessary to have besides political stability... serious studies undertaken on the possibilities for the installation and success of such and such a branch of industry...

My government, I affirm, will devote itself to putting all into effect so that foreign private capital seeking to invest in the territory can do so without fear of fiscal instability which would be harmful to it ,¹³⁰

Since the Ahidjo administration was rarely in a sufficiently strong position to risk the dangers and dislocations" of a fundamental change, Planned Liberalism became appropriate to sustain the neo-colonial economy because it was hardly a revolutionary policy; hence changing the names and labels

However, the above trend of argument does not exclude the use of external resources. In fact, the immediate post-independence state of the underdevelopment of Cameroon's productive forces made external wealth essential to facilitate take-off into introverted growth. One of the central points of the above concept of introverted growth is the limitation of the costs of foreign goods and services and the maximization of their benefits. This could best be achieved in Cameroon only in a situation in which the external resources in question were able to generate enough momentum domestically to phase out their own use in a relatively short period of time. They did not necessarily have to conform to national policies, rather they had to justify their use in terms of their contribution towards building a Cameroonian capacity to make and implement essentially national decisions. Thus an overall decline in the amount of external wealth procured by a nation is not a significant as the rate of increase in their domestic equivalent. An emphasis on their quantity may also neglect the fact that their qualitative impact may bear little relation to their size. Again, those of limited size which are useful in strategic sectors of the nation's life may have an impact out of proportion to their size.

Similar considerations in the context of Planned Liberalism in Cameroon also indicated that external goods and services were not integrated into a national framework of values, structures and procedures for resource mobilization and allocation as well as neither into the process of formulating, implementing and reviewing national development plans. The absence of a cohesive national framework of activities or the inadequate integration of these resources into it only increased their cost. In the first place, their use tended to increase external dependency and vulnerability to political pressures by providing no means for checking the manipulation of major decisions by a coalition of external assistance donors or for counteracting the possible struggle among donors to carve out different territorial, functional and institutional spheres of influence. External resources, logically became external control irrespective of the intentions of the donor and recipient alike since the latter lacked clear national institutional and goal framework within which they could be fitted to prevent the donor from advertently or inadvertently influencing national activities.

Secondly, a national framework for integrating external resources would have served the purpose of weeding out inefficient and inappropriate

resources. It is sometimes difficult to transfer goods and services from one socio-economic situation into another. Their uncritical importation across different cultural environments tended to cause inefficiency and waste because of the inappropriateness of some of them. When this is combined with the inability or failure of the recipient to supply the complementary resources, the transfer problem naturally is accompanied by disastrous results. The main principles of Planned Liberalism involved (a) the respect of private property and the mechanism of profit as factors of progress; (b) Government protection of national and foreign investment as well as their encouragement through special fiscal and political measures as well as the complete repatriation of profits; (c) the integration of Cameroonians in foreign investment undertakings; (d) democratic, indicative and regionalised planning which was optional for private foreign investments and imperative for national public investments. From these principles, it becomes clear that Planned Liberalism never acted as one of the frameworks for integrating external resources into national planning. Its perception of these foreign resources as the engine of national development, and not as supplements to essentially Cameroonian ones, as it came to be, meant that foreign goods and services were not necessarily of the right kind in order to work smoothly with the local inputs and efficient in order to increase the capacity of the local inputs to phase out their future use.

The emphasis of the nation in each case of external resource acquisition as R.H. Green has succinctly pointed out, should have, therefore, been placed on: (a) the integration of the resources into the overall national framework of goals, resources, traditions and procedures; (b) the coordination of various types of foreign inputs in order to build up a capacity to phase out their use; (c) their choice on the basis of a rank of priorities; (d) the harmonization of the interests of the donors among themselves; (e) the will to reject unsuitable foreign aid, particularly when it is initiated by the donor.¹³⁴ In such a case, the macro-effects of a self contained strategy of growth could have been maximized to the benefits of national power and national control of development. In addition, they should have been justified by the purpose of Cameroonian development which should have been the promotion of the greater wellbeing of the people as a whole. Changes in this direction never occurred because Planned Liberalism by its philosophical implication meant the absence of measures restricting the operation of foreign capital since the formation of the state sector had to be in conformity with foreign capital formation instead of the Vice-versa.

From the analysis of Cameroon's domestic economic structure and philosophy between 1960 and 1982, one would provisionally concord with Shaw and Aluko that Cameroon belonged to the category of countries "in favour of incorporation in the Western economic system and with an economic strategy based on state capitalism".¹³⁵ From a political economy perspective, this means that there was a strong relationship between the domestic economic system of the country and the foreign policy of the country; and there was a strong relationship between the colonial experience and the fact that the country followed a capitalist path of development. The adoption of Planned Liberalism as the economic development philosophy meant that there were options to choose from such a philosophy and their alternatives in foreign policy to be considered by Cameroon decision-makers. The range of such alternatives in foreign policy was limited by the choice of the economic system and this meant also that the development policy choices were limited. This means that the economic philosophy or path chosen by (or imposed upon) a set of leaders strongly influences their foreign policy. One would strongly suspect that this is more the case for relatively weak, developing states as Cameroon than it is for such powerful, rich states as France or the USA.

Shaw and Aluko do not clearly define the types of states they identify. Crawford Young has defined these rather more concisely in his Ideology and Development in Africa,¹³⁶ where he uses the terms Afro-Marxist, Populist Socialist, and African Capitalist. He includes, and quite correctly, Cameroon in the latter category.¹³⁷ According to Young, the capitalist state is characterized by having a significant place reserved for private markets. "Foreign capital is viewed as the crucial factor of production and important spheres are reserved for the private sector, a strong exchange relationship with industrial economies is a presumed corollary, in the economic sphere predominantly Western relationships are viewed as perfectly natural",¹³⁸ and "little opprobrium attached to the accumulation of wealth".¹³⁹ Young utilizes Sayre Schatz's concept of "nurture capitalism"¹⁴⁰ in discussing the role of the African state in capitalist development. The concept of "nurture" capitalism includes the following points:

- (1) Private enterprise is expected to provide the basic developmental thrust in the directing productive sector.

- (2) For this to occur with anticipated vigour, a congenial environment is assured for all capital, domestic and foreign.

(3) At the same time, an awareness, from a nationalist perspective, of the risk of total foreign domination of the economy dictates the strenuous promotion of indigenous capital.

(4) The contradiction implicit in points 2 and 3 triggers sharp and continuous conflict between multinational and national capital.¹⁴¹

As suggested in point 4, Young mentions the idea that "nationalism intervenes... to render ambiguous the value of foreign capital".¹⁴² This seems to be one area where a capitalist state exercises choice. There is a significant point of differentiation between Cameroon, where foreign capital was warmly welcomed and indigenous capitalists felt - and correctly - that their interests frequently took a second place after the interest of foreign capital and Nigeria, for example, where the influence of local capitalism was much stronger and the government placed much greater restrictions on foreign capital and the activities of foreign investors.¹⁴³ The characteristics of nurture capitalism outlined by Young suggest definite directions for foreign policy decision-makers. And Shaw strongly believes that the differences between capitalist and socialist orientation affect foreign policy.

Clearly the foreign, as well as development, policies of such different regimes would themselves be quite distinctive. The former, state capitalist type would tend to be less radical, less non-aligned and more open to transnational associations whereas the latter, state socialist or socialist type would tend to be more radical, more non-aligned and less open to transnationalism.¹⁴⁴

Yet, in a chapter devoted to the question of the relationship between ideology and foreign policy behaviour, Young concludes that "ideology... takes us some distance to an understanding of African international relations. But only a small part!"¹⁴⁵ There are common themes that unite African states - nonalignment, the demand for a New International Economic Order, and opposition to racist rule in South Africa are among these. Regional politics influence the foreign policy of particular states but "the tightly circumscribed choices in international economic relationship considerably reduce the impact of ideological perspective" and "there is simply no alternative to primarily Western linkages in trade and in access to capital".¹⁴⁶ The non-integrated character of the Cameroonian Economy domestically between 1960 and 1982 manifested itself in (a) the dualism of the modern and traditional socio-economic sectors; (b) the co-existence of

export and subsistence economies and (c) the dependency of the distorted sectoral structure and the inadequacy of the relations between different branches of the economy. An adequate explanation of the implications of such an economic structure for Cameroon's foreign policy may be achieved if only national power is then realistically described as a mixture of strategic, military, economic, and political strengths and Weaknesses. It is determined in part by the military forces and the military establishment of a country, but even more by the size and location of territory, the nature of the frontiers, the population, the raw material resources, the economic structure, the technological development, the financial strength, ethnic composition, the social cohesiveness, the stability of the political system, processes, and decision-making, and finally the intangible quantity usually described as national spirit.¹⁴⁷ To minimize the risk of circumlocutions of describing elements of national power in their various combinations, we parsimoniously represent them as follows:

$$P_p = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

Where

P_p = perceived Power

C = Critical Mass

E = Economic capacity

M = Military Capacity

S = Strategic Purpose

W = Will to pursue national strategy.

However, national Power can further be divided into positive power (C + E + M) and negative power (S + W).¹⁴⁸

Positive power is used here to refer to the ability of a state to exert influence over others in the direction of getting them to accede to its demands. This usually requires the overall superiority of the state over its victims, or at least a virtual monopoly of some resources critical for their wellbeing. On the other hand, a state may lack the strength to persuade others to honour its wishes, but may possess the ability to prevent them from achieving their objectives at the expense of its national goals. In such situations we refer to negative power. Sometimes, however, the boundary between positive and negative power is blurred. It may require the overall superiority of its domestic resources for a state to be able to resist the demands of another power, particularly when it applies force.

Those resources which are essential for positive power include the general level of economic development of the country, particularly its industrial capacity. Assuming that the will to commit available resources to the pursuit of military power exists, then the level of economic development and industrial growth reflects the capacity for a large scale sustenance of modern warfare. Although positive power is not confined to economic development and military strength, a nation's economic capability is one of the most important factors in the exertion of diplomatic influence. In its absence national objectives earn very little tangible respect from other states. Without a high level of military capability, a high level productivity of goods and services, or significant scientific achievements, a nation is largely powerless to influence other states on behalf of its objectives. In terms of this conception therefore, Cameroon had a limited power base between 1960 and 1982.

Furthermore, negative power requires a high level of national unity and moral, a strong political will on the part of the national leadership, and an independent and self-confident government. But the ability of Cameroon to resist pressures from the major powers was reduced by the informal access of foreign capital and alien bodies into the national economy - a situation caused by the colonial heritage of economic dependency and disarticulation and the asymmetrical nature of the contemporary international system.

In this case, we can conclude that the foreign policy system of the developing state is open and non-autonomous in the sense that the domestic economic system is highly vulnerable to external pressures and influences. When this happens policies are formulated, not to meet internal needs and demands, but to satisfy external constraints and interests. An extreme case of a situation where the policy system of a developing state was easily penetrated and for a while dominated by external actors may be drawn from the experience of Ghana during the late Koffi Busia's administration (1969-1972).¹⁴⁹ Less dramatic examples of such external penetration of the foreign policy machinery may be drawn from the experiences of other countries.

The external actors gain access to, and are able to influence the policy process in the developing state because they are invited to tender specialist advice. External influence may also be extended on the policy-making machinery of a developing state in an indirect manner. As we saw

above, top decision makers in the developing state (elites of the periphery) often have identical interests and, therefore, identical views on issues and events with top decision makers in the developed capitalist state (elites of the centre). Elites of the developing states even conceive of international relations in general, and the development process in particular, in a similar manner as elites of developed capitalist states conceive them. For example, the former accept the basic features of Western society as the development goal and heavy reliance on vertical division of labour as the means of development.

This identity of views is fostered through a process of penetration of the belief and perceptive systems of the elites of the periphery by elites of the centre. Penetration is achieved mainly through the education of the elites of the periphery in the educational institutions set up by or under the guidance of the European elites and on the basis of neocolonial curricula designed by them. This kind of education, in addition to establishing ideological identification between the two groups of elites, also fosters a dependency mentality on the part of the elites of the periphery. Maintenance of strong economic, political and cultural ties between the developed and underdeveloped states is consequently strongly advocated by these elites especially because they also develop economic vested interests in a high (and increasing) level of trade and other forms of interaction between the centre and the periphery states.

With this identity of views and interests, it becomes relatively easy for external actors from developed states, operating from a distance, to influence the policies of the developing states. Elites in developing countries see no problem in concluding agreements or implementing policy proposals that perpetuate the economic status quo when they are initiated by elites of the centre precisely because the minds of the former already provide fertile ground for penetration by the latter. This explains, at least in part, why, in spite of the obvious disadvantages and frustrations of their external economic relations with the developed states, the developing states continually renew or renegotiate treaties which perpetuate these inequitable economic relations based on a vertical division of labour between the centre and periphery states.

The openness of the foreign policy and economic systems of the developing state is reinforced by the interpenetration of their domestic and

external milieux. Most developing states are dependent on, and vertically integrated with the capitalist economic systems of the Western world. As a result developments in that system - for example devaluation of the sterling or the dollar, fall in aggregate demand or in volume of production in Western Europe, wars involving the major capitalist states, etc. have immediate and significant impacts on the economy, society and foreign policy of the developing state. Similarly since the development process in the developing state is predicated on the collaboration between the private and public companies and parastatals in the developing state on the one hand, and multinational companies from developed countries on the other, the latter become crucial elements within the domestic environment of the developing state.

As Timothy M. Shaw has argued, the foreign policy system of a developing country is characterized by a diversity of actors precisely because these new states are characteristically underdeveloped and dependent.¹⁵¹ The national institutions formally responsible for making foreign policy have insufficient funds, staff, and experience; consequently "they adopt many policies by proxy" and foreign diplomats, multinational corporations, representatives of international organizations become authoritative actors in the making of foreign policy choices... It is (therefore) inaccurate (either) to exclude the foreign origin of such policies from the national foreign policy system¹⁵¹ or to draw a sharp distinction between the domestic and the external environments of a developing state's policy system.

The openness of the domestic economic and foreign policy systems of the developing state has certain implications for both the policy process and the nature of policy output. First, the diversity of internal and external actors in the policy system leads to problems of coordination and multiple advocacy - problems which are accentuated by the high decentralization of functional responsibility and lack of a tradition of organizational collaboration in the developing state. Secondly, the foreign policy of a developing state is largely reactive in nature because since the developing state is highly dependent on the developed countries, its action in the international system often consists of merely "ad hoc" responses to stimuli from these states. Thirdly because the developing state is heavily dependent on external actors for financial and other forms of economic aid,

its leadership feels unable to adopt policies that run against the interests and wishes of external donors, creditors and trading partners.

The parameters of the policies of the developing state are therefore set by the degree of importance which its leaders attach to their economic ties with the developed states. Thus, on a historical or aspirational level, the leaders of the developing state may adopt a militant line on sensitive and crucial issues. But on the operational level, the leaders of the developing state can do little or nothing precisely because of this great economic dependency. This wide gap between the declaratory and the operational levels of policy is another important characteristic of the foreign policy of the developing state. One of the main reasons for this gap is the low economic achievement which is a feature of many developing states. In practical terms, this gap is reflected in the fact that often, the credibility of threats made by the developing states against other states is low. As such its foreign policy is determined less by economic-structural than by economic-attitudinal variables. Why this is so constitutes the object of the next chapter.

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