Thése

Présentée par

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING STATE : THE CAMEROONIAN EXPERIENCE, 1960 - 1982

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING STATE : THE CAMEROONIAN EXPERIENCE, 1960 - 1982

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PART THREE

External Economic Relations as a Determinant of the Foreign Policy Orientation and Behaviour of the Developing State : An Empirical and Comparative Study of Cameroon, 1960 – 1982

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CHAPTER SEVEN

EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AS A DETERMINANT OF FOREIGN POLICY

7.1: INTRODUCTION:

The external economic relations of a nation may be defined as representing the total sum of exchanges and actions by the state intended to affect the extent, composition and direction of its imports and exports of goods and services.[1] The external economic policy includes not only the familiar direct interventions in international trade, such as tariff, subsidies, export taxes, quotas, licences, exchange controls, payments and bilateral agreements, state trading and the like, but also a host of indirect interventions ranging from pricing policies to sanitary regulations, safety standards requirements, packaging controls... etc.[2]

International economic relations played a crucial though not necessarily a benign role in the historical development of the developing states. Primary product exports have traditionally accounted for a sizeable proportion of individual Gross National Products of the developing states. In most developing states almost 25 to 30 percent of the monetary GNP is derived from the overseas sale of agricultural commoditions such as coffee, tea, cotton, cocoa and sugar. This means that most of these countries depend on primary product exports for a vast majority of their foreign exchange earnings. Since the markets for these exports are often very unstable, primary product export dependency carries with it a degree of risk and uncertainty which few of these nations can resist.

In addition to their export dependency, many developing states rely even more on the importation of raw materials - machinery, capital goods, intermediate producer goods and consumer products both to fuel their industrial expansion and to satisfy the rising consumption aspirations of their people. For most developing nations, import demands have exceeded the capacity to generate sufficient revenues from the sale of exports. This has led to chronic "deficits" on their balance of payments position vis-a-vis the rest of the world. While such deficits on the "current account" (i.e. an excess of import payments over export receipts for goods and services) were often more than compensated for by a "surplus"

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on the "capital account" of their balance of payments table (i.e. a receipt of foreign private and public lending and investment in excess of repayment of principal and interest on former loans and investment) in recent years the "debt burden" of repaying earlier international loans and investments has become increasingly acute.[4] In a number of developing states severe deficits on both current and capital accounts therefore have led to a rapid depletion of their international monetary "reserves". Such a chronic excess of foreign expenditures over receipts (which incidentally may have nothing to do with the developing state's inability to handle its financial affairs but may rather be related to its vulnerability to global economic disturbances) not only retards development efforts but also greatly limits the developing state's ability to manage its overall domestic and foreign policy.

But in terms of the definition of economic development we gave in Chapter One, external economic relations should be understood in a much broader perspective than simply the inter-country flow of commodities and financial resources. By opening their economies and societies to world trade and commerce and "looking outward" to the rest of the world, the developing states invite not only the international transfer of goods, services and financial resources, but also the "developmental" or "anti-developmental" influences of the transfer of production technologies, consumption patterns, institutional and organizational arrangements, educational, health and social systems, and the more general values, ideals, and lifestyles of the developed nations of the world, both capitalist and socialist. The impact of such technological, economic, social and cultural transfers on the character of the domestic developmental process can either be benign or malevolent. Much will depend on the nature of the political, social and institutional structure of the recipient country and its development priorities

This part of our study constitutes an attempt to identify and analyze the main external economic relations and processes that constitute the inputs of power base of the foreign policy orientation of the developing state using the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982. First of all, it must be recognized that any attempt to account for the character and impact of the inputs and output of the foreign policy of the developing state whether from internal dynamics of the state as suggested by "inter-

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dependence" scholars or from the crucibles of its external functional socio-economic relations and decision-making as preferred by dependency scholars, is a difficult exercise. Apart from the paucity of theoretically oriented studies directly concerned with the subject, the bewildering profusion of constitutional, institutional and governmental fluctuations in the socio-economic structures as well as the idiosyncracies of personalities and the tendency towards the proliferation of institutions and actors directly and indirectly involved in foreign policy in the developing state, make the conception of the external economic development inputs and outputs of foreign policy problematic. Is it limited to the dynamic interaction between the international economic setting of decision-making including the social structure and behaviour on the one hand, and the historical tradition, social values and the economic system on the other hand or does it encompass the entire configuration of elements, parts or constitutuents in which the state as an economic organization is situated? Infact, it is in this broad sense of the entire configuration of the state as an economic organization that the concept of external economic relations is understood since it connotes a complex entity, both human and nonhuman, organized into a sytem of economic roles, interests and action, and interacting within the internal and external processes which link one state to other states.[3]

The concept of the external economic relations is by its nature a dynamic interaction between institutions and personalities in their struggle to maximize the allocation of scarce means or resources. The character of this interaction varies with the resilience and effectiveness of this allocation and as such serves to impose limits on the actions of individuals involved in foreign policy. Thus in analyzing the character and impact of the external economic relations in relation to foreign policy, it will appear unhelpful, therefore, to focus solely on the pure economic structure and processes because such an approach may lead to the erroneous conception that the nature of the international mode of production (or production forces) rather than the overall global socio-economic structure (that is, the productive forces plus the socio-political relations of production), determines the foreign policy orientation of the developing state. Therefore, any systematic assessment of the external economic relations as an input and determinant of the foreign policy orientation of the developing state needs to come to grips with the other major components and forces of the international socio-political relations of production (or the international social

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environment of development). These other forces of the international relations of production would include (i) the international cultural and historical environment and forces of production; (ii) the international socio-political environment and forces of production; (iii) the international institutional framework and processes of production; (iv) the international class formations and relations in production and the global systemic environment of production.

It would appear that in this way one can easily grasp the role of international economic relations and forces in the pervasive nature of the material under development of the developing state and from there assess the extent to which external economic conditions and forces constitute the decisive formative influences on the foreign policy behaviour of the developing state. If external economic relations are assumed to constitute an essential point of departure for discovering the "laws of motion" of the foreign policy behaviour of the developing state and for explaining it, then it would appear appropriate at this point to discuss the relationship between external economic development and foreign policy in an attempt to assess the role of external economic relations in the foreign policy formulation, and implementation in the developing state. Charles O. Lerche and Abdul Said in discussing the tangible and intangible power capabilities of nation-states contend that the level of external economic relations of a nation more than any other factor determines its power capability in the international system[4]. According to them economic power is at the basis of any other power and as such confers the ability to control the minds and actions of other actors. Like Morgenthau in his concept of power, they believe that economic power helps to establish and maintain the control of man over man and as the basis of all other power, economic power determines all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.[5] Thus, according to them economic power could be considered as an intermediate synthesizing concept fusing the roles of force and influence.

However, the exercise of economic power depends on the nation's capabilities including its tangible and intangible attributes of nationhood that allow it to exercise various degrees of power in its contacts with other actors[6]. In this perspective economic power can be seen as both a means and an end, as an input and as an output of political action and as such of foreign policy. Thus external economic power cannot be viewed as a static, one-time, uni-directional relationship. It is rather a dynamic, ongoing and feedback relationship either in reserve (potential) or actualized. Actual economic power is power immediately available whereas potential economic power is power that can be generated with need. The greatest intangible in considering economic power relationships is one's "will" to employ one's power. An economically powerful nation that either does not know its power or is unwilling or unable to decide on how to use it is for all practical purposes powerless.

External economic power, therefore may be viewed from several aspects. It is a means, it is based on capabilities, it is a relationship and a process, and can be measured at least crudely. We can break down the concept of external economic power into three distinct analytic elements - economic power determines (i) acts (process, relationship), of influencing other states (ii) the capabilities used to make the wielding of influence successful; (iii) responses to acts. Before discussing the problem of capabilities and responses we have to fill out our model of influence acts to account for the many patterns of behaviour that may be involved in an international economic relationship. First, the exercise of influence involves more than state A's ability to change the behaviour of B. Influence may be seen when attempts to get B to continue a course of actions or policy which is useful to it or in the interests of A . The exercise of influence does not always cease, therefore, after B does X. It is often a continuing process reinforcing B's behaviour. Secondly it is almost impossible to find where influence is unidirectional. In reality influence is multilateral. At a minimum there is the problem of feedback in any relationship. Thirdly, the frequency of a state's involvement in acts of influence depends upon the general level of involvement of its government in the system. The first requisite for attempting to wield influence is a perception that some how state B (or any other) is related to the achievement of state A's goals and that there is, or will be some kind of relationship of interdependence. If the relationship covers only in consequential matters, few acts of influence may be necessary, but the greater the involvement, (dependency or interdependence), the greater the necessity to wield influence over other nations.

Furthermore, there is the type of relationship that includes "anticipated reactions". According to K.J. Holsti;

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> Thus is the situation frequently found in international policy, in which A might wish B to do X but does not try to influence B for fear that B will do Y instead, which is an infavourable response from A's point of view. In a hypothetical situation, the government of India might wish to obtain arms from the United States to build up its defenses, but does not request such arms because it fears that the United States would insist on certain conditions for the sale of arms that might compromise India's nonalignment. This anticipated reaction may also be multilateral, where A wishes B to X, but will not try B to do it because it fears that C, a third state, will do Y, which is unfavourable to A's interest. India wants to purchase American arms, but does not seek to influence the United States to sell them for fear that Pakistan (C) will then build up its own armaments and thus accelerate the arms race between the two countries. In this situation, Pakistan (C) has influence over the actions of the India government eventhough it has not deliberately sought to influence India on this particular matter or even communicated its position in any way. The Indian government has simply perceived that there is a relatively high probability that if it seeks to influence the United States Pakistan will react in a manner contrary to India's interests[7].

This demonstrates that eventhough external economic power and influence may be measured, what is important in foreign policy is the perceptions of influence and capabilities held by policy makers, and the way they interpret another government's reactions.

The second element of the concept of external economic power consists of those capabilities that are mobilized in support of the acts taken to influence B's behaviour. It is difficult to assess the general capacity of a state to control the actions and policies of others unless we also have a knowledge of the capabilities involved. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that scholars do not understand all the reasons why some actors wield influence successfully, while others do not. It is true that in economic relationships not every actor possesses equal influence. But not every actor who possesses these capabilities can command or influence other actors. What is crucial in relating capabilities to influence according to Dahl[8], is that the actor mobilizes these capabilities for his economic and political purpose and that he possesses skill in mobilizing them. Thus the amount of influence a state wields over others can be related to the economic capabilities (external economic transactions) mobilized in support of foreign policy objectives. To put this proposition in another way, we can argue that an external economic

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capability does not itself determine the uses to which it will be put. The use of capabilities depends less on their quality and quantity than on the external objectives a government formulates for itself. The variety of foreign policy instruments available to a nation for influencing others is partly a function of the quality and quality of capabilities. What a government seeks to do-the type of objectives it formulates - and how it attempts to do it will depend at least partially on the resources it finds available. Therefore, how states use their capabilities depends on their external objectives, but the choice of objectives and instruments to achieve those objectives are influenced or limited by the quality and quantity of available capabilities.

Some interesting attempts have been made to operationalize definitions of external economic power and thereby afford an opportunity to measure it[9]. We shall briefly deal with three of the more noteworthly of these attempts in an effort to ascertain the extent to which external economic power determines the foreign policy behaviour of the developing state. First, Ray S. Cline has suggested a very useful method for the measurement of the concept of external economic power. For him "external economic power", is important in the sense that it is perceived both by its wielders and by those over whom it is exercised. He has advanced a simple formula (already presented in chapter 6) which does not necessarily permit the "exact" measurement of economic power but which is amenable to quantification[10]. It is as follows:

Pp = (C + E + M) X (S + W) where
Pp = Perceived economic power;
C = Critical Mass = Population and Territory
E = Economic Capability
M = Military Capability
S = Strategic purpose
W = Will to purpose national strategy.

Ingredients of "perceived economic power" such as "population", "territory" or "economic" and "military capability" are subject to relatively exact measurement. Yet it is obvious that Cline places very important values or wieghts to the country's ability to define its objectives and then to its capability and willingness to pursue them without wavering. This is a big weakness in Cline's approach.

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The second approach towards the measurement of external economic power belongs to Robert Dahl. Dahl has defined external economic power as the ability to shift the probability of outcomes[11]. In a highly sophisticated analysis, Dahl also views external economic power as a relationship between political actors, such as individuals, groups, parties, governments and international organizations. According to Dahl, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do". There are a number of ways of arriving at concrete values denoting economic power as it is defined by Dahl. However, such measurements which involve precise mathematical and statistical procedures, may result in useful probabilistic rankings of the external economic power or influence of various political actors. But such methods may hold only for countries with open and free information systems such as the developed countries.

The third useful attempt to quantify external economic power can be credited to Karl Deutsch[12]. Deutsch influenced by the work of Talcott Parsons, views external economic power as a form of currency that allows its holders to satisfy important values and attain objectives. There is an interesting analogy to be made here between economics and politics. For example, the economic power of an individual, company or nation-state depends not merely on the amount of cash at hand, but also on the amount of credit available. Credit, in turn can be secured on the basis of the reputation of the borrower and his expected capability to repay the loan. In politics, a nation-state's economic power is to be understood, in terms of its capability to supplement its economic power base by means of techniques such as alliances, treaties and leases of territory to foreign nations. Proceeding beyond this conceptualization, Deutsch suggests three specific dimensions of economic power that can be readily measured and that permit analysts to quantify and rank the actual and projected capabilities of nation-states. Deutsch calls these three dimensions of economic power; domain, range and scope.

Therefore it is our contention here that by combining the Cline-Dahl - Deutsch approaches to the study of external economic power, the analysis in this part of our study, we could reasonable assess the foreign policy orientation orientation of a developing state in terms of its external economic relations. Under conditions of interdependence characterized by

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relations of superordination and subordination in which the developing state finds itself, its external economic development as one of the basic determinants of its real status and foreign policy power base is comparatively low. While the formal equality of states is a valuable and on the whole valued convention of international relations, it is evident that in peace, on less than in war, differences in external economic power have serious consequences for the foreign policies of states. All things being equal, the state with great economic resources has more influence on events outside its frontiers, greater security from foreign pressures and attacks, more prestige, and a large element of choice in respect of its foreign policy. A developing weak state is more vulnerable to external pressure, more limited in terms of foreign policy choices open to it and subject to a tighter connection between domestic and external affairs. In other words, the smaller the human and material economic resources of a state the greater the difficulties it must surmount if it is to achieve its foreign policy objectives; and in consequence, the weaker the state, the less viable it is as a genuinely independent member of the contemporary international system.

Of course, sheer physical economic (human and material) size is not the only factor. But the social structure and forces (including social classes, ethnic composition, cultural and psychological factors at work in society), contigency and situational forces (including political and economic crises, coups d'Etat, elections, massives strikes, large-scale violence, military actions and war, and other factors which influence the intensity of social and national drives and reactions), the state system (including the government machinery of decision-making); and the leadership which refers to the way in which state power is used by current office-holders and decision-makers are directly depended on the mode of production in the economic development of the state. In this way external economic relations set the limits to what can be attained in foreign policy and fix the international role and status of the nation more securely than any other factor. At this point, it would appear that the strengths and weaknesses of the developing state and its viability in foreign policy can best be examined in terms of the degree of its economic relations which best determine its capacity to withstand stress, on the one hand, and its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy commensurate with its national interests on the other hand.

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Therefore, this chapter is designed not only to answer the question of how external economic relations affect the structure and character of the developing state's economy and how the articulation of such an economy influences or determines its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour, but also to ascertain the validity of our third hypothesis according to which "because of economic underdevelopment and dependency of the developing state on external economic relations not only is there an interpenetration of the external and domestic environments which renders the former vulnerable, but makes that the ability of the state to achieve its foreign policy policy objectives varies and diminishes with the given issue (or issue-area) as one moves from local to global issues". Since the above hypothesis implies that the poor performances of the developing states in external economic transactions is in a large part responsible for the limited (or failure) achievements of their foreign policy objectives, this chapter will partially examine this hypothesis from the standpoint of external commercial transactions and the next chapter (eight) will partially examine it from the viewpoint of external financial and technical relations. In the light of this clarification, this chapter examines (1) the debate over the external economic relations of the developing state, (2) the evolution and structure of exports, (3) evolution and structure of imports, (4) Balance of Trade and Balance of Payments, and (5) a conclusion.

7.2: EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPING STATE

Emmanuel Arghiri, a prominent French writer, using centre-peripheral concept in his now popular book on unequal exchange contends that wealth does not diffuse from the centre of the periphery equalizing factor returns and living standards in the process; but rather it tends to concentrate at the centre at selected growth poles. Thus the Marxian forecasts are largely unrealistic where industrialized nations are being realized on the scale of the world economy. He traces through domestic and international equilibrium prices permanent inequality in wage levels, implications of unequal exchange, and comparative costs. In Arghiri's mind, developing countries need to shut themselves up, and embark on a course of development directed towards the internal economy[13].

A second argument is that of Hans Singer. He argues that vertical trade is not so much a matter of the nature of products exchanged, as if the conditions under which they are produced[14]. Singer stresses differences in the level of technological development of developed countries and developing countries. Emmanuel Arghiri likewise stresses differences in wage rates[15]. For these scholars the indicator of trade verticality used in this study (based on the level of processing of goods exchanged) is, if not wholly misleading, not the most direct indicator of trade dependency. They would prefer indicators based more directly on differences in technological resources or man hours that went into the production of the goods exchanged.

Developing countries may be rendered asymmetrically dependent through several types of economic transactions between two countries - including foreign aid, direct private investment, and monetary relations. At the same time, Richardson et al. observed that virtually every review of asymmetrical international economics places foreign trade at the center of discussion. They explicitly stated that the pre-eminent position accorded to trade owes to its greater volume as a source of income, particularly for non-industrial countries in their trade with industrial ones where asymmetrical trade is most often alleged to occur. In the 1960s, for example, trade between the United States and most of Latin America was said to have far out distanced official U.S. foreign aid or capital flows from U.S. private investors[16]. Richardson et al. further noted that classical and neo-classical economists characterize foreign trade as a mutually beneficial enterprise wherein, following their respective comparative advantages, nations specialize for export sales, resulting in an international division of labour. However, many contemporary observers attack this characterization on the grounds that it glosses over the asymmetries that are crucial features of trade between the rich and the poor. Their criticisms are generally of three types.

First, the critics point out that although the goods exchanged between a rich and a poor country may be of equivalent monetary value, absolute figures will have a greater impact on a poor economy, thereby rendering it more dependent on the continuation of that beneficial trade than is the rich, dominant partner. In short, the poor economy has more to gain or lose from trade relations than does the rich one[17]. In dependency terminology, this means that a poor country is more sensitivity dependent. A second line of attack has been said to concern the prices of goods in trade between rich and poor countries. The former mainly export manufactures to the poor while the latter sell primary products in

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return, roughly following their respective comparative advantages[18]. The problem with this set up has been attributed to the declining world prices for primary commodities relative to those of manufactured products since World War II. These "declining terms of trade" in the view of Richardson et al. mean that poor countries must export increasingly greater quantities of primary goods to maintain a constant level of purchasing power for capital goods imports[19]. In the language of dependency declining terms of trade thus describe heightened sensitivity dependency (or declining purchases of manufactures). Such unfavourable price trends contribute to vulnerability dependency as well. By continuing to specialize for export in primary goods production, Richardson et al. contend that a poor economy will remain rather unprepared to shift economic policy if confronted with a severe blow to its export markets. If, for example, such a country were to lose its principal buyers, it would be likely to encounter immense hindrance shifting its economy over to partial specialization in alternative commodities since its factors of primary goods production are relatively immobile. Furthermore, Richardson and Kegley write that:

> The fact that it has specialized in extractive or agricultural production means that the non-industrial country has probably not been accruing many "spin off" benefits, the derivative economic activities conducive to upgrading labor skills, advancing technology, and enhancing capital formation[20].

The inflexibility of its economy, they added, is therefore likely to be a persistent condition.

Thirdly, in Richardson and Kegley's postulation, the prevailing tariff structure further contributes to the vulnerability of trade-sensitive poor countries, quoting Balassa (1970), they argued that the tariff levels in the major (capitalist) wrold markets comprised of the industrial giants tend to vary directly with the extent to which a commodity is processed[21]. The United States, they noted placed no tariff on imported iron ore. But a 20 percent duty is levied against dressmakers' pins[22]. Such tariff differentials systematically imposed by the largest economies mean that a non-industrial country contemplating a move up the scale of processing encounters increasing tariff barriers on its potential new exports. The non-industrial country is thereby discouraged from diversifying its economic base and must instead continue to emphasize primary goods production. Henceforth, tariff structure can be viewed as a contributing cause of that

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vulnerability if a low level of industrialization contributes to vulnerability dependency. In the final analysis, Richardson and Kegley in their brilliant article, "Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance" which appeared in The International Studies Quarterly (June 1980) stressed that "these considerations lead numerous scholars to a very different characterization of foreign trade from that espoused by neoclassicists"[23]. They concluded that the present international division of labour is self-perpetuating to the detriment of perennially poor countries and that their poverty is importantly imposed on them by their rich trade partners.

The prospect that foreign policy behaviour is, like foreign trade, a mode of exchange, suggests that the greatest compliance should be expected of those that are most trade dependent. McGowan and Gottwald have also observed that suspicion that the personalities and ideologies of foreign policy makers in weak societies are of secondary importance to their environmental circumstances: "within a context of powerlessness and dependency, character and ideas alone cannot overcome a passive - subordinate role in international affairs"[24]. Keohane and Nye (1977) have advanced the discussion of distinctions between symmetry and asymmetry which has been widely adopted[25]. Another step is that, they, as well as Waltz (1970) believe that the costs and utilities of interdependence not only define symmetry and asymmetry, but can also differentiate two facets of the dependency of one actor upon another; in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability[26]. Sensitivity dependency, it is said, summarizes the costs that A could suffer at B's hands before A makes compensatory adjustments. The second dimension of dependency, they said, is vulnerability. This refers to the longer run costs that A would experience even after it had adjusted its policies as best it could to the changes wrought by B. This line of thought holds that of the two types of costs that B could potentially impose upon A, vulnerability costs are thought to be more important to an understanding of the politics of asymmetrical interdependence.

However, Keohane and Nye (1977) noted that the condition of vulnerability dependency does not automatically yield political leverage to the dominant partner[27]. Instead, a dominant country must establish and maintain "linkages" between the domain of its dominance (that is, military, economic and so on) and the area it wishes to influence in the countries dependent upon it[28]. Further, an alternative and equally plausible explanation for declining cold war agreement with the United States by non-dependent

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and, especially by independent countries returns us to Keohane and Nye's notion of linkage[29]. It may be that 1970 marked the passing of a period during which the United States could successfully link others' economic vulnerability to its own cold war politics. This interpretation is given greater credence, of course, by the economic self-assertiveness of so many poor countries crystallizing in the 1960s, as witnessed in the formation of the United Nations Conference on trade and development and the more recent calls for New International Economic Order[30].

Further, it was observed that although the export dependency index is relatively less satisfying, however, as an expression of the external sector in proportion to national economic size, it is preferable to measures fashioned after savage and Deutsch (1960)[31],"relative acceptance" index which is not wholly satisfactory. Vulnerability, after all, calls for a measure tapping an economy's capacity for further policy change under altered conditions. SOme observers have noted that there is as yet no cross national measure of economic vulnerability. However, Richardson and Kegley have uncovered evidence of a policy compliance for much of the period since 1950 in their study entitled "Foreign Policy Compliance" [32]. Dolan et al. in their study of African Foreign Policies concluded that the interaction of relative economic strength and relative linkage concentration limits or expands the choices available to the surbordinate state in its pursuit of goals of economic well-being and political autonomy[33]. These choices are reflected in the conduct of its foreign policy with the surbordinate state. As we have indicated earlier, foreign policy consists of both the objectives and behaviour. Objectives are defined as the steering mechanisms adopted by governments in their attempts to influence the external environment so as to enhance the achievement of economic well-being and political autonomy. The study further found that as economic strength increases across the asymmetrical dyad set, foreign policy behaviour towards the super-ordinate country becomes more restrictive. However, as the rate of economic growth and the absolute level of linkage concentration increase across the subordinate countries, foreign policy behaviour becomes more expansive. The change in linkage concentration has no significant effect on foreign policy behaviour.

For the more affluent African States such as Nigeria, the only significant coefficients, according to the study of Dolan et al., appears

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for the linkage concentration and the economic change indicators which are not in the expected direction (as either indicator increases, foreign policy behaviour becomes more expansive). With the poorer country dyads, the two economic indicators are statistically significant, but in opposite directions: as the level of economic strength increases, foreign policy behaviour becomes more restrictive (the expected direction) but with economic growth more expansive behaviour results. The level of concentration, which affects the richer countries most substantially, does not significantly affect the poorer countries. In the final analysis, as linkage concentration increases across the dyads in the richer set, in interaction with economic variables, foreign policy correspondingly becomes more expansive. This divergence in results between the more and less wealthy African countries, might not be unexpected by some African specialists. Lemaitre (1976) suggests different foreign policy orientations for the semi-peripheral and peripheral African countries[34], with the former adopting a more open, collaborative stance with the government and corporations in the industrialized world "and the latter because of poor prospects of growth, adopting more socialist, more autonomous, and more self-consciously indigenous regimes as well as a concomitant restrictive foreign policy"[35].

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On the whole, dependency theorists generally agree that foreign trade especially trade highly concentrated by export commodity and trading partners and characterized by the exchange of exports at low levels of processing for imports at higher levels, is one of the most important mechanisms of external dependency. On contention is Vincent Mahaler's view that trade relations of this sort tend to offer less developed countries even less value for their exports relative to the prices they must pay for goods they import, an assertion based on the structuralist argument. Since the 1950s, Third World trade has been marked by long-term tendency for the prices of primary products to decline relative to those of manufactured goods[36]. Lastly, most dependency theorists emphasize that the dependency syndrome is not narrowly confined to economic linkages but as Mahaler puts it, encompasses a wide range of contacts in the political, military, cultural and other spheres[37].

Increasingly, the scholars of the Socialist and Third World countries are adopting Marxism to explain the nature and structure of global economic relations and interdependence. With this explanatory adaptation has come the increasingly militant theories of dependency in the developing countries. Some African countries, scholars and leaders share this view. In this view internal economic problems are not determined simply by the inadequacy of factor endowments. Increasingly, impoversihment combined with sluggishness or lack of real economic growth are perceived to be determined by the involuntary participation of less developed countries in the the global capitalist structure of economic relations. With the new imperialism of the vertically integrated multinational corporations has arisen the peculiar structures of neo-colonialism and widening gap between more developed countries and lesser developed countries. The extent of social change and the pattern and scope of economic and infrastructural growth are heavily constrained by the operational modes of global capitalism. It is therefore believed that dependency is explained in terms of the historically forged linkages between lesser developed countries and the Western Capitalist Countries. If the emerging theories of dependency are adopted, along with the policy prescriptions that lean heavily on the analysis of neopolitical economy, the twenty-first century may see African ideologies of development merging with socialist world views of dependency and economic development, or so says one observer[38].

7.3: EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND POWER

It is important to keep clearly in mind that dependency theory is fundamentally dynamic - it is concerned with "becoming", with structural "transformation", with "process". To be of any real intellectual importance, a test model concept is not the most appropriate way to capture the relevant dynamics. Rather, what is needed is a formulation that reflects slow, historically - extended processes, because the theory is "historical" in the sense that is entails arguments that long-term processes of conditioning and determination have worked (and are working) over time to set the contemporary scene. Thus, contemporary features of the economy and policy of a peripheral country are affected, for example, by the extent and form of capitalist penetration of the country over 25, 50 even 100 years.

It would suffice, here, to summarize three sets of factors important for the existence of dependency:

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A) Magnitude of reliance

- large share of needs supplied externally,
- large share of markets are foreign,
- large share of foreign to domestic capital,
- technology, production facilities, etc.

B) Choice-based measures

- heavy reliance on one outside power,
- high opportunity cost (reliance not easily shifted),
- few opportunities for diversification, for allies, etc. (for "natural" and for political reasons);
- commodity concentration of exports and commodity concentration of total domestic production.

C) Domestic Distortion Measures

- lack of integration across economic sectors;
- lack of responsiveness of production structures to increased or decreased demands;
- responsiveness to externally generated demand.

The list under each factor could be expanded but there is no point in doing that here. However, what does seem important is that there are three fairly complex sets of factors that are associated with dependency. To attempt to lump all three processes into a single summary index of unknown dimensionality, would be a mistake. Not only are the three sets of conditions sufficiently different, but there is also little suggestion from the dependency literature that the construction of a unitary index is desirable.

Upto this point we have been trying to clarify the meaning of interdependence and dependency often used to express rational equalities and inequalities respectively among actors and so doing it appears necessary to define the concept of power and integrate it into our analytical framework. Given the central role of the state in the "power" analysis in international relations, the possibility of developing linkages between dependency and power at this stage becomes clear. Let us first of all attempt to define power. But before proceeding with this rather ambiguous

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task, we should differentiate power from some related concepts.

First, we should distinguish between power and forces. Force (military coercion), is an important ingredient but not the only ingredient of power. In a majority of international relations literature, the concept of force is employed to designate military capacity of a nation, either in reserve or actualized. Power, on the other hand, is wider concept that not only includes the threat or the actual use of force but may also rely on positive and nonvoilent means of persuasion, such as economic rewards, acts of cooperation, and ideological solidarity. Our second task is to distinguish power from influence. Influence relies more on persuasion and less on threats and sanctions. Influence, as in the case of force is a very important ingredient but not the only ingredient of power. Power could thus be considered an intermediate synthesizing concept fusing the poles of force and influence.

If power is a combination of force, influence and capabilities, then there are two primary links between dependency and power. The first link is that structural asymmetries are a basis of power, that is, these asymmetries provide the resources to affect others by depriving them of the desired exchanged goods. When one actor supplies another with large amounts of important goods which cannot easily be replaced at tolerable costs, that actor is in an position to influence the dependent actor. In other words, power springs from asymmetrical interdependence. This is the view that has been put forth by Keohane and Nye:

> We suggest that a parsimonious way to conceptualize diverse sources of power and therefore to explain distributions of power resources among actors in world politics is to regard power as deriving from patterns of asymmetrical interdependence between actors in issue-areas in which they are involved with one another[39].

The authors go on to assert that these patterns of interdependence can vary along two dimensions - intensity of relations and relative power of resources of actors[40]. Presumably, intensity reflects both the relative magnitudes of the dependencies in the total sectoral activity of each actor (for example, the total amount of oil supplied by B to A as a proportion of A's total oil consumption) as well as the salience of oil in A's hierarchy of values.

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If two actors have an extremely low propensity to interact with one another, their relations are not intense. On the other hand, if they have a large magnitude of interaction involving the exchange of goods that are unimportant (in the sense that the actors could either do without or substitute for them without much cost), we would not characterize these relations as intense either. This is the "important" aspect of interactions. If we recall our earlier definition of dependency (A's motivational investment in goods controlled by B), we see that both A's desire for certain goods (which is variable and the proportion of these goods consumed by A which is controlled by B are important. The intensity of involvement and the symmetry-asymmetry of involvement, joined together by some rules of aggregation, are treated as structural sources of power. To summarize up to this point, the first linkage between dependency and power is that dependency rests on structural asymmetries which can with certain probabilities be converted into decisional power.

The second link is that dependency, quite apart from its consequences for manifest decisional power, is itself a form of value-allocating process. Unlike most analyses of power where the resources and capabilities, structural positions and asymmetric dependent relations are themselves capable of leading to certain distributions of values quite apart from the overt decisional process. For example, one actor may exploit anothers' dependency on him for the purpose of structuring a long-term relationship from which he benefits, such as the cheap supply of natural resources or a terms of trade relationship which gives advantages to one at the expense of the other. The structuring of unequal exchange relationships is an example of value-allocation that arises purely from the operation of structural relations. This is a kind of "structural power", if one wants to use that term but it must be recognized that it is quite a different phenomenon from decisional power. The concept of dependency has clear theoretical implications for the analysis of bargaining relations. Thought of as unequal interdependence, dependency summarizes the numerous ways in which one actor relies on another. Thus, it captures the multiplicity of positive inducements (the carrot) and negative sanctions (the stick) that one holds over another.

The integration of aspects of the theories of linkage and dependency in the study of foreign policy is buttressed on the umbrella concept of

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relational inequality, that is, inequality in the interactions or transactions among actors[41]. This focus principally targets linkages in relational differences which would include, among others, unequal exchange (as in terms of trade), power inequalities (as in the unequal ability of actors to achieve compliance with their wishes), and structural inequalities in the more or less permanent relations among actors (e.g. in the distribution of opportunities and constraints that impinge on each other). In the process of focusing onlinkages of relational inequalities, it becomes clear that there are two partly separate levels of analysis, each of which is important in its own right. There are linkages belonging to behavioural aspects of relations among actors or on the more patterned and stable relations. Thus, in this study the distinction is drawn between bargaining relations and structural relations. The bargaining perspective is actor-oriented and leads to a careful analysis of specific contests, among actors based on clashes of consciously held interests. The outcomes of bargaining contests may be due to differences in capabilities but they are not an automatic function of these. Outcomes may be also affected by putting a greater amount of resources into the effort, by being willing to suffer higher costs or through the skills of individual negotiators. However, these outcomes may change and the structure remains constant that is, the available choices, constraints and costs associated with the pursuit of particular paths of actions remain the same (see chapter nine of this study).

Bargaining power is the power to control the outcomes of specific events. But there is another kind of power which within the dependency model would be termed "structural power ". This type of power is a higher order power because it involves the ability to manipulate the choices, capabilities, alliance opportunities, and payoffs that actors utilize. Creating a producer cartel is structural power because while that act itself is not a triumph over an opponent, it decreases the number of independent supply sources of consuming countries. The strategy of Germany during the Third Reich of creating "exclusive complementaries" with Eastern European Countries, was also an effort to put these countries in a position of dependency on Germany. One might assert that this is a higher order form of power because it is the power to govern the rules which shape bargaining power. It is this type of power which is crucial to the understanding of dependency.

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Within the context of the theoretical framework of this study, inaddition to the twin concerns outlined by the bargaining and structural orientations, the dependency model of foreign policy studies also grasps the central insights of the nation-state as well as the transnational relations perspective. In other words the foreign policy dependency framework, in attempting to contribute to the discussion of foreign policy and economic development in the developing state tries to integrate as closely as possible variables at the governmental level and in the private sector.

Upto this point it has been simply indicated that the concept of dependency is one of the bases of power. It is a resource that can, with some probability, be converted into power. The difficulty, of course, is that we know so little about the mechanisms guiding the transition from the bases of power to its actual use. At this point, we will argue further that Dependency has another important link to power and that in order to understand this link, we must introduce Harsanyi's concept - "the costs of power".

Harsanyi's work[42] suggests that two important concepts have been left out of our power calculations - the cost to A of influencing B and the opportunity cost to B for failure to comply with A. By bringing these two concepts into the power equation, Harsanyi has provided us with crucially relevant information about the mechanisms underlying the conversion process between capabilities and power. Harsanyi urges us to look at the opportunity costs of both parties:

> the opportunity costs to A of attempting to influence B's behaviour, that is the opportunity costs of using his power over B (and of acquiring this power over B in the first place if A does not yet posses the required power), which we shall call the costs of A's power over B; and... the opportunity costs to B of refusing to do what A wants him to do, i.e. of refusing to yield to A's attempt to influence his behaviour. As these opportunity costs measure the strength of B's incentives for yielding to A's influence, we shall call them the strength of A's power over B[43].

Although these two factors are crucial components of all power calculations, they had priviously not been integrated into a unified power analysis. Yet without information on the costs to A of securing B's compliance and the costs to B of refusing to comply, we can hardly

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begin to make successful predictions on the basis of capabilities alone. By providing a broad cost-benefit framework within which to make predictions about the conditions under which it is likely that capabilities will be successfully used (given certain levels of resistance), Harsanyi has suggested a conceptual bridge between capabilities (including dependency as an exchange capability) and actual power behaviour.

Hayward Alker's "On Political capabilities in a schedule sense: Measuring Power, Integration and Development"[44] is a direct continuation of Harsanyi's work on power. Unlike Harsanyi, the value of Alker's article lies in the fact that he preserves the idea of political capability as a "counterfactual possibility" while exploring the transition to manifest power. He does this by further refining and formalizing ideas implicit in Harsanyi's writings. Taking Harsanyi's idea of "power in a schedule sense" he argues that we can "summarize power potentials in terms of schedule or graph or function linking opportunity costs to desirable performance possibilities"[45]. To carry out this task of incorporating opportunity costs into a full theory of power, it would first be necessary to assign utilities to A and B and for all of B's action possibilities as well as for A to assign cost coefficients to the use of varying amounts of its own resources[46]. In the simplest case (dichotomous and unidimensional i.e., compliance and non-compliance for a single issue), this would involve a determination of the costs of compliance or non-compliance for A and B, including the costs incurred by A's resources expenditures.

Thus, the Harsanyi-Alker view of power in a schedule sense is a kind of:

> "production function" describing how a given individual can "transform" different amounts of his resources... into social power of various dimensions). The commonsense notion of social power makes it an ability to achieve certain things - an ability that the person concerned is free to use or to leave unused [47].

The essential insight of the Harsanyi-Alker formulation is that it reinterprets conventional "force-activation models" as being similar to production functions in that the probability and amount of conversion of resource bases into decisional (inputs into outputs) power is a generalized function of A's utility for various actions of B and B's costs associated with not complying with those classes of actions desired by A.

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Power now is not a series of observed measurement readings, registered in quantities representing amounts of power, scope and extent. Rather it is a generalized, hypothetical function linking A and B's preference structures with various potential outcomes. Rather than resource bases and means of power leading directly to power, we now have power as a generalized production function. This approach leads to a much more adequate specification of a power model in that it provides cost-sensitive information regarding the choices available to actors. From the threateners' (A's) standpoint, the relevant cost information is the differential between the expected cost of rewarding B (or leaving B alone) and the expected costs of punishing B. For the threatened party (B), the relevant cost - information is provided by the expected difference between the costs of complying and not complying. It can now be clear where the concept of dependency fits into the overall picture. Dependency provides a direct measure of the costs associated with breaking a relationship and substituting for it a new one. Thus, countries which are highly vulnerable, in the sense of having few or no alternatives at tolerable costs, will also be in a position where they can easily be influenced.

What we have tried to do up to now is to develop and elaborate a framework within which one can talk about both the bargaining (or behavioural) and structural aspects of dependency. If this framework is to be effectively applied to analyzing political and economic relations, it must be positioned inside an international and transnational framework. Much of the voluminous literature on global relations can be conveniently summarized as dealing either with concrete bargaining relations among actors over clearly defined conflicts or the more permanent structural relations (including the distribution of each's opportunities and constraints). Our aim here is to illustrate the bargaining and structural aspects of dependency with slections from the power literature and suggest how the analysis of dependency can be usefully integrated into such literature. It has been a consistent element of our argument that a good measure of dependency cannot limit itself to dyadic relations. Instead the pattern of dependency must include information about the relevant opportunities and constraints available to and impinging on an actor. Stated somewhat differently, in dependency theory, portions of what is normally treated as the context of an actor's behaviour must be incorporated directly into measures of these concepts.

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Many such contextual or distributional properties have been developed within economic theory. One distributional property is reflected in the market structure of a country's exports, i.e. its export concentration. Here the elementary units of observation is the dyad, which is the relation and the concept itself is assigned meaning by a series of simple operations on these dyadic relations. Other systemic properties are an actor's vulnerability to goods provided by a set of external actors, that vulnerability being reflected in the actor's import concentration, its ability to substitute other products for the goods in question and its ability to do without the good entirely. An actor's allies, both formal and informal, and its fragmentation or solidarity with other members of the international system, are also important. The above distinctions between bargaining and structural levels somewhat parallels Johan Galtung's distinction between the liberal-oriented perspective and the structural viewpoint. The liberal perspective focuses on individual actors, analyzes political and economic situations in terms of motivation and behaviour and tends to see collectivities as simple aggregations of individuals. The structural viewpoint, however, views group properties differently: "According to the structure-oriented perspective, any collectivity consists of social positions connected by interaction relation and interaction patterns together forming a structure"[48].

The structural asymmetries examined may apply to a broad range of variables, including trade, investment, diplomatic representation, or inequalities in opportunities themselves (as in allies, products, sources of investment). These may take the form of inequalities in capacity to open up sources of supply (either internally by providing incentives to exploit resources or externally by force or by positive incentives), of having resources to pursue a "divide-and-rule" strategy or having a capacity to close off such supply sources to other actors (through cartel action). The amount of solidarity fragmentation in the system, the way in which it is organized and how it impinges on specific actors are crucial facts in any assessment of the opportunities and constraints to which actors are subject. These two considerations, structural and behavioural[49] are viewed as crucial to the understanding of asymmetries involved in the international and transnational economic relationships. To focus exclusively on the concrete bargaining among actors and the various ways in which actors effectively exert their wills over others is to ignore the fact the the social structuring of agendas may systematically favour certain parties (e.g. certain factions may be more successful than others in articulating their interests and concerns, and may have access to opportunity structures useful for politicizing these interests).

The important question at this juncture concerns the impact of foreign economic relations upon domestic structures, principally as reflected in the magnitude and distribution of economic activity. The influencing forces behind the selection and implementation of subordinate state foreign policies towards the superordinate powers have been addressed directly in the preceding paragraphs. We recall that the patterns of foreign economic relations, and the decisions which initiate them, are assumed to derive from the dependency syndrome. Michael Dolan and Brian W. Tomlin, Maureen Appel Molot and Harald Von Rickhoff of Carlton University, in a paper titled "Foreign Policies of African States in Asymmetrical Dyads", pinpointed two forms of imbalance, both necessary for the presence of this particular structural characteristic. First, there is a gross difference in the power resources available to actors. This difference in structural power represents an inequality in asymmetrical relationship. Basically, asymmetry is assumed to condition the choices which confront subordinate state actors in their efforts to fashion appropriate foreign policies in relations with superordinate partners. Foreign policy actors are governments acting as the authoritative agents of national societies. Foreign policy is conceived generally as objectives and behaviour that are pursued by national actors in their attempts to influence the international environment.

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Dolan et al. postulated that the relationship between the goals of economic well-being and political authority and the constraints imposed by this relationship on foreign policy distinguish subordinate states from other national actors[50]. Further, in an asymmetrical dyad, the subordinate state will perceive economic well-being and political autonomy as competing goals in its relations with the superordinate actor. This postulation is based on the following assumption - subordinate states accept that an increase in relations within the asymmetrical dyad, either in the scope or magnitude or exchange and agreements, will result in increased economic well-being and decreased political autonomy. This concern springs from the vulnerability created through relations with the superordinate nation. Vulnerability refers to the degree of restricted choice faced by the subordinate actor in an asymmetrical dyad. Dolan et al., quoting Caporaso[51], argue that as concentration of an activity on any particular partner goes up, one's choice decreases, and actors concern with the goal of political autonomy increases.

The imbalance in the ties that link two types of states is said to be rooted in trade, capital and aid. This imbalance, combined with the acknowledged disparity in resources available to black African states vis-à-vis major actors in the cominant state system, according to Dolan et al. displays structural asymmetry which imposes constraints on the foreign policy alternatives available to African policy makers. Further, because economic issues are so important for African policy makers, their foreign policies must be shaped so as to promote economic well-being. As we mentioned in chapter one, external ties and a weak domestic economy translate into a foreign policy which seeks to maximize the beneficial effects of external economic exchange through careful attention to the preference and behaviour of superordinate powers[52]. For some states, the salience of economic issues and reliance on foreign economic ties leads to a collaborative relationship with the metropolitan powers[53]. Furthermore, the larger and more affluent African nations have been subject to the greatest degree of external diplomatic and corporate pressure to accept and retain external ties.[54] Thus, it may be that for the developing states, a relatively stronger economy heightens, rather reduces, vulnerability to constraints imposed from outside. A.B Dolan et al. contended that this would lead to an increased emphasis upon the goal of economic well-being, while displacing concern for political autonomy which may normally be generated by concentrated linkages[55]. In this perspective, chapters six and seven attempt to examine the extent to which external economic relations determined the foreign policy orientation of Cameroon, 1960-1982, in the issue areas of trade (chapter six), foreign aid and foreign investments and monetary relations (chapter seven).

7.4: EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS

Trade relations were the most conspicous aspect of Cameroon's external economic relations. These commercial relations were characterized by a dependency on advanced capitalist nations with which most of the trade was transacted. In this way, commercial relations extended and consolidated the overall dependency of the entire economy on the cyclical changes of the capitalist world market. External dependency in trade in Cameroon remained high quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically. Exports plus imports amounted to over two-fifth of the total Gross Domestic Product and over one-half of the monetized Gross Domestic Product.

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Table 7(1) below gives picture of the evolution of Cameroon's exports in value and in indices between 1960 and 1982. From table 7(1) we can distinguish two periods in the evolution of exports in Cameroon. The first period which went from 1960 to 1970 was marked by a regular increase in the value of exports despite the fall in volume experienced in 1966. The strong increase of exports between 1968 and 1969 can be explained by the sales of Cameroonian cocoa in the world market[56]. The second period which went from 1970 to 1980 was marked by a fall in volume and value of exports expecially in 1971, 1972 and 1975. However, the general increase in the volume and value of exports during the period under study can be explained by an amelioration in agricultural policy especially because of the diversification in exports and the creation of FONADER in 1974. Thus, after the gloomy 1971, 1972 and 1975 years for Cameroonian exports, the situation underwent a net improvement in 1976, which was marked by increase in the prices of coffee and cocoa on the world market. Again the price index of exports of agricultural products (with 1970 as the base year) went from 104 in 1972 to 206 in 1974[57].

Table 7(1): EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS IN CAMEROON (1960 - 1983)

Year	Value in 106 dollars	Indice of total value (base 100 in 1970)	Indice of unitary value (base 100 in 1970)	Indice of volume (base 100 in 1970)
1961	-	42	73	58
1963	118.5	58	79	74
1965	119.0	60	72	83
1967	138.5	68	88	78
1969	227.5	97	108	91
1971	206.0	89	04	95
1973	353.9	152	119	129
1975	447.5	185	153	121
1977	793.89	351	250	140
1983	926.1	410.0	341	123

Source: a) Office Statistique des Communautés Europeenes Annuaire Statistique (1971) p.6.

b) Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale (Comptes Provisoires de la National de Mars 1978).

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In terms of structure one could distinguish two categories of export products in Cameroon during the period under study - raw agricultural, forestry and energetic products and manufactured or semi-manufactured products. Cameroonian exports during this period were dominated by raw agricultural, forestry and energy products which in 1975/1976 consituted about 67 percent, and about 79.3 percent in 1979/1980[58]. These raw materials included cocoa, coffee, bananas, timber, tobacco, rubber, cotton, groundnuts, medicinal plants and petroleum.

Table 7(2): STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS IN PERCENTAGES

Sectors (L.T.S.T. System)	1960/1961	1964/1965	1969/1970
0-Alimentary Products	60.0	75.3	62.1
1-Drinks and Tobacco	0.7	0.8	0.6
2-Raw Materials	15.9	21.2	18.0
3-Energy Products	0	0	0
4-Fats and Oil Products	0.5	0.5	0.5
5-Chemical Products	0.1	0.1	0.3
7-Machines and Transport Material	2.2	1.4	2.5
6+8-Manufactured Articles	20.5	18.9	15.6
Total	100	100	100

Source: Annuaire Statistique des Coomunautés Europeenes (1967/1969) p.17.

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However, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods assumed an important place on the export list from 1960. In 1959/60, Cameroon exported butter and cocoa products (1.116 million francs CFA), beer (16 million francs CFA), clothes (17 million francs CFA), perfumes (7 million francs CFA), soap (4 million francs CFA), shoes (4 million francs CFA)[59]. Thus, in 1959/60, if one exludes palm oil and cocoa products which have traditionally been considered as raw materials, Cameroonian export of manufactured and semi-manufactured products amounted to 1.8 billion francs CFA or 6.7 percent of global exports of 26.8 billion francs CFA[60].

Table 7(3): STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS BY PRODUCTS (in Percentages)

Products	1964/65	1969/70	1970/71	1972/73	1974/75	1979/80
A) Raw Agricultural Materials	61.0	61.2	62.40	57.3	60.20	79.20
- Cocoa	21.2	28.2	23.00	18.7	27.86	20.56
- Coffee	22.3	22.4	24.00	30.9	19.27	22.95
- Rubber	3.3	1.9	2.10	2.2	2.16	0.54
- Banana	5.6	2.5	2.70	1.4	3.41	1.80
- Groundnuts	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Cotton	6.4	4.8	6.99	3.4	1.26	3.61
- Tobacco	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Palm Produce	-	-	1.10	-	1.25	0.60
- Timber	6.2	1.9	6.80	10.1	10.60	11.16
B) Petroleum Product	-	-	-	-	-	-
C) Manufactured and Semi-Manufactured Products	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Treated Wood and Products	1.4	6.5	-	3	-	-
- Aluminium and Aluminium Products	17.0	8.0	8.80	6.2	3.84	3.86
- Cocoa Prodcuts	4.3	9.2	5.40	5.6	8.97	-
- Other Products	-	-	16.60	-	16.36	6.18

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

In 1975/76, Cameroon's exports of manufactured products amounted to 23.7 billion francs CFA or 33 percent of external sales. These included principally cocoa products, clothes, vegetable oil, beer and soft drinks, ciment, paints, perfumes, matches, etc [61].

Table 7(4): EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS IN INDICES (base 100 in 1966)

Sector (I.I.S.T. System)	1960/61	1964/65	1969/70
0-Elimentary Products	104	98	156
1-Drinks and Tobacco	117	105	163
2-Raw Materials	143	203	148
3-Energy Products	93	110	168
4-Fats and oil Products	23	70	121
5-Chemical Products	76	121	171
7-Machines and Transport Material	39	69	177
6+8-Manufactured Articles	61	86	137
Total	64	88	157

Source: Annuaire Statistique des Communautés Europeenes, 1967/69, P.16

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Tables 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4) give in percentages and in indices (taking 1966 as the base year), the evolution of the principal groups of products that constituted Cameroonian exports. These tables confirm the relative importance of raw materials in the exports of Cameroon. However, from 1968 Cameroonian exports were diversified because of the creation of industries for the transformation of raw materials into finished or semi-finished products. The beginning of this diversification coincided with the beginning of the policy of export promotion and import substitution industrialization.

The tables above demonstrate that exports in Cameroon during the period under study were made up essentially of cocoa, coffee, and forest products. In order to have an idea of the predominant role of cocoa in Cameroonian exports during this period, one could remark that in 1974, cocoa sales amounted to 39.865 million francs CFA or about 35 percent of the global external earnings of the country and in 1977, these cocoa sales represented about half of the foreign exchange earnings of the state .

Table 7(5): THE EVOLUTION OF COCOA PRODUCTION, 1961 - 1963 (IN TONS)

1961	74.000	1970	108.300
1962	74.400	1971	111.700
1963	94.000	1972	123.900
1964	95.600	1973	106.900
1965	99.800	1974	111.200
1966	79.600	1975	117.771
1967	88.500	1976	96.000
1968	95.200	1977	85.000
1969	102.900	1983	74.614

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

Table 7(5) above presents the evolution of cocoa export in all its forms and its importance within the aggregate exports of the country. Table 7(6) below on the other hand presents the evolution of cocoa production between 1961 and 1983.

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Table 7(6): EXPORTS OF COCOA (IN 10 FRS CFA)

COCOA	1965 (1)	1968 (1)	1970 (1)	1972 (1)	1973 (1)	1975	1977 (1)	1983
Beans	7.312	10.724	16.377	13.155	17.787	24.439	36.805	35.258
Sub-products	1.499	3.222	4.212	3.253	4.191	7.907	17.580	8.977
Chololates	-	782	683	462	857	1.105	1.454	197
Total	8.811	14.726	20.272	15.882	22.837	33.452	55.839	44.432
% Total Export	25.7	31.6	32.2	28.2	29.2	32.8	50.0	12.0

Source: 1) Ministère de la Coopération - Données Statistiques du Cameroon (Mai 1976).

2) Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilités Nationale.

When the figures of Tables 7(5) are compared with those of Table 7(6) we notice that there was a significant difference between the global evolution in volume and in value between 1965 and 1983. In fact , the progression in volume between 1965 and 1975 was about 66 percent, while the value of cocoa during the same period was more than 385 percent. This difference between the volume of production and value of foreign exchange earnings of cocoa could be explained by many factors:-

- The considerable increase in cocoa production and its transformation by local industries such as SOCACAO, CHOCOCAM and SIC.

- The increase in the prices of cocoa on the world market in 1973, 1976 and 1977 which benefited Cameroon. The foreign earnings of transformed cocoa amounted to 9.353 million francs CFA in 1975.

As one can notice from the tables above/that the production of cocoa in 1983 fell to the level of 1960/61. This tendency which also held good for the coffee was alarming because without petroleum such a situation would have led to a disquietening balance of trade deficit.

During the period under consideration coffee constituted the second most important export of Cameroon after cocoa excluding petroleum products. In Cameroon each of the two types of coffee - Robusta and Arabica benefited from a specific commercial circuit. The production of commercialized coffee between 1961 and 1983 is given in Table 7(7) below. The external sales of Cameroonian coffee and its relative importance in the aggregate foreign exchange earnings between 1965 and 1983 are given in Table 7(8).

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Table 7(7): PRODUCTION OF COMMERCIALIZED COFFEE (IN TONS)

Year	Robusta	Arabica	Total
1961	34.322	10.543	44.875
1962	29.414	8.395	37.809
1963	30.376	13.823	44.199
1964	36.685	12.654	49.339
1965	37.514	14.612	52.126
1966	49.776	21.338	71.114
1967	43.709	20.369	64.078
1968	56.000	21.349	77.349
1969	51.533	21.519	73.052
1970	58.287	23.628	81.915
1971	50.250	25.451	75.701
1972	63.173	30.066	93.239
1973	62.862	31.815	94.677
1974	59.352	16.288	75.580
1975	77.970	30.992	108.962
1976	84.503	29.220	113.723
1977	65.377	26.981	83.268
1978	67.700	16.700	84.400
1979	84.300	29.100	113.400
1980	75.200	24.100	99.300
1981	76.700	27.000	103.700
1982	75.600	23.900	99.500

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Ministère du Plan (Yaoundé).

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Table 7(8): EXPORT OF COFFEE: EVOLUTION FROM 1965 TO1983

	ARABICA		ROBUSTA		TOTALS	
Years	Export in value (10^6 CFA) (1)	price/Kg in F.CFA (2)	Export in value (10^6 F CFA) (1)	Price/kg in F.CFA (1)	Total Export of coffee (1)	% of total Exports (1)
1965	3.529	254	4.583	133	7.843	22.8
1968	4.292	193	8.310	162	12.602	27.0
1969	4.272	203	7.556	159	17.828	20.0
1970	5.475	263	9.103	218	14.578	23.2
1971	5.782	331	8.793	252	14.575	25.4
1972	6.709	284	8.731	260	15.440	27.7
1973	7.884	313	12.397	253	20.281	25.89
1974	10.078	365	18.696	284	28.775	25.1
1975	10.341	332	20.671	273	31.012	22.7
1976	9.821(2)	-	24.180(2)	380	34.001(2)	31.7(2)
1977	20.511(2)	-	31.457(2)	1.139	51.968(2)	46.4(2)
1983	12.701(3)	-	35.258(3)	-	48.536(3)	13.1(3)

Source: 1) Ministère de la Coopération (Paris) - Données Statistiques du Cameroun Mai 1976, p.21
2) Note annuelle de statistique - Direction de la Statistique (Yaoundé)

However, the evolution of the Robusta Coffee market was for a long time limited by the International Coffee Accord which attributed a low export quota for Cameroon. The increase in the export of Robusta Coffee noticed in 1973 and 1974 was essentially linked to the expiration of this Accord. Nevertheless, the figures in Table 7(8) show that coffee occupied an important place in the aggregate export products of Cameroon.

The forest resources of Cameroon are considerable. The surface area covered by forest is estimated at a third of the territory or about 158.000Km^2 [62]. In 1959/60, the production of wood in Cameroon was estimated at about 400.000m^3 out of which 280.000m^3 was exported and the rest consumed locally[63]. In 1975, commercialized wood production amounted to 10.500.000m^3 out of which 390.000m^3 were exported and the rest consumed by local industries. Thus, out of this total of commercialized wood production, only 37 percent was exported.

Table 7(9): OBJECTIVES OF PRODUCTION OF THE MAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DURING THE 4TH PLAN (1976-1981)

Products	Production (t) in 1974/75	Production (t) for 1980/81	Annual Growth Rate (%)
Cocoa	111.177	200.000	9.3
Arabica Coffee	32.334	60.000	11.0
Robusta Coffee	67.420	100.000	6.8
Cotton	40.000	125.000	20.9
Bananas	74.500	130.000	9.8
Groundnuts	50.000	02.000	10.5
Rubber	18.000	25.000	5.7
Tobacco	726	1.200	9.0
Industrial Palm Oil	37.900	80.000	13.25
Palm Products	10.500	22.000	13.0
Tea	1.800	3.500	11.4
Sugar-cane	252.000	1.000.000	26.0
Sugar	23.000	80.000	22.6
Wood (M^3)	1.300.000	2.500.000	9.8
Pineapples	-	100.000	-
Rice	24.000	100.000	30.0
Wheat	-	30.000	-
Cape Tobacco	2.247	5.000	14.5

Source: IVè Plan de Développement (1976-1981), p.62.

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Upon these primary products could be added bananas (4.360 million francs CFA in 1975); cotton (1.680 million francs CFA in 1975); rubber and groundnuts (2.220 million francs CFA in 1975), and palm produce (2.070 million francs CFA in 1975). Table 7(9) above gives us a picture of these exports during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1976 - 1981) while Table 7(10) below presents the credits allocated to each crop during this period.

Table 7(10): FORCAST CREDITS BY PRODUCTS

Products	Amount of Credits
Palm Produce	15.050
Rice	11.350
Sugar-cane	6.850
Rubber	6.073
Cocoa	5.300
Arabica Coffee	3.000
Wheat	2.700
Bananas	1.430
Cotton	1.350
Robusta Coffee	1.000
Maize	1.000
Cassava	1.000
Tea	800
Groundnuts	600
Food Crops	500
Tomatoes	300
Quinquinas	235
Anacardes	150
Pineapples and other fruits	150
Cape Tobacco	100
Jute Fibres	100
Medicinal Plants	

Source: 4è PLan de Développement Economique (1976-1981), p.42.

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However, despite these efforts to diversify and promote exports in Cameroon during the period under consideration, exports were concentrated in a few primary commodities (coffee, cocoa, energy product, timber and some lightly processed variants) for which there was no serious domestic market alternative and little flexibility for switching production to a domestically useable product alternative. The capital goods necessary for sustaining growth and the bulk of the construction materails and consumer goods equally necessary for domestic development were imported with no domestic supply alternative. Export trade was largely with the EEC (over three-quarter of both exports and imports) and especially with France (three-tenth of export and four-tenths of imports)[64]. The only changes in pattern over the period since independence was the precise mix in critical exports (e.g. addition of hydro electric power and cocoa products) and of imports (e.g. machinery and consumer durables) and a gradual erosion of the French share, especially on the export side, largely towards the EEC market and other sources[65].

As regards this export trade dependency, it was first of all due to the consequence of direct economic dependency and so partly to the heritage of the colonial past, and partly to the neo-colonial penetration of the Cameroon economy. It is as a matter of fact self-evident that a country whose most important economic sectors were controlled by foreign capital, had to trade largely or exclusively with the metropolitan country of that capital and had to produce what was needed by that country and had to be a ready market for goods that firms of that country wanted to sell there. This foreign trade was handled by foreign monopolies which directly determined the direction of foreign trade. Even if this was not the case as many conservative writers[66] on Cameroon have asserted, and let us suppose that foreign trade happened to be directly controlled by the State or was transacted by State organs, even then foreign capital as long as it held the key positions of the country's economy, would have had a great many other possibilities and means of channelling export trade in the direction it wished, to prevent the establishment or expansion of trade relations with other countries, (especially the Eastern countries) in an attempt to maintain the country's export trade dependency.

For example, the structure and evolution of Cameroonian exports as shown in table 7(1) (in value and indices) demonstrates the spontaneity of the international capitalist market mechanism characteristic of the external dependency syndrome as follows: (1) The first period (from 1960 to 1970) was marked by a regular growth despite the slight fall in volume noticed in 1966. The strong increase in Cameroon exports between 1968 to

1970 corresponded to the honey-moon period of world market prices for primary products especially for cocoa which constituted the principal export and foreign exchange earner for Cameroon. (2) The second period which went from 1970 to 1980 was catastrophic for Cameroonian exports both in volume and in value with the trend reaching the peak in 1971, 1972 and 1975. These years (particularly acute for export trade in Cameroon) were due to the poor climatic conditions which affected the production of certain vital export products of the country such as cocoa, coffee, cotton and groundnuts as well as oil crisis which wrested the world market prices for primary products.

These fluctuations in the structure and evolution of Cameroonian exports only point to the manner in which the perverse mechanism of the capitalist world market penetrates the national economy of a weak state due to trade dependency. In the case of Cameroon, the boom that characterized the capitalist economies in 1960s was reflected in the good performance of the Cameroon export industries and the increase in exports. On the other hand, the depression of the capitalist economies in the 1970s due to the oil crisis was reflected in the bad performance of Cameroonian export industries in the 1970s.

It is in this context that over 70 percent of Cameroon's trade was directed towards the EEC, especially towards France, which in 1966 accounted for 37 percent of total exports and 53 percent of total imports. Although, by 1980, France's share of Cameroon's total exports had fallen quite sharply, its share of total imports remained fairly stable and the direction of trade remained towards the Western countries[67]. Thus, simul taneously, trade with other EEC countries increased; exports to these countries rose from 25 percent in 1979, while imports increased from 14 percent to 18 percent of total imports[68]. Cameroon's exports to France consisted essentially of aluminium, coffee, and ginned cotton while exports to other EEC countries comprised mainly cocoa, timber and rubber. Coffee was Cameroon's main export to the United States[69].

In addition, foreign firms also made use of the banks under its control and their credit policy in order to promote trade with the metropolitan country and to discourage new trade relations from coming into being[70]. They ensured trade dependency by profiling production in the industrial and agricultural sectors under their control, that is, by determining their production structure and composition to the needs and market

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of the metropolitan country. They also ensured the maintenance of this trade dependency by making investments and introducing the production of commodities for which the necessary machines and equipment could only be purchased or replaced (standardized products) from firms in the metropolitan country. For example, a multibillion paper/pulp industry at Edea - CELLUCAM - had to close down because of the lack of the spare parts of its equipment and gross embezzlement of funds by the expatriate staff . From this point of view the bias of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon to pattern foreign investment in favour of capital-intensive techniques (and against the capital - goods sectors) also played an important role, and resulted not only in a rapid increase of the import of capital goods but also in a more intensive dependency on bilateral trade relations with the Western capitalist economy.

France and the EEC countries developed various means of establishing and maintaining this trade dependency. Among those of highest importance were the system of preferences, the financing policy and the monetary relations. The "system of preferences" created, on the one hand, relatively favourable conditions for the exports of Cameroon and ensured that the metropolitan country was supplied with the necessary primary commodities. On the other hand, by ousting rivals from the market, France provided a monopoly position on the market of Cameroon for the manufactured imports from the metropolitan country. By the latter means it prevented the development or consolidation of an authentic national industry in Cameroon.

An important role was also played by the European Economic Community, the Common Market in the strengthening of the export trade dependency of Cameroon. As is well known, in 1964, Cameroon and 17 African countries became associates of the common market. Doubtless, the association gave certain advantages to Cameroon, in the field of marketing her own export products, but from the point of view of the developmental aid Cameroon received in this way, her structural dependency was perpetuated. Since, however, in return for all this, Cameroon had to keep the tarrif rates for the goods coming from the common market low (Cameroon carried out a tarrif reduction of 30 percent), the development of her indigenous industries was held back by the cheap import products, and the outward-oriented production was maintained within the economic structure[71].

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The practical application of the economic doctrine of Planned Liberalism under Ahmadou Ahidjo also gave rise to the maintenance of this export trade dependency through the credit-financing of exports; the extension of loans and aid and the monetary relations by the metropolitan countries, especially because of the fact that Cameroon belonged to the Franc monetary zone under the control of the metropolitan country. Thus, the mechanism of financial dependency in general, provided innumerable possibilities for the metropolitan country (France) to strengthen the trade dependency of Cameroon, and thereby ensured its raw material supply and the marketing of its manufactures in Cameroon[72]. The dependency on foreign trade partners was particularly intensive and this was because of the narrow domestic market and an extensive outward-oriented export production. It, thus, became clear, that the smaller domestic market and the extensive outward-orientation in the majority of the country's export goods coupled with the greater economic power and local penetration of the domestic economy by France, only helped to reinforce the strong foreign trade dependency of the Cameroonian economy under the Ahidjo administration. This form of dependency involved many dangers and disadvantages. This meant that France determined(or at least influenced) the conditions of exchange according to her own interests (in volume, in value terms, in time, etc), and used this form of dependency in order to exert political pressure upon dependent Cameroon and even influenced and controlled her overall economic policy.

This close export trade connections and dependency meant that the economy of Cameroon became sensitive and defenseless in the case of recessions and crises of the partner country. Moreover, the latter shifted the burden of crisis in most cases on to dependent Cameroon and this was done in 1982 when a serious recession of the French economy caused a serious imbalance of trade for Cameroon[73]. However, it must be added that this form of dependency strengthened by its very nature the other ties and forms of dependency. On consequence that cannot be neglected was the overall dependency of the whole of the Cameroon economy on the cyclical changes in the world market. This phenomenon as well as the overall trade dependency could be traced back to two factors: (1) the excessively important role of export trade within the national economy; (2) the distorted structure of foreign export trade.

Since the most developed economic sectors of Cameroon (raw material production, agricultural plantations) were at the same time export sectors, a substantial proportion of the national income was realized through export trade.

For example, about 60-70 percent of Cameroon's total commodity production was exported and in certain items as rubber and cocoa;[74] these export figures were as high as 90 percent of the total output. Export made up about 75 percent of Cameroon's national income between 1975-78[75]. Therefore, the place of export trade in the economy of Cameroon was a particularly important one. Exports consumed here a substantial proportion of the output of the monetary sector, ranging from 68 percent in 1965 to 56 percent in 1980[76]. The bulk of rural Cameroonian money incomes was provided by agricultural exports grown by Cameroonian farmers and the bulk of the Cameroonian wage-earners were employed by the export-producing plantations and farms, agricultural processing plants, mines and in the transport and commercial network serving the export-import sector. A considerable proportion (between 60 and 95 percent) of the domestic consumption of manufactured goods was supplied by imports. The import-share in the supply for fuels, transport vehicles and certain raw materials was especially high. According to estimates[77] about 95 percent of the machinery required for the implementation of investment programmes (including transportation and what was typical of underdevelopment in Cameroon) was imported. The overwhelming proportion of Cameroon's export trade was accounted for by a few agricultural products (coffee, cocoa, palm produce, cotton and rubber, timber and bananas). It is self-evident that the distorted structure of exports alone made the foreign exchange position of the country sensitive to the world market situation, (as in the case of the fall in the demand for one of the main exports - bananas - of Anglophone Cameroon between 1962-1965). There was hardly no, or hardly any, possibility of offsetting the loss in export earnings by stepping up the export of other products. In addition, most of these export products were unprocessed and semi-processed primary goods or raw materials, and they were usually identical with the export products of other developing countries, which were highly unfavourable to the formation of the terms of trade of Cameroon[78]. That is why export trade dependency through its disarticulation of domestic structures of production maintained the foreign exchange sector of the Cameroonian economy in its colonial enclave with the attendant narrowness of the economic

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resource base. Consequently, up to 1982 the content of Cameroon's exports was still dominated by agricultural, forestry and energy raw materials which accounted for 76% of the G.N.P. in 1975/76 and 79.3% in 1979/80[79]. These included coffee, bananas, wood, tobacco, rubber, cotton, groundnuts, medicinal plants and crude oil. In 1960/61, the semi-manufactured exports of Cameroon in value accounted for less than 2.7% of her foreign exchange with cocoa products earning 580 billion CFA francs; wood products earning 580 billion CFA francs, cotton products earning 17 billion CFA francs, beer 16 billion CFA francs, cigarettes 8 billion CFA francs, perfumes 7 billion CFA franfs, soaps 4 billion CFA francs and shoes 4 billion CFA francs[80]. However, although in 1975/76, semi-manifactured Cameroonian exports accounted for 23.7 billion CFA francs or 33% of the total external sales,[81] this increase was insignificant since it was not accompanied by a steady readjustment of the economy to create linkages with other sectors in order to promote self-reliance and reduce economic dependency through a gradual elimination of disarticulation. This is why the semi-manufacturing sector which was dominated in 1979/80 by cocoa products, aluminium products, wood products, cotton products, maritime products, beer and mineral products could not even satisfy the domestic demand for them because the operation of these industries was not meant to liquidate its own disproportion and disarticulation, and as such could not speed up economic growth by transforming the potential consumption fund of the economy into an accumulation fund. This incapacity is demonstrated by table 7(11). As Table 7(11) shows, the contribution of local industry in the exports was very modest if not weak because of the economic dependency of the country.

Table 7(11): CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDUSTRIES IN EXPORTS

Years	Local Industries			Total (foreign and local		
	Q	%	V	%	Q	V
1973/79	145.4	12.2	19.9	18.5	1184.0	107.8
1974/75	144.7	15.6	19.2	17.9	927.6	106.9
1975/76	143.1	15.0	21.2	18.9	951.9	112.3
1976/77	138.8	13.9	26.3	16.3	997.8	161.2
1977/78	146.4	13.6	16.6	13.9	1078.0	191.0
1978.79	175.1	9.2	27.3	13.7	1899.2	198.9
1979/80	181.3	11.1	32.3	14.1	2067.8	199.8
1981/82	179.5	10.1	29.2	11.1	1956.2	188.9

Q = Quantity in thousands of tons
V = Value in billion of francs CFA

Source: Direction de la Planification, Yaoundé.

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Jean-Marie Gankou[82] has explained this biased, onesided structure of exports and the unduly high export proportion simply by the narrowness of the domestic market, and attributed a natural (spontesua) positive role to export trade which according to him partly expanded by its income-generating effect on the domestic market and led thereby to the liquidation of its own disproportion and partly speeded up economic growth by transforming the potential consumption fund into accumulation fund. How could this be so when in agriculture as well as industry up to 50 percent of the cost of construction (including construction machinery) represented imports. Perhaps 60 percent of the cost of investment activity in Cameroon represented direct import costs. Another 15 -25 percent tended to become indirect import costs through the tendency of additional labour and managerial - entrepreneurial incomes generated by investment activity to be spent on imported consumer goods . However, trade depedency and the "excessive role" of export trade in the national economy of Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration, cannot be simply reduced to the ratios of the exports to the Gross National Investment (G.N.I.). It is much more important to examine the role export trade played, together with other factors in promoting or limiting development in the dynamics of the national aconomy. Afterall, a very small share of export trade in the national income can go hand in hand with an almost complete dependency of the process of growth on imports of capital goods if the country has no machine-building industry of its own[83].

The big role of export trade in the realization of the national income under the Ahidjo administration could not be regarded in itself as a wholly favourable phenomenon. In fact, it only led to a high sensitivity of the economy to world market trends since it was associated with the distorted structure of foreign trade as a whole. And it was exactly this narrowness and unfavourable pattern of the domestic market that exerted a negative inducement towards the branches producing for the domestic market, and really justified in this respect an export-orientation. Although it is equally beyond debate that export trade might have performed a transformation function which took the form of an exchange of part of the potential consumption fund into the accumulation fund by means of exporting goods produced in sectors producing consumption goods and importing foreign goods for sectors producing capital goods,[84] as far as the assumption of this spontesua **market** expanding effect of export trade is concerned, this is not

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only refuted in practice by the decade -old experiences of the Cameroon economy, but it is even in theory the result of a rather one-sided outlook which characterizes "statecentric" and "praise-giving" classical economists. In fact, this is the outlook which reduces the market problem to the question of incomes (and consumption propensities) instead of recognizing its real essesnce which is the commodity metamorphosis built on the division of labour in productive sectors[85]. This is the moreso because the market expanding effect of foreign trade depends on whether linkage effects come into being and multiply between the export sector and other sectors of the national economy and not only indirectly through incomes (but largely directly, through productive cooperation).

For example, Tables 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4) above show in percentages and in indices, the principal group of products which entered into exports in Cameroon. With 1966 as the base year, these tables based on International Trade Statistical and Tarrif data (I.T.S.T.) not only confirm the postulate that primary products are subject most easily to the manipulated fluctuations of the capitalist international free market mechanisms but also show the little diversification that the Ahidjo administration had introduced in the export structure of Cameroon. The reasons are know. External dependency on foreign economic resources implied logically the policy of economic enclave maintenance and disarticulation since it was only under such conditions that foreign investments could yield the highest returns.

7.5: EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS

Import trade relations were very important in the process of the industrial development of the country because industrial establishments producing intermediary goods totally depended on the import of semi-finished components. For example in 1978/79 the proportion of intermediary consumer goods of foreign origin in the total imports of Cameroon was estimated at 25.36 percent while equipment goods represented 26.69 percent of imports[86].

Table 7(12) below gives an idea about the evolution of imports in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982. According to the figures in table 7(12), the average increase in the rate of imports during the period could be situated at 15 percent per year. Between 1960 and 1963, the general tendency was that of augmentation in the value of imports. The rate of

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increase in volume of imports was on the whole regular between 1960 and 1970. The rate of increase in the volume of imports on the average was about 6 percent per year[87]. The period 1970/77 was characterized by irregularity in the growth of imports especially in 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1976. Such irregularities were due in part to a fall in the imports of alimentary products, drinks, and tobacco which dropped by 15 percent during the period under study. As shown in Table 7(12), the value index of imports did not follow the same evolution as the volume index of imports which incresed from 100 in 1970 to 287 in 1977.

Table 7(12): EVOLUTION OF IMPORTS IN CAMEROON

Years	Value in 10^6 dollars	Indice of total value (base 100 IN 1970)	Indice of Unitary value (base 100 in 1970)	Indice of volume (base 100 in 1970)
1960	84.5	35	89	39
1961	96.0	40	89	45
1962	101.5	42	89	47
1963	128.0	53	91	58
1964	133.0	55	92	60
1965	151.5	62	94	66
1966	146.0	60	94	64
1967	188.0	78	96	81
1968	187.5	77	95	81
1969	207.5	85	96	89
1970	242.0	100	100	100
1971	249.5	103	108	95
1972	302.5	124	117	106
1973	336.0	138	141	98
1974	435.5	181	183	99
1975	598.7	248	197	126
1976	606.0	255	247	103
1977	696.0	287	217	132
1978	865.7	357.7	270	164
1979	1001.4	413.8	312	188
1980	1247.8	515.6	388	234
1981	1213.9	501.6	416	277
1982	1339.2	553.9	416	250
1983	1386.9	573.0	417	251

Source: a) Office Statistique des Communautes Europeennes;
b) Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité National, Yaoundé.

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However, other consumer goods such as household goods, medicines, shoes, clothes and others, witnessed only a very low increase in 1971. The slight increase in imports in 1972, 1975 and 1977 by more than 75 percent was due to buying of planes for Cameroon Airlines, Cars for Société de Transport Urbains du Cameroun (SOTUC), ships for Cameroun Shipping Lines and the buying of locomotives for the Railway Corporation[88]. The increse in the value index of imports during this period (1970-1977) can be explained not only by the increase in the imports of manufactured goods, but also by the influence of the fall in prices of oil and the acceleration of global economic crisis.

Table 7(13): PRICES OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS (IN CURRENT CFA FRANCS)

Imported Products	Average price per ton (1970)	Average price per ton (1970)	Variation (in %)	Average price per ton (1970)	Variation (in %)
1- ALIMENTARY PRODUCTS:					
Milk Products	141.710	247.600	+ 74.7	329.930	+ 233
Importd Cereals	33.000	62.050	+ 88	55.070	+ 67
Sugar	38.610	78.170	+ 102.5	122.075	+ 216
Fats and Oil Products	110.870	160.950	+ 45.8	174.345	+ 58
Drinks	64.975	97.740	+ 50.4	100.315	+ 54
2- OTHER PRODUCTS:					
Ciment	5.750	8.230	+ 43.1	9.205	+ 60
Hydrocarbon Products	11.750	24.470	+ 142.3	30.463	+ 159
Petrol (Ordinary and Super)	9.789	29.132	+ 197.6	31.325	+ 220
Gas Oil	8.552	25.279	+ 195.6	25.678	+ 266.3
Fuels	5.680	16.813	+ 196	19.239	+ 238.7
Alumia	16.670	22.980	+ 37.9	31.711	+ 90.2
Pharmaceutic Products	981.350	1.520.925	+ 53	1792.756	+ 82.7
Fertilisers	13.770	37.750	+ 174	70.361	+ 411
Insecticides Pesticides	191.800	429.400	+ 124	624.219	+ 225.5
Rubber Articles	370.800	495.000	+ 32.7	601.906	+ 61.3
Unprinted Papers	98.260	158.900	+ 64	192.140	+ 95.5
Dresses	7.336.890	2.903.900	+ 124	356.154	+ 169
Iron Products	79.345	737.950	+ 66.3	166.207	+ 108.2
Mechanical Equipment and Machines	689.190	1.094.500	+ 60	1217.898	+ 78
Motor Vehicles	506.225	206.670	+ 39.6	741.189	+ 46.4

Source: Marchés Tropicaux et Meditterraneens (1976)

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Table 7(13) taken from Marchés Tropicaux et Mediterranees (No 1616 of 29 October 1976) gives us an eloquent illustration of the evolution of the prices of certain products imported by Cameroun. Table 7(13) above shows the average values in current francs calculated before the imputation of shipping and other costs. However, taking them into consideration changes nothing in the percentage value. From this table it becomes clear that the lowest variation in the average price between 1970 and 1975 was for vehicles (+46 percent) - that which was still considerable and represented the most pernicious type of imported inflation whose distabilizing role in the developing economy does not need to be demonstrated.

The importance of the evolution of petroleum products in Cameroonian imports is given in table 7(14) below. From table 7(14), we can notice that Cameroon imported 2.996 billion francs CFA worth of petroleum products in 1970. This amount corresponded to 264.824 tons of petrol. Seven years afterwards (1977), for a volume of petroleum imports less than that of 1970, the value almost multiplied by seven.

Table 7(14): THE VALUE OF IMPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1970-1977 (IN MILLION OF CFA FRANCS)

Products	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Avaition petrol	135	109	53	43	127	71	74	110
Super Fuel	211	285	349	448	899	1217	1424	3038
Aviation Carburator Kerosine	511	678	720	663	1552	1195	921	1896
Other types of petrol	599	681	664	781	1765	2206	1801	3139
Kerosine	74	77	103	142	515	11997	1211	1935
Gas oil	673	984	1212	1262	3021	3644	3995	7632
Fuel oils	159	207	160	129	381	622	465	824
Other Lubricants	456	512	440	480	807	858	1121	1478
Hydrocarbon Gas	80	63	80	114	114	194	243	337
Other Petroleum Products	98	182	98	82	82	169	234	530
Total	2996	3778	3879	4087	9263	11373	11489	20919

Source: 1) Comptes Provisoire de la National (Mars 1978)
2) Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

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In 1977, the cost of petroleum imports in Cameroon rose to 20.919 billion francs CFA. However, this tendency was reversed from 1978 with the functioning of the Limbe refinery and the first exports of Cameroon petroleum. Hewever, the evolution of Cameroonian imports during the period under study shall be better understood with a study of its structure.

The structure of Cameroonian imports during this period was extremely varied. However, economically, they could be regrouped into three main categories[89]: - (a) final consumer goods such as alimentary products, tobacco and drinks destined for household consumption, energy products, transport materials and durable and nondurable consumer goods; (b) intermediary consumer goods which consisted of semi-finished goods or raw materials for the fabrication of other goods and consisted mainly of alimentary products and drinks destined for industries, industrial supplies, energy products and spare-parts for industries and transport materials; (c) equipment (capital) goods such as transport material for industries, machines, etc.

Table 7(15): THE STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION OF CAMEROONIAN IMPORTS, 1964-1970 (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

ITEMS	1964/65		1966/67		1968/69		1970/71	
	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%
1) CAPITAL GOODS	27.354	20.3	26.343	20.0	46.213	22.4	55.364	22.2
Machines, etc.	16.090	12.0	16.989	12.9	28.718	13.9	37.903	15.3
Transport Material for Indus.	11.264	8.3	19.354	7.1	17.500	8.5	17.340	7.3
2) INTERMEDIARY GOODS	65.590	48.8	65.686	50.0	94.021	45.7	123.210	49.6
Alimentary Prod. & drinks ofr Ind.	3.851	36.1	4.191	3.2	63.410	30.8	82.602	33.2
Energy Products	4.156	3.1	5.009	3.8	9.169	4.4	11.710	4.7
Motor Parts & Trans. Materials	8.971	6.7	8.612	6.6	15.489	7.5	19.909	8.0
3) CONSUMER GOODS	41.540	30.9	39.138	29.8	-	-	-	-
Alimentary Prod. & Drinks	11.492	8.5	10.232	7.8	17.100	8.3	21.702	8.7
Energy Products	764	0.6	626	0.5	0.789	0.3	1.302	0.6
Household & Trans. equipment	3.478	2.3	3.496	2.7	7.891	3.8	6.710	2.7
Consumer Durable	3.118	2.3	3.255	2.5	7.821	3.8	6.710	2.7
Consumer (non durable)	22.688	16.9	21.529	16.4	35.561	17.3	3.334	13.4
General Total	134.484	100	131.167	100	206.819	100	245.509	100

Source: OSCE, Annuaire (1970/1871.

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This clssification was used in compiling Cameroonian imports between 1965 and 1971 as shown in Table 7(15) above. Tables 7(15) above, 7(16) and 7(17) below present Cameroonian imports between 1964 and 1977 by group of products.

Table 7(16): THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS, 1971/72-1975/76

(IN 10^3 DOLLARS)

ITEMS	1971/72		1972/73		1973/74		1974/75	
	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%	Value in 10^3 of dollars	%
1) CAPITAL GOODS	38.672	21.8	46.231	22.4	58.609	22.2	55.292	22.2
Machines, etc.	21.032	11.9	28.700	13.9	35.315	14.6	37.944	15.3
Indus. Trans. Gds.	17.640	9.9	17.531	8.5	18.294	7.6	17.348	7.0
2) INTERMEDIARY GOODS	84.655	47.8	94.049	45.7	117.787	48.9	123.234	49.6
Prod. & Drinks for Industry	6.058	3.4	6.036	2.9	8.314	3.4	9.160	3.7
Industrial Supplies	56.594	31.9	63.472	30.8	82.955	34.5	82.570	33.2
Energy Prod.	8.431	4.8	9.107	4.4	9.533	4.0	11.722	4.7
Spare Part & Transport	13.486	7.6	15.434	7.5	16.985	7.0	19.891	8.0
3) CONSUMER GOODS	54.144	30.5	65.721	31.9	69.695	28.9	70.052	28.2
Household Prod. and Drinks	18.049	10.2	17.114	8.3	16.053	6.7	21.736	8.7
Energy Products	623	0.4	657	0.3	1.114	0.5	1.333	0.6
Transport Materials for Households	4.069	2.3	4.604	2.2	6.974	2.9	7.041	2.8
Consumer durable	5.353	3.0	7.833	3.8	7.570	3.1	6.688	2.7
Consumer non-durable goods.	26.050	14.7	35.513	17.3	34.984	14.5	33.261	13.4
General Total	177.471	100	206.001	100	241.091	100	248.587	100

Source: a) O.S.C.E., Annuaire (1975/1976)

b) Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

From Tables 7(15), 7(16) and 7(17), one can distinguish two periods in the structural evolution of Cameroonian imports. Before 1970, the composition of imports was stable. The different components increased in volume and in value but without any significant variation in percentage. But from 1970, imports evolved in an irregular fashion which was translated by the modification in composition of the products imported.

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Table 7(17): IMPORTS IN QUANTITY AND VALUE BY GROUP OF PRODUCTS
(FROM 1ST JANUARY TO 31ST DECEMBER, 1974-1977 IN 10^6 FRANCS CFA)

GROUP OF PRODUCTS	1974		1975		1976		1977	
	Quant. in tons	Value in FCFA	Quant. in tons	Value in FCFA	Quant. in tons	Value in FCFA	Quant. in tons	Value in tons
Food, Wood & Tobacco	107.948	10.370	91.492	8.921	108.161	9.720	139.388	13.619
Energy & Lubri.	318.733	9.209	377.681	11.260	317.842	11.316	388.711	20.437
Raw Materials (Animals & Veg.)	58.980	2.976	44.908	3.354	42.461	3.054	72.214	6.267
Mineral Raw Materials & Others	109.719	2.445	98.348	3.054	143.318	4.369	107.848	3.647
Semi-manufac-tured Products	381.435	16.020	416.241	21.444	641.382	20.579	552.630	27.404
Transport Mat.	16.060	10.718	17.890	13.085	19.874	16.081	23.111	25.172
Agric. Equip.	610	590	1.071	740	1.102	963	967	1.127
Indus. Equip.	23.127	13.777	31.151	20.248	37.452	28.227	37.679	31.202
Other consumer Goods	90.109	38.720	94.412	45.999	99.378	51.653	102.272	63.526
General Total	1106.721	104.825	1173.194	128.104	1110.970	145.962	1524.820	192.401

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité National, Yaoundé.

By affecting an average of imports for the years 1973, to 1982 one obtains the following percentage distribution:

(a) household consumers represented 22.42 percent of total imports during this period with alimentary products and tobacco representing 9.5 percent and other household consumer goods representing 12.92 percent.

(b) 25.36 percent of imported goods represented the consumer goods destined for enterprises.

(c) equipment goods represented 26.69 percent of the aggregate imports.

(d) energy products, and lubricants represented 6.69. percent of aggregate imports.

(c) raw materials and semi-manufactured products represented 18.84 percent of aggregate imports.

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From these figures, one can notice a decrease in the importation of equipment goods of 5 percent against 17 percent in 1969/1970 import year. This rate went down to about 12 percent in 1980/1981. The consumption of enterprises never practically varied (about 25 percent of aggregate imports) between 1970 and 1982. On the contrary, there was an increase in the import of transport materials (from 9.5 percent in 1971 to 13 percent in 1977/1978) and semi-manufactures (from 12.4 percent in 1971 to 13.4 percent in 1977/1978).

Table 7(18): STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION IN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL IMPORTS OF THE MAIN CATEGORIES OF PRODUCTS (1967 AND 1973 AS BASE YEARS)

Some Group of Products	Value of Imports in Percentages for the 1967 Base Yr.	Value of Imports in Precentages for the 1973 Base year	Growth Rate of Imports in Percentages
Meal & Manuf. Gds.	10.68	7.72	5.2
Cereals	3.50	4.91	17.50
Fertilisers	0.95	1.20	15.0
Raw Petroleum	-	-	19.5
Petroleum Prod.	5.84	6.27	13.6
Med. & Phar.Prod.	2.57	3.02	14.1
Textiles & Clothes	13.67	9.05	3.7
Non-Elec. Machines	12.05	12.94	12.4
Transport Materails	11.63	16.04	17.2
Alimentary Prod.	12.18	12.91	12.12
Agric. Raw Mat.	0.30	0.35	13.9
Combustibles	5.64	6.39	13.4
Minerals & Metals	6.74	4.54	4.0
Manufac. Prod.	74.29	75.52	11.4
Chemical Prod.	11.87	12.92	12.6
Assorted Manufac.	33.89	28.13	- 7.7
Elec. Machines	4.86	5.50	13.4
Machines & Transport Materials	28.54	24.48	14.6
Others	0.84	0.24	- 7.8
Total Value of Imports	178.3	334.3	11.7*

Source: Calculations done on the basis of data from Annuaire Statistique des Nations Unies (1976)

As Table 7(18) above shows principal imports of Cameroon were many. In 1975, Cameroon imported 12.6 billion francs CFA worth of alimentary and agricultural products[90]. A good part of these products was not destined for the final consumer but served as intermediary inputs in local industries

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Such products included wheat, flour, alimentary pestas, sugar yeast and tobacco. Thus if we reduce the value of these intermediary consumer products (about 7.1 billion francs CFA) then we will notice that Cameroon imported only 5.5 billion francs CFA of direct consumer alimentary and agricultural products which represented 4.3 percent of the total imports. Petroleum products were also an import item in Cameroon during this period. Before 1977 Cameroon was not yet producing petrol and 80 percent of the petroleum products consumed in the country was imported from Gabon[91]. Petroleum products represented 5.5 percent of the total imports in 1967 and 6.3 percent in 1973 or an average annual growth rate of 13.6 percent. In 1970, the consumption of petroleum products which was about 370.000 tons went up to 500.000 tons in 1977 (an equivalent of 20 billion francs CFA). Such consumption constituted a heavy financial burden on Cameroon. The expliotation of petroleum in Cameroon which started in 1977/78 (the first gisements amounted to 63.000 tons) helped the country to improve its balance of trade and payments. By 1982, Cameroon was producing about 5 million tons of petroleum per year. Nevertheless, Cameroon also imported other non-energetic mineral products for local industries. Cameroon also imported organic and inorganic chemical products. The organic chemical products were used mostly for perfumes; soaps, fertiliser and insecticide production. The import of organic chemical products amounted to about 450 million francs CFA in 1975 [92]. The imported inorganic chemical products comprised aluminium oxide and aluminium flour used by ALUCAM and amounted to about 3.3 billion francs CFA in 1975[93]. Other inorganic chemical products imported included solda (0.5 billion francs CFA) and carbonates (0.2 billion francs CFA). Textile imports in Cameroon were estimated at about 20 billion francs CFA per year during the period under study. The imports of textiles passed from 6.1 billion francs CFA in 1967 to 9.5 billion francs CFA in 1975[94]. On the other hand, the import of metallic products amounted to 4 billion francs CFA in 1967 but by 1975 this amount had multiplied by 6 times. The same tendency could be observed in the importation of building and construction materials and vehicles which amounted to 14.5 billion francs CFA in 1975; with an annual growth rate of 17.2 percent in 1975, these products represented 12.5 percent of the aggregate imports of Cameroon[95].

From the above statistics, the general remark is that the value of imports in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982 was situated around 15 percent per year. In volume, the rate of evolution remained regular on the average

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between 1960 and 1970 at 6 percent per annum. This regularity corresponded as in the case of exports to the stable evolution of the capitalist dominated international market. However, unlike the case of exports low rate of importations corresponded also to the high level of foreign capital inflow into the national economy in terms of organic composition, origin and occupation. Cameroon had just gained her political independence in a violent conflict that pitted the moderate nationalist of the Ahidjo administration against the guerrilla onslaughts of the radical UPC party. Under such conditions even foreign capital of French origin hesitated to participate in Cameroon.

On the other hand between 1970 and 1983 the evolution of importations was characterized by frequent irregularities with particular emphasis in 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1976. In other words, the growth of the percentage share of importation in foreign trade which went above 40 percent could be conspicously verified by the adverse trade balance registered during the period in question. The importations of alimentary products, drinks (whiskies especially) and tobacco which rose in volume by about 15 percent during the period reflected the tendency of external dependency that is, to gear importations towards luxuries over necessities. Jean-Marie Gankou has argued that the augmentation of importations in 1972, 1975 and 1977 by more than 75% was due to the increase of the importation of transport equipment corresponding to the purchase of plants for Cameroon Airlines, cars for Cameroon Urban Transport Company (SOTUC), ships for the Cameroon Shipping Lines and locomotives for the Cameroon Railway Corporation (REGIFERCAM) , which were created within those years. Such an a lopsided argument is an anachronism in the measure where the structure of ownership shares in the companies he is talking about demonstrates the predominance of foreign participation. Such an argument does not refute the fact that it was the intensive penetration of the Cameroonian economy from 1970 (when the last pockets of the UPC guerrilla resistance had been removed) by foreign investment capital that was partly responsible for the rocketing augmentations in imports.

Again, the rapid augmentation of the indice value of importations during the 1970 to 1980 period could be explained by the rise in the prices of manufactured goods, the effects of the oil crisis and the acceleration of the negative "inflation metamorphosis" characteristic of the capitalist

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international market mechanism. Such a situation as in the case of exports not only demonstrates the close connections between trade relations and dangers of external economic dependency but also demonstrates the way in which due to these trade relations, the Cameroonian economy became sensitive and defenceless in the case of capitalist market recessions and crises for which it bore no responsibility.

The above argument further raises the question of the prices of certain manufactured goods imported by Cameroon. It must be noted that although these prices did not affect the percentage range of importation, they, nevertheless, gravely increased the cost of these products for the final consumer. This points to the way in which the Cameroonian population was adversely affected by import trade during the Ahidjo Administration. As we can observe above, the lowest variation of prices was not for equipment which was destined for the capital goods producing sectors but for motor vehicles (+46 percent) which was a luxury. Finally, the incidence of the evolution of petroleum products equally had a considerable impact on Cameroonian importations.

Again, this lopsided external dependency in Cameroon under the Ahidjo Administration could be discerned from the structure of importations which was dominated by final consumer goods such as alimentary products, tobacco and drinks energy products, vehicles and luxuries. The importation of capital goods destined to stimulate industrial development and self-reliance was relatively high but their positive effect was neutralized by the domestic ownership structure of industry which was dominated by foreign capital.

From discussion of imports in Cameroon upto this point, one can distinguish two main periods of this structural evolution. Before 1970 the composition of importations was stable with slight augmentations in volume and value of unitary composition but which did not change their percentage significance. Such a situation in Cameroon corresponded to the period when foreign capital was still exploring the most profitable avenues of exploitation in the economy - a period of "neocolonial" gestation.

After 1970, Cameroonian importations were characterized by serious irregularities which indicated a modification in the composition of imported products. On the average, the percentage of distribution of importations

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between 1973 and 1982 showed that 22.42 percent of total importations represented final consumer goods (dominated by luxurious alimentary products and tobacco which alone represented 9.5 percent as against 12.9 percent for necessary consumer goods); 25.36 percent represented consumer goods for enterprises; 26.69 percent represented infrastructural equipment goods; 6.69 percent energy products and lubricants and 18.84 percent represented raw materials and semi-finished products. The irregularity of importations noticed in the 1970s which coincided with the "mise en place" of the structures of production of an extroverted economy needs no further explanation because the increase corresponds the maturation of foreign capital exploitation in Cameroon. However, it must be mentioned that since the aim of foreign capital in Cameroon was not to develop but to promote the disarticulation necessary for exploitation through dependency on the international capitalist system, the rationale of minimum input for maximum output was responsible for the stagnation (and even diminution) in the importation of capital goods such as equipment for enterprises and an increase in the importation of transport materials which were vital for the transportation of the goods to the ports. This tendency which only further reinforced the direct colonial economic dependency can only be understood from the fact that since an economic good is only valuable when it gets to the consumer, there was logic in the constant increase in the importation of transport equipment materials (as against the decrease in the importation of other capital goods) to facilitate the exit of consumer goods.

The above argument is corroborated by the fact that the consumption of capital goods by enterprises never changed after 1970 (remaining at about 25% of total importations) but instead diminished by about 5 percent. On the other hand, the importation of transport materials increased from 9.5 percent in 1971 to 13 percent in 1977 as compared with necessary capital goods which only increased from 12.4 percent in 1971 to 13.4 percent in 1977. On the whole, the relative share of the importation of consumer goods only increased. For example, in 1976/77, 70 percent of Cameroonian importations were constituted by consumer goods as compared with the 50 percent in 1962 which was even hardly reached.

It is exactly in this respect that a peculiar mechanism of external dependency in import trade could be observed in the economy of Cameroon under the Ahidjo Administration - a mechanism which involved the reproduction

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of the enclave-character of the export sector. Therefore, the expansion of the export sector only helped to deprive production for the domestic market of the necessary resources and promoted the competition of imports which only helped to keep domestic production under pressure. Even the distribution and spending of incomes and the consumption propensities were such that they induced a growth in import-consumption and compelled the country to increase primary export production.

7.6 : BALANCE OF TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

From independence in 1960, to 1982, Cameroon gradually diversified its commercial partners but as will be argued here, such diversification was not too significant to represent a fundamental change. This is because, as will be shown further in this chapter, an objective means of assessing a country's trade diversification is through an examination of its trade and diplomatic orientation in relation to its national ethic. If the two are congruent over a period of time (as in the case of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982), then no shift in position or effective diversification has taken place, over that period of time. Any lack of congruence (which was not the case of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982) which persists over a long period indicates a change. Nevertheless, France which was the principal supplier and customer of Cameroon before 1960 gradually dropped in reponderance. Despite this drops, France remained the first commercial partner of Cameroon with 28 percent of exports and 46 percent of imports in 1975 against 29 percent and 50 percent respectively in 1970[96]. During this period, the EEC countries grew in importance as Cameroon's trade partners. The development of commercial exchanges of Cameroon was not only with the EEC countries, but equally towards the United States (10 percent of exports and 17 percent of imports in 1973 against 7 percent and 10 percent respectively in 1971); towards other African countries especially the UDEAC countries (Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea) and towards Japan, China and the Soviet Union. Asian countries were not very significant among the commercial partners of Cameroon from 1960 to 1962, but from 1970/71, these Asian countries assumed positions of importance as commercial partners. Since the triple tax[97] never affected the sales of these countries, their products were generally very competitive in relationship to the European products, especially in the area of electronics and automobile.

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In terms of imports, one could distinguish three categories of taxes to which could be added a fourth:

- custom duty of common external tariff applicable to all goods irrespective of their origin and the rate of this tax varied between 5 percent and 20 percent;

- entry rights calculated upon the CIF[98] value of all goods irrespective of their origin and the rate of this tax varied between 15 and 70 percent;

- the complementary tax which was calculated upon the CIF value of an imported goods. Its rate varied from country to country. In Cameroon, this was situated between 5 and 10 percent.

the tax on the importation business turnover whose imposition was based on the CIF value of the goods and whose rate of 10 percent was cumulative with the customs and entry duties.

The socialist countries (USSR especially) which had only episodic commercial relations with Cameroon at independence saw their commercial relations with Cameroon develop rapidly from 1970 as we shall see later.

In terms of the geographical orientation of the commercial exchanges of Cameroon, the analysis of the export and import trade above has shown that Cameroon had very little commercial relations with other African countries. In order to demonstrate this affirmation, we shall distinguish between Cameroon's commercial exchanges with the developed countries and Cameroon's exchanges with the African countries. From the data provided in Table 7(19), 7(20), 7(121)A and 7(21)B, we notice that most of the commercial relations of Cameroon during this period were with the developed world especially with the Western European countries who accounted for more than 80 percent of the transactions [99]. The relative quota of exchange with the other developing states was negligible. A study of Tables 7(19) and 7(20) reveals that despite the progressive diversification of trading partners, the greatest part of Cameroon's commercial exchanges was still done with the developed countries especially with the European Economic Community. According to Gankou, such a situation was due to constraints imposed by the country's foreign aid and the relationships resulting from Cameroon's membership of the Franc Zone and the monetary guarantee by France which in turn

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Table 7(19): EVOLUTION OF VALUE OF IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE ACCORDING TO THEIR ORIGN AND DESTINATION, 1961-82(IN 10^6 FCFA)

Years	XT=TOTX	Rate of growth in %	XA=AFRS	Rate of growth in %	XD=PDEW	Rate of Growth in %	IT=TOTI	Rate of growth in %	IA=AFRI	Rate of frowth in %	ID=PDEVI	Rate of growth in %
1961/62	30.7	-	1.9	-	26.3	-	31.0	-	3.0	-	19.3	-
1962/63	33.9	104.2	1.8	-52.5	31.8	209.1	31.8	25.8	3.6	200.0	24.1	248.7
1963/64	34.6	20.6	1.3	-277.8	32.6	25.1	32.9	34.6	3.1	-138.8	26.0	78.8
1964/65	34.4	- 5.7	1.9	461.5	32.0	-18.4	37.4	136.8	2.0	-64.5	32.6	253.8
1965/66	35.9	43.6	2.1	10.5	32.0	0.0	36.1	-347	2.1	- 3.6	31.6	-30.7
1966/67	39.1	89.1	1.4	-333.3	31.1	-31.2	46.4	285.3	2.8	333.3	40.6	284.8
1967/68	48.6	242.9	4.4	242.8	39.6	277.4	46.3	2.1	4.6	642.8	39.8	-19.7
1968/69	59.4	222.2	4.8	90.9	49.4	247.4	53.	144.7	5.4	173.9	46.9	178.4
1969/70	62.8	57.3	5.2	-83.3	54.6	105.3	67.2	267.9	6.3	166.6	57.8	232.4
1970/71	57.3	-87.6	6.6	369.2	48.5	-111.7	69.4	32.7	6.4	15.6	59.4	27.7
1971/72	55.7	-27.9	6.1	-75.7	46.9	-32.9	76.4	100.9	6.9	78.1	62.6	53.8
1972/73	78.3	405.7	8.5	393.4	68.2	454.2	74.5	-24.8	6.8	-14.5	59.4	-51.1
1973/74	114.5	462.5	9.8	152.9	92.8	360.7	104.8	406.7	7.6	117.6	66.1	112.8
1974/75	102.1	108.3	11.8	204.0	95.6	34.5	128.1	222.3	11.6	526.3	105.1	590.0
1975/76	112.2	98.9	15.2	288.1	92.2	-35.5	145	138.9	9.6	-172.4	105.5	3.8
1976/77	161.1	439.0	14.1	-72	147.1	598.9	174.1	200.6	9.7	10.4	164.4	558.2
1977/78	191.0	184.8	14.2	78.0	175.8	195.1	216.4	242.9	11.1	144.3	205.3	248.8
1978/79	198.9	41.4	13.0	-144.7	185.9	57.5	250.3	156.7	10.0	-99.1	240.3	170.5
1979/80	298.9	492.7	8.5	-346.1	288.4	551.3	311.9	246.1	10.7	70.0	301.2	253.4
1980/81	290.8	-20.5	8.3	-23.5	282.5	-20.5	364.2	167.7	14.6	364.5	349.6	160.7
1981/82	306.3	53.3	7.2	-132.5	199.1	292.2	401.8	103.2	5.6	-616.2	396.2	134.6

XA = Exports of Cameroon via other African countries
XD = Exports of Cameroon via developed countries excluding the Eastern Countries.
IA = Imports of Cameroon from African Origins
ID = Imports of Cameroon from developed countries
XT = Total Exports of Cameroon
IT = Total Imports of Cameroon.

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

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had an incidence on the commercial exchanges of Cameroon. Such aid included food aid, building aid, service aid, military aid, gifts, loans, direct investments programmes and projects, commercial aid and technical aid[100]. Consequently, foreign trade, contrary to the market-expanding effect attributed to it by Jean-Marie Gankou, W.A. Ndongko and Kueté Jean[101] in their studies, limited the expansion of the domestic market by means of its specific structure and therefore exerted a direct negative effect.

And as regards the transformation function of foreign trade, it was not only the wasting of export earnings on importing goods (often luxuries) that impeded its coming into effect in Cameroon under the Ahidjo Administration, and it was not only the deterioration of the terms of trade that set absolute limits to it, but the transformation itself (if it took place at all) - was usually of such a character and direction that it did not sponte sua result in the expansion of the capital goods producing sector (unlike the exchange taking place within the same national economy between the two sectors (export and import) and leading to a proportionate or proportionately more rapid expansion of the sector of capital goods). This included the spontaneous tendency, which was reinforced by the conscious business policy of the international oligopolies that had their antennae in Cameroon. Moreover, the maintenance of the results of this transformation made further transformation necessary, that is increased export orientation and import sensitivity. Again, the absolute dependency of the export sector (including the railways, power stations and ports necessary for exports) and, via the export sector, that of the whole economy upon the world market, arose from the fact that the internal market not only could not get beyond its rudimentary initial stages but after having been created by methods of rudimentary accumulation (above all by the wholesale dispossession of the peasantry), this internal market began to contract at once, and this prevented internal accumulation from the outset. However, the contraction of the internal market was due to the pressure exerted by the export sector on the economy as a whole, and the exclusive orientation towards the foreign market was by that means primarily due to the narrowness of the internal market.

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Table 7(20): CAMEROON'S FOREIGN TRADE BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

1970-1975 Total Exports: 105,200 (E) E

Total Imports: 125,972 (1) I = 83.5%

Country	1970.71			1971/72		
	Imports	Exports	Balance	Imports	Exports	Balance
Europe	53.781	45.106	-8.675	56.340	42.384	-13.956
E. E. C	48.300	41.296	-7.004	50.022	38.600	-11.422
France	34.951	17.162	-17.789	36.438	16.881	-19.607
Belgium/Luxemburg	1.606	1.535	- 71	1.966	1.212	- 754
Netherlands	2.063	14.504	+12.436	1.854	13.857	+12.003
Italy	4.616	1.319	-3.297	4.409	1.059	- 3.350
West Germany	5.059	6.776	+1.717	5.304	5.291	- 13
E.F.T.A.	2.684	1.499	-1.185	2.918	1.183	- 1.735
Other Western European Countries	993	1.150	+ 107	1.011	1.526	+ 516
Spain	697	873	+ 176	698	1.384	+ 686
Europe	731	1.013	+ 282	898	798	- 100
U.S.S.R.	144	832	+ 688	239	697	+ 458
Poland	21	n.a	- 21	22	n.a	- 22
Others	n.a	n.a	n.a	467	71	+ 396
	1972/73			**1973/74**		
	Imports	Exports	Balance	Imports	Exports	Balance
Europe	54.051	49.600	- 4.451	60.047	86.980	+26.933
E.E.C	46.216	41.202	- 5.014	56.880	79.554	+22.933
France	35.543	18.722	-16.821	38.825	30.445	- 8.380
Belgium	n.a	n.a	n.a	1.688	3.379	+ 1.691
Luxemborg	1.549	15.407	+13.858	2.053	30.125	+28.072
Netherlands	n.a	n.a	n.a	3.128	5.486	+ 2.358
Italy	n.a	n.a	n.a	7.879	8.518	+ 639
West Germany	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
E.F.T.A.	2.341	900	- 1.441	2.960	1.372	- 1.588
Others W. Europe	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Spain	571	2.016	+ 1.445	750	4.199	+ 3.494
Europe	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
U.S.S.R	407	1.088	+ 681	256	2.219	- 1.954
Poland	n.a	n.a	n.a	317	n.a	- 317
Others	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	- 6 n.a

E.F.T.A. = Europe Free Trade Area

Source: Fourth Five Year Development Plan, 1976-1981, Yaounde, 1976, p.61

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Table 7(21)A: TRADE BY MONETARY AREA 1970-1975 (MILLION CFA FRANCS)

Monetary Area	1970/1971			1971/1972		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
Franc Zone	23.623	41.103	- 7.480	22.978	42.978	-19.814
Sterlling Area	2.739	3.739	- 1.540	1.460	4.153	- 2.693
Dollar Area	6.839	5.826	+ 1.013	4.403	5.135	- 6.810
Other	29.078	9.218	- 9.865	28.293	19.727	+ 8.566
Total	61.739	69.881	- 8.142	57.134	71.807	-14.673

Monetary Area	1972.1973			1973/1974		
	Exports	Imports	Balance	Exports	Imports	Balance
Franc Zone	28.150	42.654	-14.504	37.370	45.269	- 7.899
Sterlling Area	1.368	8.966	- 7.598	1.779	5.659	- 3.890
Dollar Area	6.810	5.675	+ 1.135	5.968	5.892	+ 76
Others	30.148	20.038	+10.110	62.725	22.725	+39.991
Total	66.471	77.333	-10.862	107.842	79.554	+28.888

Monetary Area	1974/1975		
	Exports	Imports	Balance
Franc Zone	40.447	68.140	-27.693
Sterling Area	2.814	9.133	- 6.319
Dollar Area	3.980	11.104	- 7.124
Others	59.659	37.595	+22.064

Source: Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1976-1981, p.60

Hence, the Ahidjo Administration's trade dependency on the capitalist world market had its roots deep in the very structure of the economy. This administration by 1982 had brought the country to the point where it became much more difficult to abolish this trade dependency. It is in this context that one can find the negative consequences of Ahidjo's foreign trade policy. This is because such a foreign trade policy made it even possible that the very economic measures taken to liquidate direct economic dependency only tended to increase dependency on the world market. This has been the greatest challenge to the Biya administration since 1982 because to offset this import growth this administration had hardly had any other possibility - temporarilly -

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than the enforced export of the products of the traditional sector, and the cutting of the consumer goods imports by strictly limiting the luxuries.

Table 7(21)B: TRADE BY MONETARY AREA (MILLION CFA FRANCS) 1974/75 - 1979/80

Monetary Area	1976/77		1977-78		1978/79	
	Export	Imports	Export	Imports	Export	Import
Franc Area (A)	40.447	68.140	40.574	68.894	56.479	87.393
Sterling Area (B)	2.814	9.133	3.968	7.012	3.621	11.091
Dollar Area (C)	3.980	11.104	3.800	10.834	5.494	19.581
Other Areas (D)	59.659	37.595	63.910	43.697	95.648	56.012
General Total(T)	106.900	125.972	112.252	126.557	161.242	174.077
Structure (%)						
A	37.84	54.09	36.14		35.02	50.20
B	2.63	7.25	3.53		2.25	6.37
C	3.72	8.82	3.38		3.41	11.25
D	55.81	29.84	56.9		59.32	32.18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Fifth Five-Year Developing Plan, p.16

Nevertheless, the one-sided foreign trade dependency of Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration implied that the development of the country was, to a very great extent, determined by the foreign trade relations, the absorbing capacity of the former metropolitan master (France) as well as the cyclical changes in the world economy. The domestic economy remained quite defenceless against the detrimental effects of international trade and so the economic growth achieved by internal efforts was counteracted by the external effects.

The country's foreign exchange reserves reached a peak of $20.7 million in 1969 and $16.8 million in 1972/73, (although in 1974/75 the country's net foreign exchange position improved by $4.9 million, owing to an increase in liabilities) but in 1978 this trend was again reversed[102]. For example, Table 7(22), Table 7(23) and 7(24) give a picture of the evolution of the balance of trade from 1962 to 1983. From Table 7(22), we

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can see that over the whole period under study 8 years experienced a balance of trade deficit while 6 years had a positive balance of trade. As we saw from the analysis of importations and exportations, two phases could be distinguished in the evolution of the Cameroon's balance of trade under the Ahidjo administration. The first period which went from 1960 to 1970 had an accumulated surplus balance of 0.3 billion CFA francs, thereby corresponding to a regular and balance period of foreign exchange which characterized not only the international capitalist dominated economy of

Table 7(22): THE EVOLUTION OF CAMEROON'S BALANCE OF TRADE (IN BILLIONS OF CFA FRANCS)

Years	Exports	Imports	Balance
1962	30.7	31.0	- 0.4
1963	33.9	31.6	+ 2.3
1964	34.6	32.9	+ 1.7
1965	34.4	37.4	- 3.0
1966	35.9	36.1	- 0.2
1967	39.1	46.4	- 7.3
1968	48.6	46.3	+ 2.3
1969	59.4	53.0	+ 4.1
1970	62.8	67.2	- 4.4
1971	57.3	69.4	-12.1
1972	55.7	76.4	-20.7
1973	78.3	74.5	+ 3.8
1974	114.5	104.8	+ 9.7
1975	102.1	128.1	-26.0
1977	161.2	174.1	-12.8
1979	198.9	250.4	-51.5
1981	290.8	364.2	-73.4
1983	370.5	416.1	-45.6

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale (Ministère du Plan, Yaoundé).

the 1960s but also translated the period of the "honey-moon" gestation of neocolonial consolidation in Cameroon. On the other hand, between 1970 and 1983, the cumulated entries amounted to 520.4 billion CFA francs and the cumulated payments represented 470.7 billion francs CFA out of which the negative balance amounted to 49.7 billion CFA francs. For the whole period this deficit represented 90.45 percent of foreign exchange savings. This deficit as we have already mentioned was due to the dependency of a national peripheral capitalist development strategy on the one hand and

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a pervasive international capitalist economic indifference on the other. The incidence of the spontaneous capitalist market inflation on prices of imported goods and the fall in international prices of the most important primary products (cocoa and coffee) of Cameroonian exportations and their consequent fall in production might have also contributed to the adverse balance of trade but all these factors only demonstrate the pervasiveness of external economic dependency and its disarticulating effects on national development and self-reliance.

The evolution of the balance of trade of Cameroon between 1962 and 1982 eventhough it contributed to the rapid growth of national output might have had little impact on "development". An export-oriented strategy of growth (particularly when a large proportion of export earnings accrued to foreigners as in Cameroon during the period under study) might not only have biased the economy in wrong directions but it might have also reinforced the national and external dualistic, and inegalitarian character of that growth. Therefore the fact that trade might have produced expanded export earnings, even increase output levels especially in a primary producing economy, did not mean that it was a desirable strategy of economic and social development. As in the case of Cameroon since the export sector was weak and dependent in nature, the distribution of its benefits and its linkages with the rest of the economy were inegalitarian. From the evolution of the Cameroonian balance of trade between 1960 and 1982 we can almost state that as for the distributional effects of trade, the principal benefits accrued disproportionately to rich nations and within the nation disproportionately to both foreign residents and wealthy nationals. This reflects the highly inegalitarian,institutional,social and economic ordering of the global system in which powerful nations and their multinational corporations control vast amounts of world resources. In this case, trade like education, tends to reinforce existing inequalities. But it has the added defect of being conducted at the international level where the absence of a "supernational" authority eliminates the possibility of redistributing the gains or investing them to promote development in disadvantaged regions. Such factors include the widespread existence of increasing returns, the unequal international distribution of economic assets and power, the growing influece of multinational corporations and their combined ability to manipulate international prices, levels of production and patterns of demand. Together, these factors lead to the conclusion that the developing states have benefited

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disproportionately less from their economic dealings with the developed world.

The second remark that comes up from the analysis of the evolution of Cameroon's balance of trade between 1960 and 1982 is that changing relative price levels of primary products add to the important quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the trade problems faced by the developing states. In such situations, the total value of export earnings had depended not only on the volume of these exports sold abroad but also on the price paid for them. If export prices decline, a greater volume of exports will have to be sold merely to keep total earnings constant. Similarly, on the import side, the total foreign exchange expended depends on both the quantity and price of imports. Clearly, if the price of a country's export falls relative to prices of the products it imports it will have to sell much more of its export products and enlist so much more of its scarce productive resources merely to secure the same level of imported goods that it purchased in previous years. In other words, the "real" or "social" opportunity costs of a unit of imports will rise for a country when its export prices decline relative to its import price. Such a ratio between the price of a typical unit of exports and the price of a typical unit of imports constitute the <u>Commodity Terms of Trade</u> which have been at the basis of unequal exchange[103] which has characterized North-South economic transactions. It is only in this perspective that the deficit of the Cameroonian balance of trade can be partly explained.

Table 7(23), 7(24) and 7(25) present an over-view of Cameroon's commercial exchanges with the rest of world between 1975 and 1980. We notice from these tables that from 1975 Cameroon's commercial exchanges were every where negative (in deficit) except with Africa and the Socialist bloc countries. In percentages, the geographical distribution of exports and imports was as shown in Tables 7(24) and 7(25).

During the period under study, exchanges with Europe predominated Cameroon's commercial transactions absorbing 80.6 percent of its exports and providing 74.4 percent of its imports. The different European countries in the different transactions occupied the position shown in Table 7(25)below. The deficit between Cameroon and France was absolute representing 29.9 percent of aggregate exports and 23.9 percent of the aggregate imports of Cameroon.

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Table 7(23): CAMEROON'S BALANCE OF TRADE BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION (BILLION CFA FRANCS)

Country/Area	1974/75			1976/77			1979/80		
	Export	Import	Balance	Export	Import	Balance	Export	Import	Balance
World	106.900	125.972	-19.072	161.242	174.077	-12.835	296.981	311.953	-14.972
E. E. C.	74.480	88.411	-13.931	117.488	111.630	+ 5.858	174.838	207.032	-32.194
France	31.061	57.403	-26.342	43.186	71.974	-28.788	68.153	139.033	-70.880
United Kingdom	4.337	1.846	+ 2.491	3.951	6.700	- 2.749	6.956	8.695	- 1.739
Other Western Europe	-	-	-	6.350	5.394	+ 956	12.172	12.926	- 754
Eastern Europe	-	-	-	7.805	1.770	+ 6.035	1.426	3.888	- 2.462
U.S.S.R	9.086	440	+ 8.646	7.462	1.185	+ 6.277	1.237	1.789	- 552
U. S. A	3.270	9.137	- 5.867	5.207	15.430	-10.223	78.154	15.979	+62.175
Canada	545	790	- 245	289	754	465	79	1.393	- 1.314
Japan	2.114	3.545	-	5.558	10.146	- 4.588	8.363	13.417	- 5.054
People's China	18	2.440	- 2.422	4.302	3.800	+ 1.280	319	5.720	- 5.401
Africa	11.841	11.640	+ 201	-	-	- 18	18.710	25.888	- 7.178
UDEAC	7.168	8.571	- 1.403	10.002	8.232	+ 1.770	11.177	11.637	- 460
UMOA	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.444	5.848	- 2.404
North Africa	712	422	+ 299	854	581	+ 273	515	998	- 483
Europe	97.797	85.895	+ 5.902	131.643	118.649	+12.949	188.436	223.846	-35.410

Source: Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, Yaounde, 1981, p. 15

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Table 7(24): CONTINENTAL DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Continent	Export (in Percentage of total)	Imports (in percentage of total)
Europe	80.60 percent	75.5 percent
Africa	13.50 percent	8.05 percent
America	2.95 percent	9.05 percent
Asia	2.85 percent	7.00 percent
Others	0.10 percent	0.50 percent

Source: Gankou; Echange et Développement, p. 108

Table 7(25): THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN CAMEROON AND THE REST OF THE WORLD (IN BILLIONS OF FRANCS CFA)

Countries	Exports	Imports	Balance
EUROPE	82.3	96.6	-14.3
Viz			
E.E.C.	67.1	91	23.9
Eastern Europe	10.8	2.2	8.6
Other European States	4.4	3.4	1
AFRICA	13.8	10.3	3.5
Viz			
UDEAC	7.9	7.5	0.4
UMOA	1.6	1.2	0.4
Rest of Africa	4.3	1.6	2.7
AMERICA	3	11.6	-8.6
Viz			
U. S. A	2.5	8.4	-5.9
Other States	0.5	3.2	-2.7
ASIA	2.9	9	-6.1
Viz			
Japan	2.3	5.1	-2.8
China	-	1.2	-1.2
OTHERS	0.1	0.6	-0.5
Total Exchanges	102.1	128.1	-26

Source: Marché Tropicaux et Méditerraneens.

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The low countries were the best partners of Cameroon with the traditional excess balance being maintained eventhough this excess dropped in 1975 (+17.9 billion francs) from the 1974 level. This situation was due to the reduction of Cameroonian cocoa exports in 1975. As for the other EEC countries, the balance was not attained. The deficit (export/import = 68.25 percent of the guarantee rate) was important with West Germany. Less with Britain (58.7 percent), Denmark (52.6 percent), Italy (51.7 percent), the Benelux (48.2 percent) and Ireland (2.95. percent) [104]. The other European countries bought more from Cameroon than they sold (289 percent guarantee rate for Spain and 482 percent for the Eastern European countries). In 1975, USSR imported goods from Cameroon worth 10.8 billion francs CFA and exported only 0.65 billion francs CFA worth of goods.[105]

Table 7(26): CAMEROON'S COMMERCIAL BALANCE WITH EUROPE

Countries	Exports (in percentages)	Import (in Percentages	Balance (in billion FCFA
(A) THE EEC GROUP	65.7	41.8	-23.9
Viz			
France	28.5	46.3	-30.2
Low countries	21.55	3.2	+17.9
West Germany	7.16	8.4	- 3.4
Italy	3.7	5.75	- 3.6
United Kingdom	2.75	3.7	- 2.0
Benelux	1.75	2.9	- 1.9
Denmark	0.2	0.35	- 0.2
Ireland	-	0.4	- 0.5
(B) SPAIN	3.8	1	+ 2.5
(C) EASTERN EUROPE	10.55	1.75	+ 8.5
Viz			
U.S.S.R	9.8	0.5	+ 9.4
Other Countries	0.75	1.25	- 0.9
(D) Other European Countries	4.3	2.65	+ 1.0

Source: Direction de la Statistique et la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

Cameroon's exchanges with African countries was mainly with the UDEAC and UEAC countries. Table 7(26) shows the transaction quotas of these countries in relationship to Cameroon's aggregate external trade in 1975.

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The trade deficit with Gabon during this period was due to Cameroon's imports of Gabonese petroleum products. Tchad and the other three countries bought a wide variety of industrial products from Cameroon. With other Africa countries, Cameroon had an excess balance but the unit participation of these countries in Cameroon's external trade was small such as that of Ivory Coast with which the excess was significant (1.5 billion francs CFA of exports against 1.2 billion francs CFA of imports - that is an excess balance of 0.45 billion francs CFA)[106].

Table 7(27): CAMEROON'S COMMERCIAL BALANCE WITH UDEAC STATES (IN 1975)

Countries	Exports (in percentages)	Imports (in percentages	Balance (in Billion FCFA)
UDEAC/UEAC	9.25	5.95	+ 18
Viz			
Gabon	4.5	5.4	-2.35
Congo	2.0	0.35	+1.0
Tchad	1.5	0.05	+1.45
C.A.R	1.2	0.05	+1.15
Others	0.5	0.4	-0.1

Source: Direction de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale, Yaoundé.

The bulk of trade transactions with the American countries was mainly with the United States which supplied Cameroon with many varieties of products and also bought many of the Cameroonian exports. Cameroon's export to the United States in 1973 stood at 6.7 billions francs CFA while her imports stood at the same amount. In 1974, exports amounted to 6.5 billion francs CFA while imports amounted to 4.6 billion francs CFA or an excess balance of +1.9 billion francs CFA. In 1975, Cameroonian exports to the United States amounted to 8.5 billion francs CFA and imports amounted to 2.5 billion francs CFA or an excess balance of 5.9 billion CFA[107]. Among the other American countries Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago sold petrol to Cameroon and bought nothing in return. With Brazil,the Commercial exchanges during this period were modest[108].

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In Asia, Japan remained the most important trading partner of Cameroon The disequilibrium in commercial exchanges between the two countries aggragated more and more due to Cameroon's imports of Japanese cars and electronics. Fomorsa, North and South Korea, India and Socialist China supplied much more than they bought from Cameroon during the period under study.

The extension of our analysis beyond simple commodity trade into the area of the international flow of financial resources permits us to examine the balance of payments position of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982. A balance of payments table is designed to summarize a nations transactions with the outside world. A more analytically convenient way to present such a table is to divide it into three components. The current account component portrays the flow of goods and services in the form of exports and imports of the country and allows us to analyze the impact of various commercial policies on commodity trade. The capital account shows the volume of private foreign investment and public grants and loans from individual nations and multilateral donor agencies such as UNDP and the World Bank. It permits us to examine the relative importance of international flows of financial resources in augmenting a nation's domestic savings. Finally, the cash account shows how cash balances (foreign reserves) and short term claims have changed in response to current and capital account transactions. The cash account is thus the "balancing" item which is lowered (i.e. a net outflow of foreign exchange) whenever total disbursements on the current and capital accounts exceed total receipts.

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Table 7(28) gives an idea of the evolution of the Cameroonian balance of payments in billion of francs CFA between 1970 and 1982. Cameroon's external transactions could be regrouped in two parts - the current account, the transfer account and the capital movements. Eventhough the balance of trade in terms of the physical flux of goods was deficitary, the "balance of trade" column of the balance of payments which concerned the FOB transactions was excedentary. The "balance of services" was characterized by a chronic deficit of less than 20 billion francs CFA in 1973 and more than 50 billion francs CFA in 1978[109]. Eventhough the balance of the transfers account remained positive throughout the period of our study, the "balance of services and transfers" nevertheless, remained deficitary. Such chronic deficit was due to the transport fares of goods which was born by Cameroon as well as transfers done outside of the country in the form of renumeration of capital and labour. As for the capital account, the relative stability of the entry of private capital

Table 7(28): THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1973-1982 (IN BILLIONS OF CFA FRANCS)

On 31 December	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
1. CURRENT ACCOUNT										
Exportations FOB	91.19	118.60	109.73	139.60	198.77	238.65	+287.61	+350.19	+383.30	+446.21
Importation FOB	73.50	101.65	124.63	142.63	195.15	227.32	270.26	342.33	371.96	400.10
Commercial Balance	-18.13	+1695	-14.90	- 2.59	+ 3.61	+11.33	+ 17.35	+ 7.86	+ 11.34	+ 46.11
Net Services	-20.437	-21.89	-24.30	-30.44	-34.07	-50.38	- 48.14	-103.97	-140.53	-170.52
Other Transfers	+ 7.89	+ 1.01	+ 5.78	+ 9.93	+ 4.32	+ 1.13	+ 1.58	+ 1.86	- 1.80	- 23.96
Balance of Services and Transfers	-12.55	-20.87	-18.51	-20.50	-29.75	-49.25	- 46.56	-102.40	-142.38	-194.48
2. CAPITAL ACCOUNT										
Private Capital	+ 4.19	+ 6.73	+ 8.51	+ 2.26	+ 8.21	+15.00	+ 25.78	+ 34.40	+128.20	+ 45.93
Commercial Capital	+ 0.91	- 2.11	+ 0.53	- 2.16	- 6.64	+ 2.33	- 11.77	+ 39.89	- 65.50	+ 51.56
Official Capital	- 0.99	+ 5.00	+ 3.69	+25.04	+19.24	+ 8.63	+ 25.76	+ 37.50	- 50.78	+ 24.49
Net Omissions and Errors	- 0.70	- 0.82	0.55	+ 0.46	- 0.10	+ 0.43	+ 0.33	- 0.33	+ 0.19	+ 0.27
Balance of Payments	- 7.17	+ 4.87	-20.16	+ 2.49	- 1.49	-12.38	+ 12.89	+ 17.22	+ 17.31	- 4.54

Source: Ministère des Finances, Direction des Contrôles Economiques, Yaoundé.

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and commercial credits through banking institutions and the strong increase of public (official) capital in the form of aid and subvention helped to finance the negative current account. Generally, the balance of payments of Cameroon was deficitary during the whole of the period under study[110]. The deficits of the years 1971, 1972, 1975, 1977 and 1978 could be explained to a large extent by the negative situation of the balance of services and transfers. The balance of payments of Cameroon during this period would have attained alarming proportions were it not for the contributions of foreign capital in the form of direct investments, private capital and public capital.

Furthermore, a glance at the balance of payments position in table 7(28) above shows that despite the absence of statistics for the 1960 to 1970 period, the frieght charges for marchandises were an important source of loss of foreign exchange reserves from the country and the losses of foreign exchange reserves were higher than the volume of direct public aid to the country. Again, a close analysis of table 7(28) shows that in Cameroon the capital revenues which went out of the country were by far higher than the gross value of foreign investments. Again, one can observe that most enterprises and investments were through and through financed by borrowing - a situation which indicated a diminution of new investment creation. The Gross Fixed Capital formation of private enterprises was thus due to the existing enterprises financed through foreign borrowing. The gross evolution of salaries showed a tendency of high increases and the government authorities had the habit of including this into foreign public aid as subventions. The strong increases in salaries were due more to the exorbitant amount of salaries repatriated than increases in savings rates. Indeed, the nature of the Cameroonian balance of payments under the Ahidjo administration demonstrates the extent to which the close connections between foreign trade and foreign investments led to numerous and serious financial losses in the country. The only way by which such monetary losses could be arrested could have been the authoritative state intervention but the dictates of economic dependency did not call for such measures. The Cameroonian investment code even guaranteed the repatriation of salaries and profits of foreigners working in Cameroon. It is unfortunate because this total repatriation of salaries and profits was decreed in an economy which was completely dominated by foreign capital.

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The consequence of such a situation was that Cameroonians encountered difficulties in the traditional market and sometimes the country found its foreign balances - for certain, may be for political reasons - frozen as it happened in 1972/73[111] - a situation which led to the introduction of the Operations Account Convention signed in Libreville (Gabon), on 13 March 1973[112]. In such a situation, the possibility of earning "hard" current from another relation or securing the necessary foreign exchange from its imports in some other way became rather limited for Cameroon. Moreover, and this is perhaps the most important factor, Cameroon became (owing to this one-sided distorted character of her dependency as well as the underdevelopment of her industry and the export-oriented character of her agriculture and foreign trade), increasingly import sensitive, that is her economic development and even her current needs called for a large volume and a wide range of imports (including, of course, "hard" goods, machines and equipment). Therefore, her foreign exchange receipts, usually earned from the exports sales of a few agricultural and (by 1978) oil products became the only means of financing imports.

7.7: CONCLUSION

Nevertheless, from the analysis carried out in this chapter, one thing is clear. Relations between the developing states and their former colonial powers have remained remarkably close and generally cordial, despite the conflicts - some of which were violent - that accompanied the process of transition to independence. Both the closeness and cordiality have proved resilient so that although (with independence) most developing states have greatly diversified their external relations as a matter of deliberate policy, their links with their former colonial overlords continue to reflect a "special" character. These relations are particularly sharply articulated at the politico-dimplomatic and broad economic levels. They manifest themselves politically in various ways; for example, in the form of regular processes of diplomatic consultation; in the existence of more or less formal institutions that facilitate multilateral diplomatic exchanges, such as the (British) Common-Wealth of Nations and the Francophone grouping of states; and, in some instances, in formal agreements whereby the former colonial power are granted exclusive concessions in

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developing states. An example of the latter are military agreements such as those between Britain and Nigeria (1960-1962) and France and several of its former West and Central African territories including the Ivory Coast and Gabon, wherein the former colonial power was granted military bases or permission to station its military personnel on the territory of the given African state . SImilarly, agreements have often been agreed between developing states and their respective former colonizers in respect of such matters as cultural exchanges, immigration and citizenship.

These relations show considerable variation in that some developing states are more heavily dependent on their former colonial overlords than others. There is little doubt, for example, that in general former French colonies in Africa have remained linked to France by tighter institutional arrangements than those states previously ruled by other European powers. Not only did most of the former French colonies conclude direct military-security agreements with France as part of the independence bargain, but they also at the same time accepted economic, technical and financial arrangements that formally institutionalized French control of their development as newly independent states. An example of this, as we saw above, is the French government's decision at independence to create two multilateral Central Banks as a mechanism to group and control the economies of its former colonies in West and Central Africa. The overall effect of this system is to give France a large hand in determining the monetary, financial and general economic policies of the African states grouped under these banks. These institutional ties are only a part of the intricate web that binds many French speaking African states to the former "mother country". Equally notable are the ties based on French private investment, aid, trade and technical and cultural exchanges involving the former colonies. It is significant that these ties and relations have survived the political transition in France from the rule of the Gaullists and their conservative allies to that of the French Socialists under François Mitterand.

The question which immediately arises is why the newly independent developing states have preserved something of the umblilical cord tying them to the former "mother countries"? One line of argument would suggest that this relationship is in some way linked to the process of socialization of the developing state's elite during colonialism. This thesis has been elaborated by, among others, Tevoedjve and Singer . Its central claim is that leaders formally and informally schooled under colonialism evince a "love-hate" attitude towards their former colonizers. Besides, institutional networks, either inherited from the colonial era or established as part of the independence bargain, tend to persist over time despite an official rhetoric that may suggest their illegitimacy. Bureaucratic mechanisms and procedures based on French and British models persist long after independence has been gained. Armies continue to be commanded by officers trained at Sandhurst or St. Cyr. The former colonizer's language being itself very often an indispensable tool of international or even internal communication, - including communications among African states - must be fostered rather than discarded. This same language, among other things, enormously facilitates communications with the former colonial power, and this has many political, diplomatic and, more broadly, cultural implications. Hence, high-level manpower tends to be trained in the former metropolis because education systems are at least comparable and sometimes identical. As the students imbibe a British, French, Portuguese or Spanish education , they naturally must to some considerable degree reflect the cultural attributes or modes of thought of the society within which they obtain this education. This is attributable to the process of acculturation which occurs precisely because an educational system, like any societal enterprise, is itself a profondly a cultural phenomenon that is specific to a given nation. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that an African leader such as former Senegalese President, Leopold Sedar Senghor, should seem more "French" than the French themselves and remain so despite his championing the seemingly anti-European doctrine of Negritude. Senghor declared that "France remains our major partner, not only in cultural affairs, but in economic matters as well", thereby echoing the position taken by Ivory Coast's President, Felix Houphouet-Biogny, in 1957, three years before his country's independence, when he asserted that "France's enlightened self-interest, but specially its keen sense of humanity, have led it to seek with us, actively and sincerely, the achievement of a new community"[113]. Negritude or no Negritude, Senghor has called for the establishment of a unity between Europe and Africa, and beyond that a federation of the cultures of the various peoples of the world

A slightly different hypothesis to explain the close relations between the developing state and their former colonial pasters hinges on the dynamics of social class. The argument revolves around the variables of social structure, different class interests and class conflicts that characterize the post-independence societies of developing states. More specifically, it is asserted that developing states emerged into independence under the leadership of a petit bourgeoisie whose interests were the same as those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The developing state's elite was an essentially dependent, or "comprador" bourgeoisie whose interests coincided with those of the imperialist bourgeoisie. Its interests were as a result at odds with those of the common people in the former colonies. Inorder to maintain its power and privileges this bourgeoisie resorted to a variety of tactics including the use of coercion and often a political ploy best defined as a form of "defensive radicalism". According to Professor Claude Ake, who has done much to popularize this concept, "defensive radicalism" is essentially a mystification whereby African rulers seek to blunt revolutionary pressures of the masses by the adoption of a radical rhetoric which masks the true intent and orientation of the bourgeoisie. As Ake puts it:

> The assumption of a radical posture and the use of this posture (is) a cover for containing revolutionary pressures and for maintaining the status quo. There is no African country which is not involved in defensive radicalism which is manifested in the following tendencies:
>
> a) the increasingly radical rhetoric against imperialism even among the most reactionary African leaderships such as those of the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia;
>
> b) the radical rhetoric of the Organization of African Unity against the continued colonization of Southern Africa;
>
> c) the Verbal Commitment of most African leaders to some form of Socialsim and the rejection of Capitalism;
>
> d) the policy statements used to justify extentions of public ownership;
>
> e) the militant attack on inequality in some African countries;
>
> f) the policy statements explaining the curbs on the operations of foreign capital;
>
> g) the show of being friendly with socialist countries such as Cuba [114].

Ake makes two further observations. Firstly, he concedes that there are a few African states where the leadership takes its radical rhetoric seriously and where steps have been taken to achieve Socialism. However, he states that even in these cases, the radicalism of the official rhetoric tends to outstrip radicalism of official practice. Secondly, he argues that defensive radicalism is a product of the objective situation in which post-colonial Africa finds itself. Leaders must show that they are on the side of the masses if they are to stay in power. To achieve a semblance of credibility

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leaders must, however, translate some of their rhetoric into action. Hence Ake concludes, defensive radicalism can be a progressive phenomenon[115].

However, the main contention advanced by Ake and other writers is that in the developing states the elites constitute local allies of imperialism and of the international bourgeoisie that runs the global capitalist economy. The implication of this perspective in respect of external relations is evident enough. It is that the closeness of relations between the developing states on the one hand and their former capitalist colonizers on the other is to be explained at the level of social dynamics that have their roots in the global capitalist system. ChinWeizu puts it more pungently

> Since these leaders were concerned with acquiring for their class the privileges within colonial society, the freedom they sought had to be freedom within the imperial system, not outside it: not individual freedom within African societies liberated from the empires. They desired British or French liberties, not African liberty, and not African liberties...
>
> Encouraged in their march to freedom by the colonial authorities, they had use for neither national liberation nor a populist nationalism... While campaigning for civil liberties, they were granted local power as well and were persuaded that such local autonomy amounted to sovereignty. But in reality it was not sovereignty, since the states over which they were granted supervisory powers were still parts of the European imperial structure [116].

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This interpretation, which hinges on a class analysis, clearly reflects a considerable part of the reality of internal and international relationships of most developing states. It puts in perspective and clearer relief much of internal and external social and political relationships which would otherwise be most difficult to comprehend. Yet it is by no means a definitive analysis.

In the first place, it tends to minimize the variations among African regimes, lumping them in the same basket and thereby producing an image of the African state that, for a number of countries, is in fact a caricature. The difficulties we encounter in understanding state's internal political processes and international relations arise from these variations. While generalization is necessary and important, as without it there can be no theory or meaningful analysis, its utility is reduced to the extent that numerous facts either do not fit or appear forced into the particular conceptual framework. Thus Algeria's degree of dependency on France can hardly be said to be the same as that of Gabon, eventhough both countries are former French colonies and both are oil-rich states. Similarly, Kenya and Tanzania, both members of the Commonwealth and former British colonies, have historically pursued significantly different policies towards the former colonial power. Several other examples could be cited. The point is that foreign policies or external relations are not to be considered as automatic, unilinear, or invariant by-products of the single variable of social class. Second, if class is invoked as the sole explanatory category for state behaviour, it becomes difficult to explain why some states take their "defensive radicalism" more seriously than others (Ake himself admits they do) eventhough all African states are under the rule of the petit bourgeoisie. Variability in internal and external policies in Africa is not only an observable phenomenon but it is also one that requires modes of analysis that are more nuanced than is sometimes found in the literature.

Third, relations between developing states and the former colonial powers reflect calculations of national interests on the part of both sets of parties to these relations. Having been colonized by one or the other of the European powers, it is hardly surprising that developing states seek to exploit to their advantage any possibilities derived from the circumstances yielded to them as part of the legacy of history. It is the possibilities inherent in the previously imposed colonial relations which African states seek to translate into cooperative arrangements. It is naturally expected that these arrangements take full account of the new circumstances of independence and that they should be carried out on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Developing states reason that their success in achieving their objectives is more probable within the framework of these cooperative relations given the historical associations involved. Obviously, success will depend on other factors as well: One must also consider such factors as the nature of the independence bargain or the structure of relations between the given developing state and its former colonizer; the degree of "acculturation" of the particular developing state's ruling elite; the nature of the issues that form the subject of such co-operation and the bargaining capabilities and advantages of the developing states, individually or collectively, vis-à-vis their former

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colonizers. It is quite apparent, for example, that developing states have (due to their unity of approach as part of the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) grouping of states), been more successful in winning trade and aid concessions from the European Economic Community (EEC) than would otherwise have been possible. Yet the ACP-EEC relationship is not without some serious problems and difficulties. In particular, the expected gains for the ACP states have not been as large as expected so that dissatisfaction has been rampant within ACP ranks. This dissatisfaction relates to all the main issues of trade, aid, investment and technology transfers, and the pace of industrialization in the ACP states[117]. Apart from the ACP-EEC framework developing states have also sought assistance from their former colonial overlords within such institutions as the Commonwealth and the less formalized Francophone and Lusophone African Communities, the United Nations fora. Various mechanisms or understandings are incorporated in these institutions for purposes of promoting co-operations.

These multilateral arrangements not withstanding, bilateral relations between individual developing states and the former colonial powers still remain important features of the external relations of these states. This is best exemplified in the field of trade as Table 7(29) illustrates. This table shows quite clearly the position of the former colonial powers as trading partners of the new African states. Of the countries listed, for twenty-three, nearly half of the total, the former colonial power was the largest single market for their exports. A further nine countries looked to the former colonial power as their second largest market. As for imports, the table shows that the majority of the states - thirty-five or 81 percent of the total - drew the largest proportion of their imports from their former colonial rulers. When one considers that these figures, with a few exceptions, refer to trade in 1976 - some fifteen states - the persistence of close relations between the African states and the former colonial powers is still all the more remarkable. Whilst the level of export or import dependency on the former colonial power shown in table 7(29) is generally below 50 percent, the figures cited nonetheless reflect, in virtually all cases, a pattern of commercial links with a strong bias in favour of previous colonial linkages.

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Table 7(29): AFRICA'S TRADE: FORMER COLONIAL POWERS AS TRADING PARTNERS (1980)

Note: (1) Figures in parenthesis refer to former colonial power's comparative position in respct to trade with the African country concerned.

(2) N/A = Not available or not applicable.

(3) Figures not available or not applicable to Botswana, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Lesotho.

Country	Former Colonial Power	% Exports to former colonial power	% Imports from former colonial power
Algeria	France	13.8 (3)	27.1 (1)
Angola	Portugal	26.9 (2)	22.0 (1)
Benin	France	24.3 (1)	28.6 (1)
Burundi	Belgium	5.3 (4)	18.1 (1)
Cameroon	France	25.4 (1)	44.3 (1)
Central African R.	France	44.4 (1)	46.2 (1)
Chad	France	3.3 (4)	36.6 (1)
Comoros	France	N/A	N/A
Congo	France	15.9 (3)	47.1 (1)
Gabon	France	42.1 (1)	68.8 (1)
Gambia	United K'dom	29.8 (1)	24.5 (1)
Ghana	United K'dom	15.3 (1)	14.7 (2)
Guinea	France	13.0 (2) (1977)	20.0 (1) (1977)
Guinea-Bissau	Portugal	38.0 (1) (1977)	27.0 (1) (1977)
Ivory Coast	France	25.4 (1)	38.2 (1)
Kenya	UNited K'dom	29.1 (1)	13.2 (2)
Liberia	U.S.A*	22.0 (1)	31.4 (1)
Libya	Italy	19.4 (3)	25.5 (1)
Madagascar	France	29.3 (1)	40.9 (1)
Malawi	United K'dom	47.3 (1)	22.5 (2)
Mali	France	30.8 (1)	40.1 (1)
Mauritania	France	11.8 (2)	50.0 (1)
Mauritius	United K'dom	69.3 (1)	16.3 (1)
Morocco	France	23.7 (1)	29.4 (1)
Mozambique	Portugal	23.8 (1)	15.4 (2)
Niger	France	63.7 (1)	43.4 (1)
NIgeria	United K'dom	10.9 (3)	23.3 (1)
Rwanda	Belgium	8.5 (1)	19.8 (1)
Sao Tome & Prin.	Portugal	33.0 (2)	61.0 (1)
Senegal	France	31.5 (1)	30.5 (1)
Seychelles	United K'dom	N/A	21.0 (1)
Sierra Leone	United K'dom	60.8 (1)	21.5 (1)
Somalia	Italy	6.5 (2)	32.0 (1)
Sudan	United K'dom	N/A	20.3 (1)
Swaziland	United K'dom	33.0 (1) (1977	N/A
Tanzania	United K'dom	14.3 (2)	13.4 (1)
Togo	France	39.3 (1)	33.1 (1)
Tunisia	France	17.1 (2)	32.2 (1)
Uganda	United K'dom	20.5 (2)	27.3 (1)
Upper Volta	France	18.8 (2)	44.5 (1)
Zaire	Belgium	21.9 (1)	15.4 (1)
Zambia	United K'dom	13.6 (4)	N/A
Zimbabwe	United K'dom	7.0 (4) (1981	11.0 (2) (1981)

*Liberia, although dominated by the USA, was never formerly colonized.

Source: 1) Africa Today (London: Africa Journal Ltd., 1981), passim;
2) Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982 Book of the Year, (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1982) passim
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It should be noted that in maintaining or developing the relations discussed above African states have sought to shape or reshape relations with their former colonizers in such a way as to promote their interests. These is no doubt, for example, that African states which as members of the Commonwealth states tend to take more progressive positions on matters ranging from Southern Africa to other major conflict situations such as the Arab - Israeli dispute and to such major global issues as those relating to the so-called North-South Dialogue[118]. While it can be conceded that there are some positive aspects to the relations between African states and the former colonial powers, these have nonetheless to be seen in conjunction with the negative ones. Firstly, despite the progress made in the evolution of these relations, some fundamental problems remained unresolved. The most basic of these is structural. This refers to the fundamentally asymmetrical nature of these relations. The parties to these relations may, in terms of international law, be considered to be equal, but practice points to a real inequality. Elaborate argumentation is scarely necessary to prove this point.

Developing states, as suppliants, cannot, for example, dictate such matters as the volume, terms or conditions under which they receive international assistance; nor can they dictate the prices of their export commodities or of their manufactured imports from the developed countries. They are, as has been frequently stated, "price-takers" rather than "price-setters". This is not to suggest that they are entirely powerless but only that they are relative or comparatively powerless. It can thus be argued that relations between developing states and the former colonial powers reflect, at a sub-global level, the asymmetry that characterizes North-South relations at the global level. Yet it can also be said that the progress so far achieved in the evolution of such cooperative arrangements as those between the ACP and EEC states constitutes an important milestone towards the realization of a more equitable international socio-economic and political order. A second major difficulty affecting relations between developing states and the former colonial powers - or the "North" generally - lies in the absence of a broad agreement on basic principles. There is no basic perspective to facilitate the resolution of problems. There is no, or at least only a tenuous, consensus so that all questions, including questions of principle, are matters for bargaining and compromise. In more specific terms, a consensus is yet to emerge in regard to, for

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example, how we explain the phenomenon of underdevelopment; whether the elimination of underdevelopment should constitute a priority question of contemporary international relations; how best to tackle North-South problems; and, finally, what should constitute the essential ingredients of a more civilized and just world order. These questions, not surprisingly, are at the centre of the debate concerning the bilateral and multilateral relations between the developing countries of the South and the privileged minority of states that constitute today's developed North.

Finally, in terms of the contributions of this chapter to our initial hypothesis, we can make the following observations:-

(A) we saw in this chapter that the rapid growth of national output in foreign trade had little impact on self-sustained development. An export-oriented strategy of growth (particularly when a large proportion of export earnings accrued to foreigners) only biased the structure of the economy in the wrong directions (by not catering for the "real" needs of the economy) and instead reinforced the international dualistic and inegalitarian character of its growth. Therefore, the fact that trade expanded export earnings and even increased output levels did not mean that it was an inadapted strategy for economic and social development against which the attainment of the objectives of foreign policy could be pitted. This is because as we saw above, the nature of the export sector, the distribution of its benefits and its linkages with the rest of the economy only reinforced the dependency of the national society upon the outside.

(B) As we saw above, one of the strategies of the external commercial policy in Cameroon was export promotion and import substitution. Import substitution seeks to increase the share of total consumption satisfied by domestic production. Primarily it involves an effort to take over the existing domestic market from foreign producers by prohibiting their imports (usually by high tariffs and import controls)[119]. But development by import-substitution in Cameroon was not something which arose out of sheer necessity. The necessity was complemented by popular arguments about the desirability of import substitution. First, it was argued that in the course of foreign trade, Cameroon like most developing countries had an already established domestic market but that this market was currently supplied by foreign entrepreneurs. Through import substitution, it was thought, the country could by supplying the domestic market from local sources, save foreign

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exchange and promote domestic industrialization. Secondly, import substitution was held to be necessary to correct the differences in the income elasticities for imports and exports. Thirdly, import substitution was said to have some potential for decreasing unemployment. Fourthly, import substitution was credited with the ability of making more goods available than foreign exchange constraints would normally allow in the absence of import substitution. Fifthly, it was said to aid the industrialization and the diversification of the economy. These could be considered the objective economic considerations which seduced the Ahidjo administration into industrialization based on import substitution. To encourage import substitution, the Ahidjo administration (instead of mobilizing indigenous entrepreneurs and capital) cooperated with foreign companies and gave all sorts of incentives to foreign capital such as tax holidays for a certain number of years, tariff protection, accelerated depreciation allowances, import duty relief for imported inputs industries, the provision of industrial estates and the provision of equity capital and debentures. The drive for import substitution-led industrialization in Cameroon was rather disappointing.

(C) To begin with, even on the level of economics there was perhaps not enough critical understanding of the limitations of import-substitution as a means of generating development. Since a concerted effort to achieve import substitution meant in effect rapid industrialization, it created a demand for imported inputs and for capital goods which obviously created balance of payments problems. Furthermore, import substitution was made possible by the heavy and often government-subsidized importation of capital goods and intermediate products by foreign (and domestic) companies. In the case of foreign companies, many of these were purchased from their parent and sister companies abroad, with two immediate results. First, capital intensive industries were set up, usually catering for the consumption habits of the rich, while having a minimal employment effect. Second, far from improving the balance-of-payments situation, indiscriminate capital-good inputs and intermediate goods worsened the situation, while a good part of the profits was remitted abroad in the form of private transfer payments.

(D) Another detrimental effect of import-substitution was on traditional product exports. Inorder to encourage local manufacturing through the importation of cheap capital and intermediate goods, foreign exchange

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rate (that is, the rate at which the Central Bank of a nation is prepared to purchase foreign currencies) were often artificially over-valued. This had the effect of raising the price of exports and lowering the price of imports in terms of local currency. The net effect of over-valuing exchange rates in the context of import substitution policies was the encouragement of capital-intensive production methods still further (since the price of imported capital goods was artificially lowered) and the penalization of the traditional primary product export sector by artificially raising the price of these exports in terms of foreign currencies. This caused local farmers to be less competitive in world markets. In terms of its income distribution effects, the outcome of such government policies penalized the small farmer and the self-employed at the expense of improving the profits of the owners of capital both foreign and domestic.

(E) Import substitution in Cameroon also had inflationary effects on price levels because the newly produced goods became more expensive due to the foreign producers not having as yet maximized from the economies of scale and because these producers depended on protective tariff barriers. In this case, import substitution only helped to increase inefficient industrial monopoly enterprises. Industrial protection, thus had the effect of taxing agricultural goods in the home market as well as discouraging agricultural exports. Import substitution policies, in practice worsened the local distribution of income by favouring the urban sector and higher income groups, while discriminating against the rural sector and the lower income groups. Finally, import substitution which was conceived with the idea of stimulating self-sustained industrialization by creating "forward" and "backward" linkages with the rest of the economy, in practice inhibited that industrialization. By increasing the costs of inputs to potentially "forward" linked industries (those which purchase the output of the protected firm as inputs) or intermediate products in their own productive process and by purchasing its inputs from foreign sources of supply rather than through "backward" linkages to domestic suppliers, inefficient import substituting firms infact blocked the hoped for the process of self-reliant integrated industrialization.

Thus it became difficult to find any rationale for the pattern of commercial relations which were (whether consciously or not) promoted. This pattern gave undue emphasis to consumer goods and insufficient attention

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to potential long-run comparative advantages (that is the resource endowments and learning possibilities). Furthermore, it employed alien and unsuitable capital-intensive technologies to an extraordinary and unnecessary degree. But of course we cannot decide this type of issue on the strength of theoretical arguments, for as we have seen above so much of the regretable consequences of import substitution in Cameroon not only found expression in, but also reinforced the neo-colonial commercial depandency of the state between 1960 and 1982. In this context, we can see that as far as external commercial relations of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982 are concerned, our initial hypothesis was largely validated.

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93. _ibid_, p. 43.

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104. The International Relations Institute of Cameroon's Library has many mimeographs written by its students mostly as their graduation theses, papers or dissertations on Cameroon's relations with many developed and developing countries. The most important of them which have been read and used in this work but for which space cannot allow us cite them here, are presented in the section on theses in the bibliography at the end of the work.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

EXTERNAL MONETARY, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL RELATIONS AS A DETERMINANT OF FOREIGN POLICY

8.1 : INTRODUCTION :

We discovered in chapter seven that a country's international financial situation as reflected in its balance of payments and its level of monetary reserves depends on its balance on capital account (its net inflow or outflow of private and public financial resources). Since most Third World States typically incur deficits on their (balance of trade) current account balance, a continuous net inflow of foreign financial resources represents an important ingredient in their long-run development strategies and foreign policies. The international flow of investment resources thus constitutes one of the central axis of the country's external monetary, financial and technical relations.

In developed states monetary and financial policy plays a major direct and indirect role in directing the national economy and as such in achieving foreign policy objectives. As will be shown in this chapter, such a role cannot be attributed to the developing states because in these states many monetary and financial markets and institutions (infact the entire monetary and financial system) are highly disorganized, externally dependent and spatially fragmented. Their orientation (like that of multinational corporations) is usually geared more towards the external and less towards the internal socio-economic situations. In this case, the ability of the developing state to control its national policy is further constrained by the "openness" of its economic system and by the fact that the accumulation of foreign earnings is a significant but highly variable source of its domestic financial resources. Moreover, the monetary and financial system of the developing state restricts its activities almost exclusively to retioning scare loanable funds

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advantages and virtues of the system which is seen essentially as beneficial to all its member states.[1] But in an attempt to identify the facts of the issue through the prism of dependency theory,[2] this chapter by analyzing the origin, structure and functioning of the Franc Zone system assesses its legal, political and economic consequences for Cameroon and its other African member states. The evidence suggests that contrary to the prevailing view, the Franc Zone has contributed little to the "control over economic decision-making and the national economy, the establishment of a firm industrial structure leading to a self-generating and self-sustaining growth and a diversification of external economic contacts consistent with the nation's economic interests."[3] Financial and monetary autonomy is a crucial component of the sovereignty of the developing states and it is in this perspective that the financial and monetary dependency of the developing state takes a particular significance. The financial and monetary dependency of the developoing state is a global, multidimensional phenomema calling for an integrated approach including trade, aid, foreign investment and industrialization. The creation of the Franc Zone dates back to the protectionist policies introduced by France in her colonial empire in the 1930 as a result of the economic recession. Similar autarchic considerations led to the strengthening of the France Zone structure during World War II. As early as 1955, the Franc Zone was characterized by a very centralized decisionmaking structure organized around four major principles:- (1) free convertibility, at parity, of the overseas and metropolitan currencies; (2) free movement of capital within the zone; (3) pooling of gold and foreign exchange reserves in a common Fund for exchange Stabilization; and (4) common rules and regulations for foreign commercial and financial transactions.[4] These principles were, by and large, retained in the various agreements concluded between France and her African partners.

(A) OPERATING PRINCIPLES OF THE FRANC ZONE

The monetary cooperation system set up by the 1960-62 and 1972-73 agreements was based on the same operational

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principles which were already in force in the late 1950s. The Franc Zone operated according to four basic principles: (1) fixed parity between currencies (principle of equivalency of currencies); (2) freedom of internal transfers: transfers from one country to another were free and transfers from one currency to the other were unlimited (principles of freedom of transfers and unlimited transfer); (3) harmonisation of exchange regulations of the member-states according to the French regulation for all external financial transactions (principle of exchange harmonisation); and (4) pooling of foreign exchange reserves of the Franc Zone member states in the operations account (principle of common management of foreign exchange reserves).

The UMOA Treaty as well as the monetary cooperation convention concluded between France and the Central African countries both recognized the 'CFA franc" (CFA F) as a single monetary unit issued by a common financial institution.[5] This common monetary unit issued solely by the Central Bank of West African States (Banque Centrale des Etates de l'Afrique de 1(Ouest (BCEAO) within UMOA, and BEAC in Central Africa.[6] Since the African states' independence, the value of the CFA F has remained fixed at 0.02 French Franc (FFs). In relation to the French Franc, the CFA Franc enjoys the benefit of equivalency of currencies, freedom of transfers, and unlimited transfers. The CFA Franc also enjoyed and benefits from free convertibility with the French Franc through the operations account's mechanism.

(B) THE OPERATIONS ACCOUNTS MECHANISM AND THE FREE CONVERTIBILITY GAURANTEE

The Operations Account mechanism constitutes the cornerstone of the Franc Zone system. This mechainism was regulated by specific legal instruments:- the 13 March 1973 convention between France and the BEAC member states on the one hand and the 4 December 1973 convention between France and the UMOA member states on the other hand. According to these regulations, each of the two multinational central banks, BCEAO and BEAC, was allocated an operations account (OA) at the French treasury (Trésor public francias: FT).

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The Operations Account recorded as credits all the foreign exchange earned by each central bank outside its currency zone. Conversely, it recorded as debits each central bank's currency expenditure outside its currency zone. However, it was stipulated that the total amount of foreign exchange other than the French Franc deposited in each central bank's operations Account should not exceed 35 percent of their net foreign reserves (excluding their International Monetary Fund's/IMF gold tranche and special Drawing Rights/SDRs). This meant that in effect 65 percent of the African central bank's (ACB) external reserves should be denominated in French Franc in order for the CFA franc to benefit from the free convertibility guarantee. The Operations Account must, as a rule, remain positive, in which case it earned interest to the benefit of the central bank concerned.[7] As a matter of policy, the French Treasury granted unlimited overdraft facilities on each operations Account, and this allowed the members countries to draw French Francs without regard to the foreign exchange actually earned. Although there was a progressive interest rate charged by the French Treasury on any net debit balances[8] this rate was so low to be considered "non-dissuasive". The CFA Franc was thus said to benefit from the free convertibility guarantee. However, elaborate legal paraphernalia (or 'safeguard clauses') were designed to make it extremely difficult for the Operations Account actually to show a deficit. First of all, the safeguard clauses really started operating not when the foreign exchange reserves were totally depleted, but when they were equal or inferior to 20 percent of deposit liabilities. Secondly, when the Operations Account's reserves became depleted, the African Central Banks had to draw on all possible sources of external reserves before resorting to the French Treasury's financial assistance. Moreover, if the Operations Account showed a debit throughout a ninety-day period, a series of drastic corrective measures were automatically to be adopted. It is therefore not surprising that, until very recently, the balance of both the BCEAO and BEAC accounts were constantly positive.[9]

Thus, the so-called free convertibility guarantee

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seemed to be more hypothetical than real. For one thing, as Tchundjang Pouemi rightly points out, "it is not a guarantee that France will automatically compensate for any foreign exchange "gap" since, as we have noted, the African Central Banks' balances were pratically always positive".[10] In addition, as Diarra cogently remarks, "the principle of pooling of foreign exchange reserves results in an automatic compensation of the accounts of the debtor countries by those of the creditor countries. Consequently, the free convertibility guarantee started operation only when all the member states' accounts collectively showed a debit, an extremely unlikely occurence under existing circumstances. Furthermore, the guarantee started operating not when the African Central Banks' foreign exchange reserves were equal or inferior to 20 percent of deposit liabilities, but when they were totally depleted".[11] Finally, it should be noted that the French Treasury, as a non-monetary institution, was in an anusual position vis-a-vis the African Central Banks which were placed under it. Indeed, "the Operations Account could not globally show a deficit because the French Teasury did not actually issue any currency."[12] In view of these facts, it is difficult to see how the staunchest advocates of the Franc Zone could persist in justifying the so-called 'free convertibility guarantee' other than by resorting to mere semantic jugglery, as Bourdin does; "it is not because it is not operational that the convertibility guarantee should be discarded, it is because it exists that it is not activated".[13]

The major drawback of the operations mechanism is that it significantly limited African member-states monetary- and thus economic-decisionmaking autonomy. Indeed, the French monetary guarantee was counterbalanced by a number of rules and regulations which seriously affected the African member-states' autonomy and sovereignty. Thus, the principle of common management of foreign exchange reserves allowed France to "keep an eye' on the member-states foreign exchange reserves so as to 'ascertain that the requests made were based on a real need".[14] In addition, the French government actively participated in the management and control of the African Central Banks and French officials often occupied key management

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positions within these institutions. Although a process of progressive "Africanization" of most decisionmaking positions within the African Central Banks was initiated in the early 1970s,[15] the French administrators in these institutions still retained, by virtue of the "unanimity rule" which prevailed in the main decisionmaking organs, a quasi-veto right.[16] Thus, as K·Yansané rightly remarks, the progressive Africanization of the African Central Banks key management positions did not significantly affect the balance of power within these institutions, which remained heavily biased in favour of the French government.[17] One is led to wonder, as Diarra rightly does, whether the price paid by the France Zone African member-states in terms of limitation to their sovereignty was not exceedingly high in view of the hypothetical free convertibility guarantee that they were supposed to benefit from in return.[18]

Another major drawback of the Operations Account system was that due to the equivalency of currencies principle, the fate of the CFA F was inextricably linked to that of the French Franc. In effect, the CFA Franc did not have any value in and of itself - it constituted a mere appendage to the French Franc. As Amin remarks, one should not speak of a "franc zone" but of a "zone of the franc".[19] Indeed, as Tchundjang Pouemi bluntly puts it, "France is... the only country in the world which has succeeded in having its own currency - and only its currency - circulated in politically independent countries".[20] A further consequence of the adoption of the equivalency of currencies principle is that any modification in the value of the French Franc vis-a-vis other foreign currencies automatically and fully affected the CFA Franc . When the French Franc was devalued, as was the case in August 1969 and after 1981, the CFA franc was also devalued by the same percentage in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate. Similarly, when the French Franc floated, along with the other European currencies, against the dollar and the yen, the CFA Franc had to join the float.[21]

In view of the uncertainties and negative economic consequences resulting from this situation, the African

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member-states persistently asked for the right to introduce some flexibility in the CFA Franc/French Franc exchange rate, to no avail. Following the 1972-73 agreements, the French government merely agreed to make two minor concessions to the African government on this issue - (1) contrary to the prevailing pratice of the fait accompli, France was to, in the future, 'consult' with the France Zone member-states before any devaluation decision; and (2) in order to mitigate the potential negative impact of the French Franc devaluation on the African member states' economies, the African central Banks' net balances were to be indexed on the IMF's special Drawing Rights, according to some fairly esoteric method of calculation whose effectiveness was yet to be demonstrated.[22]

8.3 : LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRANC ZONE SYSTEM FOR AFRICAN MEMBER STATES

Even the most superficial analysis on the zone reveals that while France benefited from exorbitant rights and privileges and wielded considerable power, the African member-states were pratically powerless, and their rights were almost non-existent. Thus, the principle of 'prior consultation' referred to above was considered as a mere "act of courtesy' on the part of France towards her partner countries. Consequently, "it could not possibly lead to the modification of a decision previously agreed upon and consitent with French economic and financial interests".[23] It is therefore quite clear that the French government did not consider itself bound by the "prior consultation" procedure, and unequivocally expressed its total freedom of decision and action in economic and financial matters. As to the African states' leeway, it was pratically nil. Their only rights were those of the ultimate resort (non-membership or withdrawal), whatever the nature and significance of the difficulties encountered.[24] While the monetary cooperation agreements did provide for the possible modification of the CFA Franc/French Franc exchange rate, the French government clearly cautioned the African states on the serious economic and political consequences of severing the monetary 'umbilical cord' which linked them to France. In such times of doubt and 'dangerous'

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temptation, the African states were appropriately reminded of the Old Testament warning: 'He who breaks a hedge shall be bitten by a snake' (Ecclesiastes, 10.8.).[25]

The acute imbalance between the rights and power of France on the one hand, and those of the African states on the other hand, resulted in a situation of extreme legal and political unequality. What is more is that by cusioning the African member-states against any monetary risks through the free converbility guarantee, the France Zone system put these countries in a position of dependency which was not conducive to the normal assumption of their full monetary and financial responsibilities to say the least.[26]

One wonders whether the Franc Zone advocates' insistence on the complexity of monetary mechanism, the sophistication of monetary policy instruments and the rigour and discipline required for a sound management of money and public finance was not a manifestation of these people's belief in the fundamental incapacity of Africans to manage their own economic, monetary and financial affairs. Was it not the expression of a latent racism based on the conviction that "since we left, the African countries are incapable of managing their own affairs?"[27] Since France obviously continued to assume most of the monetary responsibilities in the Franc Zone African member-states, one would be tempted to believe that this is indeed the case.

(A) DEGREES OF DEPENDENCY: THE "CONCENTRIC CIRCLES"

While a global analysis shows that all Franc Zone African member-states were legally and politically greatly dependent on France, a more detailed examination shows, that there were, in fact, various degrees of dependency according to the criteria of 'proximity' to France. Levels (or 'circles') may be distinguished according to this criteria. The first circle included France and its immediate dependencies: overseas territories and districts, Monaco. The second circle is made up of the Central African states, members of BEAC linked to the French Treasury by an Operations Account convention. A quick comaprison with UMOA shows that

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BEAC's status was much less liberal and autonomous than that of the West African UMOA states. For one thing, contrary to their West African counterpart, the Central African states had not yet set up a full-fledged monetary union. Furthermore, the monetary cooperation mechanism instituted within BEAC were less elaborate and sophisticated than those within UMOA.[28] The third circle is constituted by the UMOA member-states which, as we have just memtioned, enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy from France than their Central African counterpart. A fourth circle includes the Francophone North African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). With their accession to independence, these countries created their own currencies and central banks, and were therefore conducting an autonomous financial and monetary policy. The only formal institutional links remaining between the North African countries and France were the 'special drawing accounts' (comptes d'avances) which their central banks still retained at the French central bank-Banque de France (BDF), and which provided them with short-term, limited monetary assistance.

Figure 8 (1) below graphically represents these four concentric circles. A main criterion of French 'interventionism' in the African countries' economies was the state of these countries' economies; the weaker and less healthy the economy, the greater the degree of French intervention in monetary and financial management. Another criterion is the proximity to the implicit model represented by the French economy, according to the various levels of development of the other Franc Zone countries. In this perspective, North Africa, UMOA, BEAC, and dependencies represented different stages of development, from the highest to the lowest, in relation to the French model which they tended to emulate. Ultimately, the degree of financial and monetary autonomy was a function of the level of development, which itself conditioned the state of the economy. It is important to note that this process of progressive autonomy (or independence) was strictly and exclusively controlled by the central unit (or metropole) of the system in France. In this regard, it is quite clear that no radical transformation of the structure

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of economic cooperation between France and her former African colonies actually took place since independence.[29]

FIGURE 8(1) : THE FRANC ZONE'S FOUR CONCENTRIC CIRCLES



Source: Guy Martin, "Underdevelopment and Dependency in Froncophone Africa" p. 217

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B. SECTORAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRANC ZONE FOR AFRICAN MEMBER STATES

In their prolific writings, the Franc Zone panegyrists insist, ad nauseam, on the numerous advantages that the African member-states derive from the free convertibility gaurantee attached to the Operation Account's mechanism.[30] Prominent among these "advantage" were the stability and security conferred to the CFA Franc by the French convertibility guarantee which exonerated the African beneficiary states from any balance-of-payments and foreign exchange difficulties. Other assumed "advantages" included the favourable climate for foreign private investment and public capital flows created by the economic growth and development of the African member states. Finally, the Franc Zone was said to constitute a powerful incentive for solidarity, cooperation and regional integration among the African member-states themselves. The "success" of the Franc Zone demonstrated as much by the number of candidate countries it has recently attracted (Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zaire) as by the economic failure of those states which initially refused to joint it (Guinea and Mali).

A comprehensive study addressing each of these points would be necessary to asses adequately the real substance of the 'advantages' attached to the free convertibility guarantee. As this is obviously not possible within the confines of the present chapter, we shall limit ourselves to a brief survey of some of the main sectoral (rather than global) economic consequences of the Franc Zone system for the African member-states. In this perspective, devaluation and inflation, and savings and credit policies will successively be examined. We noted above that by virtue of the equivalency of currencies any modification in the value of the French Franc vis-a-vis other foreign currencies automatically and fully affected the CFA Franc. Thus, in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate, the CFA franc had to be devalued by the same percentage as the French Franc each time the latter was devalued vis-a-vis other foreign currencies. This was notably the case in August 1969 (12.5 percent), October 1981 (3 percent), June 1982 (5.57 percent), and in March 1983 (2.5 percent). These successive devaluation added to the stready increase of the US dollar on world monetary markets since 1980 had a devastating impact on the economies of the African states concerned.

In the first place, the devaluation's immediate result was automatically to reduce the value of the foreign exchange reserves held by the African Central Banks in the French treasury. These sums were all the more significant since in fact these banks held most of their assets in French Francs well beyond the 65 percent statutory minimum.[31] Furthermore, as previously noted, the African Central banks net balance vis-a-vis the French treasury were always positive, by an

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average of 50 billion CFA from independence to 1974. From 1974 to 1976, this position increased from 50 to 75 billion CFA F.[32] Table 8(1) below clearly shows the significant imporvement in the BEAC countries' position (from 126.6 billion CFA F in 1981 to 161.9 billion in 1982 and 191.3 billion in 1983). At the same time, the BCEAO's position began to deteriorate, decreasing from 127.3 billion CFA F in 1978 to 54.6 billion in 1979 and becoming significantly negative starting in 1980 (from - 52.6 billion in 1980 to - 200.4 billion in 1983).

TABLE 8 (1): EVOLUTION OF THE BCEAO and BEAC OPERATION ACCOUNT'S BALANCES, 1978-83 (in million of CFA francs)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
BCEAO	127,350	54,637	-52,650	-85,820	-80,972	-200,446
BEAC	21,273	41,390	93,573	126,637	161,980	191,375

SOURCE: Rapports des Comités Monétaires de la Zone Franc (1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 et 1983).

It should be stressed that these assets were rather poorly remunerated. Thus from 1960 to 1973, the interest rate granted by the French treasury on deposits was similar to that posted by the Banque de France, which was the lowest on the French monetary market. The 1973 agreements attempted to reduce somewhat the gap between the interest rates granted to the African Central Banks by the French treasury and those of the French monetary market, with at best mitigated results. If one adds to this the fact that the interest rates posted by the other financial markets (including the Treasury Bills that the Banque de France underwrote with her own reserves) were during that period significantly higher than those of the French monetary market (by about 4 to 5 percent), one can safely estimate the net loss suffered there from by the African states member of the Franc Zone during the first twenty years of independence at 80 Billion CFA F.[33] In the particular case of the French Franc devaluation, (by 12.5 percent) of August 1969, the loss to the UMOA countries of

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that devaluation in relation to gold and to other foreign currencies has been estimated at 4.3 billion CFA francs[34]

Furthermore, it should be noted that the French Franc was steadily devalued vis-a-vis other foreign currencies from 1973 . Thus, the devaluation vis-a-vis the US dollar was of 12.3 percent in 1980, 21 percent in 1981, 15 percent in 1982, 15.8 percent in 1983.[35] This gives an idea of the significant gains that the African Central banks might have realized, had they held most of their reserves in US dollars during that period. In view of this situation, one is dumbfounded by the astounding statements made by some of the unconditional advocates of the Franc Zone to the effect that the foreign exchange reserves of the African member states were better remunerated under that arrangement than would have been the case had these states held most of their foreign exchange reserves in gold.[37] If this was the case, one wonders why Cameroon would take such pains to hold more than half of its foreign exchange earnings derived from oil revenues in US dollars in American banks, both in Cameroon and in the United States. According to the most conservative estimates, Cameroon's oil revenues (which were deposited in a special, extra-budgetary account) were in 1981-2 valued at 1 billion dollars, with a production amounting to about 5.3 millions tons. This, in effect, meant that close to 500 million dollars (or than 2000 billion CFA frs) actually escaped the regular Franc Zone channels, much to the dismay and irritation of the French government. It is generally estimated that the interest earned on these deposits alone largely compensated for any nominal deficit of Cameroon's balance of payments.[38]

In the area of trade, the progressive devaluation of the French franc had a negative impact on the Franc Zone African countries to the extent that it resulted in an increase of import costs from Third countries, particularly of oil imports denominated in US dollars. Such a negative impact was all the greater since there was a steady increase of the share of Third (non-Franc Zone) countries in the

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global trade of African Franc Zone countries, and a proportional relative decline of France's share in that trade. Thus, the proportion of non-Franc Zone imports was 73 percent (1977) and 72 percent (1979) for Benin, 72 percent (1980) for Togo, 66 percent (1982) for the Ivory Coast, and 66 percent (1981) for Senegal.[39]

Another negative effect of devaluation was to increase the amount of annuities -both in terms of capital and interest- on the foreign debt of the African countries denominated in foreign currencies. The more these countries were indebted to strong currency countries, the greater the additional amounts dued. Thus, according to the Hudson Institute, 80 to 90 percent of the LDCs' foreign debts were denominated in US dollars. Other sources estimated that devaluations accounted for 60 to 70 percent of the external indebtendness of the Franc Zone countries.[40] Tremblay has calculated that the August 1969 devaluation of French Franc increased the annuities on the UMOA countries' foreign debt by about 414 million CFA F.[41] Countless examples could be cited to demonstrate the negative impact of the devaluation of the French Franc on the indebtedeness of the Franc Zone African member-states.[42]

In addition, devaluations tended, through various indirect mechanisms, to increase the overall price level in the African Franc Zone states. Initially those countries were already disadvantaged by the fact that the basic monetary unit commonly used was not the CFA Franc - which is merely a unit of account - but coined with a face value of five, ten or twenty-five CFA francs. This meant that prices were necessarily increased by multiples of five CFA francs, which contributed to the overall price and inflationary tendencies in the African Franc Zone states.[43] One of the major immediate effects of inflation was that known as "time-lag". This refers to the fact that a period of time elapsed between the moment when the devaluation decision was taken and the time when the real impact of this decision was felt. Thus, the oligopolistic firms operating in the African countries

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increased their prices, by anticipation, as soon as the devaluation decision was known. They then increased their prices a second time when the impact of the extra costs due to inflation were actually felt. This phenomenon explains why in these countries an expected price increase of, say 8 Percent usually ended up as a real price increase of over 15 percent.[44]

TABLE 8(2) : FRANCE'S PERCENTAGE SHARE IN THE EXTERNAL TRADE OF THE FRANC ZONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1978-82

	1978		1979		1980		1981		1982	
	Imp.	Exp.	Emp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp	Exp.
UMOA COUNTRIES										
Benin	28.5	22.6	25.7	13.6						
BurKina Faso					39.3	18	33	12.2	27.6	14.5
Ivory Coast					39.8	21.6	33.1	18.6	30.5	19
Mali	32.7	32.7								
Niger	43.3	64.2	40.1	42.1	39.1	40.4				
Senegal			38.1	44.7	33.6	32.3	29.1	19.7		
Togo			32.4	15.7	25.1	15.3	31.6	17.2	27.1	22
BEAC COUNTRIES										
Cameroon			43.8	24.2	43	20.4	41.3	19.6		
Central African Republic	57.8	49.6	63.2	45.6	60.7	52.1	56.3	50.6	53.3	44
Chad										
Congo	49.9	24.4	51.4	2.8	47.4	1.3	54.8	1.7	63.5	10
Gabon	55.3	25.2								
Comoros	29.1	53.7	50	76.3	56.2	48.4				

SOURCE: Rapport du Comité Monétaire de la Zone Franc (1983), pp. 285ff

A further negative economic consequece was the machanism whereby French inflation was transferred to the Franc Zone African countries through trade links and capital transfer. Although it is true (as noted above) that the African states progressively diversified their foreign trade partners, France remained, by and large, the main trading partner of those countries. Table 8(2) above shows that while the African states' exports to France were decreasing overall (except in

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the cases of Niger, Central African Republic and Comoros, where they exceeded 40 percent), these states' imports from France remained significant (between 40 and 60 percent), notably in the cases of Niger, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Congo. Thus, the high rates of inflation that prevailed in France over the past years (13.6 percent in 1980, 14 percent in 1981, 9.7 percent in 1982, and 9.3 percent in 1983) had a negative impact on the Franc Zone African economies, which remained largely influenced by the French. For one thing, the price of imported goods increased. In addition, this increase in the price of imported goods - which were essentially consumed by the national bourgeoisie and expatriates - indirectly affected the level of local prices in the African

TABLE 8(3) : EVOLUTION OF FRANCE'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH NON-FRANC ZONE AND WITH FRANC ZONE COUNTRIES, 1978-1983 (OVERALL BALANCE IN BILLION OF FRENCH FRANCS)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Non-Franc Zone countries	+26,759	+6,109	- 892	-71,281	-46,151	-3,858
Franc Zone countries	+ 447	+1,816	+1,932	- 2,623	+ 2,896	+ 76

SOURCE: Rapports des Comités Monétaires de la Zone Franc, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 et 1983 and various Annexes

countries, which tended to increase as a result. In this fashion, French inflation was, literally, imported into the Franc Zone African countries.[45] In the final analysis - and contrary to some dubious assertions[46] - the pooling of foreign excahnge reserves through the Operations Account's mechanism seemed to be much more beneficial to France than to the African states concerned. As previously noted, the African Central banks Operational Accounts at the French treasury were constantly positive. There is no doubt that the French Treasury used these assets to offset any deficit that might have occurred in the French public accounts.[47] Furthermore, the African states were constantly among the main foreign

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exchange earners within the Franc Zone via the Operations Account mechanism. Thus, in 1966 they provided 99 percent of the Franc Zone's foreign exchange.[48] Finally, Table 8 (3) above reveals that while France's balance of payments (particularly with other developed countries) was in chronic deficit since 1980 (-71.2 billion FF in 1981, - 46,1 billion in 1982, and - 3.8 billion in 1983), this balance was always (except in 1981) positive with other Franc Zone countries (+ 1.9 billion FF in 1980, + 2.8 billion in 1982, and + 76 million in 1983). It is thus quite clear that the Franc Zone's overall positive foreign exchange reserves significantly contributed to offset France's chronic deficit of its balance of payments, which otherwise would have been much worse.

If it can truly be said of the Franc Zone that it was a "solidarity Zone",[49] it must be acknowledged that it was, unfornately, a one-solidarity. Indeed, the fact that the Operations Accounts were opened at the French Treasury, and not at the Banque de France (as they should) in effect insulated the French economy from fluctuations arising within the Franc Zone states, while these states were actually subjected to the full impact of fluctuations arising in the French economy. The latter benefitted on two accounts: while it was protected from disturbances arising within the Franc Zone states, it benefitted substantially from the significant foreign exchange reserves held by these states in the Operations Account. As for the African states, they were double losers: first, because of the negative impact of imported inflation on their economies, which were largely influenced by France; secondly, because of their net losses arising from the fact that they were compelled to hold most of their foreign exchange reserves in the constantly depreciated currency. Ultimately, it would seem that the African states struck a bad deal in which France was the major beneficiary and they were the losers. The study of saving and credit polities in the Franc Zone cannot but reinforce this pessimitic conclusion.

8.4: SAVINGS AND CREDIT POLICIES OF FRANC ZONE AFRICAN MEMBER STATES

Generally, savings and credit policies are the main economic instruments through which the state attempts to

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allocate internal capital resources according to sectoral priorities as defined in the global development strategy. Yet, surprisingly, such policies were highly orthodox, conservative and centralized in the Franc Zone African member-states. First of all, while it was generally admitted that savings and credit policies should necessarily be initiated and controlled by the state, one finds that in the Franc Zone African states these policies were actually carried out by the African Central banks, which were themselves placed under the authority of the French Treasury. This means that it is in fact the Banque de France (as the French treasury controlling authority) with ultimately controlled savings and credit policies in the Franc Zone. Secondly, such policies, as conducted in that zone, were clearly influenced by the most orthodox neo-classical conception of development and the weak financial infrastructures of the African states called for specific types of monetary and credit policies. The same school of thought holds that in the developing states' credit allocation has a direct impact on external reserves.

In these countries, therefore (so the argument goes), the level of external reserves determines the necessary level of credit allocation. Thus, in the Franc Zone African states, the African Central banks were invested with the exclusive right to determine the "reasonable needs" of the member-states' economies which can be satisfied "without actually upsetting the external balance".[50] Consequently, in these states, the African Central banks' allocations to the national treasuries were limited by specific ceilings (20 percent of ordinary budgetary receipts in BEAC, and 20 percent of national fiscal revenues in BCEAO). Such a pratice was supposedly designed to "moderate the states' excesses".[51] It is quite clear that the observance of these ceilings was a tacit condition of the French external convertibility guarantee.[52] France was thus invested with the responsibility of supervising the compliance with orthodox financial and monetary regulations. Such a collective discipline as was enforced within the Franc Zone was seen as constituting "a safeguard against individual excesses".[53]

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While it is generally admitted that one of the bank's functions is to finance the national treasury, thus making the government indebted to the banking system, one finds that the African Central Banks generally ran a credit vis-a-vis the African governments.[54] This is all the more surprising since the pressing economic needs of these developing states called for a radically different situation. Thus in the Franc Zone countries one was faced with a most unusual situation in which the treasuries of supposedly independent states were not in a position to mobilize financial resources by resorting to monetary mechanisms commonly used elsewhere. Furthermore, the central bank's policies were determined not by the member-states' economic needs but by the their level of foreign reserves. This resulted in the conservative management of these states' foreign reserves. Ultimately, one must admit that the exceedingly strict monetary and financial discipline imposed on the Franc Zone African member-states was unique in the world.[55] As Fabra rightly observes; "One is easily orthodox when it comes to poor countries".[56] This observation is born out by the study of the actual implementation of savings and credit policies.

(A) IMPLEMENTATION OF SAVING AND CREDIT POLICIES

The main method of quantitative credit control used in the UMOA and BEAC member-states was that of the banking system's refinancing through the central bank, rather than the resort of the discount rate. Thus, interest rates in these states were deliberately stabilized at a fairly low level, although they were progressively increased since 1974.[57] As a result within the Franc Zone, this policy of low interest rates inevitably resulted in a significant capital flight from the African countries towards France, where the interest rate were much higher.[58] Thus the main purpose of this policy, which was to facilitate and encourage private national and foreign investment, was clearly being defeated. Ultimately, the is no doubt that savings in the Franc Zone African states were discouraged by the continuing low interest rates policy. Thus, Table 8 (4) below shows that within UMOA, the nominal interest rates on savings accounts increased from

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3.25 percent in 1970-72 to 4.75 percent in 1973-74, 5.50 percent in 1976-79, 7.50 percent in 1980-81 and 9.50 percent in 1982. The same table shows that during that period, the minimum real interest rates on savings accounts (taking the rate of inflation into account) were constantly negative (- 15.90 percent in 1975, - 14 percent in 1978, and - 11.60 percent in 1979). This situation being, by and large, the same in the BEAC countries, its logical consequence was for savings to move to more remunerative markets, notably to France.[59]

Table 8(4) UMOA SAVINGS ACCOUNT'S INTEREST RATES, 1970-82 (PERCENTAGES)

ITEMS	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Nominal Interest rates	3.25	3.25	3.25	4.75	4.75	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	7.50	7.50	9.50
Real Interest rates	-1.75	-3.45	12.35	-6.96	-14.65	-15.90	-7.10	-7.90	-14.00	-11.60	-5.50	-3.90	

SOURCE: P and S. Guillamont; Zone Franc et Développement Africain, pp. 156-157

The selective control of credit aimed at regulating credit allocation so that it could direct to those sectors considered as priorities within the national development strategy. Credit allocation was usually the responsibility of the commercial bank. Table 8(5) below shows that over half of all the banks operating in the Franc Zone African countries were foreign owned in the proportion of 70 percent.[60] While these co-existed alongside a significant state sector, only 8 percent of the total number of banks identified in those countries were owned by private nationals on a majority basis. Indeed, "in Africa the banking profession is a foreign preserve. There are no genuinely African banks... Blacks are pratically excluded from the banking profession".[61] While there is no doubt that control of financial capital is a necessary prerequisite of a genuinely Africanized banking system, such control at present largely eludes the African public and private sectors.[62]

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Table 8(5): OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL IN THE BANKING SECTOR OF THE FRANC ZONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1984

	Total number of banks surveyed	Number of banks and ownership of capital (percentage)					
		National				Foreign	
		States		Private			
		N°.	Percentage (average)	N°.	Percentage (average)	N°.	Percentage (average
Benin	3	3	97	-	-	-	-
Burkina Faso	2	3	52.4	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	12	6	77.2	-	-	6	60.8
Central Africa Republic	3	1	60	-	-	2	70.8
Congo	2	2	58.3	-	-	-	-
Gabon	5	1	69	-	-	4	66.1
Ivory Coast	12	2	66.4	2	56.8	8	66
Mali	4	2	65	1	73	1	77
Niger	7	4	77.2	-	-	3	100
Senegal	9	2	74.2	2	71.8	5	65.3
Togo	4	-	-	-	-	4	59.1
TOTAL	63	25	69.6 (average	5	67.2 (average	33	70.6 (average)

Source: M Adel. Amine and S Gharibi; "150 leaders de la banque en Afrique" in Le Journal de l'Economie Africaine, N° (69) (September 1985- pp. 66-7 (author's computation).

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The African countries' capital needs are determined by their development strategy. Whatever that strategy might be, it initially requires vast amounts of capital for investment in basic transport communications and social infrastructure. This necessarily calls for long-term financial loans on concessional terms. On the other hand, the commercial banks operate according to market principles and are essentially concerned with making the highest profits in the shortest possible time. Consequently, they will be interested in financing only business ventures with a sufficiently broad and sound financial basis which offer the best prospects for assured and immediate gains. These obviously incompatible

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strategies of development of the African states and the private banking sector can only be reconciled and accomodated within global state-controlled credit policy in which the state would be in a position to direct to the priority areas. However, in the Franc Zone African states, it is in fact the central banks which actually controlled the credit policy. It is therefore these central banks, and not the states themselves, which had the responsibility of allocating credits among the different sectors of the economy. Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that in the Franc Zone the banking sector tended to favour short-term credit, to the detriment of medium-and long-term credit,[63] those sectors which were still heavily dominated by foreign (mostly French) capital, namely commodities, small-scale import-substitution industry and wholesale and retail trade. Thus, this particular credit policy tended to favour export oriented foreign firms to the detriment of nationally owned business. Furthemore, by favouring short-and medium-term as opposed to long-term-credit, the Franc Zone banking system did not allow the African states (and entrepreneurs) to have access to the necessary investment capital. These states were thus compelled to resort to bilateral and multilateral overdraft accounts in order to finance their development programmes and projects This is all the more unusual since, as we have seen above, the African Central banks generally ran a credit vis-a-vis the banking system. If one adds to this the fact that the African central banks' Operations Account was almost always positive, one can safely conclude that the African Franc Zone states had an important credit potential which was actually untapped or wasted.

In the final analysis, the Franc Zone constituted a single preferential economic area within which France could freely pursue a purely neo-colonial policy of economic exploitation of the African countries. It is thus necessary to analyse the Franc Zone globally, rather than sectorally, if one is to assess fully and accurately its impact on the African economies concerned.[64] Unfortunately, it is not possible to deal with other aspects of economic cooperation within limits of the present chapter.

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Thus the ties of financial dependency were very strong in Cameroon because the banking system and through it the internal money circulation and the credit system too came under foreign control through the operation of the Franc Zone in which financial dependency was an element and consequence of direct economic dependency.

In such a situation foreign capital was free, through the banks under its control to support or setback by means of its credit policy, any particular economic sector, to promote the development of the industries complying with its own interests to hinder that of others running counter to them, to influence export trade and to keep local national capital even in the field or credit in a dependent state. On the other hand, it did through the regulation of money emission, impose at will inflation on the country, "taxing" thereby the entire population, especially by means of decrease in real wages of the wage workers employed by it. Thus it also influenced the budget position and the balance of trade and payments of the country. This extreme form of financial dependency first came into being in Cameroon under coonialism, but the Ahidjo administration perpetuated the phenomenon. In fact, in Cameroon local capital did exist but only at an embryonic state, the domestic market was not wide enough and there was a lack of financial cadres, as well as a lack of a national monetary system built upon the national currency. Since this was the first and most important pillar of French neo-colonial structure in Cameroon, it was through this phenopenon that the Cameroonian economy was tied up to the other French African Countries in collective neo-colonialism between 1960 and 1982.

8.5: FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Few developments have played a critical role in the extra ordinary growth of international trade and capital flows during the past decades as the rise of multinational corporations. These huge business firms with their far-flung networks of subsidiaries all marching to the drum of centralized global profit-maximizing decisions of parent companies located

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in North America, Europe and Japan present a unique opportunity and host of critical problems for the many developing states in which they conduct their business. Since in this chapter we are concerned with the monetary and financial relations of the developing state in terms of its foreign policy, it must be remarked that the international flow of financial resources takes two main forms:- private foreign investment and public development assistance (foreign aid). In this section (8.5) we examine the nature, significance and consequences of private foreign investments in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982 with principal emphasis on the traditional "north-south" flow of development finance and in the next (8.6) we examine foreign aid.

The investment code which provided fiscal and customs facilities of the most liberal genre, was instituted by the law of 27 June, 1960, and modified by that of 16 April, 1964 as well as by the application of the Presidential Decree of 16 January, 1968. All these modifications were crowned by a Presidential Circular Letter of March 1976 requesting all files for foreign investment, authorization under the code to be treated by the competent ministerial authority within thirty days of their reception and then reported to the Prime Minister. This liberal investment code which allowed partial or total exemption from customs duties on imports of raw materials and equipment by foreign forms, fiscal exemption running for up to twenty five years and free capital profit and dividend transfers represented an unchallenged invitation for the preservation of the domination of foreign capital in Cameroon. The effect of this liberal investment code was the establishment of a firm stranglehood by foreign capital in the economy ranging from the import/export sector through wholesale trading, public works and the constructions industry, agro-industry, banking and educational investments. For example, the oil industry was completely dominated by foreign concerns. Elf-Aquitance held 71 percent of the capital of the oil Company; Elf-Serepca explioting the oil fields of the South West Province produced 5.5 million tons of crude oil in 1982, the <u>Compagnie Francaise du Petrole</u>, (CFP-Total),

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was expected to produce one million tons in 1982 through TEPCAM. The French Firm, TECHNIP won the contract for the liquifaction of natural gas at Kribi.[65]

The heavy French investments in Cameroon were strengthened by German investments through the West German Technical Cooperation Agency (G.T.Z.) which encouraged joint business ventures between Cameroonian and German businessmen. American foreign capital penetrated the Cameroonian economy mainly in the oil industry and banking. The United States of America was Cameroon's biggest customer, buying 90 percent of the country's oil. Pecten, Mobil and Gulf oil were actively involved in offshore oil prospection and expliotation as well as the transformation of hydrocarbon products. Manhattan and Bank of America were deeply involved in the banking business in Cameroon with headquarters in Douala and Yaounde.

Choosing 1960 to 1982 as a period of reference, the Ministry of Plan in 1984[66] undertook to analyse the ownership structure of some major manufacturing industries in Cameroon. This study revealed that out of a sample population of 86 largest firms in selected industries, 64 (74.41 percent) were 100 percent foreign owned and 4 (4.66 percent) were 100 percent owned by Cameroonian private groups. The government corporations were reported to own 6 (6.97 percent) on a 100 percent basis. The remaining 12 firms representing 13.95 percent of the sample group were owned jointly either by foreign private groups in partnership with government agencies or with both government corporations and Cameroonian businesses. Table 8(6) illustrates the above statistics.

Commenting on the Ministry's findings one can only observe that the passage of time with independence only slightly altered the situation through such bourgeois compromises as minimal sales of chares to Cameroonians.[67] This view, which might sound strange in the light of efforts that were made by the Ahidjo administration to increase the participation of Cameroonians in the national economy. However, this could be, however, supported to a large extent by other relatively recent studies conducted on the ownership structure

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as it applies to trading companies. Out of a group of 62 selected Cameroonian companies involved in the distribution of important commodities in Cameroon, Marchés Tropicaux et Meditérraneens discovered in 1976 that 51 (that is 82.25%) were foreign owned while only 11 (that is 17.75%) were owned by Cameroonians and the government.[68] As far as the Cameroon oil sector is concerned, it is a common knowledge that here big foreign multinational firms excelled and dominated.

TABLE 8(6): OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF SOME CAMEROONIAN INDUSTRIES

Nature of Ownership	No of establishments	Percentage
100% foreign owned	64	74.41
100% owned by Private Cameroonians	4	4.65
100% owned by Government Corporations	6	6.97
Owned jointly by Privatee foreign and government	12	13.95
TOTAL	86	100

SOURCE: Direction de la statistique, Yaounde, 1985

To appreciate the relative position of foreign businessess in Cameroon during the Ahidjo Administration with respect to their financial background and strength, it is important to note that the data is rather scanty . In an attempt to arrive at some rough estimation of the amounts invested by foreign firms one must resort to fragmentary information.

In 1976, the total industrial investments were found to amount to approximately 143.282.000 billion F CFA (100%). The share of foreign investmens in the total amount was about 101.626.000 million F CFA, that is, 70.96%, that of the Cameroon Government about 24.284.000 million F CFA, that is 16.95% and that of private Cameroonians about 3.137.000 million F/CFA, that is 2.19%. Out of the total mass of investments, 14.185.000 million F.CFA, that is 9.90%

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remaining unidentified.[69]

For purposes of comparison, it is pertinent to note that total foreign business investment was reported to be 39.800.000 million F/CFA in 1965 and 262.300.000 millionF.CFA in 1976.[70] Thus, foreign investment in Cameroon had increased by 359.88 percent over the ten year period from 1965 to 1975 and at 183.88 percent over the ten year period from 1965-1976 respectively. If, on the other hand, one considers the total period ranging from 1965 to 1976, one observes that foreign investments had progressed substantially by 659.05 percent which indicates a yearly average of 59.91 percent[71].

TABLE 8(7): SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, 1976-1981 (BILLION F/CFA)

	Allocations	% of Total
Rural Economy	125.154	17.27
Industry, Mining	224.505	30.96
Trade, Transportation	39.083	5.39
Tourism	99.119	1.26
Infrastructure	156.768	21.62
Education and Training	36.721	5.06
Youth and Sport	3.000	0.41
Health, Social Affairs	12.005	1.65
Housing	89.180	12.30
Information, Culture	4.056	0.57
Equipment	21.561	2.97
Studies	4.000	0.55
Investments	-	-
TOTAL	725.232	100

Source: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé

As a critical study of Table 8(7) will reveal, under conditions of unrestricted economic liberalism combined with the strong attraction of foreign investments by the timely expanding Cameroonian oil sector from 1978, it is obvious that the above observed trend of heavy investments in mining and industry to the detriment of other sectors could hardly stop or decline. Rather, it gained momentum as the Ahidjo administration perpetuated it through its perversed economic policies. In fact, the Ahidjo administration never saw the

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impact of its economic policies in the perspective of reducing the financial dominance of foreign firms in Cameroon. It would be dangerous to imagine that such an overwhelmingly neo-colonial policy could succeed in reverting, in an abrupt manner, a situation that had developed over several decades of foreign economic presence in Cameroon. Already, voices had been loud to denounce the flagrant malpractices affecting the successful implementation of the Cameroonian indigenization policy. Such malpractices corroborated the existence of some vested interests linking foreign businesses with Cameroonian interest groups.

Furthermore, the period after Cameroon's political independence was characterized by the adoption of an open-door policy favouring foreign investments attracted from diverse industrial nations. Unlike what was obtained in the colonial era when the French were the major economic agents in the country, Cameroon was now open to various economic forces from different parts of the industrial world. The oil sector, which as mostly dependent on multinationals for investment and technical knowhow, is a good case for illustration purposes. The rush of new foreign investments in the commanding heights of the Cameroonian economy with the beginning of oil in 1978 could cancel outrightly whatever gains Cameroon might have derived from the implementation of its indigenization policy.

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A statistical distribution of foreign investment by type of activity for the periods 1960/61 to 1970/71 and 1971.72 to 1982/83 is given in Table 8(8). From Table 8(8), it could be observed that : (1) The share of the mining, manufacturing and processing sector in total investment, which was already over-whelming in the base period of the 1960s, had significantly increased from 43.2 percent to 77.2 percent, making this particular sector by far the most important concern of foreign private investors in Cameroon. The real magnitude of the increase is fully appreciated if one considers that, in absolute terms, physical investment in mining progressed from 1960/61 to 1982 by 10.10 times and that therefore a conversion of the 1971/1982 share of

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investment in mining, manufacturing and processing gives a percentage increase of 779.72 per cent (77.2% x 10.10) as compared to the situation in the base period. However, it must be remarked that the relative share of manufacturing and processing soared abruptly after 1970,[72] undoubtedly following import substitution industrialisation measures in Cameroon.

TABLE 8 (8): CAMEROON: FOREIGN BUSINESS INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY (IN BILLION F CFA)

Type of Activity	1960/61 1964/71	Percentage	1971-82	Percentage
Minning, manufacturing and processing	17.2	43.2%	203.5	77%
Transport and Communication	4.7	11.8%	2.7	1.0%
Trading and Business Servicing	12.2	30.6%	21.2	8.2%
Building and Construction	2.2	5.6%	12.2	4.7%
Agriculture, Forestry and fishing	3.5	8.8%	0.5	0.2%
T O T A L	39.8	100%	262.3	100%

SOURCE : Direction de la Statistique, Yaounde

2) Transport and communication as well as trading and business services indicate a strong decline in their share in foreign investment from 11.8 per cent to only 1.0 per cent and from 30.6 per cent to merely 8.2 1/2% per cent respectively. This decline no doubt, was due to the policy of indigenization which tended to reserve economic activities requiring less capital investments to Cameroonians.

3) Building and construction equally indicate a gradual decline in their share from initially 5.6 per cent to 4.7 per cent probably due to government contract award policy, making the government largely responsible for the provision of the major infrastructures to the private sector of the Cameroonian economy.

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Lastly, agriculture, forestry and fishing, whose relevance was limited from the viewpoint of private economic interest, suffered most from neglect by foreign investors, over the time period under consideration.

As the above analysis clearly reveals there was a noticeable shift in the relative importance foreign private investors attached to individual sectors of the Cameroonian economy. As time went on, nearly exclusive emphasis was being laid on the sectors of mining including oil extracting activities, and manufacturing including the processing of raw materials. Unlike in the base period ranging from 1960/61 to 1964/65 when the combined share of the two sectors was 43.2 per cent of total foreign investment, the same sectors in 1971/82 period accounted for 77.8 per cent of total foreign investment to be apportioned among all remaining activities as shown in Table 8 (8).

The evidence of the timely correctness of the above remarks is produced with the help of the data in Table 8(8). In particular, the figures in the last column show that from 1971 to 1980 net capital investments in mining and manufacturing had top priority with a share of 76.30 per cent in the allocation of foreign financial resources. The next most favoured set of activities over the period was as usual these connected with trading and business services which, on their part, accounted for 16.31 per cent of total net capital investments. Still agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing came last with only 0.15 per cent of total net foreign capital investments.

Incidentally, mining, manufacturing and processing which, as indicated, attracted the lion share of foreign investment in Cameroon, while the activities that were usually recognized internationally as the backbone of the economy of underdeveloped countries because such activities generate, in the categories of countries under consideration, profits that foreign investors are after. In addition, "the motivation for (preferential) foreign investment in the extractive sector (inparticular) was to secure access to critical imports of (strategic) raw materials for the metropolitan countries".[73] In as much as the two priority sectors concerned were, to a significant extent, concentrated in the hands of powerful big firms, it is necessary, at this juncture, to get acquainted with the motives and intentions that underlaid foreign business activities in the said areas in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration.

The motives supporting foreign investments in Cameroon in particular were at least of three types. They were in essence economic, political and ideological. The motives given by James C. Baker as constituting the economic considerations of foreign investments in developing countries hold good for Cameroon and are worth citing.

> According to official experts and assistance missions sent out by industrial nations, ... the investment of foreign private capital is handicapped, among other things, by the opposition it creates for nationalistic reasons, by the inequitable and excessive restrictions imposed on the possible control of national enterprises by foreign investors, and by restrictions that unnecessarily limit the employment of expatriates as cadres and technicians. Some developing countries do not allow that foreign participation in a national business exceeds 50 per cent and some others go as far as to make sure that such foreign participation is always less than 50 per cent. Many foreign firms reject considering possibilities of investment especially in those countries where a majority participation is denied them.... The fear for nationalisation or expropriation is often too justified. For foreign investment seeking new opportunities to invest, it is very difficult to be altruist: What this category of investors is after, is both maximum profit (at a record time) and minimum risk, and such are two of the major dilemmas facing developing countries that wish to industrialise with the help of foreign private capital.[74]

In this study of the different problems encountered in its activities by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a subsidiary organ of the World Bank, J.C. Baker points out again that the Corporation :

> Is persistently faced with another problem emanating from the difficulty that it has; to find suitable projects that satisfy its investment criteria. National as well as foreign investors as a rule are interested in and concerned with projects that are the best ones and the most lucrative ones while other less profitable ventures might better satisfy imperative (and urgent) needs of the economy of the developing countries.[75]

Such highly profitable projects were usually found in Cameroon under Ahamadou Ahidjo in the areas of mining, manufacturing and processing.

For above reasons running counter to whatever is subsumable under altruism and humanitarianism foreign private investors, although they were used to associating their economic activities in Cameroon with the idea of aid and assistance, disengaged themselves significantly from the developmental needs of Cameroon. As already demonstrated and as will be seen further, the activities connected in particular with transport and communication, building and construction, agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing were almost absolutely neglected by foreign economic agents for offering less opportunity to maximize profit in the shortest possible time.[76]

To maximise profit and minimize risk of losses, foreign investors, backed by their home government, motivated the Cameroon government to create a favourable investment climate by offering them incentives, inducements, and guarantees which, in practice, took the form of official undertakings, embodied in official documents, decrees, and crowned with "the most liberal" investment code. In the case of the Ahidjo administration, such understakings covered a large range and gamut of government decisions referred to as industrial development income tax relief, Approved User Scheme, customs duties on dumped and subsidized goods, customs (drawback) regulations, Companies income Tax Decree relating to accelerated depreciation and related to the creation of industrial estates, the promulgation of mineral rights; entry remittance and repatriation of capital; customs and excise

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tariffs; tariff protection; the protection of patents designs and trade marks as well as to a series of other additional legislations meant to encourage the activities of foreign private investors in the nation.

No doubt, while offering extremely generous concessions and guarantees, government authorities in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration might have expected in return that foreign investors were going to fulfil some specific obligations vis-a-vis their host country. Such obligations also generally formed part of the investment code. But as experience came to prove, foreign investors, realizing a pronounced inefficiency and laxity in the functioning of administrative control machinery in the country, hardly abided by the obligations they had agreed to uphold. They simply circumvented them whenever they could do so in an attempt to add some incremental elements to their guaranteed profits. Fraud was, therefore, observed and reported to have been a common practice adhered to by foreign private investors in Cameroon.[77]

The judgement of E.C. Chibwe which is corroborated by that of the Cameroonian economist Georges Ngango epitomise the observation made above:

> The few control operations that could be conducted so far by a small number of (African) countries have revealed important fiscal frauds quite apart from the non-adherence to the clauses of agreements and conventions passed on the basis of investment codes. Out of 17 foreign firms under the establishment convention that the Government of the people's Republic of the Congo caused to the investigated into ... from 11th April to 3rd May 1967, virtually none was found to be in conformity or in a regular situation with the convention. All undertakings (by the foreign firms) relating to the volume of investments to be made and to the local manpower to recruit or to train have in general not been observed. This is an indirect way to cheat fiscal authorities since the fulfilment of such undertakings is the basis for the general tax reliefs (and other not less important advantages) from which foreign firms benefit.[78]

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> As far as direct and proper fiscal fraud is concerned, (occasional) fiscal control activities have contributed to uncover the magnitude of tax evasion by foreign firms. The operation that dealt with only 11 foreign firms (2 for Cameroon, 2 for Chad, 2 for Gabon, 2 for Central African Republic and 3 for the Congo) has allowed us to redress the business accounts of the said firms and to identify a fiscal fraud having occasioned a fiscal loss amounting to F CFA 110.720.000. The reality of such fraud was so glaring that the leadership of the first subjected to control could not but accept the findings of the auditing group and agreed to reparations and fines. If, for 11 foreign firms alone, the forgone fiscal revenue is already so high, one wonders what the situation would be at the overall level of foreign firms taken together at a time, most of which have qualified to be known as real experts in the fraudulent manipulation of business accounts: voluntary omissions of properties and incomes, increased overhead expenditures, inflated honoraria for experts and lawyers, increased expenditure on receptions, public relations and business journeys, presentation of all purpose bills, wrong declaration of purchase bills in the name of fictitious persons, etc.[79]

If such was the case in the small countries such as Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon and Congo whose economies were hardly comparable in size and complexity to that of Cameroon, one must wonder what fiscal fraud would have taken place in Cameroon, a relatively rich nation having complex economic structures, where it was not an easy matter to achieve economic transparency and control over the multitude of economic activities.

One good example in this respect is given by the "hypocritical" attempt by the Ahidjo administration to control prices in Cameroon. Obviously, prices which did not conform with government regulations, necessarily yielded profits higher than those obtainable if regulations were to apply strictly. Because of the circumvention of government regulations and its implications, only a portion of the total profit was declared. Undeclared profit arising from the non-observance of government directives constituted elements of fiscal fraud having its sources in high prices, the

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application of high depreciation rates, a wrong assessment of capital assets, etc.[80]

By formulating and promulgating special regulations intended to attract foreign investment, and to ensure their profitability through the enforcement of the same regulations, the Ahidjo administration necessarily operated in consonance with individualistic and particularistic aspirations of expatriate firms in search of ever-growing profits, the repatriation of which was also to a large extent guaranteed by law. In this way, ill-reflected principles of economic liberalism, free trade and an open-door policy found legal backing and were largely instinitutionalized and became somehow a modus vivendi. "We (industrial nations) need colonies (among other things) for economic purposes: we need (cheap) raw materials for our (rapidly expanding) industry and we need (large) markets for the (massive) sale of the finished goods of this (growing) industry".[81]

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Despite all acknowledgement of the changes in the political status of colonial Cameroon and all possible naunces connected with the same changes, the above statement, which dates as far back as 1936, remained as valid as it was in the time of its formulation because as Kodjo rightly makes the point, "Contemporary welfare states of the Western hemisphere in particular find their foundations in forced economic growth and expansion and behave accordingly in international relations with other states, soft or not, the only difference in historical perspective being the worldwide political context which has become more complex than was the case in the past".[82]

However, because of the close relation between political, ideological and economic motives of foreign investment in Cameroon, it is useful and even necessary to consider the ideological and political motives together. As indicated earlier, it was customary to regard foreign private capital investment in Cameroon as aid or assistance. As aid had become an integral element of international diplomacy of big industrial powers taken individually or collectively, it is only understandable that foreign private investments in Cameroon were given full backing by political authorities in the industrial nations concerned. This explains why specialised national as well as multinational institutions emerged whose role it was, among other things, to channel foreign private funds into developing countries in a co-ordinated way and to protect them against possible risks. Seen in relation to specialised national and/or multinational agencies of the kind referred to above, foreign private capital in Cameroon became a non-negligible instrument of the international politics and diplomacy of the industrial nations vis-a-vis Cameroon. Thus, foreign private capital as well as foreign public funds which found entry into Cameroon in the usual form of development assistance, for satisfying special political needs and requirements of donor countries, were tied to the political and ideological interests not only of individuals but also of the collective donor countries because:

> transnational corporations as the structure and the direct governmental relationships as the superstructure of the international system are interrelated and condition each other. It is a function of the superstructure to provide the ideological rationale and justification of the system as well as to lay down the rules of the game and provide the practical instruments of implementation.[83]

This amounts to saying that :

> If conflicts of interests exist between Western industrialised states and their transnational corporations, these conflicts are more apparent than real: the proliferation of such instruments of domination and transnational expansion-facilitating tools as tied aid, tied loans, preferential trading agreements, tariffs, political support for transnationals, threats of retaliation, governmental subsidies for technoligical development, etc - eloguently testify to that. They also testify that the time has come to put to rest once and for all the argument that transnational corporations constitute a self-reliant international capitalism, independent of nation states.[84]

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The cooperation of alliance between advanced capitalist states and private business usually goes beyond that and takes the operational practical form of a regular exchange of qualified manpower, an agreement by which the realization of private interests is institutionally secured with public means.[85] Aid policy, viewed in the above larger context, provides the basis for what is generally termed international realpolitik definable as politics without sentiments and emotions. Karl Hesse expresses this view more clearly and more authoritatively by observing that development aid, far from being a humanitarian act, is a political calculation.[86] To be subsumed under this political reckoning, is a series of motives and measures of economic politico-ideological, strategic-military and diplomatic nature.

If, as indicated above, the contemporary international political context had grown more complex than it was some decades before independence, one finds that under the new conditions of the world-wide political life, development aid policy of the industrial nations in Cameroon served, among other things, as a timely adequate substitute for previous direct foreign rule and power domination. While serving to cover and possibly to divert attention from conflicts and voilence implied in the international system based on unequal and asymmetric relations of domination and subordination among industrial nations and Cameroon, it helped to conserve and consolidate the same previous relationships in another differently structural historical situation.

Alongside the discovery of the modern expression of aid policy in lieu of colonial policy, new terminologies such as partnership and international cooperation emerged, creating a myth of international equality between Cameroon and the industrial nations. With the proliferation of such abstract and obsolete academic exercises, the impression was given that the relations of the colonial type had ceased to exist forever and that a mutual understanding and confidence

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then governed their international relations (among factually unequal).

To the extent that Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration believed in this, she opened her doors broadly for western capitalist interests, a situation that was simply tantamount to keeping Cameroon within the zone of Western Capitalist influence as the historical game reserve of Western Capitalist nations. The corollary of the policy of Western capitalist powers to always have and preserve a game reserve such as Cameroon, was at all times the urgent need felt by these nations to persistently discourage Cameroon from having dealings with socialist countries in general. For this reason, development aid policy had to be conceived to further serve to find ways and means by which a close co-operation and a long-term relationship can be obtained, established and kept on-going and undisturbed between (Cameroon) and industrial nations (of the West in particular) and in this way to make possible the attainment of a series of international political aims and goals such as the non-recognition of the Soviet zone (by Cameroon) and the non-attraction, non-incorporation and non-integration of (Cameroon) into the Eastern (Socialist) zone of influence. The political prevention of Cameroon from being infiltrated and contaminated by the virus of socialism and communism, was surely a necessary precondition for the economic use of Cameroon by Western Capitalist powers on a exclusive basis, of course, with the blessings of the Ahidjo administration.

It has already been shown with regards to some profitable economic activities how marginal public investments in Cameroon were compared to foreign private investments in particular. This may be sufficient enough for critical minds to raise issues about the role of public investments in the Cameroonian socio-economic context. Such issues derived directly from the socio-economic order or system prevailing in the country. That Cameroon was a

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declared supporter of the principle of mixed economy, is not in doubt. Cameroon was not an exception with respect to a large-scale practice of the system of mixed economy. Like any other western capitalist country, Cameroon opted avowedly for any economic order and policy based essentially on the maxim of free entrepreneurship. According to this maxim, the state and private entrepreneurs participated in the economic life of society by following a more or less well defined pattern of division of labour rooted in the political philosophy of Planned Liberalism.

TABLE 8 (9): FOREIGN FINANCING OF THIRD PLAN, 1971-1976 (IN BILLION F/CFA)

	ALLOCATIONS	% OF TOTAL
Rural Economy	25.545	9.12
Industry, Mining	70.300	25.11
Trade, Transportation	42.400	15.14
Tourism	7.200	2.57
Infrastructure	57.300	20.46
Education and Training	21.635	7.73
Youth and Sports	1.500	0.54
Health, Social Affairs	6.750	2.41
Housing	29.700	1.06
Information, Culture	1.300	0.46
Equipment	10.300	3.68
Studies and Research	3.000	1.07
Investments	3.070	1.11
TOTAL	280.000	100

SOURCE : The figures are taken from a basic economic survey of Cameroon, 1960-76 Marches, Tropicaux, NO. 1616, 1976, p. 160.

If one glances through Table 8(9), one cannot but observe that the typical areas in which foreign investments traditionally never excelled were those of education, health, housing, transportation, roads, electrification, water supply, sewage information, defence and security, etc. These highly expensive but less profitable socio-economic activities urgently needed by the private investors were as a matter of principle, carried out by the Cameroon government

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with the help of public funds. Such productive but by not means lucrative activities constituted indispensable infra- ructures on the basis of which externalities and important external economies were generated for the prosperity of the private sector of the Cameroonian economy.

Here it would suffice to mention two issues which reveal the degree to which the development plans were cyni- cally used by the Ahidjo administration to promote private investors. One, foreign private capital was the key source of financial resources (73.7%) for the Second Five Year Development Plan, (1966-1971). Foreign private capital seeked to maximize profits by exploiting labour. Secondly, of the 32.3 billion F/CFA projected as agricultural invest- ments under the second plan, only 23.5 per cent was actually realized. The corresponding percentage for mining and industry was 61.2.[87] This radical departure from the peasant-oriented plan was dictated by the demands of foreign private capital.

TABLE 8(10) SUCCESSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROJECTIONS, 1960-1981
(IN BILLION F/CFA)

	1960-61 1965-66	1966-67 1970-71	1971-72 1975-76	1976-77 1980-81
A= Production Sector	16,406	91,602	153,815	397,941
B= Infrastructure and Transport	25,278	45,269	63,600	182,385
C= Social Equipment	9,099	26,024	59,585	140,906
D= General Studies	2,399	2,283	3,000	4,000
TOTAL	53,182	165,176	280,000	725,232
Structure (%)	1	11	III	IV
A	30	55	55	55
B	48	27	23	25
C	17	16	21	19
D	5	2	1	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
Relationship of I-IV	11/1	111/11	IV/III	
A	5.58	1.68	2.58	
B	1.79	1.40	2.06	
C	2.86	2.29	2.36	
D	0.95	1.31	1.33	
Global Relationship	3.10	1.70	2.59	

SOURCE: Direction de la Statistique, Yaoundé.

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With the above Table 8(10), valuable information is provided to demonstrate that the Cameroonian mixed economy was dominated through and through by foreign economic interests operating in the most sensitive areas of the national economy and that, therefore, it was a mixed economy strongly and decidedly biased towards favouring and supporting a powerful foreign sector. It was accordingly, to be identified as a basically capitalist economy. One could notice the comparatively huge financial responsibilities and commitments devolved upon the Cameroonian capitalist government which could not even predict and monitor the behaviour and engagements of foreign economic agents. The incomparably high financial obligations on the part of the capitalist administration, therefore, were not an indication that the state had power and control over the national economy. Nonetheless, the content of Tables 8(9) and 8(10) clearly reveal that, basically, the Cameroon government, far from entering into any declared competition with the private sector, was rather prepared to collude with the same sector by stressing possible opportunities that could arise from a collaboration between public and private sectors.

It was, to a significant extent, this collusive attitude that gave rise to problems affecting the country's development. In fact, the adoption of a capitalist order as a frame of development policy actions unavoidably went together with a series of reflected or unreflected assumptions or even agreements that private, basically foreign domination of the national economy, was fundamentally acceptable and viable, that dominant foreign economic interests were compatiable with the interests of the majority of the Cameroonian population: that the use of the disposable economic surpluses for individualistic private purposes was adequate in the face of a situation characterized by the abject poverty of the majority of the Cameroonian population; that the allocation of scarce public funds to areas supporting the expansion of foreign economic activities was comensurate with the solution of problems facing common men and women in Cameroon;

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that occasionally and randomly carving out some aspects of the foreign sector of the economy for the purpose of bringing them under public control was a sufficient corrective policy measure that could reduce economic dependency and other attendant problems; that there was no other positive way of achieving economic development than to foster and to institutionalize a strong partnership between public and private economic interests, etc.

The question as to whether and how far such all purpose assumptions can stand a critical test drawing on fundamental environmental and historical conditions of Cameroon, however important they were, must be left undiscussed. But one has to single out a few contradictions discoverable between what the development plans in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration stood for and set out to achieve, and what was obtained in the economic reality of the country. If the universal drive of foreign economic agents to miximise profits is anything to go by, and if one agrees that humanitarian sentiments and considerations are largely alien to such a drive, one hardly sees how private business groups acting in their own individualistic interests would have incontrievably committed themselves to the priorities and objectives of Development plans[88] that were known to be:

1) an increase in per capita income
2) more even distribution of income,
3) a reduction in the level of unemployment,
4) an increase in the supply of high level manpower,
5) diversification of the economy,
6) balanced development,
7) indigenization of economic activity,
8) social justice

The least one could predict about the performance level of the plans is that left to the foreign sector of the economy alone some of the objectives enumerated could only be achieved partially as by-products of a capitalist mode of development. The extent to which the foreign sector could generate employment and distributive income depended, however, on the techniques of production adopted. Capital intensive techniques definitely contributed to relatively reduce the overall level of employment and the size of the income ready for

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distribution. One must also agree that the quest for a more even distribution of income could not be any serious concern of foreign capitalists. This necessarily called for government involvement in investment activities to fill the gap created and left by the private sector in its inability to function in accordance with the provisions of the plan thereby occasioning growing public expenditures. But increasing public expenditures had to do more with symptoms than with real causes of underdevelopment so long as the drastic review and overhauling of the socio-economic order was not undertaken.

From this survey of foreign investments in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration one thing comes out clearly:- that the percentage of the imported inputs in all the groups of industries considered was above 65 percent and this points to the counter-reproductive nature of foreign investments in Cameroon. Moreover, the foreign companies involved in these industrial investments were precisely the enterprises that were in a position to mobilize the capital, knowhow and contacts to spearhead the policy of import substitution. However, their contribution was greatly limited by their conservatism arising from their privileged position. These companies most often had financial investments in the home countries from which they imported and did not wish to encourage the development of manufacturing in Cameroon to harm their interests. In addition to this, the import trade made their export trade more profitable by reducing overheads. So these companies were not very enthusiastic about import substitution, and when they tried it, they went about very timidly and selectively, always mindful of the merchant interests. An this should show us the types of constraints that external economic dependency in Cameroon placed on the achievement of the goals which import substitution was supposed to achieve.

However, one could have been astonished only if the new industries created by foreign investment to supply domestic demand ever became competitive with the foreign producers.

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In this case high rates of protection (which were innumerable) could have been justified with reference to arguments for protection of infant industry. Indeed, under the Ahidjo administration there were other than economic arguments for import substitution, especially the need to stimulate foreign domestic entrepreneurs by providing them with a captive market. That is why import substitution as applied in Cameroon under Ahidjo can not be understood wholly in economic terms, for political and psychological factors were equally important.

Having accepted to collaborate with foreign capital, and having come under pressure from the revolutionary UPC movement, what the Ahidjo administration needed was a growth strategy that was not too destabilizing domestically; that seemed to make economic sense; and that responded to and sufficiently counteracted nationalist pressures. Import substitution was therefore embraced because it satisfied all these constraints. It was not really revolutionary strategy because it provided an acceptable interpretation of how to achieve high growth through neo-colonial dependency and it was created or popularized primarily by a number of Third World elites. All these factors made import substitution industrialization extremely useful politically and psychologically to the elites in Ahidjo administration.

The "simplistic" economic development theories of the 1960s seemed to be vastly oversimplified responses to complex problems. In Cameroon, these "simplistic" theories were usually attributed to two factors; the need for a clear and attractive alternative to the socialist model of development and the tendency to use the relatively uncomplicated history of Western economic growth as a relevant analogy for Cameroon's development. Infact most of the available theories stressed easy "stages of growth" in which, once a missing link had been provided (usually capital or technology or enterpreneurship), economic development would follow more or less automatically and other problems, like population

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growth, income inequities or political development, would presumably disappear as income rose. This implied that Cameroon could safely concentrate on solving her internal problems without worrying too much about the control and regulation of foreign investment nor about the "shocks" from abroad that such a system could create. In the ultimate analysis the Ahidjo administration followed these policies and found Cameroon impoverished as a result of protection of exccessive profits for foreign investors and income drain and the structural dependency of production that benefitted only the rich. In practice, however, rapid industrialization become the order of the day, not only because it seemed to be a symbol of modernity (to the elites) but also because the agricultural sector was a symbol of the colonial era. In addition to the conventional theory industrialization seemed to provide better returns on investments and more prospects of increased employment opportunities.

8.6 : FOREIGN AID

In addition to export earnings and private foreign investments, a major source of Cameroon's foreign exchange was public bilateral and multilateral development assistance, known as foreign aid. In what follows we have taken foreign aid to include any flow of capital which met these two criteria (1) its objective had to be non commercial from the view point of the donor and (2) it had to be characterized by "concessional" terms, that is, the interest rate and repayment period had to be "softer" (less stringent) than commercial terms.[89] Thus, foreign aid is here conceived to be "all official grants and concessional loans, in currency or in kind, which are broadly aimed at transferring resources from developed to the developing states".[90]

Between 1969/1960 and 1975/1976, the French bilateral aid to Cameroon was estimated at 975.68 billion CFA francs.[91] French financial aid (reimbursable subsidies and credits) within this period amounted to about 93,254 billion CFA, of which 53.4 percent came from French Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation (F.A.C.), while 46.6 percent was from the Caisse

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Centrale de la Cooperation Economique (C.C.C.E.)[91]. The very fact that the sectorial distribution of this aid involved all the key sectors of the economy like infrastructure, rural development, education, industrial and mineral development, general research, and others, meant that the control of the economy was total.[92] Infact, the values of the total sectorial distribution of French aid between 1959 and 1974 were as follows (a) infrastructure. II.335.000.000 CFA francs with the peak of 1.280.000.000 CFA francs supplied in 1971 (b) Rural Development, 6.050.000.000 CFA francs with the peak of 830.000.000 CFA francs in 1967; (c) Education and Training, 5.127.000.000 CFA francs with the peak of 793.5000.000 CFA francs in 1973; (d) industrial development and mining, 1.555.000.000 CFA francs with the peak of 332.000.000 CFA francs in 1965; (e) Health and Social Equipment, 1.101.000.000 CFA francs with the peak of 186.000.000 CFA francs in 1961, (f) Information and Culture, 1.040.000.000 CFA francs with the peak of 540.000.000 CFA francs CFA in 1974; (g) general research, 549.000.000 francs CFA with the peak of 147.000.000 CFA francs in 1964 and General Expenses and Auditing 49.000.000 CFA francs with a peak of 22.500.000 CFA francs in 1965.[93] This sectorial distribution of French Aid depicts the extent to which French multinationals spread their tentacles to the economy and as such exercised control over the processes of production, distribution and even consumption in Cameroon. Under such conditions of absolute control how does one expect a nonaligned foreign policy to be effective?

Commenting on the French public aid to Cameroon in 1974 and 1975 which amounted to 433.448 million CFA francs, Tatah Mentan made this insightful diagnosis:

> One can gain a correct inside into the nature and aims of French plans for aid to Cameroon in the light of the main line of its imperialist policies. The keynote of French aid plans has been to exercise a powerful influence on the economic, policy and social and cultural structure of recipient countries like Cameroon through loans, credit and subsidies. The loans, credits and subsidies serve as coercive weapons assuring the

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> transfer of political power to private property and the direct subservience of production in Cameroon to the demands of the appropriating imperialist classes. The economic and political subjugation occurs in a series of intermediate steps and stages which coerce the parasitic Cameroonian ruling class to compromise with neo-colonialism rather than seek to totally transform the conditions of domination and subjection. The aid generally serves purposes such as the return flow of the aid through the purchase of equipment, payment of French technical assistance staff who reinforce the French mindset in Cameroon and the rooting of capitalist relations of production and exchange in the rural areas.[94]

Various United States (USA) agencies gave aid to Cameroon through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or through the Import/Export Bank of the United States (EXIBANK). The credit line of 1.200.000.000 CFA francs for the construction of a microwave link and its expansion between Yaounde and Kousseri was furnished by EXIBANK. Apart from the 50.000.000 CFA francs subsidy for the construction of the Rural Centre for Printing School Books in Cameroon (CRPMS), the total estimate of United States Aid to Cameroon stood at about 9.500.000.000 CFA francs between 1960 and 1970. The secondary and cumulative effects of such capital flows are very obvious because they not only result in disguised income drain, during the period of debt servicing and repayment, through the transfer or the unequal distribution of the benefits resulting from the "specification" of purposes (that is, the use of which the load would be put) but also rendered it "impossible" for the country to extricate itself from the general position of vulnerability arising from its colonial heritage of dependency on the western capitalist nations, and as such made the achievement of a nonaligned independent posture in foreign affairs far-fetched.

This assertion is exemplified by the growth of American aid from 10.8 percent of the total in 1962/1963 to 16.2 percent of the total in 1968/1969, to 27.9 percent of the total in 1976/77 and to 42.69 percent of the total in 1981/1982.[95] Even the sectorial distribution of the USA

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aid was not as strategic as that of France; the huge sums involved coupled with the content of the aid package which in all cases included the export of American technical assistance staff to oversee the utilization of the loan made the loan not only accompanied by strings but also rendered it unprofitable since a huge part of the grant was spent by Cameroon on the facilities and salaries of this expatriate staff. Moreover, United States foreign aid was more crucial in applying pressure on Cameroon because of the relative ease with which it could be offered or withdrawn. In many ways American foreign aid programmes were more than those of trade, the instruments of a general political strategy, even from the point of view of the elites in Cameroon. This is because as far as American aid is concerned, the general calculus has always been clear: that whether the main concern is with security, economic growth or prestige, the giving and the taking of aid had always been intended to serve a foreign policy goal.

Therefore, as a conscious political instrument, American aid has always, by and large, been used to influence the international behaviour of the recipients since most American aid programmes have obviously not been undertaken solely for humanitarian purposes, for example, a vast portion of their aid has always gone to just a few countries and sometimes, not those with the most pressing economic needs.[96]

West Germany (FRG) was the second important European aid donor to Cameroon after France. Between 1964 and 1982, German aid to Cameroon amounted to about 233.77 billion CFA francs, and again between 1964 and 1975 over 150 expatriates of the German technical assistance worked in Cameroon.[97] The sectorial distribution of German aid depict the highest concentrations in education and infrastructure. For example, German aid was given to the International Relations Institute of Cameroon, for the construction of the Forest Rangers School in Maroua, the Waza-Maltam highway, the warehouses for the Yaounde railway station and the extension work on

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the Douala port. However, the German Development Assistance and Cooperation (D.A.C.) aid to Cameroon amounted to 17.7 million US dollars in 1972/1973, to 24 million dollars in 1974/1975 and to 37.9 million dollars in 1976/1977.[98]

Canada was one of the most prominent aid donors to Ahidjo's Cameroon. Concentrated in the financing of socio-economic projects and the purchase of Canadian equipment, the total package of Canadian aid to Cameroon was estimated at 26.800.000.000 CFA francs in 1980 and was distributed in 14 projects. The estimates for Canadian public aid stood at 17.500.000.000 CFA francs while Canadian Development Assistance and Cooperation aid stood at 9 300.000.000 CFA francs.[99] The sectorial distribution of Canadian aid in Cameroon, shows a high concentration in education and Health.. The most outstanding accomplishments of this aid being the Bilingual Grammar School of Bonaberi in Douala, the Water Supply System at Kumba; an airborne geo-physical research programme in North Cameroon, the Public Health Research Unit of the Medical School of the University of Yaounde (CUSS).[100] Since some of these Canadian loans to Cameroon were granted in the form of an interest-free credit with deferred amortization of more than ten years and reimbursable in over forty years, the political underpinnings of their awards became evident. Such interest free loans were often calculated to increase the positive power of the donor country in the recipient country through the control of the recipient country's negative power and thereby rendering the national independence of the recipient state questionable.

The United Kingdom was also an important aid donor to Cameroon with the total value amounting to 2.100.000.000 CFA francs in 1971, to 1.170.000.000 cfa francs in 1972, to 1.080.000.000 CFA francs in 1974, to a sharp fall of 540.000.000 CFA francs in 1975 and to a slight rise of 720.000.000 CFA francs in 1976.[101] Despite the fluctuations in value, the United Kingdom aid to Cameroon was substantial and only revealed Cameroon's attachment to the neo-colonial capitalist countries. Another very important aid donor to Cameroon

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was the Netherlands whose contributions between 1972 and 1976 stood at 5.220.000.000 CFA francs.[102] Whatever the mechanism utilized, the system of control these aid donors were able to exert in this sphere on the Cameroon was smooth and automatic because from their central aid agencies to the local peripheral agencies they maintained the final authority and veto-power in the hands of their own personnel. The continued reliance of the Cameroon on high-level expatriate advisers was only an informal complement of the extensive formal structure of centralized bureaucratic control of Cameroon through their aid policies.

In the sphere of trade and investment similar considerations apply. We have already indicated that the considerable "burden" these countries allegedly shouldered in aiding Cameroon was not apparent in any examination of the actual statistics. Not only was there a market decline during the 1970s in the amount of aid these countries alloted to Cameroon but this decrease was further disguised by the inclusion in published figures of aid to overseas departments, as well as the transference to the cooperation budget of charges usually covered by other ministries, such as defence.[103] Many resource transfers took disguised forms such as the granting of preferential tariffs by these countries to Cameroonian exports of manufactured goods as well all transfers of capital flows of private foreign investors. These private flows represented normal commercial transactions prompted by commercial considerations of profits and rates of return and therefore should have been viewed as aid. Commercial flows of private capital are not a form of foreign assistance eventhough they may benefit the developing state in which they take place. Thus the volume of "official development assistance" which included bilateral grants, loans and technical assistance as well as multilateral flows in Cameroon grew from about an annual rate of 6 million dollars in 1962 to approximately 10.5 million in the mid-1970s. However, interms of the percentage of developed country GNPS allocated to official development assistance there was a steady decline from 0.52 percent in the early 1960s to slightly less than

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0.30 per cent in the mid 1970s. France remained the major supplier of public aid to Cameroon but its proportion of total development assistance declined from 59 percent in 1960 to approximately 35 percent in the mid - 1970s in Cameroon.[104]

TABLE 8(11) : FRENCH FINANCIAL AID TO CAMEROON, 1959-1975
(MILLION FRENCH FRANCS, 1976 VALUES)

	F.A.C.	C.C.C.E.	TOTAL
1959-60	1.894	627	2.521
1961	2.060	425	2.485
1962	1.757	558	2.315
1963	1.889	1.008	2.897
1964	1.540	964	2.504
1965	2.562	-	2.562
1966	2.156	1.737	3.893
1967	2.298	1.125	3.423
1968	1.478	2.576	4.054
1969	949	563	1.512
1970	1.487	1.885	3.372
1971	1.721	1.781	3.502
1972	1.359	2.108	3.467
1973	1.842	1.723	3.565
1974	1.803	3.616	5:419
1975	1.650.8	4.085.9	5.736.7
TOTAL	28.445.8	25.781.9	55.227.7

SOURCE: A Kekuine; Le Cameroun et la Cooperation Internationale (Thèse d'Etat, Paris I, 1977), P. 188.

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A few statistics gleaned from the Gorse Report are instructive. Between 1963 and 1969, the proportion of French aid dropped from one percent of the GNP in 1963 to just under 0.7 percent in 1969. As a percentage of the French annual budget, this sum during the same period dropped from 5 to 3 percent. Conversely, the part of this Aid budget allocated to Cameroon drastically rose from 13 percent of the total in 1962 to 34 percent in 1969. The final set of relevant statistics was the drop in public aid, as opposed to private investments and export credits, from 66 percent of the total capital commitment to Cameroon in 1963 to 54 percent in 1970.[105]

Roughly half of the total aid transferred went to pay the salaries of French technical assistants. The latter, of course, largely repatriated their inflated earnings back to France. Detailed studies undertaken about specific cases demonstrated the congruence between French aid and the local patterns of economic activities of French firms in Africa.[106] Such French metropolitan agencies as the FAC (Funds d'Aide et Cooperation) and the CCCE (Caisse Centrale de la Coopération Economique) proved in practice to be remarkable circuits for transferring state capital from France to the African state then to French firms implanted there. Until 1970, for example, eight large colonial and transnational companies had procured 50 percent of the CCCE's "developmental" credit.[107] Not only did this transfer of metropolitan capital into private enterprise profit via the periphery take place, but French control of local banking concerns, and the lower rate of interest charged in the periphery to those in Europe, led to the appropriation of local capital formation by French concerns for their own purposes.[108]

The striking injustice of France's trading arrangements with its African partners was one of the features of this overall system known perphaps to the Anglophone world mostly because of the debates on the issue stimulated by the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common Market, and the insistence by British negotiators such as Judith Hart on the elimination of practices highly disadvantageous to the developing countries established under the first Yaounde Agreements of 1963/64.[109] Generally, not only were these African countries denied any real control over their political economies because of France's domination of their monetary policies, but the reciprocal duty-free arrangements between France and the periphery ensured the flooding of the local market with high-priced French goods protected in multiple ways from external competition.

France was eventually forced after 1963 to extend these preferential arrangements to its EEC partners in keeping with the terms of the Treaty of Rome. Yet the

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entrenched network of French trading firms, banks, aid agencies, and local advisers did not only serve to limit the incursion of France's partners into its African domain but it also enabled France to promote the diversification of export from the neo-colonial periphery to the EEC (i.e, sharing the burden of quantity, quotas, and support prices) while retaining for France the major share (50 percent) of these countries' imports of manufactured goods.[110] Even when France's former colonies gained access to aid from the Common Market Fund, the Francs, liras and marks had first to be handed over to the CCCE before the African beneficiaries could draw on their accounts (in French francs) to purchase the products and services to which the aid was usually tied.[111]

The maintenance of this clientetist and kleptocratic financial and aid dependency in Cameroon was provided by the Banking Act of 1973[112] which aided the domination of foreign, particularly French Commercial Banks in the country. In 1976/77, the Cameroonian banking network had 169 branches broken drawn as follows:- 135 permanent offices, 39 periodic offices and 5 exchange offices. Foreign Capital was in all, except 10 branches established by the Cameroon Bank - the poorest and only indigenous bank in the country. Yet, an annual report of the National Council of Credit dared to say, "undoubtedly this is proof of the dynamism of our financial institutions in the private sector".[113] Indeed, Mentan's comment in this regard is worth citing

> ... the grope for foreign capital is based on the imperialist inspired myth that capital shortage is the source of underdevelopment, and that without foreign monopoly capital, underdeveloped countries cannot industrialize. And they can thus not liquidate underdevelopment. Armed with this erroneous belief the Cameroonian ruling class has been facilitating the influx of foreign capital while ironically legalizing its outflow by non-nationalization, free profit repatriation, non-disriminatory regulations, etc. The national economic plans serve as advertisements for foreign capital investments while Cameroon's membership of the French franc zone guarantees the existence of money robbed by imperialist firms from the country![114]

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Being companies with large capital supply, these banks were able to influence the entire turnover both in cash and credit and to control almost the whole financial life of the nation - by granting loans to the State or the State banks of issue (BEAC), or through the purchases of government bonds, by opening current accounts and interest policy. They usually also acquired an interest in the financial institutions such as the S.N.I. (Société Nationale d'Investissement) and B.C.D. (Banque Camerounaise du Développement), established by the national capital and got under their control the whole banking and insurance apparatus.[115]

However, a milder, and to a certain extent, a more lasting form of financial dependency was the one which tied Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration to France in matters of foreign exchange. This foreign exchange dependency was the consequence of trade dependency and as such was connected with the distorted structure of foreign trade, and, by extension the whole economy. A country such as Cameroon which sold most of its export products or bought most of its imports in the traditional French metropolitan market, was necessarily also in a dependent relationship in matters of foreign exchange with the latter (just as vice-versa, foreign exchange dependency strengthened the maintenance of trade dependency).

Tamas Szentes has pointed out that in a sense we can not only speak of foreign exchange dependency in relation to the developing countries. He contends that if there are close trade relations between two advanced countries, then the changes in the foreign exchange position of the one of the country make themselves also felt in the economy of the other, and vice-versa. (This is, of course, mutual dependency). If, however, one of the two is a country with "hard" and the other with "soft" currency, the latter may find itself in a grave situation if its export sales to the "hard" currency country, for financial or other reasons, come up against difficulties. Unless it succeeds in earning "hard" currency from the other through new trade relations, or finding an other way-out, it will be compelled to restrict those of its

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purchases on the world market for which hard currency is absolutely necessary.[116] This was the state of foreign exchange dependency that characterised Franco-Cameroon trade relations.

However, in the case of Cameroon, foreign exchange dependency was always a one-sided dependency. That is, it was only Cameroon that depended for her purchases on the hard currency of the advanced capitalist nations especially France. It was only her financial and overall economic situation that reacted most sensitively to the changes in the flow of foreign exchange owing to currency restrictions, tarrif modifications, ... etc, in the advanced capitalist countries and above all in metropolitan France itself. For example in 1969, the French franc was devalued by 12.5 per cent, and not only was the Cameroon franc which was guaranteed by the French franc automatically devalued but, the overall balance of payments surpluses of the years 1960-1964 and 1966-1968 turned into deficits, due to this devaluation.

Eventhough the debate on foreign aid in Cameroon was sometimes carried with such passion and ferocity that obscured facts, the debate centred on how much aid could be extracted from the Western capitalist world, not on whether it was necessary or useful. As propounded and practised by the Ahidjo administration, self-sustaining growth - largely mythical beast, especially for a small and weak country as Cameroon that could not isolate itself from external forces - was their goal and capital accumulation via high rates of foreign investment and savings was the means. Foreign aid therefore was to fill whatever gaps existed, either the domestic savings gap or the foreign exchange gap. That is, as a crucial supplement to domestic resources, foreign aid would have been the catalyst that spurred growth forward. Indeed one can assert that under the Ahidjo administration, official ideology justified the quest for foreign capital but the available practice was extremely ambiguous.

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TABLE 8(12): ESTIMATES OF FRENCH PUBLIC AID TO CAMEROON IN 1974 AND 1975 (MILLION FRENCH FRANCS)

	1974	1975
1. Financial Aid		
F.C.A.:		
Subsidies	1,263.2	1,650.8
Loans	540	-
C.C.C.E. (Loans)	5,615	4,085.9
Total	5,418.2	5,736.7
2. Technical Assistance:		
Direct	3,159	4,385
Indirect	1,167.4	988.9
Volunteers for progress	100	97.5
Total	4,426.4	5,471.4
3. Aid to the University	198.9	258.3
4. Scholarships and Training	179.2	221.5
5. Investment subsidies to Private projects	30	39.5
6. Cultural Activities	13.5	13.5
Total	10,266.2	11,740.9
7. Guarantee from COFACE	2,850)	

SOURCE: Mission d'Aide et de Cooperation.

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Foreign aid under the Ahidjo administration obviously served so many purposes for both the capitalist donors and recipient Cameroon. This was obviously part of its charm since failure of any particular purpose could always be obscured by reference to the fact that the end in sight was "really" something altogether different. The dominant purpose for both the donors and recipient in the Ahidjo administration was, ostensibly, economic development. But even when economic development was the legitimate goal for the parties, it was never the only goal or necessarily the most important goal. Since relative priorities were very often not asymetrical in Cameroon, the grounds for misunderstanding were substantial.

TABLE 8(13): DISTRIBUTION OF F.A.C. AID BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1959 - 1974 (MILLION FRENCH FRANCS)

	Total	Best Year
1. Infrastructure	1,335	1971: 1,280
2. Rural Development	6,050	1967: 830
3. Education, training	5,127	1973: 793.5
4. Industrial and Mining Development	1,544	1965: 332
5. Health and Social Equipment	1,101	1961: 186.5
6. Information, Culture	1,040	1974: 540
7. General Research	549	1964: 147
8. General Expenses and Auditing	49	1965: 22.5

SOURCE: Kekuine Le Cameroun et la Cooperation Internationle, p. 218

We can see the effects of this assymmetry in priorities when we contrast the criticisms that have been made of the Ahidjo administration with the perspectives of the elites to whom the aid was granted. For the elites in Yaounde, aid was almost a free good, for even where the aid had to be applied to particular programmes, it released other resources to be used in whatever way the elite chosed. In this sense, aid simply increased the resources of the government, allowing it to consume more - with an unspecified effect on the growth

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rate, which had to be determined by how the funds were spent and by what other changes took place in attitudes and institutions.

TABLE 8(14): D.A.C. AID TO CAMEROON, 1972-1976
(MILLION U.S. DOLLARS)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	TOTAL
Canada	4.4	4.1	4.8	7.3	10.2	30.8
France	33.7	31.7	48.6	37.6	87.5	238.9
U.K.	0.7	3.9	3.6	1.8	2.4	12.4
U.S.A.	13.0	3.0	1.0	5.0	4.0	26.0
West Germany	4.1	13.6	18.6	5.4	23.0	14.9
Netherlands	2.0	2.1	1.8	3.5	8.0	17.4
OPEC	-	-	2.7	17.4	8.0	28.1

SOURCE: OECD; Georgraphical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1978, p. 42

Aid's most salient purpose in Cameroon from this perspective, is that it was a useful resource for an elite intent on staying in power. The case is self-evident in the military assistance that France poured in for the Ahidjo administration. (The elites simply used it to increase their own control over the military). But even the development aid primarily benefitted the industrialists and skilled workers (middle classes), on the presumption that inequities were necessary to raise the level of domestic savings and investments sufficiently. In any case, the elites of the Ahidjo administration directed the aid to their supporters and then controlled its profitability by judicious use of tarrifs and import controls. Development aid in Cameroon did not increase the growth rate because it was used to supplant instead of supplementing domestic savings. Therefore, aid was associated with a proportionate decline in domestic savings, and in most cases the fall in savings was greater than the rise in aid so that the rate of investment actually declined.

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It is virtually a truism that aid was not indispensable to Cameroon's economic development. But it would have been helpful if the other conditions for progress were present. Therefore, aid was really necessary if the ruling elites had the will to develop but since the will was absent, aid became pernicious and irrelevant. From this perspective the Ahidjo administration wasted aid on consumption and corruption or on badly designed development plans instead of using it to facilitate a fuller use of domestic resources. This is, of course, an unassailable truth for there is obviously no way in which the impact of aid on Cameroon could be separated from the corrupt practices and behaviour of the Ahidjo administration. Nevertheless, it is a useful truism that impact of aid on economic development in Cameroon was negligible, especially when compared to the impact of the policies pursued by the government. This consensus is especially important when one recalls that by 1970 foreign aid financed nearly 58.6 per cent of Gross Investment in Cameroon and constituted almost 40 per cent of her G.N.P.[117]

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From 8(12), 8(13) and 8(14) above, two essential arguments have provided much of the basis for negative views of the aid process in Cameroon. The first(to which we have already alluded in passing) is that the aid (and capital inflows in general) reduced domestic savings and even lowered the aggregate growth rates. This happened because with the Ahidjo administration, every aid receipt relaxed its tax efforts on the international oligopolies in Cameroon and went on to increase its consumption expenditures or simply aided private foreign investment to usurp domestic investment opportunities (which, of course, would cut savings, to the extent that savings is determined by investment opportunities). In the ultimate analysis with the Ahidjo administration every capital inflow had a detrimental effect on the rate of growth of the GNP because these inflows were consumed and because these capital inflows were associated with lower tax revenue or increased government consumption.[118]

The second argument against aid in the Ahidjo administration is more political. Foreign aid programmes in

Cameroon only helped to postpone the need for structural reforms and sustained the existing structure of inequality and exploitation (social injustice), by providing the ruling elites with arms, money, and political support from abroad. Since the elites were reactionary, corrupt and interested only in their own immediate survival, they were surely not interested in any development programme that threatened either instability or gains to potential enemies; thus foreign aid in Cameroon merely perpetuated the reactionary and corrupt status quo.

The above discussion has demonstrated that the need for the liquidation of economic underdevelopment and the possible raising of the social, cultural, health and educational standards in Cameroon really necessitated a material contribution from the advanced countries but this very need itself provided the basis for the leading capitalist countries to link Cameroon with new ties of financial dependency. Suppose that these loans and grants offered by the Western countries for development purposes, subject to appropriate conditions, had a positive effect in themselves in Cameroon, the very fact alone that the leading capitalist countries (especially France) were making an increasing use of these economic loans and grants in order to keep Cameroon in a dependent relationship, indicated the considerable degree of neocolonial penetration that Cameroon underwent under the Ahidjo administration after the collapse of the colonial system. In the broader Third World context, it is this phenomenon that put in a bold relief the lack of equilibrium in the capitalist world economy so much so that it is now less and less possible to maintain the internal mechanism of the capitalist world economy without these loans and grants.

What was then the detrimental effect of these loans and grants on the Cameroon economy and why were the leading capitalist powers interested in extending them? It is but self-evident that any country that bases the financing of its economic development programme, as the Ahidjo

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administration in Cameroon did, on foreign sources, and is able to maintain the temporary equilibrium of the state budget only with foreign aid and make good the recurrent deficit of its trade balance only by foreign credits, will be left to the mercy of the countries offering this aid. This is the more true because a single capitalist country monopolized the role of creditor as France did in Cameroon.

By stopping these credits and freezing the amounts laid aside, the creditor country could cause unexpected difficulties in the debtor country and could hinder the implementation of the development programmes. It could use all these methods, according to its purposes, for economic, political or military blackmail. When supporting the budget of the developing debtor country and undertaking the financing of its economic development plan or covering the deficit of its foreign trade, the creditor country usually claimed the right to interfere in the fiscal policy, the elaboration of the development plan and the foreign policy of that country. Thus, what was involved in the case of Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration was not only the fact that the implementation of the budget estimates and the fulfilment of the targets of the development plans depended to a great extent on the financial support of the creditor country (France), but also the fact that the fiscal policy and the development plans themselves had to be adjusted to the interests of the latter (France).

Moreover, France and the other leading capitalist aid donors were in the habit of granting aid almost exclusively for military and political considerations. Military aid in the case of Cameroon, was definitely detrimental to the economy since Cameroon was compelled to buy arms in return for a considerable part (often 90 per cent) of the aid, and also had to incur additional military expenses. For example, in 1961-65 Cameroon spent eight billion francs CFA on military investments in addition to eighteen billion francs CFA received as aid.[119]

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It was mainly political considerations that induced France to change a bit of its aid policy towards Cameroon after independence. In order to avoid revolutionary changes and to maintain the power status quo in the country, it set as its aim the carrying out of certain modest social reforms for the improvement of the economic position of Cameroon in its new aid programme from 1961.[120] Although very few of these aims were attained, the foreign policy of France towards Cameroon demonstrated that France considered the interests of French private capital and anti-UPC attitude to be more important in the implementation of certain modest reforms. Thus, the initially much advertised reforms were but forgotten and the leading circles of France were since the crushing of the last pockets of the UPC rebels in 1970 supporting the stability of the the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon, rather than the social and economic reforms whose outcome seemed to be uncertain until the Ahidjo administration crumbled in 1982. In this context, the example of Cameroon might permit us to generalize that the leading capitalist countries are guided in their aid policy by the principle of supporting regimes whose economic, financial and cultural policies are "sound" and in which "appropriate political conditions" prevail, in other words where the interests of private capital and the rule of their economic and political interests seem to be ensured.

Apart from other conditions of a political nature, grants were usually tied to the condition that the countries offering them had to supervise the way the grants were utilized. In most cases the grants were given for certain objectives only, for the financing of definite projects conducive to their interests, while loans were granted mostly for the supply of commodities (credit financing of their exports). In this way they wanted to prevent an economic policy contrary to their interests in Cameroon from being pursued. They wanted to make sure by means of their financial help that non-desirable industries did not develop, but in the case of France, they wanted to retain the Cameroon market for themselves. They specially preferred the

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development of the infrastructure (transport, communications and public services) since this improved the conditions for the activity of private capital. In Cameroon, prior to offering the grants, the leading capitalist donors very often sent missions to the country, sometimes through the international organizations under their control, to work out recommendations for the size and conditions of the loans and grants; to take part in the detailed working out of the development programme; and, of course, to represent in every case the interests of those granting the aid. The economic "specialists" of the mission often remained in the country for a considerable time to supervise the implementation of the aid programme, while at the same time, of course, they exerted an influence on the government's economic policy.

Another dimension of the problem in Cameroon was that through their loans and grants the leading capitalist countries also wanted to strengthen the private sector in general. They usually gave help for the development of the public sector of the country only in the field of infrastructure, public health, education, etc, while they sought to prevent, or at least were reluctant to support productive branches proper. The worst of it all was that in return for the loans and grants received, Cameroon was often compelled to offer guarantees for the free operation of foreign capital, and for free capital and profit repatriation; the Ahidjo administration had to safeguard against nationalization and had to ensure for various benefits and concessions (taxes, customs, etc). Therefore, loans and grants in Cameroon, were in general connected with the position and interests of foreign aid capital.

Granting aid and credits in Cameroon, as we have already mentioned, was usually tied to the expansion of commodity exports and to closer trade relations in general. By the 1960s in Cameroon, the expansion of exports, owing to Cameroon's financial and currency positions was less and less possible without the credit-financing of these deliveries,

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and therefore the advanced capitalist countries (especially France) were forced in the 1960s to raise substantially the proportion of their exports financed out of credit (from the 50-60 per cent average of the 1960s to 80-90 percent in the 1970s).[121] The growth in the proportion of credit-financing was to a certain extent also connected with the shift in the import structure of Cameroon.

This form of financial dependency had a self-reinforcing, cumulating tendency, which was connected partly with the outlined crediting and aid policy and practice of the leading capitalist donors and partly with the concrete credit conditions themselves. Since the loans and grants hampered the transofrmation of the distorted economic structure of the country and since they preserved the unfavourable position or trend of foreign trade and the terms of this trade, that is, since they kept a permanent import surplus; since they were associated with the free operation of foreign capital and the free repatriation of profits and incomes, that is, since they exerted an adverse negative effect on the balance of payments; since they prevented the emergence and strengthening of a state sector in the profitable industries; since they deprived the state budget of important sources of revenue - then they did not decrease but increase the almost complete reliance of the country on foreign financial support.

As regards the concrete credit conditions, the practice of the leading capitalist aid donors was highly unfavourable for Cameroon. Long-term credits were usually extended at the customary commercial terms repayments in hard currency in 10-12 years average at an interest rate of 4 - 6 percent.[122] In the case of Cameroon, this period was generally too short. Prospective planning thought ahead in terms of 15-20 years, which was a necessary time-lag because of the long realization time of developmental investments, the time requirements of industrialization and the transoformation of agriculture. Since most of the loans had to be

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repaid within a shorter period than 10-15 years the amortization imposed a great burden on the country long before the results of economic development projects launched by means of the loans revealed themselves. In such cases it was usually by raising further loans that the Ahidjo administration tried to meet its repayment obligations. Cameroon was also compelled to do so by the high rate of interest charged by the advanced capitalist donors and the stipulation that capital and interest had to be paid in the same hard currency in which the loan was granted.[123]

However, the economic competition of the leading capitalist donors, mainly in the field of the credit-financing of Cameroonian exports, with one another (especially between the United States and France after 1975), and with the socialist countries for gaining the sympathy of Cameroon as well as the pressure on the Ahidjo administration due to the general growing dissatisfaction with the credit and loan terms, forced the ahidjo administration to renegotiate these terms with the donors.[124]

The easing of the loan terms manifested itself in the lengthening of the repayment period and the reduction of the rate of interest and other repayment concessions. Although examples could be found for such an easing of loan terms in Cameroon (the process was facilitated by an international coincidence - the great efforts made by the U.N. organs (particularly UNCTAD) in this respect for all Third World Countries), no considerable change really took place as the financial position of Cameroon deteriorated between 1974 and 1978 before the oil boom. Even with the oil boom, there was still a simultaneous increase in this dangerous aid dependency - to such an extent that before Ahidjo's departure in November, 1982 the country was threatened with the cumulative process of indebtedness owing to the accumulation of interest charges on loans and the worsening of the country's foreign trade position.

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TABLE 8(15)

CAMEROON ESTIMATES OF PUBLIC DEBT
JUNE 30, 1978

(In billions of French Francs)

	Original Amount		Outstanding on June 30, 1977			Repayments in Fiscal Year 1977/78		
	Capital	Interest	Capital	Interest	Total	Capital	Interest	Total
DOMESTIC DEBT								
Investment bonds	1,604	...	1,604	...	1,604	...	...	...
Debenture Loan	60	7	48	3	51	12.0	1.9	13.9
Total	1,664	7	1,652	3	1,655	12.0	1.9	13.9
FOREIGN DEBT								
Contracted by Gov't								
Loans from Gov't								
France	1,250	264	639	68	707	82.9	18.1	101.0
U.K.	240	260	190	210	400	10.0	11.0	21.0
Private Loans for studies and works from France	25	40	13	6	19	0.6	0.7	1.3
Loans from CCCE								
Consolidated loans	9,040	2,140	8,713	1,695	10,408	66.6	87.6	154.2
Federal Budget support	1,127	178	472	45	517	102.1	19.6	121.7
Local Authorities	113	32	46	4	50	6.9	1.5	8.4
Guaranteed by Gov't but contracted by Local authorities (from France)	627	153	142	...	(142)	48.0	...	(48.0)

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TABLE 8(15) CONTINUED :

Cameroon Dev. Bank (France & Germany)	1,199	100	420	...	(420)	73.0	...	(73.0)
Societe Immobiliere du Cameroun (from France)	735	88	578	...	(578)	57.0	...	(57.0)
Electricite du Cameroun (France)	2,150	-	2,204	...	(1,204)	17.0	...	(17.0)
Other (from France)	495	59	382	...	(382)	63.0	...	(63.0)
Extrabudgetary loans contracted or guaranteed by Gov't. Cocoa Stabilization Fund (From EEC)	1,500	...	230	...	230	-	-	-
Cameroon Development Bank and Ministry of Planning from (Germany)	2,200	...	281	...	(281)	-	-	-
Trans-Cameroon Railway and Min. of Planning (from United States)	3,200	...	1,100	...	(1,100)	-	-	-
Cameroon Dev. Corpn. (from International development Assoc.	2,717	...	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cameroon Dev. Corpn. (from World Bank)	1,729	...	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other loans to public agencies and enterprises (from CCCE)	6,000	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
TOTAL	35,928	(3,314)	(14,412)	(2,028)	(16,440)	(528.1)	(138.5)	(1.116.6
TOTAL DEBT	37,592	(3,321)	(16,064)	(2,031)	(18,095)	(540.1)	(140.4)	(1.180.5

Sources: Budget Estimates, 1977/78, Yaounde, 1978. + Parantheses indicate incomplete data.

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This increasing indebtedness of Cameroon was to a certain extent favourable for the leading capitalist donors (especially France) in that it enabled them to force Cameroon into a more dependent relationship, a consequence fully in line with neo-colonialist aims. An interesting development in the financial dependency of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon was that France and the other leading capitalist donors came to realize that beyond a certain point this cumulative process might threaten actual payment, and would lead to a situation which would entail serious economic and political dangers, for the capital-exporting country (e.g. the expropriation of their capital), which might induce these creditor country rather to write-off in the end part of their outstanding claims. It was partly the danger of such risks and the intention to eliminate competition among themselves, together with the endeavour to conceal their neo-colonialist aspirations, that compelled these "Ahidjo's friends" to handle the granting of loans, and aid to Cameroon through the various international agencies. Among a number of these agencies were the EEC Development Fund, the International Monetary Fund, the IBRD (and its two subsidiaries: IFC and IDA), the UNICEF, EFTA, the UN special Fund, etc; it was especially the World Bank (IBRD) and its two subsidiaries, the International Finance Corporations and the International Development Association, which were of great importance.

Finally, the financial dependency of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon on loans given to it by France and the other leading capitalist countries and international agencies controlled by the later was determined of course, not only by the size of these amounts but also by the credit conditions and the political and economic strings attached to them. In proportion as the internal sources of accumulation increased, as the role of the state in guiding the economy and controlling the internal finance grew, as the independent state-capitalist sector strengthened in Cameroon, and as the sources of foreign grants and loans

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expanded (partly by aid from the socialist countries such as China and also by the mutual assistance of other developing countries such as the Arab countries), the intensity of this form of dependency began to diminish, eventhough the foreign loans and grants received from France especially increased, either in absolute terms or in relation to the size of the state budget. Thus, in spite of the fact that this form of financial dependency became more and more the main form of economic dependency and the principal means of neo-colonialism in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration, this form itself lost much of its intensity and onesidedness, as the domestic conditions of development in Cameroon went ahead due to the shifts in the world economy and world politics. Thus, the Ahidjo administration's dependency on foreign loans and grants was primarily intensive in Cameroon not only because of the country's little economic power and poor internal accumulation potentials as well as its significant budgetary expenditures, but also because the neo-colonial strategy of development helmed in the economic doctrine of Planned Liberalism which in the end did not provide Cameroon with an endogenous development but made the country an appendage of international capitalism.

8.7 : "TECHNICAL" RELATIONS

A major source of the global power exercised by the multinational corporations lies in its near monopoly over industrial technology. But as we saw in chapter six, the investment codes of Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration sought to ensure freer access to the required technology on more reasonable terms by strengthening the bargaining capacity of national firms in their negotiations with multinational corporations. But such investment regulations did not ensure that imported technology was assimilated nor did they necessarily foster the development of the potential for the generation of new or more appropriate technologies in the country. At the level of the firm, therefore, while the investment codes contributed to "learning by doing" in the sense that it fostered a process of learning how to negotiate with foreign technology suppliers over matters

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such as the elimination of restrictive clauses and the reduction of the royalty payments, it did not promote another aspect of "learning by doing" which had to be mastered if future technological self-reliance was to be achieved. This is the process by which firms learn to adapt and assimilate imported technology - a process which presupposes the creation of in-house research and development (R and D) capabilities.

The structure of dependency and underdevelopment within which indigenous firms had to learn to assimilate, adapt, extend and perhaps improve upon imported technology were rarely conducive to technological self-reliance. Indeed, the pattern of ownership structures and product choices which emerged in such settings were associated with the decision to license technological knowledge. Within the context of dependency and underdevelopment, moreover, licensing itself becomes a factor inciting and maintaining technological dependency by impeding "learning by doing". Legal restrictions and psychological factors undoubtedly affected the relationship between licensing and future technological dependency. But the existence of a "technological dependency syndrome" also contributed to our understanding of the close association between licensing and technological dependency. This suggests that the ownership structure, product sector, and licensing interacted with choice of machinery imports and research and development activities in such a way as to produce a "technological dependency syndrome" in which opportunities for "learning by doing" were consistently missed.

As we mentioned in chapter Two of this study, in the early 1950s the development strategies of W. Arthur Lewis and Raul Prebisch held sway. Fundamentally they argued that national political economies in the Third World were not capturing an adequate share of the gains from technological change. The solution was to industrialize. Both economists perceived a scarcity of capital, skills, and technology in the region which made it appear imperative for those countries seeking to industrialize to attract private foreign investment into extractive industries (Lewis), light manufacturing for import substitution (Prebisch), and Labour-intensive production

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for export (Lewis) by offering such incentives tax holidays, duty free importation of materials, and infrastructural costs under written by the state.

The "industrialization by invitation" strategy, however, did not have the effects anticipated. Despite its success in attracting direct foreign investment into Cameroon, the costs of doing so were enormous. First, although an increase in the book value of direct foreign investment was recorded in Cameroon, the real contribution of direct foreign investment to capital accumulation was not substantial. As we shall see below, the total outflows, at anypoint in time, of remitted profits out weighed the total inflows of foreign capital. The lack of backward linkages to suppliers within the host country served to increase imported bills at a time when exports were outpriced in the World market or were prohibited through the imposition of restrictive clauses. Second, the national political economy was not capturing, as Lewis and Prebisch had hoped, a greater share of the gains from technology. Multinational Corporations which undertook research and development with a view to exacting monopoly rents on the sale of products embodying the new technology, centralized research and development efforts in the home country. This inhibited the creation of linkages between local firms and local research institutions in the host country and led to a disinclination to generate technology locally. A dependency on imported technology was thus reinforced.

Third the product technology transferred was frequently inappropriate to the country. As the products chosen for transfer had been developed for the parent or licensor's major market, they reflected the tastes and incomes of the industrialized world. Transfer to underdeveloped countries with the collaboration of elites in those countries merely exacerbated the Chewed income distribution found there and diverted resources away from investments which could have met the needs of a broader spectrum of the local population. At the same time, the small size of the local market which resulted from a product mix chosen to satisfy elite tastes implied that factories in developing countries

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were operating far below capacity and at high cost. Finally, when process technologies developed for the markets of industrialized countries - where the cost of capital relative to labour was cheap - were transferred they proved largely inappropriate to domestic needs where, unless government policy specifically distorted factor costs, labour was relatively more abundant and cheaper. To the extent that capital-intensive technologies were consistently imported and attention was not paid to the appropriateness of this choice to local conditions, direct foreign investment made only a limited contribution to solving the severe unemployment problems faced by the country. In sum, the "industrialization by invitation strategy" by providing mechanisms for the transfer of surplus, the structuring of product and process choice, and the further segmentation and disarticulation of the political economy reinforced the existing structure of dependency and underdevelopment in Cameroon between 1960 and 1982.

The concept of technical dependency used in this section stresses the need to understand underdevelopment in historical perspective. That is, as a result of the formation, expansion, and consolidation of the World capitalist system - a process which shaped the political economies (including the class structures) of peripheral Third World countries in such a way as to subject their development to the development needs of the capitalist countries at the centre. The dependent capitalist development of the periphery is marked by extreme and growing inequalities in income and in income - generating possibilities, uneven development and notable disarticulation and segmentation of the political economy such that there is :

> a lack of capability to manipulate the operative elements of an economic system... an absence of interdependence between the economic functions of a system. This lack of interdependence implies that the system has no internal dynamic which could enable it to function as an independent autonomous entity.[125]

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This notion of dependent capitalist development moves us beyond the narrow calculation of dependency as a nation's reliance of foreign markets, capital, technology, or skills and towards the view that dependency is a process conditioning national social and economic development through these external linkages. It thus implies that simply measuring the value of local research and development (R x D) as a percentage of Gross National Product, the number of national patents registered, the ratio of imported capital goods to exported capital goods, or the number of technology licenses acquired does not adequately map the set of relations which shape, structure and distort development in the periphery. In so far as technology is concerned, these relations would include political relations to a technology supplier or parent company, such as those involving power or bargaining, and legal relations growing out of restrictions on the use to which imported technology can be put. They would also encompass economic relations to the larger political economy with which the firm is situated, as a result, for instance, of a historical pattern of reliance upon imported technology. We cannot hope to capture this set of relations in its entirety, but here we shall be concerned with the factors which were associated with decisions to license technology and the ramifications of licensing for technological dependency. Thus here technological dependency is operationalized as the product of the above set of relations and is situated within the framework of the concept of "learning by doing". The concept "learning by doing" is highly significant within the context of an ongoing debate over the extent to which adaptation, extension, and improvement activities develop the very capabilities needed to make those major innovations which for some are tantamount to inventions and symbolize technological independence.[126]

One of the most import characteristics of Planned Liberalism in Cameroon was its technical dependency. Dependency on imported manpower and knowledge similarly shifted in form rather than substance. The non-technical and civil service and much of the middle-level non-technical productive sector cadre were Cameroonian-manned but key technical and managerial posts remained foreign and predominantly French. For example in the large private corporation subsector as of 1971, about 1000 of 15,000 employees were expatriates and their earnings were over 47.5 per cent of the total wage and salary bill.[127] By "technical" dependency we mean dependency on "intellectual" imports, whether in their "materialized" form (as the import of technology, the standardization system, patents and licences, or the results of researches in science and technology) or in its "live" form (as the import of experts, advisers, teachers or the sending abroad of students on foreign scholarships.)

France and other advanced capitalist partners of the Ahidjo administration also tried to bind Cameroon to themselves and in their spheres of interests, "technologically" and "intellectually". This endeavour of theirs, no doubt, coincided with the actual needs of Cameroon, for "technical" assistance. And just as "capital assistance" (that is the long term credits and grants), technical assistance was a phenomenon having two sides (that is, being built, on the one hand, on a real need for capital and, as such it might have had, subject to appropriate conditions, a favourable effect and, on the other hand, having been accompanied, as we have seen, by those dangers and negative consequences mentioned above). So "technical assistance" in Cameroon, also had (or even more so) a mixed character; in some cases it promoted and in others, it hindered development.

This specific form of dependency came to the fore at independence, following the efforts of Cameroon in industrialization and public education, etc, and owing to the technical assistance of France and other industrial investment policy of international oligopolies operating in Cameroon. Mention must also be made that in this context the neo-colonial investment policy in Cameroon perpetuated this depandency by accepting the inevitability of technical dependency in the country in all ascpects of development. That relationship was relatively weakened and as France's role declined, other Western States took up the difference. Cameroon attempted

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to diffuse its economic relationships but such diffusion took place significantly only among the Western States. However, the French ties were very strong, not only in the official treaty sense, but also in less discernible ways. French businessment knew how to operate in Cameroon, and the Cameroonian bureaucracy frequently operated to the benefit of French interests and to the detriment of other foreign interests. This might have been due to individual likes and dislikes of bureaucrats or it might have been due to their greater familiarity with which the French were doing things. The net effect was that non-French foreign investors and businessmen frequently felt that there was an invisible but very real pro - French bias among the Cameroonian bureaucracy and that this bias made it especially difficult for them to operate in Cameroon.[128]

Kofele-Kale noted that "the strange fascination that Cameroon's ruling elite have for metropolitan culture is another factor which explains the assured position France enjoys in Cameroon".[129] Such a fascination is difficult to document; even more difficult is the attempt to show a relationship between a liking for French culture and the foreign policy content. One could not travel in Cameroonian cities without gaining a sense of the pervasiveness of French culture as an influence on Cameroon. In terms of language, dress, foods, items for sale in shops and stores and in numerous other ways one is constantly reminded of France's role. In meeting with and getting acquainted with Cameroonians, except for those from the Anglophone portion of the country, the positive evaluations of French culture greatly out-weighted the negative. From the French perspective, there was a strong attempt to cultivate and increase this liking for "French" things since independence. This campaign was most obvious in the Anglophone sector where the French government played a major role in developing French language programme through the provision of French staff, training and study in France for Cameroonian staff; a well-conceived French-by-radio programme; textbook and curriculum assistance; a language training programme for non-school adults; and the opening of libraries and French cultural centres. Such openness to the

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and synthetics, and to a greater and greater extent the scientific and research capacity in general of the capitalist world.[131] Although some writers expressed the optimism that as the process of the scientific-technical revolution was also progressing in the socialist world and as Cameroon got more and more involved with the socialist countries especially with China, the scope of the above-mentioned monopoly was to a certain extent limited.[132]

Under the Ahidjo administration Cameroon needed for her industrial development patents and licences, blueprints, standards, technological specifications, machine installations and their component parts, and last but not the least, specialists (engineers, geologists, economists, etc) and teachers. The economic doctrine of Planned Liberalism, decreed foreign "technical" assistance as the magical panacea for the liquadation of underdevelopment. This therefore meant that this assistance was given in such a way that the realization of these licences, blueprints, standards and technological specifications, etc, the smooth operation of the plants, and the working and repair of the machinery and equipment, was dependent on the deliveries of the metropolitan firms. They also made sure the production of the new plants did not ambrace the whole cycle of processing and the component parts standard equipment, motors and machines were supplied only from the metropolitan firms. They arranged things so that the management of production and the technological leadership was concentrated in the hands of specialists sent from the metropolitan country. Very often plants were only built for the production of component parts (e.g. Alucam) of the main product manufactured in the metropolitan country. They were nothing but subsidiary units of the metropolitan firm, only appendices, not independent industrial plants. Such cooperation in Cameroon was a suitable means of tax and customs evasion.

This type of cooperation between capitalist metropolitan firms and their established local enterprises - an unnatural and economically hardly justifiable form of cooperation - and the leading role of specialists from these

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metropolitan capitalist countries especially France, showed that production in certain industrial branches or the most important industrial plants could, depending on foreign interests, be paralysed over-night.

This phenomenon had grave consequences for employment, the meeting of export commitments, the fulfilment of evisaged plan targets, the satisfaction of the needs of production of other branches, etc. This exposed the economy of the country because it meant that with an unexpected withdrawal of specialists immense difficulties could be caused in economic management or in any other field of life (in the supply of medical staff, in public education, state administration, public services, etc). Therefore, through this cooperation, the metropolitan monopolies controlled the development of individual industries in Cameroon, and the experts and advisers made available in the framework of "technical" assistance had a decisive role in determining among other things the direction and spirit of economic policy, public education, ... and consequently the whole political system.

It is virtually a truism that the direction and spirit of public education was (and still is) of special importance for economic, social and political development of Cameroon. The assertion of the demonstration effects via education resulted (through increased salary claims, a higher way of living and consumption propensities, etc) in serious tensions. And since the development of education in Cameroon was characterised not by a proportionate widening and increasing of the pyramid of public education but, as in industrial development, by the appearance of "patches" of a superstructure without adequate basis and intermediate elements, the danger of the alienation of the highly qualified cadres from the local society became a reality during the Ahidjo administration. All this exerted a negative effect on the cohesive forces of society. It was hardly surprising that the cadres trained in the framework of technical assistance often became also "physically" alienated from their own society - yielding to the temptation of better living conditions and a different

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way of life, and perhaps as a result of marriage, they preferred to serve France more than Cameroon.

While an attempt has been made above to summarise a complex set of relationships established between the capitalist nations (especially France) and Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration, it must be emphasized that this author's main intentions, here, has been to discuss how this externally-imposed system was of decisive importance in determining the political and socio-economic arrangements in Cameroon. If, for example, the great emphasis in France's "Aid" programme on the supply of co-opérants or technical assistants to Cameroon were studied by examining each of the threads of this practice, it would appear as an intricate web ready to tie the knots of any sector of the Camerooian economy ready to emerge from it. Even President Ahmadou Ahidjo, recognized that the "cooperation" system was not established to promote the "development" of the periphery. Indicicuals sent out from France to operate the system simply "assisted" in preserving rather than transforming what they found in place. Of the 4,300 coopérants in Cameroon in 1969, half were theoretically there in a "technical" capacity and the other half as teachers.[133] The technical assistants were to be found scattered throughout the administrative hierarchy and research institutes where they served as an effective fifth column controlling the flow of information from the territorial services to France and, in some cases, deliberately away from the local government ministers themselves.

Today, there is a strong call in Cameroon for the development of a relevant educational system and curricula, but the Ahidjo administration made Cameroon so dependent on France for the staffing of the University, colleges and schools that French educational models became even more entrenched with the expansion of the educational system since independence. In the Cooperation Agreements; Cameroon had pledged to consult with France before the establishment in the country of any higher education institution. France was also to be given first option for the recruitment of expatriate personnel. Entire University and secondary school systems were foreign supplied from the physical plant to details of curricula, examination systems, teaching materials, and personnel regulations.[134]

Still, it can be shown that the very Ahmadou Ahidjo who called for the changing of this system was the one most compromised by, and dependent on it. Pressure from the popular, professional and entrepreneurial sectors of the Camerooian population might have forced him to try to reduce the more visibly offensive aspects of the French presence, but this was the same leader who turned around and lamented the failure of France to send him high-level experts. It was no surprise that Ahidjo was one of the African leaders who openly expressed dismay at the abolition of the General Secretariat of Cooperation and the retirement of Jacques Foccart in 1974.[135] Ahidjo for so long saw Cameroon's interests and those of France as identical, so much so that it was Cameroon which was trying to hold on to the arrangements France would have definitely let go.

Hence, the spurious nature of the rhetoric about the transformation of these relations. In this vein it must be said that the French had never attempted to disguise the economic rationale behind their culturally-weighted cooperation in Cameroon in particular and Africa in general :

> The most distinterested initiatives are not (necessarily) at least rewarding: the assistance France is able to grant - by the cultural impregnation it achieves - leads to the formation of cadres of less-developed countries (Cameroon) (in) an environment favourable to the diffusion of our techniques and, subsequently of our merchandise.[136]

The fact that France found it necessary to obtain from its Cameroonian pro-consuls an agreement to satisfy the greater part of Cameroon's educational requirements from France, to obtain Cameroon's military supplies and advisers solely from France, to consult with France before international conferences, to exercise the same financial policies towards other countries as France did, etc, could not be dismissed solely

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on the basis of the tremendous quiet of Gaullist politicians or the hallowed traditions of greater France. An equally important factor was the concurrent structure of political power that emerged in de-colonized Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo. Even such a feature as the cultural hegemony of the French language served to justify the "right to rule" of members of the professional and bureaucratic elites during the Ahidjo administration. They derived financial sustenance from the salaries and subsidies provided under the Cooperation Programmes (i.e. in the universities), as well as secured the option of later moving on to metropolitan jobs armed with their "equivalent" diplomas. France could well withstand criticism from her Cameroonian protégés for she knew that they knew how well she had served - and continued to serve them.

The French secret services always acted in coordination with their local counterparts to neutralize potential challenges to the status quo, and, in Pairs, Foccart and his agents saw to the liguidation or driving into more distant exile of Camerooian dissidents. The French more than maintained their side of the bargain. The conventional picture of the French non-commissioned officers scattered throughout the local Cameroonian armed forces in the capacity of coopérants was a dramatic representation of a usually much more prosaic train of events. On the basis of these overlapping personnel and structures, the French were able to use their military forces as counter-insurrectionary instruments in the most important centres of potential anti-governmental action, viz, the local army camps. There was a clear pattern to the use France was willing to make of its military presence to control and determine local political arrangements. There were the obvious cases of direct intervention as the more drawnout involvement in Cameroon in the early 1960s.

With respect to internal French politics, it was predicted by political commentators that the departure of de Gaulle would lead to an extended period of crisis of French politics in Cameroon because of his failure to create a party and parliementary system that would function as

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anything but instruments of an autocratic President. These prognostics were not confirmed, probably because of the failure to consider fully another form of "institutionalization" which took place during de Gaulle's rule involving the entrenchment of State-assisted monopoly capitalism with its attendant social classes and governmental agencies. As the 1971 Gorse Report demonstrated, "France had also succeeded in entrenching the dependence of its post-colonial periphery in Africa. This dependency has been noticeably reflected in the close personal relationships between the metropolitan and peripheral Gaullist leaders".[137] Yet, as in the case of a magician's performance (a deed behind the scenes) the foregoing analysis has revealed the French hidden supporting structures in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration, whose presence appeared all the more remarkable because popular attention was so distracted by the oratorical display of the regime.

8.8 : CONCLUSION :

Some years ago I William Zartman wrote that "euro-African relations are a matter of continuity and change, but judgements of them vary considérably ... To some, the successor of colonialism is neo-colonialism and dependency; for others, what is taking place is gradual disengagement, and the multilateralization of ties to the developed nations".[138] The latter approach zartman called "decolonization" "an evolutionary process as various forms of bilateral, metropolitan influence are replaced with multilateral relations.[139] As we have seen from above, it is not decolonization that seems to best describe the history of Cameroon's foreign monetary, financial and technical relations. Though there was a gradual disengagement from France that was most easily observable (and measurable) in economic relations, this did not amount to any structural change in these relations because this multilateralization took place only within the Western capitalist world, though diplomatic and economic relations extended to the communist bloc as well. It is in this respect that we see the limits of choice within Cameroon foreign relations. However, a dilemma remains if we attempt to explain

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those limits. In chapter six, we suggested that such limits were a result of the Cameroonian political economy - that the choice of a capitalist mode of development oriented Cameroon towards the opening of more intensive relationships with countries of a similar economic system. Thus the development and intensification of relations with the Western capitalist countries made sense and seemed logical. Young presents an alternative explanation in his comparison of the foreign policies of African capitalist, populist socialist, and Afro-Marxist regimes.

In essence, he argues that the Eastern Bloc States had little to offer in terms of trade, aid and investment and that therefore all African states remained primarily tied economically to the West.[140] To this can be added the argument that, for some African states, the choice is even more limited by their relative lack of attraction from Western or Eastern Bloc states. Those like Cameroon strategically located were in a better position to attract outside interest. But such "attractiveness" is increased or decreased by policy decisions made by African leaders. Thus, Cameroon's decision (between 1960 and 1982) whether or not prompted by France's mode of departure from its colonial status, to follow a capitalist development policy set the boundaries of its foreign policy options, and the succeeding decisions to implement policies of openness to foreign investors and trade greatly increased its attractiveness in the domain of foreign aid and technical assistance. In a similar manner, government policies with respect to its budget, to the control of foreign debt, and its general monetary and financial policies reinforced such integration within the capitalist camp.

Such a situation obviously led to limitations in the country's national interests as discussed in chapter Three due to the hostility of the external environment to these interests. It thus becomes easy for us to validate our initial hypothesis at the beginning of this chapter that bacause of economic underdevelopment and dependency, the ability of Cameroon (developing state) to attain its foreign policy

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objectives in the issue - areas of monetary, financial and technical relations was greatly constrained between 1960 and 1982.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The following constitute a representative sample of Literature; J. Alibert; "La Zone France: Intelligence et Réalisme" in Afrique Contemporaine, vol. 126 (April 1983), pp. 3-13; J. Bourdin; Monnaie et Politique Monétaire dans le Pays Africains de la zone Franc (Dakar, Nouvelles Editions Africaines/NEA, 1980); B. Vinay; Zone Franc et Coopération Monétaire (Paris, Ministère de la Coopération, 1980). Also related to the same approach is the study by P and A Guillaumont; Zone Franc et Développement Africain (Paris, Economica, 1984) stands out as a serious, exhaustive and competent piece of research.

2. Illustrative of this new approach are, A Bourgi La Politique Française de Coopération en Afrique (Paris and Dakar, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (LGDJ/NEA), 1979); M. Diarra, Les Etats Africains et la Garantie Monétaire de la France (Dakar, NEA, 1972); J. Tchundjang Pouémi; Monnaie, Sévitude et Liberté (Paris, Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980), K. Yansané; Contrôle de l'Activité Bancaire dans les Pays Africains de la Zone Franc (Paris et Dakar; LG.DJ/NEA, 1984).

3. Justinian Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania. (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 38.

4. De la Fournière; La zone Franc (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 13-14.

5. To the extent that the devolution of political power from France to the newly sovereign African states was a peaceful process, the transition from colonialism to independence was usually smooth and did not entail a total break with the past or a radical transformation of the pre-existing economic arrangements and institutions. Thus except for Guinea (which on 1 March 1960, created its own currency and Central Bank) the other Francophone African states decided to remain within the existing monetary arrangement, subject to minor adjustments. Starting in August 1960, the Central African states concluded separately a number of cooperation agreements with France. The West African states, on their part, were engaged in similar negotiations which culminated in the conclustion, on 12 March 1962, of a formal treaty setting up a West African Monetary Union (usually referred to by its French acronym UMOA-Union Monétaire Ouest-Africaine). A new set of negotiations was initiated in 1972/1973 as a result of which new monetary cooperation structures - constituting mere

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Africanization even went further

adjustments of the cooperation conventions of 22/23 November 1972 concluded between the Central African States and France, and (2) the 14 December 1973 Treaty concluded between France and the UMOA member states in West Africa. See Guy Martin; "The Franc zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa" in Third World Quarterly vol. 8, N° 1 (January 1986), pp. 205-235.

6. In this case, it might be useful to view the Franc zone as a "system". According to a generally accepted definition of this concept, a system is "a set of elements or units, which interact in some way and are set off from their environment by some kind of boundaries". see Robert. L. Lieber; Theory and World Pilitics (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1973) p. 121. Also see Samir Amin; "zone Franc et Développement" in Samir Amin, Impérialisme et sous-Développement en Afrique (Paris Anthropos, 1976). However, it must be noted that "CFA Franc" originally stood for "Franc of the French colonies in Africa". According to the 14 November 1973 Treaty, "CFA" means. "African Financial Community" (Communauté Financière Africaine) in the UMOA states, since the 1972 reform, "Financial Cooperation in Central Africa (Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale) in the Central African States.

7. Originally, the French Treasury's interest rate was equal to the (variable) discount rate of the Banque de France with a minimum of 2.50 percent a year. From the 1973, a new mode of calculation designed to harmonize earnings on deposits in the African Central Banks and in the French Treasury was adopted.

8. The interest rate was 1 percent for overdrafts amounting to 5 million French Francs, and 2 percent for overdrafts amounting to between 5 and 10 million French Francs.

9. Rapport du Comité Monétaire de la Zone Franc, (1982), p. 187.

10. Tchundjang Pouèmi; Monnaie, Sérvitude et Liberté, p. 58

11. M. Diarra, Les Africains et la Garantie Monétaire de la France, pp. 12-13.

12. Tchundjang Pouémi; Monnaie, Sérvitude et Liberté, p. 101.

13. Bourdin; Monnaie et Politique Monétaire dans les Pays Africains de la zone Franc, p. 12.

14. B. Vinay; Zone Franc et Coopération Monétaire, p. 18.

15. Out of BEAC's twelve Executive Council members, only three (that is a quarter) are French. The process of Africanization even went further in UMOA, where the principle

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of equal representation of member-states prevailed. See Guy Martin; "The Franc Zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa", pp. 205-235.

16. H. L. Engberg; "The Operations Account System in French-speaking Africa" in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 11,N° 4(1983) pp. 540-541.

17. K. Yansané; Contrôle de l'Activité Bancaire dans les Pays Africains de la zone Franc, p. 44

18. Diarra; Les Etats Africains et la Garantie Monétaire de la France, p. 20

19. Amin; "zone Franc et Développement", p. 413

20. Tchundjang Pouémi; Monnaie, Sérvitude et Liberté, p. 27

21. Engberg; "The Operations Account System in French-Speaking Africa", pp. 543-544

22. Guillaumont; Zone Franc et Développement Africain, pp. 72-75

23. J. Alibert; "La Zone Franc: Intelligence et Réalism", p. 7

24. B. Vinay; Zone Franc et Coopération Monétaire, pp. 137,197.

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26. On this point see Diarra; Les Etats Africains et la Garantie Monétaire de la France, PP. 27-28; Tchundjang Pouémi; Monnaie, Sérvitude et Liberté, p. 55 and Vinay; Zone Franc et Coopération Monétaire, p. 216

27. Guy Martin; "Les Fondements Historiques, Economiques et Politiques de la Politique Africaine de la France" in Genève-Afrique, vol. 21, N° 2 (1983), pp. 41-42 and 46.

28. Two facts might help illustrate this point. First, whereas BCEAO's Executive council is structured on a parity basis (twelve members, two for each state), that of BEAC has an unequal composition (twelve members, four for Cameroon, three for France, two for Gabon and one each for the other states). Secondly, whereas a financial market has been created within the framework of UMOA on 1 July 1975, no such market has yet been organized within the BEAC Zone. See Guy Martin, "The Franc Zone: Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa", pp. 205-235.

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29. See in particular A. Bourgi; La Politique Française de Coopération en Afrique, p. 155, M. Diarra; Les Etats Africains et la Garantie MOnétaire de la France; p. 21 and Guy Martin; "Les Fondements Historiques, Economiques et Politiques de la Politique Africaine de la France", pp. 49-56

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31. Thus BCEAO held about 78 percent of its foreign exchange reserves in French Francs in 1978-1979. In the case of BEAC, this proportion varied between 90 and 95 percent from 1979 to 1982. See Rapports des Comités Monétaires de la Zone Franc (1978, 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1983).

32. Tchundjang Pouemi; Monnaie, Sérvitude et Liberté, p. 58

33. Ibid, p. 38

34. R. Tremblay; La Dévaluation du Franc CFA à la suite de la Dévaluation du Franc Français: Un Exercice de simulation" in R. Tremblay (ed); Afrique et Intégration Monétaire (Montréal, les Editions H R W, 1972), p. 260.

35. Rapports des Comités Monétaires de la Zone Franc, (1980), p. 170; (1982), p. 164; 1983), p. 157.

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38. Africa Confidential, vol. 24, N° 16 (3 August 1983). This issue is said to have been one of the main points of contention raised by the French delegation during President François Mitterrand's state visit to Cameroon on 20-21 June 1983.

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42. Taking Cameroon as a case in point, one author has demonstrated the negative impact of the devaluation of the French Franc on the indebtedness of that country. According to this author, Cameroon's external debt amounted to 2.487 dollars in 1980. On the basis of the then prevailing exchange rate ($1=4.55 French Francs), Cameroon needed 11.32 billion French Francs (or 565.80 billion CFA francs) to pay its debt. In January 1983, as a result of the intervening devaluation of the French Franc ($1=7.43 French Francs), Cameroon owed 18.48 billion French Francs (or 932.92 billion CFA francs). Thus the same debt had increased from 565.80 billion CFA francs to 923.92 billion CFA francs between 1980 and 1983 (which represents an increase of 358.12 billion CFA francs). See T.M; "Devaluation et l'Alourdissement de l'Endettement des Pays de la Zone Franc", p. 14.

43. Interview with R. Messi, General Manager of the Sociéte Camerounaise de Banque (Cameroon Bank Corporation) in Jeune Afrique Economie vol. 29-30, (December 1983), p. 24.

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45. The rate of inflation prevailing in some African countries was quite impressive. In Ivory Coast, for instance, this rate was 16.3 percent in 1974, 18.9 percent in 1975 and 19.5 percent in 1978. In Senegal, it was 19.4 percent in 1974 and 21.4 percent in 1975. See P. and S. Guillaumont; Zone Franc et Développement Africain, pp. 156-157.

46. Vinay; Zone Franc et Coopération Monétaire, pp. 221 - 232.

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49. J. Alibert; "La Zone Franc: Intelligence et Réalisme", p. 8.

50. Vinay; Zone Franc et Coopération Monétaire, p. 104. According to the same author, "The borderline between reasonable and unjustified needs is not neatly drawn. It can vary with circumstances... and according to the countries and economic structures" (ibid, p. 104).

51. Ibid, p. 189.

52. Ibid p. 192

53. Ibid, p. 192.

54. In UMOA, the government's net position vis-à-vis monetary institutions moved from creditor (by 29.6 billion French Francs) in 1980 to debtor (by 122.4 in 1981, 218.4 billion French Francs in 1982, and 345.8 billion French Francs in 1983); See Rapports des Comités Monétaires de la Zone Franc

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1982, p. 149 , 1983, p. 142 .

55. M. Rudloff has this to say in this regard; "The imposition of reduced credit ceilings is a measure which the developed countries adopt only reluctantly. Such a measure can be catastrophic in under developed countries. One wonders to what extent the present economic stagnation that prevails in many Franc Zone member states is not due to the imposition of suchconstraining and rigid financial measures" cited in Yansané; Contrôle de l'Activité Bancaire dans les Pays Africains de la Zone Franc, p. 46.

56. P. Fabra; "Zone Franc ou Zone de Pauvreté?" in Le Monde (Paris, 2 December 1972).

57. Thus from 1962 to 1974, the BCEAO's discount rate remained fixed at 3.50 percent, and that of BEAC never exceeded 4.25 percent. However, the BCEAO's discount rate was progressively raised from 5.50 percent in January 1973 to 8 Percent in July 1975 and 10.50 percent in April 1980. Similarly, that of BEAC increased from5.50 percent in 1974 to 6.50 percent in Junuary 1976, 8.50 percent in October 1979, and 9 percent in December 1982. See Rapports des Com ités Monétaires de la Zone Franc, (1978, p. 389), (1982, p. 408).

58. This capital flight was not noticeably reduced even after the increase in the African Central Banks' interest rates which took place from 1973/1974. These rates still remained significantly lower than those prevailing in France:16. 81 percent in April 1982, 12.88 percent at the end of 1982; and 12.27 percent at the end of 1983) See Rapports des Comités Monétaire de la Zone Franc (1982, p. 124), (1983,p. 120).

59. Thus during 1980, the rate of one-month Eurodollar deposits increased from 9 to 23 percent and the basic rate in the U.S increased from 10.75 to 21.50 percent. In France, the basic rate decreased from 14 to 12.75 percent between the beginning and the end of 1982. See Jean Kuete; Le Franc CFA Face aux Mutations des Grandes Unités de Compte (Yaoundé, Editions clé, 1981), pp. 148-162.

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61. Yansané; Contrôle de l'Activité Bancaire dans les Pays Africains de la Zone Franc, p. 164; G. Rocheteau; Pouvoir Financier et Indépendance Economique en Afrique (Paris, Karthala, 1982), p. 30. Also see C.A. Michalet; Le Défi du Développement Indépendent (Paris, les Editions Rochevignes, 1983), pp. 134-138 and A.Y. Yansané; "Some Problems of Monetary Dependency in French-Speaking West African states" in Journal of African Studies, vol. 5, N° 4(1978/1979), pp. 469-470.

62. Thus within BEAC, the proportion of short term credit in relation to total credit allocation was 67.5 percent in 1981, 70.2 percent in 1982, and 69.9 percent in 1983.

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For medium-term credit, this proportion was 29.1 percent in 1981, 26.8 percent in 1982, and 27.7 percent in 1983. For long-term credit, the same proportion was 3.4 percent in 1981, 3 percent in 1982, and 2.4 percent in 1983. See Rapports des Comités Monétaires de la Zone Franc (1981, pp. 152-153), (1982, pp. 156-157), (1983, pp. 148-150).

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CHAPTER NINE

DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES OF CAMEROON, 1960-1982

9.1: INTRODUCTION:

Asymmetries in international relations may be manifested in many different ways. This chapter will focus upon some of the asymmetries which manifest themselves in the foreign policy of the developing state in the course of its diplomatic activities using the Cameroonian experience between 1960 and 1982. To a large extent, diplomatic activities are in themselves acts of international negotiations and bargaining. However, one must remark that although the process of international negotiation has received increased attention in the literature of international relations in recent years, relatively little of that attention has been directed towards the issue of inequality and asymmetry within the bargaining process and diplomatic activities. Therefore, one must look largely outside the field of international relations in search of heuristic propositions which might guide our discussions in this chapter. This chapter will borrow concepts from formal game theory and theories of strategy and bargaining, in the search for propositions that might help to explain the conditions under which negotiations will produce asymmetrical outcomes. The validity of these concepts will depend on whether or not their propositions can be justified on the basis of consistency with some fundamental assumptions and rules of interrelatedness and asymmetries in our dependency - linkage matrix proposed in chapter Two of this study.

There has been considerable attention in recent international relations research to the issue of international bargainging and negotiations, with the most important works probably being those of Ikle[1] and Lall[2]. Most of these approaches to negotiations have focused on a set of interdependent actors engaged in bargaining, although surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the "asymmetrical interdependencies" which may exist among the participants[3]. Much of the literature has overlooked the fact that power resources and control relations among the actors engaging in many international bargaining and negotiations are not even approximately equal. This applies within the major alliances, where the superpowers and the smaller bloc members, certainly do not have equal bases to provide resources to "affect other actors" directly, to deprive them of "desired exchange goods", or prevent one another from "achieving domestic goals"[4]. This also applies to the relations between nonaligned actors, especially the developing states of the world on the one hand, and members of the two superpower blocs, on the other.

Power discrepancies have not been totally overlooked in recent writing on bargaining and negotiations. For example, Lall has suggested the following proposition about the relationship between power asymmetry and the negotiation process:

> When there is a real or assumed significant disparity of power between the parties to a dispute or situation or when one of the parties is imbued with a sense of growing power, then such disparity or sense of bouyant power may militate against resort to negotiation to settle the dispute or ameliorate the situation [5].

While Lall emphasizes power considerations with regard to the issue of entry into negotiations and concerning a country's general stance towards negotiations, when he turns to the subject of concessions and movements towards aggrement he tends to deal almost exclusively with considerations of the bargaining strategy. The structural asymmetries among the actors are not introduced as a significant consideration affecting the process and outcome of negotiations. Thus a central objective of this chapter is to extend theories of negotiation to include assumptions about the affects of structural asymmetry upon the bargaining process. An adequate theory of bargaining at the international level must include such a component inorder to describe and explain how negotiations and bargaining operate in the realm of asymmetrical international relations.

The concept of asymmetry as it is treated in bargaining theory is similar to theories of power, influence or relational control as exhibited in other works in international relations, although the emphasis is sometimes different. One major difference in emphasis is that theories of bargaining assume that actors seek an end goal of agreement and that

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they hope to collaborate in some way to receive mutually beneficial outcomes which they cannot achieve unilaterally. As Iklé observes, "two elements must normally be present for negotiations to take place: there must be both common interests and issues of conflict"[6]. If there were no common interests, then there would be no basis for negotiations. In this case a theory of coercion would perhaps be more applicable. On the other hand, if there were no conflicting interests, then there would be nothing to negotiate about as the actors' positions might be expected to converge naturally. In short, bargaining theory deals with "mixed motive" situations in which the individual interests of actors are partially but not completely over lapping. By contrast, theories of dependency as relational control may deal only with unilateral relationships in which one actor may require another with completely different interests to act in a manner preferred by the former. Although most bargaining relationships are multidirectional and are based in part on common interests, concepts of influence and relational control are still relevant in many instances. The fact that two or more actors have some interests in common does not mean that they are in the same structural position to influence the negotiated outcomes, nor does it mean that a resulting agreement will benefit all actors equally. In order for an agreement to occur, all actors must perceive that they will receive a better net outcome with the agreement than they would without it. However, the overall gains may not necessarily be distributed evenly among the the actors, and this unevenness in outcomes may be the result of structural or relational asymmetries among the actors. It is at this point that these two approaches meet and need to be integrated more fully.

However, inorder to develop a framework (in accordance with our dependency - linkage matrix) to analyze the effects of structural asymmetry in the diplomatic activities of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982, we shall briefly examine the relevant aspects of the game theoretic orientation[7]. In this effort we shall be operating primarily at the level of "the state as actor", based upon the assumption that negotiators serve as representatives of their states and are the articulators of policy outcomes developed within the decision-making apparatus of the state. In terms of the games theoretic orientation one of the most prominent sources of models about the negotiation process is the mathematical game theory[8]. There are, of course, some serious limitations to the application of game theoretic models to the analysis of international negotiations. For example, game theoretic models

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assume that the number of players in a game is fixed and known, that each player acts rationally in the sense of trying to maximize his own personal gains, that pay off functions are fixed and known in advance by the players, and that communications between the players cannot affect the form or content of the game[9]. Many of these assumptions are not met in international negotiations and diplomacy, especially the assumptions about communications and about perfect information concerning pay off functions. Furthermore, game theoretic models alone tend to be static, dealing largely with the relationship between initial conditions (actors' preferences) and outcomes (the distribution of some value). Little direct attention is paid to the dynamic process of negotiation and bargaining. In spite of these very serious limitations, game theoretic models may help to clarify the structure of negotiation-situation . This provides a foundation for building more complex and dynamic models of bargaining through the introduction of elements not included in formal game theoretic models.

However, these games theoretic models suggest that asymmetrical outcomes in negotiation will be affected by the relative threat potential of negotiators, in the following ways: (1) those actors with the least cost from noncooperative outcomes will have the greatest threat potential and are thus likely to obtain a proportionately large share of the outcome of an agreement, whereas those actors with the greatest costs from noncooperative outcomes will have the least threat potential and are thus likely to obtain a proportionately smaller share of the outcome of an agreement; (2) those actors who will suffer the greatest loss from being left at their security levels will have the least threat potential and are thus likely to obtain a proportionately smaller share of the outcome of an agreement, whereas those actors who will suffer least from being left at their security level will have the greatest threat potential and thus are likely to obtain a larger share of the outcome of an agreement. Thus outcomes along the negotiation set are influenced by the location of the "status quo point"[10]. In the first place, the status-quo point is determined by the intersection of the security levels of the two players and in the second place, it is the threat by one player to reduce the "status quo point" of the other, to the other's security level which affects the outcome. Both propositions explain asymmetrical outcomes largely as a function of the costs to the actors of noncooperative solutions, and both tend to suggest that the player with greater costs from the failure to cooperate will receive less in any solution, including a cooperative one along the negotiation set. These arguments are demonstrated in Figures 9(1) through 9(3) below.

Figure 9(1): A SIMPLE BARGAINING MODEL



Source: Oran R. Young; Bargaining: Fromal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana III, University of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 42.

The construction of an adequate theory of the role of asymmetry in bargaining requires the consideration of the use of information manipulation and strategic devices for influencing the behaviour of others. Such a consideration involves an extention of the game theoretic model to include a more dynamic, process-oriented approach. Strategic devices may contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in two primary ways. First, they may be used to affect the information available to negotiators, by either clarifying or obfuscating the structure of the bargaining situation. Second, they may be employed to modify the actual structure of the bargaining situation to induce an actor to accept an agreement which it might otherwise not prefer.

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Figure 9(2): THE ABSENCE OF BARGAINING SPACE



Source: Young; Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, p. 52

As young points out, the strategic approach focuses on interactions in the presence of conflicts of interests and imperfect information[11]. Bargainers may try to manipulate one another's understanding about the payoffs, and they may even try to change objective payoffs. Thus, manipulative theories are most likely to be appropriate to negotiations where extensive communications are possible, such as in the case of most international bargaining and diplomacy. Young further notes that the manipulative approach is particularly relevant to asymmetrical bargaining:

> bargaining is often causally conceptualized as a phenomenon involving roughly asymmetrical activities on the part of two or more purposive actors. However, situations involving manipulative bargaining is the limiting case in these terms. Thus, perfectly asymmetrical bargaining is the limiting case in which the players engage in equal or identical efforts to manipulate the information conditions of each other. And perfectly asymmetrical bargaining is the other limiting case in which only one of the players makes any effort at all to manipulate the information conditons of the other(s). It seems reasonable to conclude on a priori grounds that perfectly asymmetrical bargaining will seldom occur in the real world, if only because the resources and personal attributes of the players are unlikely to be identical. Situations that approximate perfectly asymmetrical bargaining, on the other hand, are probably more likely to occur in reality [12].

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The first means of manipulation noted above is to effect the information available to players, such as information about utilities. Although the pure game theoretical model assumes that utility schedules are perfectly known to all parties, in international negotiations, this is not generally the case. Thus actors may manipulate others in an effort to deceive them about their own true utilities, especially about their minimum level for an acceptable agreement. This is illustrated in Figure 9(3) below. Thus unequal capabilities to engage in such deception may produce asymmetrical outcomes.

Figure 9(3): AN N-PERSON BARGAINING MODEL



Source: Young; Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, p. 76

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A second means of manipulation is for one actor to influence another inorder to change his utilities or inorder to get him to accept agreements which he might otherwise not prefer. Theories of influence process are directly relevant to aspect of bargaining. Indeed, a classis definition of influence treats it "as a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act"[13]. Harsanyi has criticized this simple version of influence on the grounds that it fails to take into account at least two important considerations. First, it overlooks the " opportunity cost of A of attempting to influence B's behaviour"[14]. Second, it disregards "the opportunity cost to B of refusing to do what A wants him to do, i.e. of refusing to yield to A's attempt to influence his behaviour"[15]. In other words, it overlooks the fact that the relationship between A and B is bidirectional and that B has an option either to accede to A's influence attempt or to resist it. Harsanyi then concludes with a reformulation of the influence relationship in terms of utilities such as those contained in a game theoretic model of the bargaining relationship:

> A's power over B should be defined not merely as an ability by A to get B to do "X" with a certain probability "P", but rather as an ability by A to achieve this at a certain total cost "U" to himself, by convincing B that B would have to bear the total cost "V" if he did not do "X" [16].

As Harsanyi amplifies this definition, he also stresses that power power must be conceived in a "schedule sense", that is, as a function of the costs of using power in relation to other dimensions of power such as resources[17]. Alker has more recently suggested that this functional treatment of influence relationships should take account of contingencies which may alter the nature of the functional relationships among "power amounts, effects scopes, extents, strengths, net inducements, net gains, and influencer costs"[18]. All of these considerations may by reflected in the utility schedules and base points of the basic bargaining model depicted in Figure 9(4) below.

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Figure 9(4): THE EFFECTS OF MISINFORMATION



Source: Young; Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, p. 91.

Other aspects of contigent relationships may be accounted for by the employment, generally at some cost, of manipulative devices to influence the net balance of costs and gains from an outcome at any point along the issue dimension for parties to a negotiation. The decision to employ strategic devices may reflect a decision to convert the potential power of one party into actual power through the issuing of a commitment, a threat, or a promise in order to induce change in the bargaining and diplomatic behaviour of other parties. Furthermore, as Knorr points out the external conditions (such as events in the international or domestic environments) "determining the conversion of putative power into actualized power may change during the time of the bargaining or diplomatic process"[19]. Thus the dynamic aspects of the bargaining process, those aspects which make a negotiation something more than the "discovery" of an abstract "agreement point" are likely to be captured from the analysis of manipulative devices through which negotiators attempt to influence one another.

One of the most common strategic devices is commitment, - a firm statement by a negotiator that he will not compromise beyond a certain specified point. Commitments serve several functions in bargaining. In "integrative"[20] bargaining they may be used by the parties as a device for communicating the level of minimum acceptable agreements. In this respect they may be used to improve the state of information. On the other hand, in "distributive"[21] bargaining the commitment may be used by each party in trying to exaggerate its minimum level of agreement in a direction favourable to the party employing it. In this case commitments may be used to reinforce deceptive manipulations of the type describedin Figure 9(1). Thus is A tries to commit himself to a position just to the right of "b" in Figure 9(1) and is successful in doing so, then B has no choice but to accept an agreement there at little gain for himself and at a substantial gain for A. Actors may try to make their commitments credible by engaging in actions preventing themselves from compromising figuratively "burning their bridges behind them"[22].

Commitments may thus bring about asymmetrical outcomes in bargaining and diplomacy in several ways. First, they give advantage to the intelligent bargainer who can use them judiciously. An actor who can commit himself credibly without becoming overcommitted will generally have a significant advantage in influencing the outcomes. Second, an actor willing to run the risk of a break down of negotiations through his commitments may also have an advantage. An actor's commitment will be more credible if the costs to the actor of sticking to his commitments, even at the risk of stalmate, are relatively low. Thus commitments generally reinforce the tendency already noted in the game theoretic model to give an advantage in a bargaining to the player with the lowest cost from noncooperate outcomes.

Figure 9(5): <u>THE EFFECTS OF THREATS AND PROMISES</u>



<u>Source</u>: Young; <u>Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation</u>, p. 117

The second bargaining strategy is the threat, which may be subdivided into two classes. The first class is a threat by one party to cut off negotiations and to leave both parties at the status quo. The second class of threats goes beyond the bounds of the original game and introduces the notion of side payments as shown in Figure 9(5). In this case, A may tell B that, if B does not agree to a solution favoured by A, then A will remove a reward or apply a punishment. This, in effect, alters the nature of the game by increasing the cost of nonagreement relative to agreement for B. Nevertheless, the success of a threat depends heavily on the credibility of the threat. Thus as Schelling remarks,"the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, <u>ex post</u>, have an incentive to carry it out"[23]. In this perspective, threats may be functional

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for communications in "integrative" bargaining situations. In this case, they may be used to mark emphatically minimum positions and thus help to clarify the range of available bargaining space. In "distributive" bargaining, however, threats may produce results which will be less than Pareto-optimal, that is, which will reduce the joint payoffs for both parties. In this respect, they may lead to outcomes which are somewhat different from those which would be predicted by "pure" game theory in the absence of strategic considerations. When threats are used by one party only, they will reduce the payoffs of the party using them than of his victim. In this context, they will tend to lead to more asymmetrical outcomes, although both parties are likely to be less well off than if threats had never been employed[24].

The third strategic device is the promise, which is the logical inverse of the threat. In a promise party, A may inform B that if he accepts an agreement at a point favoured by A, then A will provide him with a reward or remove a punishment. This has the effect of raising the gains of agreement relative to no agreement. Like a threat, however, it may open up new possibilities for agreement. In addition, its success depends heavily on the credibility which the recipient places in it. This is likely to be a function as well of the past performance of the promiser in executing promises and of the resources available for carrying out the promises.

Against this background, this chapter examines the validity of our fourth and final hypothesis (we formulated in chapter Two) according to which the level of economic development of the developing state more than any other factor of foreign policy determines its real status in terms of power, prestige and influence on the international scene. In terms of the diplomatic activities of the developing state and in conformity with the above discussions, this suggests that asymmetrical outcomes in bargaining and diplomacy could be predicted on the basis of relative costs to the developing state of noncopperative outcomes represented by the "status quo point" as well as by the threat to be left at one's own security level. Thus the ability to influence the behaviour of the developing state (because of her economic underdevelopment and dependency) is an important factor affecting the asymmetry of bargaining and diplomatic outcomes in developing states. Within the context of the specific concerns of this chapter, we therefore propose that:

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(1) Negotiations will tend to result in asymmetrical outcomes favouring the bargaining party which has:-

(a) the least losses associated with being left at the status-quo point of nonagreement or

(b) the least losses resulting from being threatened to be left at his own security level.

(2) Negotiations will tend to result in asymmetrical outcomes favouring the bargaining party which has:-

(a) the greatest resources available to reinforce his strategic behaviour, including commitments, threats and promises or

(b) the least losses in the event that the use of strategic devices results in a stalemate, thus leaving him at the status-quo point of nonagreement.

This propositions show the position of "underdog" the developing state occupies in most international bargaining and diplomatic processes. In the light of the above discussions, we now begin an investigation of their empirical plausibility through an examination of Cameroon's diplomatic activities in terms of her Nonalignment policy, African policy and Global policy between 1960 and 1982.

9.2: THE POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT

If one of the major constraints in the achievement of national goals in diplomacy in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration was the low level of the national economic power base, it becomes easy to understand why choosing an external orientation in terms of foreign policy for an economically poor and weak state as Cameroon constituted a critical and complex decision for the policy makers. It was critical because the external world appeared to provide the developing states simultaneously with the opportunities of diminishing the adversities and enhancing the advantages of their domestic situation on the one hand, and the risk of losing even more autonomy on the other. Secondly, choosing a foreign policy orientation was a complex decision because decisions about the external world had to

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balance all considerations of the domestic and external forces such as the security of the elites, the economic assets and level of development of the country, the capabilities of the policy making system, considerations of past achievements and policies. Thirdly, if foreign policy refers to actions designed by a state to achieve a set of goals and involves a range of actions taken by various sections of government of the state in relation with other bodies or states similarly acting on the international scene in the hope of advancing their own interests,[25] the dilemma was even greater in the case of the developing state as Cameroon because "international politics is the arena of international relations in which power, coercion and bargaining are used to determine how world resources are allocated among various states"[26]. Thus it would appear that the above factors conjugated to make nonalignment a plausible choice in the diplomatic orientation of Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration between 1960 and 1982. Ahidjo defined this nonalignment policy option for Cameroon as consisting in a:

> Permanent state of vigilance against all powers - organised, present or to be - without priority biases against any, but having open arms for loyal cooperation as long as no vital interests are sacrificed [27].

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This definition is remniscent of the so-called Gaullist "third path" which could be conceived literally as not openly taking sides in Great Power conflicts. This conception of nonalignment is especially attractive only when two cold war antagonists are at war. In this circumstance, the Weaker State (Cameroon) becomes the object of competition but not the victim of the war. From this perspective nonalignment as practised in cameroon was obviously not a foreign policy, but simply a tactical response to a particular distribution of power between the Great Powers which in reality amounted to the alignment with capitalism against socialism. President Ahidjo's argument meant that nonalignment necessarily rested upon the continued existence of rivalry between two power groupings but this is surely a misleading argument.

Nonalignment cannot be explained by bipolarity alone, but it also cannot be explained without bipolarity. The viability of nonalignment, therefore is directly related to the power balance between the Great Powers.

It is decisively affected by this balance and in turn exercises some influence over its operation. Nonalignment would hardly be attractive to the nonaligned if the Great Powers were at a total war or total cooperation since the possibility of attracting benefits from both sides and remaining independent would have disappeared. Nor would it have been attractive in a balance of power system (as in most of the nineteenth century) where the Great Powers primarily sought the support of their peers rather than of their inferiors. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, nonalignment as conceived by Ahidjo for Cameroon was always in reality an informal, unstated unilateral alignment with unnamed powers. These comments indicate why in Cameroon nonalignment was a tactic, not a foreign policy.

A systemic perspective of nonalignment in Cameroon as a useful tool of foreign policy is critical in the understanding of the orientation of Cameroon's external relations. This perspective shows why nonalignment seemed to be so rational a choice for the Ahidjo Administration's diplomatic postures. It was always a sanctioned tactic within the bipolar system, which promised the widest possibilities of maneouvering. In this perspective, this study analyzes nonalignment in Cameroon as a derivative of the patterns of relationships created by the Great Powers which constrained the margin of independence in the domestic process of choice because of the deep-seated penetration of the national society by uncontrolled foreign interests.

This does not mean that the significance of the external configuration of power can be forgotten because if nonalignment had been an irrational response to external pressures and opportunities in the international system, it would have been much more difficult for the Ahidjo administration to make sensible use of it (as it did) domestically. Indeed, what seemed to have made nonalignment so important as a foreign policy option to the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon was that, just like indigenization and import substitution industrialization embodied in Planned Liberalism, it responded well to both domestic and international needs and pressures.

The pre-independence power struggle between Ahmadou Ahidjo's conservative and the UPC radical nationalists made both groups to develop a great deal of expertise about foreign affairs. But since the UPC radicals were

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purged out of the struggle by the French, and independence merely granted to Ahidjo's conservative nationalists not only was the diplomacy of pre-independence power struggle difficult to convert in the diplomacy of independence in the face of entrenched French neocolonialism but the very promise of Ahidjo to cooperate indiscriminately with Western foreign capital in national economic development on coming to power showed that he had clear and definite ideas about a pro-Western foreign policy and its implications for national development. Moreover, in the face of the UPC post-independence threat, energies were primarily directed towards domestic problems.

In addition, Cameroon lacked a tradition of an independent foreign policy that might have compelled some attention to the external world through custom or habit. Beyond this, information about the external world was sparse and public interest minimal.

In sum the primary elite goals in the foreign policy of the Ahidjo administration in general were personal security and the creation of a sense of national unity necessary for the development of the country's resources. At first glance, personal security seemed to have had little to do with foreign policy except because the state confronted an external threat like that of the UPC. But with time, the foreign policy choices of the administration's pro-capitalist stances exacerbated domestic conflict because by lining up with France, the administration intensified the antagonism with its ideological enemies - the UPC. Under this background nonalignment provided the Cameroonian leaders with a popular policy alternative that obviated the need to choose sides in the cold war (that is, the need to disclose which side one has chosen in the cold war).

In a sense, nonalignment both reflected and provided an alternative to a domestic stalemate between two opposition groups (Ahidjo versus UPC) that were in fundamental conflict but were too weak to resolve the conflict in any single direction. A foreign policy that had the support of all the major domestic competitors at least had the negative virtue of not making a difficult situation worst. It kept conflicts at one level from reinforcing those at another level. Nonalignment also facilitated the quest for national unity and a national identity. Like other developing countries Cameroon wanted very much to have her independence reaffirmed and her sovereign equality

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recognized. Establishing a position separate from, and implicitly morally superior to the Great Power blocs was thus enormously appealling. As ALi Mazrui observed, "nonalignment always reflected an emotional desire for equal dignity and for the right to be one's own policeman"[28].

Nonalignment seemed to symbolize freedom and independence and the right to decide important issues without Great Power meddling. All the conferences of the nonaligned, the summit meetings, and the declarations of Third World brother-hood (and First World duplicity) to the Ahidjo administration seemed to be a meaningless and hypocritical rhetoric, but it fitted its primary purpose because it provided the ceremonial and symbolic disguise for its pro-western capitalist alliance. From the Cameroonian perspective, nonalignment was not a policy but a frame of mind that sharpened and highlighted the illusion of national independence while at the same time providing the symbolism of the distinction between "we" and "they"[29].

In a way the general fuzziness of nonalignment in the 1960s, provided a sensible way out for the Ahidjo administration since it could accept all sorts of foreign ties in practice but still insist that it was nonaligned because it did not - formally - belong to one of the blocs. This tactical posture was possible, of course, because nonalignment was never very important to more than a handful of elites, and this was because Ahidjo's Cameroon was a country with transient delusions about the possibility of converting external ceremonial success into the internal consolidation realm. Nonalignment was chosen by Ahidjo because it always referred to global issues. Even when nonalignment was adopted because of its domestic utility, its rhetoric was concerned with the overarching issues of the Cold War and anti-colonialism (not anti-neocolonialism). Conversely, nonalignment had little if anything to say about either, local conflicts or economic relations among regional organizations.

Indeed, many of the potential conflicts within regional organizations were simply not foreseen, perhaps because primary attention was focused on the former colonial mentor. However, there were two major strands in Cameroon's nonalignment policy. The first was tactical and opportunistic and reflected the desire to take advantage of a particular structural configuration within the international system, to squeeze out foreign resources for

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the promotion of domestic economic development. The other major strand in the nonalignment option of Cameroon was that it (nonalignment) provided the moral disguise for the defence of dependent capitalism at home. Thus, wholly apart from the moral hypocrisy provided by nonalignment, the moral strand was related however distantly, to the current of world opinion in the 1960s that the small powers were somehow intrinsically more moral than the large - that is, Nehru's concept of establishing a "Zone of Peace" - inplicity a morally superior zone - between the Great Power blocs which was the most fashionable version of this assumption in the 1960s.

But one thing is clear that whatever strand of Cameroon's non-alignment we select, the direction of interest was the expliotation of the global system in the interest of domestic capitalist development. If a scale of priorities could have been established for Cameroon in relationship to nonalignment during the Ahidjo administration, a distinction would have been made between two areas of symbolic concern and two areas of substantive concern:-

(1) The global arena was fundamentally an area of ceremonial and symbolic concern, used to create a national identity, to reaffirm the acquisition of independence and sovereign equality and to provide the elites with the status and prestige attendant on "international" statesmanship. In some ways the global arena could be used in this fashion only because the elites were primarily concerned with domestic political stability and did not fully understand the extent to which the capitalistic patterns and trends of the international economic system affected the alternatives they had chosen.

(2) The regional level always seemed more important than it was; that is, it seemed as if the region ought to have been important for states which were manifestly too weak to go very far on their own; example, UDEAC, OCAM, OAU... and so on. But rhetoric dominated substance, here, in the case of Cameroon. Regional partners were too weak to be of much material use even if they had wanted to cooperate because communications, transport and trading ties were still directed towards the former metropolitant areas. What was left were expressions of brotherhood - Central African Solidarity, pan Africanism and so forth. Therefore, inter-regional affairs had so little to do with the dominant domestic conflicts in Cameroon so much so that Cameroonian leaders could do as much as they wanted in that arena and since

the regional was not very important, they could whip old friendships and transient ties could determine particular outcomes[30].

Therefore, regional cooperation as a pillar of authentic nonalignment for Cameroon did not get very far, not only because neighbours were too weak to be useful, but also because active mistrust and fear of neigbours existed. In this circumstance mutual antipathy destroyed the flexibility provided by mutual indifference. Indeed, Cameroon wanted to ensure national before regional development and was not willing to sacrifice special accords with any extra area outside capitalist Great Powers or any revenue from substituting a regional for a national tarrif boundary. Material weakness, the reluctance of elites in Cameroon to surrender any aspects of the sovereignty (except for personal benefits) and the indifference to and dislike of neighbours combined to limit the practical significance of regionalism as an important component of nonalignment and national independence.

(3) Objective calculations of real interests prevailed at two levels in Cameroon's nonalignment. Bilateral capitalist Great Power relationships were generally perceived as too important to be sacrificed to the ideological rhetoric of nonalignment. These relationships through "secret accords" were usually carefully separated from the wider systemic relationships because they were always considered unique and different. Therefore, while colonialism was universally attacked, this rhetoric did not prevent the Ahidjo administration from persisting with profound ties with the "former" colonial rulers. This is because Ahidjo was especially conscious of the implications of the economic development strategy he had chosen and the need for aid and investments from the West for its sustenance. Foreign investment was sought and protected, expatriate officials exercized significant power, and the foreign policy behaviour of the country was restrained and moderated. But this sacrifice of national independence did not prevent Ahidjo's Cameroon from being a member in reasonably good standing of the nonaligned movement.

(4) The other area in which objective calculations prevailed in Cameroon's nonalignment might be called the contiguous environment or local areas of discord. Border areas were too important and potentially dangerous to be analysed either ideologically or in romantic terms of nonaligned brotherhood. Extroverted domestic capitalism in itself dictated a conservative domestic policy because the materialization of whatever threats to its security was likely to be heavily dependent for success on sanctuary and support from

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a hostile neighbour[31]. The point here is that the nonaligned policy of Cameroon always advocated the peaceful settlement of disputes, (especially with neighbours) whatever the merits of the case at hand. Thus, as a member of the movement of nonalignment Cameroon could expect much help both from her capitalist Western friends as well as her peers if a festering dispute erupted into war. In this sense,vigilance and preparation became an imperative component of her substantive nonalignment. This calculation proved its vitality and dynamism during the Cameroon - Nigeria border crisis in 1981 when the Ahidjo administration under the cloak of nonalignment exercized extreme prudence about getting involved in "foreign adventures". This is self-explanatory because commitment to the status quo had far more to do with careful calculations of self-interests than with normative calculations about the need to establish principles of international law, justice, harmony and progress.

After such a discussion of the implications of Cameroon's nonalignment, three basic questions come into consideration with regards to the practical application of nonalignment in Cameroon's diplomatic postures. First of all, since nonalignment aims at maximizing national independence as its end product and since real independence in a developing country as Cameroon can be ensured only through a reasonable level of development of economic resources, the national economy and society, and since in the modern era of neo-colonial penetration of national economies by the advanced countries, national power and independence (by the implications of nonalignment) impel a judicious diversification of external economic transactions, the question arises as to how nonalignment as a foreign policy option in Cameroon helped the country in maintaining a reasonable mesure of balance in external transactions.

9.3: CAMEROON AND THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

Central to Cameroon's attitude towards the OAU, was Ahidjo's firm belief that a rational and moral international order based on universally valid principles could not be achieved. According to this realist view, the demands of expediency and narrow self-interests of states transcend the limits of morality. Foreign policy should, therefore, not be limited by any morality or principles which are universally binding on states but rather by the expression of national self-interest embodied in the respect for the terrirorial integrity and sovereignty of states as well as the non-interference into the internal affairs of other states. Inherent in this attitude was an acceptance of the idea that there cannot be political morality without serious considerations of the political consequences of universal principles. It entailed the rejection of moral principles as a guide to action and the recognition of historic precedents. Ahidjo's model of diplomatic strategy took cognizance of the fact that "national interest has always been... whatever the policy-makers have at any given moment decided it should be"[32]. Against this background, our intention here will be to examine the implications Cameroon's pro-capitalist economic development for African Unity.

Within this context we can assert that the orientation and configuration of Cameroon's African diplomacy did not emanate from any historical accident but was the product of a domestic pro-capitalist economic system. The general orientation of Cameroon's behaviour towards the Organisation of African Unity was provided by Ahidjo himself in these words:

> The destiny of our country (Cameroon) is, indeed inseparable from the destiny of the entire African Continent. This destiny must be thought out and realized in freedom and dignity by African peoples themselves, which means evidently, the total Liberation of Africa from colonialism and racial discrimination [33].

The central issue is not really the above statement of intentions by the Cameroonian President but rather the reality of how far Cameroon's inter-African relations and diplomacy went concordantly with the ideals which are fully spelt out in the OAU charter. It is within this orbit that the official pronouncements and practical diplomatic behaviour of Cameroon, when pitted against the exigencies of these OAU principles reveal a curious adulteration.

Right from independence Cameroon adopted a low profile to any supranational African organization with political ambition. Cameroon was a member of the first African bloc to break the front of Pan-African Unity. In fact, in December 1960, she became a prominent member of the "conservative" Brazzaville Francophone African states, who under Gaullist influence pitted up against the views and actions of the Pan-Africanist "radicals". To follow

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up her conservative stance at Brazzaville 1960, in May 1963 Cameroon threw its weight behind the Monrovia group of "moderate" states in order to buffer the casablanca group of "progressive" African states advocating a federal solution to the political unification of Africa. Cameroon's response to the federalist prophecy of "Africa must Unite" or perish was the pluralist conception that "immediate" continental unity was an idealistic and impracticable ambition. Indeed, Ahidjo squarely marshalled his conception of African Unity in these words:

> For Cameroon, the matter is clear. A continental government at the present hour appears to raise anew a pure political utopia. This would be a snare for all African peoples, the construction of a false facade and a parade (for the benefit of) the exterior, an instrument without any real effectiveness for the true evolution (or) improvement in the life of the African, a source of confusion, indeed of difficulties in the way of inter-African co-operation [34].

The above declaration by Ahidjo was just a remote extension of the Monrovia group's pluralist conception of African Unity which was summarised in their final communique as follows:

> The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not political integration of sovereign states but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African solidarity and political indentity [35].

The Ahidjo conception of African unity and solidarity, from the above citations was pluralist, i.e. the view that nation - states consitute the basic unit in the process of integration. The conception of African unity which relied more on harmonisation and saw the component parts of the community - model African unity to be nation-states who although they retain their soveireignty, could modify the way in which they deal with each other by means of harmonization of values, perceptions and habits. This Gaullist conception of politics emphasized the role of self-interest and socio-political attitudes and is very remniscent of the realist conception of the nature and composition of the basic units of the international system.

As we can see this conception was antithetical to the federalist views of the Casablanca Group whereby African Unity was viewed to entail the immediate creation of a central political authority involving a territorial

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dispersion of power and the binding commitment to an irrevocable union. African unity was viewed in the context of a political kingdom. Therefore the Casablanca federalist approach posited the building of a supranational body - a political community - as the end-product of African integration. In this thinking power was the heart of the matter and the main aim was to harness power by direct political acts envinced in constitutions. The concern was the allocation of power to units of the African federal system, and checks and balances between the power of the centre and the units.

Despite the conceptual incompatibility between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups on the content and nature of African unity in which Cameroon found herself in the Monrovia pluralist conservative camp, Cameroon's rejection and initial hostility towards the idea of an African political union was perhaps owed to Gaullist influence. The architects of the "Federal Union Government" for Africa were radicals like Ghana which consistently fought Ahidjo's regime in Yaounde. The bitter and bloody struggle for Cameroon's independence and reunification had caused a severe strain in relations between Accra and Yaounde. This conflict accruing from the actions of Guinea and Ghana in giving refuge to the rebels of the Ahidjo regime under Dr. Felix Moumie was further to push Ahidjo into a resistance of the radicialism of of Nkrumah. However, the liaison for reconciliation came in 1960 when during the West Cameroon's independence struggle Nkrumah supported J.N. Foncha whose K.N.D.P. party was "highly traditionalist and conservative in its image" against Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, the first anglophone Cameroonian leader to have spoken "the language of anti-imperialism" when he attended the All African Peoples' Congress in 1958.

Nkrumah supported Foncha in the 1959 elections because of the latter's anti-Nigerian approach to reunification. Nigeria's staunch opposition to Nkrumah's continental ambitions, made Nkrumah to fear the possibility of "getting Nigeria too big". Ahidjo thus exploited the anti-Nigerian strategy of Nkrumah-backed Foncha to win a concession from Nkrumah who then had:

> to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the state of the (French) Cameroon and to extend to the new state a hearty welcome into the Comity of Nations [36].

Ahidjo reacted furiously to Nkrumah and Toure's refusal to give full recognition to his government. Dr. E.N. Tatah Mentan's account adequately summarises the point:

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> He (Ahidjo) used conservative William Tubman to make the Nkrumah-Toure ambition to unify Ghana, Guinea and Liberia conditional on the full recognition of the Yaounde regime. Since Nkrumah and Toure became frustrated by the stalled negotiations for the union which they wanted to utilise as a showpiece of African unity, Ghana and Guinea conceded partially to recognize the existence of the State, not the Ahidjo government [37].

The main concern of the Ahidjo regime to dislodge the international wing of the UPC was due to the fact that, if the UPC compaigns started abroad did not amount to anything internally, the propaganda broadcast from Cairo, Conakry and Accra certainly prejudiced the chances of the Ahidjo regime being easily accepted within the African framework. Organisations supporting the UPC in London and Paris - where its material was also published extensively influenced the still insignificant members of the African intelligentsia and their sympathisers who were studying and working in these capitals. The UPC party had also apparently established cordial relations with the USSR and China. Although the Soviet Union had recognized Cameroon from the outset, its attitude to the new State was equivocal, while the Peking government continued to receive visits from UPC leaders in exile and to support them with money and material[38]. It is in this background that we can begin to understand some of the remote foundations of Ahidjo's pluralist stance on African unity.

In 1963 Yaounde sought to fight it with Accra on the Union Government campaign. The Cameroonian representatives, at the Addis-Ababa founding meeting summit of the OAU in May 1963 lobbied within their more populous Monrovia group. When this Conservative Monrovia Group successfully subverted the whole concept of Union Government, President Ahidjo turned against the radical's idea of an African High Command qualifying it as constituting the most dangerous instrument fabricated by the radicals to radiate subversion into the moderate African countries. The Ahidjo stance is epitomised by his declaration during the Cairo Summit in 1964 that:

> I should like to state, on my behalf and on behalf of a great many states, for the present at least, the most serious threat to our States is that of subsidized subversion teleguided from other African States [39].

The "other African States" were evidently Ghana, Guinea and Egypt. France's nuclear tests in the Sahara in 1960 attracted no comments from the

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moderate states. These tests condemned by Ghana, Egypt and Guinea were warmly viewed in Yaounde as a deterrent to the "expansionist ambitions" of Nkrumah[40].

Since Ghana was given the "honour" of hosting the 1965 OAU Summit, Yaounde saw this as an opportunity to be exploited. Contacts were made with the Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny who accepted to shoulder the responsibility of reconciling Ghana and Cameroon, by negotiating for the return of the UPC refugees. Following a visit by Ghana's Botsio to Yaounde in September 1965, Nkrumah returned some UPC refugees to Cameroon with Houphouet-Boigny - the reconciliator - overseeing the visible efforts made to reintegrate them into the Cameroonian society so as to assure the Osagyefo that the rest would share the same fate. The ringleaders of the Acrra-based UPC like Woungly Massaga, Tchaptchet, etc. were parcelled to Egypt to enable President Ahidjo to attend the Accra Summit[41].

Despite the absence of any clear break with the colonial past in the post independence Cameroonian diplomatic programme, it however, shared common features with all African states i.e. "a shared conception of the fact that they need one another"[42]. The most astonishing introduction of certain clauses in the preambule of the 1972 Cameroonian constitution is perhaps a pointer to a change of strand on the part of the ruling Cameroonian class in favour of a supranational organization in Africa:

> Convinced (the Cameroonian people) that the salvation of Africa lies in the achievement of more and more straightforward solidarity among African States, their desire to arrive at (using Cameroon's independence as an instrument) African Unity and freedom, while still maintaining peaceful and fraternal relations with other peoples of the world, in conformity with the principles of the U.N charter [43].

The idea of "using Cameroon's independence as a instrument of African unity and freedom" is not a novelty in Cameroonian political rhetoric. As far back as 1964, President Ahidjo became vocal about using the Anglophonie and the Francophonie as the foundations of Cameroon's colonial heritage to transform the country into the catalyst of African unity[44]. This idea was put to the test in domestic and external politics. At the domestic level, the incrementalist approach to the national question, that of moving from a federal state in 1961 to a unitary one in 1972 which

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consisted in using the transformation of this anglo-French heritage into a unitary state was regarded as the only realistic approach to African unity. In fact, many Cameroonian intellectuals had nursed the ambition of effectively deploying the linguistic and cultural heritage of the country to promote African unity. For example as a partisan of bilingualism and biculturalism in Cameroon, Professor Bernard Fonlon used his intellectual background in the Sorbonne and Oxford, his ministerial position and his prolific writings in Cameroon Times and in the Cameroon Cultural Review, Abbia, to stir many Cameroonians in the 1960s. Indeed, Fonlon and other more radical nationalist intellectuals tended to conceive of Cameroon's bilingualism and biculturalism as a potent weapon against the neo-colonialism of the French Union

The domestic climate of opinion influenced Cameroon's approach to the OAU, though not radically. It provided the leverage for President Ahidjo to uphold before many OAU member States that Francophonie and Anglophonie were of great significance in the coordination and harmonization of the general policies of member States in the domain of political and diplomatic cooperation as stated in the OAU charter. The test of credibility for this "linguistic" diplomacy which projected Cameroon as a true Union of brothers from which both sides of the African colonial heritage could draw strength, was the ease with which Ahmadou Ahidjo got through the election of two Cameroonians to the post of the OAU Secretary General in quick succession - with Nzo Ekah Nghaki being elected in 1972 and William Eteki Mboumoua succeding him in 1974 [45].

Indeed, if there is one thing for which President Ahidjo could be credited diplomatically, then it was his ability to depict Cameroon as standing above Anglophone-Francophone squabbles in Africa. In fact, Ahidjo in an interview made this clear when he said:

> I have never concealed the fact that Cameroon being majority Francophone, we are prepared to participate in all cultural activities with Francophone African States. Nevertheless, we shall not participate in what might look like a war machine against the Anglophone world [46].

Eventhough in March 1970, Yaounde adopted a Convention instituting the French Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, in 1973 in Paris,

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1975 in Bangui, 1976 in Paris and 1977 in Dakar, President Ahidjo rejected the idea of participation in the Franco-African "Summits". Despite these overtures, Cameroon's African diplomacy never embraced the federalist concept of a Union Government for Africa, as anything serious, not even to talk of its being incorporated as a foreign policy commitments. While not totally in support of Dr. Mentan's conclusion that the Cameroonian approach to African unity ignored the fact that "merely demonstrating the need for an institution does not bring it into existence"[47], one would not fail to assert that such a conclusion falls short of a deep-seated understanding and interpretation of a perpetual contradiction that characterised politics (both internally and externally) in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration. Perhaps the most basic dialectic in Cameroon diplomatic history during the Ahidjo Administration was the quest for a contitental unity and the pull exerted by a continuing colonial dependency upon the Western capitalist world (especially France). The quest for a continental autonomy as symbolised by Ahidjo's conservative conception of a pluralist African nationalism, commitment to pan-African solidarity and the continuing dependency upon the capitalist world was best illustrated by paternalistic and monopolistic political economic traditions which could not permit the continent to move towards both genuine self-discovery and self-reliance nor towards a just and beneficial relationship with the human heritage as a whole. This Western capitalist alignment is best illustrated by the reality of Cameroon's economic external dependency. Besides, this conflict of principles over reality in Cameroon's African diplomacy was the remote extension of a wider conflict that has stumbled Africa since independence - the conflict between the ambition of a self-reliant Africa and the cosmopolitan ideal of "Eurafrica" i.e. the wider dialectic of nationalist versus internationalism which in turn relates to the genesis of African self-assertion[48].

9.4: CAMEROONIAN DIPLOMACY AND REGIONALISM

Regional cooperation can be defined as "any inter-state activity with less than universal participation designed to meet some commonly experienced need"[49]. The need can be military, political, economic or it may be of social, technical or residual public interest. So defined, regional cooperation was not entirely new to Cameroon. In the colonial era cooperative arrangements abounded among territories belonging to the Afrique Equatoriale Française. For example, the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun met a regional economic need. The motive for cooperation was

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imperial interest, the cooperative arrangements serving the colonial master's administrative convenience and fiscal needs or ensuring their trading companies' monopoly and profits. From the terminal years of colonialism when Cameroonians began to occupy responsible political positions, and particularly from 1960 Cameroon began to develop new patterns of continental and regional cooperative arrangements. Her efforts often involved what Green and Krishna[50] call a "creative destruction" of colonial arrangements or their modification to meet her needs and aspirations. Nevertheless, the motive in the post colonial struggle for cooperative arrangements was primarily economic in Cameroon. As Jalloh rightly observes:-

> A motivating factor was consciousness of the small size of most of the countries involved and the realization of many of them that without joining others in larger groups, they face serious obstacles in promoting their economic development. In this, they were particularly influenced by the creation and success of the EEC. The reasoning was that if even major countries like France and Germany felt the need for regional integration, such a need was even greater for far smaller and underdeveloped countries [51].

Secondary politico-security motives reinforced the economic rationale behind the post-colonial efforts at cooperation. Small, economically and militarily weak, and politically insecure, Cameroon like most developing states needed to present a collective front against the rest of the world, particularly the most developed part of it, inorder to break down dependencies, political control and inferior status and to arrest the balkanization of Africa. There was also a defensive motive, arising from fear of larger and more powerful neighbours. Thus the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) was formed in part out of fear of the economic threat from Nigeria and Zaire and OCAM was partly inspired by fear of Ghana and the Casablanca bloc[52]. Therefore, cooperation and unity for collective betterment were at the centre of Cameroon's regional policy. Indeed, according to President Ahidjo, Pan-Africanism, as an idea and as a movement on the African continent, was predicated on cooperation and unity. Therefore, Cameroon's struggle to develop new patterns of post-colonial, continental and regional co-operative arrangements was, in a real sense, an aspect of her contribution to the struggle to institutionalize Pan-Africanism[53].

Thus efforts to institutionalize the concept of Pan-Africanism in the 1960s in cameroon structured and shaped the debate on the proper form

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and scope of Cameroon's sub-regional policy[54]. Attention became focused on the geographical scope as well as the intensity or degree of cooperation deemed necessary. As we saw above, Pan-Africanism was largely because Cameroon and other conservative states opposed it. Cameroon's position was that economic integration must precede political union and that economic integration itself must begin at the sub-regional level and proceed in stages beginning with functional cooperation and coordination and leading towards, perhaps, a common market. Cameroon thus favoured functionalism - the theory that co-operation in non-controversial areas leads to the acquisition of knowledge and skills which spill over to make cooperation in politically sensitive areas possible[55]. Clearly, too, Cameroon was imbued with the notion of the struggle for power in central Africa especially against Zaire.

The question of political unity on a continental or even regional basis was laid to rest with the formation and subsequent development of the OAU. The OAU it should be noted, was not formed to bring about unity hence the strong objections by most of the founding fathers to it being called the organization <u>for</u> African Unity. Rather the organization represented itself the extent and scope of political unity, the embodiment and expression of that unity, so it was rightly called the organization <u>of</u> African Unity[56] After the formation of the OAU the various political groups fizzled out. Meanwhile under the impetus of those states like Cameroon which favoured functional co-operation and co-ordination, and with the backing of United Nations General Assembly resolutions as well as the relenthles independent efforts of the United Nations Economic Commission For Africa,[57] it became generally acepted that for the purpose of economic cooperation and development cooperative efforts and organizations had to be centred on regions. Economic integration in Cameroon, therefore, took many forms, depending on the level of degree of discrimination which was eliminated.

Bela Balassa[58], identifies five levels at which discrimination may be removed and, by implication, five ideal-types of regional cooperation. At the lowest level is the free trade area in which tariffs and quotas are eliminated among the members of the integrating region. A customs union

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goes further. In addition to the elimination of tariffs and quotas, a customs union also eliminates discriminatory tariffs by non-members countries. This it does by setting up common external tariffs against such non-member countries. A third ideal-type (or level) of integration is the common market. This combines the features of the free trade area and the customs union with the elimination of obstacles to the free flow of the factors of production, namely labour and capital. Economic union or community goes one step further. It harmonizes economic policies among its members, sometimes including a common currency. Finally, at the highest level of integration we have political union. Here the very structures and political institutions which harmonize policies are themselves harmonized and become unified.

Given these various forms of economic integration we can say that the African regional organizations to which Cameroon belonged were, by and large, economic communities or, intended to be so even when they called themselves by different names. Jalloh reviewing the respective treaties which created the various economic communities observed that:

> They all aim at creating free trade among their members and joint co-ordination of commercial policies with respect to third parties. Besides the free movement of goods, there are also provisions for the movement of persons among the members. Co-ordination of other policies, notably policies on foreign investments, transportation, and industrial and economic development, is provided for. Finally there is the agreement to create and operate joint services in the area of education, infrastructure and research. Two of these regional organizations, OCAM and the Conseil de l'Entente, also include coordination of foreign policies among the tasks of the regional organizations [59].

Thus by 1982, Cameroon belonged to nearly thirty such organizations and this excluded affiliated institutions of the United Nations. Among them were the African Development Bank and its affiliated institutions, the African Timber Organization, Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aerienne en Afrique et Madagascar, Arab Bank for Economic Development, Cocoa Producers Alliance, Comité Inter-Africain d'Etudes Hydrauliques, Conférence Internationale des Contrôles d'Assurances des Etats Africains, Conférence des Ministres des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre sur les Transports Maritimes, Conseil Africain et Malgache pour l'Enseignement Supérieur, Lake Tchad Basin Commission, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organisation Commune de Lutte Anti-Acridienne et Antiaviare, Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne

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(OCAM) (up to 1972), Organization Interafricain du Café, Organisation Internationale Contre le Criquet Migrateur Africain, Niger Basin Authority, Section Regionale de l'Association des Aeroports Civils en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, Société Africaine de Développement des Industries Alimentaires à Base de Mil et de Sorgho (from 1980); Société de Développement Hotelière et Touristique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre (from 1981), UDEAC, Union Africaine des Postes et Télécommunications to name but these few.

One of the main features of Cameroon's regional policy was the contradiction between her willingness and determination to maintain and defend her independence and sovereignty and the necessity of promoting collective organizations as a means of ensuring this sovereignty. Alima[60] and Oyono[61] have recounted Cameroon's efforts in promoting regionalism in Africa as means of reinforcing her domestic power base and of maximizing her foreign policy choices. Such an interpretation is not only a restatement of the official rhetoric of the government but fails to conceive Cameroon's regional diplomatic postures as reflecting a tactical manipulation of a difficult situation in the interest of a domestic peripheral capitalism. The inability to see Ahidjo's regional diplomatic postures as well-conceived and calculated to sustain a domestic capitalist development, has led some critics like Ndiva Kofele Kale to the conclusion that "Cameroon's fellowership rather leadership stature in African Unity has been due to the absence of a mobilizing ideology guiding foreign policy"[62]. In the light of our preceeding discussion, it becomes clear that "Cameroon's fellowship rather than leadership" was the inevitable and logical consequence of a peripheral capitalist development at home which demanded an inherent conservatism of the leadership in its general political orientation as well as an attitude of <u>reaction</u> rather than <u>radicalism</u> in her diplomatic format. The validity of this interpretation find expression in Cameroon's " accommodationist gradualism"[63] (rather than transformationist radicalism) that Ahidjo himself often expressed in this common Cameroonian logic:

> Nobody starts building from the top. African unity must be built on regional solidarity which must continue to broaden [64].

The strategy for implementing this accommodationist regional foreign policy choice was explained by the foreign minister as entailing three essential objectives (a) to ensure that a Cameroonian presence was equal to

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the necessities of the situation; (b) to ensure Cameroon's active participation in regional organizations in a bid to strengthen all efforts of peace and cooperation, and (c) to make the impact of Cameroon felt so that its influence and voice will clarify the national interest and the interest of world peace[65]. Therefore, an attitude of conservatism and prudence characterized her conception of regional cooperation and it is within this context that Cameroon's participation in (a) the lake Chad Basin Commission (CBC), (b) the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) and (c) l'Organisation Commune d'Afrique et Malgache (OCAM) will be examined.

(A) LAKE CHAD BASIN COMMISSION (CBC)

One of the cornerstones of Cameroon's diplomacy during the Ahidjo administration was therefore the use of regional cooperation to sustain the domestic capitalist system at home. In this perspective, regional cooperation provided a means by which the regime could avoid any destabilizing manoeuvres from the neighbouring countries perpetrated by groups opposed to the regime especially the UPC. Secondly, regionalism provided the regime with an anchorage from where to check expansionist ambitions of "mighty" neighbours like Nigeria. Thirdly, regional cooperation provided an insurance policy with which to deal with the already explosive internal situation in Cameroon (UPC rebellion). Therefore, regionalism to Ahidjo did not only offer some opportunities that were beyond the range of small domestic markets and some protection against the pressures of the international economic and political system, but more especially regionalism provided more security, more peace, and the congeniality of safely promoting a domestic capitalism as well, to cramp down on culprits. Regional integration in post-independence Cameroon thus began as a classic foul-weather measure, a response to domestic failures and international complicity with foreign capital.

It is within this background that the "Convention and Statute Relating to the Development of the Chad Basin" as the foundation document of the Treaty giving birth to the Lake Chad Basin Commission was approved in 1962 and signed in May 1964 by the First and Second Chad Conferences of Heads of State of Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon[66]. All the signatory States had land around the Lake Chad Basin. The CBC States agreed on certain principles. First, they had always to consult the commission on their new projects and plans in the area for joint approval. Secondly, they had to refrain from any

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sort of land development and water resources utilisation that was likely to jeopardize the nature of the general water system of the Lake as well as its basin. Thirdly, the signatories had to appoint two commissioners each to the commission among whom the Executive Secretary had to be chosen. The commission was constituted by all the commissioners, (fourthly), who had the powers:

(a) to prepare general regulations which, when approved by the member states, would be enforced by the commission.

(b) to recommend plans for joint projects and research;

(c) to maintain a liason between member states;

(d) to formulate common transport and navigation rules, staff regulations and administratives codes;

(e) to settle disputes after hearing complaints; and

(f) to prepare a budget which could be raised by member states through contributions[67].

The first commission which had a ten-years term of office during which eleven sessions were held between 1964 and 1970 sought the participation of United Nations agencies in the area of water resources development and utilization. While the U.N. Special Fund financed the water resources study, UNESCO handled the project itself and the FAO allied the UNESCO study on the development of agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries. In a draft agreement on water utilization and conservation in the Lake Chad Basin produced by FAO, emphasis was laid on "the reasonable and equitable sharing of resources, the regulation of the existing and future uses of these resources and the injuries caused by national projects"[68]. However, outside the domain of water resources development and utilization, transport development projects within the area were to be financed by the United States of America and these included raod networks linking Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad as well as the road link between Cameroon and Chad. The commission also embarked on the development of telecommunications networks between the CBC States[69].

The cooperation between most underdeveloped countries has always suffered from the vice of external financial dependency. It is within this framework that the commission's attempt to realize its telecommunication

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and transport projects through the financial subventions of major aid donors such as the World Bank, USAID, EDF and the Federal Republic of Germany, could be adequately explained. However, the first ten years of the first commission led to a reasonable degree of development planning and implementation of programmes with noticeable achievements in agricultural studies, irrigation and health in the basin.

The CBC was ruined by crisis and constraints in the early seventies. High among these was escalating governmental instabilities coupled with political crisis that affected the region. The traumas of a devastating and bloody civil war in Nigeria (1967-1970); violent military coups d'Etat ousted civilian governments in Niger and Chad in 1974 and 1975 respectively. The consequences of such wave of political instability in the region was the pre-occupation of the military juntas in Nigeria, Niger and Chad with domestic consolidation of power and their entanglements with the politico-economic heritage and government to the detriment of the success of the commission.

The 1972-1974 drought catastrophy constituted the test of regional commitment on the part of member states. The failure (unwillingness) of the member states to use the CBC machinery to seek solutions to the disaster coupled with their failure to provide long, medium and short-term programming in their conception of the irrigation, agricultural and water utilization projects as well as the failure to convene neither an emergency session of the Heads of State nor the council was a glacing illustration of the salient fact that regionalism among developing countries has always remained a cooperation of the victims of domestic and international pressures in which the region has always been symbolically impotent , perhaps as a repository of shared experiences and resentments. Mentan's comments in this regard are instructive:

> Even frustrating, none of the member states used its initiative to act outside the commission's framework to bring all the states together to seek joint solutions to the drought. No sense of urgency united them on the too obvious and important goal of food production and water conservation utilization to avoid the consequences of another drought. Rather, Niger, Chad and Cameroon sought external aid from the UN, EEC and other "friends".[70]

However, there is the possibility that Cameroon and Chad were losing hope in the CBC since General Gowon's ambition to establish an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1972 was welcomed in Yaounde and Ndjamena with suspicion and indifference. Ahidjo and Tobalbaye's rejection

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of ECOWAS was, however, attenuated by the assurance of their strong desire not to go beyond bilateral agreements and "commitment" to the existing multilateral CBC and River Niger Basin Commission in the intensification of cooperation with Nigeria and the strengthening of the relations of good neighbourliness. Indeed, Ahidjo was speaking for both states when he made it known to Gowon that rather than join the West African economic grouping, Cameroon and Chad, will like to welcome "your great country as a full member of an economic grouping of Central African Nations"[71].

Table 9(1): MATRIX OF INTRA-CBC STATES IMPORTS, 1970
(Million U.S dollars)

To	From			
	Cameroon	Chad	Niger	Nigeria
Cameroon	-	0.06	-	0.3
Chad	1.6	-	-	5.8
Niger	-	-	-	0.8
Nigeria	0.4	-	0.1	-

Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1970-1971 p. 281.

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Although the Lake Chad Basin Commission was reactivated, the full exploitation of this regional cooperation in terms of international trade among CBC member states, was seriously hampered by Nigeria's non-membership of the Franc Zone. As Tables 9(1) and 9(2) demonstrate, the volume of trade that existed in this region was negligible in relationship to the basin's potentialities.

Table 9(2): MATRIX OF INTRA-CBC EXPORTS, 1970
(Million U.S. dollars)

From	To			
	Cameroon	Chad	Niger	Nigeria
Cameroon	-	1.6	-	0.4
Chad	0.3	-	-	0.8
Niger	-	-	-	6.3
Nigeria	0.1	-	0.009	-

Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1970-1971; p.281.

Again, Mentan made an eloquent assessment of the situation when he wrote:

> Inter-State trade among CBC members could be very lucrative if Niger, Cameroon and Chad were not bound to the franc zone tariff wall which highly discriminates against non-EEC (especially French) commodities. The competitive nature of their economies cannot fully account for the low export trade because even re-export trade is possible. For instance, even French-made goods are generally cheaper in Nigeria than in the franc zone states [72].

The above comments only go a long way to explain the fact that regional cooperation among poor countries has not been much more than symbolically important because the practical problems - both political and economic - that these countries confront do not seem to have regional solutions (this is because of neocolonialism). The problems appear either local or global in origin, and regional institutions and processes have seemed too weak to deal with pressures or conflicts from either direction. Moreover, as the CBC case demonstrates regional organisations have rarely been given either the resources or the authority to act autonomously in pursuit of regional goals. The region has thus remained a negative and defensive arena, turned to only as a last resort when local problems threaten to get out of hand and international solutions are unavailable or unappetizing. The ultimate consequence of this trend has been that regional groups have become varitable forums and fashionable models of the demand and supply of international capital finance and technique for the support of "friendly and corrupt" regimes and for the overthrow of unfriendly radical regimes in an attempt to establish a sphere of influence - all of these in the name of development assistance.

(B) NIGERIA AND CAMEROON

Although the economic benefits were discouraging, interaction among CBC states had the effect of "cooling" off combustible inter-state problems as well as strengthening their links. For example, Nigeria's gigantic size and the consequent fear of expansionist ambitions on the Cameroonian side; the French efforts to use Cameroon to penetrate anglophone Africa; the principle of good neighbourliness interpreted as "the biscuit to shut the baby's mouth in order to deal with the mother"; all constituted the centralities of Cameroon's diplomacy towards Nigeria. These factors compounded to give Nigeria a pivotal position in Cameroon's relations with its neighbours. Nevertheless these relations started on a bad note at independence. Kale has rightly summed up this icy state of the Nigero-Cameroonian relations in these succinct words:

> The loss of Northern Cameroons to Nigeria following the results of the 1961 UN supervised plebiscite evoked strong official resentment and for several years the anniversary of this event was observed in as official mourning day for the "lost territories [73].

Buttressed strongly by France, Cameroon took the case to the International Court of Justice and the outcome of the case against Cameroon, strained Nigero-Cameroon relations and Anglo-French relations on the other.[74] Thanks to the interaction within the CBC framework Nigeria and Cameroon came to iron out their differences.

The reality of Nigero-Cameroonian relations came to discredit Martin Wight's claim in his "pattern of power" theory that "neighbouring states are usually enemies... common frontiers are usually disputed, and your natural ally is the power in the rear of your neighbour"[75]. Although both states refrained from subsidizing "subversion" against each other, these friendly gestures did not imply the uneventful nature of these relations. An explosive boundary dispute troubled relations between the two neighbouring countries for long. Originating from an ill-defined stretch of border land in the area West of the Rio del Rey around Jabane, the dispute became almost intractable with Cameroon's discovery of significant oil deposits along the coast towards Limbe. After a series of meetings of the Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Commission, Gowon and Ahidjo met in August 1974 at Mokolo, in Cameroon and agreed to leave a two-kilometre-wide buffer zone on each side in the area[76]. This interim and superficial measure which left "the bomb untouched" was overturned when on May 15, 1981, Cameroon soldiers were reported to have killed five Nigerian soldiers on patrol in the disputed territory. The general sentiment which in Nigeria had risen up to the brink of war, held France as the instigator, using Cameroon, "to frustrate (Nigeria's) efforts... by cultivating relations that may not serve (Nigeria's) national interests"[77].

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It is most probable that France, in the event of a Nigero-Cameroonian border war, cannot abandon Cameroon by virtue of their military accords since 1960 but it also seems impossible to see France sacrifice its immense wealth from Nigeria to prosecute the war for Cameroon [78]. In fact, French diplomat in Yaounde was right in the following analysis:

> No doubt Cameroon has military assistance accords with France. But I do not see how France can use her troops to fight against Nigeria on behalf of Cameroon. Does it not occur to you that France's biggest market in Africa is Nigeria? Does this give room for such a Military adventure? What of the French businessmen in Nigeria? Can you imagine that they surpass those in Francophone Africa? [79].

However, the diplomat insisted that France exerted pressure on Cameroon to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. During Ahidjo's visit to Nigeria in January 1982 "both parties... expressed regret at the border clash between the two countries... and resolved not to allow the incident to affect cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon"[80].

Furthermore, the Nigerian and Cameroonian principals resolved to reactivate their dormant Joint Commission to handle and diffuse similar explosive incidents. One would concord with the New Nigerian newspaper of 18 January, 1982 when it estimated that "the restraint exercised by the two governments and (their) quiet diplomacy "was exemplary for other African states"[81]. But what was important was the finding of a permanent solution to the problem not whether an adhoc solution to a permanent problem was exemplary.

However, what was exemplary was that the two countries came to understand the great lesson of history that in the modern times war has become so costly, so destructive, so imprecise in its impact and unpredictable in its result that its continued use for settlement of disputes is not only insupportable but also constitute a sovereign suicide and a dangerous self-abnegation. Nigeria and Cameroon quickly understood that a war between them will have no victor.

Commerical and trade relations were another area of concern for the two states. Smuggling was of great concern to Cameroon, for goods

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coming illegally from Nigeria undercut Cameroon industries and lower the receipts from import taxes that were so important to the Cameroonian budget. Nigeria sought to increase its trade with Cameroon, seeing the Cameroonian population as a logical market for Nigerian-produced goods. Cameroon feared that such competition would undermine its struggling industrial sector and thus did not wish to see an increase in this trade. It is widely assumed that this was the cause of Cameroon's failure to improve the miserable highway links between the two states. Cameroon could benefit from an increased sale of foodstuffs to Nigeria, which suffers a severe food deficit situation; but such an increase might have caused high food prices in cameroon and might have given Nigeria reason to have insisted on opening the Cameroon market for Nigerian goods. As a result of these considerations smuggling continued at a high but unmeasured rate and legitimate trade remained small. Cameroon's long-term interest lay (and still lies) in developing links with its UDEAC partners preventing the spread of Nigerian economic ties to the area. France although developing strong economic links with Nigeria, prefers to see Cameroon - and France - remain the major economic influence in the UDEAC area, too.

(c) UDEAC

The participation of Cameroon in the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) represented a veritable extension of national external dependency into a regional external dependency. Cameroon saw UDEAC as a forum of self-determination and an important instrument in a self-reliant development strategy but upto 1982 UDEAC provided only limited gains to member states. In fact, the only success of UDEAC was that it managed to survive and the greatest contribution of Cameroon to UDEAC was that it helped UDEAC to survive. Ahidjo's insistence on the "frank" negotiations in UDEAC and his general conception of UDEAC as an organisation to "effectively neutralise forces of resistence which within or without tend to impede our continent from being stable" reveal themselves as a gross exaggeration when one makes a detailed study of the UDEAC. Here the conditions under which competitive nationalism was evoked to the detriment of industrial coordination are exposed, highlighted in particular by the emphasis on trade liberalization as the engine integration in a context shaped by the existence of market-segmenting fiscal policies and excessively generous

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investment codes. Under such conditions and in view of the outward-oriented pattern of production and the absence of industrial planning, it was inevitable that few benefits would be generated by regional integration processes. Since UDEAC constituted the most important regional organisation to which Cameroon belonged and since UDEAC demonstrated some of the important aspects in the failure of regionalism to provide the safety-belt for the self-relaint development of the region, a detailed analysis of UDEAC in terms of competition and conflict amongst the member states will adequately reveal the role of UDEAC as an instrument of national self-reliance in cameroon[82].

The UDEAC operated mainly as a Customs Union, though there were some attempts at constructing an economic union. As noted in AGBOR-TABI's recent study of UDEAC, the reality is that very little trade occurred between the member states. Each was basically a producer of raw materials for European economies and the members had little to offer each other[83]. There was some transit trade especially through Douala into the Central African Republic and Chad; and there was also a growing trade in foodstuffs from Cameroon to food-deficient Gabon. A large number of Cameroonians found employment in Gabon or were involved there in commerce and transport. The real significance of UDEAC for cameroon was that in future it could become a valuable market for cameroonian goods. Infrastructural development was a key need before that future could begin to take shape. France, among other Western donors provided substantial assistance for the development of such infrastructure - roads, railroads, port facilities - that improved Cameroon's central position in the region. Douala with its port and growing industrial, commercial and banking sectors became the major pole of development for the entire UDEAC region. Such a development was in the best interests of both Cameroon and France, for it was largely French investors and the Ahidjo administration that benefitted from this role.

The analysis of cooperation in UDEAC demonstrates that not until efforts to restructure the international division of labour through North-South negotiations had reached an impasse, and pressures resulting from the global economic crisis had mounted, was a reconsideration of the role which regional integration could play in the development of UDEAC member countries undertaken. Import substitution was running into trouble, for it was neither saving foreign exchange nor transforming domestic economies so as to allow

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these economies produce intermediate or capital goods. The growth rate for primary products had also slowed, apparently justifying Presbisch's export pessimism for the developing countries. But the need to export to acquire the necessary foreign exchange for financing the necessary imports was still strong. Since the advanced countries were not providing much help in either foreign aid or trade preferences, the only solution seemed to be regional integration. But on the contrary, apart from being an instrument of neo-colonialism, the UDEAC integration scheme was designed to extend the range of a domestic foreign-dominated import substitution to the entire region. Given the limitations of the UDEAC regional market such an arrangement was not likely to yield substantial benefits to Cameroon. Therefore in reality, Cameroon's participation in UDEAC cannot be regarded as a veritable example of the urge for regional integration but as a defensive reaction to the sense of loosing a place in the international system.

Again, this "gap" psychosis dominated the calculations of many developing countries. But free trade was always the doctrine of the strong, of those who had faith that they could compete and it was no less true when applied to UDEAC. In UDEAC what the weaker states feared was that Prebisch's vision of the international system in which the center exploited the periphery and compelled the periphery to live by exchanging primary products for manufactured goods, would be repeated within the region. Thus each member country of UDEAC sought to use the regional framework for different purposes: the weaker to compensate for their backwardness and to build an industrial base, the stronger merely to widen the available market and to improve their export performance. The weaker always wanted concessions to their weakness but the stronger were sufficiently satisfied with the status quo so much so that the need to sacrifice to ensure a better future never seemed overwhelming. As a result most of the regional integration schemes in UDEAC worked at cross-purposes. National interests dominated regional interests, and the region remained an afterthought to more pressing concerns.

However, within UDEAC Cameroon and Gabon came to establish exemplary and salutary relations eventhough these relations were sometimes disturbed by border disputes. By 1976, Cameroon was getting 80 percent of its oil needs from Gabon. With the British firms taking over 11 percent of

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the equity held by the French in the second tranche of the Eurotrag consortium building, (the two billion dollar transgabonese railway) the Cameroonian work force in Gabon increased tremendously to over 15.000 people . Gabon also obtained a heavy supply of its basic foodstuffs such as plantains, yams, rice, beans, vegetables etc. from Cameroon. Cameroonians and Nigerians dominated the retail trade business in Gabon.

The Multiple Gabon-Cameroon interactions were so vital to both states that explosive border disputes like the one splitting the Fang ethnic group between the two states was never allowed to degenerate into an inter-state military confrontation[84]. For example, France furnished documents and maps dating back to the Berlin Treaty of 1885 on the partition of Africa and also those redrawing the Gabon-Cameroon boundary after World War I to both states in the heat of a border dispute. On June 14, 1976 Presidents BONGO and AHIDJO met in Ngaoundere in Cameroon, to resolve the dispute and both delegations accepted from the "texts and maps that Gabon constructed a Gendarmerie post on Cameroonian territory"[85]. A final communique issued at the end of the meeting reaffirmed "their mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state"[86]. However, on the whole Cameroonian -Gabonese relations remained excellent.

Cameroon's relations with Equatorial Guinea were generally peaceful and positive because the Ahidjo administration rightly perceived that the existence of that small country could be significant for Cameroon in the future. Equatorial Guinea consists of two main parts. One is on the mainland between Cameroon and Gabon; the other consists of a relatively large island and a couple of small ones off the coast of Cameroon and Nigeria. Probably the greatest potential of this territory for Cameroon lay in the fact that the off-shore islands could be the basis of, or at least a part of, a dispute with Nigeria, the giant neighbour of Cameroon's West. Elements in both countries occasionally called for the annexation of these islands, and in view of other disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria this could be a serious issue. In the early 1960s, Ahidjo envisaged the formation of a trilingual federation, joining the English and French Cameroon with the the Spanish colony, now known as Equatorial Guinea. Students at the government's bilingual secondary school at Man O'War Bay received Spanish lessions in preparations for such an eventuality. In this respect, Cameroon

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was following an old French policy of extending influence over Equatorial Guinea.

Cameroon also supported the nationalist movement there as part of its general opposition to colonial rule, and Ahidjo welcomed the country's independence in 1968. Even to that point there was widespread support for a takeover, not only of the islands but also of the mainland portions both of which have strong cultural links with Cameroon peoples. On Equatorial Guinea's indepedence day, coastal Cameroon was rife with rumours of troop movements, the possibility of war with Gabon, and a takeover of the Spanish territory. Nothing occurred.

Independent Equatorial Guinea has had a difficult political and economic history, and it was ruled for many years by a regime similar to that of the IDI AMIN government in Uganda. During this period Cameroon received and cared for many refugees while attempting to influence the Equatorial Guinea Government to follow more reasonable policies. By the time, the almost inevitable coup d'Etat took place in that country, the economy, policy and society were in shambles.

The direction in relations between Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and their neighbours was towards limited economic cooperation since Equatorial Guinea was tied into the Spanish monetary system. However, it has now joined the Franc Zone, becoming a member of the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale. On December 19, 1983, at the 19th Summit of UDEAC, she became a full member of the organisation. The possibility of petroleum resources makes this small state an attractive partner for UDEAC and a member of the Franc Zone, all in keeping with France's long-term interests in the region.

(D) O.C.A.M.

L'organisation Commune d'Afrique et de Malgache (OCAM) formed in 1965 as successor to l'Union Africiane et Malgache de Coopération Economique (U.A.M.C.E.) was the embodiment of direct Gaullist neocolonialism in Francophone Africa. Since it was essentially " a reassertion of the

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loyalty of its members to France and to the French community" the fall of its architect -General de Gaulle - brought about its split in 1969[87]. Traxler's account in this regard is insightful:

> The unity of OCAM was severely tested, however, at the January 1969 summit meeting in Kinshasa when Congo and the Central African Republic boycotted the conference because of their differences with Zaîre. The dispute between Kinshasa and Brazzaville developed in October 1968, when President Mobutu ordered the execution of a former rebel leader, Pierre Mulele, who returned to Zaîre expecting a full pardon after voluntary exile in Brazzaville. The trouble between the Central African Republic and Zaîre exploded when, in December 1968, the former withdrew from Mobutu's UDEAC formed earlier in the year [88].

Cameroon initially as an active member of OCAM whose head-quarter was in Yaounde, had to quit the organisation because of personality and policy controversies between Presidents Ahidjo and Houphouet-Boigny. Suspicious of the "hegemonic ambitions" of the Ivory Coast and "disappointed with the distribution of shares and allocations of contributions, Cameroon withdrew from Air Afrique, an OCAM affiliate, in the words of President Ahidjo, "to remove a challenge and prove its sovereignty"[89]. After the withdrawal from Air Afrique on 23 January, 1971, Cameroon proceeded to the formation of a "mixed economy" company Cameroon Airlines with an initial capital of 1.500.000.000 francs CFA, in which the Cameroon Government held 30 percent of the shares as of 11 June 1971[90]. However, a United States Export-Import Bank was to provide a total of two billion dollars for Cameroon's share of OCAM investment programme from 5 December 1971. The paternalism of Houphouet-Boigny and the "ivorisation" of OCAM coupled with the clashes between Ahidjo and Boigny with regards to the seat of the African Development Bank in 1964, led to the closure of the Cameroon Embassy at Abidjan in 1965 and it was not until March 1975 at Yaounde and August 1975 at Abidjan that both leaders resolved the conflict. But the reconciliation only came after Cameroon had pulled out of OCAM on 1 June 1973[91].

O.C.A.M provided a good forum for a common African diplomatic front against the "collective imperialism" of the EEC. With tacit French support, OCAM member states were able to protect their position on trade preferences effectively both at the meeting of the "Group of 77" in Algiers

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(10-25 October 1967) and at UNCTAD II in New Delhi (February 1968). However, the organization remained an embodiment of French presence in Africa. At the Niamey (January 1968) and the Kinshasa (January 1969) summits, OCAM member states envisaged the feasibility of developing a common African position during negotiations towards the renewal of the Second Yaounde Convention which was to expire on 31 May 1969. The Niamey and Kanshasa summits constituted the last summits that Cameroon attended as a member of OCAM. One of the fundamental reason for which Cameroon left OCAM was that the organisation being a purely francophone African club and Ahidjo having just achieved the liquidation of federal structures at home (20 May 1972) and having made known to Anglophone Cameroonians that Cameroon was neither Francophone nor Anglophone, saw the pulling out of OCAM as a strategic instrument not only to convince international opinion of Cameroon's position as a "catalyst" of African unity but to convince Angl ophone Cameroonians of his determination to make Cameroon neither Anglophone nor Francophone.

Again, the failure of OCAM as an instrument through which Cameroon could attain a leverage towards her economic development demonstrated not so much the perforating effects of French neocolonialism in post-independent Africa, but also pointed to the weaknesses of regional integration between poor and weak states. This failure epitomised the inability of OCAM member states to analyze the limitss and possibilities of regionalism. Whatever form it took, regional integration usually was suppose to involve trade liberalization, the removal of discrimination between the members of the arrangement but in the case of OCAM Cameroon faced a number of dilemmas: the benefits from integration were likely to be long-term, major changes in domestic institutions and processes seemed necessary, the quest for autonomy would have been underminded by relinquishing power to the Ivory Coast or the regional institutions of OCAM. dominated by Ivory Coast and since it was not the masses of Cameroon which benefitted but the elites, the slow and modest progress of OCAM was not very attractive psychologically to elites schooled in the French notion that externally dependent rapid growth and industrialisation were both a possibility and the solution to all the problems of underdevelopment.

Escalating domestic problems and increasing external dependency (in Cameroon) upon an uncertain and complex international environment meant that the response to regional integration was always conflict-ladden and what most of the elites of the OCAM member-states seemed to do was to hedge. That is, they made rhetorical commitment to OCAM and thereby turned it into a minimal extension of national extroverted production structures, mechanisms and transport links[92]. This was a low-risk, short-run strategy, because it offended as few domestic interests as possible and made no effort to transform the prevailing socio-economic structure. By the same token it was a low-gain, high-risk strategy over the long-run, for by failing to confront domestic problems and to make a genuine commitment to a dynamic form of regional cooperation, the elites of OCAM made it likely that the region soon ran into the same constraints that made these elites solicite OCAM (eventhough Gaullist France was very instrumental in OCAM's tacit unity in the 1960s).

However, as far as the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon was concerned, one would say that the prudence which they manifested about a fundamental commitment to regional integration within OCAM was not completely irrational but it was simply another illustration of the dysfunctions of external dependency as embodied in the so-called Planned Liberalism. It demonstrated further that cooperation with poor, weak and potentially unstable partners is clearly risky, especially for countries with small margins of error and a need for substantial short-run benefits. Nevertheless, regional integration remained a vital challenge that faced OCAM member states. But more serious efforts to cooperate failed because the political will to cooperate among the member states was not sufficiently strong.

Finally, the main lesson from the failure of OCAM to live up to the expectations of its founders is that cooperation without an underlying political commitment to create a genuine regional institution is inevitably limited and tenuous. Only agreements in which all members benefits immediately were really feasible. In addition, cooperation in OCAM was unlikely because it threatened existing bilateral aid and trade arrangements, impeded national development plans and endangered national elites and threatened to diminish their status. Since neither the weak nor the strong partners in OCAM were willing or able to sacrifice in the short-run, cooperation (or regionalism) never became much more than a last, reluctant resort when all else had failed. It is, therefore, hard to escape the impression that despite

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all the rhetoric, when faced with a choice between depending on the developed capitalist countries (especially France) or depending on neighbours, most of the elites really preferred dependency on France and other capitalist countries.

9.5: CRISIS DIPLOMACY AND CAMEROON'S FOREIGN POLICY

The pluralist approach which won the day at the OAU in 1963 and which Cameroon embraced found its expression in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). By the dictates of this article member states pledged to defend the territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the independence of each other. The acceptance of this principle therefore amounted to the acceptance of non-interference into the internal affairs of member states. However, Cameroon's reaction to three serious crises in Africa (the Congo Crisis, 1960-1965; the Chadian Crisis, and the Nigeria Civial War, 1967-1970) will help us to more adequately assess the dynamism of her diplomacy vis-à-vis these principles.

(A) THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1965

The Congo crisis of 1960-65 which could be described as the consequence of Belgian neo-colonialism began only five days after the independence of the Congo, that is, on July 5, 1960. Incidentally, taking place the day when the army units in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and Thysville mutinied, and culminating in the declaration of independence by Katanga with the backing of Union Minière under Mr. Moïse Tshombe, the Congo became the first picturesque demonstration of neo-colonialism at the peak in Africa. The intervention of the Belgian troops, the breakdown of law and order accentuated by tribalism, the material support given to the new Katanguese state by Union Minère, the dismissal of Lumumba and his subsequent murder, not only revealed the redundancies and the contradictions of the parasitic Belgian colonialisation of the Congo but also represented the outcome of the expansionist policy of neo-colonialism, as well as the most complicated event that ever confronted the OAU and the UN.

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The Congo crisis of 1960 and the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) were the most complex historical events that ever confronted the world organisation. The elements of all the international crises - external and internal insecurity, subversion, secession, civil war, vested economic interests, bloc politics and related factors - all put together to create the most complex situation in the Congo for the United Nations to deal with.

The fundamental obstacles to the peace and political stability in the Congo were internal: the lack of trained administrators and professionals capable of running the apparatus of a modern state, the regionalism of Congolese party politics, the absence of any experience in the management of democratic institutions, personal rivalries among the politicians. The UN undertook to intervene in this situation; first to bring Belgian intervention to an end and then to go on with the task of building a modern Congo. This required law and order throughout the territory. Finally by the use of force, Congolese unity and the expulsion of foreign elements were at least temporarily attained. The case of ONUC, despite its failure, must therefore be considered as instance of organisational growth relative to previous UN operations.

The three principles - "force only in self-defence", "non-interference", and "entry only with the consent of the host country", which had hitherto guided the UN peace-keeping operations were seriously challenged in the Congo. The issue of force or no force merged into the issue of interference or non-interference. Non-interference was even less possible in practice than abstention from force, because the mere presence of ONUC was interference. Non-interference was also a more indispensable principle because there was no other agreed alternative. In practice, however, the three principles could not be adhered to and they were expediently stretched, modified and, at times, bypassed.

The reality of the situation was that the Congo was a preserve for western economic interests. Any change in that respect, either because of the UN intervention or any other cause, would have produced grave repercussions and a wider conflagration. In this regard the history of the cold war is fairly instrusive. Whether it was the Berlin crisis or the Korean war, Guatemala or Hungary, Formosa or Cuba, the two super powers had displayed their determination to use force if necessary to preserve what was their sphere of control, but neither of them would risk war to gain new ground. The stakes for western powers in the Congo were too high to let the vast economic resources slip from their control without a fight.

From beginning to end, the United States diplomatic, financial and logistic support was so readily available that the UN operations in the Congo turned out to be somewhat similar to the one taken in the name of the world organisation in Korea. However, in the case of Congo it remained more subtle and much less direct than in Korea. In reaction the UN operation received severe criticism from the USSR. Thus the US involvement on one hand and USSR repudiation on the other, served to defeat the very effort of ONUC as a peace-keeping operation. Moreover, the Congo operation engendered a financial crisis which proved dysfunctional for the long term process of task expansion.

Hammarskjold's policy of non-intervention failed to secure its objectives. His assumption that neutrality was the means to secure the broadest base of support from the member states was a crucial mistake for his ranking or ONUC's sub-goals differed from the priorities favoured by many states. In fact, only by opting for a vigorous policy directed at Congolese unification and the expulsion of Belgian and other foreign elements, could a subtle base of support for ONUC have possibly been maintained. Furthermore, non-intervention and political neutrality were never truly observed, for ONUC did not refrain from taking action to preserve human life and public property. Why, then, should Hammarskjold have insisted on the legalistic approach which confronted him with such severe contradictions?

One answer may be that he felt the organisational growth could only take place within the context of legal norms and behavioural practices consistent with the Charter. In this view, non-intervention, the basis of UN impartiality, may well have been the only principle capable of attracting, in the long run, the support of the UN peace-keeping operations. However, the fact remains that an individual, in all sincerity and loyalty to the Charter, is bound to exercise his discretion according to his values, his inhibitions and orientation.

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When ONUC ended its mandate, the Congo was a united country in name only; one-fifth of its territory was under leftist rebels, tribal warfare was still rampant and there were signs of subversion and violence throughout the Congo. What the UN intervention in the Congo accomplished was the restoration of status quo ante. There was a central government friendly to the Western countries, having the vestige of sovereignty, but dependent upon Belgian military and civilian technicians and administrators as was the case before 1960. With a pro-Western Government in the saddle the Western influence was very much in and the threat of communist encroachment was out.

Despite these dysfunctional consequences one should not, however, detract from the overall results of UN operations which helped avoid a direct confrontation between the two super powers. In the face of incredible difficulties and frustrations, ONUC filling in the vacuum, kept the violence localised. The ONUC civilian operations had reached the magnitude and size of ONUC. The capabilities of a peace-keeping force were expanded far beyond what was initially envisaged for it.

Nevertheless, the Congo operation clearly demonstrated that a world organisation characterised by uneven distribution of economic and military power among multiple sovereignties cannot but be controlled by the power structure in the making and implementing of its mandaters. To that extent the United Nations could not obviously perform its functions with impartiality and objectivity. For the first time, the peace-keeping operation had become a weapon of national interest of one of the super powers. These developments brought into focus the question of the competence of the UN organs. Which of the two organs, regulate and control such operations? Or to put it bluntly: should the peace-keeping operations be subject to the veto or not? The controversy had in related issues taken the form of a financial crisis which threatened the very existence of the organisation.

However, when the Congo crisis erupted, Cameroon was not yet a full member of the United Nations. From November 1960 when the former French colonies took a collective stand on the issue. De Gaulle arguing that Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prescribes non-interference in the internal affairs, made the United Nations intervention in the crisis a blantant violation of its own charter. The position adopted by Guallist France voted

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alongside the Soviet Union against the resolution of 20 September 1960, calling on members to contribute to the Fund for Congo operations. Opposing the UN intervention in the Algerian war of independence, it was but logical that he had to oppose the UN intervention with respect to the Congo[93].

France exerted pressure on the bloc of OCAM conservative Francophone African countries (of which Cameroon was a member) which met at Brazzaville in December 1960 to support France's Congo policy. The bloc which invited Moïse Tshombe (who enjoyed the French and Belgian backing) to Brazzaville ended up by accusing the UN of partiality in favour of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who paradoxically was murdered a month later in the presence of the UN troops alledgedly "protecting" him. While rendering praises to France for her "wise" policy towards the Congo crisis and pledging their full support for secessionist Tshombe and Katanga, Cameroon and her OCAM allies postured against the territorial integrity of the Congo. Indeed, the pro-western strand of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon in the Congo crisis was in conformity with the pro-western capitalist option and strategy of development that the administration had embraced from independence. This is because since dependency upon foreign resources removed the domestic basis of national power and since it made the success of domestic politics dependent on the compatibility between the country's interests with those of the big powers who were involved in an international struggle for the division of the world into shperes of influence and domination, Cameroon was accordingly impelled by the obligations of such an alliance to assist and approve foreign intervention in the Congo. The lessons of the Congo crisis vis-à-vis Cameroonian diplomacy demonstrated the "paralysis" of "dependency" capitalism as a strategy of development in a world polarized along ideological lines which only intensify and reinforce the contradictions of underdevelopment. Mentan's judgements are accurate and revealing:

> In other words, Cameroon was committed to preserving the status quo in the Congo. And actual or potential Western intervention to preserve the status quo was never objected to by Cameroon. Western intervention was seen as part of the strategy. In 1960-61 and again in 1964-65 Cameroon leagued with its Franc Zone African states to encourage Western intervention. It was the same status quo mentality which drove abortive appeals to Washington to finance troops from OCAM states to replace Tshombe's mercenaries. Despite Cameroon's obsession with the maintenance of the status quo it did not deviate from the common hatred of all OAU member states to see the continent turned into the theatre of a world struggle of Capitalism against Communism 94.

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Cameroon's approach to conflict resolution as shown in the violation of the territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence of Congo was a clear demonstration of the political objectives of foreign aid. Cameroon had no option. The Congo crisis was not simply a political crisis but it was the peak of a capitalist contradiction consequent upon the overwhelming concentration of capital in the hands of a single European enterprise (Union Minière) and the extraordinary dependency of Katanga on European technicians and investments made secession linked to the support of these capitalist interests. This represented the most concerted of the Cameroonian diplomatic initiatives to (in league of other status quo powers in Africa) forge a common front and attitude of conformism with neocolonialism in the continent.

(B) THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970

The Nigeria civil war represented the most critical test for Cameroon's commitment to the territorial integrity of an OAU member state. The heterogeneous federation of Nigeria had its unity baptized by blood and fire from July 6, 1967 to January 15, 1970, when after a monstrous massacre of the Ibos and Eastern Nigerians, the former Eastern state of Nigeria declared its independence as a Republic of Biafra under Odumegwu Ojukwu. Cameroon was faced with the critical imperative of making her positions conform to the obligations of Article 2(1) of the OAU Charter. Apart from the fact that Cameroon is a geographical neighbour of Nigeria, she was faced with a dilimma which equally confronted many African states and which in the memorial words of President Milton Obote of Uganda consisted in the fact that:

> It is clear from the OAU resolution on Nigeria that, between unity and separation, the OAU voted for unity. There is, however, no doubt that in the Nigerian tragedy the OAU is in a dilemma. On the one hand, it must support the unity of Nigeria. On the other hand, however, due to the continuation of the conflict, the OAU resolution may appear to be disregarding and tolerating the tragic loss of many African lives [95].

Cameroon was firm in supporting the OAU resolution for the unity of Nigeria, first, because Cameroon was a member of the consultative committee which avoided conflicting with the Federal Authorities of Nigeria[96].

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Eventhough Cameroon defied French pressure to recognize Biafra while a majority of Francophone African countries toed France's position by recognizing the secessionist republic, Cameroon's surprising attitude was due to many reasons. As Jos-Blaise Alima has noted:

> In 1968, at the peak of the Biafran war, Ahmadou Ahidjo preferred faithfulness to the spirit of revenge. Signatory to the OAU Charter, which sanctions respect for inherited colonial boundaries, the Cameroonian President was proclaimed "more Nigerian than Nigerians" by refusing despite pressing requests from Paris, to recognize the secession 97.

Though a highly inflammatory and boisterous judgement, the real reason for Ahidjo's diplomatic postures vis-à-vis the Nigerian civil war was one conjunctural factor. Ahidjo was canvassing for the OAU chairmanship and he became the chairman of the OAU during the war. In the face of this situation there was only one way out of the dilamma; either to support Biafra and compromise his chances of becoming a chairman of the continental organisation. or back up the OAU resolution and confirm his candidature as the impartial chairman. Moreover, the reasons he gave during his Press Conference indirectly corroborate this interpretation. For example, in two press conferences in Garoua, Ahidjo reiterated his firm stance against the disintegration of Nigeria and his unrelenting support for the OAU principle of the inviolability of territorial borders[98]. Again in Bamenda in a Press Conference on May 8, 1969, he admitted fears of irredentism in Cameroon and inherent dangers of fanning it within his borders by encouraging secession in adjacent Nigeria:

> As far as I am concerned, as long as I shall be Head of State of Cameroon, there will never be a question of recognising a secessionist state in Nigeria... This stand has been criticised outside and within Cameroon... And even if I were afraid (of succession in Cameroon), I deem it a sound fear because no Head of State with a sound mind and worthy of this name can admit that a part of his country secede 99.

Mentan is right in asserting that by refusing to recognize Biafra, Ahidjo alienated two interest groups.

At the domestic level, he alienated most Anlophones who openly sympathised with, and hoped for Biafra's survival as an inspiration for

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the eventual emergence of a sovereign and independent Anglophone state in Cameroon. Just as Mentan puts it squarely:

> Ahidjo's diagnostic was correct in that he viewed this domestic reaction as sequel to a reproduction of Cameroon's own Biafra especially under its Confrontationist "State Rights" Prime Minister Augustine JUA. The fear stampeded Ahidjo into replacing Jua with the more malleable and compliant Solomon MUNA as West Cameroon Prime Minister. Muna's open lackeyism fetched him the stigma of "traitor", "black leg" in West Cameroon. And when Ahidjo rushed the creation of the Unitary State on 20 May 1972, West Cameroonians saw the move as a confirmation of his fear of secession and Muna's "back-stabbling", sell-out...etc. of "his people" to Ahidjo and "Patrons in France" 100.

Externally, Ahidjo offended Gaullist France but France did not formally recognize Biafra. This emboldened Cameroon to benefit from the French diplomatic ambivalence over the Nigerian Civil War. But it could also be argued that the open refusal by Ahidjo to recognize Biafra was compromised by the secret Franco-Cameroonian military agreements which authorised the free movement of French troops and military equipment through Cameroonian territory[101]. This is where we identify the fact that although Ndiva Kale rightly pointed out that another factor which swung the Cameroonian diplomatic pendulum towards the Federal cause in the Nigerian civil war was the ethnic affinity between Ahidjo (a Foulbe) and the Fulani-Hausa of Northern Nigeria who were the principal enemies of the Easterners,[102] the main constraint on Ahidjo from recognizing Biafra was the position of cameroon as a member of the Consultative Committee of OAU and Ahidjo's position as Chairman of the OAU which exposed him to international opinion and impelled Cameroon to act in conformity with the spirit of the OAU resolutions. This is predicated on Ahidjo refusal to recognize Biafra but allowing French military assistance and humanitarian relief to pass through Cameroon.

(c) CHADIAN CRISIS

The Chadian crisis must be viewed within the context of serious structural problems which resulted in the inability of the central authority to exercise any control over the larger part of the country. The

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nature and instability of the central government and the poor socio-economic conditions of the country, aggravated by instrusion of foreign military presence made the prospects for the peaceful resolution of the conflict very unattractive. The French never really conquered Chad; they attempted to assist Tombalbaye to exert his authority through the provision of military interventionist assistance. However, these attempts were largely inadequate half measures to deal with specific occurences of insurgency without really dealing with the problem of "non-conquest".

Additionally, and definitely more importantly, the regime of Tombalbaye, as a result of the authoritarian and corrupt nature of the ruling party, failed to make the concessions which would have prevented the growth of insurgency and would have gradually unified Chad. The proliferation of insurgent movements in Chad and the existence of several groups of heavily armed factions created the need for a clear victor to emerge from the battlefield before a political solution could be effected. The attempt of the Malloum regime at political reconciliation without first achieving military victory was, therefore, doomed to fail. It was not enough to have some Northern representation in the central Chadian government because the opposing camp itself was not unified.

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The Chadian crisis assumed a major importance in inter-state African politics largely because of the vested interest of several countries in the outcome of the crisis.

The country that played the most important role in Chadian politics and which was in fact to a large extent responsible for the duration and intensity of the conflict was France. Paris maintained extensive military and economic linkages with Chad well after independence. Libya's role was that of the power-broker among the various Northern insurgent groups, switching its support to take advantage of opportunities and providing base facilities and equipment to the various parties to the dispute. Sudan's role was much more lowkeyed, depending more on the cordiality of its relations with the government in N'Djamena. Some of the Eastern groups, including Hissen Habre's maintained base facilities and received their reinforcement from there. The most important support which the Sudanese gave was to Hissen Habre who received his military reinforcement from the French and Egypt through the Sudan and the Cameroon. Cameroon suffered adversely from the outflow of Chadian refugees who fled the areas of conflict, especially when it centred around N'Djamena.

Cameroon's interest in the outcome of the crisis in Chad stems from two basic reasons. One was the need to safeguard its national security through the promotion of peaceful relationships with the neighbouring countries. It was considered crucial to Cameroon's security to ensure that good and friendly relations existed between her and her neighbours and to promote peace and tranquility in those countries for fear that crises in the neighbouring countries would have a spill-over effect on Cameroonian security. The other reason was that Cameroon considered it dangerous to its security to entertain the existence of massive Libyan military presence in any of the neighbouring countries. Such presence was outside the limits of her control and could be used against Cameroonian interest. Also, Libyan military presence would have forced the introduction of an additional military force into the Cameroonian defence calculus, thus making the task of defending Cameroon much more expensive. Again the effects of the Chadian crisis were being very heavily felt in the form of influx of refugees into Northern Cameroon and the form of military incursions across the lake Chad. The refugee camps in Kousseri, Maroua and other Northern Cameroon towns were gradually being transformed into areas of conflict among the various Chadians factions. It is reported that some refugees infiltrated into the towns and were at the origin of several crimes like theft, aggressions, rape...etc[103]. They could, not doubt, have weakened internal security if the Cameroonian law enforcement agencies had found it difficult to contain the conflicts.

It is primarily for these reasons that Cameroon participated in the two Kano Peace Conferences and also the ones held in Lagos. But the Cameroonian contributions to enhance peace in Chad failed for various reasons, among which was the fact that Cameroon was perceived as not being disinterested in the outcome of the crisis. In fact, Cameroon's strategy in Chad was tied up to that of the French which consisted in supporting the faction which could best defend French strategic and economic interests in the country. It was felt that by bringing in several other factions to Kano II and by insisting on their being accommodated, Cameroon like Nigeria and Libya, was pushing its own interest. Cameroon was representing the interest of Hissen Habre and the French. However, it is clear that Cameroon did not want the French to pull out of Chad and to leave the peace initiative to a "foreign" African power.

Cameroon insisted that the Chadian Transitional Government must be as broadly based as possible and for this reason Yaounde and Lagos led the opposition to the first transitional government until a second government was formed on the basis of the Lagos Accord. Cameroon was quite supportive of Hissen Habre in his fight against Goukouni, not because the latter was not the legally constituted leader of the Transitional Government, but because according to Cameroon the provisions of the Lagos Accord never provided for the Leader of Transitional Government of Chad to dismiss any member of the Lagos Constituted Government. Afterall the leader was a mere premius inter pares. In this case Cameroon considered Habre's dismissal grossly illegal. Again, Cameroon's position was strengthened because Habre had become l'Homme de la France in Chad. It can be, therefore, argued that Cameroon's role in the resolution of the Chadian conflict was less ambivalent than it appeared to be at the time, because in a secret alliance with France,[104] they identified Hissen Habre as the one faction that was most likely to bring peace to Chad and did everything possible to support Habre indirectly. Even-though, the Chadian problem was a complex one and despite the risk of loosing her image as an impartial arbiter, this was the necessary price that Ahidjo paid to ensure that any government in Chad was not controlled by an external force hostile to her interest. The Libyan intervention and especially the Libyan merger plan introduced another disturbing element into the confused situation in Chad.

While regreting the end of French military presence in Chad and the impossibility of a return to normalcy without France, Ahidjo's fears of a hostile foreign power filling the void were confirmed by the Libyan plan in Chad. The Libyan presence in Chad was onsidered dangerous to Cameroon in view of the suspected increase of Libyan influence within Cameroon itself. Libya was alleged to have had some influence on the religious rioters in Kano and Ahidjo was afraid of a possible spread to Cameroon. These considerations coupled with the French support for Hissen Habre, consolidated Ahidjo's indirect support for Habre by refusing to exchange a French presence in Chad for a Libyan one.

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Cameroon's postures notwithstanding, it must be remarked that she did not play a role consistent with her self-image as the link between Anglophone and Francophone Africa even though Ahidjo personally mediated between Nigeria and the Francophone states (Gabon and Ivory Coast) which recognised Biafra. There is little doubt that African unity was not a subject on which Ahidjo dwelled at length (both in practice and theory), either at home or abroad but Cameroon's potential as an important living example of the functioning of African unity was recognised, both inside the country and abroad. On the contrary, on many occasions, Ahidjo made reference to African Unity as "that objective which is clear to Africans". But the language in which he did so either made it clear that his enthusiasm was rhetorical, or that it was guarded and limited to an endorsement of specific organisations like the UAM, OCAM or UDEAC.

Finally one can only say that the Chadian, Congo and Nigerian crises demonstrated the conformism that existed between international and internal threats in Africa and showed the degree to which international capitalism destabilized new nations. By creating its national appendages, it used these appendages to create disorder and civil strife whenever its peripheral foundations were challenged and consequently these peripheral appendages always seeked refuge in external propaganda, foreign financial resources and military aid. In Congo, it was the contradictions of the Belgian savage exploitation of Congo through the promotion of monopoly capitalism and its defects that led to the Katanguese secession which was backed by Union Minière but in Nigeria it was the contradictions of British perverse "Indirect Rule" which was interested only in the exploitation of Nigeria that ushered in the perpetration of atrocious murders of innocent Eastern Nigerians accompanied by other acts of barbarism and inhumanity. On each of these cases the conservative side was always the local appendage of international capitalism. And Cameroon diplomacy was always in terms with the interests of this international capitalism and conservativism. In Congo, Tshombe represented the local appendage of international capitalism and was backed by Cameroon while in Nigeria, it was represented by Gowon and his Hausa feudals and in Chad it was Hissen Habre; and Ahidjo gave all of them the full support

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9.6: DECOLONISATION AND CAMEROONIAN DIPLOMACY

If the ambition of total decolonization has been a constant theme of concord among the OAU member states since the African Liberation Day on 25 May 1963, then the pledge has been "to destroy for ever pretentions of any foreign power to own, govern or exploit any part of Africa". This amounts to the total commitment of member states to decolonization. If decolonization meant total desengagement from colonization which was the logical consequence of the historical development of capitalism and which was either achieved peacefully or through violence, then it logically meant that the liquidation of underdevelopment in Africa was consequent on the elimination of colonialism. The issue of decolonization always occupies a strategic place in the assessment of Cameroon's commitment to the continental liberation and cooperation because as one of the founding fathers of the organisation in May 1963, she subsequently became an active member of the coordination committee for the liberation of Africa in Rabat in June, 1972,[105] following the signing of the Lusaka Manifest in Cairo in 1969 which Ahidjo as OAU Chairman, had presented to the United Nations General Assembly on 8 October, 1969. The controversy which developed over the decolonisation of (a) Angola, (b) Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (c) French Colonies in Africa; and (d) Western Sahara, did not only constitute the acid test of the Pan-Africa organization's unity but also demonstrated the extent to which foreign capital dependency dictated the general diplomatic orientation and postures of Cameroon.

(A) ANGOLA

Almost like the Congo crisis of the 1960s, the Angola Civil War resurrected cold war rivalries in Africa. The OAU was once again caught in a fix when it had to reconcile warring factions which were contending for leadership in Angola before and after the independence which was declared on 11 November, 1975. The OAU Peace Conference on peace in Angola on January 14, 1976 ended in a stalemate when 22 out of the 46 member states voted in favour of the recognition of MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola; the 22 votes for MPLA were counterbalanced by 22 against with Ethiopia, and Uganda (Idi Amin was the Chairman of OAU) registering neutrality by their absence[106]. Cameroon's Foreign Minister at the time Jean Keutcha vehemently "opposed any unanimous condemnation of South Africa's

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role unless the Soviet Union and Cuba are condemned"[107]. Cameroon's unwillingness to support the MPLA amounted to an indirect alignment with apartheid camouflaged under the cloak of anti-communism.

The Libreville Conference of 19 November 1975 between the conservative pro-capitalists of the OAU (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Zaïre, Senegal and Cameroon) not only endorsed the American South African policy (which consisted in:

1) - an unequivocal support for majority rule;
2) - a firm condemnation of governments which perpetuate the political and economic inequality on the basis of race;
3) - a strong preference for a peaceful realization of self-determination and majority rule;
4) - the determination that the area should not become the arena for super-power rivalries)[108].

but also went on to reiterate their strict adherence to the idea of "enabling Angola to form a Government of National Union". The capitalistic contradiction of Cameroon's foreign policy on decolonization was Yaounde's illusory condemnation of oppressive forces of imperialism such as apartheid, while in reality honouring her obligations of fidelity to the international forces or tendencies that enhanced the chances of capitalist oppression. For example, it is incomprehensible that Yaounde could rhetorically condemn apartheid and at the same time give unconditional support to Jonas Savimbi, Leader of UNITA in League with apartheid. Mentan's assertions corroborate the above analysis:

> Despite Savimbi's fraternity with the apartheid forces, Yaounde, was still on his side. WHile on a visit to Yaounde, Jonas Savimbi was allowed to whip up anti-communist feelings that "three ships-two Soviet and one East German - (had) landed last week on the South Coast of Angola, 10,000 tons of war material and 750 Cuban soldiers who (would) serve in the ranks of the MPLA". The audience granted Savimbi was a diplomatic "faux pas" which could never be in force with Cameroon's prescription of "policy of force" against apartheid and Colonialism [109].

Indeed, this contradiction could only be adequately explained by the domestic economic development strategy anchored on external resource

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dependency that was chosen by the Ahidjo administration. The diplomatic implication of such a posture was that its very operation rendered the country susceptible to external political pressures exerted by the foreign manipulation of economic relations. The most important general factors which facilitated vulnerability to these pressures were poverty, external dependency and inflexibility in external economic relations which were consolidated by the adoption of the economic strategy of Planned Liberalism. The more a state needs another the more it is dependent on it and as such lacks the flexibility to orient its economic and diplomatic manipulations. This was the greatest dilemma of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon: how to maintain independence and act according to the objectives of the OAU in the face of the need for, and dependency upon, the former metropole. Another was the problem of inflexibility in the national economy imposed by the country's integration within the metropolitan economy as a peripheral sector during the colonial period. This was the basis of persistent neo-colonialism and economic dependency in Cameroon under the Ahidjo administration.

(B) RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE

The Press Conference given by President Ahidjo in Garoua on 3rd March, 1969, provided the parameters within which Cameroon's diplomatic strands with regards to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of Independence on 5 November, 1965 could be assessed. Ahidjo by insisting that "the rebellion could have been put down by British troops" in the 3/3/69 press conference meant that Prime Minister Harold Wilson's refusal to "crush the white minority rebellion by the use of British troops could only be attributed to national egoism and racist connivance"[110]. The May 1973 veto by Britain and America in a security council resolution destined to extend sanctions against Rhodesia to include South Africa and Portuguese territories in Africa proved Ahidjo's assessment right. In fact, Cameroon's commitment was very firm so much so that she had to strain diplomatic relations with the Ivory Coast because of the latter's "pro-dialogue" yearnings[111]. This vehement opposition to any form of dialogue with the racist regimes and "the need for a policy of force to bring an end to policies of racial oppression" was characterised by Ahidjo himself as "un dialogue des sourds" because:

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> It would be impossible to establish a dialogue with a partner who had already refused to accept the principle of human equality and refused to make any concession in the policy of apartheid [112].

But these pontifical pronouncements against "dialogue" with, and in favour of the use of "force" against the racist regimes in South Africa were compromised when Cameroon became prominent among the 17 OAU member states which registered reservations against the OAU ministerial council drafted resolution of 30 August, 1970 calling for unanimous condemnation of the role of France, Britain and West Germany on arms sales to South Africa, "whether actual or intended" as well as the derogatory attitude of silence over the sanctions against the activities of French firms in Rhodesia[113]. Again, French influence over Cameroon's diplomatic activities consequent upon a bilateral economic dependency on France, largely accounted for the inability of Cameroon to implement OAU resolutions condemning or injuring the interests of her major Western capitalist partners in the Southern African enclave. This situation was reinforced by the fact that Ahidjo administration in Cameroon had an objective interest in maintaining national economic dependency on the Western capitalist nations or was convinced that it was incapable of making major reforms of its domestic and external relations and had, therefore, to request marginal ameliorations of particular unsatisfactory situations on a piece-meal basis and through appeals to the sympathy of its western capitalist friends. Thus, in this case powerlessness corrupts as often(and as such) as power (even if) in very different ways. Again as R.H. Green has succinctly remarked, "in the poor states it has created a pervasive client mentality and insured the dominance of groups whose local power is founded on external powerlessness and dependence of the nation "[114]. This psycho-intellectual colonization prevented Cameroonian leaders from paying attention to the identification of limits of national power and possible united actions with other African countries in order to pry out resources from the rich nations as well as to contribute towards the total liberation of Africa, through negotiations in joint areas of interest rather than through unsavoury and conspired appeals to sympathy and "assistance".

(c) FRENCH COLONIES IN AFRICA

Because of the fake independence granted to Cameroon by France in 1960 with its attendant political and cultural subjugation consequent

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upon the deep economic penetration of the country by French firms, Cameroon found herself in a helpless situation to condemn overtly or covertly continued French colonialism in Djibouti, Mayotte, Reunion and the Comoro archipelago which according to Thomas A. Marks were used by France "to link their upper African sphere of influence with that which they maintain in South Africa[115]. The assimilation of Mayotte as a département de la France because of its "deep water habour"; the referendum of 1974 in which the Comoro island's unilaterally declared its independence; the overthrow of President Ahmed Abdalah's government in 1975; and the mercenary conspiracy of Colonel Daddy Bob Donard masterminded by France in the overthrow of President Ali Soilih in May 1978, meant little or nothing to Yaounde which feared the loss of French military support and which was constrained by the predominance of French capital in Cameroon.

(D) WESTERN SAHARA

Western Sahara was for a long time the apple of discord among OAU member states with regards to the interpretation of Article II, 1(d) of the OAU Charter on decolonization. Cameroon's constant support for Morocco in the dispute demonstrated the alliance of international capitalism on the African continent. After the 1957-1958 nationalist struggle against Spanish colonialism in Western Sahara, Morocco proceeded to form a pro-Moroccan guerrilla group - the United Front for Liberation (FLU) composed mainly of the Teknas to counteract the revolutionary Polisario Front which stood for the independence of the territory. The controversy over the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of sovereignty over the territory against the contending Polisario Front and Spain which was taken to the International Court of Justice, ushered in the rejection of the suit by the court for the inadequacy of evidence to establish the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of past sovereignty.

However, the U.N Visiting Mission recommended by the International Court of Justice to evaluate the Morocco - Mauritanian claim to sovereignty found "the Frente Polisario... appeared as a dominant political force in the territory. The mission witnessed mass demonstrations in support of the movement in all parts of the territory". By the time Spain withdrew in May 1975, no part of the territory was secure from assault and following

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the Madrid agreement of 1975, the Western Sahara was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania. This act sanctioned the fear of "black imperialism in Africa" just in the same way as President Modibo Keita of Mali had warned:

> We must take Africa as it is, and we must renounce any territorial claims, if we do not wish to introduce what we might call black imperialism in Africa...
> African unity demands of each one of us complete respect for the legacy that we have received from the colonial system, that is to say: maintenance of the present frontiers of our respective states [116].

Cameroon never only not questioned the wisdom of the Madrid Agreement of 1975 but also voted against the recommendation of the OAU Liberation Committee at Maputo, Mozambique in February 1976 for the recognition of the Polisario Front as the authentic movement incarnating the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination. Again at the Mauritius Heads of state summit in July, 1976, when the Chiefs of State in a 29 against 2 votes and 16 absentions recognised the Democratic Saharaui Arab Republic (SDR) proclaimed by the Palisario Front, Cameroon was amongst the conspicuous abstainers. Moveover, this resolution which expressed "unconditional support for the just struggle" being waged by the Saharauis to regain their national rights and called for the speedy withdrawal of "all foreign occupation forces" was boycotted by Morocco. Cameroon's concealed and cold-blooded attitude over the French engagements in counter-revolutionary operations against the Polisario positions fighting against Morocco and Mauritania, coupled with Yaounde's violent protests against the participation of the Polisario in OAU summits and Cameroon's subsequent boycott of the Nairobi (1981) and Tripoli (1982) AOU summits, attested to the alliance that existed between neo-colonial interests in Ahidjo's Cameroon and neo-colonial interests in Hassan II's Morocco. Cameroon's diplomatic strand on the western Sahara demonstrated the complementarity between neo-colonial capitalist peripheral sub-centres manipulated in the interests of the advanced capitalist countries.

7.7: CAMEROON AND THE CAPITALIST BLOC

The logical consequence of the above analysis shows that the success of nonalignment as a foreign policy guideline depended on the effectiveness of national economic independence through a judicious use of positive and

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negative powers. Again, since national power depends on the extent of national independence, it means therefore that political independence can only be ensured by economic independence, the failure of which makes the successful implementation of a non-aligned foreign policy hazy. In this background and considering the fact the Ahidjo's Planned Liberalism placed magical attributes to external resource factors in national development, the logical consequence was that the nonaligned diplomatic posture of Cameroon was more rhetorical than real in content and substance. This was because the international capitalist system which accounted for most of the important economic activities of the free market variant wherever its tentacles could reach in Cameroon was a fundamental external force conditioning the international behaviour of Cameroon through the strong bonds it established in trade, aid and investment which automatically linked the national society as the peripheral sub-centre to the main centre in capitalist world.

This economic control automatically led to political control and therefore made the success of an authentic nonaligned posture diplomatically not only rhetorical but also difficult. As Mentan has coined it:

> These bonds tend to constrain Cameroon's non-African economic relations to the extent that the sermons of non-alignment preached by the rulling class are qualified, if not eroded, by what Ahidjo himself called "the special affinities which geography and history have established". These affinities are between certain peoples (French neo-colonialists) and ourselves (the Cameroonian ruling class) [117].

One thing which Ahidjo forgot was that for genuine independence and nonalignment there is no substitute for self-reliance. Indeed, the economic dependency of cameroon through foreign capital imports viewed from the perspective of the practical application of nonalignment amounted to a voluntary surrender of definite advantages and sovereignty in its extra-African relations which retroactively led to a low social mobilization capacity of the country to solve its own development problems and therefore to make and implement its own decisions.

Cameroon's major and most significant trade relations were with France though the strength of this relationship declined over the years. It should be no surprise that France was at independence the key factor in Cameroonian economic, political and cultural relations. Afterall, France had been the predominantly economic and political power since 1916 and had established a long network of ties between the two states. And, as we have mentioned before in this chapter, France was able to manipulate the independence so that a highly favourable regime came to power, a regime tied to France through numerous treaties of cooperation. In this manner, France established the limits of choice for Cameroon's foreign policy.

It is the breadth of these treaties that indicates the strength of the French presence at the government-to-government level: cultutal, military, transport and meteorology; technical cooperation; monetary and financial affairs; diplomatic relations; and a variety of legal and technical matters were covered in the ten original agreements. These agreements were renegotiated in 1973 but apparently with only minor changes that in no way reduced France's significant position in Cameroon's affairs[118]. Traxler argues that the original agreements "provided the juridical framework for this patron-client relationship between France and its ex-African colonies and that the importance of the revisions was slight"[119]. Kofele-Kale confirms this when he wrote that "with the possible exception of the diplomatic convention, nothing of substance was accomplished"[120]. These agreements provided the basis for intensive French cooperation, collaboration with, and assistance to the Cameroonian government in terms of the provision of financial and technical aid to almost every aspect of the government's activity. The University, largely paid for with French funds, was administered and largely staffed by French personnel. Numerous French teachers took up positions in Cameroonian secondary schools. The agreements also provided for assistance and protection for French businesses and investors operating in Cameroon. Military assistance included training and equipment, as well as participation by French personnel in the war against the "Union des Populations du Cameroun". A joint airline combining several of the ex-French colonies in with French capital and expertise was established (Air Afrique).

The monetary system of Cameroon was tightly tied to that of France through the inclusion of Cameroon in the France Zone with its currency pegged to the value of the French francs and controlled through the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale. The bank in turn was controlled by France. It has been argued that in such circumstances, a certain stability and respectability was granted to the Cameroonian franc in World affairs, but this amounted to complete monetary dependency since such qualities depended totally on world opinion towards the French franc. This arrangement meant that Cameroonian currency was easily transferable, and this facilitated foreign (especially French) investments and commerce in Cameroon. Furthermore, this meant that Cameroon had almost no influence over its currency since Cameroon had to devalue (or revalue) whenever the French francs moved. But what was monetarily wise for France was not appropriate for Cameroonian needs. Thus, by strengthening Cameroon's dependent position in the Western, capitalist economic system, her freedom was limited by this monetary arrangement[121].

At independence, the capitalist bloc's role in the Cameroonian economy was clearly indicated by export and import statistics. Like the economies of most developing countries, Cameroon's economy was dependent on foreign trade, a factor that only emphasized France's role in the economy. In 1961, France accounted for 59 percent of Cameroonian exports and 55 percent of its imports. These figures appear even more impressive when compared to the second largest partners. The Netherlands purchased 14 percent of exports; West Germany provided 6 percent of imports[122].

Over the years, the Ahidjo administration did very little to develop relations with trading partners other than France, and France's relative significance never significantly declined. For example, in 1980, France was still the major supplier of Cameroon's imports, but the percentage of imports from France had only been reduced to 45 percent, a drop only ten points in twenty years! West Germany (8.5 percent), the United States (5.5 percent); Japan (5.5 percent), and Italy (5.0 percent) were the next major sources of imports and none of these compared in magnitude with France[123]. In 1982, France accounted for 44 percent although the United States had replaced France as the major pruchaser of Cameroon's products, largely as a result of a new factor in cameroon's export make-up - petroleum. France was also challenged by the Netherlands, (which had been running a very close second to France for several years/even surpassing France in 1974), which was tied with the United States in 1979, and which remained close to France as the third largest purchaser in 1980. By 1982, the United States was reported to be pruchasing 41 percent of all cameroonian exports, but even this figure might be lower than reality. The United States purchased Cameroonian petroleum, and Cameroon consistently under-reported its petroleum exports[124]. These statistics, taking into account imports and exports, indicate a somewhat weakened position for France but also indicate that France remained the most powerful trading partner of Cameroon.

Considering the crucial role that external trade plays in national development; considering the fact that nonalignment is primarily a diplomatic device to assert national economic independence in a bipolar world infested by neo-colonialism, without talking side in the ideological bopolarity; considering the danger of neo-colonial penetration inherent in external trade as well as the inevitability of interdependence as a sovereign duty of states, it becomes clear that a nonaligned country should seek to diversify her external trade transactions calculated to maximize foreign economic resources for her domestic development through multilateral diplomacy. On the contrary, the bilateral nature of Cameroon's external trade relations not only perpetuated the old pattern of colonial dependency in its geographical and sectorial distribution and orientation but also affected the independence and effectiveness of her "nonaligned" diplomacy.

For example, the concentration of Cameroon's trade relations with the NATO countries was at variance with national self-reliance as the domestic economic extension of nonalignment. Indeed, the value of trade with NATO countries amounted to 276.939.000.000 CFA francs (or 84.08 percent) of her total world trade in 1974/1975; to 404.075.000.000CFA Francs (or 82.98 percent) of her total world trade in 1976/1977 and to 718.285.000.000CFA Francs (or 84.77 percent) of her total world trade in 1979/1980. These statistics compared badly with the value for socialist countries which amounted to 93.000.000CFA Francs (or 15.92 percent) of her total world trade in 1974/1975; to 2.324.000.000CFA Francs (or 17.02 percent) in 1976/1977 and to 4.379.000.000 CFA Francs (or 15.23 percent) of her total world trade in 1979/1980[125]. Moreover, Cameroon's trade with the USSR since 1970/71 recorded deficits of only 8.646.000.000 CFA Francs in 1974/1975 and 525.000.000CFA Francs in 1979/80. Franco-cameroonian trade during the same period, a primitive barter type dictated by Franc Zone arrangements earned Cameroon a unique surplus of 26.342.000.000CFA Francs in 1974/75. The rest of the years were marked by deficits, with a high record peak of 70.880.000.000CFA Francs in 1979/80[126].

From the above statistical demonstration calculated from different Cameroonian Five-Year Plans, it is clear that cameroon's trade with the

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common market in particular and with the capitalist world in general put the country almost in a situation of total dependency on the capitalist world for the purchase of manufactured goods. In this case the country tended to concentrate on production for export and to concentrate on the consumption of imported goods. This tendency of producing what Cameroonians did not consume and consuming what they did not produce, into which the Ahidjo administration plunged the national society has been eloquently summarised by Mentan when bringing out another aspect of the interpretation:

> Of course, the Franc Zone arrangements constrain Cameroon's choice of trade partners. This monetary constraint condemned the country to continuing trade relations with capitalist countries plagued by inflation, etc. Cameroon, throughout the 1974/1975 - 1979/1980 period, had a negative trade balance which rose to 25.400 million francs in 1976/1977 and 51.500 million francs in 1979/1980. The trade deficit has been a result of the deterioration of terms of trade (sharp drop in in the world prices for raw materials and increases in the price of imported goods).
>
> The logic of monetary sovereignty requires that Cameroon would trade more with "other" currency areas, little with the "Dollar area", less with the "Sterling Area", and least with the "Franc Area". However, cameroon's dependence on the Franc Zone has determined its trade partners with whom trade deficits are a remarkable constant [127].

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This demonstrates the fact that the free flux of capital as a surplus value in Cameroon came through the channels of this highly concentrated bilateral foreign trade with the advanced capitalist countries and this phenomenon in itself became an important ingredient of <u>the equalization process of the capitalist profits</u>[128], that is of the formation of the average rate of profit. The difference between the progress of the transformation of the market value into the price of production at the international level and the corresponding level within Cameroon laid in the fact that what was taking place in the former was not simply a redistribution among the capitalist of the society concerned but a redistribution of surplus profits among different nations (of which Cameroon was one) in the course of which the value created in Cameroon was appropriated by the advanced capitalist countries through this concentrated bilateral trade. The ultimate consequence was the surrender of political and economic sovereignty.

This equalization process in foreign trade which was particularly reflected in the structure of cameroon's imports/exports trade relations reinforced the neo-classical theory of international development. Consequent upon its asymmetrical integration into the capitalist world system, Cameroon continued to specialize in the production and exportation of raw materials and agricultural products. Such a neo-colonial pattern preserved vertical trade transactions geared towards the centre rather than horizontally, accounting for cameroon's limited trade transactions with other Third World countries. This is why the relative share of Cameroon's exports to other African countries only increased from a miserable 6 percent in 1978/1979 to 6.3 percent of its total exports in 1979/1980[129]. Therefore, the general orientation of external trade towards a bilateral (instead of a differentiated multilateral) association with the advanced capitalist countries and its dangerous implications for national power and independence made the effectiveness of cameroon's nonaligned foreign policy rhetorical.

Foreign aid, as we have seen, played a decisive role in the economy of Cameroon. Indeed, the phenomenon of economic underdevelopment could not even be understood without the understanding of the penetration of foreign aid and the flow of investment capital. Thus owing to the emergence of the world economic system of imperialism the flow of this foreign capital by way of the movement of loans and foreign resources on easy terms, this capitalist internationalisation of credit was facilitated and consolidated and became also a vali d working factor in the relations between Cameroon and the advanced capitalist countries. Foreign capital penetrating into the economy of Cameroon usually worked at a lower "organic composition" than its "indigenous" counterpart in the country. This followed, on the one hand, from the character of the typical investment spheres created under colonialsim (agriculture and industry) and on the other hand, from the strength of the capitalist motive inducing the growth of constant capital (owing for example to cheap unskilled labour and the monopoly protection with government backing).

This tendency nurtured dependency - inducing "interdependence" remniscent of the Euro-African "centre-periphery" structural inequalities[130]. As a result of this free capital flow, this capital had to realize in full the higher surplus value created in the country when marketing the products of the investments on the world market by selling them at an "international price of production" higher than the market value and it was this surplus value of Cameroonian products that was channelled back to Cameroon as investment loan to the government at a lower interest[131]. In other words, the phenomenon was due to the fact that the purpose of foreign "aid" to Cameroon from these capitalist countries was not to promote the development of this country but to provide favourable conditions for the operation of branches which capitalist corporations maintained in the country and to ensure that its economy remained a privileged peripheral enclave dependent on the international division of labour[132].

This vicious cricle of external dependency was a negation of nonalignment because a nonaligned foreign policy demanded economic independence as a prerequisite for national independence and sovereignty in order to be effective. Under the weight of this logic, it is but clear that an authentic nonalignment anchored on Cameroon's economic independence should have been accompained by "control over economic decision-making on the national economy" as well as "the establishment of a firm industrial structure, leading to a self-generating and self-sustaining growth, and a diversification of external economic contacts consistent with the nation's economic interests"[133]. The aid content clearly epitomised the total control of the Cameroonian political economy by foreign interests. Indeed, the aid consisted not only of grants and loans but about 52.5 percent of the total aid package consisted of technical assistance, scholarships, training courses, assignment expenses, equipment, social subventions etc.

However, the general survey of foreign aid in Cameroon has demonstrated the failure of the Ahidjo administration to remove the straight jacket of economic relations with the West imposed by the colonial heritage, thereby justifying the absence of a credible nonaligned position in foreign in foreign policy which required some disengagement from the West and the establishment of new links with the East until a much more meaningful interaction with both sides was achieved. Again, we have seen that the absence of this diversification through multilateral diplomacy only went on to consolidate the excessive emphasis and the magical properties that the Ahidjo administration had placed on the external component of national development resources to the neglect of their domestic components. In fact, this capital inflows through foreign aid only accentuated the extroverted nature of national development because the receipts of aid were were not accompanied by a concomittant attempt to diversify the internal structures which conducted foreign aid.

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The Banks, monetary system, wholesale business, major research institutions and the construction industry were still dominated by Western interests or their local appendages. Therefore, the old colonial relations which were disadvantageous were maintained as a price for achieving huge sums of foreign aid at low interest rates from the West and this became antithetical to one of the prime purposes of nonalignment and a nonaligned foreign policy which was aimed at improving the benefits of external resources and reducing their costs. Again, Mentan's judgement cannot be avoided:

> Summarily, the dominance of European aid to Cameroon is a pertinent pointer to why the ideology of Euro-Cameroon must be relegated "into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe". Politically, Cameroon's association with the EEC following "bloc politics" has linked the country to the destiny of France and the rest of Common Market Europe. France sees itself as the watchdog of the interests of the Western Capitalist Alliance in Franc Zone Africa which is factually a French Version of the "Monroe Doctrine". This doctrine is both to counter the heavy economic weight of the United States and Japan. This is done by monetarily curtaining them off partially from Cameroon as well as other France currency Union African members in order to enhance EEC multilateral imperialism in these countries. Hence, the bilateral aid pacts are neo-colonial in nature to promote economic and political power for Europe while simultaneously promoting Cameroon's underdevelopment and impotence [234].

Though a complicated sentence, Mentan's idea, depicts one salient fact, that the deep penetration of Western aid in Cameroon, made the country extremely vulnerable to outside influences and rendered its capacity of independence and self-determination totally ineffective.

Diplomacy may and can reduce the political costs of foreign investment by emphasizing multilateral over bilateral investments. The Ahidjo administration in Cameroon ignored this vital political calculus and as such, bundled Cameroon's nonaligned foreign policy into the waiting hands of capitalist neo-colonialism. It is in this wise that the operations of the Ahidjo regime in the economic sphere consisted chiefly of seeking to attract foreign investments at any price, by guaranteeing the best conditions for the rapid realization of such investments. For example, in the preamble to the constitution of Cameroon, Ahidjo and his French advisers made this unequivocally clear:

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> The State of Cameroon, conscious of the importance of the free development of its economy and for the necessity for the participation of capital of all origins in its development, is concerned to provide in its institutions, regulations, conventions and contracts as suitable to guarantee its (foreign capital) assistance. It (Cameroon) intends to pursue right away, in agreement with interested countries and international organisations all means of creating the best possible conditions for capital desiring to invest in undertakings profitable to the two parties [135].

The details of this constitutional recommendations were enshrined in the national investment code.

Taking all these factors together, we can conclude that Cameroon's dependent relationship with France in economic matters remained quite strong after more than two decades of independence.

Therefore, as we saw in chapters Seven and Eight, the Ahidjo administration strongly believed in the fact that foreign private investment should be the engine of economic development in Cameroon. Partly as a result of this belief and partly to guarantee the flow of resources required by European manufactures the advanced capitalist countries in Cameroon created conditions in which foreign firms dominated the activities of national economic life. The assumptions of the Ahidjo administration on foreign investments were based on the mistaken dichotomization of politics into the domestic and foreign aspects, banking in the belief that the major constraints on the successful pursuit of the nation's "nonaligned" foreign policy lay in the configuration of power and interest within the international environment. Contrary to this view, the deep penetration of foreign investments in the national economy made the foreign policy of non-alignment in Cameroon counterproductive.

Under these circumstances, the national objectives were abandoned or corrupted in order to accord with the realities of the external environment. Instead of a strong commitment to the goals of development conceived in terms of national independence, individual freedom, economic growth, and African unity, the basic premisses of nonalignment in the foreign policy of the country were subjected to serve foreign capitalist interests. One of the consequences of this foreign policy resulted from the inability of

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the Ahidjo administration to engage itself in a meaningful reorganization of the domestic environment in order to create more favourable conditions for the operation of national diplomacy. This situation, in turn, indicated that the leaders never realized that the factors impinging on foreign policy always came from both the domestic and external environments but that these environments were always very closely inter-related because of the existence of multinational linkage groups which simultaneously participated in them.

Since one of the consequences of the participation of the multinational linkage groups was that "domestic relations" involved external participants, a transformation of the external aspects of inter-state relations which left these groups unperturbed could not succeed because since their economic power was dominant they constituted some of the most critical variables in the external transactions. This was so because as a group they dominated the economic base of political life. And since their political interests clearly contradicted and dominated national interest in Cameroon, it became difficult for the political elites (even if they had the intention) to fully mobilize the nation's economic resources behind its diplomatic activities. Instead, the Ahidjo administration made it easier for foreign groups whose interests were congruent with those of the multinational linkage groups in the country to achieve their goals at the expense of the nation. Ultimately, in alliance with foreign countries, these multinational linkage groups presented the most formidable obstacles to the observance of nonalignment in the country's foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the above discussion only reinforces the idea that developing states may find that the cost of foreign aid outweighs the perceived benefits but their inability to develop domestic sources of investment capital, the more or less permanent state of economic underdevelopment and the demand for social justice tend to perpetuate the ruling classes reliance on external sources of assistance, since such assistance helps them to allay domestic unrest. However, this dependency on foreign aid makes the developing states' ruling elites vulnerable to blackmail by the aid donors. As we have seen above more often than not the donors reap greater advantages than the recipient. For example, in return for economic and military grants and favourable trade and loan terms the recipient country

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might be forced to compromise vital national interests, such as allowing the establishing of foreign military bases on its soil and the virtual surrender of the right to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies.

9.8: CAMEROON AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC

The establishment of diplomatic contacts with the socialist countries was not so much the consequence of the fact that the socialist states were fighting against colonialism and racism which constituted a threat to world peace and justice, but the principal motive for these relations lay in the configuration of internal politics. The pre-independence contradiction between the radical nationalism of the UPC party supported by the socialist countries and Ahidjo's conservative moderates supported by the Western countries made the establishment of cordial relations with the socialist countries an imperative for the post-independence Ahidjo administration if it wanted to survive. First of all, these relations served to dislodge the last strangle-hold of the external wing of the UPC and enhanced the international standing of Cameroon as a truly nonaligned country. It is because of this that in 1962, the then Cameroon's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Victor Kanga, paid a "path-finding" mission to the socialist countries which culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow on 20 March, 1964. Moscow reciprocated with financial aid amounting to 8 million dollars in 1971[136]. Indeed, Sovieto-Cameroonian relations were limited to cultural affairs and financial participation in economic development projects of limited political implications. However, Ahidjo also tightened up relations with Korea, Rumania, Poland, East Germany(GDR), Albania and Yugoslavia. In general, these relations resulted in limited economic participation by these countries in the Cameroon's development.

Among the socialist countries, relations with People's Republic of China were "laborious" to establish but were the most intense. In September 1960, Ahidjo declared that "if we had proof that communist China has stopped interfering in our internal affairs, we would recognize her and vote for her admission into the United Nations [137]. And when China relinquished her military support for the guerrilla nationalism of the UPC by 1964, Cameroon started making overtures for the establishment of concrete

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relations with China. By 1970, Cameroon which was initially sympathetic to the "two - Chinas" formula specifically demanded that Taiwan should vacate its seat and its permanent membership in the security council in favour of the People's Republic of China. The impression that all countries were expected to follow after the state department had taken the initiative, caused considerable resentment and Cameroon reacted "by swelling the ranks of those delegations which voted overwhelmingly to drop Taiwan" and support Peking[138].

Cameroon backed up her UN support for the People's Republic of China by establishing diplomatic relations with Peking on 26 March, 1971[139]. On 17 August, 1972 Cameroon signed economic, commercial and technical cooperation agreements with China. And, between 25 March, 1973 and 2 April, 1973, Ahidjo paid an official visit to China at the end of which an aid agreement valued at 18.000.000.000 CFA francs was signed. This visit was followed by another visit to China in April 1977 by Ahmadou Ahidjo. The fruits of these Chinese loans have been the construction of the Super Complex and Ultra-Modern Congress Centre in Yaounde, the construction of the Lagdo Dam in Garoua in North Cameroon and several rural development and research projects. However, it must be asserted that the cordiality of the Cameroon's socialist bloc relations was not an indicator of the effectiveness of non-alignment but a demonstration of a tactical twist of nonalignment in the diplomatic orientation of the country for fear of an unknown danger from the socialist bloc and in order to safeguard and consolidate a peripheral capitalist alignment domestically and internationally.

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9.9: CAMEROON'S DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

The United Nations constituted the international forum in which Cameroon continued the search for world peace and justice. Initially, Cameroon joined the French-block UAM group at the UN which was institutionalised in March 1962 and whose outlook on the United Nations was much less enthusiastic and sanguine. Their opinion was sharply critical of the expanding influence of the General Assembly and of its apparent sympathy for anti-colonial causes, for example, they disapproved of the UN involvement in the Algerian and the Congo crises, arguing that they were strictly domestic concerns and therefore, beyond the purview of the General Assembly. With the Founding of the OAU in 1963, and with the call on "African Governments to ensure that their U.N. representatives... constituted a more efficient African Group, with a Permanent Secretariat in order to establish straightforward cooperation and better coordination on issues of common intersts"[140] the U.A.M group transferred its French allegiance in favour of the African Group recognized by the U.N resolution NO. 2011 of 11 October, 1965 which was in conformity with Article 33(I) of the U.N Charter which authorizes regional agencies or arrangement to seek a solution to the parties in any dispute. The African Group became the OAU executive organ at the U.N and was made up of the permanent representatives of the OAU member states; for example, between May and July 1973, the African Group at the United Nations showed itself to be a model of effective solidarity at the United Nations through articulating the interests of the African peoples on all "matters of common interests" as well as the discussions and consensus on several issues endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, etc. but which could not be settled by negotiation, equity, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or by other peaceful means. Between 1964 and 1973, the African Group at the United Nations held 294 meetings ordinarily and 120 meetings during United Nations sessions[141].

Moreover, during this same period, 398 issues were discussed 33 times each on the average; ranging from Rhodesia, Namibia, UN problems, OAU-UN relations, Group work, Middle East, UNCTAD, South Africa, Congo, Inter-African conflicts, external African relations and so on. The key contribution of cameroonian diplomacy to World peace lay in its role within the African Group at the U.N. Indeed Cameroon was very instrumental in resolving conflicts within the African Group at the United Nations since its representative could easily mediate between Anglophone and Francophone representatives. For example, Cameroon resolved conflicts over African candidatures as follows: (a) Uganda - Nigeria for a seat in the Security Council on 22 March, 1965, (b) Tunisia - Ghana for ECOSCO Presidency on 6 January, 1971 and (c) Morocco - Nigeria for the UNDP Presidency on 16 December, 1971.

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9.10: CAMEROON'S MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY

With advent of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), cameroon's Middle East diplomacy assumed extraordinary importance because of the substantial monetary allocations made to Cameroon by OPEC. During the 1980 Bafoussam Congress of the ruling "Union Nationale Camerounaise" Party (UNC), Ahidjo praised Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait "for the considerable and disinterested aid these countries have been granting us for the execution of our development projects"[142].

Despite these praises, it must be remarked that Cameroon's determination to promote capitalist relations with both sides in a conflict met with the most perplexing diplomatic dilemma in the Middle East. Jewish honour violated for centuries most ruthlessly and dramatically by the Nazis demanded that the Jews be provided by the World Community with a national home. Such a home was only possible in Israel, the only area where the Jews traced ancestry and had a sentiment of attachment to. At the same time, the honour of the Palestinians demanded that the new Jewish nation should not exist at the expense of Palestinian national home. It was a concrete example of two conflicting demands, both of which were right but only one of which could be satisfied. Cameroon attempted to reconcile the conflicting interests by accepting the U.N partition of Palestine, recognizing the State of Israel and dealing with it while insisting that the Palestinian refugees be adequately treated by the world community. It was not until the end of the six-day war in 1967 that this basic friendly attitude towards Israel was changed to that of hostility. The continual expansion of Israeli territory through conquest, which worsened the Palestinian refugee problem and further violated Palestinian honour as well as the national honour of the neighbouring Arab States and the international norm of territorial integrity, led the Ahidjo administration to accept the Arab charge of Israeli expansionism and aggression and to support resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

In fact, Ahidjo was particularly irritated by Israeli obdurate refusal to respect the principles of International Law and the moral pressures by the General Assembly of the United Nations for a solution to the Middle East crisis. Blaming the United Nations for laxity in the "implementation of its own resolutions" Ahidjo declared that he could not imagine how:

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> a country can arrogate to itself territories of other countries by force, reducing a state to wandering refugees [143].

Cameroon's impatience with Israeli intransigence and the threat to Africa posed by the latter's occupation of Arab territories was demonstrated in Cameroon's co-sponsorship of United Nations resolution 3379 (XXX) of November 1975 linking Zionism to racism[144].

Conversely, the abrogation of relations with Israel in the Middle East was counterbalanced with the copious inflow of Arab financial assistance to Cameroon from 1974. Cameroon was classified among the most severely hit by the oil crisis of 1973/1974 by the United Nations Emergency Operation[145]. Cameroon's oil bill in 1975/1976 stood at 15.000.000.000 CFA francs or at 13 percent of its import bill but, however, this figures compared better with the pathetic cases of Tanzania (18.6 percent), Kenya (18.6 percent) and Ethiopia (17.2 percent) in the same year[146]. Apart from Gabonese oil exportations to cameroon, Cameroon could boast of huge offshore reserves of 60 million tons along her geological and geographical littoral . About 63.000 tons of crude oil from Cameroon were exported from the Kole offshore fields in 1978, representing the premier return on a 2 billion franc investment by ELF-SEREPCA and PECTEN-CAMEROUN (an affiliate of shell) and a total oil prespection investment of about 50.000.000.000 CFA francs[147]. When the 37.500.000.000 CFA francs Cape Limbe Oil Refinery was completed in 1981, it had the capacity of 1.5 to 2.000.000 tons with prospects of being a net exporter of some one million tons of refined oil in the 1980s.

However, the above considerations do not cancel the fact that Cameroon's pro-Arab stances contributed to the inflow of Arab-petrol dollars in Cameroon. Ahidjo even made this clear in 1975 when he expressed Cameroon's gratitude for OPEC assistance of 28.100.000.000 dollars:

> despite their immense problems of development but in the name of Arabo-African solidarity, Arab oil producing states offered non-negligible assistance to African countries[148].

Indeed, Arab petrol-dollars were used in financing the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1976-1981), in which direct foreign subsidies covered

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4 percent, foreign borrowing 45 percent, and the foreign-dominated private sector, 29 percent[149]. Again, the organic composition and geographical orientation of Cameroon's Middle East diplomacy demonstrated the fact that the greatest concentration of interactions was around the feudal and conservative Arab states, avoiding the Arab radical states or making cooperation with them purely a rhetorical intercourse meant to avoid the unknown or calculated to avoid any embarrassment. This was predicated on one fact. With the dominant role that the Western capitalist countries play in the domestic economies of these conservative Arab states, one can adduce that the concentration of cameroon's Middle East diplomacy on them during the Ahidjo administration not only represented the cooperation between peripheral international capitalism but was also an attempt to safeguard and consolidate the basic model of this peripheral capitalist development at home through a Middle East alliance. Afterall, the April 1984, coup d'Etat against Ahidjo's successor - Paul Biya - organised by Ahidjo himself was alledgedly financed by these Arab conservative states[150].

9.11: CAMEROON'S MILITARY RELATIONS

As we noted before, the doctrine and movement of nonalignment were the confluence and culmination of centuries-old ideas, principles, activities and trends that fundamentally rejected the dominant structures and cultures of international relations and one of the most important of them was the principle of the struggle to safeguard peace and to eliminate the danger of war through détente. This principle was not only a negation of the old principle that glorified power, force and war as essential and inevitable ingredients of international relations but also constituted a resistance to the division of the world into power-blocs and politico-military blocs and to bloc-oriented policies. Furthermore, since the rejection of bloc-politics entailed the rejection of the concept and theory of power politics, it means, therefore, that the demand for the elimination of colonialism, imperialism, racism, apartheid, domination in any form and political and economic equality in all its aspects, was part of the nonaligned crusade. Again, logically and accordingly from the above analysis, it means that nonalignment involved the principle of active peaceful co-existence of independent and sovereign states which challenged the division of the world into

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bloc system of international relations necessarily generated. Peaceful co-existence, thus, implied that a world made of many independent sovereign and legally equal states of different sizes and political, military and economic power and with different social systems should be able to exist peacefully, not based on the exercise of force but on tolerance and respect for the independence of the states.

Since the key aspect of nonalignment was the elimination of structures and processes of domination and expliotation in the international system, it stands to reason that the most important aspect in the successful implementation of a nonaligned strategy in diplomacy for a new and weak state like Cameroon, should have been the complete avoidance of Defence and Military Cooperation Agreements with the bloc powers. It is in this perspective that the pursuance of an independent foreign policy, the acceptance of the principle of peaceful co-existence, and the support for national liberation of the peoples still under colonial rule was contradicted in cameroon through the country's military agreements with France - a situation which rendered the nonaligned concept of non-fraternisation in defence matters with the countries of the two main ideological blocs obsolete.

At independence, Cameroon signed co-operation agreements with the departing colonial power - France - including defence. However, it was only the departing colonial power that benefited from this post-independence military agreements entered into. Though, these agreements did not involve the former establishment of a military base and the stationing of troops on the Cameroonian territory, they amounted to much more than mere military assistance agreements involving the equipment and training of Cameroonian troops since:

> the "special (military) relationship" with France has endured to respect the oracles of the guardians of the Gaullist legacy of which the African military policy is a cornerstone. In Cameroon, the dual threat of military coups and a socialist revolution of the type U.P.C. wanted at independence made France to demonstrate to her closest and least expendable Ahmadou Ahidjo that it stood to protect him in the face of any vague appearance of foreign intervention or a threat to French nationals. The task of securing the military pact with Cameroon was undertaken by the French Ministry of Cooperation in November 1960[151].

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The above statement demonstrates the fact that France's objective was not to create a Cameroonian army to replace the colonial forces nor the accelerated training of cameroonian officers. But beyond this practical plan for the erection of the cameroonian army laid the security of the French-installed Ahidjo regime as the custodian of their neo-colonial interests in the country.

Franco-Cameroonian military connections were formalized in a series of Defence and Military Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis in 1960/61. Even-though the juridical form of the text of the agreement[152] was a poor guide to the actual military behaviour of France in cameroon, (since it was shrouded in official secrecy) its (the agreement) basic culculus was clear; that the military arrangements between France and Cameroon were not only part of the dense network of bilateral economic and political cooperation agreements, but were the cornerstone which gave these bilateral economic agreements as well as France's domination of the political economy of Cameroon - their perpetuity and guaranteed their concrete and practical application. The visit of a 76-member delegation of the French Institute of National Defence including several Generals and Senior Officers to Cameroon in February 1964 cemented this Franco-Cameroon military alliance[153].

On 3 October, 1964, the French military base at Koutaba was handed over to the embryonic Cameroonian army and on this occasion, the French Ambassador, Jean Pierre Benard, assured the Ahidjo administration that the departure of French troops never meant that France would abandon on its military obligations to Cameroon[154]. This assurance was followed up on 10 April, 1965 by "a gift of four planes from France (which) brought the strength of the Air-Force to two twin engined C47s, six single-engine Broussards and one Bell-helicopter[155]. French military experts and personnel continued to serve as technical advisers in the Navy and Air-Force as well as in the training of the cameroonian staff under a secret military pact negotiated in 1974 and ratified in 1975[156].

In 1979, Cameroon also signed a military assitance cooperation with China for the provision of equipment, hardware and training[157]. The policy of accommodating military assistance agreements with both France and the People's Republic of China could have constituted an advantage to the

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operation of a nonaligned foreign policy in Cameroon but France's increasing military presence in Cameroon virually relegated the assistance agreement with China to complete irrelevance.

However, it might be understandable why Cameroon should have been involved in defence agreements with Foreign Powers, especially the big industrial powers, but like virually all independent African countries she was a buyer rather than a producer of arms and depended on external sources for almost every bit of hardware used by her armed forces. In this case, it would have been normal if the stated aim of the agreement had been to build up the military capability of the state (as in the case of the Sino-Cameroonian military agreement). Again, such an agreement would have involved the supply of hardware, training and the giving of technical advice and would not necessarily have conflicted with the operation of a nonaligned policy since such assistance was limited to the declared objective of building up the latter's capability in order to place it in a position whereby it could defend itself. But, since on the contrary, the French military assistance agreement provided for other exclusive strategic advantages, it was not only incompatible with a policy of nonalignment because the agreement was with one of the leading powers in the ideological warfare, but also constituted an obstacle in the way of a nonaligned foreign policy. This was so to extent that coupled with the political economic domination of cameroon these agreements with France, not only enhanced the strategic position of France against her opponents on the other side of the ideological bloc in Cameroon (for example, China) but also rendered impossible the operation of an independent and flexible foreign policy in line with the country's national interest.

Nonetheless, judging from the manner of France's deployment of her troops in Cameroon in the 1960s, one could say that the Franco-Cameroonian military assistance agreements were in reality bilateral defence alliances, involving the mutual rendering of military aid to any of the parties in need. This explains why France, throughout the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon, played the role of the "Cameroonian Gendarme". This assessment strikes the point:

> Theoretically, there was to be a division of labour between the new national army and gendermerie which would ensure internal security, and France whose intervention forces would guarantee the country against any external aggression. In practice, internal and external security were inseparable as exemplified by the "pacification" campaigns of 1959-1964 led by French General Briand 158

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The above citation demonstrates that France's military intervention in Cameroon was not limited to responding to external threats since France's intervention in Cameroon against the U.P.C. movement in favour of the Ahidjo regime between 1959 and 1965 was not in response to an external threat. Therefore, since France's intervention had to do with internal unrest, moreover, quelling an internal popular movement, it follows that the agreements could be invoked not just against external threats, but also in internal disputes. Furthermore, in the light of this analysis and without any twist of logic, one can assert correctly that the interpretation of these agreements to include intervention in internal disputes gave France the opportunity of using her troops to either keep an unpopular pro-French government in power or to overthrow that not favourably disposed towards her. Moreover, the frequency of French intervention in internal disputes in Cameroon tends to suggest that the primary motive for entering into these defence partnership with the Ahidjo administration was to maintain the regime in power. This, of course, meant that to be in power, the Ahidjo regime had to continue in the manner prescribed by the French rather than responding to the aspirations of the Cameroonian people.

Some writers[159] have argued that French military interventions in Cameroon as well as in other Francophone African countries, is in no way connected with the cold war strategy of the Great Powers. Since France is not a member of N.A.T.O. and as such her defence agreements with Francophone African countries constitute no violation of nonalignment principles on the part of the African countries concerned. Apart from the fact that nonalignment's emphasis is on maximizing independence and justice in internatinal relations, it must be noted that eventhough France, is somehow out of N.A.T.O., she is still very much a faithful ally of the North Atlantic Community in the latter's efforts to contain communism. The fact that she has not formally joined NATO should not mislead anybody. In fact, France does not see her security and defence as separate from that of the Atlantic community. The Defense Minister, Yvon Borges made this quite clear in August 1979, when he said that France's destiny, and France's defence, could not be separated from that of the rest of the continent; adding that participation in European defence was one of the French army's essential missions[160]. In fact, France is as responsive as other Western Powers to what to them is a battle against the spread of communist influence in Africa. As a result of the defence

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cooperation agreements she signed with a number of African States (including Cameroon), France deployed a substantial number of troops to a number of conflict areas in the continent. It is the seeming uniquity of the French in Africa that led "Newsweek" commentator to say that "the French presence is one of the West's most effective checks against the growth of Soviet influence."[161]

This is not to say that the French military deployment in Africa is not tied up with the defence of her economic interests. In fact, part of the motivation was to protect her economic interests with her former colonies and other African States, like Zaire, from whom she gets cheap raw materials. The point of note, however, is that to the French, there is no distinction between the containment of communism and the protection of her economic interests. The two are intertwined. If you succeed in containing communism, your economic interests are protected, and if you want to protect your economic interests, you must have to contain communism. Like most other Western powers, France sees Soviet communist hands in every agitation or unrest in Africa. And what encouraged the Soviet to profit in various situations, according to the then Foreign Minster, Louis de Guiringaud, was "the weakening or disappearance of a certain kind of American presence"[162]. Little wonder then that the French believed that their policy of massive troop deployment in Africa filled a big-power void left by the United States. Given the above anti-communist posture of France's global strategy and the pro-NATO utterances of her leaders, it will be naive for any one to claim that a defence alliance with France could be inhibited from the East/West confrontation over spheres of influence. France's entire global strategy, in which the Franco-Cameroonian bilateral defence alliances formed a vital element, was predicated on the perceived Soviet communist threat which was represented by the Cameroon UPC radical movement. Thus, even if the motive of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon for contracting her defence alliances with France was not connected with the Western struggle against communist domination, France's motives were obviously to use these defence alliances to complement her world-wide strategy of containing Soviet Communist influence. Thus, since by choosing France as a defence partner, the Ahidjo administration became partakers in the big power ideological conflict, one cannot escape the conclusion that in doing this, Cameroon not only defaulted in her obligation and pledge as a non-aligned nation but furthermore eroded the basic tenets on which her national power could be built, her independence consolidated and her sovereignty protected.

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9.12: CONCLUSION

From the analysis of Cameroon's foreign policy of nonalignment during the Ahidjo administration several issues stand out clearly for a conclcusion. First of all, that the minimum basic foreign policy objectives of Cameroon should have included the maintenance of state security and the freedom to make major domestic decisions by the Cameroonians and for the Cameroonians. In other words, foreign policy should have been operated to enhance and consolidate national political and economic independence. In terms of real politik, this should have entailed reliance on its power when this was sufficient, or allying with a more powerful state when it was not. The Ahidjo administration in Cameroon, as we have seen, completely ignored the fact that in the contemporary international community small countries like Cameroon, could not realistically employ either of these means, that is, by relying on a big power and still maintaining her independence or by relying on her own power. Cameroon's low power capability limited her ability to achieve self-sufficiency in this respect and as such made it impossible for her to rely on her own power. The option which the Ahidjo administration took was external dependency. The very fact that the discrepancy between national power in Cameroon and that of the big powers with whom any meaningful alliance was concluded (as in the case of France and her allies) meant that although the security of the regime (not national security) was guaranteed, the price for it in terms of the loss of freedom and national independence to make major domestic decisions was too costly for the benefits acquired.

The natural consequence of this situation was that the nature of peripheral capitalist relations led to a total control of Cameroon by the big powers in which case the latter did not allow the former any latitude of flexibility in foreign affairs which was inconsistent with their interests nor was the former allowed to adopt any form of socio-economic organisation which they did not prefer. Beyond all these considerations Ahidjo failed to know that alliances which do not jeopardize national independence were possible only between states of the same order of magnitude of power or those bound together by significant, identical or complementary interests. The adjustment of Cameroon's national interest to suit foreign western interests jeopardized national independence.

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One remark on the Ahidjo administration's conduct of foreign affairs was the total neglect of the vital role of the domestic base of power for successful diplomacy. Their emphasis was on the plea for the reorganisation of international affairs as a means of wielding influence in world politics. But since the domestic base of national power is the critical factor in world diplomatic influence, foreign policy objectives enjoy very meagre respect in the absence of effective domestic, economic and technological strength.

Consequently, an adequate and viable strategy of diplomacy needed also to have embodied a programme for the economic development of the country, the most effective way of increasing national power. Only under such conditons could the country have achieved a high proportion of its foreign policy objectives. The foreign domination of the domestic structure, the neglect of these factors and the lack of direction in the pursuit of incremental short-run and tactical foreign policy goals led to a situation where the overall foreign policy strategy was disconnected from the overall internal development strategy of the country with its ultimate product being the sacrifice of national independence for neo-colonial penetration and exploitation.

A survey of Cameroon's external relations shows that Cameroon's diplomatic flexibility and national independence were circumscribed by the fundamental compatibility that existed between the objectives of national peripheral capitalist development and those of foreign economic agencies of the advanced capitalist countries on which the Ahidjo administration depended. This compatibility helped to increase the degree of mutual responsiveness between the international capitalist mutations and the diplomatic postures of Cameroon with regards to boiling issues and crises.

This implied, therefore, that national power and consequently national independence had been weakened by the participation of foreign linkage groups in national life. With roots in both the domestic and external environments these groups not only tended to link conflicts in the former with intervention from the latter but in most cases they dictated the position of Cameroon on most international issues. The consequence was a neglect of the domestic resources of national power and the demonralization of the population. The linkage groups were more susceptible

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to inputs from abroad because their ties to the domestic environment were weak; for example, most of the groups were expatriates who were non-citizens of the state and more so because the size of their inputs into the domestic environment was large. In other words, the "indegenization" of the linkage groups embodied in Planned Liberalism did not reduce the negative impact of the external influences because this indigenization was accompanied by an increase of bilateral foreign investment and aid which neutralized the impact of the latter. In fact, the experience of Cameroon's inter-African relations has thought us that the greater the amount of foreign investment and aid a country receives, the less the power of independent decisions by its national leadership in foreign affairs.

Thus, foreign economic dependency introduced into the country linkage groups whose roots in the domestic environment were much weaker than those they had in the advanced countries because the latter constituted the base and the core of their activities of which the domestic scene was largely peripheral. Since the advanced countries were more powerful than Cameroon and according to Planned Liberalism, Cameroon needed the roots of the linkage groups more than these groups needed her, the influence of the advanced countries in the Cameroonian domestic scene was bound to be strong and their control of Cameroon's diplomatic postures was bound to be total. The major states tended to make full use of this influence because they wanted to control the direction of the country's internal and external affairs as part of their Cold War calculus. In addition, the access into the population by these groups, had enabled them to be involved on one side or the other of domestic disputes. Their roots in the advanced countries, coupled with the benefits the latter derived from them, enabled the advanced countries to take sides as well in these disputes with the net effect being the increase in tribalism and a reduction in national unity and, therefore, national power. A country consumed by tribal and civil antagonism, as Ahidjo's Cameroon, is too weak to ward off the designs of an outside power. Usually its independence is severely curtailed thus eliminating it from effectiveness as an independent member of the Comity of Nations.

The existence of dependency on foreign entreprises in Cameroon eroded its power of independence in various other ways. In general, governmental policies were less effective because of the more open nature

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of the national economy and the greater degree of foreign participation in domestic activities. In this case, foreign firms constituted avenues through which the laws, politics, foreign policy and culture of the advanced capitalist countries impinged on Cameroon. For example, a law passed in any of these advanced countries, where the headquarters of a firm was located and which was detrimental to the Cameroon's interests automatically affected the activities of the branch in the host country - Cameroon, thereby limiting the latter's choices for action. Secondly, the status relationship between the foreign entreprise and its headquarters which frustrated creativity in Cameroon reduced the latter's ability to focus on or fully mobilize domestic resources. Again, as we have seen, national power at the diplomatic level was also diminished by the poverty of information on external conditions, thereby limiting the possibility of independent decisions on international issues.

This adversely affected the nation's bargaining position and therefore its ability to protect its interests in negotiations, particularly those of an economic nature with the advanced countries because in a significant struggle for status, independence and influence among states power is related to the availability of information and weakness to the lack of information. The indiscriminate pursuit of western capital under conditions of uncertainty as in the case of the Ahidjo administration in Cameroon, led national planners to construct policies favourable to those of Cameroon's advanced capitalist partners. The price of the extroverted economic development strategy in Cameroon during the Ahidjo administration was the manipulation of Cameroon's diplomatic behaviour to suit external interests.

One of the logical products of the above discussion becomes the consequences of economic underdevelopment on the foreign policy means and capabilities of the developing state. In common parlance, we know that the more of the economic resources and instruments at the disposal of a state, the greater its potential to influence the development of the international system in a direction favourable to itself. In other words, the more "powerful" state is, the greater its ability to achieve the objectives of its foreign policy. But as we saw above the atimic process inhibits the developing state from acquiring the necessary means and capabilities to deal with its foreign policy problems. However, we must recall that our purpose of discussing the effects of atimia on the foreign policy means and capabilities

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of the developing state is to demonstrate that the analysis of economic development in terms of foreign policy is in the last resort an assessment of the means and capabilities of the state in its external and internal relations.

A more comprehensive formulation of the issue of means and capabilities has been made by Silviu Brucan[163]. Brucan suggests that the process of foreign policy formulation derives from five factors; (a) natural-material basics, including the size of territory, population, geographic location, resources and the state, and level of economic-technological development; (b) societal structures and forces, including social classes, ethnic composition, cultural and psychological factors at work in society; (c) contigency and situational factors including political and economic crises, coups d'état, elections massive strikes, large-scale violence, military actions and war. These factors influence the intensity of social and national drives and reactions; (d) the state system, including the government machinery of decision-making; and (e) leadership, which refers to the way in which state is used by current office-holders and decision makers.

All the five sets of variables cited above clearly have relevance for policy-making and execution. It is unfortunately, not possible to assign "weights" to them indicating _a priori_ their relative significance in the policy-making process. Two general observations may, however, be made in regard to them. In the first place, the five sets of varibales may be viewed as falling into three broad categories; those which are in the nature of permanent and immutable physical realities which the policy-maker cannot alter at all or can only alter at great cost in terms of resources and time,; those variables which are entirely amenable to manipulation by decision-makers; and those which occur randomly and yet are capable of exerting decisive impacts on the course of events.

The first set of variables includes the so-called natural-material basics and societal structure and forces. The second set refers to the state system, including the institutions and agencies of government which can be changed more or less easily by those in power or at their initiative. The third set of variable - contigency/situational factors and leadership - are

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both unpredictable and also capable of influencing policy-making in sudden and decisive ways. There is no doubt at all for example, that the change in Cameroon in 1982 and the personality and style of leadership of President Paul Biya significantly affected the substance and direction of Cameroon's foreign policy after the change. Similar examples could be cited from the recent history of other African states and else where.

In the second place, these sets of variables constitute a kind of benchmark against which to measure or gauge the potential and actual capabilities of the developing state in respect to foreign policy formulation and implementation. The question of the capabilities of the developing state has been approached from two perspectives. On the one hand is the liberal approach which identifies the observable and objective deficiences of these states and the negative impact these have on policy formulation and implementation. David Vital, for example, has cited the "mental and administrative limitations, economic disabilities, national defence allocation deficiencies and the general and relative vulnerability to external coercion and pressure of developing countries"[164] as critical variables in any assessment of the capabilities of these states in international relations.

On the other hand, the question has also been approached from the radical view point of the impact of capability deficiences on the developing countries. Theories of neo-colonialism are of this kind[165]. Here the emphasis is on the consequences of structural dependency - expliotation, the drain of surplus production, the loss of political control and the virtual nullification of political independence. In this situation political independence is viewed as a matter of mere form rather than of substance. Put in general terms the greater the external control over the economic resources and processes of a state the less meaningful is its formal political independence and hence the less it is able to define and pursue an independent foreign policy.

Yet it would be an exaggeration to say that developing countries are incapable of playing a role in international politics because of their low level of development or the inadequacies of their "natural-material basics" or because of their structural dependency on the world capitalist

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system. Evidence exists in the history of post-war international relations to show that small developing countries can, infact, exert significant influence on the movement of world politics and thereby achieve their policy objectives. In 1956, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser won the suez canal against the claims of Britain and France who had a seemingly overwhelming military force at their disposal. Since its formation in 1964, Tanzania has earned under, President Julius Nyerere, a reputation among Third World states for its steadfast adherence to the principles of anti-colonialism and nonalignment. Tanzania is classed by the United Nations among thirty of the least developed countries of the world. Tanzania has upheld these principles even when this was bound to cost the country dearly in material terms[166]. Many more examples exists in post-war African history to illustrate this point.

These examples indicate that undoubted drawbacks imposed by a limited economic resource base need not incapacitate the exercise of initiative by developing states in regard to matters of importance to them in their foreign relations. Put differently, the ability to exercise such initiative is not invariably a function of the natural-material basics but may depend on such other variables as political leadership - the intellectual capacity, resourcefulness, judgement, imagination and the political astuteness of the leaders and policy-makers - or alternatively, the institutional coherence and administrative competence of the political system as a whole. For example, in Congo (now Zaire), despite his vision for his country and its relations, Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was unable to translate that vision into reality because of a collapsed administrative machine[167].

But under condition of atimia and dependency characterized by a strong interpenetration of the domestic and external environments (linkages), the ability of the developing state to achieve its foreign policy objectives varies and diminishes with the given issue or issue-area-even with the so-called "core-issue". It is possible to identify four of such issue-areas-high priority issue or "core" issues, regional issues; continental issues and global issues.

"Core-values" are of such importance that states are supposed to invest vast amounts of resources in order to safeguard them. A country's territorial integrity, for example, is a matter of such crucial importance that governments and nations will normally spare neither effort nor resources to defend it. That is to say, even an economically weak and militarily under-developed state is supposed to "throw everything it has" into defending its territory or independence. But it follows that in the context of the highly stratified global system, the willingness to make supreme sacrifices in defence of core values isnot only diluted but where such a willingness is exercised, it does not even ensure the developing state, of a significant degree of influence in the settlement of issues that have a direct bearing on such values.

Again without its economic dependency and underdevelopment the developing state would normally have had a significant ability, at least potentially, to affect the outcomes of issues of a purely regional or local character. Neighbouring states are surely well placed to deal effectively with such matters as trade, territorial boundaries and movement of persons across national boundaries through established bilateral or regional mechanisms and institutions. Examples of these include the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS), Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), among others. The ability of the developing state to affect the outcomes in matters of local or regional character should have arisen not only from the intensity of their interests in such matters but also from the fact of their great knowledge and familiarity with, the issues involved. But in the contemporary era of heightened superpower competition for spheres of influence, even the so-called local or regional issues can, and often, assume a global character as a result of super-power intervention. Territorial disputes in the Horn of Africa, the Chad-Libyan conflict, the civil wars in Nigeria, Sudan, Angola among others have all in their turn attracted a more or less pronounced measure of superpower intervention[168]. Such external intervention do not only bedevil the serach for solutions to the issues involved, but also diminish the capacity of the developing state to influence the settlement of the issue or issues.

The capacity of the individual developing state, to exert influence on the course of event, therefore, tends to diminish as one moves from local or regional issues to continental and global issues. The transnational character of the developing state imposes such limits. This transnationality because of the absence of an efficient domestic system,in most cases, tends

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to make such issues too remote from or peripheral to the immediate pre-occupations of the state. This is perhaps also illustrative of the situation that at both the continental and global levels the developing state's mode of participation is multilateral since its objectives cannot be achieved through individual efforts or initiatives. Collective diplomacy is here seen as a potentially efficacious instrument. Continentally, regional organizations such as the organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, Organisation of American States among others, have constituted the main mechanisms for tackling the problems that the developing states face in common. Globally, developing states have found it useful to work in close collaboration in seeking solutions to the problems they face in common, particularly the so-called North-South economic problems - trade, technology transfers, commodity prices, terms and conditions of international aid. Examples of such institutionalized collaboration among developing states include the Non-Aligned Movement, the "Group of 77" and the African - Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) grouping of states.

These institutions and other similar ones are designed to enhance the bargaining power of the developing states vis-à-vis their developed interlocutors. In other words, their existence is supposed to reflect, in part at least, the awareness of the developing states that the objectives or those aspects of their foreign policies that have a global dimension cannot be fully achieved through individual efforts or initiatives. It is therefore pre-supposed that as the scope of their involvement in global issues increases developing states can both expand and strengthen the institutional mechanism that serve to express and champion their collective interests.

Yet because of economic underdevelopment, this multilateralism of the developing states, of which such fora as the above are the expression, is not without problems of its own. First, the divergent aims of the developing states acruing from differences in domestic systems, render effective cooperation among them difficult. Such cooperation is often difficult to achieve even in areas where broadly shared goals otherwise exist. For example, all developing share the aspiration of developing their economies rapidly and of doing so - in part at least - by importing or inviting foreign capital and technology. However, there is a wide

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divergence of views on whether, for example, transnational corporations (TNCS) are the appropriate agencies for effecting the transference of such capital and technology. Thus, whereas socialist Tanzania is supicious of the actions of TNCS, "free-enterprise" , Ivory Coast pursues an open-door policy with reagards to these corporations. However, these two states are partners in the group of 77, the ACP grouping and in other multilateral institutions for Third World cooperation.

This divergence of views or perspectives which stems from factors such as the structure and ideology of regimes, means that Third World co-operation is achieved at the lowest common denominator of agreement. As a result, observers[169] tend to become cynical about intergovernmental organizations which proclaim grandoise aims but somehow fall short of translating these into concrete accomplishments. This cynicism is however, not justified in so far as it does not take full account of the domestic factors of individual state interests which tend to override collective or multilateral interests. Yet the pursuit of collective interests cannot be regarded as meaningless because the task of identifying and working towards the realization of the interests is itself a learning process. Thus it could be said that with economic development the act of participating in multilateral institutions will afford these states the opportunity to develop the confidence necessary for them subsequently to appreciate the benefits that cooperation can yield.

Secondly, multilateral cooperation is rendered difficult by the inability or reluctance of the states to surrender any significant portion of their sovereignty in order to facilitate the achievement of collective goals. This inability or reluctance is often explicitly enshrined in the charters or constitutions of intergovernmental organizations. Thus, although inspired by the desire of African continental unity, the OAU charter, as drafted in Addid Ababa in 1963, gives special emphasis to the following cardinal principles; the sovereign equality of member states; non-interference by member states in each other's internal affairs; state sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state, and the condemnation of political assassination and subversion perpetrated against another[170]. These principles, which merely represent an elaboration of the concept of state sovereignty, can be viewed in some ways as in contradiction with policy-seeking

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inter-state unity as a vehicle of achieving collective goals. For to be effective, such a vehicle would need to be strengthened by at least the partial surrender to it of the sovereignty of the constituent states.

Finally, Third World multilateral cooperation has been unable to contend the divisive tactics of Great Powers. Since one of the main purposes of this multilateral cooperation is to redress the existing global imbalance of wealth and power so as to benefit the developing states, it is inevitable that those powers that benefit from the current lop-sided distribution of these resources would resist the efforts to change it. One method of achieving this end has been that of "divide and rule". This, in part, explains the frequency with which Great Powers have intervened in conflicts of a purely local character involving developing states. Despite these drawbacks, one fact stands out clearly that one of the remedies to the economic underdevelopment of the developing state is that its foreign policy must continuously reflect the multilateral dimension that was historically absent from the foreign policy of older states. To this extent intergovernmental organizations must, no doubt, continue to play a vital role in sysnthesizing and promoting the objectives of foreign policy and economic development in the developing state. In this way, we can observe that on the international scene the institutional basis of the real status of the developing state in the patterns of power and prestige depends on the institution that make it possible for the state to achieve a high status in the pattern of economic development. At this point the significance of our study stands out clearly - that economic development is a basic determinant of the foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour in the developing state. In this perspective, we can affirm that the findings of our investigations in this chapter are consistent with the propositions of our hypothesis at the beginning of this chapter. This means that the outcomes of the diplomatic activities of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982 reflected the fundamental asymmetries of her economic relations during this period.

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CHAPTER TEN

THE FINDINGS AND THE NULLHYPOTHESES

10.1 INTERPRETATION OF THE INDICATORS COEFFICIENT

Data, it may be argued, only emerges after large and unassorted heaps of facts have been screened and codified by the systematic application of consistents; visible and replicable procedures for observation and classification. When such operational and scientific procedures have been so utilized, we may speak of data making, as distinguised from more anecdotal and intuitive procedures of fact accumulating and information gathering.[1]

To put it another way, empiricism does not inevitably generate data which are theoretically useful, it often generates nothing more that facts or impressions which while valuable are not yet in the form required for testing hypotheses.

Our hope is that the data generated here and the resulting interpretations and generalizations will carry our disciplines a step further away from the traditional end of the spectrum, and a discernible degree closer to the scientific end. Our justification is not, however, a purely intellectual one. If we think of interactions among nations in scientific as well as normative terms, rather than in the latter fashion alone, then it becomes evident that the variations can be explained not only by factors having little to do with the conventional "diplomatic history model" of foreign policy.

That is, an appreciation of some other basic phenomenon such as economic capability in the calculus of political variations would seem equally critical. Thus, we present in this chapter, not only the findings and implications of our research (based on foreign policy correlates), but also the data techniques that we have used to arrive at such findings.

In this analysis we rely heavily on the estimated coefficient of each individual parameter, the cummulative $\bar{R}^2$,

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the significance of the "t" and DW statistics, and the "F" ratio. These key summary statistics will illustrate that the theoretical constructs developed in this study to analyze economic development and foreign policy in Cameroon have a strong scientific basis.

We utilized time-series econometric models to test our arguments based on the economic determinants of foreign policy. First, we constructed systems of equations (See Chapter Two) to hypothesize the relationship between the economic indicators and the foreign policy variables over time. Then we ran simple and multiple regressions utilizing the models developed. The "ordinary Least Squares"[2] method was used to estimate the parameters of the theoretical models.

Special care to resolve some of the problems involved with using this technique was necessary. To guard against multicollinearity we contributed a correlation matrix of all the dependent and independent variables to see which independent variables correlated among themselves, and which did not. As a rule of thumb, if the correlation coefficient between the independent variables was less than the correlation coefficient between the dependent and the independent variables, we concluded that multicollinearity was not a serious problem and included the independent variables in one equation. If the coefficient for the independent variables was higher we dropped one and made attempts to resolve this problem.

We first estimated these regressions with the actual levels of Yt and Xt. The R^2 were considerably high. Although a high Fs^2 reflected a good fit, we suspected from the Durbin-Watson statistic that auto correlation was a problem. If this problem was not resolved the results obtained would have been biased and might not have captured the reality we were trying to explain; that is, changes in foreign policy as a result of changes in economic development. To resolve this auto correlation problem and to minimize the observed multicollinearity we used the first differences.[3] The Rs^2 were lower but the Durbin-Watson statistics were closer to 2.0, thus,

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demonstrating that the Rs^2 obtained earlier were spurious. We found out that the regressions in first differences revealed the true nature of the relationship between independent and the dependent variables.

Thus, we expected that changes in gross national product,:-petroleum, export, balance of payment, foreign reserves, capital outflow, captail inflow, and gross national product per capita-will affect positively the changes in the foreign policy of Cameroon.

As far as our findings are concerned, Tables 10(1) to 10(3) presents the results of the simple regression equations that were the results of the annual levels of exports, potroleum, and gross national product as regressors on the regress and; the support for the national liberation movements. From 10(1) we observed that twenty nine percent of the variations in the support for the national liberation movement was accounted for by the changes in the level of exports. That statistic (2.52) shows that the parameter is significant at .05 level. The Durbin-Watson (2.1) indicates that there is no auto correlation.

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The estimate coefficient for the export (0.095) shows that for every billion francs CFA increase in export, Cameroon spent about 90.000 Frs on the support for the national liberation struggle in Africa. The R^2, t, and DW statistics justify the a priori expectations of the parameter estmate. The theory postulated above expects this estimate to be positive.

The t and DW statistics - the parameter estimate of 0.095- tends to give us some explanation for the explained variance in the support for the national liberation movement. The constant (beta) states that the independent variables not included in the equation accounted for the 60.54 million frs variations in the funds that Cameroon spent in the wars of national liberation.

TABLE 10(1)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
EXPORT	0.095		2.52
CONSTANT	60.54		1.6
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.29	134.024	2.1	(1.15)6.35

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B (Export)

TABLE 10(2)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
PETROLEUM	0.055		1.68
CONSTANT	71.53	(1.15)	1.70
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.159	146.58	2.26	3.98

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B (Petroleum)

Tables 10(2) and 10(3) display similar results with petroleum and gross national product. From 10(2) we noticed that 16 percent of the variations in the support for the wars of national liberation was explained by the growth in petroleum. Gross national product (Table 10(3)) accounted for 27 percent of the variance in the same foreign policy posture. This makes sense considering the fact that the GNP is a much more conprehensive measure than the petroleum. The t statistic for petroleum is significant at 0.01 level, and the GNP at 0.05. Durbin-Watson shows no auto correlation.

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TABLE 10(3)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.05		2.38
CONSTANT	-6.25		-0.10
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.27	136.14	2.40(1.15)	5.69

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B (GNP)

TABLE 10 (4)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.176		1.6
EXPORT	0.23		1.5
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.41	131.4	2.4 (2.14)	3.98

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B (GNP + Export)

TABLE 10 (5)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistics
BALANCE OF PAYMENT	-0.06		-0.48
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.5		3.5
PETROLEUM	-1.06		-1.2
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.39	1.3	2.2 (3.13)	10.53

Support for National Liberation (Y) =
A + B (GNP + Balance of Payment + Petroleum)

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TABLE 10 (6)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
EXPORT	0.10		2.52
PETROLEUM	0.05		1.68
CONSTANT	71.5		1.7
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.15	74.4	2.60	6.3

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B (Export + Petroleum)

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We ran multiple regressions in Table 10(4), 10(5) and 10(6). The results were relatively impressive. Changes in export and gross national product combined, explain a forty one percent variation in the support for the national liberation movements. Balance of payments negatively correlated with the foreign policy. When we first regressed with the actual levels of Yt and Xt, the balance of payments had a negative parameter estimate with the monies that go to the support of the national liberation, and was negatively related to the military posture.

The reasons for the negatively estimated coefficient of the balance of payments can first be attributed to the first differences, and second, to the (actual) minutesimal positions of the balance of payments in the 1960's. We ran the regression again and logged both foreign reserves and funds for the support of national liberation. The parameter estimate was positive (0.05) and that statistic was significant at the 0.01 level. Durbin-Watson was 1.8, R^2 was 0.16. This means that changes in the balance of payments accounted for the 16 percent variations in the support for the national liberation.

In table 10(6) changes in petroleum and export explain 15 percent variances in the support for the liberation movement. Durbin-Watson, and t statistics indicate 0.05 significant level and no auto correlation, respectively. Our findings tended to

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support the hypotheses we postulated that changes in the economic development (represented by economic indicators) generate changes in the Cameroon's foreign policy.

Next we regressed five potential measures of economic development on the military posture. We postulated in Chapter Five that there was a relationship (positive) between the level of Cameroon's economic development and its military posture. Our findings proved that only GNP and Capital outflows positively correlated with the military posture (see Table 10(7) and 10(8) below). Yet their respective t statistics (0.18 and 0.39) were too weak to confirm the argument of positive relationship. But when we first regressed this dependent variable with petroleum, gross national product and foreign reserve on the levels of Yt and Xt, the relationship was linear. The "t" statistic was significant at 0.05 level. The R^2 for each was high. When we logged it the relationship was curvilinear; and when we scat it, it was still curvilinear.

Why would military posture not be functionally related to the levels of economic development? We checked the original data again for some error and also checked the residuals. We noticed that except for the rebellion years (1960-1970) military expenditure expressed as a percentage of GNP was not really rising.

The outliers in the residauls picked up the abnormality; that is, the behaviour of the military posture during the rebellion years. We used Dummy War to correct it and ran the regression again. The result was still negative.

However, the result tended to depict the real life situation. Cameroon was not at war with any of her neighbours, therefore, the responsiveness (or elasticity) of the economic development to the military build-up (to deter aggression) was minimal. The inverse relationship then depicted the deficit nature of the military expenditures to the aggregate economic performance, not only to Cameroon but to the Third World as a whole.

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TABLE 10 (7)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
EXPORT	-0.02		-0.55
CONSTANT	171.245		3.29
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.02	183.9	0.71	0.31

Military Posture (Y) = A + B (Export)

TABLE 10 (8)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
PETROLEUM	-0.12		-0.56
FOREIGN RESERVE	-0.01		-0.3
GROSS NATIONAL PROD.	0.008		0.18
CAPITAL OUTFLOW	1.22		0.39
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.03	204.4	0.6	0.09

Military Posture (Y) = A + B (Petroleum + Foreign Reserve + GNP)

Tables 10(9) to 10(11) below report the findings for the diplomatic personnel models. Changes in the gross national product and capital outflow had an impact on the Franco-Cameroon (DPLI) relationship. Thirty nine percent of the variations in Cameroon's diplomatic strength in France was explained by the relative changes in GNP and Capital outflow. For every billion francs increase in GNP, Cameroon spent about 40 million frs in diplomatic personnel. The parameter estimate for the capital outflow was higher than that of the GNP. What this implies is that if Capital Outflow increases by a billion francs about 1/3 of that increase is spent on foreign diplomatic and consular missions. In other words, it states that for every million francs increase in Capital Outflow,

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TABLE 10(9)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.004		3.03
CAPITAL OUTFLOW	0.35		1.5
CONSTANT	17.6		4.07
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.39	7.38	1.9	4.64
Diplomatic Personnel(France) (Y) A+B (GNP, Capital Outflow)			

TABLE 10 (10)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
PETROLEUM	0.009		6.58
CONSTANT	30.99		16.4
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.74	6.12	1.8 (1.15)	43.4
Diplomatic Personnel France X US (Y) = A + B (Petroleum)			

350,000 frs is spent on diplomatic personnel. This is highly relevant considering the fact that Cameroon has a very large numeric strength of the diplomatic personnel in France, Germany, Britain and the US. The statistics was significant at the 0.05 level. Durbin-Watson showed a good fit (no auto correlation).

Changes in petroleum (Table 10(10)) explained 74 percent of the variations in the Cameroon's diplomatic personnel's model for France. This is reflective of the largest numeric strength of the diplomatic and consulr personnel that Cameroon has in these countries (more than any other African country).

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It is also a reflection of the old-colonial ties. Fourteen percent of the changes in export explained the changes in Cameroon's diplomatic personnel in the Soviet Union. This is, however, a good indicator of the relative strength of Cameroon diplomatic personnel in the Soviet Union when compared with the United States and the United Kingdom.

It also depicts the limiting (cultural and economic) influences that the Soviet Union has on Cameroon and vice verse. The mode of Cameroon's production is basically the indication of

TABLE 10 (11)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
EXPORT	0.006		1.6
CONSTANT	19.06		4.8
DUMMY I	-0.8		-1.4
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.14	14.04	2.08(1.15)	2.6

Diplomatic Personnel USSR (Y) = A + B (Export)

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such influences and the fact that most of the Third World countries that Cameroon dealt with were in the same Western camp like Cameroon. The mixture of economic and political relationships with respects to Cameroon and the Western world was revealed in these models.

We corrected for the "no foreign policy" with the Soviet Union in the first six years of Cameroon's independence with Dummy I (see Table 10(11)). We also included Dummy variable (Dumwar) in Table 10(12) to correct for the imbalance or depletion in the foriegn reserve and excessive capital outflow. The regression result, (Table 10(12)) however was a poor fit. Capital outflow was inversely related to the

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diplomatic personnel, while changes in foreign reserves explained minimally, changes in the diplomatic model for the Soviet Union.

TABLE 10 (12)

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic
CAPITAL OUTFLOW	-0.28	-0.13
FOREIGN RESERVE	0.002	0.7
CONSTANT	12.9	3.57

R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.04	15.4	0.28 (2.14)	0.3

Diplomatic Personnel USSR (Y) = A + B (Capital outflow + Foreign Reserve)

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Impressively, changes in the economic development indicators (export, GNP, petroleum, and foreign reserves) had a relationship with the variances in the foreign policy. Our findings empirically supported that argument.

We displayed in Tables 10(13) through 10(17) the regression results for equation 2.4 (See chapter two). We posited in Chapter two that the pattern of Cameroon's votes in the United Nations (Yt) in agreement with the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) particularly on the issues of the Third World will rise and fall with the level of Cameroon's economic development (Xe) over time. We anticipated that the level of Cameroon's economic development would be inversely related to Cameroon's votes (agreement) with the United States (specifically in the issues of colonialism, self-determination, apartheid, racism, nuclear non-proliferation, and raw materials); and linearly related to the Soviet Union on those issues.

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TABLE 10 (13)

REGRESSION OF UNV4S ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 -1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	-0.003		-1.63
CONSTANT	19.35		1.85
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.15	11.6	2.4 (1.15)	2.66

United Nations Votes with US (Y) = A + B (GNP)

The ratios of the votes with each entity over twenty-two years (1960 - 1982) were taken and regressed with major economic indicators. Table 10(13) above shows a simple regression result of economic development and the pattern of Cameroon's votes (agreement) in the united Nations with the United States. Gross national product was inversely related to Cameroon's votes. This implied that Cameroon's voted less in agreement with the United States at the UN as the level of Cameroon's economic development increased.

Fifteen percent (R^2) of the variances in Cameroon's disagreement with the United States in the world forum was explained by the changes in the gross national product. The t statistic was significant at a 01 level. Durbin-Watson depicted a good fit.

This result constrasted with the voting pattern of Cameroon with the United States and France in the 1960's. The qualitative research findings reveal that Cameroon voted "yes" with the same country in the seventies. The issues they agreed upon in the 1960's did not change much in the 1970's.

What changed in the 1970's was the level of Cameroon's economic development that generated changes in foreign policy. This was very much depicted in our equation. The change in

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foreign policy with respect to the Third World issues was independent and radical. The decolonization of Africa, apartheid, right to self-determination of oppressed and colonized peoples which the United States voted against in every agenda, occupied Cameroon's attention in the 1970's. And now that its strategy for economic development did not depend so much on the foreign aid from the United States, France, and even the Soviet Union, tended to see an evolution of independent foreign policy that defined the national interest of Cameroon.

The pattern of Cameroon's votes in disconjunction with the United States also reflected the pattern of the World votes in disconjunction with the West, in the United Nations in the 1970's on the Third World issues. The increased political awarness of the developing countries emanating from their economic relationships with the advanced industrial societies generated antagonisms. Antagonisms that were derived from the debt trap, the foreign trade carrot, and the foreign aid influence.

TABLE 10(14)

REGRESSION OF UNVUS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N. = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
EXPORT	-0.007		-2.4
CONSTANT	16.4		5.4
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.29	10.63	1.86 (1.15)	6.23

United Nations Votes with US (Y) = A + B (Export)

Exports also delineated a negative link with the UN Votes with respect to the United States (Table 10(14). The multiple regression in Table 10(15) shows that increases in capital inflow and petroleum were negatively correlated with the votes. When GNP was regressed with petroleum and Capital

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Inflow on the votes with the Soviet Union, the estimated coefficient (0.0003) for GNP was positive, but its statistic (0.15) was too weak to make any strong argument.

With the Soviet Union, Cameroon's votes in the United Nations tell a different story. Twenty one percent of the variations of Cameroon's agreement with the Soviet Union at the UN was explained by the changes in the level of economic development. Table 10(16) indicates that for every billion francs change in the gross national product, Cameroon's voted 0.0013 times in agreement with the Soviet Union at the United Nations. The "t" statistic, showed 0.01 level of significance. Durbin-Watson revealed no serial correlation.

TABLE 10 (15)

REGRESSION OF UNV4S ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.0003		0.15
PETROLEUM	0.64		2.24
CAPITAL INFLOW	0.26		1.19
CONSTANT	17.29		3.84
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.42	10.28	1.82 (3.13)	3.23

UN Votes with US (Y) = A + B (GNP + Petroleum + Capital Inflow

The regression results tended to depict Cameroon's foreign policy convergence with that of the Soviet Union with respect to the Third World issues. The Soviet Union voted in agreement with the Third World on such issues as the elimination of colonialism, racism, aparteid, self-determination, Palestinian autonomy, which the United States, the United Kingdom and France consistently voted against. In addition to the votes, the Soviet Union demonstrated concretely the support for the national liberations struggles of the opressed peoples in Africa.

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TABLE 10(16)

REGRESSION OF UNVSS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.0013		3.07
CONSTANT	2.58		3.16
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.21	1.88	1.7 (1.15)	4.5

United Nation's Votes in agreement with Soviet Union (Y) = A+B (GNP)

Lastly, Tables 10(17) and 10(18) show the regression on Gross National Product per capital, foreign reserve on the UN votes (in agreement) with the Soviet Union. The result was poor, judging from the individual parameter estimates, R^2, t, and Durbin-Watson statistic. Foreign reserve and income per capita were negatively correlated with the foreign policy. Income per capita in our previous results (that is regressions on the actual levels, of Yt and Xt) was also negative. In this instance, changes in foriegn reserves and income per capita reflected variation of the voting patterns of Cameroon with the Soviet Union. Generally, the quantitative evidence of the impact of

TABLE 10 (17)

REGRESSION OF UNVSS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
PETROLEUM	0.00		-0.51
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.0003		0.64
CONSTANT	2.4		2.77
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.11	2.01	1.96 (3.13)	1.9

UN Votes with the Soviet Union (Y) = A+B (Petroleum + GNP)

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TABLE 10 (18)

REGRESSION UNVSS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1982 N = 22

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate		t Statistic
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA	-0.0004		-0.24
FOREIGN RESERVE	-1.20		-0.9
CONSTANT	19.77		4.6
R^2	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.016	196.5	0.9	0.8

UN Votes with the Soviet Union (Y) = A+B (GNP Per Capita + Foreign Reserve)

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economic indicators or foreign policy was supportive of and equally stronger as the qualitative research we have reported in the previous chapters, although the quantitative evidence yielded results no less conflicting.

The application of the key summary statistical tools in this research to test our hypotheses have sound scientific basis in establishing our conclusion that changes in the levels of Cameroon's economic development indicators (GNP, petroleum, export, capital outflow, foreign reserve) affected the conduct of Cameroon's foreign policy. The higher the increases of these economic indicators (reduction in dependency), the more independent and radical the foreign policy was.

We found Gross National Product, crude petroleum, capital outflow, and exports to be very elastic with the conduct of Cameroon's foreign policy. There was a very strong linear relationship between each of these parameters and the Cameroon's foreign policy, particularly in the 1970's. The relationship, however, is not absolute. There are unexplained variances that economic indicators are incapable of discerning and which we believe the other elements of national power (See Chapters Four & Five can explain. This is to acknowledge again, the relative importance of other factors in the determinants of

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Cameroon's foreign policy. But those factors we have always maintained are themselves, economically invigorated.

In the foregone analyses we noticed peculiar instances where foreign policy was insensitive to the Gross National Product per capita. That is, income per capita had a negative functional relationship with the foreign policy. There is more to this explanation than what the statistical data indicated. This data did not only reflect the structural imbalance of the economic system that is fundamentally based on social inequality, but it tended to give the suggestiveness of the political system that traded off social welfare programmes for power and influence. The reality we are trying to capture is the philosophical implications of the low level of GNP capita in a system of structured social inequality. If Cameroon, with a modest wealth and low income per capita was exercising influence internationally, the price tag of such ambition was not just the millions of francs spent abroad to wield the influence, but it was definitely the unresolved domestic social problems. Given the low level of income per capital to reflect the high degree of domestic social problems, in contradistinction with its expensive foreign policy commitments, then we can deductively imply that the negative regression coefficient between these two variables (foreign policy and GNP per capita) depicted the negative social reality. That is, the poverty of the masses.

However, there are limitations to that interpretation. First, much of the social ills in Cameroon's economic system are not statistically addressed in this research. We are not obliged to such an explanation. The unit of our analysis has basically been the impact of an economic subsystem on the input-output of foreign policy. Since an analysis of foreign policy inevitably touched upon the analysis of the structures of power and influence, then we have been basically concerned with the analysis of the economic structure of Cameroon's power and influence, and not the social problems.

As far as Cameroon is concerned the implication of this analysis is that the composite index of economic growth proves to be a useful indicator of foreign policy. For example, the higher the levels of gross national product, foreign reserve, export, capital outflow, trade with African countries, and petroleum, the greater Cameroon's involvement in international politics. Thus the repoliticization of economic issues will have a positive linkage effect with Cameroon's foreign policy in as much as self-reliance remains the predominant engine of growth. The power and influence of Cameroon will continue to exert an incredible pressure in international politics if it succeeds to be self-reliant.

In conclusions we can assert that there was a functional (linear) relationship between the changes in the gross national product, export petroleum, capital outflow, and the variations in Cameroon's foreign policy in the period we have studied. There was a cirvilinear relationship between the foreign reserves, balance of payment and gross national product per capita with the foreign policy of the same period. Military posture was inversely related to the economic development. Diplomatic personnel, and the support for the wars of national liberation as dependent variables correlated positively with the economic growth indicators. Cameroon voted less in agreement with the United States (on the issues of the Third World) as the former experienced economic growth, and tended to vote more in agreement with the Soviet Union (on the issues of the Third World) as its (Cameroon) level of economic development increased. In other words, a decrease in economic dependency leads to an assertive, independent and more radical foreign policy in the developing state.

10.2 : LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY IN CAMEROON, 1960-1982.

We started this research with the prognosis that significant changes (reduction in dependency and increase in self-reliance) in the fundamental economic attributes of the developing state will affect its behaviour towards other nations, and thus, alter the orientation of its external relations. We raised the argument that a country generating national growth may also generate lateral pressures in the form of conflict, domination, and violence. We then asked the question;

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how and in what ways Cameroon's growing economic potentialities affected the calculus of political variations in Africa and the world. In the inquiry, we utilized both quantitative and qualitative data to test our hypotheses. Below we give a summary of our findings.

The variations in foreign policy over the period we have studied were both linearly and curvilinearly related to the changes in the level of economic development. Changes in Gross National Product, Export, Outflow, and Petroleum production explained positively the variations in the foreign policy; while changes in the Balance of Payment, Gross National Product Per Capita and Foreign Reserve were inversely related to the changes in foreign policy.

Diplomatic personnel and the support for the wars of national liberation in Southern Africa correlated positively with the changes in the fundamental economic attributes. Military posture had a functional (inverse) relationship with the level of economic development. Cameroon voted less in agreement with the United States at the United Nations on the issues of the Third World as it (Cameroon) experienced a high level of less dependent economic development; and tended to vote more in agreement with the Soviet Union on the same issues in the same forum and at the same level of economic development.

Cameroon's economic development generated a quasi-economic and political independence that had a positive functional relationship with the emerging political consciousness of the African nations. The growing African political activism for the decolonization of the colonial enclaves in the African geopolitics moved beyond the level of appearances to the level of essence; and concretized in the material (military, political, financial) support given by Cameroon and other African states for the revolutionary social praxis in Southern Africa.

The resultant births of new nations such as Angola, Mozambique and the independence of Zimbabwe correlated

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policies, and actualized African economic interdependency, emanated from national economic growth.

Economic imperialism was out of the vocabulary of Cameroon's economic nationalism. Rather it was the national economic growth that generated African political consciousness and revolutionary social praxis for the decolonization of the African continent. The quality of Cameroon's economic relations with other African states confirmed this point.

Cameroon's foreign trade was a good indicator of the power or leverage it was able to exercise in international economic relations. Cameroon's power and influence on the international scene was largely derived from its supply of a critical non-renewable resource (petroleum) with a relatively high inelasticity of demand.

But it must be noted that the structural vulnerability of a monopolistic supply of this commodity was like a double-edged sword. The reason being that most economic relationship usually involved the simultaneous existence of both economic vulnerability and economic power for the actors involved. The precise balance depended on the relative costs in changing the relationship for the involved parties. That is dependency on imported raw materials was a vulnerability, but it was also a source of economic power over an exporting country that depended upon its foreign earnings from the sale of raw materials to procure necessary military weapons.

The quality of Cameroon's relationship with the other major powers mildly moved from colonial - imperial (specifically with the France) to client - patron, (particularly with the Western Countries), the re-alignment of the United States' foreign policy towards Africa, the re-examination of the France's African old colonial policy and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's support for the struggle of national liberation in African were greatly influenced by Cameroon's and African perceived economic power.

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Cameroon's perceived power was a mix of economic capability, critical mass, political capability, military capability, and the strategic will reified as political leadership. Changes in economic capability had a causal inference on changes of other elements of power. Changes in economic capability effectuated changes in the international political relations.

Cameroon's economic assertiveness in the late seventies and early eighties reconstructed Cameroon's ideological neutrality and redefined it in the context of non-alignment. In essence, then, the level of Cameroon's economic development affected its foreign policy format; and the higher the level of self-reliant economic development, the lower the level of economic and political dependency and the more radical the foreign policy output was.

10.3 : ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

From the above, it is clear that as modern nation-states are politically interdependent, so do they rely upon each other for resources and commodities that enable them to develop and sustain viable economies. Such external economic relations to a large extent determine the foreign policy orientation of the states concerned. This part of our research therefore, highlights the essential elements of the role of the external economic sector of the developing state, in determining its foreign policy orientation. As we have argued throughout our study, a common feature of the economic development of the developing state is the strong external orientation of the economy. Although on the average the developing state does not necessarily have a greater quantitative ratio of, say, exports to total measured ouput than an industrially developed market economy, forces for domestic economic growth in the developing state are much more directly dependent on international economic relations than in the industrialized state. For example, the overwhelming proportion of domestically generated funds for investment in the developing state come either from tariff duties on goods and services flowing across international

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boundaries or from surpluses extracted by quasi-government bodies such as Marketing Boards, from the producers of commodities destined for export.

Thus just as political factors shape foreign policy outcomes so do economic factors shape foreign policy outcomes and orientations. Students of the foreign policy analysis, however, invariably overlook the economic determinants of the foreign policy oreintation and/or behaviour of the developing state. There are three ways in which external economic relations shape foreign policy outcomes. First since the economic system shapes the political system in the developing state, the structure and operation of its international political and diplomatic relations are to a great extent, determined by the structure and operation of its international economic relations secondly, since in the developing state economic concerns often shape political and diplomatic policies important foreign policy decisions are often dictated by overriding economic interests. Thirdly, international economic relations of the developing state, in and of themselves, are political and diplomatic relations, since its external economic interactions like its external political interactions constitute the process by which the developing state and other state or non-state actors manage or fail to manage, their conflicts, and by which they cooperate or fail to cooperate to achieve common goals. Let us look in more detail at the three economic dimensions of the foreign policy of the developing state in an attempt to illustrate the above contention.

The structure and operation of the developing state's external political and diplomatic relations is to a large extent determined by the structure and operation of its external economic relations. Throught modern history, states at the pre-industrial stage of development have adopted a foreign policy of national consolidation.[4] As such their diplomatic relations have been shaped by the prevailing modes of production, distribution and consumption. During the mercantilistic period between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, two principal political and diplomatic

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developments were shaped by economic interactions. First was the development of powerful nation states from the ruins of medieval universalism and local particularism - the emergence of new centralized political units-England, France, Spain, Sweden, Russia, Russia - whose foreign policy goals were the consolidation of power, both internally and vis - a - vis other states Second, in the mercantile political system the competition was among nearly equal states. Because power was idstributed fairly equally relatively minor changes were very important in the overall power position of a state. But despite the significant competition for power, there were important limits to competition. There was a common political culture, including a consensus on royal legitimacy. There were also limits to state capability. State administration was weak, armies were small and mercenary, and, therefore, military and diplomatic objectives were limited.[5]

The impact of the economic structure on the political and diplomatic structure of mercantilism was profound. The economic realm became the main arena for political conflict. The pursuit of state power was carried out through the pursuit of national economic power and wealth, the process of competition limited by political reality, was translated into economic competition. All international economic transactions were regulated for the purpose of state power. Because mercantilists believed that wealth and power were intimately linked with the possession of so-called precious metals, governments organized their international trading structures for the purpose of maintaining favourable balance of trade to accumulate these metals. There were controls on exchange markets and the international movements of precious metals, along with regulation of individual and general commercial transactions through tariffs, quotas, and prohibitions of some transactions. Sates gave subsidies to export and import subsitution industries and sometimes engaged in production or trade. Mercantilist states also acquired colonies for the purpose of favourable trade balances and for the political goal of self-sufficiency. Colonies existed to accomodate the mercantile interests of

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Cameroon's foreign policy outcomes, that is, positive foreign policy accomplishments.

By 1982, Cameroon's economic development had generated a semi independence that was inversely related to the Ex-Ante economic structure. The extension of loans and aid to some of the needy African states (e.g. Equatorial Guinea) minimized the economic and political dependency of these states on their former colonial and imperialist masters, and maximized the economic and political interdependence of the African nations. The formation of UDEAC and its positive role in inter-African economic relations were some of the positive accomplishments by Cameroon.

The politicization of the African bloc votes in the United Nations in relations in relation to the major powers was another Cameroon's accomplishment. Cameroon's votes in conjunction and disconjunction with the super powers on the Third World issues reflected to a large extent the African political stance on those issues that Cameroon cast its votes.

The coalition with the Arab states at the United Nations in the demand for Palestinian autonomy resulted in the Arab states coalition with the African nations in the demand for the decolonization of Africa. Cameroon was at the center of that diplomacy and influenced the production, distribution, and allocation of loans, aid, and grants from the EEC and the OPEC to the African nations in particular and to the Third World at large.

Above all its growing economic strength was inversely related to its neo-colonial economic structure. The relationship generated a by product - a moderate foreign policy posture. Its moderate foreign policy posture was a mix of; (1) aggressive foreign economic policies; (2) political actions and nonactions; and (3) putative and actualized military posture for the negation of colonialism, imperialism, and the elimination of apartheid in the African politectonic zone. Thus, the propensity to generate foreign economic

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the metropole, and strict state regulation of the colonial economy existed to serve these ends. It was the reaction to such mercantilist policies-the regulation of production of exports and imports, and the control of shipping - which led the American colonies to rebel against England. Thus in the mercantile period, it was the nature of the economic system which in large part shaped the nature of the emerging state and the nature of the state system-and when that economic system underwent a dramatic change, the political structure changed and Great Britain rose to political dominance.

In the nineteenth century, the political system was characterized by the balance of power on the continent and by Great Britain's power overseas. On the continent, Russia and France were constrained by the territorial realignments of the congress of Vienna, and the four major continental powers were controlled through their own rivalries. This enabled Great Britain to play a balancing and mediating role. With its geographical position off the European continent and its predominance on the seas, Great Britain was able to control Europe's access to the rest of the world and by denying overseas colonies to the continental states. This naval power combined with the decline of the continental powers meant that the greater part of the non-European world was independent or under British rule. Because of their industrial and economic development, Great Britain dominated this political system of a balance of power on the continent and British economic power overseas helped to establish an international economic and political system that centred on Britain. The basis of the system was free trade. The political roots of free trade may be traced back to the Napoleonic when the French emperor imposed the continental system - an economic embargo on Britain. The Napoleonic embargo encouraged a transformation of the British economy from trade with the continent to trade overseas. After the defeat of France and the end of the embargo, Britain continued on the established path. With the repeal of the corn Laws, the Navigation laws, and the gradual removal of tariffs, however, Britain developed an exchange system of domestic manufactures for overseas raw materials. Treaties with and

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among other European states expanded the system to the continent and trading dominance was reinforced by British investments overseas. Vast amounts of capital flowed out of Great Britain in the nineteenth century to the United States, Canada, Latin America and the nontropical areas of the empire. And the city of London emerged as the world's financial centre.

Thus in the nineteenth century the military and political dominance of Britain was possible because of her adoption and internationalization of a liberal economic system. But, once again, when the economic system began to change at the end of the nineteenth century, when British power waned, the liberal economic system also began to decline and a new imperialist system emerged. The roots of 19th century imperialism are complex and elusive. But two economic factors were crucial to its development. The first was the decline of British dominance that stemmed from the rise of rival political, military and economic powers, in particular, the United States and Germany. And, second, the discruptive influence of these new powers was reinforced by the emergence of modern economic nationalism. The increasingly powerful rival states, and Britain as well, were motivated by the unruly forces of national identity, national pride, and the quest for national self-fulfillment and power. More nearly equal power relations and the new nationalism led to a high competitive international system, one increasingly less constrained by Great Britain's balancing and overseas domination, which stabilized the earlier nineteenth-century system. These crucial economic changes permitted the operation of other important forces-the political pressures of a newly powerful capitalist class, along with the military escapades of various adventurers (explorers and fortune hunters); important technological and communications developments, which facilitated control of overseas territories; and the action and reaction dynamic of imperial competion. International political conflict increased, but often it was acted out not in Europe-at least not until 1914 - rather it occurred in Asia and Africa. In the space of a few decades much of Asia and virtually all of Arfica were divided up by Western Europe and the United States.

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The new economic imperialism was the basis for a new international political system. European economic dominantion led to political domination and expliotation. As in the days of mercantilism, Colonies were integrated into an international economic system which was designed to serve the economic interests of the metropole. The political victors controlled investment and trade, regulated currency and production and manipulated labour, thus establishing structures of economic dependency in their colonies which would endure far longer than their actual political authority. The imperialist system and the residual domination of the United Kingdom in the West finally collapsed under the strain of World Wars I and II. In the post - World Wars II period, a new political and economic system based on the hostile confrontation of two superpowers emerged. Politically, the new system was bipolar. In the West, there was a hierarchy with the United States as the dominant economic and military power over a weakened Europe and Japan. In the Third World, Nations in great part remained economic and politically subordinate to the old imperial powers. In the East, the Soviet Union was the overwhelmingly dominant economic and political power. And finally, East and West confronted each other in the cold War.

This internal economic system shaped the postwar international political system. For political reasons, the East and West were isolated into separate economic systems. In the East, the Soviet Union imposed a communist international economic system based on the concept of a socialist commonwealth and, for political reasons, sought to make the other members of the socialist commonwealth economically dependent on the Soviet Union and economically isolated from the West. In the West, the U.S. military and political dominance was matched by the U.S. economic dominance. America's liberal vision shaped the economic order in the West. The principles of the international economic system were again as in the period of British hegemony-free trade and free capital movements. Within such a system, American trade, American investment and the American dollar predominated. Thus economics have shaped politics in the postwar era. And in

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the 1970s as the breakdown of the postwar political system, the decline of American power and increasing pluralism in the West, a superpower detente, and a new political and economic consensus in the developing World are now leading to a new international political system.

In addition to shaping political systems, economic factors also influence political policies. Throughout history as we have seen, national policy has been shaped by international economics. In the mercantile period governments regulated economic activity and acquired colonies. In the 19th century the British repealed the corn laws and the navigation acts and turned to free trade. At the end of that century, public policy turned to the annexation of territory in Asia and Africa. In the years since World War II, American foreign policy has been influenced by her multilateral, free trading system. These national policies were, in turn, determined by internal economic processes. Political policy is the outcome of an economic bargaining process in which different groups representing different interests conflict over different preferred policy outcomes. Group conflict occurs, for example, between groups favouring low tariff barriers and those advocating protection, between those favouring energy independence and those advocating reliance on foreign sources of energy. The outcome of political conflict is determined by economic power. The different economic strengths of competing groups shape the outcomes of foreign policy. Thus mercantilism may be viewed as the external outcome of an economic conflict between particularist local powers and the rising power of the central government; free trade was the external product of a conflict between the landed class which advocated protection, and the rising bourgeois class which supported free trade; imperialism was the external reflection of the political and economic power of the ascendent military and capitalist classes; U.S. Liberalism was determined by the support it enjoyed among powerful business and labour groups.

Very often what shaped the economic bargaining process is overriding strategic and diplomatic interest. Foreign

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policy is frequently either shaped by economic concerns or becomes an explicit tool of national strategic and diplomatic policy. Trade policy frequently determines political goals. Embargoes have been political tools of economic warfare throughout history. France applied an embargo to weaken Great Britain during the Napoleonic wars; the League of Nations called for an embargo of Italy after the invasion of Ethiopia in an effort to end the former's aggression in 1935; the United States since 1949 has embargoed trade with communist countries in an effort to weaken the latter's military capability; the Arab oil embargo of the United States and the Netherlands was an effort to alter their pro-Israeli foreign policy. Trade has also been used for defensive military purposes. Alexander Hamilton argued that the fledging United States should develop a domestic manufacturing system through trade protection to avoid dependence on foreign sources in conflict or war.[6] A similar policy advocated by the European countries and the United States during the oil crisis called for the development of demestic energy resources to avoid consequences, both economic and political of dependency on foreign sources of supply.

Foreign aid is another familiar economic tool that determines strategic and diplomatic outcomes. The Marshall plan under which the United States gave 17 million in outright grants to Western European countries to rebuild their economies after World War II, was designed to make Western Europe impervious to aggression by the Soviet Union. Foreign economic assistance to developing countries has been used to win friends for the West or the East during the cold War. Foreign aid also has been used by former colonial powers to retain political influence in their former colonies.

Finally, international economic relations, in and of themselves, constitute political and diplomatic relations. International economic relations may be defined as the patterns of economic interaction between and among states. And, as with all politics, international economic relations involve goal-seeking behaviour and a process of deciding who gets what, when and how. Thus international economic

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relations are political when they involve the interaction of different economic groups in goal-seeking pursuits. Interaction among economic groups in the international system range from conflict to cooperation. At one extreme pure conflict occurs when the interests of these groups involved are diametrically opposed. If one of these groups realizes its goal, the other cannot achieve its objective. For example, in a conflict over an economic zone one state will gain the zone and one will lose it. At the other extreme cooperation exists. In such a situation economic groups share a common interest and all benefit from the furtherance of their shared interest. For example, allies have a common interest in ensuring their common economic defence or the developing states have a common interest in achieving economic independence, or trading partners have a common interest in maintaining beneficial trading relations.

Most international economic interactions involve elements of both conflict and cooperation, since, even in situations of extreme conflict there is often an element of cooperation. For example, despite the severity of political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over placing missiles in Cuba in 1962 or over the Middle East War of 1973 both supper powers have maintained economic relations no matter however minimal. Conversely, in situations involving high levels of economic cooperation, there is usually conflict over specific interests and specific solutions. For example, all Western States may want to establish and maintain a stable international monetary system, but certain of these states have a preference for a particular type of monetary system, (such as a fixed exchange rates or floating exchange rate regime) which satisfies more specific national economic interests. Thus within a framework of common economic goals, states conflict over the best means to achieve their common ends.

In domestic politics goal-seeking behaviour is regulated by the government which has the authority to make decisions for a society and the power to enforce those decisions. The peculiar characteristic which distinguishes

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international politics from internal politics is the absence of government. In the international system no legitimate body has the authority to manage conflict or achieve common goals by making and enforcing decisions for the system; instead, decision-making authority is dispersed among many governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental groups. Because of the absence of government, the central problems of international politics are the adjustment or management of conflict and achievement of cooperation. The means by which the state and nonstate actors manage, or fail to manage, their conflicts and the ways in which they cooperate, or fail to cooperate to achieve common goals is the central subject of international politics. Over the centuries actors have deliberately or in adventently developed rules, institutions, and procedures to manage international conflict and cooperation. These forms of managing international order have varied over time, over space and over issues. They range from balance of power to alliances to international organizations and from hegemony to colonialism to international law. When there are effective rules, institutions, and procedures conflict takes place within agreed limits, and cooperation is facilitated. When there are no effective rules, institutions, and procedures conflict may be unregulated and cooperation is impossible to achieve. In such a situation international conflict may escalate into war.

The subject of international economic relations may be viewed as the management of conflict and cooperation in the absence of government. As with all international political interaction, economic interaction ranges from pure conflict to pure cooperation. Some economic relations involve high levels of conflict. Wealth is an important goal of groups in international politics and the pursuit of wealth in the presence of scarce resources leads to conflict-over access to markets, over control of raw materials, over the control of the means of production. Such conflict often is linked to conflicts over power and sovereignty. The confrontation of producers and consumers over the price of oil, for example is a challenge by producers to the power of both the developed countries and the oil companies. The outcry in the Third

World against multinational corporations is, in part a reaction to an infringement of sovereignty. Much of the international economic interaction, however, has a high level of cooperation. Many states share the goals of a stable monetary system, expanding trade relations and rising production though they differ over the means of achieving these ends. Some favour fixed exchange rates, whereas others prefer a float. Some advocate tariff reductions on textiles, whereas others forcefully oppose them. Some favour growth through free trade, whereas others feel free trade inhibits growth. Some feel multinational corporations are a vital new road to economic growth, whereas others fill they perpetuate underdevelopment.

As with all international politics, states have deliberately or inadevertently established rules, institutions and procedures to manage international conflict and cooperation: International economic management varies with time, place and issue area. Mercantilism, free trade and imperialism have been different historical forms of trade management. The Gold Standard and the Dollar System have at different times regulated international monetary relations. Sometimes, such as during the 19th century Gold standard or the 20th century Dollar system, management is effective. At other times, such as during the Depression of the 1930s or the monetary crisis of 1971-1973, management breaks down. In some relations, such as those among the developed market economies, there are complex and effective management rules, institutions and procedures. In other relations, such as those between developed and the developing countries, rules, institutions, and procedures either are not developed or are the subject to great conflict. Finally, in some areas, such international trade, complex rules have been formally established, international organizations created, and informal procedures developed. In other areas, such as international production, international management relies on more rudimentary forms of control. In this perspective, one can therefore assert that the external economic relations of a state determine its foreign policy format. However, it must be remarked that one can evaluate the impact of the external

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economic relations of state on its foreign policy only in relation to its general economic policies and performance. In this light, external economic relations can also serve as an instrument for maximizing national power by providing maximum support for the state's general foreign policy.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Raw material must still, however, be manipulated, rearranged and combined inorder to be theoretically useful. That is, data on one variable must be compared and correlated with data measuring other variables, both for purposes of cross-validation among apparently similar variables and for the production of empirical generalizations. See H. M. Blalock, Jr; Measurement in the Social Sciences (Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 26-26; Blalock, Jr; Causal Inference in Nonexperimental Research (chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 86-98; Ben W. Bolch and Cliff. J. Huang; Multivarious Statistical Methods for Business and Economics (New Jersey Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 116-168 and Van Dyke; Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 1-125.

2. See J. Philip Cooper and Gary A. Curtis; Econometric Software Package (Chicago, Illinois, University of Chicago Press, 1976). pp. 42-86

3. The first differences are defined as :

$$Y_t - Y_{t-1} \text{ and } X_t - X_{t-1}$$

For a detailed discussion, see G. S. Maddala; Econometrics (New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1977), p. 92.

4. W. W. Rostow; The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963); A. F. K. Organski; The Stages of Political Development (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1965) and G. Lovell Field; Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968).

5. Ibid.

6. J. E. Spero; The Politics of International Economic Relations (New York. St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 10-14.

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GENERAL CONCLUSION

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A: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS IN THE DEVELOPING STATES

We argued above that the dominant paradigms (the "power paradigm" and "international systems analysis") of international relations have tended to overlook the importance of the developing state in international relations (and as such have overlooked the importance of the national economic component of these states) and have tended to adopt a mechanistic view of international interaction based either on each actor's immutable "search for power" or on the system's impersonal "needs" and its "essential rules". Many foreign policy objectives, however, are formulated to fulfil primarily internal social and economic needs and to satisfy specific pressure groups or domestic forces. Thus a national actor bargains for a special tariff agreement to benefit one of its industries, and intervenes diplomatically or even militarily ro protect one of its enterprises abroad. Thus, an actor's geographic location and topographical features[1] are very important variables in the definition of the "economic development and foreign policy" linkage, because they are the least changing (especially in the developing states) and that is inspite of scientific-technological advances. This is because:

> While modern technology can alter the political and economic significance of geographic characteristics, many of these characteristics still influence policies by providing opportunities or by placing limitations on what is feasible in both domestic and foreign policy programs. A country's size, population, distribution of natural resources, climate, and topography will have an important bearing on its socio-economic development needs vis-à-vis other nations, and access to other areas of the world. These conditions also have the greatest relevance to military defence policies. Topographical features create avenues for invasion and suggest the best lines of defense; economic characteristics and distribution of natural resources determine a nation's self-reliance or dependency on others in war time as well as during peace; and climate imposes restrictions on the types of warfare that can be conducted in a particular area or the kinds of agricultural products that can be grown[2].

Though this does not mean that different policy-makers interpret the significance of these geographical-topographical determinants in the same way, or adopt the same means to promote foreign policy objectives, a policy-maker

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is forced to relate his country's international behaviour to its immediate and potential capabilities[3] (e.g. military forces, transportation facilities, diplomatic personnel). However, foreign policy objectives that demand capabilities beyond the actor's potential (e.g. the developing states' demand for an alteration in systemic or subsystemic structure in the so-called New International Order) are not altogether dropped but are still adhered to, at least symbolically.

All these foreign policy determinants are relatively more easy to identify and measure than other variables of the "national component" such as the influence of the "national historical experience" or of domestic public opinion. To take the historical variable first, a common variable among developing states is their colonial "inheritance situation"[4]. This colonial situation has imposed a very special type of variable in the "national component" which explains not only the developing states' past reaction as "dependent peoples" but also conditions their post-independence behaviour. This is because colonialism implied not only political subjugation or economic expliotation, but also cultural degradation and psychological humiliation[5]. Nkrumah has expressed these multi-faceted effects of the "colonial relationship" very explicitly:

> The stage opens with the appearance of "missionaries" and anthropologists, traders and concessionaires, and administrators. WHile the "missionaries" with "christianity" perverted and implore the colonial subject to lay up "his treasures in Heaven where neither moth nor rust doth currupt", the traders and concessionaires and administrators acquire his mineral and land resources, destroy his arts, crafts and home industries[6].

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This explains why:

> the socio-economic effects of colonialism are more insidious than the political and psychological. This is because they go deep into the minds of the people and therefore take longer to eradicate. The Europeans relegated us to the position of inferiors in every aspect of our every day life. Many of our people came to accept the view that we are an inferior people[7].

Because of the deep-rooted influence of this variable, Nkrumah, through his theory of "New Emerging Forces" insisted that the basic task of the developing state's foreign policy is to fight the "forces of domination".

Diplomatic historians and students of international relations point to another variable in the "national component" when they quote examples about the influence of organizational values, needs and traditions (e.g. military organizations, foreign embassies or offices, intelligence services) on foreign policies. A notorious historical example showing the influence of lower grade personnel on the formal policy-making authority which led to a major conflict is the case:

> in 1914 when German military and diplomatic officials took steps to goad Austria into war against Serbia, and deliberately kept the Kaiser uniformed of their own activities as well as of several British diplomatic moves aimed at reducing tensions and preserving peace[8].

The values of these bureaucrats and civil servants are bound to influence the formal policy-making process if only through their interpretation of other actors' "messages" or through their organizational sources of information and briefing. For instance:

> the American State Department in any one day receives about 1.300 cables from American diplomatic and consular officials abroad providing information, requesting directions, or seeking permission to make certain decisions in the field. But of the large number of communications the Secretary of State will read only 20 to 30 - about 2 percent of the total. The State Department also sends out approximately 1000 cables daily, many of which elucidate objectives and provide directions on policies designed to implement them, of these the Secretary of State may see only six, while the President will have only one or two of the most important communications referred to his office[9].

Though these are routine and non-vital happenings, a decision made on a misleading basis can lead to an international crisis, or a major foreign policy failure. Since top policy-makers are generally concerned with suggesting the general objectives and not with their specifics, values and traditions of lower policy-making organizations and officials will continue to influence policy. As Frankel's analysis of <u>The making of Foreign Policy</u> stated:

> The higher the position of the decision-maker, the more remote he is from the original sources of information. Compression of information invariably involves the omission of subtler points and simplification and the further it proceeds the more does it involve separation from the operational environment and the possibility of its complete misinterpretation[10].

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And the study substantiates its proposition by giving the example of:

> President Eisenhower... (who) refused to become acquainted with news directly and dispensed even with the one-page summary for every twenty-four hours period which Truman had used. He relied on John Foster Dulles to draw his attention to anything important[11].

Though most developing states do not have the same degree of elaborate organizational networks, bureaucratic complexity and structural differentiation as other "developed" states, different organizations (e.g. the military)[12] still influence the policy-making process in these "praetorian" societies[13].

As for the influence of domestic public opinion on foreign policy, its importance lies in its function as " summary indice of the psycho-soocietal state of the people". But unfortunately there seems to be consensus that:

> probably no aspect of the study of international politics or foreign policy is more difficult to generalize about than the relationship of public opinion to a government's external objectives and diplomatic behaviour[14].

and consequently,

> more research on this area, particularly in non-Western countries needs to be completed before students of international relations can offer generalizations with much confidence[15].

This undeveloped stage of the study of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in the developing states is not surprising, given the vague and diffuse character of the "public opinion" concept itself. Consequently, if there is here a broad field of future research especially as far as "non-Western countries" are concerned - it is imperative that some conceptual - methodological refinements be made first. To start with, such extreme and unconfirmed general hypotheses suggesting, for instance, that: (a) "foreign policy goals and diplomatic behaviour are merely a response to domestic opinions" or (b) "public attitudes are virtually ignored as important components of a definition of the "economic

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situation - international role" linkage in the developing state, should be discarded - at least at the beginning. Empirical examples do not confirm either absolutely and/or on all occasions. Indeed, some government officials have claimed frankly that their decisions could not be influenced by "fickle public sttitudes", but there are also examples where "officials yielded to public pressures despite their own preferred policies"[16]. The second refinement is that the simple direct correlation between public opinion and foreign policy has to be qualified by breaking down the general "public opinion" concept into its constitutive parts and by distinquishing between: (a) who is expressing opinions concerning (b) what issues in (c) which situations[17]. This is because various studies concluded their analyses of public attitudes by the proposition that:

> the vast majority of population - even in highly literate societies - is unknowledgeable, uninterested and apathetic with regard to most issues of world affairs:
>
> The sustained efforts made by the government, the foundations, the universities and some private individuals to educate the public in foreign affairs have not been successful[18].

This is why scholars of public opinion and foreign policy divide the people-for purposes of analysis - into a small "attentive" minority (ranging from 1 percent to 15 percent in "Western" actors) which is closely correlated with higher education, urban domicile, higher income, male sex..., [19] and the "mass public or inattentive" majority (about 70 percent or more of the population) which "can be characterized on most issues as apathetic, uninformed and non-expressive". In certain circumstances, however, these people "can display considerable interest in some issue areas and, if properly mobilized, can express great hostility or loyalty to foreign relations or their political leaders"[20]. Because most of the empirical findings are - as we have indicated above - based on research done in "Western" countries (especially in the USA) they cannot - given the existing structural and cultural differences - be easily generalized to apply to developing states. But what is called in public opinion studies the "Mood Theory"[21] (that is, the general notions, attitudes or predispositions about what is appropriate and inappropriate in foreign policy orientation and behaviour) is very applicable to our research topic. Though this "public opinion mood" can be, as Caspary said, "permissive" and provides "a blank check for foreign policy adventures", it can also be restrictive and prescribe limits within which foreign policy can be oriented and carried out. An example from "colonial wars" can clarify this point.

If we compare the termination of the French colonial war in Indo-China with its continuation in Algeria, we find that "Mendes-France was given an opportunity to find a settlement because the (French) people had become tired of the prolonged war in Indo-China (whereas) for a long time public opinion obstructed a solution of the Algerian problem even under de Gaulle's subtle leadership"[22]. Other examples could be quoted, but a proposition remains valid that while the "public opinion mood" might not prescribe exact policies or responses, it establishes limits beyond which few policy-makers would normally dare to act. As far as the "conomic development/foreign policy" linkage in the developing state is concerned, we shall see later that the choice of nonalignment as a foreign policy principle in cameroon seemed to have brought together divergent political forces within the country's domestic system. There is, however, one important point that needs to be mentioned concerning the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy; namely that this relationship is not "one-way", as some recent findings have shown[23]. In other words, policy-makers - especially in the developing states - do not only respond to public pressures but also orient these pressures and make public opinion perform a supporting function[24]. The exact influence-ratio between the policy-maker and the "people" depends on such variables as the degree of societal and political system diffierentiation[25] (e.g. mobilization versus reconciliation systems)[26], the degree of autonomy of the communication media[27], and the degree of "charisma" in the leadership authority[28]. this last factor points out the importance of a key component in the developing state's definition of the "economic development/foreign policy" linkage - the leadership's personality variable.

The "personality"[29] component constitutes an important component in our definition of the "economic situation - international role" linkage. Observers and statemen group developing states as diverse as India, Cameroon, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico... etc. into one category labelled "Third World" or developing, because the members of this category share some common attributes such as similar positions in the international system, and the similar structure of their social (sub) systems. These common sttributes are correlated with their common foreign policy orientation (non-alignment). But one does not need to be a specialist on African politics to notice the wide differences between, for instance, Guinea and Ivory Coast in their foreign policy behaviour (as distinguished from foreign policy orientation). The leader's "personality" variable - as manifested in his state's role conception[30] - is adopted in this study as a means to account for behavioural specificities within the developing states as a sub-system. Thus the treatment of the "personality" component in the definition of the "economic situation - international role" linkage in the developing state attenuates the oversimplification in lumping the developing states together as one uniform entity. Moreover, this procedure paves the way towards a typology of behavioural patterns within the Third World states. In addition to this function of the "personality" component, the treatment of its influence on the foreign policy process in the developing states seems to be justified by other - but reinforcing - premises[31].

Epistemologically, political behaviour is a human activity, and since men are the prime actors in this activity, "their personalities are important contributors to the character of their political participation"[32]. In other words, political participants are "something considerably more than can be indicated by the impersonal categories, students of politics ordinarily use to explain political behaviour - as more than ... creatures of situation, members of culture, and possessors of social characteristics..."[33]. Methodologically, the personality variable links the global systemic variable to societal determinants of foreign policy, since foreign policy makers occupy the middle position linking the international system to the national (sub) system. Thus one of the endemic methodological problems in both natural and social sciences (micro-macro linkages)[34] seem to be cared for; and this is without having to choose between "Durkheimian unwillingness to explain "social facts" psychologically" and various "reductionist failures"[35]. Operationally, the "personality" component helps us not only to avoid the reunification of the state but to account for such a widespread - but controversial - concept as the "national interest".

Our position here is the same as that of the decision-making model which explains state behaviour by the way its policy-makers perceive things[36]. Empirically, the importance of the "personality" component lies not only in the fact that other foreign policy determinants (i.e. the systemic and the national) are mediated by the policy-makers' images, attitudes, values, beliefs, doctrines and ideologies[37] but also in the characteristics of the political (sub) system of most developing states. In these states, a "charismatic[38] leader tends to play a monopolistic part in the policy-making process, with little possibility that he will be contradicted by other high officials. Hence, in these states, the relative influence of the "personality" component in foreign policy-making is accrued.

The review of literature confirms this proposition. For instance, though Choucri accepts other determinants of non-alignment (e.g. alliance formation such as, strategic location, national capability, diplomatic status), she states that "in the last analysis, however, the perceptual orientation of the national leadership may well be the most significant determinant of a state's alignment or non-alignment"[39]. This is confirmed by Shaw's analysis who qualifies foreign policy decisions in African and Asian states as "presidential decisions"[40]. Moreover, detailed analyses of many new states have emphasized this "personalized" aspect of the policy-making process, and linked it not only to the present societal characteristics of the developing states, but also to their age-old cultural traditions and religious precepts. Thus, for instance, it was found out that islamic constitutional theory emphasizes as its "sole important proposition" the personal qualifications of the ruler. Therefore, "most islamic constitutional lawyers, in speaking about political leadership, emphasized specific personal qualifications. This emphasis was closely connected throughout islamic history with military ability and prominence. There was rarely any serious discussion of the checks to be placed upon the ruler, so he came to be accepted as the law-maker, dispenser ofjustice and chief executive"[41]. If the leader combines with these personal qualities effective control over the sources of physical force (i.e. military leadership) his position is even stronger.

These factors, then help to explain why this "type of leadership has always been more important in Arab-Islamic societies than the type of political institutions" and why "a charismatic leader is more important in,

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say, Egyptian politics than the mechanisms of checks and balances that loom large in Western political practice"[42]. Precisely, the pattern of policy-making in Nasser's Egypt can be cited as a revealing example. Indeed there was a National Assembly, but it only recorded "its approval of (foreign) policies already decreed by the executive", and indeed there was a cabinet but cabinet status was not the most important criteria for collaboration in policy-making; for President Nasser continued "to make policy in consultation with a core of Free Officers closest and most loyal to him, and presently in executive positions, but not necessarily with their real participation"[43]. Moreover, President Nasser was "not constitutionally responsible to any institutional checks upon his authority"[44].

While this hypothetical positive correlation between a "personalized" policy-making process and an Arab-Islamic culture merits further testing, we must nonetheless agree that this" personalized" policy-making process is not limited to Arab-Moslem members of the Third World subsystem. This is because it was found out that International Relations in New Africa[45] follow the same pattern. As Zartman affirmed:

> In few African states does the opposition have access to national symbols or an opportunity to organise public opinion to the point where it becomes necessary for the group in power to defend itself with a particular foreign policy action. The unit of interest referred to here is purely personal. Summit meetings enhance the local prestige of the party-government leader (they may thus also enhance his value as a central symbol for nation-building). Good relations are based most firmly on personal friendships drawn from common experiences in school, politics, labour unions or exile. Rapproachement is more frequently reached in terms of this common past than in terms of national interests. If there is no common past, repproachement is contingent upon a personal meeting of the heads of state. An alliance functions when heads of state meet; when they do not - even if lesser figures do - the alliance is considered to be foundering. Bad relations are revealed through nasty comments about the head of state-not about the state itself and sometimes not even about the rest of the government[46].

Looking at the actual decision-making process we find that it:

> derives from this situation and is focused on the president and the presidency. The declarations of the president become the national ideology, consecrated into "-isms" formed on the leader's name - such as Ahidjoism, Bourgibism, Nkrumahism and Ben Bellaism. Specific, even minute decisions are made

> by the President... His anger and his ardor, his whims and his convictions become the mood of his country's policy, and his friendships and acquaintances mark its limits. When the chief is absent - he must attend conferences and take vacations - or occupied with other problems, the progress of African relations awaits his return, for there is no alternative person or institution qualified to handle them. It is therefore necessary to deal with problems seriatim, so that long-term or sustained action in one field, such as African relations is not possible and projects progress slowly. On the other hand, because of the personal nature of decisions, the roles and influence of all other groups and institutional changes are also possible. Within this pattern of relations and decisions, the roles and influences of all other groups and institutions work through the presidency and must be seen primarily as modifications of the rule of centralized personal power[47].

Nor is the pattern of a "personalized" foreign policy-making process reversed, as one might imagine, in those developing states which still apply substantially a form of the Western democratic model. Thus in the Indian multi-party political system which is supposed to check and restrain personal monopoly of the foreign policy-making process, Nehru remained supreme. As Michael Brecher remarks:

> The influence of a Foreign Ministry varies from one state to another. Nowhere does one man dominate foreign policy as does Nehru in India. Indeed, Nehru is the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world. This does not mean that he is entirely a free agent. It does mean, however that he has impressed his personality and his views with such effect that foreign policy may properly by termed a private monopoly... He is then Minister, chief policy planner and roving ambassador...[48]

An understanding of this "personalized policy-making process in the developing states throws more light on the "economic situation-international role" linkage which is the object of our investigations.

From the analysis and discussions touching upon the various aspects of this work, it should become clear that the logic of the foreign policy behaviour and orientation of the developing state stems from and leads back to the logic of its production and distribution at the national level. Furthermore, it should also become clear that although peripheral

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capitalism may, under certain circumstances, be relatively successful in accumulating capital, it cannot solve the linked problems of national disintegration, widening socio-economic gaps, relative and even absolute poverty, and the continuing penetration and distortion of national economies and societies. In short, the dependency way of framing the question of development leads one to ask not only what and in what fashion the global capitalist system disadvantages the economies of the periphery in their dealings with the centre, but why and in what fashion peripheral capitalism as a system of production and distribution, makes difficult to the point of impossibility the resolution of critical socio-economic problems that are evident everywhere in the less developed world. Put in distributional terms mentioned earlier even if host governments or domestic producers succeed in capturing larger shares of global product, there is no reason to believe that the common man will be significantly better off in terms of the state internally or externally ensuring that the benefits, opportunities and wealth are pushed against the grain of social structure, and market.

B: THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN REAL AND OFFICIAL INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPING STATE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

In Chapter Two of our study we opted to investigate (through a series of hypotheses) the proposition that because of the strong correlation between economic development and foreign policy in the developing state, its foreign policy orientation and/or behaviour at any point in time was the product of its external economic relations which in turn were a reflection of its mode and pattern of production, distribution and consumption at the national level. At the end of our investigations a few lessons have been learnt but all of them conjugate to arrive at the conclusion that the incompatibility between economic underdevelopment (and dependency) and the achievement of foreign policy objectives in the developing state, is in the ultimate analysis the cause and effect of the contradiction between the real and official interests of the state in its domestic and external transactions. This contradiction in most cases (as we observed throughout our investigations) is manifested in the hostility of the external environment towards national goals.

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Part of the explanation for the hostility of the external environment to national interests lies in the incompatibility of the nation's real interests (as distinguished from the official interests) with those of other states. A significant aspect of this conflict of goals arises essentially out of the coexistence of the rich and poor states in the contemporary world community. Such a coexistance has the potential for improving the economic and other prospects of the less-developed nations. By sharing the growing stock of accumulated scientific, technical, and organisational knowledge and skill, they can avoid a number of errors and false starts. In fact, the equivalent experience of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel were salutary. Their dependency on more advanced nations contributed positively to their economic progress.

However, unlike Cameroon they shared essentially similar socio-economic, cultural, and technological background as the advanced countries on which they relied for external resources. In addition, for them as well as for Japan, technological growth was possible because of the absence of the kind of constraints imposed today by the activities of the multinational firms. Although some multinational enterprises existed during the critical periods when these nations acquired foreign technology, their power and art of control were relatively underdeveloped. On the other hand, Taiwan and South Korea have made some progress toward self-sustained economic growth largely because of their special political relations with the United States. And most of these states were never colonies. Some states like China, North Korea, and Cuba with similar colonial histories and socio-economic background as Cameroon have also made economic progress. But their achievements were preceded by violent socio-economic and political revolutions. Today, the general interdependence of the world community, and the desire and ability of the powerful states to control the domestic activities of the weak ones make it difficult for small states like Cameroon to achieve their national objectives.

In general, Cameroon's real interests contradict those of the advanced states. In particular, however, they strongly contradict those of the advanced capitalist states with whom the nation has been historically closely associated. For example, unless the rules and regulations governing the international exchange of goods and services are revamped, and

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based on equality and need, the international environment will remain benign to the interests of the wealthy nations and hostile to those of the poor ones. The international economic system makes no provision and embodies no machinery for tackling the problems of economic development on a global scale. While it is based on the needs and ideas of the advanced nations and favours them, it causes fundamental disruptions in the activities of the poor countries which cannot be remedied by mere reforms. It does not attempt to grapple with their difficulties and problems. In any case, it is grossly inadequate for that purpose. The tendency is to think of the amelioration of the conditions of the poor states in terms of some marginal reforms in the nature of the system rather than a thorough overhaul of the whole of it. Where the latter attitude is expressed in the advanced countries it remains very low on the list of priorities.

The chances of restructuring the system are, however, severely limited. It is precisely what has assured the developed states the disproportionate share of the world's riches which they acquire. It has benefited especially but not exclusively the capitalist industrial economies. In spite of the occasional breakdowns of the monetary exchange mechanism, the system has increased commerce and made it more serviceable to the growth of the industrialized countries. It has ameliorated liquidity crises. Today, the adverse effects of economic instability in one advanced state or the other are much better controlled than before. In short, the contemporary international economic paradigm has maximized the benefits which the advanced countries derive from the external environment. Therefore, the latter have an interest in maintaining its fundamental features.

In another respect, the gap between the rich and poor states causes disparities in their perception of the crucial economic problems of the world. The developed nations bring the view point of developed economy, while the poor ones bring the perspective of an underdeveloped economy, to bear on the allocation of the world's resources. As a result of the discrepancy in their power, however, it is the men with the viewpoint of the developed economy who manage and control the mechanism for such resource allocation. The most significant problems for them are those which they are faced with daily; these are problems affecting industrialized economies. They are those which their experience and training prepare them best for; and so they tend to see

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the difficulties of the underdeveloped countries in terms of such familiar problems. This introduces distortions into the types of solution they propose for overcoming underdevelopment.

In addition, since an increase in the share of the external resources which accrue to the poor states is not high on the list of priorities within the international economic system, domestic pressures in the industrialized nations can more easily temper with decisions about them than is the case for similar policies of interest to the advanced economies. Discrimination against the goods and services of the poor states is easily established and widened, while among the developed countries equivalent actions are eschewed and, if practiced, are confined to innocuous economic transactions. By and large, although it is accepted that external constraints against the economic progress of the less developed nations is detrimental to the interest of the wealthier ones, the effect is usually viewed as long-term and its significance marginal. Consequently, the relationship is hardly explored in detail; and worse still, no urgency is attached to the application of remedial action. Under the circumstances the developing states' economic interests cannot easily be accomplished.

Again, the high rate of technological advance in the industrialized countries frequently and rapidly renders the skills, processes, and products of the poor states obsolete. Rich nations have increasingly substituted synthetics for natural products imported from poor states, partly because they wish to minimize the use of imported raw materials and partly as a result of the shift towards services and partly as a result of the shift towards services and products with low primary import content. The experiences of the producers of sisal and rubber in the last decade together with the possibility of synthetic cocoa, coffee and tea, indicate how the developing state suffers and is likely to continue to suffer from technological advances in the advanced nations. Their protectionist policies in agriculture also hamper the ability of the new states to trade, industrialize, and diversify their products.

These unsalutary consequences of the co-existence of the rich and poor states stem in part from the desire of the former to insulate themselves from the adverse effects of changes in the world community, even at the cost

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of some reduction in the benefits derived from international specialization and without any compensations for the negative impact of their actions on the progress of the Third World nations. It testifies to the fact that although there has been an increase in the interdependence of states, there has not been a corresponding increase in internationlist outlook on the part of the advanced countries. Nationalism seems to be growing more than internationalism in the developed states, causing them to emphasize national interests far and above any worldwide concern. For example, their restriction of the export of capital and skills on grounds of national interest or national prejudice hampers the economic growth of the poor states which would have resulted from their participation in the fortunes of the rich ones. Their relatively high market for professional and other skills tends to distort income distributions in the poor nations, and to lead their loss of skilled manpower through the phenomenon known as the brain drain. Both effects impede economic development. The international activities of a state are motivated primarily by the domestic requirements of its population. Therefore, its external economic activities must be and are usually largely, dictated by the economic wishes of its members especially but not sölely in states with market economies. Consequently, it is impossible to expect the advanced countries to assist the poor ones to the degree required while still allowing them a measure of political independence. A very large portion of foreign goods must inevitably be utilized for projects geared towards infrastructural transformation which will not yield any short run economic benefit to the foreign donor. And citizens are usually reluctant to wait for the long-term profits unless their government can manipulate its counterpart in the receipient state in such a way as to insure that the profits eventually materialize. This imposes severe constraints on the independence of the poor recipient state.

Even when this manipulation is possible, it is still not certain that sufficient assistance will be extended. As far as the Western capitalist countries are concerned, African states constitute a potential rather than present area of meaningful economic activities. They are only peripheral to their interests, the core remains the industrialized countries of the West. Attention devoted elsewhere is only secondary, such that the slightest conflict of interest between the core and the periphery would lead to the jettisoning of those of the latter. Similarly, African states are

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peripheral to the Soviet economy and suffer comparable disadvantages. In any case, advanced Eastern countries, with the increasing exception of China, have been unable or unwilling to give substantial assistance towards the growth of African economies.

Finally, the finite nature of world resources imposes a limit on who gets what, when, and how. Even when there is an agreement to share the resources there is a limit to the possibilities of sharing. This causes conflict among states. Today such conflicts are more prevalent than during the earlier historical periods when much of Africa and Asia was left outside the mainstream of the world's technological and economic and advancement. A development ethos has spread to all corners of the globe encouraged by the successes of the advanced countries in raising their standards of living. Practically all countries now wish to use external resources for this purpose. As a result, relative to the past, each state's share is reduced. Natural resources are also scarcer today because of their depletion over the years by those advanced nations whose industrial history spreads over a relatively longer period of time. In general, the earlier and more productive a state's output of industrial goods, the higher is the rate of exhaustion of its domestic riches. As a pracaution against the total liquidation of their own wealth the advanced states stock-pile external raw materials in order to conserve their own and assure uninterrupted supply in the event of sudden irregularities in their external market. Thus what is available for allocation to other states diminishes by the amount stock-pile.

The general contradiction in the trade policies of the advanced and developing states is illustrated by the UNCTAD conferences at which the advanced countries fight very hard to perpetuate the pattern of international economic relations, which maximizes their trade but frustrates that of the poor states. For example, their trade policies acted against the interest of developing state to develop primary products for export or to transform the pattern of export. Consequently, external market conditions have had a negative impact on the nation's external activities. As we saw above the nature of the Cameroon trade was not very different from that of other underdeveloped countries. Agricultural products constituted the major part of the exports. In their raw and semi-processed forms agricultural products accounted for about 70 percent of the exports. Cotton, coffee, cocoa, and oil were the leading export commodities.

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However, it is specifically in those commodities where its share of the world output was fairly significant that the country suffered from organizational problems and/or synthetics were adequate substitutes. The country's ability to influence the prices of its major exports was therefore, very limited. In addition, the exports sold through overseas brokers or by auction; or through foreign-controlled distribution networks, or through the marketing agencies of the advanced countries. In none of these cases did the country have any say whatever about the price structure of the resulting manufacture at any time from the first step in their manufacture to the time that consumer prices were attached to them. The government's efforts to influence export marketing stratefy or the prices of the manufactured goods therefore, only had a very limited success. The potential was further lowered by the shortage of competent manpower or marketing know-how. Consequently, the pruchasing power of its exports started declining.

The advanced countries subsidize the production and export of primary products in which they cannot compete effectively in the international market because of domestic political pressure. The United States not only protects its weak agricultural commodity but promotes its expansion and consequently hampers the growth in the export of more efficient producers in the underdeveloped countries. The Soviet insistence on barter trade creates a situation in which African primary products eventually find their way into the international market to compete with those of the country of origin. Under these circumstances the export potential of a developing country could not be maximized.

Manufacturing in Cameroon emphasize the processing of agricultural products for export. Some metal manufactures, petroleum, paper, plastics, cement, footwear, meat products, simple pharmaceuticals, and clothing were also produced. But most of these were exported. But most of these were exported to underdeveloped countries. These included Gabon, Chad, Congo, C.A.R and Guinea. Only an insignificant amount of the total manufactured products was sold to the advanced states. Apart from the processing of raw materials for export, Cameroons manufactures were meant to provide substitutes for imported products. The cost of achieving this was usually high and consequently the products could not compete effectively in the world market unless they were subsidized. Usually, however, attempts to institute subsidies designed to promote the export of manufactured goods from the poor states were frowned upon by the advanced countries. But such subsidies and the resultant increase in export could never be the most economical and rational way of developing the economies of the poor states, and consequently the world economy at large.

At the same time high effective tariffs protected the light competition some of the Third World states could mount. The shift in the advanced countries from light to heavy industries converted the former into the weaker sector of the manufacturing enterprise. The need for protecting them from liquidation arises. Those who benefit from their continued existence put pressures for this purpose. Such protectionism reduced the revenues and impeded the growth of those poor states for whom light industry constituted the most critical sector of manufacturing, and who were more efficient in such manufactures. In fact, it was not from oversight that the Kennedy Round for the liberation of trade did not include manufactures that were labour or raw materials intensive; and these were important for the new nations. Where, for example in UNCTAD II, preferences were given for the manufactures of these countries, accompanying safeguards were such that stringent barriers effectively limited their export.

As far as foreign aid is concerned, the advanced countries also pursued interests divergent from those of Third World countries. The type of capital aid which was fully useful for development were grants. Unlike export earnings, most grants went fully and directly into capital formation and other activities in the public sector rather than through private hands. And, unlike loans, they did not carry the burden of repayment, or incur interest charges. However, the percentage of total aid that came in the form of grants was declining and that of loans increasing.

The poor countries lack the power to pry out funds from the rich states. They are geographically, socially, and politically so distant from the ruling elites of these wealthy nations that they have no power to elicit concessions from them. This is reinforced by the fact that foreign aid programme have become unpopular in the donor states after reaching their heights.

Similarly, as a result of the intense ideological, political, and economic struggle stemming from the Cold War the importance of external aid

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for economic development has decreased and its role in the political manipulation of poor states by rich ones relatively increased. Some governmental aid, in fact, obstructs economic progress because it supports feudal conservative, or corrupt regimes which are unwilling to carry out the social and political reforms necessary for economic advancement. Apart from the deliberate attapt in some cases to use aid as a prop for client governments, part of the reason for this situation is that the aid policies of the advanced capitalist states tend to focus on economic activities and to neglect social reforms which are crucial for their success. More important still is the obvious ruthlessness of the advanced donor countries against Third World nations desirous of asserting their interests against those of their mentors. Thus in 1958 France sought to cripple the young Guinean nation. Belgain attempts to dismember Zaire during the period 1960 to 1963 were in response to Lumumba's implacability against Belgain exploitation of the country.

Consequently, the demands of the new nations for more useful aid can easily be ignored. The available evidence indicates that the advanced states prefer to prop up their client governments in the poor countries rather than supply the massive amount of economic resources capable of promoting economic growth. The volume of foreign aid has therefore been declining.

The declining trend is reflected in the lower proportion of the national income of the donors which is given as aid, the decline in the real value as a result of inflation, the lower proportion of grants. Since 1961, such aid has not increased at all, despite the rising standard of living of the wealthy nations. It has not even increased to keep pace with the rising cost of the development goods which they sell to the new states or to offset the fall in the prices of the exports of the latter. For example, the total amount of external capital aid which cameroon received in 1965 was less than the amount by which its cocoa and coffee earnings were depreciated by the fall in its world market prices[49]. The aid could not, therefore, make up for the reduction in the country's total purchasing power caused by the fall in the price of just one of its major exports. Africa's share of total aid fell from 35 percent in 1960 to about 27 percent in 1970 and 23 percent in 1975[50]. On the other hand, it is estimated that between 1960 and 1975, the net flow of investment income out of the continent more than trippled from 12.6 percent of net official inflow to about 42 percent.

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The economic impact of aid is also reduced by its being tied to the pruchase of goods from the donor country instead of from the cheapest or most efficient sources. It has been estimated that as a result of trying, the true or grant value of aid to developing states during the period 1960 to 1982 was about half of the actual commitments. In addition, it comes much later than expected and not always in the form wanted. Finally, the burden of debt servicing resulting from the receipt of foreign loans is becoming increasingly unbearable for the Third World nations. Today, private investment and governmental aid create greater problems than when many of the developed countries were industrializing. Now almost all long-term private capital takes the form of direct equity at 15 percent to 25 percent pre-local tax, 10 percent to 15 percent post-local tax; defaults on loans, (whether private or official) adversely affects the balance of payments of the poor states as well as the level of reinvestment in them. Thus, for example, the outstanding external public debt of ninety-seven poor states rose from 270 billion in 1965 to 5273 billion francs CFA in 1985[51]. The estimated service payments on external public debt outstanding increased by 11 percent over the period 1961-1967 from 151.2 billion francs CFA to 323.4 billion francs CFA and rose by another 9.1 billion during the first half 1978 to a total of 332.5 billion[52]. During the same period estimated payments of interests and amortization increased by about 74 percent to slightly more than 28 billion francs CFA in 9168. Of these ninety-seven countries, thirty-seven are African and their external indebtedness more than doubled from 23.1 billion francs CFA in 1960 to 56.28 billion at the end of 1967, declining in the first half of 1968 to 55.65 billion, while their service moved from 1.19 billion francs CFA in 1961 to 3.7 billion francs CFA in 1968[53].

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Since the payment of interest and amortization must be effected by the generation of a surplus of exports over imports, the transfer burden of debt services has been negative for most of the Third World countries because of their worsening terms of trade. This loss of funds from debt servicing is the consequence of serveral characteristics of foreign aid programmes. In the first place the accelerated growth generated by a loan under certain conditions can be less than its effective cost because of aid tying, replacement in conveatible currency, and the secondary effects of servicing the loan on terms of trade. Even when the cost of the loan is less than its domestic return, the administrative mechinery may be inadequate for collecting the necessary taxes with which to service the payments. And such payments have to be remitted by stepping up exports or by saving on imports, which are hindered by the worsening terms of trade and the demands of development projects respectively. Funds are thereby drained from the country to service these loans.

The developing state and the advanced capitalist countries differ in their attitudes regarding the role of foreign investment in the national economy. The latter strongly believe that foreign private enterprise should be the engine of economic development in the developing state. Partly as a result of this belief and partly to guarantee the flow of resources required by European manufactures the metropolitan states created conditions in which foreign firms dominated the activities of their colonies. And in their relations with Third World nations they tend to insist on the critical role of foreign private investment for development. Developing governments continued this colonial heritage. They depended mostly on private foreign investment, aid from governments of the advanced capitalist states, investments from local capitalists, and taxes from import and export products for its investible surplus. Only about one-third of the total capital formation was made by the public sector. And in the private sector, foreign investment predominated.

Since profit maximization was the main motive force for the activities of the foreign private enterprises their investments tended to be concentrated in a very small sector of the economy where the incomes were high. This involved primarily economic activities such as plantation, which fed the world market with primary products, and those which catered for the high income market for imported manufactured goods. In other words foreign firms concentrated their production-oriented activities on goods which were not consumed within the country and focused their consumption-oriented endeavours on goods which were not produced in the nation. By and large, they were not interested in those local foodstuffs and goods, which were produced and consumed by the vast majority of the population, rural and urban. This pattern of economic activities contradicted the national interest in balanced growth among the different sectors of the economy and segments of the population; the expansion of income-earning opportunities in agriculture; and an increase

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in the capacity of the industrial sector to provide in part its own needs mediate and capital goods, and to process the nation's products to a more valuable stage before exportation. On the production side, only the plantation farmers, some middlemen, and cooperative societies particpated. In relation to consumer goods, the wealthiest and most prestigious segment of the population provided the major participants. Those included were the European settlers and expatriates, the African large-scale cash crop farmers, the plantation farmers and traders, a sprinkling of African politico-businessmen leaders of cooperative movements, the senior civil servants, and university teachers. Since they enjoyed a disproportionate share of the economic surplus in the country, they were financially able to participate.

The limited incomes of the middle income civil servants and semi-skilled labour force acted as significant constraints on the type and amount of the imported goods they could buy. Consisting of the unskilled labour force, the urban unemployed, and the mass of subsistence farmers, the majority of the population could only marginally afford these consumer items. The foreign firms as peripheral branches of parent enterprises whose headquarters were located in the advanced capitalist societies deemed it profitable to encourage the consumption of the goods supplied by the parent body. They were able to achieve a large scale production and sale of these goods because they operated in different areas of the world of which the modern sector of Cameroon was only an insignificant fraction. In the absence of such a global network it would have been economically disastrous for them to peddle the consumption patterns of the advanced nations in this small-sized local market. Thus the activities of the foreign enterprises contradicted the interest of Cameroon in increasing the size of its modern market system by the production and sale of goods and services developed on the basis of the taste and standard of living of the vast majority of the population, and the prices they can afford. By so doing they fruscrated any effort to narrow the gap between domestic resources use and domestic demand, or promote the nation's consumption of what it produces and production of what it consumes. Only by a radical transformation of the structures of supply and demand away from the external to the domestic environment could this distortion of economic development be arrested and the foundation laid for genuine economic growth. Although the activities of foreign firms contributed to some economic progress, the economic future of a Cameroon dominated by them could not be optimistic. However, by

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creating an economy in which the import coefficient was high and marketed output was specialized for export sales. Exports were concentrated on the production of primary output, and export sales were concentrated in a narrow rage of advanced capitalist markets where agricultural commodities were unstable. These activities prevented the growth of an organic link, rooted in an indigenous science and technology, between the pattern and growth of domestic resources use and the pattern and growth of domestic demand. Under these circumstances, foreign investment could not continue to stimulate the economy.

In the first place, one of the effects of foreign private investment is the absence of a moderate income internal market of the kind which stimulated economic growth in the rich capitalist states during their pre-industrial stage. Second, foreign manufacturing firms in the poor states opt for import substitution. By imposing high tariffs on foreign imports while failing to suppress the high income demands which created the imports, the national government creates a well-protected internal market which benefits the foreign firms. However, once this import substitution has taken place, it is no longer easy to maintain the pace of investment and consequently the foreign firms are likely to look elsewhere for further expansion.

Few investors are likely to be interested in investing in the exporting activities of a poor state like Cameroon which faces inelastic world demand for food, increasing substitution of chemical for natural fibers, and competition from protected producers in the rich nations. Similarly, investment in manufactured goods is limited by the restrictive trade policies of the rich and poor states alike. The desire of each government to protect its own producers discourages new patterns of trade in manufactured goods and perpetuates the advantages of the rich established countries over the poor ones. Substantial foreign investments tend to be made where immediate beneficial returns are possible. This is illustrated by the very low level of United States investment in black Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless valuable primary products such as strategic raw materials exist or the internal market is large enough to justify the extensive production of industrial producer goods, foreign investment is unlikely to remain sufficiently profitable to maintain the pace of economic growth. Cameroon lacked these advantages.

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In any case, the amount of foreign capital necessary to assure sustained economic growth in the poor states is much greater than what the foreign enterprises are willing to provide. In fact there has been a slackening off in the net foreign private capital inflow from the rich to the poor countries. The tendency has been for the rate of gross inflow of private capital to slow down, while the rate of outflow in the form of repatriated profits on earlier investments is maintained. This is because, soon after the foreign firms have dominated the important markets and taken advantage of the most profitable investment opportunities in a poor state, they begin to feel that the lack of developed industrial structure, the growing shortage of foreign exchange as development projects proliferate, the consequent dangers for the export of profits, and the underdeveloped nature of the factors for capitalist production would jeopardize foreign investment in the area.

The conflict of interest between the foreign private enterprises and Cameroon was reflected in the out-flow of net long-term capital immediately after independence.

As subsidiaries of giant business empires whose overall investment programme was planned at the headquarters in the advanced countries, the enterprises transferred their net surpluses to the headquarters for allocation. Similary, their expatriate employees trnsferred parts of their salary abroad. They could only be attracted into the country under these conditions. Thus substantial amounts of funds were drained out of the national economy. In addition to the outflow of funds, which were usually reflected in the balanced of payments figures, private enterprises also repatriated funds through profits on the importation of machinery; overinvoicing of other exports bought from or through affiliated companies and branches; underinvoicing of exports sold to or through affiliated companies or their branches; remittances of payments to overseas head offices for management fees, royalties, and agency fees. Certain suppliers of imports paid secret commissions to make them attractive.

Some argue that it is wrong to assess the drainage of funds in this way because it does not take account of the increase in the goods and services produced by the investments which would otherwise have been imported nor any

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increase in the national income and in domestic productivity attributable to the activities of foreign firms, nor the changes in other credit items of the balance of payments. While this criticism is justified in part, it is essentially misleading because it is based on an anology of the individual domestic debtor in relation to his creditor. International transactions must be effected by the generation of surplus of exports over imports. Consequently, the inflow of investment, together with the net increase in production from it, must be compared with the outflow of funds, together with the trade policies of the advanced countries from which the investments originate. In the light of the worsening terms of trade of the nations, the outflow of funds together with the declining inflow of foreign private capital far outweighs the beneficial effects of foreign private investment. Therefore, the interest of the latter contradicted the nation's interest in retaining most of its investible surplus.

Finally, the intersectoral inequality introduced by the role of foreign private investment in concentrating wealth in the modern sector hampered domestic savings. A recent empirical study[54] of an international sample of poor countries indicates that the rate of savings is negatively correlated with income inequality. It points out the concentration of wealth tends to increase the power of the wealthy to retain their surplus for their own consumption. It also shows that it is extremely difficult to mobilize surplus laour from the non-modern rural areas because intersectoral inequality discourages mass participation in public programmes even when such participation is indispensable to an effective effort to mobilize national surplus for development.

The interest of the foreign private firms were also incompatiable with those of the developing state over the development of technology in the country. Since in their contact with these firms developing states are only exposed to middle range ideas and information, and to routine technical processes, they tend to acquire a middle-range attitude to problems of technology. They tend to be imitative rather than innovative in their approach to technology. Consequently, they lack the creative imagination required to transform their immediate environment. Such an imitative outlook are incapable of providing the intellectual momentum and originality necessary to harness existing technological knowledge to local conditions and changes

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in them. Thus, for example, in 1974 developing states could not find a remedy for the slump in the world demand for their vital cocoa export crop following the development of synthetic substitutes for it. In addition, whatever technology was transferred into these countries always lagged behind new developments in them. These countries could, therefore, never hope to be at the frontier of world technological advance.

It is the people at the headquarters of the parent company of the foreign firms who are the first to innovate products, techniques, and equipment. The discretionary incomes of the population in the advanced states permit them to experiment with new consumption and taste pattern. Once the headquarters accept a new product it employs skillful salemanship and advertising to spread it as widely and quickly as possible through the network of enterprises extending to the periphery. This is a profitable exercise because the most significant cost of a product is that of its innovation. In the short-run, therefore, the overall cost of production is well below its sale if the product is spread widely.

Thus, the multinational concerns have an interest in forestalling and preventing new, different, and independent centers of technological innovation, which hamper the spread of their products. This explains their reluctance to invest in countries with unfavourable patent laws; and the contemporary development and widespread use of industrial espionage in inter-industrial interactions. They use their power to confine their most critical knowledge and wealth to be central office in the developed nations. This is reinforced by the policies of the governments of the latter which tend to restrict the export of certain types of technology and scarce skills on grounds of national interest or national prejudice.

As a result, the import component of Cameroonian industries has tended to be high: footwear 89 percent, paper products 92 percent, metal products 87 percent, beverages 79 percent and nonmetalic mineral products 88 percent. In some industries, however, the local component was high: food processing 85 percent, tobacco 52 percent, textiles 91 percent, wood (including furniture) 85 percent, leader 99 percent, and chemical products 77 percent, these are industries designed to process export products. All the industries have remained relatively more capital intensive than the country, resource endowments would warrant. At the same time the transfer of technology was limited to a few import export enclaves.

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Favourable attitudes for technical innovation could not therefore, be widely dis-sminated throughout the population. For example, mechanization was introduced into the rural areas to double the available services of machinery to the small farmer. Individual rights to vast areas of land were canceled to make way for their subsequent cultivation in a mechanized fashion. The exercise failed because there was hardly sufficient demand to absorb so large an increase in equipment; the technical basis for an adequate maintenance and effective utilization of the equipments was so foreign to the prospective users that the machines soon fell into disuse from lack of adequate care: and the concomitant organizational problems involved with the use of these instruments could not be solved by their users. The equipment was so divorced from the local environment that it could not make an impact.

The major cause of this enclave nature of technology lies in the fact that whatever technical skills and ideas were transferred into the country by the foreign enterprises ignored technology that existed in the traditional societies. Every society at any stage of development is characterized by a culture which consists of three inter-related dimensions, namely (a) the physical devices and techniques which individuals use to perform their tasks of making their physical and biological environment serviceable to their needs and interests. The instruments used for securing food and water, building houses, and insuring defense against diseases, wild animals, and other societies reflect the technological dimension of culture, (b) the norms, values, and ethical standards which govern the relations among the members of the society as they perform their tasks of extracting and allocating resources, as well as enjoying the benefits they derive from society. (c) And symbols which give meaning to the lives of the members and cohesion to the cosiety.

As members of the society succeed or fail at any time in the transformation of their non-human environment they learn lessons which help them to improve their technology. Such changes usually lead to modification in the relations among them and therefore in the norms or ideology guiding their interaction. There is therefore an interdependence between the bulk of the population, their activities in the very act of production, their external environment, and their ideology. Any policy for the transfer of technology that neglects these factors cannot create any organic relationship between the population and technology. It will perpetuate a daulity between the new and old forms of technology.

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The technological policies of the foreign enterprises tend to create this condition in the new states. Their origin in the transformation of the environment of the advanced capitalist societies by their population causes the new technology to be largely irrelevant to the local environment. Those who acquire it face serious problems of applying it in their jobs. The sphisticated equipment and techniques which they use during their training are either not available or not applicable in the country. On the other hand their training ignores their country's technological and other resource factors. At the same time they come up against a wall of ideological barriers to the kind of innovations which they aspire to make, and which at the frontiers of world technology are not seen as of critical importance by the local population. The newly trained expert needs a lot of very complex equipment which his country is unable or unwilling to buy; he wants a radical transformation of the attitude of the people he is working with and for, but there is no prospect of this happening.

The result is frustration and alienation, which can be the basis for either an outburst of creative energy and meaningful innovations or a hopeless resignation to unproductive labour. However, with the existence of advanced capitalist states where the labour market is relatively open such skilled manpower is attracted to these nations. These trained men and women, on whom in many cases the poor state invests large sums of money to educate, are better and more rapidly informed about the existence of opportunities to emigrate than their other compatriots. The nature of their education also provides them with a greater incentive to take the plunge. They tend to seek better pay, greater facilities for research, and professional fulfilment, together with political security in the advanced countries where the best paying and, for them, most rewarding jobs are located. The result is an intensification of the brain drain from the poor to the wealthy states. Although Cameroon did not experience this phenomenon to a disastrous extent, the logic is undeniable, and the trend in some other poor countries is unmistakable.

The tendency has been to see the solution to these problems of technology in terms of four alternatives: a massive importation and adaptation of technology to local resource factors sufficient to assure take-off into sustained economic growth; starting from the sratch scientifically as

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a means of generating the technology that will be relevant; reducing the level of technology imported in order to make it congruent with the level of technology in the country; and transforming the ideology in order to facilitate the acceptance and use of technology that is presently being imported. These alternatives, however, cannot provide the necessary solution to the problems, and do not exhaust the list of possibilities because they have not taken into sufficient account the nature of the external environment and its impact on technological innovations.

It is not realistic to expect a massive importation of technology from external sources, because of the protectionist attitudes of the advanced states and the poverty in the power of the less advanced states to pry out the requisite technology. The alternative of starting from the scratch scientifically is equally unrealistic, because a large body of scientific knowledge exists which makes it unnecessary to return to the level of knowledge of the pre-industrial age. The attempt to reduce the level of technology imported neglects the deleterious effects on technological innovation inherent in the imitative attitudes consequent on such an importation. And it is doubtful that a significant shift in attitude towards technology is possible in the absence of the practice of technology by the masses in the act of production. In the absence of any empirical evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that deeply ingrained attitudes towards technology on the part of the masses cannot be changed significantly except in the use of technology to solve their most pressing needs, the improvement of production.

The solution to these problems of technology lies in a combination of two courses of action, one political and the other scientific. Cameroon should have seeked to transfer the center of innovation from the external to the internal environment. Through the resultant control of the primary, secondary, and tertiary economic activities by the national system it would have stimulated an increased technological capacity to tranform and adapt the economy to changing demands and conditions.

But even if this policy had succeeded in eliminating Cameroon's dependency for technology on the international division of labour, the existing level of technology should have made it necessary for the nation

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to import some technology from abroad. In this regard Cameroon should have increasingly emphasized that aspect of technology which had to do with the transfer of the technical skills of foreign experts to the local population. Cameroonians should have understood foreign experts with a view to replacing them. At the same time an emphasis should have been placed on the activities in the country. It is in this context that technical assistance should have been useful. It is this aspect of foreign technological transfer which should have emphasized the transmission of technical knowledge and skills to the people directly during practice in production.

However, the only meaningful long-term solution to these problems of promoting technological innovation in Cameroon should have been a relevant scientific education which focused on the national environment; and emphasized the development of innovative attitudes and skills in the masses in order to enable them to change their immediate environment in the act of production and with means available in the society. The only way technology could accomplish this task was by aspiring to be relevant for solving local problems, and changing them in such a way as to meet the local needs. At the same time the basic knowledge of such equipment should have been applied to the creation of new and related ones which could be more easily employed by the local population, and in such a way as to transform their immediate environment for their own betterment, or failing in this, to improve on the new equipment.

The idea should have been to change foreign equipment from complicated to simple, heavy to light, big to small, wasteful to economical in the consumption of materials and low to high in efficiency with regard to the transformation of the local resources by the people for their own use. For example, the principle of the factor could have been applied to the development of a simpler equipment which farmers in the rural areas could use more cheaply, easily, and meaningfully for their work; and which they could adapt, with little difficulty, to varying situations to overcome varying obstacles in their work. And it was possible that the resultant series of adaptations based on the realities of the local environment could give rise to a more complex equipment quite different from the tractor as we know it. Until science and technological education in Cameroon dedicated themselves to these tasks what was technologically possible to invent in the country remained obscure. In that event technological attitudes remained imitative, and this rendered the country slavishly dependent on the technologically superior nations.

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The activities of the foreign firms, together with governmental policies which equated development with the expansion of the modern sector created by them contradicted the national interest in promoting socio-economic equality among Cameroonians. By introducing capitalist values, ethics, norms, morality, and institutions they transferred inequality inherent in the capitalist way of life into the nation. As a result personal wealth and its private accumulation by individuals and groups became the purpose of work and the major incentive for national development. Competition and individual consciousness rather than co-operation and social consciousness became the dominant mode of inter-human relation. In a society consisting of different socio-cultural groups forcibly amalgamated and in which national unity was extremely rudimentary, this mode of life was highly potentially destabilizing. Furthermore, it created a condition in which the citizen was more conscious of the allocative rather than the productive side of national wealth, contrary to the desire of the poor state for a maximum emphasis on production.

One of the structural consequences of this inequality was the emergence of urban-rural dichotomy in national life. A very small relatively developed modern sector co-existed with a much larger and poorer rural non-modern sector. While the former appropriated most of the national surplus, it was the latter which bore the major brunt of the high prices and the loss of benefits from the programmes that might have been undertaken in the broad public interest. Under these circumstances, the inequality in wealth, knowledge, and standard of living between the two sectors could only grow wider to the detriment of national unity and stability.

Similarly, inter-regional inequality with a high potential for social conflict was introduced into the country. The colonialists brought education, health, and other elements of the social infrastructure first and foremost to areas of gainful economic activities. This meant that those areas with the best economic prospects enjoyed the greatest social amenities. This situation contained the seeds of tribalism, regionalism, and their concomitant secession, whose effects on national unity and societal stability could be disastrous. The smallness and the great multiplicity of the nation's ethnic groups acted to defuse the explosive potential of the situation. Inequality along religious lines was also equally potentially destructive.

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Christians tended to be better educated and to have better jobs than other religious practitioners; in general they dominated activities in the modern sector.

Another consequence of the introduction of inequality into the social fabric of the nation was the racial stratification of the society. The emphasis of the colonial economy on settler agriculture meant that only a limited number of African peasants in a few suitable regions were encouraged to move into large-scale cash-crop farming. Consequently, Europeans owned all the best land that was alienated for plantation estates and large farms.

Within the African stratum itself there was elite-mass inequality. The elite consisted of the rich cash-crop farmers; top bureaucrats and university lecturers; a very small segment of people in business; the middle rank civil servants; the semi-skilled and unskilled workers, who to some degree could influence the distribution of income in their favour and the members of the marketing cooperatives. They enjoyed most of the fruits of the nation's economy. To them were opposed the overwhelming majority of the masses of the country, who remained passive, outside the realm of wealth and income distribution, and guagmired in poverty, ignorance, and disease. They lacked any organization for th effective pursuit of their economic interests. The discrepancy in the standard of living of the former and latter was also potentially dangerous for national unity.

Even the elite and mass social categories were not homogeneous. Socio-economic differentiation were daily becoming sharper and clearer, thereby intensifying the adverse effects of inequality within them. For example, an increasingly wide gulf separated the stratum of intellectuals, higher civil servants, prosperous traders and farmers, professionals, and higher military and police officers from the lower stratum of middle government employees, junior clerks, soldiers, middle-income traders and farmers. These two strata continually diverge from that consisting of poorer shopkeepers, lower income government employees, and other wage earners. As this divergence increased their contradictory interests also became clearer, posing serious dangers to national unity.

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For long the African peasantry was perceived to be largely socially undifferentiated. Today, however, there is growing evidence to who that the rudimentary pre-colonial social strata of rural Africa have either been reinforced by the activities of the foreign enterprises and other colonially inherited institutions, or replaced by new and more sharply delineated strata. Although the impact of this differentiation was not very significant on the country's diplomacy, the growing contradiction among the various strata was potentially dangerous for national unity and stability. Apart from the "kulaks" or rich farmers who usually owned more fertile land than the others, employed labour and branched into money-lending, transportation, and trading, the farming population of Cameroon is known to have included also middle-income and lower-income peasants. Some have even identified a "rural proletariat"[55]. The relationship among members of these various strata involved exploitation and was, therefore, contradictory of social cohesion.

Thus, by encouraging inequality and lack of co-operation in inter-human relations, the activities of the foreign private enterprises and the advanced capitalist states fostered verical and horizontal cleavages in the Cameroonian social fabric. They thereby created potential sources of tension and societal instability which were detrimental to national morale, confidence, and initiative, and therefore not conducive to the full mobilization of domestic resources for development. Much of the potential danger did not materialized because the mutiplicity and small size of the horizontal groups made it difficult to successfully capitalize on horizontal cleavages; the overwhelming emphasis of the national leadship was on national unity; and it made major efforts to dilute the anti-social effects of the vertical cleavages. These efforts were facilitated by the transfer of political power to the Cameroonians at the lowest rung of the vertical and racial ladder, the anti-racist policies of the Cameroonian leaders, and the absence of significant and fundamental vertical cleavages within the Cameroonian population. Fundamental to this divergence of interests was the lack of congruence between the country's economic infrastructure and its socio-political super-structure. Under normal circumstances, the former is firmly based on the latter; the two have identical interests and share similar personnel and world view which makes it possible for policies pursued by the government to be acceptable to those who own the means of production, distribution,

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and exchange. In Cameroon, however, colonialism created an situation in which political power was transferred to leaders whose background was essentially bourgeois and who were characterized by their economic power rather than by their political appeal to an essentially rural population; by their ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange and by their control of the instruments for regulating production, distribution, and exchange, namely, the apparatus of state. Their interests did coincide with those of the foreign capitalists who dominated the non-governmental sector of the economy, and the advanced capitalist states who dominated foreign trade and aid and whose interests coincided with those of the foreign capitalists.

Thus, between 1960 and 1982 Cameroon earned a reputation in the West as a model and hope of African development and moderation. It had continued the system of government inherited from the France. Left unfettered and even encouraged foreign private investment in the country, curbed racism in its domestic life, relied on appeals to the Eastern countries for the solution of the problems of racism and colonialism in Africa, and failed to join the militantly anti-West Cassablanca group of African states.

External relations of Cameroon during the period, 1960-1982 point out clearly that in general the country's interests were incompatible with those of the super-powers and other big powers who were involved in an international struggle for the division of the world into spheres of influence and domination. The polarization of the world along ideological lines reinforced and intensified this contradiction. It also transformed the nature of the domination. Since an ideology helps to delineate the "true" characteristic of development, its starting point, transitional process, and end product, control of the small by the big power must be total. This was made easier by increased spatial mobility and parallel developments in the art of manipulation and repression. The lessons of the Congo crisis from 1960 to 1965; the Gabonese crisis of 1964; the United States' intervention in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Indo-China; and the Soviet invasion of Hungary, confirm the experience in this regard.

In particular, Cameroon's interests were most directly contradicted by those of the advanced capitalist countries. Their domination of the nation's economy and the international commodity market adversely affected

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the country's economic growth, as well as its desire to ensure human equality and cooperation in national life; and imposed exorbitant costs on its assertion of national independence. Their vast interests in most of the African states constituted a serious impediments to African unity because they militated against genuine national independence, a prerequisite for continental union. And, within the context of their global struggle with the socialist countries, their worldwide interests imposed drastic constraints on the peaceful pursuit of justice in domestic and international life.

On the other hand, the country's interests were fundamentally congruent only with the interest of the other small, poor, and powerless states of the Third World. They all shared an identical interest in emancipation from domination by the big powers, from poverty, ignorance, and diseases, from the vagaries of the world market and the uncertainty of foreign assistance, and from the deleterious effects of the rapidly growing technology and the accompanying financial power of the industrial nations. In their desire to asset the right of the weak states to determine their own policies in their own interests, and to have influence in world affairs which accords with the right of all human beings, their support for the ideal of freedom and self-determination for all nations, and expression of outright opposition to colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, and rascism, they shared the ideal of respect for human dignity. In spite of their differences, which were usually limited to questions of strategy and tactics, their fundamental interests lay in an organization analogous to trade unions in domestic life designed to radically increase the benefits they derived from the international allocation of resources.

In the light of these areas of compatibility and divergence of national interests between Cameroon and the other members of the world community, a reorganization of the country's external relations was necessary in order to avoid a repetition of the frastrating experience of the first diplomatic period (1960-1982). A more successful international behaviour ought to be based on a new pattern of external relations which emphasizes (a) less resources, and less involvement with advanced powers in diplomatic life in general; (b) greater reliance on, and interaction with, the middle powers whose political interests in the world community are not as extensive as those of the major powers, and with whom therefore a clash of interests is likely to be less frequent; (c) a more extensive and intensive interaction in economic matters with the predominantly agricultural but advanced states, whose attitude towards problems of economis development are less divergent from those of Cameroon than the perspectives of the industrialized countries; (d) a greater reliance on other states for the achievement of the goals of antiracism and anticolonialism; (e) and a greater degree of coordination of activities with countries of the Third World in relations with the advanced nations. The purpose of the reorganization of national life since 1982 has been to increase Cameroon's bargaining power in the struggle to ensure its economic progress and development.

Such a reorganization of the country's external relations is likely to yield meaningful rewards if the country's economic power position improves. In fact, it may not even be possible to effect the requisite changes without this improvement in the nation's economic capability. In international politics it is essential that what is desirable be tempered by what is possible. This means that the demands of action must not be contrary to the nature of action itself: - that the desired economic task be made to be commensurate with actualized national economic poser.

C: TOWARDS THE DIPLOMACY OF DEVELOPMENT:

Indeed, from this study several lessons have been learnt: (1) That a developing nation like Cameroon, being in an economically dependent position is unable to have and effective foreign policy in terms of infuence, pressure and military capabilities. (2) That, even if she manipulates the international environment to achieve autonomy despite her dependency on the outside, this autonomy can never be translated into influence unless it is backed up by a meaningful and effective self-reliant development. (3) That in the ultimate analysis external economic dependency not only creates unequal linkages with the external environment but also erodes the national base and perpetuates underdevelopment.

In the light of the foregoing analysis, an adequate strategy for achieving the twin and minimal goals of economic development and foreign policy (in the developing state as Cameroon) should be one which effectively

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relates the needs of its members to their local physical and human environment and the means available in society for accomplishing them. It should enable them to live cooperatively, while simultaneously operating to change their surroundings for the greater welfare of the members. Critical to such a strategy should be commitment, fervor and participation by the members of the society on a basis other than a narrow ruling elite. National dependency on external resources can not be such a strategy because it can not provide any meaningful basis of fervor and commitment in developing state as Cameroon. In fact, a massive importation of external resources implies a negative impact on participation because it tends to give the impression that foreigners, their knowledge and their goods and services are better than their indigenous counterparts. Its impact on local morale and participation is therefore, negative. Therefore, no matter how a national development plan is, if it is the product of foreigners and demands the predominance of external resources, the national population cannot be psychologically or emotionally attuned to it. Consequently it will evoke little or no enthusiasm in the people and will be largely irrelevant as a significant source of change in society.

However, the above trend of argument does not exclude the use of external resources. In fact, the state of underdevelopment of Third World productive forces makes external wealth essential to facilitate take-off into introverted development. One of the central points of the above concept of introverted development is the limitation of the costs of foreign goods and services and the maximization of their benefits. This can best be achieved in the developing state only in a situation in which the external resources in question are able to generate enough momentum domestically to phase out their own use in a relatively short period of time. They do not necessarily have to conform to national policies, rather they have to justify their use in terms of their contribution towards building a national capacity to make and implement essentially national decisions. Thus an overall decline in the amount of external wealth procured by a nation is not as significant as the rate of increase in their domestic equivalent. An emphasis on their quantity may also neglect the fact that their qualitative impact may bear little relation to their size. Again, those of limited size which are useful in strategic sectors of the nation's life may have an impact out of proportion to their size.

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Considerations in this context should ensure that external goods and services are integrated into a national framework of values, structures and procedures for resource mobilization and allocation as well as into the process of formulating, implementing and reviewing national development programmes. The absence of a cohesive national framework of activities or the inadequate integration of these resources into it only increases their cost. In the first place, their use tends to increase external dependency and vulnerability to political pressures by providing no means for checking the manipulation of major decisions by a coalition of external assistance donors to carve or for counteracting the possible struggle among donors to carve out different territorial, functional and institutional spheres of influence. External resources in this case logically become an embodiment of external control irrespective of the intentions of the donor and recipient alike since the latter lacks a clear national institutional and goal framework within which these resources could be fitted to prevent the donor advertently or inadvertently influencing national activities.

Secondly, a national framework for integrating external resources should serve the purpose of weeding out inefficient and inappropriate resources. It is sometimes difficult to transfer goods and services from one socio-economic situation into another. Their uncritical importation across different cultural environments tends to cause inefficiency and waste because of the inappropriateness of some of them. When this is combined with the inability or failure of the recipient to supply the complementary resources, the transfer problem naturally is accompanied by disastrous results.

In this perspective external dependency fundamentally undermines national interests in the state's general orientation towards its external environment. A new approach to external relations is imperative in the developing states. It would be necessary therefore to articulate and rationalize foreign policy within a broader framework of national self-reliance. Thus, by incorporting foreign policy within a realistic economic development strategy, a framework could be provided for a more structured and comprehensive national participation in foreign affairs. Obviously in the light of the close inter-relationship between external conditions and domestic activities, a new approach to domestic relations is also necessary

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if the projected alteration are to yield fruit. The need to correct the adverse effects of foreign affairs on domestic policy and to promote essentially national values and objectives within and without the nation requires a new set of guidelines to domestic politics which must supersede empty and meaningless catch-slogans, if the developing states are to effectively integrate foreign policy into the overall strategy of national development.

In order to solve such domestic development problems and provide new guidelines for a more salutary pattern of external interaction than hitherto the strategy of effective self-reliance must be adopted with its emphasis on the development of national power and resources. This new general orientation towards the external environment will supplement the initial guidelines of foreign policy. The actual Third World approach to foreign affairs based on universal moral principles must be supplemented by one, which recognizes the cirtical role of power in world politics. Since the major impact of economic dependency is the weakness of national power and the consequent expliotation and humiliation of the nation, self-reliance is the most appropriate strategy for ending this oppression and humiliation. Its major function should be to focus attention primarily, but not exclusively, on domestic resources and priorities for the accomplishment of national objectives.

In essence, the emphasis of the nation in each case of external resource acquisition should therefore be placed on:

1) the integration of the resource into the overall national framework of goals, resources, traditions and procedures.
2) the coordination of the various types of foreign inputs in order to build up a national capacity to phase out their use.
3) their choice should be on the basis of a rank order of priorities.
4) there should be the harmonization of the interests of donors and that of the nation (recipient).
5) there should be the will to reject unsuitable foreign aid especially when it is initiated by the donor(s).

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6) in every negotiation of aid the macro-effects of national self-reliance must be maximized to the benefit of national power and national control of development.

7) the acquisition must be justified by the purpose of a national self-reliance programme which aims at promoting the greater well-being of the nation as a whole.

8) since this study demonstrates that economic weakness and dependency on foreign resources on the part of the developing state strengthens unequal linkages with the international system and that such linkages offer opportunities for intervention in the internal affairs of the country, one of the tactics of ensuring liberation from such stultifying economic linkages would be the emphasis in the country's foreign policy on multilateral over bilateral relations - that is a non-ideological multilateralism which is based on strict and dynamic considerations of national interest in terms of self-reliance development.

The strict implementation of the above measures should be geared in the first place towards a partial disengagement of the economy from its traditional pattern of relations with the international systems through a policy which reduces the bilateral proportion of trade, investment and monetary/technical assistance and transactions with the capitalist core, while attaining self-sufficiency in basic needs such as food, clothing, energy and defence. Secondly the application of such measures should aim at the multilateral level, at re-structuring the country's pattern of relations with the international system through "collective self-reliance". That is, through increased trade, investment, monetary/economic co-operative institutions and relations with other developing states. This is also partly achievable through deliberate fiscal, monetary and income policies that alter consumer values and consumption patterns, engender decentralization for maximum mass participation, and re-structure the existing domestic class relations. It is only on such basis that the developing state can expect to use foreign policy as an instrument of national development.

In this case, can one not safely assert that the impact of economic development upon foreign policy success or failure in the developing state is directly proportional to the extent of democracy (choice) within the state? In other words, is the extent of democratic processes within the developing state not a critical determinant of the nature and extent of the state's economic development and self-reliance which in turn determine the state's ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives? It would seem as if the relationship between economic development and democracy within the developing state as Cameroon underscores the relationship between economic development and foreign policy within that state.

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